"... Politics is business. That's what's the matter with it. That's what's the matter with everything,—art, literature, religion, journalism, law, medicine,—they're all business, and all—as you see them." Steffens, The Shame of the Cities (New York, 1957 [1904]), 4.


15. Chapman, Causes and Consequences, 7, 101. Practical Agitation (New York, 1900), 144. Chapman made use of the ideas of the German educator Friedrich Froebel to argue that the growth of the whole man depended upon his creative interaction with others for unselfish ends (Causes, 83-112). Chapman's emphasis on the fundamental bond between creative self-expression and cooperative activity closely paralleled the educational theories of John Dewey and others among the Progressives. Such ideas lent support to the view that individual creativity and disinterestedness were two sides of the same coin.


17. Lippmann, A Preface to Politics, 49.


19. In discussing the motives for educated, middle-class persons entering settlement work, Jane Addams pointed out that to ignore the struggle against starvation, which was the central element in human history and still occupied at least half the race, deadened one's sympathies and powers of enjoyment and forced one "to live out half the humanity which we have been born heir to and to use but half our faculties." ("The Subjective Necessity for Social Settlements" [1892], reprinted in The Social Thought of Jane Addams, ed. Christopher Lasch [New York, 1965], 35). Max Eastman remarked that if contemporary artists exhibited a tendency "to linger among destitutes and prostitutes and those whom exploitation has driven to vagrancy and crime, this is not because these seem truer subjects of art, but because they are subjects of art which have so long been unrecognized." (Journalism Versus Art [New York, 1916], 58). As a youthful writer in New York, Brooks went through a Bohemian phase. (Scenes and Portraits, 124, 151-152.)


22. Waldo Frank dated the new critical movement in America from the appearance of Croly's book. (The Rediscovery of America, 314.) Brooks drew on Croly to support his own thinking on the exploitive instinct of the pioneer mind and the stultifying effect of business on individuality. (The Ordeal of Mark Twain [New York, 1920], 44-45, 60-61.)


27. Frank, The Rediscovery of America, 314.


bryan, norris
and the doctrine of
party responsibility

shirley ann lindeen
james walter lindeen

The institutions and processes of American political life are more
the subjects of controversy today than at any time since the reformist
decades 1900-1920. Very frequently political parties are the institutions
singled out for special attention by the critics; and whether the discus­sants are practicing politicians, members of the electorate or academi­cians, invariably they are concerned with party cohesiveness and respon­sibility. Should our parties develop programs, operate the government
(or criticize it) in accordance with those policies and be accountable as
a whole to the electorate? Or should they continue to be rather loose
coalitions that amass majority support for the regime and promote
candidates for public office? In this discussion at least two points should
be recalled: First, that in the event of a liberal-conservative realign­ment the party of the Right would have little chance for national
success. Second, that American political parties are not so incohesive
as some of their critics might suggest.

Like many controversies, the present issue of party cohesion and
discipline can be illuminated in the light of historical experience. We
believe that, by contrasting two Congresses from the turn of the century
and by comparing the attitudes toward party discipline of two particular
members of those Congresses, it will be possible to suggest a typology of
party behavior. This model can, in turn, re-focus discussions about the
American national political arena and guide inquiry into political party
systems in general. The two men who have been selected for special
scrutiny are William Jennings Bryan and George W. Norris. In addition
to their attitudes as expressed orally and in written form, their views of
party will be inferred from the record of roll-call votes that they left
behind as freshman members of the United States House of Repre­sentatives.
The history of the House of Representatives suggests that occasion­ally considerable party discipline can occur in American politics—at least in that body and given certain preconditions. Both high and low degrees of party cohesion are to be found in the voting records of the House near the turn of the last century.

