Commentators on higher education in the 1970s have noted that American colleges and universities have begun to have “diplomatic relations” with foreign nations. Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany, for example, have used dollar surpluses in their banks to endow professorships in the United States. Some of the most active of these nations have been Middle Eastern oil-producers, which not only have endowed professorships but also have donated their “petro-dollars” to establish centers for Arab studies. In addition, many thousands of students from oil-rich nations have matriculated in the United States in the 1970s. These dollars have been a windfall for educational institutions throughout the country, for they have arrived at a time of declining enrollment and economic retrenchment.

These funds, however, have caused disturbing questions to be asked. Why, for example, would Arab nations want to finance the establishment at Georgetown University of the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies? Why would the Libyan government want to give $750,000 to Georgetown for the creation of a chair in Arab culture? Critics have charged that Arab nations want to influence the working perspective of the many hundreds of foreign service officers who receive their education at Georgetown’s School of Foreign Service. Moreover, why would Saudi Arabia donate $1,000,000 to the University of Southern California to endow the King Faisal Chair of Islamic and Arabic Studies, and why would American corporations provide the remainder of the endowment for this chair? (One of these, the Fluor Corporation, did more than
Some observers have suggested that the desired goal has been to propagandize the United States on behalf of anti-Israeli movements, and they have urged American universities not only to scrutinize such proposals in order to determine their purposes and to see if they have come with strings attached, but also to avoid making opportunistic responses which they might later regret. What is at stake, these critics have argued, is the integrity of higher education in the United States.¹

Yet the attempted use of American colleges and universities by foreign governments is not new. Well over forty years before the emergence of the current controversy, there was another imbroglio in the "diplomatic relations" between American colleges and universities, on the one hand, and foreign countries, on the other. In the 1930s Nazi Germany was eager to maximize and publicize whatever pro-Nazi sentiments it could detect in American institutions of higher education. Foremost among the educational institutions which the Nazis hoped to manipulate for propaganda profits was Harvard, the nation's oldest college.

Presiding over Harvard in the 1930s was an organic chemist, James Bryant Conant. And while Harvard had institutional constraints to surmount in negotiating with the Nazis, Conant had a deep personal dilemma to overcome: he was a Germanophile who was very much in the intellectual debt of German science, and yet it was the German government itself which was destroying that heritage. The painful realities of Hitler's Germany were deep in Conant's consciousness as he sat down in 1939 to draft his autobiographical note for the twenty-fifth anniversary report of his Harvard College Class of 1914. Conant by 1939 had been Harvard's president for six years, and Adolf Hitler had been dictator of Germany for the same period during which the Nazis' contempt for the German tradition of academic freedom had reduced world-famous universities like Berlin, Heidelberg and Goettingen to little more than Nazi propaganda factories. Through "the last twenty-five years of my own personal experience the word Germany has kept recurring like a theme song," Conant wrote his classmates. His "own personal reactions to such words as pro-German and anti-German" had "boxed the compass at least twice." The world teetered on the brink of another world war as Conant composed his autobiographical note. "Must it all happen again?" he asked.²

Between 1933 and 1939 Nazi Germany was to present Harvard and her president with an ugly dilemma. It was "the dilemma," Conant explained, "of those abroad who had friendly feelings for Germany but detested Hitler." If Harvard continued to maintain normal relations with the German universities as fellow members of the international intellectual community, this could be easily interpreted as recognition of, and indeed acquiescence in, the death of academic freedom in Ger-

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many. “A friendly act” toward Germany in the 1930s, Conant recalled, could “always be misinterpreted as a friendly act toward Hitler. On the other hand, a repudiation of Hitler could always be interpreted as a repudiation of Germany.” The impact of Nazism on the universities had become apparent only weeks after Hitler had assumed power. Brilliant scholars had been forced by the “national resurgence” in German education to resign or retire; and Conant was aware of this upheaval, having known some of these displaced scholars personally. He also knew, however, that there were others still teaching in Germany who were trying to resist the Nazis’ regimentation of higher education, and he feared that outright repudiation of the German universities by their American counterparts might cause these scholars to feel abandoned. Yet to sit by without registering vigorous opposition to this conquest of free inquiry by Nazi dogma might be equally dangerous. Conant never was able to resolve this dilemma to his satisfaction.

Several factors compounded Conant’s dilemma. First of all, as a Germanophile whose model of intellectual excellence and scientific achievement was Germany, Conant felt betrayed as he observed the Nazi subversion of German higher education in the 1930s. Conant had traveled to Germany in 1925 and 1930; while there, he had observed the organization of academic and industrial chemistry, and he had marveled at the nation’s scientific traditions and accomplishments. But he had also witnessed that German reactionaries, who had never reconciled themselves to the defeat of World War I, were violently opposed to democracy in Germany and accepted as reality the myth of the “stab in the back” of the German military forces by various international elements, Jews and Social Democrats. The Weimar Republic, Conant found during his two German trips, was competing for popular support with “an opposition shadow system consisting of anti-democratic elements” that
were ambitious and unscrupulous; and he left Germany in 1930 wondering how a republic so despised by many conspiratorial citizens could long endure. By the early 1930s, the Nazis were emerging as a major force, anti-Semitism was rampant and democracy in Germany, Conant feared, might well be doomed.\textsuperscript{5}

Viewing the Nazis as the despoilers of a rich intellectual heritage, Conant realized that until they were eradicated Germany could never again be true to herself or anyone else. Conant was by then, however, an academic leader and a bureaucrat. His constituency was Harvard—her alumni, faculty, and students; and this was a constituency which at times displayed not only ambiguous feelings toward Germany but even pro-Nazi sentiments. As a bureaucrat, Conant was on occasion cautious and unwilling to take the risks of leadership. He wanted to avoid controversy, even after it was no longer possible to do so and still be a sincere opponent of the Nazi regime. Conant also aspired to national prominence as an educational leader in the 1930s and, like other American leaders at that time, he sought to rationalize away the products of his timidity and avoidance.

Throughout the early 1930s, refugee scholars from Germany began to arrive in the United States, and various groups and private individuals established programs to take care of them.\textsuperscript{6} Among these organizations was the Emergency Committee in Aid of Displaced German Scholars, formed to raise funds to endow temporary lectureships for the refugees at American universities. Headed by Cornell’s President Livingston Farrand, it had as members many college and university presidents, including those of Princeton, Williams, Bryn Mawr, Northwestern, Carnegie Tech, Vanderbilt, Chicago, Vassar, Smith, Stanford, California, Oberlin and Mount Holyoke. The name of the president of Harvard University was conspicuously absent from the membership list.\textsuperscript{7}

It was not that the executive secretary of the Emergency Committee, Stephen Duggan, had neglected to ask Harvard to sponsor a displaced German scholar; for he had. Duggan had explained to outgoing President A. Lawrence Lowell that the Committee wanted a score of America’s best universities to invite refugee professors to serve on their faculties for two years, and that to facilitate the program the Committee would defray the cost of each professor’s salary by up to $2,000 a year. This proposition did not appeal to Lowell, however, and with unmistakable anti-Semitism he expressed his opinion that Jewish organizations were trying to exploit Harvard for purposes of propaganda, and that if Harvard were to extend an invitation to a refugee scholar, these organizations would not only trumpet the event all over the country, but also would do so in an effort to persuade other universities to follow Harvard’s lead. Viewing the Committee’s work as Jewish propaganda rather than as humanitarianism in action, Lowell made a negative recommendation to
the Harvard Corporation, which voted in late May not to participate in the program.  

