science, culture and the new socialist intellectuals before world war I

mark pittenger

In Max Eastman’s *Venture* (1927), a *roman à clef* about prewar bohemian radicalism and the I.W.W., a character based on Mabel Dodge embarks on a somewhat random quest for “learning” under the guidance of a Russian Marxist intellectual. When “Doctor Moses” suggests that she might find the social sciences most interesting, Mary Kittridge responds with amiable indiscrimination: “Well, social and unsocial . . . I like them all.” This representation of Greenwich Village radicalism as fundamentally trivial and dilettantish is a familiar one, and not least so from the writings of onetime rebels such as Eastman and Walter Lippmann. It is not a wholly accurate picture, especially with regard to socialists’ interests in the sciences—social and otherwise.

The scholarship on American socialism just before World War I has often failed to take seriously the ideas associated with the movement, and has tended to treat as a homogeneous and rather unoriginal group the disputatious array of radical intellectuals who attempted to put socialism on a new scientific footing. Writers associated with the *Masses*, the *New Review* and the *Seven Arts* have certainly been seen as interesting, colorful and even as leavening influences in a society struggling to shrug off its Victorian hangover and enter the modern age. But while it is quite proper to place them within the context of a more general upheaval in western culture, this is also to risk losing sight of their specific attempts as intellectuals to give new shape and direction to a political movement. To characterize this group as partisans of a “lyrical left” or as fomenters of an
“innocent rebellion” is in part to overlook their serious reassessment of the socialist movement’s theoretical foundations, a rough synthesis of Charles Darwin’s and Herbert Spencer’s evolutionary theories with Second-International Marxism. It was their critique of that scientific tradition—a critique whose contours emerged in socialist discourse between 1912 and 1917—that gave radicals of this generation their distinctiveness as thinkers. By re-orienting socialist theory away from Darwin and Spencer and toward the findings of post-Darwinian science and philosophy, new socialist critics such as Walter Lippmann, Robert Lowie and William English Walling hoped to push socialist political strategies and tactics in more activist and radically egalitarian directions. An examination of their interventions in socialist discourse will reveal a significant effort to build a radical, democratic politics and culture equal to the demands of a newly “modern” world, and may also cast light on the deradicalization of some socialist intellectuals at the crisis of World War I.

Socialist evolutionism had a considerable history before the rise of Greenwich Village radicalism. Marx and Engels understood Darwinism to be a revolutionary force in nineteenth-century science and culture. It historicized the natural world, naturalized humankind, and destroyed “metaphysical” and teleological world views. They did not claim, however, that it provided the basis for a revolutionary social movement, and the once-revolutionary thrust of Darwin’s views had indeed been largely blunted and absorbed by the early twentieth century when progressives and pragmatists invoked Darwin as their philosophical godfather. Nonetheless, beginning in the 1870s, American socialists—Marxian and otherwise—did graft socialism onto evolutionary theories of nature and society. The founding of the Socialist Party in 1901 established a vehicle for “scientific” socialism in a culture that saw science, in Thorstein Veblen’s phrase, as “a word to conjure with.”

The apparent congruence between Marxian historical “laws” and progressive evolutionism gave the Second International its distinctly scientific and inevitabilist cast and shaped the thinking of the American Socialist Party’s first group of intellectuals. Because socialism was now to be “scientific” and no longer “utopian,” American Marxists undertook an extensive discussion on the relations between socialism and evolution. Darwin and Spencer were typically conjoined as revolutionary figures barely subordinate to Marx in importance: Darwin for the reasons noted above; Spencer for applying the evolutionary principle to all realms of thought and experience in his massive “synthetic philosophy,” and also for elaborating the analogy between organisms and societies from which many socialists concluded that progressive structural integration and collectivization must follow. Therefore the trust phenomenon, for example, could be unequivocally welcomed as a harbinger of the organic socialist state. Evolution was typically seen as a cosmic continuum with a predetermined
outcome. Darwinism was enfolded within Spencer’s much larger philosophical edifice, while in turn Marx and Engels were understood to have completed the work begun by the two British evolutionists, supplying their own denouement in place of Spencer’s laissez-faire utopia—a socialist capstone for the grand bio-social evolutionary synthesis. Thus American Marxists conflated natural with social evolution and proclaimed, with the radiant optimism of Gaylord Wilshire, “Socialism Inevitable!”

Socialist discourse, including theoretical and political writings, popular lectures and fiction, was permeated by evolution and often showed an uncritical deference to the authority of popular evolutionary racism, nativism and antifeminism. But if scientific knowledge was generally considered revolutionary and a crucial component of any radical’s education, the actual meaning of the Darwinian revolution was a matter for sharp debate. Adherents of contending party factions variously interpreted the significance for Marxism of social organicism, neo-Lamarckianism, mutation theory and other developments. As intra-party antagonisms intensified between 1908 and 1912, scientific ideas were increasingly reduced to mere weapons in the arsenals of warring factions; “evolution” and “revolution” came to be identified with distinct political positions in the party, and serious theoretical discussion declined drastically.

Coincident with this ascendancy of politics over theory were changes in the sciences themselves. In the rapidly professionalizing natural sciences, grand systems like Spencer’s had given way to an ethos of controlled experimentation and carefully limited conclusions. The social sciences were emancipating themselves from biological determinism as anthropologists, sociologists and psychologists developed the modern concept of “culture.” The party’s founding generation showed little receptivity to the new critiques of Spencer and Darwin, which entered socialist discourse primarily though the younger intellectuals’ aggressive criticisms of orthodoxy. As evolutionism proved increasingly compatible with the progressive capitalist world-view of liberals such as Woodrow Wilson, younger American socialists attuned to newer currents of thought began to recognize and attack the weaknesses of the socialist evolutionary synthesis.