The Fifty-second (1891-93) and Fifty-eighth (1903-05) Congresses provide a contrast in party cohesion. Party discipline was minimal in the Fifty-second Congress, particularly on the majority (Democratic) side of the aisle; it was notably high in the Fifty-eighth—and particular­ly so on the majority (Republican) side. These differences in central tendency probably result from a number of causes. A contributing factor probably was that the earlier Congress was organized by the Democratic Party at a time when low legislative cohesion was fashionable politically. Strong party discipline had come to be the norm twelve years later, however, when the Republicans were ascendant in the House. That the majority party also held the Presidency in 1903 but not in 1891 would be a second influence. The creation of the office of party whip in 1897 must have made some additional contribution to the difference. The issues of the times had an impact upon cohesion, as did the different professional skills of the two Speakers of the House, Charles F. Crisp (D.-Ga.) and Joseph G. Cannon (R.-Ill.). Crisp met with such frustra­tion that he resigned from the House to run for the Senate. In contrast, Cannon was eminently successful at coalition building—indeed, too suc­cessful—and his high-handed methods of dealing with the Insurgents in his own party led to his downfall in 1910. “Uncle Joe” was beaten then only by what he regarded as deviousness; and even the strongest supporters of the Insurgent leader of that later date and one of the subjects of this study, Norris, would concede that Cannonism was defeated only through good fortune and consummate political skill. The disciplined, programmatic party that interests some Americans was not exemplified by Cannon’s Fifty-eighth Congress; and neither was the Fifty-second Congress the best alternative to disciplined party action. In fact, both of them seem to have been pathological conditions of legislative partisanship. Either too little or too much direction was supplied by the Speaker and his organization.

The roster of members of the Fifty-second and Fifty-eighth Con­gresses, respectively, included William Jennings Bryan and George W. Norris. Their selection for special attention here is owing partly to their compatible views on public policies and to their similar constitu­encies (probably they are the best known historical political figures to have come out of the state of Nebraska). But they have been selected
also because they approximate archetypes of the two poles of the party discipline and cohesion issues. Despite their national reputations both suffered numerous disappointments within their parties; yet Bryan stayed within the Democratic organization while Norris left the G.O.P. after years of intra-party discontent. Both belonged to the more liberal wings of their parties; both were relative newcomers to the districts that they represented as freshmen members in Washington. Bryan was only one year older than Norris and their active careers in national politics coincided for twenty-three years. Neither had prior legislative experience before entering the House of Representatives. Both were elected from "unsafe" districts, and both entered upon a congressional career as strong supporters of their parties.

Their subsequent paths as partisans within their parties diverged, however. Although falling from a position of influence in the Democratic Party after 1915, Bryan was unfailing in his enthusiasm for what party might accomplish. He was not adamant that one must adhere always to his party, yet he favored regularity wherever possible. Norris was of the opposite view. Eventually he left the Republicans. Still, he refused to join with the Democracy (with which he was ideologically compatible), for it was regarded as being further from salvation than the party he had just abandoned. The extent of Norris’ beliefs became apparent from his advocacy of the “non-partisan party” in 1913—a full twenty-nine years before he was defeated for re-election to the Senate in 1942.

Bryan was not uncomfortable during his two terms in the House. He was concerned with higher office, and probably looked upon his four years in Washington as a period of apprenticeship. He was selected to the influential Committee on Ways and Means as a result of an agreement between Speaker Crisp and Rep. William Springer (D.-Ill.), an old friend whom Bryan had supported for the Speakership but who was persuaded to withdraw his candidacy for the office. Bryan joined those Southern and Western Democratic members who ignored party lines on tariff and monetary issues. Although Werner went too far in crediting Rep. Joseph W. Bailey (D.-Tex.) with introducing him to the importance of bimetallism, the Nebraskan did develop greater interest in the issue when his district was altered to increase the number of debtor farm voters in the 1892 election. It has been said that Bryan saw politics as a struggle between good and evil, and certainly he was a moralizer on many social issues. But unlike many who are convinced of the rightness of their ideas, he was willing to support a platform or candidate in the short run in exchange for the subsequent support of the party when his views might prevail in the future. He supported Alton B. Parker in 1904, and supported the Democratic Party even when it selected Wall Street lawyer John W. Davis as its Presidential nominee in 1924. This hope of greater gain through party solidarity typifies
the thinking of the party responsibility theorists; and because Bryan and his policies were influential in the Democratic Party for two decades, his philosophy was tested in actual political confrontation.

The experiences of George Norris as a freshman member of the House contrasted with those of Bryan twelve years before. Norris changed from extreme partisan to party critic during his first three to five years in the chamber. He had been supported for district judge in 1895 by Republican creditor interests against a Populist incumbent, and later he said that he was as bitter a partisan as any at that time. He was on good terms with Speaker Cannon and the Party during his first term, although he broke party ranks only a few weeks after taking his seat. A Democrat had moved to recess the House for Washington's birthday and the Republican members opposed the motion en masse, in keeping with the strong party discipline of the time. Norris liked the motion on its merits, however, and the Democrats were surprised to find him among them on a teller vote. After receiving a severe upbraiding from his Republican colleagues for crossing the aisle, the freshman member was downcast until he happened past the Senate wing on February 22. There a motion to recess for the national holiday had been brought by a Republican rather than by a member of the minority; it had passed, and the Senate chamber was vacant. Norris was embittered by this first of many instances of what seemed to be the influence of whim and of partisanship for its own sake over the true principles of Republicanism as he understood them. It seems significant that he maintained his quarrels to be with the system of partisanship itself and not with the men through whom it operated. He was elected to the Senate in 1913. There he opposed American entry into World War I, associated himself with numerous Democratic programs during the Twenties and Thirties, and achieved notice in the South as the father of the Tennessee Valley Authority. Still, he refused to cross the aisle in 1936 when he declared himself to be henceforth an Independent. Just as the party loyalty of Bryan contrasts with that of Eugene McCarthy in 1968, so does the political independence of Norris after 1936 contrast with the willingness of Sen. Wayne Morse (R., I., D.-Ore.) to affiliate himself with his former opponents.

