Symbolic and Physical Violence: Legitimate State Coercion of Filipino Workers in Prewar Hawai‘i

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On 9 September 1924, toward the end of a long, drawn-out strike of Filipino sugar workers in Hawai‘i, ‘the police shot dead sixteen strikers in what later came to be known as the “Hanapçpç Massacre,” losing four among its own ranks by the end of the violent confrontation. Edward Beechert (1985:222) writes:

Who or what precipitated the violence is not known. The special deputies, armed with hunting rifles and positioned above the exit road on a bluff, fired repeatedly into the massed strikers, killing sixteen and wounding others. Four policemen were killed in the melee. One hundred and sixty-one strikers were rounded up and jailed. Subsequently, seventy-six Filipinos were indicted for rioting; fifty-seven others pled guilty to charges of assault and battery. A single counsel was provided for the seventy-two men tried and convicted. The county attorney was assisted by two special deputy attorney generals hired and paid for by the HSPA [Hawaiian Sugar Planters’ Association].

Marking one of the bloodiest days in U.S. labor history, this one incident in Hanapçpç, on the island of Kaua‘i, accounts for over six percent of all strike-related deaths in twentieth-century United States (Jackman 2002:399).
As reproachful as it may appear in retrospect, the incident did not arouse contemporary public censure nor bring into question the legitimacy of the coercive agents or their actions. While scores of the strikers were arrested, tried, and convicted, no charges were ever brought against the police. In fact, there is no evidence that doing so was ever seriously considered. Furthermore, the police violence and its unquestioned legitimacy, though noted and described, have not been explained by historians and other social scientists. Far from unique to this particular incident, or to Hawai‘i, there is a general lack of a theoretical understanding of legitimate state violence in the social sciences.

This paper attempts to explain how physical violence can be perpetrated legitimately, in the case of the Hanapçpç Massacre and in general. First, I propose a rethinking of Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic violence. The concept and Bourdieu’s theory of social order and domination in which it is situated provide a powerful vocabulary and a productive starting point for analyzing legitimate acts of physical violence by the state. In particular, his writings on the state bring together and provide suggestive linkages between symbolic violence, physical violence, and legitimacy. At the same time, they raise a number of questions that call for reconsidering and retooling the concept of symbolic violence. Incorporating W.E.B. Du Bois’s notion of double consciousness, I propose a reconceptualization that better explains the possibility of legitimate physical violence. Second, examining the Hanapçpç Massacre, I analyze how racial, and gendered, symbolic violence made possible and legitimate the deadly use of physical violence against Filipino working-class men.

**Reconceptualizing Symbolic Violence**

Bourdieu (1994:3; emphasis in original) defines the state as that institution “which successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical and symbolic violence over a definite territory and over the totality of the corresponding population,” emphasizing, in italics, his point of departure from Max Weber’s classic formulation. The definition establishes a link between symbolic violence—his innovative and widely cited concept—and physical violence. It also raises a number of questions. How does symbolic violence relate to the notion of legitimacy? What exactly is the theoretical link between symbolic violence and physical violence, aside from their supposedly common claimant? How does the state successfully claim a monopoly of the legitimate use of symbolic violence?

“A gentle violence, imperceptible and invisible even to its victims,” symbolic violence, according to Bourdieu (2001:1), operates in the realm of doxa, the typical condition of correspondence between a social order and agents’ internalized dispositions of perception, appreciation, and action structured by and thus adapted to that very social order. The correspondence makes the social world appear natural, even to those who fare badly in it. Symbolic violence refers to this tacit acceptance of oppression by the oppressed: “doxic submission
of the dominated to the structures of a social order of which their mental structures are the product” (1994:14). It is the unconscious consent that the dominated give, or cannot but give, to the relation of domination because they, as well as the dominant, take the established social order for granted (Bourdieu 2000:170). For example, as Bourdieu (2001:35) points out with respect to gender domination in contemporary France, most women profess to wanting a husband who is older and taller than themselves.

