In 1917 at East St. Louis, Illinois, a community then popularly known as the "industrial offshoot of St. Louis," the bloodiest race riot in twentieth century America took place. Nine whites and at least thirty-nine Negroes were killed. The whites were determined to maintain supremacy in a community where Negroes were a subordinate and segregated group. For more than a generation after 1917, the race riot was used as a cautionary tale to keep Negroes from altering the status quo. Not until after the Second World War did Negroes feel free to consider challenging white dominance.

In violation of state laws, in 1917 East St. Louis Negroes were excluded from restaurants, theaters and hotels, and were educated in separate schools. Both the AFL and the large industrial corporations excluded Negroes from skilled jobs. In the big factories unskilled colored employees used separate washrooms and dressing rooms, usually worked in segregated labor gangs and ate in the colored section of the lunchrooms. Most Negroes resigned themselves to accepting the status quo, and the few who agitated for racial equality were condemned by local whites who charged them with preaching discontent to the rest of the colored residents. One militant Negro, who was labeled "an aggressive political agitator," was falsely convicted of starting the 1917 race riot and sentenced to life imprisonment.¹

The background of the East St. Louis racial conflagration was laid in the migration of several thousand Negroes who arrived from the South between 1915 and 1917 to work in the factories. At the time of America's entry into World War I, Negroes constituted approximately 13,000 out of a total population estimated at 70,000. Negroes were accused of taking the jobs of the whites, and unskilled white workers charged that the plant managers had imported the Negroes in order to depress the wage scale and prevent unionization. Actually there was no evidence of widespread "importation" by East St. Louis corporations. Negroes left the south because their economic conditions were poor in comparison with the opportunities available in the job market of the North which had expanded because of the European war.

Factory laborers attempted to improve their working conditions by forming unions, but the employers refused to recognize them. In some
instances unions were crushed by the employment of Negro strikebreakers, and in other cases white union sympathizers were fired and replaced by Negro migrants. The white workers hated the Negroes because management used them as a labor reservoir, and played off one race against the other. And the insecure whites who regarded the Negroes as a threat exaggerated the size of the migration. In the weeks before the riot, the fears of the white workers were exacerbated by the local newspaper, which repeatedly published false stories about thousands of Negroes who were arriving monthly, not only to take white men's jobs, but also to commit crimes against the white population.

Negroes in East St. Louis were resented for political as well as economic reasons. In 1916-17, Negroes, who comprised about 15% of the total population, held the balance of power in closely contested elections. Forming political clubs and demanding recognition in the forms of jobs and status, they angered many citizens who were not used to Negroes exercising their constitutional rights. White politicians, when their own purposes were served, showed no reluctance in using inflammatory race prejudice. For example, several months before the riot, during the 1916 presidential campaign, East St. Louis Democratic leaders falsely accused Negroes of conspiring to "colonize" in the city in large numbers, a charge which the union organizers later modified slightly in unfurling the banner against importation.

East St. Louis Democrats, in their propaganda against the mythical colonization conspiracy, said that white Republicans illegally brought Negroes to East St. Louis from the South for the purpose of defeating Woodrow Wilson in his bid for reelection. Since the Democrats placed Illinois in the "very doubtful" column, they hoped that the attack against colonization would not only insure a large turnout of supporters at the polls, but, in addition, intimidate Negro Republicans from casting ballots. The local newspaper, which supported the Democrats, obligingly filled its columns almost daily with stories about Negro migrants who were descending upon the city to undermine the very foundations of the American democratic process by stealing an election from the people.

Thus, in the months before July 1917, an uneasy and hostile white population was stirred up by the irresponsible actions of the local newspaper, the factory managers, labor organizers and politicians. There is no evidence that the riot was premeditated, but shortly before it broke out, laboring men gathered to find ways of "getting rid of" the Negroes. Almost nightly, white gangs made unprovoked attacks upon colored men and even women. On the night of July 1, 1917, a group of whites in a Ford car shot up a Negro neighborhood, and shortly afterwards, when a Ford police car entered an unlighted Negro section, residents fired upon it. That action, which was almost certainly a case of mistaken identity, resulted in the deaths of two white law enforcement officers and triggered the holocaust the
following morning.2 At least 39 Negroes, some of whom were merely passing through the town on their way to St. Louis, paid with their lives.