A more systematic comparison of the degrees of partisanship seen by Bryan and Norris as first-term congressmen can be made through roll-call analysis. The twenty-five most significant roll-call votes in which each man participated as freshmen members can be examined, with "significance" defined empirically as highest when (1) all members of the House are present and voting, and (2) the outcome of that vote is decided by a single aye or nay. Moreover, these twenty-five roll calls have been selected from areas of policy that are as nearly distinct as possible.
The statistical measure of roll-call significance was devised by William Riker. Significance is highest when all members are present and voting and the outcome is decided by a single vote, and lowest when a bare quorum participate and all voters are on the same side. In the 435-member modern Congress, significance is highest for an outcome of 218 to 217 (or vice-versa) and lowest at 218 to 0. The formula for computing the coefficient is

\[ S = n - q - m + 2 + \frac{n - r + 1}{n - t + 2} \]

where \( n \) is the number of members of the voting body (Congress), \( q \) is the number on the losing side in the roll call under study, \( m \) is the minimum number of votes necessary for victory when \( r \) voters participate, \( r \) is the number voting on the roll call being studied, and \( t \) is the number needed for a quorum. Riker, “A Method for Determining the Significance of Roll Calls in Voting Bodies,” in John C. Wahlke and Heinz Eulau, eds., Legislative Behavior: A Reader in Theory and Research (Glencoe, Ill., 1959), 379-380, cited in Lee F. Anderson, Meredith W. Watts, Jr. and Allen R. Wilcox, Legislative Roll-Call Analysis (Evanston, Ill., 1966), 82-83.

A preliminary judgment of the importance of party membership, regionalism, tenure and other variables can be suggested statistically. Party membership was determined to be a statistically significant variable by the chi-square test at the .01 level in twenty-two of the roll-call votes of the Fifty-second Congress and in twenty-four of the roll calls in the Fifty-eighth. Sectionalism was statistically significant only twelve times in the Bryan Congress, however, and fourteen times during Norris’ initial term of office. Tenure in office was a significant predictor of voting but three times in both Congresses. Applying this type of standard, it seems clear that party affiliation was the leading determinant of voting on these selected roll calls even in the period 1891-93.15

The chi-square test of significance has been used here. Chi-square compares outcomes that have been determined empirically with what would have been expected to occur by random chance or under certain theoretical assumptions. The difference between expectation and reality is compared with any of the standard tables of chi-square values. The statistic is described in most elementary texts on quantitative methods. See Hubert M. Blalock, Social Statistics (New York, 1960), 212-221.

A closer analysis of partisanship per se is obtained by comparing the Rice Indexes of Cohesion of the two parties in each Congress. In the Fifty-second Congress the Democratic majority was less cohesive than the Republican members on twenty-two of the twenty-five occasions. Because both parties were unanimous on two roll calls, this means that the majority party in the House was more cohesive on only one of the twenty-five selected votes—and that was on a motion to allow Sunday memorial services for those congressmen who might pass away during the coming session. The mean indexes of cohesion during the Fifty-
second Congress were .31 for the Democrats and .72 for the G.O.P. A sharp contrast had occurred by the time that Norris entered the House—especially in the cohesion of the Democrats. The Republican Party had a greater central tendency on only fifteen occasions; and the mean cohesion of the indexes had increased to .81 for the Democrats and .86 for the majority-party Republicans. The discipline being imposed on both sides of the aisle was far stronger in 1903-04 than it had been when Bryan was a member of the House.

