The 1930's opened with an omen of the pressures that would intensify attempts to form an effective antiwar coalition and at the same time would wedge irreconcilable differences of view between the factions of the peace movement. Japanese troops drove into Manchuria in September, 1931, and Toyohiko Kagawa wrote:

Again I have become a child of an aching heart,
Carrying the burden of Japan's crime,
Begging the pardon of China
and of the world,
With a shattered soul;
I have become a child of sadness.¹

The American State Department countered the Japanese attack on China with the Stimson Doctrine that it would not recognize any settlement that impaired the territorial or political sovereignty of China. The League of Nations vacillated, formed a commission to investigate, and finally condemned Japan, while trying to leave the way open for a negotiated peace in the Far East. About eighteen months after her attack, Japan withdrew from the League.

This crusade is being launched because of the serious possibility that within the near future a general war will break out in Europe and Asia. The signs of the times are more disquieting than during the years preceding the outbreak of the World War.

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In such a world governments have little confidence in treaties and are sceptical concerning the effectiveness of pacific agencies of justice. As an instrument of war prevention, the League of Nations is weak. And this fact constitutes one of the most ominous aspects of the present world situation. International anarchy produces war.

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The peace sentiment of the nation must be adequately organized if peace legislation is to be adhered to during the hysteria of crisis. Mass pressure from citizens is required both for the enactment and maintenance of a pacific foreign policy.

No-Foreign-War Crusade (1937)
The Manchurian crisis pre-empted the attention of the American peace movement, which had focused on fairly remote considerations of world organization, international law and moral regeneration. Even the program of arms reduction by international agreement, a political objective upon which the movement was united, was disrupted by the crisis.

In April, 1932, leaders of major peace groups formed an Interorganization Council on Disarmament (ICD) in order to coordinate activities designed to promote the success of the international disarmament conference in Geneva. The member groups fell into at least two broad wings. One consisted of traditional internationalists who, whether committed to international law or organization, were oriented to informational programs. They sought to educate the public; and, because their leaders were influential men, they also hoped to influence policy-makers informally. These were groups such as the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the World Peace Foundation, which antedated World War I, or the League of Nations Association and the Foreign Policy Association, which had their origins in the Great Crusade.

The other wing of the ICD consisted of groups whose leadership was largely, if not exclusively, pacifist—men and women who not only worked for peace but repudiated any given war. They, too, sought to inform the public on international affairs, but there were differences. For one thing, throughout the Twenties they had cultivated a moral opposition to war itself. For another, they were issue-oriented and had in fact considerable staff experience in organizing various segments of public opinion. The liberal pacifist groups were without exception formed during or immediately after World War I, and they combined a traditional pacifist repudiation of war per se with a progressive emphasis on social-political reform and transnational humanism. They included the Fellowship of Reconciliation, the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom and the National Council for Prevention of War.

Ironically, in view of their later alignment against collective security, liberal pacifists were most militant in response to the Manchurian incursion. Not all pacifists agreed, but the major pacifist groups supported collective sanctions against Japan, and they were a driving force within the ICD for collaboration with the League. James G. McDonald, chairman of the Foreign Policy Association and the ICD, was “shocked and horrified by the willingness of so-called radicals and pacifists to jump into the use of sanctions almost without thinking.” Nonetheless, the ICD itself was converted temporarily from a conference site into a pressure group, as an aroused peace movement tried to pull together in response to the Far Eastern crisis.

Unanimity did not last. The council divided over what programs it should urge upon policy-makers the following winter and spring. By autumn, 1932, the council had returned to its original design as an organization for educating and conferring. Six months later it dissolved, thus
ending a major attempt to coordinate the whole peace movement and paving the way for fresh coalitions.

The fleeting Interorganization Council for Disarmament contributed little to antiwar work and could be dismissed outright, except that it conveniently illustrates the pressures that determined the configuration of the peace movement in the Thirties.

At that time the cause of peace required a political response to the threat of real war and totalitarianism. Peace advocates of almost all persuasions accepted the validity of political activity—influencing decision-makers through personal contact or public groups—and political action required coalitions of peace societies to build and sustain antiwar public pressure. The consequence was a politically articulate, aggressive antiwar movement, aligning and realigning in search of bases for effective coalition. That was one axis (as it were) of antiwar strategy in the Thirties, and it represented continuity with coalition efforts in the previous decade.