Over the next three decades, the memory of that race riot was undimmed and was used to keep Negroes in line. In 1940, for example, a local Negro lawyer, testifying before an Illinois legislative committee, reported that although the state public accommodations law was still flouted in East St. Louis, Negroes contemplating civil rights suits were warned by white residents -- and even by some Negroes -- that legal action could trigger another race riot.3

Several years later, a Negro organization composed of teenagers wanted to have a picnic at a public park with white youngsters from several clubs, but the recreation agency which sponsored the groups vetoed the idea because it might start another race riot.4 When East St. Louisans debated the question of school integration in 1949, some opponents declared that the residue of prejudice from the first race riot might create a second one if the schools were desegregated. During the time that Negro youngsters were staging a sit-in at a white school, the local newspaper editorialized:5

All of the ingredients for a recurrence of the 1917 race riot are simmering now, heated by the fire of race prejudice that has kept smouldering for these many years in the darkness of suspicion and fear. All that it takes is one overt act and the flames will envelop us. That must not happen . . . . Ever since 1917, East St. Louis nursed a taboo of its own. The horrid words "race riot" have been the fetish that we have kept in the gloom of the medicine man's tent to be whispered about and never brought out into the open except when we wished to strike fear in the hearts of the people. It is time now for East St. Louis to face the facts of life and to bring this hobgoblin out into the open for all to see and talk about and understand. That is the only way we can work out a cure for the malignancy that has gnawed at our social, economic and political vitals for more than 30 years.

However, the newspaper's idea of facing the facts was to uphold the doctrine of white supremacy and blame the school sit-in on Communist sympathizers.

Fourteen years after this editorial, East St. Louis was rocked and shaken in 1963 by a series of racial demonstrations against banks, stores and even the City Hall.6 Especially because some of the methods used by the militant Negroes directly interfered with the operation of businesses and almost certainly involved violations of criminal trespass laws, many white East St. Louisans angrily charged that Negroes, rather than wanting equal rights, were actually insisting on superior rights. As usual there were predictions of another race riot, but the warning no longer struck fear
in the hearts of Negroes. Most whites were totally unaware of the grievances of Negroes, and of their growing efforts, since the school sit-in of 1949, to protest against the injustice of discrimination. Most of these efforts had been ignored, and even when concessions came they were frequently merely symbolic.

Thus the school sit-in of 1949, to which we have already referred, appeared to have resulted in a clearcut victory, but in practice this victory was emasculated by use of various devices. This sit-in, sponsored by the local branch of the NAACP, was the first time that East St. Louis Negroes used direct action to oppose race discrimination. It lasted only two days and was called off when white students engaged in a protest strike, which might, NAACP leaders feared, trigger racial violence. The Negro protest followed years of concern about the inferior equipment and facilities in their separate school system. Negroes had also complained about classroom overcrowding, which was especially acute at Lincoln High. To handle the overflow at that school, the auditorium, study hall, library and music room all were converted into classrooms. The Board of Education had agreed to build a new Negro secondary institution, but the money earmarked for the school was so inadequate that the Board late in 1948 decided to eliminate such "frills" as an auditorium, band room and other rooms for specialized activities. A Negro delegation was told that classrooms were more essential than music rooms, and that the group should be grateful for the new high school.

At the start, the Negroes' complaint was essentially against unequal facilities, not against the segregated system per se. For years the separate school system had been condoned by Negroes on the grounds that it provided many jobs for colored school teachers. Consequently the first reaction after the Board of Education's rebuff was to request a larger Negro high school and the right to send the overflow of Negro secondary students to the white high school in the city. However, the national headquarters of the NAACP strongly urged the branch not to be satisfied with a segregated educational system which would always have unequal facilities. The Association favored strict compliance with an 1874 Illinois statute outlawing segregated school systems. The local branch, encouraged by the national office, and angered by the Board of Education's undiplomatic treatment, sponsored a mass meeting that drew such an overflow crowd, that one Negro observer noted, "One would think there was a revolution in the making." A young Negro attorney suggested that a court test should be instituted and the sit-in resulted a few weeks later.