Although Bourdieu retains the word “legitimate” from Weber’s definition of the state, it is somewhat redundant, because symbolic violence is meant to address the issue of legitimacy. Again, Bourdieu (1994:14; see also 2000:177) contrasts his own position to that of Weber: “The recognition of legitimacy is not, as Weber believed, a free act of clear conscience. It is rooted in the immediate, prereflexive, agreement between objective structures and embodied structures, now turned unconscious.” That is, our mental structures internalize, or embody, objective social structures, through gradual inculcation, thereby rendering them homologous, mutually reinforcing, and unconscious. In modern, differentiated societies, the state effects this prereflexive agreement by “incarnat[ing] itself simultaneously in objectivity, in the form of specific organizational structures and mechanisms, and in subjectivity in the form of mental structures and categories of perception and thought” (Bourdieu 1994:4; see also 2000). For example, prototypical among state institutions, the educational system legitimates class domination, among dominant and dominated classes alike, by transforming the inherited economic and cultural advantages of the children of the dominant classes—through ostensibly disinterested, meritocratic practices that align with and favor those advantages—into universally recognized academic advantages and credentials that reproduce their dominant class positions (Bourdieu 1996; Bourdieu and Passeron 1977).

No doubt, Bourdieu is right to attenuate the realm of consciousness in the reproduction of relations of domination. The “paradox of doxa” is that so little of the established order is questioned (Bourdieu 2001:1). Shifting the point of contention between Marxism and its critics, he writes, “In the notion of false consciousness that [Marxism] invokes to account for effects of symbolic domination, that superfluous term is ‘consciousness’” (1994:14). How (un)consciously the dominated give their “active consent” (Gramsci 1971:244) to the established order is also, according to Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992), the point of distinction between symbolic violence and hegemony. Although the distinction is probably overdrawn—since one of the signal merits of Antonio Gramsci’s concept, particularly in relation to antecedent Marxist theories of ideology, is that it does not refer only to a “conscious system of ideas and beliefs” (Williams 1977:109; see also Bourdieu and Eagleton 1994; Eagleton 1991)—Bourdieu undoubtedly places much more emphasis on the tacit in legitimating relations of domination, quite radically “reducing that of . . . consciousness” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:25). While he allows for a delimited realm of
conscious conflicts and disagreements, much of what constitutes relations of domination “belongs to the order of belief” and thus goes unquestioned (Bourdieu 1994:14; emphasis in original).\(^7\)

The term itself derives its rhetorical force, in part, from its jarringly oxymoronic pairing of “symbolic” and “violence,” disturbing commonsensical boundaries of what violence is and bridging the often, if falsely, counterposed spheres in the social sciences of meaning and materiality. Bourdieu’s symbolic violence is also ironic: Conceived as “tacit agreement,” it excludes a sense of coercion, unless coercion itself were understood ironically, or at least obliquely (1994:14).\(^8\) In this way, the usual semantic association between “violence” and adjectives like “gentle” and “imperceptible” is inverted. Corollarily, rather than an analogous concept to physical violence, symbolic violence is rendered its negative complement: The need for physical violence to maintain the established order arises from insufficient symbolic violence.\(^9\) If translated, albeit incongruously, into Gramscian terms, winning consent, as well as exercising coercion, would be considered violence—symbolic and physical, respectively. Thus, Bourdieu’s concept overextends the notion of violence to encompass not only physical violence but the condition of its absence: Violence is made effectively synonymous with domination. More critically, his theory of symbolic violence misses a key aspect of domination, what I refer to as doxic asymmetry, the analysis of which has the potential to help explain the legitimate use of physical violence.

Bourdieu’s theoretical model of order and domination rests, I argue, on a problematic assumption. He posits the “unanimity of doxa,” that is, the unanimity of what is taken for granted. Not meant as an ideal type or a limiting case, this unanimity is intended to be quite literal: “nothing is further from the correlative notion of the majority than the unanimity of doxa” (1977:168; emphases in original). Though stated in absolute terms here, there is some ambiguity in his other writings. For example, his illustration of women’s doxic submission was based on surveys that found “a large majority of French women say they want a husband who is older and also (quite coherently) taller than themselves” (Bourdieu 2001:35; emphasis added).