The impact of war and totalitarianism also heightened latent differences of approach within the peace movement. These differences underlay and disrupted coalition efforts on behalf of arms limitation, neutrality legislation, an international conference for economic redistribution and neutral mediation. The ICD floundered in 1932 because the campaign for arms limitation had largely failed. (The Geneva conference accomplished nothing. It adjourned in July, 1932, resumed discussion from the following February to July, adjourned again and lingered on from October, 1933, until spring.) Disarmament, like defense, always had been an instrument of national policy; and in the Thirties peace advocates divided and realigned over basic, prior policy questions. The consequences were that traditional internationalists became increasingly political in their support of collective security, and that those liberal pacifists who in the Twenties had related to every internationalist approach became isolated from the broad peace movement in their pursuit of neutrality. That was the other axis of antiwar strategy in the Thirties—an ever sharper cleavage between pacifists and traditional internationalists—and this represented discontinuity from the Twenties.

Following the Manchurian crisis some traditional internationalists tried to develop an energetic program. Their efforts were given a fresh impetus when on January 29, 1935, the Senate failed to carry adherence to the World Court. Raymond Rich, general secretary of the World Peace Foundation, complained, "The peace forces, having for the most part disregarded the popular, are losing the populace."6 After a series of meetings, leaders in the League of Nations Association devised a political program and an organizational base which largely reflected the thinking of James T. Shotwell and Newton D. Baker. Their political program coupled issues then quite popular—control of arms traffic, war profits and disarmament—with the traditionalist objectives of world economic co-
operation and close American association with the League. Their organizational base envisioned a new coalition with the politically experienced pacifist wing, which itself was drafting a coordinated program through the fledgling National Peace Conference. Shotwell wanted the pacifists, their organizational apparatus and their constituency, but not their distinctive programs. He believed that it would be possible to give "recognition" to the National Peace Conference "while subordinating it to the broader plan" of traditional internationalists by naming the leadership and providing the funds.7

Quite to the contrary, when the new coalition was organized, late in 1935, it was coopted by the liberal pacifists. There were at least three reasons for this. First, Shotwell and Baker were unable to get the fifty thousand dollars they had budgeted, whereas the pacifists were able to raise that much or more on their own.8 Second, although the traditionalists were able to name the chairman, Walter Van Kirk, the pacifists won numerical balance on the steering committee and, with their prior involvement in politics, they obtained considerable initiative there.9 Third, the liberal pacifists already had designed a "broader plan" of their own to which the National Peace Conference itself was subordinated—a half million dollar Emergency Peace Campaign "to keep the United States from going to war," to promote such political and economic changes as "are essential to a just and peaceable world order," and to enlist pacifist organizations and individuals in this common cause.10 The Peace Campaign was fashioned and operated largely by leaders in the American Friends Service Committee and the Fellowship of Reconciliation.

FOR leaders especially looked to the political center for an antiwar coalition as the pressures of war and totalitarianism mounted. They found no effective base on the Left, with which they had frequently associated in the cause of social justice. Some of them had been attracted to the united front American League Against War and Fascism, organized in September, 1933, in response to a similar coalition in Europe. Other pacifists opposed cooperation with Communists in any case, and even those who initially were sympathetic soon were repelled when Communists coopted the League and manipulated it for their own purposes. The Socialist Party was riddled with factionalism in the mid-Thirties, and soon was placed in an awkward position on foreign affairs by the Spanish Civil War; Norman Thomas lobbied for strict neutrality legislation at the same time that he tried to defend his Party's legal right to intervene in the Spanish Civil War through the "Debs Column" of socialist volunteers.11 The Emergency Peace Campaign was aimed, therefore, at the political center.