While the local branch's case was in the courts, the national headquarters of the NAACP obtained support from Illinois Rep. Charles J. Jenkins, a Negro Republican from Chicago, who proposed an amendment to the Illinois school appropriations bill which would bar state financial aid from schools practicing racial segregation. In 1949, the East St. Louis share of
these Illinois grants amounted to between $600,000 and $700,000 — some of which had already been spent in anticipation of receiving the funds. The East St. Louis NAACP attorney announced that on the basis of the Jenkins amendment an injunction would be filed to prevent the allocation of state educational funds for East St. Louis. He also said that he intended to prove the existence of racial segregation by attempting to register Negro students at neighborhood schools when they opened for the September 1949 term.

Almost immediately the local School Board appointed a blue-ribbon citizens' committee to work out an agreement with NAACP leaders. In exchange for the NAACP pledge not to enroll Negro children in white schools when they opened that fall, the School Board promised to help educate the community to accept integration peacefully. While no date for integration was announced, Negroes understood that in the following semester some of their youngsters would leave their old schools, and that desegregation would proceed as rapidly as practicable. Since Lincoln High had started the branch's protest, references to that institution were featured prominently in the board's agreement. Lincoln was to have its auditorium and band room, and its students were to be offered the same subjects as taught at the white East St. Louis Senior High and in classes of comparable size.

Despite this agreement, the Board of Education used various means to maintain racial separation and inequalities in the elementary and secondary institutions. In racially mixed residential areas, the Board established a "boundary of convenience" for white children, providing them until about 1960 with bus transportation to circumvent the neighborhood school concept. For most Negro youngsters the boundary lines were rigidly enforced, and during this period when school funds were expended to transport whites away from neighborhood schools, some Negroes were required to walk as much as two miles to their neighborhood schools. Negro parents making "a big enough fuss" or having political connections could, if willing to pay transportation costs, send their children to distant integrated institutions.

The handling of graduates of Alta Sita elementary school illustrates the School Board's continued practice of assigning students on a racial basis. In 1950 Alta Sita had been integrated despite rumors that the building would be burned down if Negroes entered. From 1950 to 1963 the Board assigned white students graduating from this school to the almost exclusively white Clark Junior High School, from which they went on to the predominantly white East St. Louis Senior High. Negro graduates of Alta Sita, on the other hand, were routinely assigned first to all-Negro Hughes-Quinn Junior High and then to all-Negro Lincoln High School. Because Lincoln's boundary lines were vague and unpublicized, some Negroes attended that institution although their home addresses actually entitled them to enrollment at East St. Louis Senior High. White students living nearer to Lincoln than to East St. Louis Senior High attended the latter institution even, as in one recorded instance, when an application was made.
Regardless of the School Board's agreement, inequalities continued between the all-Negro Lincoln and the predominantly white East St. Louis Senior High in such important matters as class size, equipment and curriculum. For example, among the vocational courses taught at East St. Louis Senior High but omitted at Lincoln were auto mechanics, electricity and machine calculations. Not until 1962-63 were Lincoln students, at their own financial expense, routinely permitted a transfer to East St. Louis High if the courses they wanted were unavailable at Lincoln.

The education case has been described in detail because it shows that even at a time when the Negroes constituted 40 to 45% of the city's population, the white citizens controlled social institutions primarily for their own benefit. During the 1950's the NAACP sent delegations to protest against educational inequality, but they were ignored. Paradoxically, the Negro bloc vote, controlled by a white-dominated political structure, was largely responsible for maintaining the Board in office.