Robert Rives La Monte, an established left-wing socialist evolutionist, welcomed the insurgent group whom he called “The New Intellectuals’ in a 1914 New Review article. To the orthodox but friendly La Monte, these cosmopolitan and adventurous rebels showed respect for the Marxian method but considerably greater “breadth of vision” than most of their predecessors, who had been either unscientific or narrowly dogmatic. While La Monte’s article concerned Max Eastman and Walter Lippmann, his criteria roughly fit Floyd Dell, James Oppenheim, Louis Fraina, Robert Lowie and William English Walling, among others. Some were socialist veterans, some newcomers; all gravitated to New York City’s new centers for socialist discourse such as the Masses and the New Review, which resounded with the ideas of Bergson, Sorel, Nietzsche, Freud, James, Dewey and Boas. Although wary of their unorthodox Marxism and especially suspicious of Lippmann’s fascination with “statecraft” and
strong leadership, the fatherly La Monte thought their flaws a fair exchange for the fresh breezes they had set in motion.\textsuperscript{7}

What has not been noted about this rather mixed assortment of leftist intellectuals who made up the radical wing of the "Innocent Rebellion" is their common, if seldom coordinated, assault on the evolutionary underpinnings of socialism. Their clamoring for a decisive break with the past and their celebration of youth, modernity and "the new" were always implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, a rejection of passive evolutionary fatalism and a demand for emancipation from the constraints of biology and history. They were less concerned with Darwin, Spencer and origins than they were with James, Dewey, and with shaping the future. The upsurges of popular Freudianism and of Boasian cultural relativism diminished the cachet of evolution as modernization and re-legitimized the "primitive," both for Village devotees of psychoanalysis and for students of non-western cultures once considered evolutionary failures. Bergson was regarded with suspicion on the left, but his emphases on intuition, process and "creative evolution" suggested a universe more poetic and more malleable than the older product of dull Darwinian selection, which had been accessible to the intellect only through patient empirical investigation. Attacks on Bergson in the \textit{New Review} still betrayed a certain enthusiasm for the French philosopher’s élan, which seemed so well matched to the eclectic and vital radicalism of Greenwich Village itself.\textsuperscript{8}

Eastman and Dell at the \textit{Masses}, Oppenheim and Van Wyck Brooks at the \textit{Seven Arts}, and Fraina at the \textit{New Review} all attacked the ideas and spirit of socialist evolutionism, while Arthur Bullard’s novels \textit{A Man’s World} (1912) and \textit{Comrade Yetta} (1913) introduced the new perspective to socialist fiction.\textsuperscript{9} But William English Walling, Walter Lippmann and the anthropologist Robert Lowie most creatively diverted new currents from the dominant intellectual stream to undercut the musty evolutionary determinism and social organicism which they associated with a stodgy and bureaucratized Socialist Party. They carefully probed the persistent tensions in socialist thought between activism and inevitabilism, will and natural law, evolution and revolution. Where socialist evolutionists had always sought—and found—an emergent socialist order amid capitalist chaos, these New Intellectuals equated such evolutionary optimism with a naive nineteenth-century faith in "progress," and hoped to revise the socialist scientific ideal to emphasize method over content, the future over the past, culture over biology, and human creativity over passive prediction. Walling attempted to fuse science and socialism with Dewey’s pragmatic philosophy—"the method and the spirit of modern Socialist thought."\textsuperscript{10} Lippmann invoked Henri Bergson and Georges Sorel to score the Marxists for their fatalism, and called for a new scientific "mastery" over random evolutionary "drift." Robert Lowie, like Walling, attacked socialists for underwriting racism, anti-feminism and eugenics with evolutionary theory. He also sought to replace the socialists’ outmoded evolutionary anthropology with the cultural relativism of Franz Boas.

Despite their significant differences, the three shared certain character-
istics. All were younger than the party’s founding generation,\textsuperscript{11} lived in the area of New York City, had connections to Greenwich Village radicalism and served on the editorial board of the \textit{New Review}. All were broadly educated, intellectually curious and committed to exploring what Walling called “the larger aspects of socialism.” None was an orthodox Marxist, and all were touched in some way by pragmatism. Believing that no truth was “final,” they shared a studied irreverence for the Marxist classics. All were mavericks in a party whose New York organization was politically and culturally conservative, hostile to the \textit{New Review} and disdainful of all bohemian radical hangers-on.

No one evoked more powerfully than Walter Lippmann this generation’s bewildered gropings through a liberated present still strewn with the debris of a century’s battles against “the sanctity of property, the patriarchal family, hereditary caste, the dogma of sin, obedience to authority.”\textsuperscript{12} Lippmann considered these battles won, but evolution was for him only a pleasant if pervasive myth without instrumental value. The thrust of his first two books was that government, social institutions and mental habits had not evolved in line with modern conditions—progressive and socialist rhetoric to the contrary. Modern life was something entirely new, and evolutionary theories of progress, whether Marxist or Spencerian, could not help this generation to confront the riddle of freedom and the struggle to create an unformed future.

