Scholarship and Native American Studies: A Response to Daniel Littlefield, Jr.

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Everyone who works in some relation to Native American literary culture will be grateful to Daniel Littlefield for addressing so forthrightly issues that have been growing in intensity and that have already divided “us” into several camps or factions.* I have adopted here, albeit in inverted commas, Littlefield’s use of the first person plural to refer to “American scholars, American Indian as well as non-Indian, who are products of Western educational philosophies and whose scholarly research and writing and teaching relate to American Indians.”¹ This is what Littlefield says he means “By we, here and below.” (108n)

But this is not how he actually uses the pronoun. Throughout Littlefield’s talk, “we” effectively means non-Indian scholars as in such sentences as “... each of us must decide if we care what opinions Indians have of what we write or say about them,” (107) or, “. . . we can do nothing, try to ignore what the Indians say, and go on about our business as usual . . . ,” (101) or, “No wonder American Indians say that what we do has little or no relation to them . . . .” (104) There are dozens of other such sentences. In these, Littlefield constructs the category of “Indians” as a “them” set against a non-Indian “us”; he thus perpetuates exactly the opposition his remarks ostensibly seek to undo.

But the situation is much more complex than any simple opposition can convey. Neither Native scholars nor non-Native scholars can legitimately be represented as a singleminded, unified group with a consensual position on the issues in question. Indians don’t all see eye to eye any more than non-Indians do. Moreover, Littlefield uses the term “Indians” ambiguously. For the most part, “Indians” is a term that does, indeed, refer to Native scholars, academic Indians.
Sometimes, however, “Indians” seems to refer to Native people who do not “write culture,” so much as they (en)act, or produce it, and by no means necessarily in accord with “Western academic philosophies.” Still, all of Littlefield’s “Indians,” scholars or not, are, as I have said, portrayed as acting as a more or less united force to defend against, police, guard turf, or otherwise resist “our” ongoing depredations. “We” non-Natives, scholars only, are also presented monolithically—for all that some of “us” are definitely worse than others; and names are named.

In what follows, I’ll try to offer some thoughts about the many issues Littlefield raises, for all that the way in which he raises these issues, his almost exclusive focus on an oppositional version of identity politics—us/them, Indians/non-Indians, etc., what the anthropologist Terence Turner calls “difference multiculturalism,” does not seem to me a very fruitful line of approach. I will offer only one among the many reasons I think this: this line of approach cannot help but blur, far more than our historical moment necessitates, the epistemological distinctions between dialectical rationality, logic, or philosophy, and rhetoric, what one says as an aspiration to “truth” and what one says as an aspiration to worldly effectivity. What Plato didn’t bother to note (but Sartre did), was that to claim to speak in the name of “truth” requires a relatively unembattled and secure subject-position. But identity or difference politics in the academy today arise most acutely among those who feel themselves embattled and insecure; for them, or even some of “us”—the pronoun references remain highly charged and problematical—rhetorical rather than logical principles tend to predominate, as they (but also some of us) seek to contest the material conditions that keep them (but also some of us) from a relatively untroubled relation to what rationality one may still decently believe in today.

What Littlefield has tapped is a vein of ressentiment, and a rich one; what, after all, should oppressed people feel but resentment and anger. But it never occurs to him to attempt to distinguish (not that it is all that easy to distinguish) between statements that seek to present logical arguments and statements that may be offered primarily for their rhetorical or political effect. (And, again, I have no illusions that logic and rhetoric can be neatly separated.) Thus, Littlefield finds himself constantly in the position of trying to produce logical support for statements that, so it seems to me, are essentially political gestures. This is an impossible task, and it has the effect of muddying further the waters Littlefield would clear.

After more than half a century in this world, I still tend to believe that the truth—I’ve dropped the protective quotation marks—can make us free; and that truth, however much decentered, qualified and relativized, may be approached by rational and logical procedures that are not strictly “Western” or “Eurocentric” but panhuman. In what follows I will do my best to argue logically and rationally; as a non-Indian, perhaps I have that luxury; as a non-Indian, I also have that responsibility. But I want to be very clear about the fact that even as I logically interrogate the arguments of some of the Native scholars Littlefield cites—
arguments, as I have said, that often seem to me not so much arguments as rhetorical gestures—I do so in a spirit of solidarity. That Native American scholars feel the need to defend their right to speak about Native American culture “by any means necessary” (Malcolm X, via Spike Lee) is entirely understandable. Let me try to make this point statistically before going further.

In 1986, minorities accounted for 22.4% of American high school graduates; of these, only .7% were American Indian. Projected figures for 1995 are 27.7% for all minorities, but only .8% for Native Americans (largest increases are projected for Asian and Hispanic people). Minorities accounted for 12.5% of all Bachelor’s degrees in 1986-7, the last year for which I have figures, with American Indian B.A. recipients numbering .4% in all fields, by far the lowest percentage for any minority group. For doctoral degrees granted in 1989-90, I have figures only by fields: in all humanities fields, 9.2% of the doctorates granted were to minority students, with American Indians numbering .3% of that total. Only .1% of the doctoral degrees granted to American Indians were in the field of English and American literature, with another .3% in Modern Foreign Languages. These statistics make it very clear that an ongoing domestic imperialism has been quite successful in keeping the Native population from the “benefits” of higher education. Academic Indians—the statistics for minority faculty members that I have been able to find are unclear in that the categories they specify other than “white” are only Hispanic and Non-Hispanic—are a species currently in danger of extinction. Obviously Native American scholars have got to “fight back,” in Simon Ortiz’s phrase, in any way they can. One way to “fight back,” if not the only way, is by marshalling facts and clear arguments.

In what follows, I offer remarks arranged in five (overlapping) categories; these are offered critically, but sympathetically as a response to Dan Littlefield’s important address.

1. The problem of the double bind.

Double binds are situations in which you’re damned if you do and damned if you don’t. They are logically untenable and, to those who experience them, practically intolerable. It is illogical and intolerable, for example, for non-Native scholars to be excoriated for failing to include Native American materials in their teaching/writing on American history/culture/literature, and also excoriated when they do include them on the grounds of colonial appropriation, “speaking for others,” experiential inadequacy, or inauthenticity.