Whatever the ambiguities, I do not dispute that there is a large realm of the established order that goes unquestioned by the dominant and the dominated alike, for the study of which Bourdieu’s social theory and research are invaluable.\(^10\) What I dispute is that there exist only two realms: the “universe of the undiscussed (undisputed)” and the “universe of discourse (or argument)” (Bourdieu 1977:168). In Figure 1, the solid, oval boundary represents this mutually exclusive division between the unconscious doxa on the one hand, in which symbolic violence takes place, and the consciously orthodox (i.e., dominant) and heterodox (i.e., dominated or subaltern) opinions on the other. Partitioned neatly into what is implicitly agreed and what is explicitly disagreed, this theoretical model leaves no room for disagreement over what is implicit.
In one sense, the foregoing omission is puzzling, for all of Bourdieu’s analyses presuppose and demonstrate the ubiquity and durability of hierarchical social divisions, foremost class ones. However, these social divisions do not divide the “universe of doxa.” Instead, Bourdieu assumes, as Thompson (1984:61; emphasis in original) notes, “a certain kind of consensus with regard to the values or norms which are dominant in the society concerned.” As much as the dominant, the dominated find natural the order of things.

It is hard to accept, even ideal-typically, that there is no disagreement over what is taken for granted, for example, between capitalists and workers, men and women, whites and people of color, natives and immigrants, teachers and students, and so on. I suggest that there is a certain asymmetry of doxa that accords with, if imperfectly, the asymmetry of relations of domination. The dominated are conscious, albeit variably and far from fully, of much of what remains unconscious for the dominant. This asymmetry is, for instance, precisely what feminist and antiracist research has consistently shown: Occupying unmarked, normative categories, men and whites in the United States remain oblivious to the breadth and depth of inequalities of gender and race, while women and people of color are forced to be much more aware of not only the inequalities but also the obliviousness to which they are subject.

Doxic asymmetry corresponds to Du Bois’s concept of double consciousness, an undervalued and underutilized concept in mainstream social
theory. Intrinsic to the concept is an asymmetric slippage in what is and is not taken for granted, because those who are oppressed—to extrapolate from Du Bois’s discussion of race and African Americans—are, due to their oppression, “gifted with second-sight,” able, and indeed compelled, to see the world through the eyes of the dominant as well as through their own ([1903] 1965:214-215). Put in Bourdieu’s idiom, the dominated recognize, if only partially, the cultural arbitrary of the relation of domination that the dominant misrecognize as natural. For example, doxic asymmetry may account for why the best past writings on race by people of color, like Du Bois’s, tend to read less dated today than those written by their white counterparts, because they recognized contemporarily the cultural arbitrary of a racial formation that whites could recognize only retrospectively.¹³

Although he does not allow for the “second-sight” of the dominated in his social theory, Bourdieu provides an apt example of it from his personal biography, characterized interestingly as an effect of “racism.” Of his provincial social origin, Bourdieu states:

> It gives you a sort of objective and subjective externality and puts you in a particular relation to the central institutions of French society and therefore to the intellectual institution. There are subtle (and not so subtle) forms of social racism that cannot but make you perceptive; being constantly reminded of your otherness stimulates a sort of permanent sociological vigilance. It helps you perceive things that others cannot see or feel (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:209).

Du Bois ([1903] 1965:215) had long ago described a similar situation of “always looking at one’s self through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity.”

If we were to modify Bourdieu’s theory by incorporating Du Bois’s insight, there would be a third realm in the symbolic order in which subaltern consciousness, or heterodox discourses, is not consciously recognized, or even recognizable, by the dominant. I propose that symbolic violence should be rethought of as this tacit nonrecognition (see Figure 2). It shares with Bourdieu the idea that symbolic violence is a matter of course for the dominant, requiring no conscious formulation of intention, but differs in that the dominated consciously recognize and question aspects of the established order that the dominant take for granted. To be clear, I do not mean that the dominated are conscious of all, or even most, aspects of domination.¹⁴ But, symbolic violence occurs when some subaltern discourses are not recognized as such because deeply held dominant beliefs (i.e., doxa), and dominant discourses structured by them, preclude it.
The latter point concerning dominant discourses needs some clarification. According to Bourdieu (1977:169; emphasis in original), once provoked to discourse by the “competing possibles” posited and implied by subaltern discourses, the dominant attempt, “without ever entirely succeeding,” to “restor[e] the primal state of innocence of doxa” through orthodoxy, “straight, or rather straightened, opinion.” Though mostly in agreement, I suggest that doxa can sometimes remain unfazed even when awakened into discourse. Some dominant discourses, even if they refer to subaltern discourses, may not be consciously straightened opinions. Rather, they may be doxa sleeptalking, as it were. There is no conscious engagement or “argument,” in Bourdieu’s sense, because the dominant do not hear that there is anything to be argued, even as they argue. In other words, the restoration of the “innocence of doxa” may not always be necessary, because the dominant may not recognize that it is threatened. They remain oblivious.\textsuperscript{15}