Unfortunately, in the confusion of retiring Lowell and preparing to install Conant, the Corporation never even acknowledged the offer. Thus the matter hung in limbo throughout the summer, although two Harvard professors—Hans Zinsser and Harlow Shapley—were industriously negotiating on their own with both the Emergency Committee and the Rockefeller Foundation to bring Dr. Ulrich Friedemann, a German bacteriologist, to Harvard. Zinsser, also a bacteriologist, had even procured from the Rockefeller Foundation an offer to pay one-half of Friedemann's salary. These negotiations proceeded throughout the summer without any orders to the contrary from the Harvard administration. Lowell was not in Cambridge and Conant, who had sailed for Europe a week after his election, did not return until the end of August; all the while, unanswered correspondence piled up on a desk in the administration building. It was not until Friedemann decided to accept a job in London that these negotiations finally broke down.  

Duggan wrote Harvard again in October, four months after his first unanswered letter, and Conant replied promptly and apologetically. He was "extremely sorry" for the delay, he wrote, but he had assumed that the Emergency Committee had automatically rescinded its offer once Friedemann had taken the London appointment. If Duggan wanted the Corporation to reconsider its position on future lectureships for refugee scholars under the aegis of the Committee, it would do so at its next meeting.  

The Corporation met two weeks later to reconsider the Emergency Committee's offer and again rejected it. Conant took a very hard-nosed position. People sympathetic to the plight of the refugee scholars, he claimed, were "apt to mix up charity and education." In order for the University to hire a professor, it had to have an opening, and, he added, apparently sincerely, "I have not seen many men on the list of displaced scholars whom I thought we could use at Harvard." But if one of the departments recommended a qualified scholar, then Conant would hire him. Salary was another problem; the Emergency Committee's subsidy of $2,000 was insufficient. Conant also felt that "the best chance of a brilliant, intellectual future in America is to give every opportunity for our young men to develop." Filling full professorships "with imported people of middle age" could well discourage the young men; temporary appointments of even distinguished scholars could, he argued, "lead only to misunderstandings and do more harm than good."  

Obviously, time has proved Conant to be wrong. As is now well known, much of America's intellectual future, especially in the natural, biological, and social sciences, would depend on the contributions of refugee scholars. In the fall of 1933, however, Conant felt that foremost among his responsibilities as Harvard's new president were those of re-
cruiting a distinguished faculty and increasing the quality of graduate instruction. Indeed, it was Conant's outspoken commitment to building an outstanding faculty that was his chief asset in the estimate of the Corporation in electing him president. The Emergency Committee's program forced him and the Corporation to choose between unpleasant alternatives, and they chose the one they thought was in the best interest of the University. Perhaps as a more experienced university president, Conant would have arrived at a different conclusion. Then, too, Conant might have done otherwise had he been acting solely on his own and not as Harvard's chief executive officer. Yet he did not plead even in private in behalf of the refugee scholars. Conant's position reflected not only a failure of foresight, but also a failure of compassion and political sensitivity.  

Harvard's rejection of the Emergency Committee's proposal might have encouraged Nazi officials to conclude that Harvard had a policy of neutrality toward the new German regime, or at least that the university was not strongly anti-Nazi. Conant sensed also that the Nazi government might have perceived him as being sympathetic to Germany, since he "was known to have been in Germany in 1925 and again in 1930, and had a number of German friends, and had shown himself to be sympathetic to the Germans in their predicament as a consequence of the loss of the war, inflation, and had even failed to join in any of the denunciations of the Germans in World War I."  

Believing perhaps that neither Conant nor Harvard was anti-Nazi, one of Hitler's close associates tried to endow a scholarship there in 1934. Ernst F. S. Hanfstaengl was not only a Nazi and Hitler's Foreign Press Chief, he was also an alumnus of the Harvard College Class of 1909. A mammoth, garrulous man with a mop of tousled hair, "Putzi" was known less for his intellectuality than for his drinking capacity, his ribaldry and his spirited if jangling music-making on the piano. Hitler and Hanfstaengl had known each other since the early 1920s. Indeed, it was at Hanfstaengl's villa in Ufling, outside Munich, that Hitler hid after the abortive "beer hall putsch" in 1923, and where he was arrested two days later. They had also collaborated in writing "The German Storm," a popular Nazi marching song. Hanfstaengl often boasted that whenever Hitler was distraught, he would summon to his quarters his old friend "Putzi," who would lull him to sleep by playing Wagner.  

The gregarious Hanfstaengl had been one of the most popular men in his class, and his ties to the United States were close. His mother was American, and he later married an American. Hanfstaengl had remained in the United States after graduation, becoming the custodian of a family-owned photo gallery and reproduction shop on Fifth Avenue. But in the final months of World War I the Alien Property Custodian had seized these assets and auctioned them off. The government, claimed Hanfstaengl in his autobiographical note for the Class's twenty-fifth
anniversary report, had auctioned off this property to a Jew; "this may serve as a hint to the dear reader as to who in reality won the war." Hanfstaengl returned to Germany in 1921. "A year later," he told his classmates, "I ran into the man who has saved Germany and civilization —Adolph Hitler." 19

Hanfstaengl announced from Berlin in late March 1934 that he was not only "looking forward to [his twenty-fifth class] reunion with the greatest anticipation," but also that he had accepted the Chief Marshal's invitation to serve as one of his aides. He also said that he might, "as a surprise," even bring along a Nazi film which "can show better than any words of mine what we Nazis stand for." "Above all," he told reporters, he was happy to contribute to his class reunion fund, although he would have to deposit his contribution in marks in a German bank "for the use of Harvard students coming to Germany to complete their university education." This was the first hint of the scholarship that was to cause a furor at Harvard. 20

Almost at once many alumni raised a storm of protest against the invitation, and surprisingly, a few days later, the Chief Marshal announced that Hanfstaengl had changed his mind and would not attend the reunion. 21 The University maintained official silence, saying only that both the original invitation and Hanfstaengl's eventual declination were wholly the business of the alumni, but later that month Hanfstaengl himself amplified the reason for his decision. Although ordinarily he would "love to attend," he was simply too "overcrowded to attend." He stoutly denied, moreover, that the intent of his visit had ever been propaganda. "As for propaganda," Hitler's foreign press aide said, "I never made propaganda and I never shall. . . ." 22

That Hanfstaengl was lying became obvious on June 7, when he walked into a banking house in Berlin, and wrote out a bank draft for 2,500 marks payable to President James B. Conant. The purpose of his check, he explained to assembled reporters, was to establish the "Dr. Hanfstaengl scholarship." Then he handed out copies of a letter he had mailed to Conant two weeks before. As "a modest proof" of his loyalty to Harvard, the letter read, he had decided to endow a $1,000 scholarship, which would enable a Harvard student to spend six months studying in Munich and another six months at any German university. These terms, he believed, "would fittingly symbolize my perennial love and affection for Harvard, Boston, and New England." 23

Reporters asked Hanfstaengl whether his disclosure of the scholarship meant that he had definitely abandoned all plans to attend the reunion. Cryptically, he replied, "Qui vivra verra," an Italian proverb meaning, "He who lives will see," and speculation rose again that he might still make the trip from Berlin to Cambridge. 24 But on June 10 he remained secluded in his apartment, while the Europa, the last ship that could bring him to the United States in time for the festivities,
made ready to embark from Cherbourg, France, the next day. It ap­
peared that he had passed up his last chance.