If, as Phillip S. Deloria has claimed, a failure to be critical of Indians smacks of arrogant and critically blind romantic idealization (Littlefield 96); but, if an intense critique of Indian self-identifications, as, for example, in some of the work of James Clifton, is dismissed in toto as “racist,” then we have a potential double bind. For a Native scholar to denigrate the work of a prominent non-Native scholar by suggesting that he has probably not ever been to a powwow but, then to publish remarks ridiculing non-Indians at powwows is to set up a double bind.

To take seriously the advice of Simon Ortiz, Alfonso Ortiz, Gerald Vizenor, N. Scott Momaday, Louise Erdrich, and many other Native people to the effect
that if America is to survive, it had better learn something from the Indian—and then to find a wide range of attempts to learn categorized as intellectual tourism, cultural imperialism, or the imposition of an unjust burden on the Indian, is to find oneself in a double bind.⁹

Native critiques of the kinds of inclusions Native and non-Native scholars may make; of the kinds of critiques offered; and of the kinds of information requested are always appropriate. Of course it is the case that ultimately, as Littlefield quotes Oren Lyons, Indians “will determine what [Indian] culture is.” (95) But this is one of those instances where it isn’t clear whether the “Indians” we are talking about are traditional people on the reservations or academic Indians (or both). In any case, neither one of these groups, for better or for worse, will determine what Indian culture is in a manner entirely independent of the culture of Euro-Americans, of the U.S. government, the state bureaucracies, and the omnipresent “media.”

Nor will they—again, for better or for worse—determine what it is independently of non-Native inquiries into Indian culture. When M. Annette Jaimes criticizes scholarly journals and academic presses for not undertaking “American Indian Studies efforts per se,” and then calls for “an autonomous Indian tradition of intellectualism” (Littlefield 98) one must pause. Indian studies “per se?” (Littlefield 98) one must pause. Indian studies “per se?” The Latin phrase itself denies the meaning of what it would convey: what “autonomous tradition of intellectualism” “per se?” I am not looking to score easy points (and I will come back to this very important question of “autonomy” and “sovereignty”); I am simply trying to show that the discourse of some of the Indian scholars Littlefield cites denies, in its very texture, that for which it would speak.

(It is exactly for this reason that I have raised the question of the distinction between rhetoric and dialectic. Inasmuch as I am quite certain that Native scholars are entirely capable of the most sophisticated logical arguments, I can’t help but wonder, as I noted above, whether some of the remarks quoted by Littlefield aren’t offered primarily for rhetorical/polemical/political effect, a possibility Littlefield either doesn’t recognize or one he doesn’t choose to consider.)

While some of the Indian determiners of Indian culture invoked by Oren Lyons may well be people who will do the determining by engaging in ritual and ceremonial activities, telling stories, producing material culture, Littlefield’s talk is mostly about—as he says himself—Indian scholars trained in and for the most part based in the universities, published largely by academic presses, occasionally supported by grants from the federal and state governments, and from private foundations. These Indians will “determine” what Indian culture is by representing it in writing and in speech, in articles and books and talks—all of which are subject to the very same problems faced by non-Indian representatives of Indian (or any other) culture. Insofar as this is the case, it is difficult to see what advantages the representations of Native scholars must automatically, a priori and per se have over the representations of non-Native scholars.

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This is why Littlefield’s focus on identity questions—us/them, Indians/non-Indians—in my view badly confuses the issue. For while it is unquestionably the case that who produces the representation is “epistemically salient,” in Linda Alcoff’s phrase (to which I will return below), and that the “social location” of the speaker provides a context that must be taken into account, nonetheless, identity and positionality can only “bear upon” (my references are again to Alcoff) not determine the nature and quality of any representational speech act.

More needs to be said about this important matter. Nonetheless, I will turn, here, to what Littlefield never does say explicitly, for all that I find it strongly implied in his remarks, that the very fact of an Indian identity (a very complex and contested fact!) might somehow in itself convey a privileged access to authentic knowledge of Indian history/culture/literature.

2. The problem of essentialization.

Littlefield speaks of Indian “journalism organizations . . . developing guidelines for non-Indian journalists who write about Indians.” (101) So long as these are “guidelines” rather than attempts at pre-publication censorship—I assume we are, indeed, talking about journalism and not about inquiry into sacred and ceremonial matters—this might be a useful thing. But, then, why not guidelines for Indian journalists who write about Indians as well?

Feminist scholars know perfectly well that to be born a woman is not necessarily to be a feminist; in spite of the color of his skin, few would be entirely comfortable with Justice Clarence Thomas’s perspectives on African-American culture. In the same way, the very fact of Indianness or Indian identification provides no guarantee of any particular scholarly or critical expertise. As T.S. Eliot wrote in the “Dry Salvages,” “We had the experience but missed the meaning.” It is always possible to have the experience but miss the meaning—or to offer meanings that others who have had the same or virtually the same experience would contest. To know that a particular scholar is a white male is not necessarily to know what he thinks—about white males, about Indians, about anything else. Same with knowing that a particular scholar is an Indian, male or female.

Wendy Rose, who is both a Native poet and an anthropologist, writes that when she is “called upon to speak anthropologically,” she finds herself “apologizing or stammering that [she’s] not that kind of anthropologist.” Of course today, there are also a fair number of non-Native anthropologists who are “not that kind of anthropologist” either. The issue is not strictly whether you are a Native or a non-Native anthropologist, but what kind of anthropologist you are.

This is not to deny the importance (or the lived reality) of having the experience of being Indian; it is to point to the obvious fact that Indian experience is not always and everywhere the same, nor is it ever unproblematically given to consciousness (nor is consciousness unproblematically represented in writing, etc.). All experience must be interpreted, and even people who have the “same” experience—the inverted commas indicate the differences inevitable in any
“sameness”—may interpret it differently, reaching very different conclusions about what their experience means and the uses to which that meaning may be put in any attempt to understand Native American culture/history/literature.