Whereas symbolic violence, for Bourdieu, designates the unconscious agreement of the dominated, my proposed reconceptualization, recovering an unironic sense of coercion, denotes the conscious disagreement of the dominated that goes unconsciously unrecognized by the dominant. Most relevant for this study, this reconceptualization provides leverage in understanding the legitimate use of physical violence: The effect of symbolic violence is to render its victims—whose discourses are so illegitimate as to be below conscious recognition and engagement by the dominant—susceptible to various forms of discrimination, including physical violence.
This reformulation of symbolic violence accords with what we mean, in ordinary speech, when we speak of the “voiceless” or the “vulnerable.” By “voiceless,” we mean that certain opinions contrary to the established order are unrecognized, not that those opinions do not or even cannot exist, save for during exceptional moments of “crisis.” For example, it is not that poor Black communities are unaware of or do not speak against—in other words, are tacitly complicitous with—the police abuse they face on a daily basis that makes them vulnerable to it. Rather, it is the tacit nonrecognition of the Black poor’s discourse of police abuse by whites and the state, structured by doxic beliefs to the contrary, that makes police abuse legitimate police practice (Cullen et al. 1996; Dudley 1991; Marable 2000; Nelson 2000; Ogletree et al. 1995; Vargas 2003). In contrast, conscious recognition and engagement of subaltern discourses by the dominant, however antithetical the engagement may be, would more likely bring under scrutiny the legitimacy of any conservative acts of physical violence. Here, note once legitimate forms of physical violence that no longer command widespread legitimacy (e.g., lynching, genocide).

As for Bourdieu’s symmetric assertion that the state successfully claims a monopoly of the legitimate use of both symbolic violence and physical violence, the empirical case below, and many others, shows that the state, though uniquely powerful, holds no such exclusive claim over the former. In fact, Bourdieu’s (1984, 2001) analyses of cultural consumption and gender domination, among others—in which symbolic violence is prevalent, but the state, though not absent, does not assume centrality—illustrate this point. The link between symbolic violence and the legitimate use of physical violence is not the monopolization of both by the state. Instead, a singular power of the state may be its routine capability to articulate symbolic violence, much of which occurs beyond the state, to physical violence, of which the state does claim, if not necessarily successfully, a monopoly.

**Hanapçpç Massacre: Symbolic and Physical Violence**

With certain exceptions, like the much discussed death of Captain James Cook in 1779 (e.g., Obeyesekere 1992; Sahlins 1985, 1995), violence has not been a major focus of historical research on Hawai‘i. The paucity of research can be attributed largely to the long-standing assumption, both without and within the academe, of Hawai‘i’s exceptionalism: that Hawai‘i, the so-called “Paradise of the Pacific,” has enjoyed social equanimity unimaginable on the “mainland.” With this paper, I suggest that this assumption is untenable. Implicating an economic and political core of prewar Hawai‘i, its quintessential sugar industry, the Hanapçpç Massacre, I seek to establish, is not an inexplicable anomaly, as commonly thought.

The most fundamental empirical questions for this paper are: How was the massacre of Filipino strikers possible, and how did it not raise public expressions of doubts of legitimacy? In line with the reconceptualization of symbolic violence
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outlined above, I propose that Filipino men in Hawai‘i had been subject to a particular racial, and gendered, form of symbolic violence that made possible and legitimate the lethal use of physical violence against them.