It purported to represent a broad coalition of pacifists and non-pacifist civic groups, but actual decision-making was in the hands of a nucleus of pacifists who wielded large financial and staff resources. Special departments were set up to reach youth, labor, church and civic groups re-
spectively. A coordinated lobby swung into action in Washington. News releases and pamphlet literature flowed from a publicity department. Well known speakers (including Admiral Richard Byrd) were shuttled around the country. The campaign proceeded in a series of programs designed to stress the international crisis, to develop a "No-Foreign-War-Crusade" and to popularize world economic cooperation. Public events were numbered by the thousand; literature was distributed by the hundreds of thousand. The liberal pacifist leaders were able to focus public attention on specific issues, particularly neutrality; and traditional internationalists became increasingly restive in the coalition, which they feared was building isolationist sentiment.12

Their cooperation was based on the fact that there were many areas on which the peace movement agreed, that the pressure of a deteriorating international scene was clear, and that their own foreign policy programs were not yet clear. Under the varied rhetoric and diverse programs of the Emergency Peace Campaign there was a dual emphasis: neutrality and world economic cooperation. During the course of the campaign the alternative premises underlying both neutrality and international economic reconstruction became increasingly clear and divisive.

Pacifist leaders clarified their views on neutrality earlier than did traditional internationalists or the Administration. Early in the decade they lost hope in the League of Nations as an agency of either maintaining international order or negotiating changes in it; and as they watched the rise of totalitarian states they became convinced that peaceful change was necessary in order to maintain order.13 Their neutralism was thus grounded in their perceptions of events in Europe, although it was popularized by a moralistic rhetoric that obscured the analysis of a small coterie of leading pacifists—notably Socialist leader Norman Thomas, Socialist author and journalist Devere Allen, influential speaker and author Kirby Page, and Socialist Scott Nearing. Frederick Libby, of the National Council for Prevention of War; Dorothy Detzer, the lobbyist and political organizer for the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom; John Nevin Sayre and Harold Fey of the Fellowship of Reconciliation; A. J. Muste, FOR leader and an early radical organizer; and C. C. Morrison, editor of the Christian Century also were influential as was Reinhold Niebuhr until the mid-Thirties.14

Briefly, then, according to pacifist political theory, Germany, Italy and Japan faced serious internal weaknesses, and the means by which their rulers dealt with their problems increased the danger of war. Authority there rested superficially on military power, but actually it was based on an insecure and temporary acquiescence of the people. In order to secure control, therefore, dictators not only developed extraordinary economic measures, but also identified themselves with militant nationalistic creeds which they fashioned into elements of state cohesion and party loyalty.15
Moreover, these inherently belligerent states were the have-not nations of the industrial world.

The western democracies had divided up the markets, resources and underdeveloped territories of the world, explained Kirby Page. These nations had won and maintained their holdings through economic imperialism and military might. Then they had piously agreed that imperialist acquisition should be brought to an end. The most-favored nations thus perpetuated the status quo which benefitted them and which they alone could change peaceably.16

Their analysis of the threat to world peace apparently posed by both the internal instability and the international disadvantage of totalitarian states led some pacifists to react to fascist aggression in terms of two principles: to strengthen democracy in nonfascist countries (such as Spain), and to alleviate the differences between have and have-not nations through peaceful means. They shared this analysis and these goals with many non-pacifists, including especially Socialists.

At this point they concluded that the crux of the peace problem was not totalitarianism per se but, rather, the inflexibility of political and economic arrangements. They differed from traditional internationalists principally in their belief that collective security as interpreted by the great European powers in their own economic and territorial interests contributed to the very rigidity in international affairs that made war likely. Pacifists who had advocated collective sanctions against Japan quickly lost hope in the League and abandoned collective security. Years later, when Nazi warplanes multiplied Shanghai’s horror in Warsaw, Charles Clayton Morrison recalled that the principle had broken down in Manchuria. In the absence of a working international system, he said, a discriminatory embargo was clearly an alliance for war.17 The great powers would act only in their own interests to freeze the status quo. The League was an international instrument, but not an agency of internationalism. Pacifist leaders interpreted neutrality as a strategy for a flexible foreign policy which might be used in order to strengthen internationalism.