The next day, however, he booked passage on the Europa. Because
it was too late then to make train or plane connections to Cherbourg,
he boarded a late train to Cologne, and then he stowed away among
the mail pouches on the plane from Cologne which was to deliver the
last post to the ship. At the last possible moment he proudly marched
up the gangplank of the Europa minutes before it set sail for the
United States.  

The press widely trumpeted Hanfstaengl’s dramatic departure, al­
though he maintained that he had staged his exit only to avoid publicity.
If this were really the goal of his strategy, then for a press secretary,
supposedly versed in such matters, he committed a series of egregious
blunders. Much more credible is the explanation that he had carefully
plotted his visit to the reunion, that he wanted to gain for himself ex­
tensive press coverage and that he hoped his trip to the United States
and proffered scholarship to Harvard would be of propaganda value to
the Nazis. An example of Hanfstaengl’s careful planning concerned
his luggage, which was scarcely a last-minute rush-job, containing as it
did a bust of General Paul von Hindenberg, which he hoped to present
to the United States Military Academy; a bust of Arthur Schopenhauer
for Harvard’s philosophy department; and a bust of Hanfstaengl’s favorite
composer, Christoph Willibald Gluck, for one of Harvard’s chapels.

Hanfstaengl’s pre-arrival publicity aroused a mixed reaction. The
Harvard Crimson seriously urged the University to confer an honorary
degree upon him in recognition of his high position in the German
government. His reception in New York City, however, was quite dif­
derent, for there he was angrily denounced by 1,500 left-wing pickets
from the Student League for Industrial Democracy and the Anti-Nazi
Federation, whom he escaped only by debarking secretly onto a tugboat
and steaming up the Hudson River to an undisclosed destination.

Hostile placards greeted Hanfstaengl upon his arrival in Cambridge.
“Give Hanfstaengl a Degree”; “Master of Concentration Camps”; “Make
Him a Master of Torture”; “Make Him a Master of Sterilization”; “A
Bachelor of Bookburning.” The returning alumni were much more
cordial, however, welcoming him warmly. Conant spoke to him only
once—at the president’s tea for the returning alumni. When Hanfstaengl
came down the receiving line to shake the president’s hand, he said to
Conant, “I bring you greetings from Hoenigschmid.” Otto Hoenig­
schmid, an internationally-known chemist, had been a postdoctoral fellow
at Harvard in 1909, studying with Conant’s father-in-law, Theodore W.
Richards, America’s first Nobel Prize-winning chemist; and he had also
been Conant’s host in Germany in 1925. But Conant was sure that
Hoenigschmid was “an ultra-nationalist” and probably a Nazi as well.

Hanfstaengl was front-page news almost every day in Boston, the
newspapers picturing him as jovial and jocular—as Hitler’s “court jester.” Much of his free time he spent at the piano keyboard, drinking tumblers of gin and singing bawdy ballads upon request. His hair was dishevelled and his suit wrinkled, but his broad, toothy grin was indeed jolly and he looked like an overgrown clown. During the annual class day ceremonies in the stadium, he marched with his class in the parade and rendered left-handed Nazi salutes to his friends as the band struck up “Ach, du lieber Augustine.” This brought roars of delight from the stands, as did the antics of the members of the Class of 1924 who in imitation strutted in goose-step and extended stiffly their right arms Nazi-style.32

It was traditional for Harvard’s president to address the gathering of the Alumni Association on commencement afternoon, and Conant had just about finished his speech—in which he denounced attempts of “reactionary intolerance or revolutionary zealotry” to subvert “our academic halls”—when two young women suddenly cast off shawls they had been wearing and chained themselves to the wooden stands on which the alumni were sitting. Anti-Nazi slogans in red ribbon adorned their dresses. “Down with Hitler,” the slogans demanded. Hurriedly they locked their chains and threw away the keys, and as policemen rushed over to eject the women, they began screaming denunciations of the “fascist butchers,” Hanfstaengl and Hitler. The police had to rip out part of the stands to unfasten the chains, and all the while the women continued to inveigh against Nazism. Finally the police carried them away. Later that afternoon, seven more demonstrators were arrested in Harvard Square. One had handcuffed himself to the fence surrounding the Harvard Yard, while another had climbed a telegraph pole and from this lofty point had launched a harangue against Hitler.33

Throughout the country and even on the floor of Congress others protested against both Hanfstaengl’s visit and Harvard’s calm and even convivial acceptance of him. Congressman Emanuel Celler asked the American people to give “no quarter” to him and his “gang of marauders, hooligans, and torturers.”34 Others called his presence at Harvard a disgrace to the University.35

Meanwhile, Hanfstaengl was imbibing in high society, sporting a blazer and skimmer for the Harvard-Yale boat races in New Haven and morning clothes for a fashionable Newport wedding. He took time out, however, to return to Cambridge to dispose of his busts of famous Germans; but he arrived to find the University practically deserted, and only after several hours of persistently pacing the halls of University buildings was he able finally to donate the sculpture of Gluck to the music department’s chairman, who was locking up his office before leaving for his summer vacation. With his other sculptures he flew to West Point where the Academy rebuffed his offer of the Hindenburg
bust. When he sailed for home in early July his two art works accompanied him on the voyage.\textsuperscript{36}

Since the Corporation did not meet in the summer, it would not vote until September on whether to accept the “Dr. Hanfstaengl scholarship.” Hanfstaengl’s name remained in the headlines, however, for in early August, he sang a paean of praise of his “Leader” in a major article in \textit{Collier’s}. “Like President Roosevelt,” he wrote, Adolf Hitler “has given Germany a ‘new deal’ and . . . new hope for the future.” “For years and years” the Jews in Germany had been like so many “leeches feeding on the body politic.” They had also “enthusiastically embraced the role of pacemaker for Bolshevism”; they were “the dead branches” on the tree that was Germany. Hitler, he concluded, was simply the “surgeon” destined by fate to cut off these dead branches “so that the tree could take on new life.”\textsuperscript{37}

Another incident at this time tended to reinforce the impression that Harvard was still unready to denounce Nazi Germany. Dean Roscoe Pound of the Law School had been on a tour of Germany that summer, and several times in the course of his trip he had congratulated Hitler for bringing domestic tranquility to the country, at one point even predicting the rise of a similar leader in France. So pleased were Nazi officials that the University of Berlin decided to award Pound an honorary degree. The ceremony was to take place in Boston’s Ritz-Carlton Hotel in September, and Pound invited Conant to attend, announcing that the German Ambassador Hans Luther would be there to confer the degree. Conant accepted but only reluctantly, for he was certain the Nazis were exploiting Pound and indirectly the University, a view which he shared with Judge Julian Mack, Charles A. Beard and others.\textsuperscript{38} The weekend before the ceremony, an old friend and classmate, A. Calvert Smith, visited Conant, and together they drafted a brief speech which was “not very pleasant” to the Nazi regime. Just in case the affair turned out to be unadulterated propaganda, he wanted to be armed with an incisive rebuttal.