Although dating back to the early nineteenth century, Hawaii’s sugar industry remained relatively undeveloped until the Reciprocity Treaty of 1876. The treaty between the Kingdom of Hawaii (and, from 1894 to 1898, the Republic of Hawaii) and the United States permitted the duty-free entry of unrefined sugar from Hawai‘i into the U.S. market; the Republic of Hawaii was established by an elite group, led by Americans, in a forcible overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchy. The U.S. annexation of Hawai‘i in 1898 as an “incorporated territory” continued the tariff protection.

The access to the protected U.S. market led to a tremendous growth of the sugar industry. It also touched off an intense concentration of capital, as the large investments needed to finance the growth drove out small, independent producers. Consequently, a handful of agencies or factors, commonly referred to as the “Big Five,” came to dominate the industry. Moreover, the Big Five were, in turn, controlled and owned by a small number of haole families with lineages to the Christian missionaries of the nineteenth century. The concentration of capital, as well as interlocking directorates among the Big Five and intermarriages among the “missionary” families, impelled industrial cohesion and the formation of the HSPA (Dean 1950; MacLennan 1979).

Leveraging their commanding position in sugar, the Big Five assumed a similar dominance in the maritime industry. Later, the Big Five also made considerable inroads in the pineapple industry, obtaining a majority market share of what would fast become Hawaii’s second largest industry by the early 1930s (Brooks 1952). Nonetheless, the sugar industry remained the backbone of the Big Five and Hawaii’s economy, accounting for about $75 million of the territory’s $109 million in exports in 1924.

Until the New Deal, the Big Five’s stranglehold on Hawaii’s economy was cozily tied to an amenable territorial government. It intervened consistently on behalf of powerful employers and against workers, most of whom were either disenfranchised or, in cases of the Portuguese and the nisei, pressured by haole into Republican consent (USBLS 1940; USHR 1940).

With the rapid development of the sugar industry, labor supply was a constant concern for employers. From the mid-nineteenth century, Hawaiians and migrants—actively recruited in overlapping succession, primarily from China, Portugal, Japan, and the Philippines—labored on sugar plantations. Following their initial contractual stints in sugar, they drifted off, in varying degrees, and worked in other industries. When the Gentlemen’s Agreement of 1907-08 between the United States and Japan halted the migration of Japanese laborers, the Philippines became the planters’ only major source of additional labor. From 1912 onward, Japanese and Filipino workers were the most numerous in the
sugar industry, with the latter becoming the largest by 1922. In 1920, there were 19,474 Japanese and 13,061 Filipino workers, combining for 73.4 percent of the sugar labor force. In 1924, the respective numbers were 12,781 and 19,475, accounting for 81.5 percent (Hawaiian Annual 1913:35; 1921:17; 1923:14; 1925:12).

The 1924 strike of Filipino sugar workers had its origin in a strike four years earlier. The five-month strike in 1920 involved around 8,300 Japanese and Filipino workers on O'ahu, representing 77 percent of the island’s work force. It was conducted by O'ahu members of two separate unions, the Federation of Japanese Labor and the Filipino Labor Union (FLU), with members on the outer islands continuing to work and contributing their wages to the strikers. The unions struck for higher wages, eight-hour workdays, overtime pay, maternity leave, and better health and recreational facilities (Reinecke 1979:95). The strike ended in defeat with the planters making “no concessions whatsoever, either direct or implied.”

At the center of the strikers’ concerns in 1920 was the plantations’ bonus system. Receiving much of their wages through bonuses that were pegged to the price of sugar, workers anticipated a drop in the World War I-inflated price and demanded a higher basic wage and a restructured bonus system. As feared and predicted, the wholesale price of sugar fell precipitously, from a record high of 12.33 cents per pound in 1920 to 4.63 cents per pound in 1922 (Taylor 1935:168). The turnout bonus was consequently worth only about a penny an hour (Beechert 1985:217). The daily wage of an unskilled laborer was, for all intents and purposes, the industry’s minimum wage of one dollar, the sugar industry’s repeated protestations about the “average” wage being much higher notwithstanding. And, if all workers fell ill to the proverbial flu of the sugar price drop, Filipino workers caught pneumonia, being largely confined to minimum-wage unskilled jobs.