Since Negro mass action had been so effective in accelerating the original integration drive, why wasn't this strategy used to pressure the School Board into equalizing the school system? In the first place, because token desegregation had occurred and some Negroes were attending schools with whites, the symbolic victory clouded the issues and blunted any mass protest. Secondly, some of the anger of Negroes (especially those in the middle classes) was drained off because through contact with influential channels, they could withdraw their children from inferior segregated neighborhood schools and send them to integrated institutions. Thirdly, the local NAACP branch was not geared for mass direct action and used it only in a crisis situation. Only about fifteen persons regularly attended monthly meetings, and these people lacked the time and enormous energy required to mobilize the Negro masses in another school fight. Thus, despite the dramatic Negro school integration victory of 1949-50, East St. Louis whites still continued to run the schools essentially for their own interests.

Negro protest and direct action methods had won little in the schools, but the use of other techniques against economic discrimination during the 1950's obtained even less. Negroes signed petition after petition, sent countless delegations to City Council and held innumerable meetings to improve their status. But nobody paid much attention. Most stores which Negroes patronized in downtown East St. Louis still used only white salesmen, corporations continued to bar Negroes from white collar jobs, most craft unions maintained their "white only" policies and even the common laborers local practiced race exclusion.

In 1954 an NAACP delegation addressed the City Council, requesting the passage of a local Fair Employment Practices Ordinance. The NAACP petition was merely referred to the Mayor's Human Relations Commission. This Commission had been formed in 1950 to prevent racial conflicts, but meetings were held sporadically and little was accomplished.
except the integration of a theater and a hotel. The Commission ignored the 1954 request for an FEPC, and five years later, Negroes were still unsuccessfully seeking the ordinance in conferences with the City Council.

During the 1950's the East St. Louis City Council was also asked to help end job discrimination in the public utilities by threatening these corporations with revocation of franchises. In the middle of the decade, not a single Negro was employed by the City Bus Lines, the Southwestern Bell Telephone Company or the Illinois Power Company. Although three Negroes were working at Union Electric and seventeen at the East St. Louis and Interurban Water Company, all held "scrub bucket and cuspidor jobs."

One Negro group, the City-Wide Women's Civic Club, sponsored a rally "to heat this town so hot the City Council will have to take action," but not a single white politician attended. A Negro speaker bitterly reminded the audience that only before elections did the white politicians go into Negro neighborhoods to proclaim their devotion for the colored race. In 1956, after years of negotiating with the bus company, the fruits of victory consisted of two openings for Negro bus drivers. The long negotiations with the Southwestern Bell Telephone Company finally produced two white collar positions for Negroes in 1958.

Even more galling was the fact that almost no Negroes were employed in skilled jobs on a federally financed multi-million dollar public housing project begun in 1958 in the Negro neighborhood. When, in the early part of the year, a delegation asked the City Council to help Negroes obtain jobs at the development, the Negroes were told to join unions so that building contractors would hire them. After the delegation described the extent of discrimination in the building trades unions, the councilmen "promised to investigate." Over the course of the next two years the NAACP held meetings with the East St. Louis Housing Authority, the Greater East St. Louis Central Labor Council and the Federal Committee on Government Contracts -- all without avail.

In only one area had Negro protest activity obtained any significant success during the late 1950's and that was in public accommodations. During 1959 and the first half of 1960 a persistent CORE chapter, through "negotiation and a little talking," had succeeded in reducing the number of restaurants which violated the state public accommodations law from 58 to a hard core of 17.

Because petitions, negotiations, political pressure and mass rallies had not proven very effective as strategies, some Negroes counselled boycotts and picketing, but they were ignored largely because there seemed to be a basic desire to preserve "good public relations" with influential whites. However, in 1960 the Southern lunch counter sit-ins served as a stimulus to East St. Louis Negroes, increasingly impatient with their deteriorated
economic position and the continued refusal of a group of restaurants to obey a law that had been on the statute books since 1885.