In conferring the degree, however, Luther made an innocuous speech. But when photographers asked Conant to pose with Luther and Pound, he bristled. “I’m not in it,” he asserted vehemently. “It’s strictly a matter between these two gentlemen. I’m not in it.”\textsuperscript{39}

At its first meeting of the autumn semester, the Corporation considered the “Dr. Hanfstaengl scholarship.” Certain that the Nazis would herald acceptance of the gift as tantamount to recognition of the “new Germany”—and certain also that Hanfstaengl had planted his offer for just that purpose—the Corporation voted to refuse it. The refusal, the Corporation believed, could be so worded as to be a rebuke to National Socialism rather than an affront to the German people or universities. Indeed, Conant felt as he drafted the Corporation’s reply that it should be an encouragement to the democratic elements still struggling in Ger-
many. "We are unwilling," he wrote, "to accept a gift from one who has been so closely connected with the leadership of a political party which has inflicted damage on the universities of Germany through measures which have struck at principles we believe to be fundamental to universities throughout the world." 40

The press throughout the country generally applauded this rebuff. Scores of letters arrived at Conant's office and most were favorable; the few critical letters consisted mostly of anti-Semitic diatribes, a few even signed "Heil Hitler!" 41 The only faculty member to sound a discordant note in public was a professor of comparative literature, Francis P. Magoun, who wired Hanfstaengl that Harvard alumni were "ashamed on account of the action of the University Corporation." But Magoun's pro-Nazi sentiments were well-known, especially after he wrote a letter to the editor of the Boston Herald in early October extolling National Socialism as representative of "the highest aspirations of our western civilization." 42 The Corporation wrote an addendum to the Hanfstaengl affair by promptly declining an offer by a wealthy German-educated resident of Cambridge to finance a year's study in Germany "along the lines suggested by Dr. Hanfstaengl." It was quite unwilling, the Corporation informed the prospective donor, to accept a gift made as "a direct replacement" for one it had already refused. 43

Conant believed that his and Harvard's anti-Nazi views were now squarely on the record. In 1935, moreover, the University conferred honorary degrees upon two ardent anti-Nazis, Albert Einstein and Thomas Mann, and Heinrich Bruening, one of the last chancellors of the Weimar Republic, came to Harvard as a lecturer. 44 In addition, Conant took pains at this time to denounce Nazism's pernicious educational doctrines. "The suppression of academic freedom, rigid censorship, the abolition of individual liberty of opinion," he told Harvard's freshman class in 1935, "... are perfectly consistent with the aims" of the German rulers. 45 When Conant denounced Nazism, as he did increasingly in the mid-1930s, he did so almost solely because of its smothering of academic freedom, not because he viewed Nazi Germany as a threat to America's national security. As a "group movement supported by a dogmatic philosophy," National Socialism was "necessarily impatient of the detached thinker and observer and will ride him down at the slightest provocation." 46 It idealized utilitarian education while outlawing truth for truth's sake. It imposed dogma on the student. It extinguished academic freedom. It was rooted in a deep distrust of free inquiry. This same distrust, Conant often added, was also the impetus behind the noisy clamor in the United States for teachers' loyalty oaths. 47

In the eyes of some observers, Harvard's anti-Nazi posture suffered two minor blows in 1935. In April, 2,000 people, most of them Harvard students, disrupted a peace demonstration in Cambridge. Jocularity distinguished the behavior of the disrupters, who, according to a newspaper
account, “paraded the yard and the purlieus of Cambridge in true imperial German style—goose-stepping, giving the straight-arm salute made popular by Adolf Hitler, and singing war songs.” Trying to be humorous and mirthful, they also shouted “Heil!” “Down with peace!” and “We want cannon!” Heywood Broun, for one, did not think the marchers and their slogans were “really very funny, after all.” Writing in the *New York World-Telegram*, Broun opined that, while this was “intended to be awfully, awfully funny,” it was, instead, “horror heaped on horror.”48 Later in 1935, Harvard along with numerous other institutions—trade unions, city councils, religious organizations—received requests that it join in the movement to boycott the forthcoming Olympic Games in Berlin. Replying to these requests, Conant stated that American participation in the Olympic Games was not a proper question for Harvard’s consideration; and he added with some pride that, in rejecting Hanfstaengl’s fellowship, Harvard had become “the only university in this country” to take “a definite stand in expressing hostility to the present German government.” He noted, however, that he did “not believe that the way to fight intolerance is with more intolerance.” If there were assurances, and Conant understood there were, “that the Games will be handled properly, I am inclined to think that the best thing we can do to help the whole cause of democracy and liberty is to go ahead and give the Germans an illustration of something they know so little about,—namely, tolerance.”49

Conant was still not ready publicly to oppose Nazism on any basis other than that of academic freedom. Early in 1936, for example, the magazine *The American Hebrew* voted Conant its annual “Medal for the Promotion of Better Understanding between Christian and Jew in America.” Conant’s rebuke to Hanfstaengl had commended him for the medal, and the magazine singled out for praise his defense of intellectual and academic freedom, stating that “publicly and eloquently he warned America . . . against the dangers to free and untrammeled thinking inherent in Nazism and Facism . . . .” But Conant declined the medal. He explained that in “taking my stand against the forces which have threatened liberty both in this country and abroad, I have been actuated solely by my conviction of the importance of academic freedom, entirely irrespective of considerations of race or religion.” Although this was largely why the magazine had voted to make the award, Conant feared that his acceptance “would becloud the fundamental issue of freedom by placing my action on a more limited basis . . . .”50 Reasoning somewhat as former President Lowell had in rejecting the Emergency Committee’s proposition in 1933, Conant wanted Harvard’s rejection of Hanfstaengl’s offer to be judged not as pro-Jewish, but as anti-Nazi. At the same time, there is no doubt that Conant’s unwarranted and paranoiac suspicion of Jewish groups had further muddled the goal of a united front against Nazi Germany.51
Conant seemed not to understand that he would have to continue to state his anti-Nazi views each time the issue arose. He was mistaken to believe that he could remain not only mute but also uninvolved with other anti-Nazis as the evidence of Nazi repression and brutality mounted in the mid-1930's. He was also mistaken to believe that he could oppose Nazi Germany on academic grounds alone while publicly ignoring other and related Nazi crimes.