In the fall of 1922 and again in 1923, Filipino workers, many of whom were veterans of the FLU, held a series of meetings on various plantations. In the meetings—led by Pablo Manlapit, a former sugar and dock worker turned lawyer and labor leader who had led the FLU in the 1920 strike, and George Wright, the haole head of an AFL local who had led a short-lived drive for an interracial labor movement—the workers drafted a petition with a list of their “requests,” for which over 6,000 signatures were collected (Manlapit 1933:34). As indicated by the name they adopted for the union and the movement, the High Wages Movement (HWM), the primary requests or demands of the workers were the raising of the minimum wage to two dollars and the elimination of the bonus system. The other demands were reduction of the workday to eight hours, time and half for overtime and double time for work on Sundays and legal holidays, “equal compensation for men and women engaged in the same kind of work,” “proportionate increase in the wages paid to skilled and semi-skilled employees,” and “recognition of the principle of collective bargaining and the rights of employees to organize for their mutual benefit and protection.”
The petition, along with a letter, was sent to the HSPA on 10 April 1923. Holding to its past practice of dealing with labor unions, the HSPA ignored the petition. The HWM sent another letter and a second copy of the petition in early November 1923, which the HSPA again ignored. A third attempt was made on 20 December 1923 with the same result.\textsuperscript{33} Reasoning that the HSPA was legally not an incorporated body but a “purely voluntary clique” with no legal standing, the HWM then made a last ditch effort at presenting the petition to the “individual plantation companies, which [were] incorporated and legally responsible.”\textsuperscript{34} Predictably, neither the HSPA nor the individual member plantations responded to the petitions (Manlapit 1933:61).

As outlined in the HWM manifesto of January 1924, the HSPA’s refusals led the union to proceed with its intention to strike. In March 1924, the Executive Committee of the HWM drafted a “Strike Proclamation,” calling for the strike to commence on 1 April 1924. The proclamation stated that workers on some plantations would engage in a “direct strike,” while those on the other plantations would “go on a silent strike,” essentially a slowdown.\textsuperscript{35} Whether non-striking Filipino workers actually went on a “silent strike” is unclear, but the “direct strike” did begin its erratic career on the island of O‘ahu on 1 April, though with minimal organizational structure, strike fund, or means of communication (Beechert 1985:219). It then meandered haltingly through the island of Hawai‘i, beginning in June, and the islands of Maui and Kaua‘i, beginning in July (Manlapit 1933:65; Reinecke 1996:32-34). Illustrative of the indeterminate character of the strike, it ended sometime in 1925, but an exact date cannot be placed, although it effectively ended with the Hanapcpc Massacre. In the course of the strike, it directly involved 34 of the islands’ 49 plantations and up to three-fifths of the Filipino work force (Reinecke 1996:30-33).

The HWM’s general lack of organization, like that of its predecessor FLU, was not surprising, given Filipino workers’ limited institutional support and itinerancy. The latest to be recruited, Filipino sugar workers were almost exclusively young men without families (Lind 1980:41-43; Nordyke 1977: table 4b.7). Severely circumscribed in their opportunities, due not only to their late arrival but also unremitting discrimination, Filipinos were and would remain overwhelmingly tied to the plantation economy as unskilled labor (Jung 1999). In 1928, over two decades after their first arrival, more than three-fourths (76.5%) of all Filipinos in Hawai‘i lived on sugar plantations; in contrast, among the Japanese, less than one-third (30.0%) remained sugar plantation residents.\textsuperscript{36} Also far outpacing all others, over 90 percent of gainfully employed Filipino men were classified as “laborers” in the 1930 census (Lind 1980:84-85).

Socially isolated in plantation communities, Filipinos worked in the worst jobs and lived in the worst housing. With few resources to spare, they were unable to establish much in the way of durable institutions: “Unlike the plantation Japanese with their temples, language schools, young men’s associations, and neighborhood stores, the Filipinos had no community roots.” Filipinos also had no established press of their own, and the mainstream newspapers provided no
viable alternative, as rare references in them to Filipinos were limited to reports of arrests and industrial accidents. Adding to the lack of community stability was the high turnover rate among Filipinos, who moved from one plantation to another in search of higher wages. In 1923, the rate of turnover for Filipino workers was 80 percent (Reinecke 1996:2-3).