While \textit{A Preface to Politics} (1913) and \textit{Drift and Mastery} (1914) are deeply problematic as “socialist” works, Lippmann wrote the books in the immediate context of his socialist experiences as a disillusioned party activist, a quiet onlooker at Mabel Dodge’s salon and a sometime I.W.W. supporter. In both books the author directed key questions and criticisms at the socialists, whom he fleetingly hoped would help to “invent” a democratic culture that would provide direction and discipline for the rudderless young society. But for Lippmann, the worst features of the hidebound “routineer” were epitomized by the orthodox Marxists’ evolutionary determinism. True to La Monte’s uneasiness with Lippmann’s forays beyond orthodoxy, the promise of Marxism as mastery in the earlier book had soured by the second into the spectre of socialist “drift.”\textsuperscript{13}

Like Lowie and Walling, Lippmann did not reject evolutionary theory as such. But when he condemned most modern socialist thought as thoroughly deterministic and antithetical to will and creativity, it was the version of Marxism that had been embedded in evolutionary thinking that he addressed. Against Spencer’s dessicated rationalism and faith that science, armed with evolutionary laws, could predict anything, Lippmann posed the idea that social creeds began with human desires. Marx’s scientific writings therefore seemed to him no more permanently “true” than Spencer’s, their claims to truth being justified only by actions that tended to fulfill their author’s root desire for a just social order. While
respecting Marx's contribution, Lippmann thus sought to purge the American movement of scientific determinism, to substitute an instrumental conception of political and social theory and to clear the way for the elaboration of a “new philosophical basis” for socialism.\textsuperscript{14}

As socialist inevitabilism had been formed in the evolutionary-determinist tradition, Lippmann turned to that tradition’s critics to combat its grip on socialism: to the syndicalist Georges Sorel’s “myth,” to William James’s “will to believe,” to Henri Bergson’s vision of self-creation—in short, to the “mystical” side of pragmatism, which the Deweyite Walling would explicitly reject. Marxism was for Lippmann a useful social “myth” in Sorel’s parlance. That myth had become an active social force through the Marxists’ dogged “war of culture,” which had “worked,” in the pragmatic sense, by establishing the primacy of economic and environmental factors and by giving the workers a sense of their historical role that went deeper than mere class partisanship. It now needed replacing by another, perhaps not more “true,” but simply more “useful,” than evolutionary determinism: one that would place human will and desire at the source of thought and action.\textsuperscript{15}

Lippmann’s emphasis on will was not detached from the social struggles of 1912. One effect of the I.W.W.’s Lawrence, Massachusetts textile strike was to demonstrate that workers of diverse ethnic and craft backgrounds could unite to act decisively, and that a revolutionary culture would not be created solely by alienated intellectuals. Lippmann registered that strike’s profound impact and implications, and when he called upon socialists to see the individual as “creator” rather than as “creature,” he reflected the New Intellectuals’ dawning realization that the Socialist Party’s narrowly biological and economic conception of the worker could only retard the formation of a socialist working class. As Lippmann noted, the syndicalists could no longer be treated as mindless cattle because, in their furious revolt against industrial servitude, they had “ceased to be cattle.” The rebellious spirit of the I.W.W. informed Lippmann’s demand that socialists likewise “cease to look upon socialism as inevitable in order to make it so.”\textsuperscript{16}

Lippmann’s case shows how pragmatism offered the New Intellectuals an alternative to evolutionary determinism but also drew them away from fundamental Marxist ideas. As he searched for principles of action, Lippmann drew the distinction between Darwin’s revolutionary method and his less-interesting conclusions that characterized New Intellectual thinking\textsuperscript{17} and also showed its dependence on liberal intellectual discourse. It was, after all, John Dewey who had restated in 1910 this insight that Marx and Engels had also developed much earlier. In Dewey’s terms, Darwin had “conquered the phenomena of life for the principle of transition, and thereby freed the new logic for application to mind and morals and life.” While the early Lippmann may seem closer in spirit to the eclectic and ebullient irrationalism of William James, it was essentially Dewey’s sensitivity to process and adaptation that Lippmann hoped his “inventors” would apply to the Freudian “task of civilizing our im-
pulses.” Unionists, feminists, socialists and businessmen who embodied this pragmatic sensitivity would somehow meld the burgeoning energies of their diverse and sometimes conflicting constituencies into a radically democratic movement. Lippmann was rather vague on how this would happen, but he clearly believed in an open future and could have no sympathy for the Spencerian socialists’ preordained design.\(^{18}\)

When he called for an activist Marxism enriched by “all the culture of the age,” Lippmann prefigured the opposition between “drift” and scientific “mastery” that would dominate his next book. Insofar as Lippmann was ever a Marxist, he believed that a Marxist theory stripped of evolutionary determinism and fed by the many streams of contemporary culture would be a major source of mastery over the flux of modern life. But if Lippmann’s Marxism was only a working myth imposed upon that flux, then it had no roots in social reality and was reduced to a rationale for self-correcting social manipulation. Such a tenuous Marxist commitment easily evaporated as Lippmann became convinced that the left could not free itself from evolutionary determinism. Gravitating to the managerial pole of pragmatism, he soon saw modern, professional business executives, not workers, as the primary “inventors” and “civilizers” of the future.\(^{19}\)

Between the Preface to Politics and Drift and Mastery came Lippmann’s bitter apostasy from radicalism. The second book described the post-liberation chaos of the Preface as an epoch of aimless liberal “drift,” and saw socialism no longer as a solution but as part of the problem. The key to creating a future, to mastering drift, was now “science”—in which scientific socialism played no part. The scientific spirit substituted “conscious intention for unconscious striving,” offering a method, and indeed a “culture,” through which to treat life “not as something given but as something to be shaped.” Gone were the vitalism of Bergson and the irrationalism of Sorel, along with the radical promise of Marx: in science lay the “discipline” to achieve, not an ecstatic vision of freedom, but “a chastened and honest dream.” Politically, this meant a kind of pluralistic collectivism. Popular forces and administrative power would somehow balance one another; labor’s interests would be represented by unions modelled on the conservative railroad brotherhoods, not the I.W.W.\(^{20}\)