Two academic pageants in 1936 attracted worldwide attention; one was a monument to free inquiry, the other to dogma. Harvard observed her 300th birthday, while ancient Heidelberg University celebrated her 550th. Nazism had already left its ugly imprint on Heidelberg. On the facade of one of her beautiful edifices there had once been an inscription “To the Living Spirit,” but this the Nazis had ripped down and replaced with a swastika and the legend “To the German Spirit.” Almost one-fourth of Heidelberg's faculty had been fired or coerced into resigning.

The rector of Heidelberg invited universities from all over the world to send delegates to the forthcoming festivities in June, but there was something suspicious about this birthday party. It was indeed rare for a university to celebrate anything but a centennial or a multiple thereof; yet this was the 550th anniversary. The date was also suspect. Heidelberg's birth had actually been in October 1386. The anniversary festival was to be June 30, 1936, or precisely two years after the bloody Nazi purge in which scores of Nazis had been summarily executed because of an alleged plot against Hitler's regime, leading some observers to believe that the date of the birthday had political rather than historical significance.

The British universities reacted to the invitation swiftly and decisively, beginning with a letter to the Times of London from the esteemed Bishop of Durham, who wrote that British representation at Heidelberg “could not but be understood everywhere as a public and deliberate condonation of the intolerance which has emptied the German universities of many of their most eminent scholars . . . .” Soon afterwards, Oxford voted to boycott the celebration, and every other British university quickly followed suit. Many European universities—including Stockholm, Oslo and Amsterdam—also joined the boycott.

The response of America's colleges and universities was neither as unanimous nor outspoken. Many institutions such as Michigan, Yale and Columbia announced that they would send delegates, while others, such as the University of Virginia, “promptly, firmly and politely declined.” Harvard in early March accepted the invitation, announcing that she would send a delegate in recognition of “the ancient ties by which the universities of the world are united and which are independent of the political conditions existing in any country at any particular time.”
Conant undoubtedly anticipated the massive criticism that was in store for him and the University. It had not been an easy decision, and he and the Corporation had weighed the alternatives with great care. But in its rebuke to Hanfstaengl, Conant argued, Harvard had been able “to express most forcefully and strikingly our disapproval of the Nazi regime.” That was “the point at issue.” It would be unfortunate for Harvard or any other university to protest against Hitler’s government “by breaking off diplomatic relations with German universities . . . .” This distinction between the Nazi government and the German universities was critical to Conant. He also argued that “if one allows political, racial, or religious matters to enter into a question of continuing academic and scientific relations one is headed down the path which leads to the terrible prejudices and absurd actions taken by scientists and universities during the World War.” Conant reminded his critics that Harvard had invited Nazis such as the rector of Heidelberg to her Tercentenary. Of course, this, too, had been criticized. But would it be better, he asked, to invite only those scholars and university officials who had been “investigated” and “found to be free of all taint of Nazism?” Harvard had also invited a Nazi chemist to the Tercentenary simply because of his brilliant scientific contributions. The Nazi regime was the proper target for censure, not the universities, for to ostracize them could only destroy “the unity of the learned world.”

A far more practical reason also motivated Conant. Not wanting to invite reciprocal boycotts of Harvard’s own Tercentenary celebration, he sought diligently to avoid injecting the issue of Nazism into academic pageants. In addition, the Tercentenary was to be not only an academic celebration but also an occasion for fund raising. “What my views would have been,” he admitted a year later to Princeton’s President Harold W. Dodds, “if we had not been celebrating our Tercentenary, I cannot tell you.” Yet he knew that expediency had motivated him, and in explaining Harvard’s acceptance he readily granted that he could have been simply “rationalizing a situation into which circumstances forced us!”

Unlike Harvard, where the reaction of the academic community had been relatively mild, Columbia University students and faculty alike castigated President Nicholas Murray Butler for Columbia’s acceptance of Heidelberg’s invitation. Student demonstrations and faculty petitions had apparently rankled Butler, for he proposed that Columbia, Harvard and Yale issue a joint statement or perhaps three identical but separate statements, which would not only condemn Nazism but also testify to a belief in the unity of the academic world. Conant at first thought this idea was worth exploring further, but after more reflection he concluded that it was “very ill-advised.” Harvard had already responded to Heidelberg’s invitation and another statement would be gratuitous. But he offered a counter proposal. If the Heidelberg anni-
versary turned out to be a celebration not to honor Heidelberg but to commemorate the “blood purge”—or if “someone . . . on that occasion hails the delegates from American universities as being a recognition on our part of the triumphs of the Nazi regime”—then the three presidents should issue a joint statement denouncing the perversion of an academic ceremony into a political orgy. Both Butler and Yale’s President James R. Angell agreed to the new strategy. Conant was frankly fearful that the Nazis were scheming to degrade this celebration, and he was ready in that event “to stand by for a rebuttal” from his critics.\(^61\)

When a Nazi military review launched the festival, it was obvious that the purpose of the Heidelberg anniversary was not to honor the University but to glorify the Third Reich. The Propaganda Ministry of Joseph Goebbels had had charge of all arrangements, and instead of parading scholars in colorful robes, there were squads of students in drab brownshirt uniforms. Swastikas were everywhere in evidence. Storm troopers marched through the streets. Hitler wired at the last moment that he would not be there, but most of the Nazi hierarchy attended, including Goebbels, Alfred Rosenberg, Heinrich Himmler, Joachim von Ribbentrop and Hanfstaengl. Pure Nazi ideology filled the speeches, as professors affirmed that German education does “not know or recognize truth for truth’s sake or science for science’s sake.” The purpose of German education, declared a philosophy professor, was “the formation of human beings and racial life in accord with the character and natural laws of the community.”\(^62\)

Conant glanced at the press coverage of the celebration with apprehension, but what he read relieved his anxieties. “Of course,” he wrote Angell, the speakers “pronounced a lot of nonsense about education and research, nonsense which . . . is not only absurd but dangerous.” Nobody, however, had claimed that American representation was tantamount to acceptance of the Nazification of higher education. Nor had there been “reference to the fact that Harvard by sending a delegate had reversed its decision on the Hanfstaengl matter,” and the Nazis had not even mentioned the “blood purge” of two years before.\(^63\) Angell and Butler concurred, and on the flimsy excuse that the Nazis had not exploited the presence of Americans—even though they had indeed prostituted the festival—the three presidents withheld their denunciatory statement. Conant once again had resorted to rationalization in order to avoid controversy.

The other academic pageant of worldwide importance in 1936 was Harvard’s Tercentenary. Prior to the ceremonies in mid-September there had been scattered protests against inviting Nazis or Nazi sympathizers—for example, against the Rector of Heidelberg and Carl Jung, who had assumed the editorship of the *Zentralblatt für Psychotherapie* in late 1933, after his Jewish predecessor had been dismissed, and whose recent work, some people argued, indicated a predisposition to racial concepts
of Aryan superiority. Other people asked, Why Jung? Why not Sigmund Freud? While not responding publicly to the criticism of Jung's invitation, Conant explained that Harvard would "welcome the Rector of Heidelberg . . . as a representative of an ancient university" and "in spite of his Nazism." "We shall invite him not as an individual but as a symbol of the continuing tradition of German scholarship." Conant also contended that the University had already forthrightly opposed the Nazi government, and "to carry over that point from politics to the world of learning" was "to fight intolerance with intolerance"; and he noted that Harvard's invitation list included anti-Nazis like Einstein, the classicist Werner H. Jaeger and the historian Friedrich Meinecke.