As much as the strike’s lack of organization proved to be a liability, its improvisational, tortuous tour of the islands proved to be an unpredicted asset as well. The sugar industry never knew when, where, or for how long the workers were going to strike. Nevertheless, the sugar industry coalesced in the face of the amorphous strike and did not hesitate to apply all due force. As in the past, compromise was not entertained. Ten days prior to the strike, the HSPA set up a strike claims committee to deal with strike losses, diffusing the costs to the entire industry. The struck plantations evicted the strikers, forcibly if necessary (Beechert 1985:220). Acts of espionage and frame-ups against labor leaders through informants and agents provocateur were also standard practice by 1924 (Manlapit 1933:66-67; Reinecke 1996:40, 43). Conducted at a time of labor scarcity, the industry’s main source of strikebreakers was newly arriving Filipino workers, a thousand of whom, according to Manlapit (1933:67-68), joined the strike. As usual for prewar strikes, it ended with the workers obtaining none of their material demands.

Although a few historical accounts have well described the Hanapèpè Massacre over the years, most comprehensively by John E. Reinecke (1996: ch. 10), they have not put forth a theoretical explanation for its possibility and for the prevailing unconcern for the dead and wounded Filipinos and the large number of Filipinos promptly accused and convicted of causing the conflict. I argue that deeply held, doxic beliefs of the haole elite and the larger public about Filipino men, specifically their imputed natural predisposition toward violence, precluded the recognition of contrary Filipino discourses and practices. This symbolic violence—tacit nonrecognition of Filipino workers’ discourse and practice of nonviolence—rendered them vulnerable to physical violence, the legitimacy of which would not be questioned.

In Hawai’i, each migrant group of workers faced a qualitatively distinctive racism. As in the U.S. colony of the Philippines, Filipinos in Hawai’i were constructed as an inferior, primitive race (Jung 1999). In this regard, Temperament and Race, a study by psychologists Stanley Porteus and Marjorie Babcock at the University of Hawaii, unintentionally offered an unguarded look at the racial gaze of Hawaii’s haole elite of the 1920s. As a part of the study, the authors obtained “social ratings” of Hawaii’s racial groups from “twenty-five people of long experience in the islands,” most of whom turned out to be plantation managers (Porteus and Babcock 1926:90). Of the eight “traits” rated—“planning capacity,” “self determination,” “inhibition of impulse,” “resolution,” “self control,” “stability of interest,” “tact,” and “dependability”—Filipinos ranked either last or second to last on seven of them, “tact” being the
sole exception. In other words, Filipinos were considered to be extremely short-sighted, suggestible, impulsive, irresolute, overemotional, unstable in their interests, and undependable, although of average tactfulness (Porteus and Babcock 1926:92-97). A survey study of Hawaii's Japanese later showed similar antipathy toward Filipinos—similar both in intensity and in kind (Masuoka 1931). Suggesting a general pattern for Hawaii, the Chinese also held Filipinos in the lowest regard (Masuoka 1931).

In line with their imputed "primitive temperament" and lack of manly discipline, Filipinos were regarded as a violent race, as the study by Porteus and Babcock (1926:64-68) found:

They are rather highly emotional, impulsive and almost explosive in temperament. With this type, attempts to muzzle expression are rather dangerous so that it is always better to give the Filipino plenty of opportunities to talk himself out. . . .

The explosive extrovert temperament is also reflected by the crime statistics. . . . By analyzing the statistics of court convictions for the last ten years it was found that more than half the murders, 43 per cent of the sex offenses, 36 per cent of the gambling and 28 per cent of the burglaries were committed by Filipinos. . . .

Under the stress of violent anger or a sense of grave injustice he shows no tendency to reflect, so that the act of revenge often is altogether out of proportion to the offense and sometimes in cases of "running amuck" the punishment falls on the innocent as well as the guilty. . . .

The Filipinos in common with other extrovert peoples are rather over-emotional but the currents of feeling do not run very deep. Their outbursts are indicative of weak inhibition rather than of strong emotions. . . .