The disillusioned Lippmann reserved some of his sharpest words for the “darlings of evolution.” Capturing perfectly the spirit of the traditional socialist evolutionary theodicy, he noted that socialists stopped short of believing that “whatever is, is right,” assuming rather that “whatever is going to be, is going to be right.” At their worst, Marxists were not revolutionaries but “interested pedants of destiny” who knew God’s plan well enough to prompt him occasionally. Believing socialism inevitable, they had all but demolished any rationale for having a socialist party aside from its appearance in Marx’s script. Despite his high hopes of the previous year, Lippmann declared that socialist thought, still mired in evolutionism, had simply ground to a halt.\(^{21}\)

Lippmann had served socialism well by criticizing the theoretical weaknesses that had indeed undercut the movement’s political force. He
overstated American Marxism’s impermeability to new ideas, as he himself and other New Intellectuals provided counterexamples, but he was correct in the sense that over the long run their ideas were not to prevail—at least not in the party.22 Having rejected the socialist scientific tradition, Lippmann drifted toward progressivism and opted for science without socialism. One of his colleagues at the New Review, Robert Lowie, tried to redefine both the tradition and the party’s uses of it.

Like Walter Lippmann, Robert Lowie was a brilliant young iconoclast and a lucid and witty writer. Perhaps appropriately for an ethnologist, he imagined himself something of an outsider to American culture. Born in Vienna, he was steeped in European literature as well as in science; growing up in New York City’s German-speaking émigré community, he delighted in flouting the genteel reformers’ blue laws by drinking beer on Sundays in basement saloons. The few published reminiscences of Lowie, including his own memoirs, tend to minimize or ignore his radical past and to portray him as “proper” almost to the point of dullness—an image seemingly matched to his intellectual stance as a tough, no-nonsense empiricist.23 But Lowie’s non-ethnological writings for radical and liberal journals from 1904 to 1922 reveal a man passionately committed both to establishing the scientific status of anthropology, and to applying the Boasian perspective to radical thought. He wrote little on party politics, but showed an unparalleled dedication to the socialist discourse on science, persisting almost alone through the New Review’s last, war-ravaged days in addressing scientific and theoretical topics.

Lowie adopted two tasks in his socialist writings: reassessing the pantheon of scientists admired in socialist circles, and intervening in socialist discourse against reactionary deployments of scientific ideas. The first task meant rethinking his own intellectual upbringing. Lowie came of age just as the sciences were shifting away from inflated evolutionary positivism and toward an empiricist position. Having schooled himself as a youth in the works of Spencer, Darwin and Haeckel and in the Spencerian Popular Science Monthly, he found his convictions shaken during college by Jacques Loeb’s mechanistic psychology, Thomas Hunt Morgan’s skepticism about natural selection and the assaults of Karl Pearson, Ernst Mach and William James on Spencer’s “block universe.” Socialists had always praised Darwin for overthrowing “metaphysics,” but Lowie found himself rejecting an analogous “evolutionary metaphysics” that had pervaded the natural and social sciences. As a Boasian, he ignored socialist orthodoxy by uncoupling evolution from history and culture. Calling social evolution “unhistorical” in 1909, he argued for the meticulous examination of every culture as “a unique historical product” whose trajectory could not be predicted, nor its degree of enlightenment judged, according to Euro-American preconceptions.24

As a leftist and a partisan of the revolution sweeping the sciences, Lowie was ideally positioned to revise the scientific assumptions that had shaped American socialist thought. Beginning with an appreciation of Spencer just after the latter’s death in 1903, Lowie produced a long series
of articles reconsidering the achievements of the great nineteenth-century
scientist-philosophers. He sought not to write a “great man” history of
science, portraying scientists rather as specialized workers pursuing a
cooperative, international enterprise. The articles showed a scientific
sophistication far exceeding that of previous socialist writers, but Lowie
wrote clearly and incisively for non-specialists, dispensing measured
endorsements and warnings. He was no mere idol-smasher, but often
confined his enthusiasm for the grand old men of evolution to their
historical roles as path-breaking popularizers and champions of political
freedom. Thus Lowie gently relegated the pioneering evolutionists to the
past; like Lippmann, he believed that the future belonged to the living.

Lowie praised Darwin’s scientific achievements but deplored the
impetus Darwinism had given to “the construction of artificial evolution­
ary schemes.” This was his fundamental criticism of Spencer, Haeckel and
Lewis Henry Morgan, the principle forefathers of the socialist-evolutionist
world view. In 1904, when John Spargo ranked Spencer with Darwin and
Marx as the “mightiest of modern thinkers” and called the synthetic
philosophy one of the previous century’s greatest achievements, Lowie
praised Spencer for his devotion to reason and inspiring resistance to
“current dogmas”—and not, conspicuously, for his system of thought.
Lowie’s was a charitable interpretation that saw the great rationalist as a
thorough and objective scientist, but he partially reinvented Spencer in
order to portray him as a pioneer of the scientific method and spirit while
quietly dismissing his conclusions. Later references to Spencer were less
kind. In 1916 Lowie credited Ernst Mach with exposing Spencer’s system
as “metaphysics tricked out in scientific garb,” and a year later derided
British attempts to revive Spencer in the age of modern, “anti-univer-
salist” thought. He insisted on the several sciences’ philosophical and
methodological autonomy, standing for a Jamesian pluralism against the
monistic mindset that Spencer shared with Haeckel and Morgan. He
especially stressed the social sciences’ emancipation from the tyranny of
biology.