Neither the State Department nor the traditional internationalists had formulated a firm neutrality policy by 1935. The situation was ripe for aggressive congressional initiative at just the time that pacifist-led groups became virtually unanimous in pressing for neutrality legislation that would be impartial and apply to all belligerents, and mandatory in regard to the President. They operated through the National Council for Prevention of War, the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom and the isolationist bloc in the Senate. They were instrumental in securing the Neutrality Act of 1935 which abandoned the traditional neutral rights to trade and required an impartial embargo of all belligerents, which was extended with few changes to May 1, 1937.18

Accordingly, when the traditional internationalists joined pacifists
in a political coalition in 1935-1936, they joined a movement already geared for impartial neutrality designed to keep America out of war. This did not seem to be a serious obstacle at the time.

The traditionalists had expected to dominate the coalition, of course. But, in any case, they still regarded collective security as consonant with a neutral embargo. That was the minimal commitment to collectivism that Norman Davis had pledged at the Geneva Disarmament Conference in 1933: the United States would promise not to obstruct collective sanctions applied against an aggressor state. This “negative declaration” seems to have been assumed adequate in 1935-1936 by the leaders of the League of Nations Association, although it was thrown into serious question in the Ethiopian crisis. An American embargo on all belligerents would act unilaterally but in concert with any international embargo applied to an aggressor. It would be the best of all possible worlds.

Not the impartiality of the embargo, but rather the question of whether it should be mandatory upon the President seems to have precipitated the split in peace forces. In negotiating the Neutrality Acts of 1935, 1936 and 1937 the Administration had jealously guarded its discretionary ability to determine when a state of war might exist and when, therefore, an embargo should be applied. Anything less permissive than that would jeopardize the power of the Executive to conduct the foreign relations of the United States, in the view of the State Department. Pacifists were not satisfied with the way the Administration exercised its discretion, however; they pressed for the invocation of an impartial embargo in the China war, in Ethiopia and—with Socialists—in the Spanish Civil War. When, in the fall of 1937, they received the impression from Roosevelt’s “Quarantine Speech” that the President might pursue a policy of applying sanctions selectively in alliance with other great powers, they resumed their attack upon his discretionary powers in foreign policy. They campaigned actively for the Ludlow constitutional amendment requiring a national referendum on involvement in any foreign war; and consideration of it was narrowly defeated in the House on January 10, 1938.

The Ludlow Amendment campaign precipitated the political organization of traditional internationalists and helped them to define the neutrality issue. Convinced that so-called impartial neutrality legislation was operating to isolate American policy and that the neutrality campaigns were generating isolationism, Clark Eichelberger and his League of Nations Association staff began to mobilize traditional internationalists on behalf of discretionary embargoes against aggressor states. In effect, they began to promote actively that very concept of collective security which the pacifists had feared. They solicited support for a “Statement on Behalf of Concerted Peace Efforts” and opposition to the Ludlow Amendment. The significance of their efforts was not lost on James T. Shotwell, who himself had tried to create a peace coalition.
without securing adequate political leverage within it. "Good general­ship in the strategy of the peace movement," he now said, was represented by the aggressive director of the League of Nations Association [Eichelderger] who, with his staff, would organize a series of committees to make successive assaults on American neutrality. The controversy generated alternative organizations for political influence within the peace coalition and the public.

Meanwhile, the liberal pacifists and traditional internationalists were still working together in the Emergency Campaign, now promoting world economic cooperation. This was not a new idea. It had been sponsored by League of Nations bodies since at least 1922; and in the winter of 1936 George Lansbury, leader of the British Labour Party, had sought in vain to secure a resolution committing England to call a world conference to negotiate equilization of the resources of discontented nations. Lansbury was the featured speaker opening the Emergency Peace Campaign program in April, and he not only dwelt on an international conference in his speeches, but also discussed it with President Roosevelt before leaving the country. The President was cautious, saying he would need some solid "peg" upon which to hang a meeting of such magnitude.

Lansbury got his peg with the help of the International Fellowship of Reconciliation, with headquarters in England, which created an Embassies of Reconciliation in order to take the cause of peace directly to national leaders. Private citizens were designated as informal ambassadors in order to confer with government officials and establish some basis for negotiating peace before fighting should break out. Lansbury was the first citizen-ambassador appointed. In the spring of 1937 he conferred with the prime ministers of France, Belgium, Denmark, Norway and Sweden, and with Hitler in Berlin. Subsequently he interviewed Mussolini and traveled with other representatives of the private group to the capitals of Southeastern Europe, and to Prague, Warsaw and Vienna. The most important conversation was, of course, that with Hitler who assured Lansbury that Germany would cooperate in a united effort if Roosevelt would take the lead in calling an economic conference.