The first use of direct action in 1960 came during the summer, and in view of what was happening in the South, not surprisingly involved restaurant discrimination. Since the state's attorney and the courts had shown little interest in enforcing the Illinois public accommodations law, East St. Louis CORE's first step was to picket the county courthouse, seeking to pressure judges to appoint a special prosecuting attorney. Although the judges were not sympathetic, the Negroes were drawing attention to the fact that many restaurants were violating the law. CORE's tactics then shifted to sit-in demonstrations, and after one of these resulted in the arrest of Negroes for "disturbing the peace," an angry Negro leadership persuaded the mayor of East St. Louis to intervene on behalf of Negro rights. 29

After CORE had desegregated the eating places, the chapter turned to bowling alleys, and here the same pattern of events emerged: the reluctance of public officials to do anything about discriminatory proprietors, the mass picketing of city hall to embarrass the mayor and city council, and finally the mayor's ultimatum in the summer of 1961: integration or revocation of business licenses. The local newspaper fully supported his position: "This is the plain requirement of the law. It is also a matter of justice. It is unfair for white people to criticize the conduct of Negroes, on the one hand, and on the other to deny them the facilities for normal recreation."

Meanwhile, the NAACP had picketed the construction site of the public housing project. At that time NAACP officials counted only 33 Negro workmen out of more than 1,000 employees working on the project, and the picketing began. After two weeks of demonstrations, housing authority officials were anxious for a settlement. The NAACP protest ended after the Negro labor force on the project had almost doubled. 30

Negroes had now won the right to use places of public accommodation and recreation, and had secured a modest but significant victory on the employment front. But as far as the daily lives of most Negro East St. Louisians was concerned, it soon became painfully evident that the victory had a hollow ring. A Southern Illinois University survey indicated that in 1963 one-third of the Negroes in the city's labor force were unemployed as contrasted to ten percent of the whites. The median household income of the Negroes was slightly less than half of the whites': approximately $5,125 to $2,500. 31 To some extent the economic plight was due to automation and the exodus of several large industrial corporations, but labor union discrimination was only too evident.

Negro leaders adopted a moderate approach at first. When Illinois had passed a state FEPC law in 1961, one NAACP leader noted: "We are told not to push but to wait for orderly change. We wait and the welfare rolls grow bigger. The Fair Employment Practices Commission must
achieve success on a voluntary basis. The NAACP complained that skilled Negroes were discouraged from settling in East St. Louis: "We want to attract the skilled Negro worker to create a healthy atmosphere. Instead we attract the unskilled workers who become wards of the community."

East St. Louisans were reminded that only the failure of negotiation had spawned the direct action approach such as the NAACP picketing and the sit-ins of CORE. However, union officials replied that since they had not imposed race barriers against Negroes, the Illinois FEPC law would have no effect on the labor organizations.

Nor were the Negroes successful in 1962 negotiations with the local corporations such as the public utilities and the banks. Efforts to obtain white collar positions in ten companies resulted in six jobs. For example, the Illinois Power Company until 1962 had never employed a Negro in more than a half century of operation. After a year of negotiation, two Negroes were hired. But when one of these left to accept a better position elsewhere, a white person was employed as the replacement.

Just as the Southern students' lunch counter sit-ins influenced East St. Louis civil rights activity, so in 1963 Birmingham became the inspiration. In the spring of 1963 an East St. Louis Negro weekly observed that "the surge of civil rights is mighty contagious. It's going to spread unless justice is given. East St. Louis whites should learn something from what is taking place in Birmingham."

About this time the East St. Louis civil rights movement received help from an influential Negro politician who attacked the dominant political structure with which he had previously been allied. Frustrated because the organization refused to support his candidacy for a judicial post, he ran as an independent in the spring municipal election. After his defeat several followers were discharged from their city jobs, and in protest he announced a march on City Hall. In this venture he associated himself with civil rights leaders who welcomed his assistance. The march on City Hall was a mass protest against a broad range of grievances. It strengthened CORE and the NAACP, and in turn, the increased militancy of the civil rights movement brought about more Negro political power in East St. Louis.