Haeckel and Morgan drew a mixture of censure and praise from
Lowie. Haeckel, whose thought encompassed an amalgam of radical and
reactionary ideas, would not be remembered for the monism that had
inspired so many socialists, but as a courageous advocate for evolution in
the face of stern academic and clerical opposition. Lowie sharply con­
demned Haeckel’s view that “inferior races” were transitional forms
between apes and humans—a view that some among Lowie’s socialist
readers used to justify their scant attention to Black organization and civil
rights. Morgan’s Ancient Society (1877) had provided another scientific prop
for socialist racism and immigration restrictionist sentiment. As inter­
preted and popularized by Engels’ Origin of the Family, Private Property and the
State (1884), Morgan’s universal stages of savagery, barbarism and civiliza­
tion were standard in socialist discourse. In attacking this version of the
block universe, Lowie argued that empirical Boasian ethnology showed
cultural evolution to be no unilinear, predictable process; no monistic
scheme could encompass the variousness of the world’s peoples. He suggested that New Review readers eschew the ranking of races, and set aside Ancient Society for Boas’s The Mind of Primitive Man (1911). But he was largely ignored by the party’s old guard: in 1916, the International Socialist Review touted Ancient Society in terms that showed no awareness of Lowie’s attack on the orthodox Morgan-Engels model.27

Among the others whom Lowie applauded for their scientific prowess and for their politics were Ernst Mach and Ludwig Feuerbach, who were notable for their empiricism, attacks on metaphysics and radical democratic ideas. But highest in his esteem stood Alfred Russel Wallace. At a time when some thought Wallace an embarrassing crank, Lowie praised his open and flexible mind as the source of both his undeniable scientific achievement and his controversial tastes for spiritualism and socialism. Sympathetic to Wallace’s politics, Lowie especially approved of his opposition to eugenics and to all such schemes of social control by the mandarins of an “arrogant scientific priesthood.” Politics aside, the qualities that Lowie admired in Wallace clearly linked the latter to William James; one who combined the Jamesian spirit of pluralism and open inquiry with the rigorous empiricism and left political commitments of Boas or of Lowie himself would have constituted Lowie’s ideal scientist-philosopher for the twentieth century, and a fitting figure for a new socialist pantheon.28

As the scientific watchdog over socialist thought, Lowie pointed out the political implications of the new anthropology. He invoked historical particularism against anti-Bolsheviks who denied that Russia could build socialism before passing through a Western-style capitalist phase: such skeptics, Lowie felt, were simply enslaved to the Morgan mindset. Some of these critics, such as Spargo and A. M. Simons, were in fact ex-socialists who had been purged by the war of their radicalism, but not of their monistic evolutionary world view.29

Lowie also mounted a relativist attack on the socialist racism, often grounded in readings of Haeckel and Morgan, that marred even the left-wing New Review. This involved him peripherally in a fracas over the integration of Southern locals when the integrationists adopted his critique. Following the imperatives of both profession and politics, he reduced most previous ethnology to the “globe trotter’s pronunciamentos”; rigorous modern methods, argued Lowie, had rendered meaningless the notion of “fittest” races and of cultural “complexity” as a normative category, and had shattered the assumption that a straight developmental line ran from apes to humans, with Blacks near the bottom and Caucasians at the pinnacle. If Lowie was less than a perfect relativist, occasionally characterizing one culture as “behind” another, and if his arguments had little impact on those who continued to claim that Blacks’ evolutionary retardation was proven by their low estate in American life, his remained nonetheless a remarkably progressive intervention in a socialist discourse that was still disfigured by evolutionary racism. He also pointed out links between biological racism and biological anti-feminism, and in 1916 co-

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authored with Leta Stetter Hollingworth a comprehensive deflation of scientific anti-feminism for the *Scientific Monthly*. But their arguments were never registered by the once-lively socialist feminist discourse on evolution, which had disintegrated by 1913 with the demise of the Women’s National Committee and of the journal *Socialist Woman.* If prewar American socialism left to its successors a meager legacy of support for women and minorities, it was not for lack of effort by a very few such as Lowie.

Like Walter Lippmann, Lowie tried to establish a new scientific basis for socialism by undermining the monism and evolutionary positivism in which socialist theory was trapped. He projected the Jamesian vision of an open universe in which human cultures were free from the constraints of biology and, in the large and portentous sense, of history. He was no materialist, but Lowie’s “well-known lack of interest in environment and economics” has been exaggerated. These factors may have played small part in his prewar ethnological writings, but his commentaries in socialist journals indicate that what he rejected was a “vulgar materialism” not unlike that against which Marx and Engels had also inveighed. His early socialist writing showed a consistent concern with the impact of environmental changes on culture, and his criticisms of economic determinism did not constitute a blanket denial that economy also influenced culture. That Lowie chose Mach’s empiricism as the path out of the nineteenth century’s evolutionary impasse did not reflect any stance on the Leninist critique of Mach, which was then unknown in American socialist discourse.

But Lowie’s commitment to socialism eventually paled in the shadow of his commitment to scientific work. A vocal critic of the war through 1915, he remained throughout the carnage a steadfast champion of the German scientific tradition—an unpatriotic attitude in itself, according to ex-socialist evolutionist Gaylord Wilshire, who called German “‘Kultur’ and science” the real “menace to the world.” But Lowie ceased to write for the socialist press—what remained of it—when he left New York for Berkeley in the twenties. His legacy to the left was expressed in his 1922 article on “Science” for Harold Stearns’ *Civilization in the United States*. Lowie summed up his own experience when he urged constant critical inquiry into the bases of one’s own scientific stance—an enterprise that for Lowie was grounded in a serious immersion in the European literary tradition and in left political values. Lowie brought to socialism and to science a “reasoned nonconformism” to all dogmas, scientific and otherwise. It was an attitude shared by too few of his colleagues on the left, who once having learned their science from the bourgeoisie, seemingly wanted to learn no more.