Peace leaders of all political persuasions were employing Roosevelt to take the lead, and their project got unimpeachable support in January, 1938, from an exhaustive report on international economic conditions by a former Belgian prime minister, Paul Van Zeeland (with whom Lansbury had met). Van Zeeland urged the great powers to collaborate on specific items which would "impart to the world the impetus which it is awaiting in order to recover confidence in the pacific destiny of nations."

Roosevelt was already, and unluckily, familiar with the idea of a world conference, for the British had spurned the notion when it was broached early in 1938. Preliminary negotiations had been initiated
in January for a comprehensive peace conference emphasizing economic problems and treaty revision, but the plan was rejected by Neville Chamberlain. The President had realized then that a conference to redress international grievances was not a realistic alternative to European war because such a conference could not be convened. Peace advocates learned this after September, 1939; but even in the process of promoting an economic conference they had divided over its meaning.

The Emergency Peace Campaign convened its own Conference on World Economic Cooperation at the end of March, and the traditional internationalists were dominant. Their experts supported Cordell Hull's reciprocal-trade-agreements program and also some aspects of the Van Zeeland report, but they argued, too, that any revisions of the Neutrality Law should be made flexible enough to distinguish between aggressors and victims. Their report fixed the division among internationalists between those who supported a strategy of collective action to contain aggression on the grounds that political order was a prerequisite for economic cooperation, and those pacifists who opposed the further alignment of the world into armed ideological camps on the grounds that basic economic change was a prerequisite for international order.

The project for a world economic conference, like those for disarmament, neutrality and the Emergency Peace Campaign itself, yielded division. There was no alternative to separation. About a week after the disruptive conference on economic affairs, Eichelberger resigned as director of the Campaign for World Economic Cooperation, organizing instead what Shotwell called a series of assaults on neutrality. During the next three years, under the pressure of fascist war abroad, his search for a coalition in support of collective sanctions against aggressors aligned him and his committees with those who urged outright intervention on behalf of the democracies.

That is to say, the pressure of war and totalitarianism still operated to engender political coalitions even as it divided the internationalists.

Pacifists felt this pressure acutely after the defeat of the Ludlow Amendment and the debacle of world economic cooperation. By the spring of 1938 they had formed a coalition with Socialists under the leadership of Norman Thomas, the Keep America Out of War Congress. Thoroughly alarmed by the organization of collective security advocates, pacifists cemented their alliance with Thomas early in February and launched it with a public meeting in New York on March 6. This was still the only national antiwar coalition opposed to collective security when the German troops rolled out across the low countries two years later. There were serious weaknesses in it. Pacifist organizations, particularly the Fellowship of Reconciliation and the Friends Service Committee, were shifting their resources away from political lines in order to provide for their relief work and their religious and conscientious
objector constituencies in the event of war. The Socialist Party was divided over foreign policy, among other issues, and Communists still exerted a disruptive and unpredictable influence. Moreover, the initial void on the political right was quickly filled by the America First Committee, organized in the summer of 1940 in reaction to Eichelberger's efforts for collective security.

By January, 1941, the America First Committee was obtaining public and financial support that the Keep America Out of War Congress could not tap. Reluctantly, the antiwar left associated with America First in an effort to build antiwar public pressure, but in doing so it associated with the fortress America concept. The conservative and isolationist drift of the coalition resulted in the loss of most pacifist support by the spring of 1941. Increasingly, it was dominated by antiwar Socialists. By fall the Keep America Out of War Congress was a bankrupt, paper organization.

World War II seemed to hit the American people with the suddenness of the waves of planes that unleashed destruction over Pearl Harbor. But it came as something of an anticlimax in the travail of those who had advocated a strategy of neutrality in the cause of peace, because they already had suffered defeat in their essential political goals. The President had extended American military and economic goods to the Allies, had accepted naval commitments in the Atlantic and had revised neutrality legislation. Whether or not the country would have taken additional steps into the European war had it not been attacked in the Pacific, the President had sufficient executive power to conduct limited intervention. That, and not the war itself, was the essential political defeat for the neutralists.