As it is false and irresponsible to offer essentialized generalizations about what Indians feel, know, think, or understand, so, too, is it false and irresponsible to offer essentialized generalizations about what non-Indians feel, know, think, or understand. The Native/non-Native dichotomy, the thoroughly fictive we/ them that appears in quotation after quotation from Native American scholars in Littlefield’s essay, simply inverts and thereby perpetuates the opposition that (as I noted earlier) Littlefield wants to undo. Not only are there abundant differences among non-Native scholars, but, again, abundant differences among Native scholars, too—differences which bear directly on the possible organization of Native American or Indian Studies in relation to American Studies, the subject I will take up in my concluding section.

I hope it will have been clear that I am not arguing against generalization of any kind in favor of a focus on a finite but impossibly large sample of “unique” individual instances. Social and political thought requires attention to collectivities, to the category of “American Indians” and “Euro-Americans,” to the difference between a historically-specific indigenous population and a population of colonist-settlers. And there are historically-specific and general statements that can be made about Indians or Euro-Americans. What I have been arguing against is the essentialized version of the general, the type of statement that precisely is not historically specific in its assumption that to be an Indian (whatever that may mean) is always and everywhere to be this, that, or the other foreknown thing; that to be of European background (whatever that may mean) is to be this, that, or the other foreknown thing.

Nonetheless, just as I believe that the criticism of literature by women should not predominantly be in the hands of men; just as I believe that the criticism of literature by African-American people should not predominantly be in the hands of Euro-Americans; so, too, do I believe that the criticism of literature by Native American people should not predominantly be in the hands of non-Native people. But there is a big difference between believing that and believing that Indians, simply by being Indian (and I note yet again that being Indian is not always and everywhere the same thing), are automatically and inevitably the most competent for every task involving the interpretation and understanding of Indian history/culture/literature. In regard to this matter as well, I would take issue with M. Annette Jaimes—while also offering substantial agreement—when she writes in her Introduction to The State of Native America, that

while most of the contributors to this book are themselves Native American—and thus can be said to speak with an “Indian voice”—others are not. The latter number among those who have already opened their eyes to the lessons of their
history, do not wish to see it continue to be repeated and have therefore joined hands with their indigenous relatives.¹⁴

I would wish to number among those latter non-Natives, and I applaud Jaimes’s willingness to include them/us. But the Native American contributors to her book cannot be said to speak with an ‘Indian voice’,” in the singular. In what would that voice consist? how would one know it when one heard it? Of the Native contributors to Jaimes’s book, Jimmie Durham does not sound like Wendy Rose; neither of them sounds like John Mohawk, and both of them on occasion sound at least a little bit like Jim Vander Wall, a non-Native contributor. I doubt whether Jaimes or anyone else would be able to guess, were I or some Native person to read passages from the work of these and any number of Native and non-Native scholars, which authors were Native and which non-Native. (Or perhaps the claim might be made that, indeed, Indians always do recognize other Indians . . . .)

But, again, for all my strenuous objections to the positing of a unitary and essentialized “Indian voice,” which implies, of course, a unitary and essentialized “non-Indian voice”; for all my insistence that the quality or value of a thought is not entirely dependent on the race, gender, or culture of the thinker; still, no thought occurs in a vacuum, and so it is indeed important to take into account the formation of the thinker. Who one is, and where one speaks from, as Linda Alcoff has made clear in the essay I cited above, are, indeed—I repeat the phrase from Alcoff—“epistemically salient.” (7) But who one is—identity—and where one speaks from—location—means “social location, or social identity,” and social locations and identities are plural, complex, and constructed. Identities are not, as in the essentialized Native/non-Native opposition, unitary, simple, and fixed or given in advance. Thus the various aspects of any particular person’s identity may be, as Alcoff explains, socially empowering or disempowering.

One may ask, for example, whether a white male who speaks from Florida Atlantic University is more or less privileged than an Indian male who speaks from Stanford or UCLA. Does it change things if the white male is Jewish or one of the Indian males part-Jewish? What is the oppressor/ oppressed equation when Native American women defend a Native male against charges of sexism raised by non-Native women? or when Indian women raise the issue of sexism on the part of Indian men? Is a lesbian Indian scholar at a triple disadvantage in relation to white, male, “straight” scholars? Questions of this sort might easily be multiplied for all that there are no easy answers to them. The point to make, however, is that these questions are always to the point, so that reliance on essentialized categories like Native/non-Native is an obstacle to real critical work. Any answer to the question, Who speaks? does not automatically convey the kind and quality of the speech.

3. Legal sovereignty, cultural autonomy, “political correctness.”

I have no expertise in the law and I will base my comments on legal sovereignty on Littlefield’s account in which legal sovereignty seems to refer to
such things as the right protected by law for Indian people to determine for themselves their social organization, religious practices, education, land use, and so on, as well as the right to determine which non-Indians are or are not permitted access to Indian lands. Whether one speaks of "tribes" or "nations"—the two are regularly synonymous in American discourse, for all that in the African context the terms are radically discrete—legal sovereignty also affirms the right of tribes or nations to determine which persons are members of those tribes or nations. The legally operative question as I understand it is not so much, Who is an Indian? but, rather, Who is a Cherokee, or Lakota, or Navajo. Sovereignty means that Cherokee, Lakota, or Navajo people get to decide that as a matter of law.

But even as a matter of law, there is no sovereignty in an absolute sense. Native Peoples are not and should not be thought to be "domestic dependent nations," in Chief Justice John Marshall's famous or infamous phrase; rather they are and should be thought to be domestic independent nations. Nevertheless, inasmuch as Indian control of Indian affairs is hedged 'round with acts of Congress, Supreme Court rulings, BIA regulations, and the like, we are, in practice, talking about a relative sovereignty, about degrees of sovereignty. Thus, while in theory, legal sovereignty and cultural autonomy seem to be quite different—in that sovereignty seems digital like on/off, either you have it or you don't, while cultural autonomy is analogue, like loud/soft, hot/cold a matter of more or less—in actual practice, they are quite the same in that both are conjunctural and refer materially to the outcomes of negotiations between Native tribes or nations and a multiplicity of non-Native institutions and entities.