William English Walling shared with Lowie and Lippmann a skepticism of evolution and an attraction to pragmatism. Breaking sharply with the whole tradition of socialist thought as it had developed since the 1870s, he connected a searching critique of socialist scientism with an analysis of the class and political dynamics of the movement. As a maverick left-wing theorist who only joined the party in 1910 after several years of unofficial involvement, he supported the I.W.W. and eloquently attacked scientific
socialist racism, nativism and anti-feminism. For Walling, as for Lip-ppmann and Lowie, building socialism meant revolutionizing not just politics and economics but literature, art, science and history. The young Marx had once called for “a ruthless criticism of everything existing”; in a similar spirit, Walling invoked for the New Intellectuals Walt Whitman’s readiness to reject all received culture: “What is known I strip away/ I launch all men and women forward with me into the Unknown.”

It was a unifying theme in Walling’s writings from 1909 to 1916 that the idea of evolution, a product of ruling-class culture now uncritically absorbed into the matrix of socialist theory, must come under serious scrutiny. He remained an evolutionary thinker in method but hammered on the foundations of the evolutionary synthesis that saw social evolution as long, slow, organic, ending inevitably in socialism and implying reformist strategies for the interim. While that synthesis reflected socialists’ general infatuation with biology and evolution, it usually appeared in Walling’s writings as the characteristic ideology of two class formations which he thought would briefly dominate society before the arrival of genuine, democratic socialism. These were the state capitalists, exponents of Wilsonian progressivism who represented the interests of small capital, and the state socialists, comprising the aristocracy of labor and their fabian, bureaucratic-intellectual retainers. Walling particularly despised the second group, consigning most of his enemies to it and vigorously attacking its evolutionary ideology—an amalgam of biology, social organicism and historicist inevitabilism. It was in this vein that he characterized socialist immigration restrictionists as reactionary historicists, reformists and “practically Laborites.”

His search for a democratic alternative to this outdated ideology—one that would retain the revolutionary Darwinian spirit—brought Walling to Dewey’s pragmatism. In his most important book, *The Larger Aspects of Socialism* (1913), Walling’s appropriation of pragmatism was not simply opportunistic, as La Monte and other orthodox critics charged, but an attempt to reorient socialist theory away from its evolutionary heritage and toward the findings and spirit of modern science. From Copernicus to Darwin, science had steadily diminished the stature of humankind; Walling saw in Dewey’s stress on intelligence and creativity an “anthropocentric” science that would reassure men and women of their power to modify their environment, to control evolution itself. And pragmatism was democratic, at least in appearance. Once progressive educational methods had spread the pragmatic, scientific spirit throughout society, science would function not as an “irresponsible dictator” but as an experimental guide to a genuinely democratic social life.

Walling shared Lippmann’s enthusiasm for “the scientific method,” if also his vagueness about the mechanics of its application to society. He hoped that an infusion of pragmatism would make of socialist theory a “prospective” science, its task to project and test usable futures, rather than to rationalize submission to the determining power of a dead past. Between 1913 and 1916, “pragmatism” became Walling’s code word for
any tendency to reject evolutionary determinism: an exemplary socialist poet was "not an evolutionist of the old school," but a "pragmatist." Pragmatic socialists would look not from the past into the future, but from the future into the present: "We are evolutionists," announced Walling, "but we have reversed the very direction of evolutionary thought."\(^{36}\)

In his attempt to reinterpret Marx and Engels as proto-pragmatists, Walling did recapture something of the spirit of their original engagement with Darwinism. That the first scientific socialists were "pragmatic" primarily meant for Walling that they had rejected the earlier static, mechanical materialisms and had emphasized human history and action over biology; he also restored Engels' sense that science and philosophy were open-ended and that truths developed through praxis.\(^{37}\) While Walling could only tenuously and selectively link Marx and Engels to Dewey, the real point was to revive something that he could call "Marxism" as a flexible and activist theory of social revolution. Like Lowie, Walling saw that such a revival depended largely on decanonizing the cluster of evolutionary thinkers who had so influenced socialist thought. Pragmatism was a tool well-fitted to this task. American socialists such as Ernest Untermann had traditionally followed the monist Haeckel, seeing evolution as the "key to the universe"; pragmatism denied that there was any single key, and determined to subject all hypotheses to rigorous practical testing. Thus where Marxist philosopher Joseph Dietzgen's materialism had been used to underwrite monistic socialist evolutionism, Walling hoped that pragmatic socialism would follow the scientific method, not illusory scientific "laws." If, as Dewey claimed, a law only described a set of changes observed during a finite period, then dialectics could only produce unscientific absolute generalizations, and Engels' philosophical work could no longer be taken seriously.\(^{38}\) Walling's strategy was actually to outstrip the evolutionists by reintroducing a Darwinian sense of flux and randomness to the social and cultural spheres.

The New Intellectuals typically celebrated "the new" and emphasized the sharp division between past and future, but Walling was perhaps the most extreme among them in his distaste for history. He charged that the vogue of evolution had promoted a reactionary fixation on the past, turning historical precedents into evolutionary "laws" that justified the existing order. While such logic might be associated with a stereotypical "social Darwinist," Walling pointed out that socialist advocates of eugenics and racism also focused on their targets' supposedly unworthy histories. Thus when Victor Berger argued that Asians' "fifty thousand years" of insular history had fixed their racial psychology and rendered them unassimilable to American life, Walling derided this "hackneyed appeal to ancient history, familiar in all reactionary reasoning."\(^{39}\) It was such reasoning, grounded in history and in truncated evolutionism, that Walling identified with the state socialists.