Einstein, however, apparently found explanations such as Conant's to be unpersuasive; his empty seat at the Tercentenary that autumn was a striking reminder of his boycott of the celebration. At the time, newspapers reported that Einstein had declined to attend because his wife had been too ill to accompany him. Years later, he conceded that his reason for not participating "was not so much the presence of Dr. Jung but the fact that representatives of German universities had been invited, although it was generally known that they were in full cooperation with Hitler's acts of persecution against Jews and liberals, and against cultural freedom in general."

Promptly at 9:30 on the morning of September 18, 1936—the final day of the Tercentenary—a bugle sounded throughout the rainswept Harvard Yard, rallying alumni to their respective class assemblies and the march to the soaked seats of the outdoor Tercentenary Theatre. Through loudspeakers a voice announced that President Conant had consulted a meteorologist who had told him that the rain would last only a half an hour; and when Professor Samuel Eliot Morison began to read his "Early History of Harvard," the rain indeed stopped. The ceremonies had been free of political connotations—anti-Nazi or otherwise—until Governor James Michael Curley, fiery leader of Boston's Hibernians and Democrats, lauded the durability and continued successes of the Democratic party by observing that a Democratic President had attended Harvard's 250th birthday; now, on its 300th anniversary, "an equally able and courageous"—and Democratic—President was an honored guest. And before the degree-granting ceremony was well under way, a hearty torrent drenched the spectators again.

So heavy was the downpour that the Alumni Association retreated to Sanders Theatre that afternoon to hear Franklin D. Roosevelt of the Class of 1904 speak. Also on the program was an arch-foe of Roosevelt's New Deal tax policy, Yale's President Angell, who could not resist the temptation to take a dig at the President. Thinking of the soggy ceremony, he gibed that he had overheard one alumnus complain upon leaving the deluge that morning that "this is evidently Conant's way of soaking the rich." Whatever politics had been injected into the
Tercentenary had been done so, not by pro- or anti-Nazis, but by Demo­
crats and Republicans, carrying on the three-and-a-half year old debate
over the glories and dangers of the New Deal. For their part, Conant
recalled, “the Germans behaved themselves very well,” being “very
cautious in what they said . . . .”

Germany hosted another academic festival in 1937—the 200th anni­
versary of the Georg August University of Goettingen. The ugly scar
of Nazism was on this university, too; Goettingen’s birthday party
promised to be a repeat performance of the farce at Heidelberg. Again
the British universities voted unanimously against the sending of dele­
gates, and this time only a handful of American colleges and universities
accepted the invitation.

Conant again found himself in a quandary, but it was a quandary
of his own making. Rather than being straightforward, he waffled once
again. Conant acknowledged that Heidelberg had been a disillusioning
spectacle, yet he still felt it was essential to maintain the solidarity
of the intellectual world; Harvard should not sever “diplomatic relations”
with her German counterparts. The Corporation was noncommittal in
acknowledging Goettingen’s invitation, writing only that it would “en­
deavor to send” a delegate. For Harvard to refuse absolutely to send
anybody, Conant believed, would be “ridiculous,” since “we crossed
that bridge last year when we sent a delegate to Heidelberg.” “Whether
we actually succeed in finding a delegate,” however, “. . . is in the laps
of the gods.” “Personally,” Conant recommended to the Corporation,
“I see no reason why we should make any effort to send a delegate.”

The Corporation concurred, notifying Goettingen that it would be un­
able to send a representative.

This decision was variously interpreted; the Harvard Crimson, for
example, criticized the University’s “snub” to Goettingen. The secre­
tary to the Corporation, Jerome D. Greene, maintained, however, that
Harvard had not rebuffed anyone. It was not that she had refused to
send a delegate; no faculty member had been available to go. And,
indeed, Greene had tried diligently to commission the Dean of the School
of Business Administration to attend the celebration. Greene’s effort
somewhat baffled Conant, whose intention it had been—and he felt it
had also been the Corporation’s—“that we should neither rebuff the
University by refusing to send a delegate nor go out of our way to honor
them by sending a personal delegate, as we did in the case of Heidel­
berg.” The Crimson obviously was not alone in its reading of Harvard’s
intentions. Many people either applauded or condemned the University
for refusing to send a delegate. The only people who seemed truly to
understand what Harvard had done were those people who criticized
her for not declining outright to send a delegate to Goettingen.

Conant was one of the first Americans to recognize the menace of
National Socialism, and his ideas on Harvard’s relations with German
universities in the 1930's were fairly consistent. These ideas seem also to have been the primary influence on the Corporation's decisions. Yet it was easy to misread what Conant meant. When he rebuked Hanfstaengl, his real target was the Nazi regime that had degraded the German universities. But his acceptance of Heidelberg's invitation did not mean that he had changed his mind about Hitler's government. Even though the Nazi Gleichschaltung, or coordination, of totalitarian ideology and higher education had reduced Heidelberg to little more than a Nazi echo chamber, Conant truly believed that this university should not be ostracized. Her tradition of free inquiry would flourish long after Hitler's regime had been destroyed; meanwhile, Harvard's delegate was a testimony to "the unity of the learned world." Those who viewed Harvard's acceptance of the Heidelberg invitation as acquiescence in National Socialism were just as wrong as those who saw Harvard's absence at the Goettingen celebration as a repudiation of Goettingen. At the same time, Conant could have rebuked the Nazi government for degrading the Heidelberg celebration—indeed for disrupting the unity of the learned world—and if had intended not to send a delegate to Goettingen, he should have explicitly declined the invitation.

The history of Harvard's "diplomatic relations" with Nazi Germany presents the historian with a perennial problem, that of retrospective moralizing, judging an individual's or an institution's actions from the comfort of forty years of hindsight. Still, the historian should not retreat from the responsibility of evaluating and, ultimately, judging. And there is a lesson here: It is that higher education in the United States has historically had an intimate relationship to political events both at home and abroad. Although the problem today of "Petro-Dollars for Scholars" is only the most current manifestation of the relationship, America's higher educational leaders have always been loath to concede that such a connection exists. For decades, it seems, only conservatives railed against the relationship, and they did so by arguing that federal funding of colleges and universities carried with it the threat of federal control over higher education. What about funding by mammoth corporations or by oil-rich foreign nations? Here, too, there is a risk, and it is one to which all scholars and academic leaders should be alert. But it is perhaps the historian alone who can apprise the public of the proportions of the threat based on this study of past experience; and, in the defense of academic freedom and independence, the historian has an obligation to do so.