I've already quoted Littlefield's citation of M. Annette Jaimes's desire "to make American Indian studies 'an autonomous Indian tradition of intellectualism' . . ." (98); William Willard and Mary Kay Downing cite Terry Wilson's 1979 concern to base Native American studies on "a uniquely American Indian perspective." Again, one must wonder in what such autonomy or uniqueness could actually consist. One may fantasize the history of the Americas had Columbus's three little boats sunk shortly after setting out; but the fact remains that from 1492 on, neither Euro-American intellectuals nor Native American intellectuals could operate autonomously or uniquely, in a manner fully independent of one another, for all the differences in power relations. It is difficult to understand what M. Annette Jaimes had in mind when she called, for example, for the study of Native American philosophy in a distinctly non-comparative framework, autonomously, uniquely, whatever. Is it not the case that such study would base itself upon written texts in large part? And everyone concerned with these matters cannot help but know that writing already denotes the absence of Native autonomy. From the first appearance of Europeans in the southwest and northeast, Native American persons took account of Western ideas and artifacts, rejecting some, accepting and modifying others for their use. But the notion of a post-contact Indian tradition that is "autonomous," insofar as the notion of autonomy means to suggest a kind of radical independence from Euroamerican influence, seems a nostalgic fantasy or a polemical device.
(And, as I have said before and will say again just below, I think it is largely a polemical device. Jaimes, at any rate, seems to have shifted her position, calling recently not for “autonomy” but for “Eurocentric parochialism [to] yield[ . . . ] to the more inclusive pluralistic project,” an intersection, as I take it, with the important project of “critical multiculturalism,” as proposed by Turner and others.)

Thus when Robert Warrior calls for more attention to the work of the Indian intellectuals, John Joseph Mathews and Vine Deloria, Jr., he is pointing to a fruitful source of further study. When, however, he claims that attention to the work of these Indian intellectuals can serve to advance the cause of “intellectual sovereignty,” one must pause. The thought of Mathews and Deloria can no more be understood without reference to the Western tradition than can Warrior’s. It can reasonably be suggested that further attention to Mathews and Deloria, to, perhaps, John Milton Oskison, Francis LaFlesche, and a great many other formidable Native intellectuals might, at this historical juncture, be more important than continued attention to any of a number of non-Native intellectuals. Apart from that, the only thing “intellectual sovereignty” can mean is, Let’s take it back! And, of course, that is exactly what it does mean. Littlefield writes that Warrior’s “statement might be seen as further evidence of what others have called ‘the growing movement among American Indians to wrest control of their cultural identity and history from non-Indians.’” (107)

I have no problem with the Indians taking it back, or wrestling control. Pam Colorado’s concern that non-Indians will have “complete power to define what is and is not Indian, even for Indians,” and her fear that “the last vestiges of real Indian society and Indian rights will disappear [because] Non-Indians will then ‘own’ our heritage and ideas as thoroughly as they now claim to own our land and resources” arises from a specific historical and social analysis.20 There is indeed such a thing as cultural imperialism, and the question of who gets to tell the stories, who gets to have their representations circulated and attended to is a question that has not had of late, so far as I am aware, many happy answers.21 The Native scholars Littlefield cites want to gain increased access to publishing outlets, university positions, grants, awards, and honors, and thus, insofar as their representations differ from those of non-Natives, to be in a stronger position to contest them. I am all for this—but, again, it is important to recognize that there is no way of knowing a priori what representations Native scholars are likely to make that non-Indians can’t or won’t make, no way of knowing a priori that their representations are likely to be “better,” “more accurate,” more politically empowering than the representations of non-Indians. In the same way, it is not possible to know in advance whether the representations and activities of the “Indian scholars” will be of more use to the “Indians” in every case than the representations and activities of the non-Indian scholars.

Warrior’s suggestion that American Indian literature be seen as “a literature of resistance to colonialism,” and that it be compared “to other literatures of
resistance” (in Willard and Downing 2, and in Littlefield 105) is, once more, a useful one. But the suggestion has two parts. The first part simply assumes what needs to be demonstrated: *is all American Indian literature* “a literature of resistance to colonialism?” Perhaps it is—although, once more, this remains to be shown. *If* it is, then, should it be compared “to other literatures of resistance?” If so, we might number among these “literatures of resistance” not only “African-American, African, or Arab,” as suggested by Warrior, but as well those of Catholics in Northern Ireland, Jews in the republics of “The Former Soviet Union,” and other “whites”—like, for example, the Frenchman, Philippe Soupault writing in resistance to the Vichy government during World War II in the French colonies of North Africa—along with Czechs and Poles, etc. These “literatures of resistance” Warrior’s narrowly informed account firmly, if rather surreptitiously, excludes.22

But how would any commitment to comparativism square with Warrior’s and Littlefield’s insistence—I cite here only Littlefield’s words—that “American Indian literature is literature in its own right, not by virtue of its juxtaposition to American literature?” (106) As a resistance literature, “American Indian literature” apparently *is* to be “juxtaposed” to other literatures of resistance; what, then, of the (delusionary or purely polemical) commitment to “autonomy,” the “in its own right” business? Confusions of this sort abound in Warrior’s writing and in Littlefield’s.

Littlefield modestly encourages Indian “control” by affirming that Native people need to “question jargon-filled, poorly reasoned presentations.” (107) Yes, of course: but I would again warn against the dangers of essentialization and the double bind in any claims to cultural autonomy and intellectual sovereignty. Native American scholars are as capable of poor reasoning and a recourse to jargon as anyone else (and names, here, definitely could be named), and this, too, will need to be challenged both by Native and non-Native scholars alike—who, if they must not romanticize by failing to criticize, must not be too quickly charged with racism or ethnocentrism if they do.