Spencer's contradictory impact on Walling epitomized Walling's own complex relationship to the party. Much of what finally distinguished the socialist evolutionists from Walling was their differing orientation to
Spencer: Walling still championed the individualistic and libertarian side of Spencer’s thought; the “state socialists”—and in fact, most American Marxist intellectuals—had rejected those values while retaining Spencer’s social organismism and “optimistic fatalism” about evolution. Walling could therefore cite Spencer’s example against the state-socialist schemes of Edmond Kelly and Charlotte Perkins Gilman to subject convicts and Blacks to military regimentation. Because he understood Spencer as a product of the bourgeois revolution, Walling was not unnaturally drawn to him despite their political differences. Walling’s radicalism was an outgrowth of his family’s Midwestern liberalism, and he saw socialism as the only true heir to the French and American Revolutionary, “Rights of Man” traditions—a view to which he held steadfastly while Gilman and other white, old-stock socialists explicitly renounced it. Yet Walling understood that Spencer had never transcended the vision of his class, and many of what Walling saw as Spencer’s most pernicious ideas now pervaded the socialist movement. Spencer’s view of slow, organic, inevitable evolution was for Walling both utopian and “narcotizing,” but it had significantly structured the socialist evolutionary synthesis. 40

Although Walling attacked the post-Darwinian “reign of biology” in the social sciences, he also saw a waning in the imagery of nature and society as a bitter struggle for existence as capitalism left behind the era of rapacious competition and—he thought—international war. It was not old-fashioned “social Darwinism” that concerned him, but a newer incarnation of biological determinism as the state capitalists and state socialists, offspring of an era of trusts, bureaucracy and government ownership, raised the standard of the tightly organized, hierarchical “social organism.” Walling’s pragmatic polemic against evolution was thus most importantly a critique of the corporate capitalist organizational model as it had shaped socialist thought. If state capitalist Woodrow Wilson shared an organicist view of society and government with state socialist Ramsay MacDonald, both were equally wrong according to a vaguely defined “modern sociology.” Walling’s grasp of the “modern” scientific thought that he constantly invoked was not always firm, but his political vision was clear: organicist socialism, formed around the negative pole of Spencerian thought, meant eugenics, racism and rule by intellectual elites who sought order and organization, not an end to classes. Spencer had been right to attack the socialism that reduced individuals to insignificant cells in a social organism; but Spencer and the state socialists were ultimately alike in their reluctance to disturb that organism’s natural growth toward perfect organic interdependence. Thus, said Walling, “anti-individualist ‘Socialism’ and anti-socialist individualism are at the bottom one.” 41

The Larger Aspects of Socialism caused an uproar in socialist intellectual circles. La Monte, a self-proclaimed monistic Marxist, condemned pragmatism as opportunistic and linked it to the right-wing socialism of Victor Berger. James Oneal, also suspicious of pragmatism, stood with the old socialist order in his reluctance to stop ransacking biology for revolutionary
implications. Lippmann rushed to Walling’s defense but later attacked him for lapsing in his next book, *Progressivism-and After* (1914), from the pragmatic spirit into inevitabilism. While it can be argued that there was no sharp break in perspective between the two books, what Walling did fail to do through his writings of 1914-1916 was to answer La Monte’s criticism that pragmatism was an ideology of reform. Berger’s tactics in Milwaukee politics had “worked,” noted La Monte, and it was precisely those “practical” and “constructive” socialists who still dominated the party in 1913 and who wanted to jettison revolutionary socialism altogether. One might object that reducing pragmatism to sheer opportunism was to vulgarize the philosophical tradition associated with James, Dewey and C. S. Peirce, but La Monte had accurately described that tradition’s meaning in socialist discourse: the increasingly conservative John Spargo also came to see Marx not only as a social evolutionist but as a “pragmatist.” Walling ignored or finessed these questions. Did a “pragmatic” revolutionist cooperate with progressive reformers or support the I.W.W.? Walling claimed to believe in revolutionary unionism and in socialist political organizing, and also in supporting progressive “measures” but not progressive “men.” But if one voted the socialist ticket, how did one “support” progressive measures, which Walling expected would be enacted with or without socialist cooperation? Not surprisingly, he failed to make sense of this position when Lippmann, in a sharp exchange of letters, accused him of utter political naiveté.