Although he was timid at crucial moments and inconsistent at others, Conant still was one of the more outspoken anti-Nazis in the United States from 1933 to the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939. But as a university president, he was not really a free agent; and he was not alone in his reticence. Leaders with constituencies to serve—whether they were university presidents with alumni, faculty, and students, politicians
with voters, corporate executives with customers and employees, or labor officials with union members—were notoriously silent in the 1930’s. And their silence must have been encouraging to Hitler and the Nazis.

University of Kansas

notes


2. Harvard College Class of 1914, Twenty-fifth Anniversary Report (Cambridge, 1939), 164; typescript copy in James B. Conant’s (hereafter cited as JBC) New York City (NYC) Papers. Although JBC’s NYC Papers have now been deposited in the Widener Library, Harvard University, as a separate part of Conant’s Presidential Papers, they will still be identified as JBC’s NYC Papers.


4. See New York Times, 1 March, 19, 28 April, 2, 3 May 1933.


6. School and Society, XXXVIII (15 July 1933), 82-83; New York Times, 13 July 1933; Stephen Duggan, A Professor at Large (New York, 1943), 77-82.

7. Duggan to Lowell, 27 May 1933, copy in James Bryant Conant Papers, Box 8, Harvard University Archives, Widener Library; and in ibid., A Lawrence Lowell, memorandum, 13 May 1933; Henry Shattuck to JBC, 11 August 1933. Unless otherwise indicated, all references to JBC Papers are to this collection. Material from the two other sources of Conant Papers—in NYC and in Randolph, N.H.—will be so indicated.

8. Duggan to JBC, 9 October 1933, ibid.

9. Shapley to Shattuck, 1, 10 August, 12 September 1933; Shattuck to Shapley, 3 August 1933; Zinsser to JBC, 29 August 1933; Zinsser to J. M. Lowe, 25 August 1933; W. S. Carter to Zinsser, 18, 24 August, 19 September 1933; Zinsser to Duggan, 23 August 1933; Zinsser to Simon Flexner, 20 August 1933, all in ibid.

10. JBC to Grenville Clark, 14 November 1933, ibid.

11. JBC to Duggan, 13 October 1933, ibid.

12. JBC to Duggan, 50 October 1933, ibid.

13. JBC to G. Clark, 14 November 1933; JBC to Harold Laski, 3 November 1933; and JBC to E. K. Bolton, 13 September 1933, all in ibid.


It should be noted, however, that in late 1938 a meeting of a number of presidents of prestigious universities (all of them members of the Association of American Universities) was held in New York City “to discuss the problem of the refugee scholar.” Duggan explained the work of the Emergency Committee and answered questions. As the meeting drew to a close, Conant offered a plan which he had drafted for the meeting. Conant’s plan, according to Duggan, was “largely aimed to accomplish” what the Emergency Committee was “already doing,” but Conant also suggested that “greater permanency for the scholars assisted would result from securing an endowment than from continuing to rely upon . . . annual contribu-
tions," and he also insisted upon "what he considered a less hit-and-miss method of selecting the individuals to be assisted." Moreover, "the refugees would not be on the university ladder obstructing the advance upward of American teachers." The university presidents discussed Conant's proposal at length, and "as a result it was considered wise to appeal to well-to-do Jewish citizens and the foundations." A subcommittee comprised of Conant, Butler of Columbia, and Harold W. Dodds of Princeton was appointed to revise Conant's plan and to secure the signatures of the officers of various higher educational associations and influential individuals. In January, all those concerned accepted the revised plan. According to Duggan, "No finer statement of the true position of the scholar in the university community has yet been made." See Stephen Duggan and Betty Drury, The Rescue of Science and Learning (New York, 1948), 96-101; David C. Thomson, "The United States and Academic Exiles," Queen's Quarterly, XLVI (Summer, 1939), 217. For the revised plan, see JBC to Robert A. Millikan, 17 January 1939; JBC to Frank P. Graham, plus the attached statement, in Millikan Papers, The California Institute of Technology; and Duggan and Drury, Rescue of Science and Learning, 99-100. Excellent histories recounting the contributions of refugee scholars to intellectual achievement in the United States and England are: Donald H. Fleming and Bernard Bailyn, eds., The Intellectual Migration: Europe and America, 1930-1960 (Cambridge, 1969); Laura Femi, Illustrious Immigrants: The Intellectual Migration from Europe, 1930-41 (Chicago, 1968); Norman D. Bentwich, The Rescue and Achievement of Refugee Scholars: The Story of Displaced Scholars and Scientists, 1933-1952 (The Hague, 1953).


23. Ibid., 8 June 1934. Original of this letter is in JBC Papers, 32. See also Harvard Alumni Bulletin, XXXVII (12 October 1934), 84; Harvard press release dated 4 October 1934, in PR Files, Harvard University Archives.


25. Ibid., 11, 12 June 1934; Hanfstaengl, Unheard Witness, 255-56.

26. This conclusion is directly contrary to Haftaengl's Unheard Witness, 255 ff.; his Hitler: The Missing Years (London, 1957), 242-45; and his Zwischen Weissem und Braunem Haus: Memoiren eines politischen Aussenseiters (Muenchen, 1970), 353-59, in which he claimed that "Conant suspected that the money came from Hitler, which it did not, and turned down the offer." Conant felt that Haftaengl's trip and gift were purely for propaganda purposes: interviews with JBC, 20 December 1965, and, in Boston, 29 December 1965; and JBC, "Tenth Anniversary of Amerikahaus," 928.

27. New York Times, 12 June 1934. Also, it seems more than coincidental that on the very day he arrived in New York there was a communique issued to the press by his assistant, reminding American reporters that Haftaengl was not a clown but a responsible government official and insisting that they report his activities in a respectful manner: ibid., 16 June 1934.


30. Ibid., 18, 19 June 1934.


34. Congressional Record, LXXXVIII (18 June 1934), 12488.


36. New York Times, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8 July 1934; Boston Post, 3 July 1934.


40. JBC to Hanfstängl, 24 September 1934, JBC Papers, 32; JBC, Memorandum III, "Hitler Comes to Power"; JBC, My Several Lives, 143-44. There is a possibility that this scholarship, if accepted, would have been funded out of the Nazi party propaganda fund; see William Phillips, Under Secretary of State, to JBC, 13 March 1936; JBC to Phillips, 14 March 1936, both in JBC Papers, 58.

41. See "Hanfstängl Case, Clippings on," in Harvard Archives; a survey of press reaction in Washington Star, 15 October 1934; JBC Papers, 32, passim. See also Felix Frankfurter to JBC, 4 October 1934, in Felix Frankfurter Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress (Box 49); Boston Globe, 4 October 1934. For some of the German reaction, see memorandum from American Embassy in Berlin, 12 October 1934, an enclosure in William Phillips to JBC, 27 October 1934, along with Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 11 October 1934.

42. Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 11 October 1934, JBC Papers, 32; Harvard Alumni Bulletin, XXXVII (30 November 1934), 289; Harvard Crimson, 23 November 1934; JBC, Memorandum III, "Hitler Comes to Power." See also protest of Harvard Club of Berlin, in H. B. Pierce to JBC, 15 October 1934; and John Fletcher Hurst to JBC, 17 October 1934, both in JBC Papers, 32; Boston Herald, 9 October 1934.