Even before the march on City Hall, CORE had set up a picket line against the Illinois Power Company and the NAACP initiated direct action against a local beer distributing company. With renewed activity of the civil rights groups and the impending march -- all played against a backdrop of the national civil rights crisis -- the East St. Louis City administration acted to satisfy at least some of the more obvious Negro demands. In June the mayor announced that companies receiving municipal contracts would be required to hire Negroes. In early July the City Council passed an FEPC ordinance covering municipal employees as well as contractors performing work for the city. A reactivated Municipal Human Relations
Commission declared that a meeting with private employers would be scheduled and that businessmen would be asked to supply racial employment statistics as well as notices of future job openings.

Despite these concessions, or perhaps because of them, the march on City Hall was held, after being endorsed by CORE and the NAACP. A survey by the Human Relations Commission confirmed that Negroes were seriously under-represented in skilled, supervisory and white collar positions at City Hall. With unusual celerity, the mayor hired several Negro secretaries, upgraded other employees, and appointed Negroes to prestigious positions on the previously all-white Urban Renewal Advisory Committee and the Board of Police and Fire Commissioners. 37

In the wake of the march on City Hall, the NAACP and CORE embarked upon a series of racial demonstrations against stores and banks, which seemingly violated the Illinois trespass laws. The doors of a soft drink plant were blockaded, preventing drivers in loaded trucks from leaving the garage. A "buy-in" was conducted in a supermarket. Grocery carts were filled with unwanted merchandise and left in the aisles. Demonstrators made small purchases of candy in order to slow up the lines of customers in front of cash registers. The Negroes entered a bank, locked hands together, preventing bank customers from transacting business. These militant tactics led to arrests, but the political repercussions of jailing the Negroes were too great for the mayor to consider seriously. Furthermore, the demonstrations, which some whites referred to as race riots, created a build-up of tension, and there was fear that the detention of the demonstrators would result in possible violence. At one point during the demonstrations more than a hundred Illinois state troopers were ordered into East St. Louis. 38 These tactics of Negroes were obviously extreme, but they succeeded like nothing had ever done before in awakening white community leaders to the problem of job discrimination. For example, before the summer of 1963 only one Negro held a clerical job in the city's nine financial institutions. The racial demonstrations resulted in an agreement giving twenty positions to Negroes.

Thus in the nearly half century since the race riot of 1917, there has been almost a complete reversal in the dynamics of race relations in East St. Louis. Today Negroes are no longer on the defensive against an oppressive white majority, but are militantly taking the initiative. Necessity no longer demands that they adjust to the desires of racist whites, and they are aggressively working to secure their rights as citizens. In fact it is now the whites who are on the defensive. The changes that have occurred in East St. Louis since the bloody holocaust of 1917 are of course representative of the changes in race relations taking place in American society generally. Certainly the willingness of today's East St. Louis officials and businessmen to accede to many of the Negro's demands is based upon the fact that their counterparts elsewhere have been doing the same thing.
Undoubtedly another factor of importance in the East St. Louis equation has been the growing size of the Negro population -- from 15% of the city's people in 1917 to about 55% today -- and the potential power of the Negro vote that this population increase implies.

But the power of the Negro vote proved practically negligible as a lever for social change until the rise of mass action in the 1960's. Involved in this development were two major items. First there was the shift in the pattern of protest from petitioning city officials and working through the courts, to direct action in the form of boycotts, picketing and sit-ins, much of it highly dramatic, embarrassing to the city, and inconvenient to its businessmen and officials, and some of it probably illegal. Secondly, there was a new mood of militance and group solidarity. As the teen-age president of the East St. Louis NAACP Youth Council solemnly told his organization in the spring of 1963: "We should not fear the white man, we should let him know that when something happens to one of us, it affects us as a whole." This new mood among East St. Louis Negroes was of course a reflection of the new attitudes of Negroes throughout the country.

Those whites who criticized the extremism and illegality of the recent demonstrations did not realize that the more traditional approaches had failed -- that the only significant concession Negroes had gained in East St. Louis prior to 1960 was the Board of Education's agreement to desegregate the schools following the NAACP sit-in in 1949. The School Board was able to renege on the promises it made on that occasion, just because continued direct-action activity did not prove feasible. It is perhaps unfortunate, but nonetheless true, that the power coming from mass pressure of this sort is the only thing political officials ever really listened to.