The Rice index is simply the difference between the percentage of a party's members who are on one side of a vote and the percentage on the other. It is found through an ordinary subtraction operation. Party unanimity yields as index of 1.00 (100 percent less 0 percent). There would seem to be an absence of party cohesion if half of the members were on either side of an issue, in which case the index would be .00 (50 percent minus 50 percent); three-fourths on one side and one quarter on the other yields .50 (75 percent less 25 percent), and so on. Stuart Rice argued that these indexes may be compared more conveniently than percentages. Rice, *Quantitative Methods in Politics* (New York, 1928), 209.

How loyal were Bryan and Norris to their own parties? Norris seems to be the greater partisan by one measure, for he voted differently from the majority of his party only three times out of twenty-five, while Bryan differed on seven roll calls. But Democratic organization under Speaker Crisp was so loose that despite his seven defections Bryan's party loyalty was greater than that of sixty-five percent of his party colleagues. Notwithstanding his loyalty on twenty-two occasions, however, Norris ranked below seventy-seven percent of the Republican members of the Fifty-eighth Congress in this respect. It must have seemed ironic to Norris that despite his efforts to vote with his party so frequently he still came to be accused of disloyalty. Bryan, on the other hand, may have seen the ineffectiveness of his own party as being related to its low level of cohesion.

The significance of sectionalism warrants comparing the votes of Bryan and Norris with those of congressmen from both major parties in each of eight regions of the country. Only members who participated on thirteen or more roll calls have been analyzed. The table below presents, by party and region, the average number of votes cast identically with one of the two subjects by relevant congressmen. The fourteen New England Democrats, for example, among themselves cast a total of 112 votes identical to positions taken by Bryan. The highest possible number of identical votes would have been (14 X 25), or 350. Dividing 112 by 14, the mean number of identical votes from that region is 8.0.

Merriam's observation is verified that Bryan represented the West (North Central and East Central) and South (Solid South and Border), against the North and East (New England and Middle Atlantic)—especially within his own party. The only aberration from this general-
average number of identical votes, by party and region, on twenty-five selected roll calls

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Democrats Fifty-second Cong. (Bryan)</th>
<th>Republicans Fifty-second Cong. (Bryan)</th>
<th>Democrats Fifty-eighth Cong. (Norris)</th>
<th>Republicans Fifty-eighth Cong. (Norris)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New England</td>
<td>8.0 (N=14)</td>
<td>5.5 (N=8)</td>
<td>3.0 (N=6)</td>
<td>15.3 (N=21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.H., R.I., Vt.</td>
<td>7.6 (N=34)</td>
<td>5.1 (N=23)</td>
<td>3.4 (N=17)</td>
<td>15.4 (N=42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid Atlantic</td>
<td>12.7 (N=50)</td>
<td>5.7 (N=18)</td>
<td>4.6 (N=10)</td>
<td>15.7 (N=51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pa.</td>
<td>13.7 (N=69)</td>
<td>7.4 (N=11)</td>
<td>3.8 (N=16)</td>
<td>17.5 (N=33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East North Central</td>
<td>12.9 (N=21)</td>
<td>7.4 (N=11)</td>
<td>3.4 (N=16)</td>
<td>13.0 (N=33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mich., O., Wisc.</td>
<td>10.3 (N=60)</td>
<td>5.0 (N=0)</td>
<td>3.4 (N=70)</td>
<td>12.5 (N=1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*West North Central</td>
<td>15.3 (N=26)</td>
<td>6.3 (N=2)</td>
<td>3.0 (N=15)</td>
<td>16.4 (N=6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minn., Mo., Nebr., D.D.</td>
<td>15.4 (N=42)</td>
<td>6.3 (N=4)</td>
<td>3.0 (N=1)</td>
<td>17.1 (N=7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solid South</td>
<td>9.0 (N=2)</td>
<td>7.0 (N=3)</td>
<td>5.0 (N=2)</td>
<td>17.1 (N=9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border States (Ky., Md., Okla., Tenn., W. Va.)</td>
<td>10.3 (N=60)</td>
<td>5.0 (N=0)</td>
<td>3.4 (N=70)</td>
<td>12.5 (N=1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountain States (Calif., Ore., Wash.)</td>
<td>10.3 (N=60)</td>
<td>5.0 (N=0)</td>
<td>3.4 (N=70)</td>
<td>12.5 (N=1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western States</td>
<td>10.3 (N=60)</td>
<td>5.0 (N=0)</td>
<td>3.4 (N=70)</td>
<td>12.5 (N=1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Denotes the region in which the constituencies of Bryan and Norris were located.