For those neutralists who also were internationalists there was a more profound, subtler defeat. Faced with the impact of real war and totalitarianism, they had organized brilliantly for political effectiveness. They had formed a strong coalition with traditional internationalists whose commitment to peace through international organization and justice they shared. Conceiving of neutralism as a flexible instrument for internationalism and viewing collective security as a way of making lines of national conflict more rigid, a few pacifists had bent every effort to commit the public to strict and adamant neutrality. They had tried to press even the peace coalition into this service, and they had seen it break apart.

Equally serious, tactically, was their inability to maintain an independent, transnational and political organizational base once the coalition of the Center had been shattered. Besides, to a great extent they elevated specific political objectives above their own perceptions of international affairs, and they stressed the moral imperative of keeping out of war over their own political analysis of international conflict. Consequently, neutralism was unalterably—if not, indeed, logically—associated only with isolationism. The very pressures of war and totalitarianism that had led to the formation of a great coalition symbolized by the Emergency Peace
Campaign had heightened the differences of outlook that broke it; and they ultimately weakened the force of the international vision claimed by those opposed to the strategy of collective security.

There was neither an ideological nor an organizational base for a broadly progressive antiwar coalition just prior to World War II or during it (as there had been in World War I). Internationalism was identified with collective security and then with wartime alliance. Neutralism was identified with isolationism. A premise of Cold War analysis—that international, liberal values are best served by being unconditionally committed to one side in a polarized world—was laid late in the Thirties. Or, rather, alternative world views were deprived then of a significant organizational base, at least until the nation would become the child of an aching heart, carrying the burden of crime, begging the pardon of Viet Nam and of the world:

"With a shattered soul; I have become a child of sadness."

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footnotes


2. The Interorganization Council on Disarmament was designed as a clearinghouse, but it soon became a lobbying and publicizing agency, even sending a delegation to Secretary of State Henry Stimson on November 14, 1931. A preliminary meeting took place on March 30, 1931, and the organization was operational in April, although its name was not formally adopted until September 29, 1931. James G. McDonald, chairman of the Foreign Policy Association, was the first chairman, and he was succeeded by Walter Van Kirk in the fall of 1932 in the wake of disagreements over the role of the council. Particularly active were McDonald, Van Kirk, Philip Nash, Roswell Barnes, Dorothy Detzer, Frederick Libby, Tucker P. Smith and John Nevin Sayre. Minutes of the ICD, Swarthmore College Peace Collection (SCPC), 1931-1933.

3. The interwar peace movement has been characterized systematically in John Masland, “The Peace Groups Join Battle,” Public Opinion Quarterly, IV (December, 1940), 36-73; Elton Atwater, Organized Efforts in the United States Toward Peace (Washington, D.C., 1936), and “Organizing American Public Opinion for Peace,” Public Opinion Quarterly, I (April, 1937), 112-121; and Allan Kuusisto, “The Influence of the National Council for Prevention of War on United States Foreign Policy, 1935-39” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1950), 24-25. Only the latter is based on research in primary materials and its focus is limited. The groups representing traditional internationalists were often related through Carnegie Endowment funding.

4. The National Council for Prevention of War (NCPW) was not a pacifist organization, but its dynamic leader, Frederick J. Libby, was a Quaker pacifist and its staff, except for Mrs. Laura Puffer Morgan, was thoroughly committed to strict neutrality. See Libby, To End War (Nyack, N.Y., 1949), NCPW papers (SCPC), and Libby's diaries (in possession of Mrs. Libby).

Some of the liberal pacifist groups were, like the Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR) and denominational peace groups, religious; others, such as the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) were secular, civic societies. The records and minutes for nearly all of them are in the SCPC.


7. James T. Shotwell to Newton D. Baker, October 22, 1935, Baker papers, box 242. The committee was composed of James Shotwell, Roland Morris (a Philadelphia lawyer), and Senator John Pope. George Blakeslee (president of the World Peace Foundation) and John Clarke (former Supreme Court Justice and a founder of the League of Nations Non-Partisan
11. Thomas sought at first to exempt the Spanish Civil War from the provisions of
the neutrality law, since it worked a particular hardship on the loyalists, by supporting a neutral
embargo against all belligerents except in the case of armed rebellion against "democratically
elected government." Thomas to the Hon. Sam McReynolds, February 20, 1937, Norman
Thomas papers, New York Public Library. When the embargo was retained, he urged that it
be applied also against Italy and Germany, which were supplying Franco with arms.