Despite the anxieties of some whites who, placed on the defensive by the new Negro militancy, warned about the possibilities of violence in a city where the events of 1917 were still vividly remembered, a race riot did not occur in 1963 and is unlikely in the future. However, if racial violence were to erupt, in the context of conditions today, it is probably more likely to come from Negroes than from whites. As the distinguished Swedish social scientist and authority on American race relations, Gunnar Myrdal, said in a recent address: "Mass Negro violence will only come... when it appears to be clear that none of the rational alternatives -- demonstrations or court decisions or politics -- are making basic enough changes in the way most Negroes live." Thus, it is precisely the nonviolent demonstrations which prevent the possibility of race riots. They inconvenience and embarrass white citizens, they may at times be "illegal," but they compel the white decision-makers to redress at least some grievances of Negroes and therefore lessen the chance of racial violence.
Footnotes:

I am indebted to August Meier, Professor of History at Roosevelt University, for his careful reading and criticism of the original manuscript.

1 Elliott M. Rudwick, Race Riot at East St. Louis (Carbondale, 1964), 5-6, 119-132, 145-149.
2 Ibid., 7-26, 36-40, 157-173.
4 Rudwick, Race Riot, 232.
5 East St. Louis Journal, February 1, 1949.
6 Ibid., July 11, 14, 16, August 18, 1963. See also East St. Louis Monitor, July 16, August 13, 1963; East St. Louis Voice, July 18, 25, August 22, 1963; East St. Louis Crusader, July 18, August 8, 15, 1963.
8 Journal, December 1, 1940; Argus, December 17, 1948.
9 Resolution of East St. Louis NAACP, December 16, 1948.
12 Journal, February 8, July 10, 1949; Argus, July 1, 1949.
13 Argus, August 26, 1949.
14 Journal, September 3, 8, October 21, November 14, 1949; Argus, September 9, 1949; see also East St. Louis NAACP Minutes, December 20, 1949.
16 Grambs, Education, 91-97.
18 East St. Louis NAACP Minutes, April 2, May 7, 13, 1959.
20 East St. Louis Board of Education Minutes, December 10, 1953. Interviews with officials of NAACP.
Race Relations in East St. Louis

24 East St. Louis NAACP Minutes, April 13, December 9, 1959.
25 Journal, June 29, 1953; Argus, September 18, 1953.
26 Announcement from East St. Louis Cooperative Civic League, December 22, 1956. See also Journal, June 29, September 14, 1953.
29 Ibid., May 1, July 31, 1959; January 22, February 1, 18, 19, June 19, 24, 26, 29, November 7, 13, 16, 18, 1960.
30 Ibid., August 9-12, 19, 21, 26, 1960; January 6, 8, 15-17, February 17, August 6, 24, September 14, 1961.
31 Jane Schusky, Employment and Unemployment in East St. Louis (Edwardsville, 1964), x.
32 The speaker was mistaken -- the Illinois statute has enforcement powers.
33 Journal, July 26, 1961; see also February 23, 1961.
36 Crusader, April 25, May 2, June 20, July 18, 1963; Voice, May 1, 8, June 6, 13, 20, 27, July 18, 25, 1963; Journal, April 15, 16, 23, July 11, 14, 16, 1963; East St. Louis Monitor, July 16, 1963; East St. Louis NAACP Minutes, May 6, 8, 24, June 12, 1963.
37 Journal, June 9, 17, 21, 25, July 1, 3, 11, 14, 16, 17, August 22, September 8, 12, 23, 1963; Monitor, July 16, September 11, 1963; Crusader, June 6, 20, July 18, August 8, 15, 29, 1963.
38 Crusader, August 1, 8, 15, 22, September 12, 19, 1963; Monitor, August 6, 13, 1963; Journal, July 28, August 18, September 8, 9, 13, 15, 1963.