There is another danger in modelling the cultural or intellectual realm on the theoretical logic of legal sovereignty rather than its material practice, a danger alluded to by the third term of this section’s title, the issue of political correctness. Littlefield claims that Native people’s ability to “determin[e] who is or is not one of them . . . “ is “basic to tribal or Indian national sovereignty,” and he adds that Indians “have done fairly well at policing their ranks.” (97) Perhaps they have, and perhaps this is a necessary thing on the political level. Still, I find a bit troubling the way in which Littlefield metaphorically extends the concept of police work to the cultural level, as, for example, when he speaks of Indian scholars prepared “to challenge outsiders who happen to venture onto their tribal or cultural turf.” (99) Apart from the macho-desperate connotations of urban gang warfare, is this the best way to understand cultural contention? as a battle of insiders vs. outsiders? (this opposition, unfortunately, pervades Littlefield’s
discourse). Are “culture” and “turf” strictly compatible terms? When Littlefield asserts his view that “American Indian studies” can act as “the defender of the cultural and historical ‘parameters’ of the discipline,” (99) his unexamined infatuation with defensive militancy threatens to obscure the issue entirely.

I say this because it seems to me that the question of just what, exactly, “the cultural and historical ‘parameters’ of the discipline” of American Indian studies may be is at the very core of this debate. Disciplinary “parameters” and political boundaries have much in common, to be sure. Both may shift and change, and both do so in response to fluctuations in power relations that involve not only cultural but economic factors as well. But disciplinary parameters, it seems to me, are somewhat less constrained by their material historicity—i.e., their real institutional existence in the academy—than are political boundaries. Disciplinary parameters are as much conceptual as geo-physical, as much constituted by discourse about them as by (academic) realpolitik—which, I believe, has a somewhat greater quotient of responsiveness (this may be naive on my part) to the outcomes of discursive encounters than the politics of nation-states. Insofar as this may be true, neither Littlefield nor I can be very sure of just what, at the moment we speak, these “parameters” actually are, inasmuch as it is in the nature of “disciplinary parameters” always to be in the process of being established or re-established. Their existence at any given moment, as many of us have argued recently about the “canon,” is not threatened by cultural contention so much as it is precisely (and fortunately) the product of cultural contention.

Further, Littlefield’s fondness for metaphors of attack/defense obscures the fact that what I have just called the “discursive encounters” that enter into the always-provisional definition of “disciplinary parameters” may be more nearly dialogic encounters than oppositional ones, not so much “attacks” or “defenses” (of “turf” or whatever) as conversations among interested parties. All this is obviously to say that I am a good deal less enthusiastic than Littlefield about the beneficial effects of “policing” the ranks of tribal or national sovereignty on the level of culture. I can’t help but recall, for example, that this police work, whatever its salutary effects, excluded Jimmie Durham from exhibitions of “Native American art,” and prevented Lloyd Oxendine from showing at the very gallery he directs at the American Indian Community House, in New York. Littlefield’s disapproving reference to “scholars [who] continue to intrude into what should be Indian business” (97) misunderstands the nature of culture as a practice—for all that, as I shall try to explain in a moment, there are definitely some aspects of Native culture that are indeed “Indian business.”

Let me offer an example of the sort of intellectual police work I find objectionable. Littlefield cites Elizabeth Cook-Lynn’s comments on Hertha Wong’s Preface to Sending My Heart Back Across the Years, in which Wong begins by announcing her recent discovery that she is part Cherokee. Cook-Lynn calls Wong’s remarks “wannabee sentiment which clutters an otherwise tolerable piece of redundant scholarship.” (Littlefield 106) I agree with Cook-Lynn that
this part of Wong's Preface is coy and potentially opportunistic, and I believe Cook-Lynn is correct in her judgment that some of the book is indeed "redundant." But Wong's first three chapters—Chapter 1 attempting to deduce a sense of "Native American . . . Autobiography Theory," Chapter 2 dealing with coup tales, vision stories, and, especially naming practices, and Chapter 3 with "Pictographs as Autobiography"—offer some observations that are not strictly "redundant" nor merely "tolerable."

What I am objecting to is, first, the ad hominem—in this case ad feminam—attack (the "wannabee" denomination and the contemptuous tone) and, second, the wholesale dismissal of a book ("an otherwise tolerable piece of redundant scholarship") some parts of which at least can stand as a serious contribution to the study of Native American autobiography. Cook-Lynn's intervention seems less an act of scholarship than a police action intended to warn white "wannabees," or maybe non-Indians generally, to keep out. It will remain for Indian people to decide officially and unofficially whether Wong is or is not Cherokee. But evaluation of her work cannot be strictly dependent on her identity. To denigrate her work in the way Cook-Lynn has done is an anti-intellectual and counter-productive gesture that, whatever short term benefits it may seem to have, in the long run can only retard the understanding of Native American literatures.

Moreover, it plays into the hands of cultural conservatives like Wilcomb Washburn, Dinesh D'Souza, Allen Bloom, and David Horowitz, editor of Heterodoxy, Articles and Animadversions on Political Correctness and Other Follies, who readily seize upon such things as Cook-Lynn's dismissal of Wong as instances of thought-policing in the interest of enforcing the politically-correct line. Individual instances of such police work are then generalized as typical of the field of Native American/American Indian Studies as a whole. This generalization is then used to support the argument that it is not Eurocentrism, racism, or a commitment to the privileges of the status quo that marginalize Indian culture/history/literature studies, but only the intellectual disreputability of the field itself.

The field, of course, is not intellectually disreputable nor is Cook-Lynn's cryptic dismissal of Hertha Wong's work typical of the field as a whole. But it becomes more difficult to speak on behalf of the field against its conservative detractors when policing metaphors and a language of turf defending, as in Littlefield's essay, are so carelessly approved.

4. To whom does culture "belong?": on the transmission and production of "knowledge."

The form of the question in the first part of my heading is given by Littlefield in one of his several references to Robert Warrior. Warrior is specifically criticizing me for what he deems my effort to have "Native American literature 'belong' to the national literature of the United States." (in Littlefield 105) I have indeed taken the position that Native American literatures be included among the several literatures that make up American literature, and that American literature
itself be included in the broader category of a global or international literature, what I’ve called a “cosmopolitan” literature.