Walling’s blend of pragmatism and revolutionary socialism remained a provocative but confused solution to the problems posed by the socialist evolutionary synthesis. His critique of the evolutionary tradition in socialist thought went to the heart of the Second International’s complacent scientism, deflating biologically based arguments for the gradual evolution of the state into a socialist organism. Its activist implications reflected his support for the I.W.W. But Walling’s individualism was grounded in the liberal tradition, and he never fully reconciled its atomistic thrust with the collective demands of a socialist polity. He also never fully stepped outside of socialist scientism and evolutionary thinking, suggesting only that science had passed socialism by. Pragmatism, a philosophy grounded in the idea of evolutionary flux and change, ultimately carried him far from Marxism, which appeared only archaic and lawbound against the infinite possibilities of an open universe. The logical outcome of the pragmatic impatience with “content” and fixed principles was pragmatism’s emergence as the primary philosophy of liberal reform. The outcome for Walling, when he faced the crisis of world war and widespread socialist capitulation, was what Randolph Bourne called “radiant cooperation with reality”: estrangement from socialism and support for Woodrow Wilson’s crusade. In the 1920s, Walling’s once-radical critique of evolutionary social theory dissipated, and he became what he had once despised: a mildly “fabian” collectivist, and a publicist for the American Federation of Labor.
A 1914 *Masses* cover showed two apes sharing a newspaper emblazoned with the headline “WAR”; said one ape to the other, “Mother, never let me hear you tell the children that these humans are descendants of ours.” World War I destroyed both the Second International and the left’s optimistic myth of evolution, including its pragmatic variants. Since the days of Engels, socialists had waged a counter-hegemonic struggle to appropriate modern scientific thought. Darwin’s and Spencer’s ideas had played a genuinely liberating role in the radicalization of many self-educated workers and intellectuals. But evolutionism itself was partly formed in the context of bourgeois political thought, and when absorbed into socialist theory it allowed socialist intellectuals to reproduce the hierarchical organicism and inevitabilism that also came to characterize progressive corporate ideologies. When the war prompted them to leave the party, old socialists A. M. Simons and John Spargo redeployed their evolutionary arguments to support the corporate state. Others who remained radical, including Dell, Eastman and Fraina, had never been orthodox socialist evolutionists, and gravitated toward the nascent communist movement.

The war marked the deradicalization of the most prominent American socialist evolutionists. When La Monte forsook the party for the Connecticut Home Guard, he sharply denounced the socialist faith in evolution as little more than disguised Calvinist predestination. Other radical intellectuals, their allegiances stretched taut between socialist commitment and nationalism, found the passage less abrupt. Many who retained their belief in evolution and who continued temporarily to hope for some form of social democracy managed to interpret surface changes in American capitalism as milestones in the evolution toward socialism. To some wavering socialists schooled in the evolutionary method of thinking, an international war in a world evolving toward a higher state of integration could even appear as a positive evolutionary event in the long view. The war forced a convergence of new and old socialist opinions: Walling and Lippmann, along with Untermann, Simons and Spargo, allowed themselves to believe for a time that the war’s massive organizational impetus might force union recognition and collectivism on the economy, break down national barriers, overthrow old-world autocracies and eventuate in a kind of international socialism—but their chastened vision resembled a Deweyite managerial state socialism more nearly than the democratic culture Walling had so hopefully projected. It was not long before they fully realigned themselves with a ruling class whose corporate ideal might optimistically be mistaken for incipient fabianism. A recalcitrant Randolph Bourne railed against the ex-radicals’ “blaze of patriotism” in his 1917 essay “Twilight of Idols”: it was the erstwhile socialist evolutionists who were now “all living out that popular American ‘instrumental’ philosophy which Professor Dewey has formulated in such convincing and fascinating terms.”
A useful work thus remained undone. What appear today as these New Intellectuals’ characteristic concerns—Lippmann’s dialectic of drift and mastery, Lowie’s cultural relativism and empiricism, Walling’s pragmatic socialism—grew largely from their dissatisfaction with the evolutionary organismism and determinism that underlay socialist theory. All three emphasized the human capacity to create culture over subservience to biological imperatives. All had begun to think beyond the confines of the received capitalist technological order, with its oppressive division of labor and ideology of progress, to develop a genuinely democratic radical vision. They had tried to lay the basis for an activist scientific socialism enriched by the resources of modern culture. They had represented the best hope for a renewed American socialist theory, freed from the grip of Victorian evolutionism. But their pursuit of a new scientific vision, which opened socialist thought to fresh influences just as the crisis of international war confronted them, also eased their passages out of the socialist movement. With their defections, any hope that the Socialist Party would bequeath a useful intellectual legacy to the postwar left evaporated. After the war, their efforts were largely forgotten, expunged from the socialist record, along with the rest of the prewar intellectual tradition, by their successors in a shrunken party with little reason for evolutionary optimism. In the press of events, scientific socialism and the intellectuals had failed one another. For ex-socialists—the jaundiced Lippmann, or the bemused Lowie—as for the America of the 1920s, it was the bright promise of science that endured.

University of Michigan—Flint

notes


9. These figures’ contributions are discussed in Pittenger, “Science and the New Social Order.”

11. Walling was born in 1877, Lowie in 1883 and Lippmann in 1890; by contrast, A. M. Simons was born in 1870, and Ernest Unterman in 1865.


16. Lippmann, *Preface*, 180-183, 207-208, 236-237. New Intellectual concern with seeing the worker as more than a biological “creature” or an “economic man” was manifested in the burgeoning interest in psychology. Graham Wallas’s imprint on Lippmann was clear in the latter’s preoccupation with “human nature.” Other examples include Max Eastman, “A New Journal,” and Louis Fraina, “Socialism and Psychology,” *New Review* 3 (1915), 10-12.


22. Some socialist critics of Lippmann’s eclecticism came around to his views during the interwar years, often reacting against the radicalism of the pre-war period. One example is Robert Rives La Monte, who adopted ideas from both Lippmann and Walling to justify his break with socialism: Robert Rives La Monte, “‘Where and Whither,’” *New Review* 3 (1915), 124-126; and La Monte and Louis Fraina, *The Socialist Attitude on the War* (New York, 1917), 4.


25. This perspective, inherent in all of the articles by Lowie discussed below, was spelled out in Robert H. Lowie, “International Rivalry in Science,” *New Republic* (19 Dec. 1914), 15-16.


45. Art Young, cover of *The Masses* (Nov. 1914).


48. Harry Laidler, *A History of Socialist Thought* (New York, 1927). This "house history" not only ignores the New Intellectuals; it even omits Simons, Spargo, La Monte, Untermann, Charles Kerr and the rest of the prewar intellectuals who created the socialist discourse on science.