Bryan’s votes were more like the votes cast by others from his own region. As might be anticipated from the writing of Charles Merriam, his voting was not too dissimilar from the behavior of congressmen from the Solid South or East North Central areas either. Norris also voted most similarly with those from his own region, but his closest geographical allies came from the Western and Mountain areas.

The preceding considerations indicate that there is more than a single dimension by which to evaluate party performance. The familiar one, of course, is cohesion. Degrees of cohesion range from unanimity to complete absence of central tendency, and either of these extremes can yield creditable or unacceptable legislative performances. A second dimension might entail normative cognitions of the worth of the partisanship encountered in political life. There can be an “ideal” situation from which rational decisions emerge about public policy, or a “pathological” condition as well—the rebellious condition of the Democratic Party under Crisp or the dominated nature of both parties during
the Cannon period. A typology can be constructed from these two
dimensions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cohesion</th>
<th>Ideal</th>
<th>Pathological</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Undisciplined</td>
<td>Programmatic Party</td>
<td>Dictatorial Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disciplined</td>
<td>Deliberative Party</td>
<td>Insurrectional Party</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The normative evaluation of "ideal" relates to what Fenton has
categorized as an issue-oriented two-party politics, while the more tra­ditional job-oriented patterns of partisanship are represented as pathol­ogies. Under the latter type the emphasis is upon securing elective and appointive office rather than upon emphasizing choices of programs, issues and policies.¹⁸

We suggest that both Bryan and Norris had their congressional ex­perience in parties of the pathological type. Bryan was concerned about the ineffectiveness of his group and wondered about the inability of so divisive a majority to function effectively. Norris eventually questioned the worth of a party dominated by a Speaker of great power and by an establishment whose ideas often bore little relationship to his concep­tions of Republicanism. By 1908 he was a leader of those who were moving to cure that pathological condition. For both Bryan and Norris the remedy was to move diagonally across the fourfold typology. The former sought a cure by moving from "insurrectional" to "program­matic" party action. Norris was hardened against party, and advanced the non-partisan party as a hope of increasing the "deliberative character of national policy-making." He hoped to move across the other diagonal.

Recently Robert Golembiewski and his associates have commented on the need for conceptual models in the study of political parties,¹⁹ and we suggest that this four-fold typology can be useful in that task. Either in an historical or contemporary context, party cohesion can be appraised by roll-call analysis as in the present study. Making the normative eval­uation is more problematic, although a panel of informed judges might supply useful indicators of this second dimension. Again, the continuing party-bolting of a well-defined core of insurgents may suggest that per­sonality, rather than policy, is the basis for dissension.

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footnotes

The authors wish to thank Darel Eschbach of the University of Toledo Computation Center for calculating the coefficient of significance and chi-square values reported below.

¹. It has been argued that in the protests of the 'Thirties, political institutions were per-
ceived as allies by those seeking to correct social and economic ills. The regime itself has become the target of contemporary critics. See Theodore Lowi, *The End of Liberalism* (New York, 1969).


6. “...[There] is room enough in the Democratic party for wide differences of opinion and I never expected to find in any platform all that I believed and nothing that I do not believe.” Letter, Bryan to Edgar Howard, October 20, 1891, Bryan Papers, Library of Congress.


10. His support of the 1924 ticket was not particularly because his brother Charles was the Vice-Presidential nominee. Bryan’s daughter reported that her father had not been aware that the Nebraska governor was under consideration for the selection, and that he was not happy that “Uncle Charlie” had agreed to be Davis’ running mate. Grace Bryan Hargraves, “William Jennings Bryan” (unpublished biography, undated), Bryan Papers, Library of Congress.


13. Letter, Norris to W. L. Hilyard, September 26, 1908, Additional Correspondence, Norris Papers, Library of Congress.

14. Yule’s Q was not used as a statistical test of issue independence because it will conclude to be similar any roll calls where very strong party discipline is maintained. Votes on railroad rates, contested elections, statehood for Arizona, New Mexico and Oklahoma, a merchant marine bill and several others would have been identified as similar issues in the Fifty-eighth Congress. Yet these measures seem to be quite dissimilar in usual parlance.

15. The greater significance of partisanship may be a consequence of the method of roll-call selection. If sectionalism emerges as a stronger factor in its own right when there are fewer members voting and the division between them is not so strongly contested, the Riker coefficient would screen out votes of this type.

16. Rejecting from consideration those members who have participated in half or fewer of the votes is a common practice in the related practices of attitude scaling. This is in hopes of gaining greater stability in both the relative frequencies and the percentages. Johan Galtung, *Theory and Methods of Social Research* (New York, 1967), 189.