I don’t, however, anywhere in my discussion, use the word “belong.” But Warrior puts the word in quotation marks. Why? To call it into question, it would seem: but he can only be questioning his own use of the term, not mine; “belong” is his word, for all that the quotation marks suggest something else, an outright falsification. Littlefield has not, of course, looked up the reference (most people will not look up the reference), and uncritically follows Warrior, saying, “The literature [Native Americans] produce does not ‘belong’ to America” (105)—as if anyone but Warrior had suggested that it might.

William Willard and Mary Kay Downing accurately quote what I say on this matter, which is that

Indian literatures ought to be included in the canon of American literature so that they might illuminate and interact with the texts of the dominant, Euroamerican culture, to produce a genuinely heterodox national canon. (in Willard and Downing, 2)

Clearly what I call “inclusion,” for Warrior means possession, and I can only again protest his presentation of his own interpretation as though it were an exact quotation, the apparent attribution to me of the word “belongs.”

Nonetheless, it’s worth looking into this matter of what, culturally, can “belong” to whom. To begin, we might try to distinguish between cultural artifacts, “culture,” and “knowledge.” Further, in regard to what I have called cultural artifacts and “knowledge,” we also have to distinguish between that which is sacred and that which is secular—recognizing, all the while, that such distinctions, while extremely important for American scholars whatever their racial or cultural origins, are understood rather differently by traditional Native people.

A cultural artifact like a Navajo bracelet can “belong” to an individual or a group, to its maker and his family. But Navajo jewelry-making—an expression of Navajo culture—can’t actually “belong” to any individual Navajo or, collectively, to Navajo people generally in quite the same way. For that to be the case, one would have to reify culture, mistakenly turning an extremely complicated concept into a thing. Navajo people may feel uniquely empowered to speak of Navajo-jewelry making, but jewelry-making does not thereby “belong” to the Navajo in the way a single ring or bracelet may.

But what, then, of Hopi kachina masks? They do belong to certain clans, but what of the knowledge of how to make them? On one hand, inasmuch as this is an aspect of Hopi culture, and inasmuch as culture is the conceptualization of a set of practices, it might be said that knowledge of Hopi mask-making, like knowledge of Navajo jewelry-making can’t belong to anyone either. But if the
cultural artifacts involved are sacred, and sacred knowledge is involved, any secular scholar who does not want to operate in a grossly imperial mode will have to shift gears and abandon the Western scientific ideal of the free access to knowledge, and respect the very different Hopi view of the matter. This, of course, is exactly what Ekkehart Malotki did not do in the instance cited by Littlefield, with the result that Hopi people acted to take back what “belonged” to them, and (appropriately, in my view) declared Malotki persona non grata.

I would suggest that a very great deal of what is currently understood as constituting the category of Native American literature is more like Navajo jewelry-making than Hopi mask-making, and cannot, therefore, actually belong to any individual or group. This is most particularly the case with Native American written literature, which—to repeat—by its written nature is an intercultural practice, and by its published nature is available to a general audience. Native American people may feel a special relation to Native American literature, and feel that relation as conferring a particular authority to speak of it, but contemporary Native American literature is a conjunctural practice, not a thing, and as a practice, like Navajo jewelry making—also a conjunctural practice inasmuch as the Navajo learned many of their jewelry making techniques from Mexicans—cannot “belong” to any single group.

This is true as well for a good deal of oral literature. Once there is a degree of circulation of stories, e.g., once narrators permit “outside” auditors to record, translate, and publish stories, then—again—while “insiders” may be especially well-positioned to speak of these stories, there is no ground on which they can claim sole rights to possession. People with different socio-cultural identities and different social locations will have different relations to these materials and these may indeed cause them to speak about and represent them differently. But it remains to be said yet again that one cannot know a priori the nature and force of such speech and representation. In practice, post-colonial practice, the lines that once separated “us” from “them” have begun to give way, permitting entry to space in which dialogue may occur. Or, at least, that is what I hope might occur; and I can only repeat that it is disturbing to note Littlefield’s attraction to the notion of patrolling arbitrary perimeters and parameters.

For all of this, it remains the case that not “literature” but certain traditional oral stories, and ceremonial knowledge of a more nearly sacred kind, like certain material artifacts, can and do “belong” to particular lineages of storytellers, to particular clans, or persons. Knowledge of these things is transmitted rather than produced and I want, here, to turn to the distinction between the transmission and production of knowledge. American scholars—intellectuals, critics, and persons engaged in cultural studies—are all producers of knowledge. Littlefield, Jaime, Cook-Lynn, Wong, Warrior, and I (among others) do not simply transmit a relatively fixed body of information; rather, we select from an ever-increasing amount of resource materials what we find of interest or value, interpreting those materials and producing a discourse about them. To use again the title of a
well-known collection of essays, we “write culture.” An experiential closeness to the material selected can be an advantage or a disadvantage to the critic; so, too, can experiential distance be helpful or detrimental to the critical production of useful knowledge. Insider or outsider status does not determine results a priori; even “wannabees” might produce good work, and there are no secure grounds for limiting the critical field to one group or another. As I have said above, it is not so much the identity of the person producing the representation as the kind and quality of the representation that must be judged.

This is not the case, however, in situations where there is not the production but the transmission of knowledge. The Hopi people who have so far successfully kept Malotki’s book off the shelves were preventing an interference in established circuits of transmission: the knowledge involved is, indeed, relatively fixed, and it does “belong” to specifiable persons and groups, more like a bracelet or ceremonial mask than like jewelry-making or literature. To wrench such knowledge from its traditionally circumscribed transmissional circuits, thus opening it to the unlimited circulation of produced knowledge is a violation of trust and propriety, and actions to prevent such violation constitute legitimate exercises of sovereignty. It is not so much that this kind of knowledge “belongs” to Hopi persons as that Hopi, who have not themselves published such knowledge, nor produced it in interaction with the knowledge of the dominant culture, have strong claims to exclusive control. This situation, as I have tried to show, differs radically from the scholarly production of knowledge focused on Native American literature as a cultural practice.