43. Matthew T. Mellon to JBC, 17 October 1934; JBC to Mellon, 20 November 1934, both in JBC Papers, 32. See also Harvard Alumni Bulletin, XXXVII (20 November 1934), 287-89; Boston Globe, 24 November 1934; JBC, My Several Lives, 144-45.

There are several other addenda to the Hanfstängl-Harvard affair. Upon learning that a Cambridge court had convicted the seven people who had caused the disruption in Harvard Square on commencement afternoon, Hanfstängl wrote Conant: "This verdict against Communist Terrorism in America stands in curious contrast to the decision of Harvard University in rejecting my Munich Scholarship." Conant had had "nol-prossed" the cases of the two women who had denounced Nazism during his commencement afternoon speech to the alumni. But the issue still was not settled, for in late November 1935, Harvard sent out a mass-mailing request to alumni for funds, and one of these went to Hanfstängl in Berlin. In response, Hanfstängl first renewed his offer and then said he would increase it ten-fold. Conant had to admit shamefacedly to Hanfstängl that the appeal had been sent to him by mistake. See Hanfstängl to JBC, 24 October 1934; H. M. Sheffer to JBC, 6 November 1934; JBC to Thomas N. Perkins, 30 October 1934, all in JBC Papers, 32; William Phillips to JBC, 13 March 1936; copy of report from American Consulate General [Raymond H. Geist], Berlin, to the Secretary of State, 12 February 1936; JBC to William Phillips, 14 March 1936, all in JBC Papers, 58; JBC, My Several Lives, 145.


45. Quoted in School and Society, XLII (5 October 1935), 451.

46. JBC, "Free Inquiry or Dogma?" Atlantic Monthly, CLV (April 1935), 436.


50. JBC to I. Landman, 3 February 1936; Landman to JBC, 5 July 1966; JBC to I. Landman, 5 July 1966; New York Times, passim. For some of the German reaction, see memorandum to the Conants, 5 July 1966; New York Times, 18 September 1934; David Wigdor, Roscoe Pound: Philosopher of Law (Westport, Conn., 1974), 250-51; JBC, Memorandum III, "Hitler Comes to Power"; JBC, My Several Lives, 143-44. There is a possibility that this scholarship, if accepted, would have been funded out of the Nazi party propaganda fund; see William Phillips, Under Secretary of State, to JBC, 13 March 1936; JBC to Phillips, 14 March 1936, both in JBC Papers, 58.

51. It should be added, however, that in the summer of 1940, when it had become clear to Conant that Hitler's Germany was indeed a threat to the national security, he not only accepted an award from a Jewish organization, the Jewish War Veterans, he also began to lend his name and energies to various citizens' committees which had devoted themselves to Hitler's defeat. A copy of this speech is in the Press Release files in the Harvard Archives. See also JBC, Speaking As a Private Citizen (Cambridge, 1941), 17-21; New York Times, 13 June 1940; JBC to G. Clark, 13 June 1940, JBC Papers, 160.

52. Heidelberg and the Universities of America (New York, 1936), 61; School and Society, XLIII (11 April 1936), 512-13, and (2 May 1936), 590-91; Literary Digest, CXX (19 October 1935), 11-12; Nature, CXXXIX (16 January 1937), 98-100; Bentwich, The Rescue and Achievement of Refugee Scholars, 3-4; "The Professor from Heidelberg," in William Allan...
Neilson, ed., We Escaped: Twelve Personal Narratives of the Flight to America (New York, 1941), 28-38.

53. See similar letters in The Times, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 18, 20, 21, 22, 24, 27, 28, 29 February 1936; and Nature, CXXXVII (18 January 1936), 93-94, and (22, 29 February 1936), 303-4, 352, 364; Heidelberg and the Universities of America, passim.


55. Ibid., 29 February, 3-5, 8, 12, 16 March, 12, 29 April, 1, 7 May 1936; JBC, My Several Lives, 146. Copy of the letter is in JBC Papers, 53.

56. JBC to Charles Singer, 23 June 1936, JBC Papers, 59. In ibid., Stephen Stackpole to Roger N. Baldwin, 6 April 1936; and in ibid., 60, JBC to Julian Mack, 25 March 1936.

57. JBC to Mrs. Alfred Meyer, 23 March 1936, ibid., 59.

58. JBC to Dodds, 23 March 1937, ibid., 92; James R. Angell, 17 August 1936, ibid., 59; “Statement of JBC to Robert K. Lamb,” ca. 23 March 1936, in Frankfurter Papers, 49.


60. JBC to Butler, 23 March 1936; Butler to JBC, 31 March 1936, both in JBC Papers, 59.

61. JBC to Butler, 23, 27 April, 7 May 1936, ibid.


63. JBC to Angell, 17 August 1936; and Angell to JBC, 13 August 1936, both in JBC Papers, 59; JBC, My Several Lives, 148-54.

64. JBC to Charles Singer, 23 June 1936, copy in JBC Papers, 59. Conant did ask for a memorandum on Jung from Dr. Stanley Cobb, Harvard neuropathologist, and what he read apparently reassured him: JBC to Cobb, 8, 10 April 1936; Cobb to JBC, 18 May 1936, all in JBC Papers, 60.

65. For the protest against the invitation to Jung, see JBC to Julian Mack, 4, 25 March 1936; and Mack to JBC, 26 February, 8 March, 3 April 1936, JBC Papers, 60; Gordon W. Allport in Harvard Crimson, 27 May 1936.


69. JBC, Memorandum III, “Hitler Comes to Power.”


71. JBC to H. U. Braudenstein, 5 May 1937, JBC Papers, 83.

72. J. D. Greene, Secretary to the Corporation, to the Rector of Gottingen, 5 March 1937, ibid., 80.

73. JBC to Harold W. Dodds, 23 March 1937, ibid., 92; JBC to Harvard Corporation, 29 April 1937, ibid., 80. See also, in ibid., 80, Greene to JBC, 27 April 1937; G. Clark to JBC, 26 April 1937.

74. Greene to the Rector of Gottingen, 4 May 1937, ibid., 80. See also New York Times, 29 April, 8 May 1937; Boston Herald, 28 April, 8 May 1937; Boston Globe, 8 May 1937; Harvard Alumni Bulletin, XXXIX (14 May 1937), 900-1; JBC, My Several Lives, 146-47.

75. Harvard Crimson, 8 May 1937.

76. Greene to Caspar Weinberger, 10 May 1937, JBC Papers, 80.

77. JBC to Greene, 28 May 1937; Greene to JBC, 24 May, 1 June 1937, all in ibid.

78. See, for example, P.T.A. of P.S. 100, Brooklyn, N.Y. to JBC, 17 May 1937; Julius Creidenberg to JBC, 10 May 1937; Mrs. Josephine Reiner to JBC, 30 April 1937, all in ibid., 83; Boston Globe, 5 May 1937; Harvard Alumni Bulletin, XXXIX (4 June 1937), 997.