12. The full records of the EPC are held at the SCPC, and include the Minutes. See also
Devere Allen's publication, World Events, for coverage in this period, and the parallel files of
the NCPW, FOR and WILPF.

13. It must be emphasized that this analysis was not confined to pacifists, but that ele­
ments of it can be found in the writings of traditional internationalists—in the work of James
Shotwell, for example, and in the Memoirs of Cordell Hull. Perhaps the best example of a
similar but non-pacifist evaluation is John Foster Dulles, War, Peace and Change (New York,
1939). Dulles wrote his approval of Kirby Page's Must We Go to War? (New York, 1937)
insofar as its analysis of the international situation was concerned.

14. Their point of view was developed in detail in The World Tomorrow and was s­
terrated throughout organizational minutes and resolutions. It was not shared systematically by
the great body of pacifists or the public, but these leaders largely defined the issues for their
constituents.

15. Liberal pacifists were in close touch with pacifist friends in the totalitarian countries
and, in the cases of Norman Thomas and Devere Allen particularly, with Socialists there.
They knew personally exiles such as Paul Tillich. John Nevin Sayre and his friends received
extensive and astute commentary throughout the Manchurian crisis from a pacifist mis­
sionary in Japan. The German situation was followed closely and intelligently in the pages
of The World Tomorrow.

16. As Kirby Page put it, a conflict between the democracies and the totalitarian states
would be a struggle between "the self-righteousness of the surfeited with the self-assertion of
the frustrated." Must We Go to War?, 25. See also Norman Thomas, Socialism on the
Defensive (New York, 1938), 11-12, 187.

17. Morrison, "The Shattered Fabric of World Peace," The Christian Century, LIV (Sep­
tember 15, 1939), 1128-1129.

18. Pacifist groups had supported discretionary neutrality legislation in 1929, 1931, 1932
and 1933, so that their shift in the wake of the Manchurian crisis was all the more significant.

The NCPW and WILPF provided extensive lobbying services, gathering material, writing
speeches and radio talks for neutralist senators, providing the press with news releases, s­
cheduling public meetings and mobilizing civic contacts built up in years of disarmament
campaigns, as well as working in the capitol itself. Regarding the 1935 legislation see Depart­
ment of State, Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941 (Washington, D.C.,
1945), 266-271; for detailed treatment of the 1936 legislation see Robert A. Divine, Illusion of
Neutrality (Chicago, 1962), 122-159.

19. The FOR, WILPF and NCPW urged the invocation of neutrality legislation with
regard to Ethiopia, and asked that it be extended to subsidiary exports as well as arms. Spain
was more difficult. Some urged outright repeal in order that Spanish loyalists might receive
aid, but most urged that the neutrality laws be applied and, in fact, extended to Germany
and Italy. In any case, the prevalent feeling was expressed by Devere Allen that American
pseudoneutrality actually benefited the Nationalists, that the western democracies had ele­
vated their own national interests and called them principles.

20. The Ludlow Amendment was introduced in the House of Representatives in 1935,
1937 and 1938. Similar measures had been introduced in every Congress since 1922. The
NCPW helped to organize a hearing on the bill in 1935, and its whole staff worked on the
project in 1937.

of Nations Records, Columbia University.

23. Lansbury to Roosevelt, May 26, 1936, FDR papers, OF 394, box 1 (Hyde Park); and Lansbury, My Pilgrimage for Peace (New York, 1938), 61-65.


28. Originally called the Keep America Out of War Committee, the name was changed to Congress at a large meeting in Washington that spring. Frederick J. Libby diary, January 17, 18, 22 and 26, 1938; “Keep America Out of War Committee; An Outline of Its Origin, Program, and Plan,” n.d. [1938], Kirby Page papers (Claremont, Calif.); Minutes of the Keep America Out of War Committee, February 7, 1938, Norman Thomas papers, box 27.

29. Minutes of the Keep America Out of War Congress, especially September 30, 1941.