Everyone knows that cultural conservatives like Allan Bloom, William Bennett, Lynne Cheney, and others overtly or covertly committed to the primacy of the traditions of Europe are generally opposed to what has come to be called—not always clearly or consistently—multiculturalism. But champions of the vitality and integrity of Native American traditions are not therefore necessarily in favor of multiculturalism. That there is not a uniformity of opinion among Native or non-Native American scholars—no “we” of any kind readily to be invoked—is perhaps nowhere so apparent as in regard to the issue of multiculturalism.

Thus, Jimmie Durham writes that “institutions in the United States are already reinforcing racism by celebrating ‘multiculturalism.’” This celebration, he continues, “makes intervention on our [Native Americans’s] part more difficult.”

Durham’s remarks come near the end of M. Annette Jaimes’s important collection, The State of Native America, which has, near its beginning, the rather different perception of Evelyn Hu-DeHart who writes:

For those of us in the academy and the publishing world who subscribe to the multicultural project, our responsibility is to
find ample space beyond tokenism for Native American scholar­
arship and discourse.²⁵

Durham doesn’t elaborate his reasons for equating multiculturalism with a
reinforcement of racism, although I suspect these are rather like those offered by
Hazel Carby (cf. Carby: multiculturalism is “one of the current code words for
race . . .”²⁶) and others who see the dominant society as willing, under the banner
of multiculturalism, to offer small doses of (at least the appearance of) cultural
equality as a substitute for social, economic, and political equality. Hu-Dehart is
also quite obviously aware of the tokenist dangers of multiculturalism, for all that
she sees these as dangers to the project, not as inherent in the project.

I want to conclude this lengthy response to the issues raised by Daniel
Littlefield by reflecting on how Native American Studies might define itself in
what I’ve called the era of multiculturalism. Different definitions, of course,
imply different values—or, at least, different emphases—as these seek to express
themselves by different arrangements in the academy. Among the many models
and possibilities are: separate American Indian Studies/Native American Studies
departments or programs; Native American Studies as a component of an Ethnic
Studies department or program; Native American Studies (as in Mario Garcia’s
view which I cite just below) as part of American Studies departments or
programs, and so on.

For Mario Garcia, whose work has been in the area of Chicano or Latino
studies, American studies and ethnic studies need to come together “to negotiate
a new type of intellectual popular front or a new form of historical bloc, one based
on an equal and democratic relationship.”²⁷ Earlier, Patrick Morris called for
Native American Studies “to be intellectually broad and integrative, utilizing all
academic disciplines and methodologies to search, identify and address the
critical issues relevant to the Native Community.” (in Willard and Downing 2)
Willard and Downing speak of “American Indian/Native American Studies [as]
preparing the way toward inter-cultural education,” (1) their term “inter-cultural”
apparently synonymous with most uses of multicultural. I think M. Annette
Jaimes has moved to something like this position as well, when, near the end of
her introduction to The State of Native America she writes:

Despite the fact of our coming from different traditions, we are
now singing to the same drum, locked together in our common
humanity and our common destiny. (10)

But some still hold to Russell Thornton’s 1978 concern to see “Indian Studies
as a separate discipline.” (in Willard and Downing 6) Cook-Lynn, for example,
is on record as wanting Indian studies to exist as an “alternative regime of
intellectual thought . . . not only through content but through methodology.” (11)
What comes up again and again is the sense that the “integrity” of Native
American Studies can only be maintained by its separation from multicultural or American studies, as, again, in Cook-Lynn’s assertion that “The integrity of what we do comes from the sober understanding of, and the regulating, and defending of the parameters of that discipline . . . .” (11)

I disagree with this view because I believe it to be both flawed in its logic and mistaken in its assessment of practical possibility. But I take it very seriously. How could Native people not be wary of an aggressive majority’s sudden offer to come in and share, the offer of an inclusion that might well be just another way to appropriate, absorb, and nullify? Cook-Lynn, in the essay from which I have quoted just above, insists that worries about the possible ghetto-ization of Native American Studies programs that insist on their separateness or “autonomy” from multicultural, ethnic, or, indeed American Studies programs are just a way of trying to keep Indians from doing things their own way; and, to be sure, there is something to that, too.

But a commitment to separatism, as Joan Wallach Scott has written, “is a simultaneous refusal and imitation of the powerful.” Because our histories are entwined, “no group is without connection or relation to any other, even if these are hierarchical, conflicted, and contradictory relations.” (75) To deny this is to practice what Fernando Coronil calls “Occidentalism” as a complex ensemble of representational strategies engaged in the production of conceptions of the world that a) separates its components into bounded units; b) disaggregates their relational histories; c) turns differences into hierarchy; d) naturalizes these representations; and therefore e) intervenes, however unwittingly, in the reproduction of existing asymmetrical power relations. (in Turner 18-19)

Of course it remains to be seen if in practice as well as theory we can achieve community without homogeneity, what Scott refers to as “communities of difference.” (76)

The major “difference” scholars committed to a separate Native American Studies curriculum may assert is not, I believe, a difference of content or methodology but, rather, one of purpose. In Patrick Morris’s words, “It is [a] definitive commitment to the Native community and people, rather than to academics alone, that distinguishes Native American Studies from other academic disciplines.” (in Willard and Downing, 2) Certainly Native scholars will feel this “commitment” more powerfully and immediately than most non-Native scholars—although I suspect that not many non-Native scholars in this field would admit to being committed to “academics alone.”

Louis Owens has wittily written of “the current tendency of critics to consider Bakhtin as a topical ointment applicable to virtually any critical abrasion,” continuing that “Bakhtinian analysis strikes [him] nonetheless as a
valuable tool . . ." It is Bakhtin that I, too, would invoke to note that a “dialogic” approach to the issues I have been discussing may well be useful. To take Bakhtin seriously—and I haven’t the space, obviously, to detail what that would mean—is to go beyond a vague pluralism or an untheorized commitment to diversity to a recognition that our speech and thought—and my plural pronoun refers to anyone who speaks and thinks about these matters—is inevitably implicated in the speech and thought of others. Postcolonial work on Native American history/culture/literature cannot help but occur in what Mary Louise Pratt has called “contact zones,” for all that we have usually tended to think of “contact zones” as somewhere “out there,” rather than just “here,” quite close to wherever we think of as home. Work on the “borders” as defined by Guillermo Gómez-Peña, Ramon and Jose David Saldivar, and others will be what I myself have called “ethnocritical” work. What this work will ultimately be like of course remains to be seen.

I will conclude by offering my belief, not merely my hope, that postcolonial work in Native American history/culture/literature will indeed create the “we” that Daniel Littlefield theoretically posits but in practice denies. “We” are and will be those scholars, Native and non-Native, who, whatever we see as our most immediate commitments, ultimately, in Edward Said’s phrase, work to produce “noncoercive knowledge in the interests of human freedom.”

Notes

*I would like to thank Betty Bell, Pat Hilden, David Moore, and Peter Whiteley for commenting on an earlier version of this essay. Their remarks were of great use to me, although mine is the sole responsibility for any errors and for all opinions expressed below.


2. See “What is Anthropology that Multiculturalists should be Mindful of It?” a talk presented to the American Anthropological Association Meeting, December, 1992. I quote from Turner’s unpublished text with his permission, and further page references will be documented in my text. Turner distinguishes between what he calls “difference multiculturalism” and “critical multiculturalism.” The latter seeks to use cultural diversity as a basis for critically challenging, revising and relativizing basic notions and principles common to dominant and minority cultures alike, so as to construct a more vital, open and democratic common culture, (ms. 5)

while the former reduces culture “to a tag for ethnic identity and a licence for political and intellectual separatism.” (ms. 6) Oddly enough, “difference” politics are roughly the same as “identity” politics, a curious semantic overlap, and both work against what Turner and I would approve, “a more vital, open and democratic common culture.”

3. I am thinking of the painful, but, I believe, essentially accurate discussion of this matter in Anti-Semite and Jew.


7. I trust it will be clear that I am not offering a defense of Clifton’s work; rather, I am objecting to certain wholesale dismissals of it which seize upon what seems to be its tendency or likely usage as warrant to avoid discussion of the particular and specific issues it raises. I will have much the same point to make below in regard to Hertha Wong’s work.

8. Elizabeth Cook-Lynn in the *Lakota Times/Indian Country Today*, 11/5/92. See also the letter protesting her remarks as racist in the December 3 issue, and the letter protesting their characterization as racist in the December 31 issue.

9. David Moore has pointed out to me that the objection of those who have criticized would-be “learners from the Indians” is not directed at the desire to learn but at the manner in which that desire manifests itself, a manner that adopts “a tone of authority or ‘cultural imperialism’ which apparently does not attempt to learn.” (personal communication) I take the distinction seriously, for all that I have not seen it very carefully applied in practice.


11. Alcoff also urges that we take into account the consequences of our speech, not merely its origin(s) but its end(s) or effects. I agree with this in theory but in practice it is not always so easy to know what uses will be made of publicked speech. While there is a moral requirement incumbent upon the speaker to consider such consequences and uses of her speech as may be knowable, given the inevitably limited awareness any one of us may have of the potentialities of usage, it would be an impossible demand that we be responsible for largely unforeseeable appropriations.


13. Rose means “that kind” not only in a moral or political sense, it is important to acknowledge, but also in a professional or disciplinary sense: she is a very “humanistically” oriented anthropologist, if that phrase conveys anything.

14. *The State of Native America*, 10. Further references to Jaimes will be documented in the text.

15. See, in this regard, Jimmie Durham’s attack on the concept of “tribe” which, he says, “comes from the three peoples who originally founded Rome,” and which is not, in his view, either “a descriptive word, nor a scientific one.” Durham also remarks that “nationalisms [are] always anti-Indian.” See his “Cowboys and . . .” in Jaimes’s *The State of Native America*. My quotations are from 433 and 432, respectively.

16. In this matter, too, there is some disagreement, with some Peoples concerned to tie tribal membership to blood quantum (“percentage” of Indian blood), and others accepting a history of enrollment.

17. In William Willard and Mary Kay Downing, “American Indian Studies and Inter-Cultural Education,” *Wicazo Sa Review*, 7 (1991), 2. All further references to Willard and Downing will be documented in the text.

18. Again, “difficult” logically to understand. Littlefield quotes Jaimes as speaking for the articulation of native American perspectives vis-à-vis the content of various disciplines and without adherence to the academic structures specific to those disciplines (e.g., Native American philosophy is philosophy in its own right, and not by virtue of a juxtaposition to the philosophy of Plato or Hegel).

19. In her *Introduction to The State of Native America*, ix, which I cite again in the final section of this essay.
20. Quoted in Rose, 405. It will come as no surprise that I must question the notion of “real Indian society,” etc., which, intentionally or not, suggests a romantically essentialized authenticity. My questioning, however, means to sharpen Pam Colorado’s concerns, not to undo them.

21. I am thinking of the degree to which Kevin Costner’s *Dances With Wolves* has determined what America, 1992-93 knows of Indians; of the fact that Robert Redford will be filming Tony Hillerman’s Indians on the lands of the Hopi, and of the difficulty the Hopi filmmaker, Victor Masayesva has had finding outlets for his own very powerful film, *Imagining Indians.*

22. The singularly important study of this subject is Barbara Harlow’s *Resistance Literature.*

23. It was just as this essay was to be copy-edited that I came across The Ethics of Collecting Cultural Property: Whose Culture? Whose Property?, ed. Phyllis M. Messenger (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1993), a book that seems to have a good deal to offer in regard to the issues I am developing here.


26. Hazel Carby, “The Multicultural Wars,” *Radical History Review* 54 (1992), 9. Carby is very reasonably concerned that an increasingly “multicultural” curriculum is to be presented to a decreasingly “multicultural” body of students. She notes, in particular, the facts that “The percentage of black students in college populations has steadily decreased throughout the last decade, as has the number of B.A.’s awarded to black students...[and that] the proportion of doctorates awarded to black people is also in significant decline” (8). I have already given the equally dispiriting statistics for Native American students.