Summing up these characteristics we may say that the Filipinos represent a fine example of a race in an adolescent stage of development. 40

Again, this view of Filipinos extended beyond the haole community. A contemporary observer as well as historian of interwar Hawaii, Reinecke (1996:3) writes, "Between the Filipinos and other ethnic groups there was a wide social distance. . . . A great part of the population stereotyped them as hotheaded, knife-wielding, overdressed, sex-hungry young men." Filipino workers themselves recalled that the terms "poke poke" and "poke knife" were slurs commonly directed at them by others, not only haole, for their putative propensity to engage in violence. 41

In Bourdieu's terms, claims of Filipinos' violent nature and racial inferiority were dominant beliefs, not empirically controvertible propositions open to
argument. For example, of the nisei subjects in her study, who overwhelmingly had negative views of Filipinos, Masuoka (1931:162) wrote, “Evidently some of the second generation Japanese are so conditioned that mere perception [sight] of a Filipino man calls forth [a] conditioned response.” One of the presumably typical respondents quoted in Masuoka’s study, a nisei woman recalled an early childhood incident—her “first experience with the Filipinos” and “a very frightful one”—to explain her racial enmity:

> While picking [guavas] I saw three Filipinos approaching us. I thought I saw them carrying knives, so I told my friends about it. We threw our guavas away and started to run toward my parents. One of my friends was so frightened that she yelled for help.

> Whenever, I pass this place now I always smile, because I know that the Filipinos did not carry knives with them but it was only an illusion. Since we were told so often that the Filipinos carried knives with them and carried away girls that app[ar]ently those three innocent Filipinos appeared to us dreadful people on earth.

> I am very much afraid of the Filipinos. It is because of my early experience with some of the Filipino men.

After telling another similar story, she concluded, “Even now I do not feel at ease in the presence of the Filipinos” (Masuoka 1931:162-163). In other words, the stories—although she recognized them as empirically unfounded and as conditioned by having been “told so often” about Filipinos—served to confirm her belief about Filipino men’s violent predisposition, especially toward “girls.”

The assumption of inevitable violence suffused the 1924 strike: “Everyone,” according to Reinecke (1996:35), “expected a Filipino strike to be a violent one.” Not confined to the haole elite, a Japanese newspaper that supported the Filipino workers editorialized, “If the strike is once commenced, violent deeds would be perpetrated everywhere. We may witness nearly every day the arson and murder” (Hawaii Shinpo 8 March 1924, as quoted in Reinecke 1996:36).

Even Wright, who would be fired from his job at the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard in 1925 for his part in the strike, unintentionally betrayed a similar belief in his reaction to the dismissal:

> I accepted the responsibility [of advising the High Wages Movement] because I believed my influence among the Filipinos would be effective in restraining them and directing them along recognized legitimate lines, avoiding all violent and destructive tactics. . . . Anyone who has followed my work from the beginning must agree that I have been frank and sincere, exerting a conservative influence and teaching these
primitive people the American principles and ideals (as quoted in Reinecke 1996:158).

Recounting the strike much later, a working-class resident on Kaua‘i stated, 
“[At] that time, Filipinos, they go for broke, they no scared. Not like now; kind of civilized.”

Contrary to Bourdieu’s notion of the “unanimity of doxa,” however, Filipino workers themselves consciously recognized and resisted the dominant beliefs of their predisposition toward violence and, more generally, of their inferiority.

Aware of such widespread fears, Filipino workers explicitly and repeatedly called for nonviolence. For example, their “Strike Proclamation” declared typically, “Let us stand together, avoid violence, use every lawful means to gain our ends, and we will WIN THE FIGHT.” In an addendum titled “WARNING,” it went on to state,

The Executive Committee of the High Wages Movement hereby warns all strikers against committing acts of violence and breaking the laws. The planters have their laws against vagrancy, picketing, they use some wrong and put you in jail, or frame up cases against your leaders. . . . Strikers who deliberately violate the law must expect punishment and need not look to this committee for defense or protection. . . . Watch out for traps set for you by stool pigeons and traitors. In every strike there are always some of the skunks who mix with the strikers and try to stir up trouble. When you catch any of these fellows, don’t be rough or cruel to them, that would be against the law. Be orderly, cheerful, quiet and patient. You are fighting for justice and a square deal, and for American ideals. Get the sympathy of the public by your good behavior.

The wife of one of the strikers in Hanapāpcā vividly recalled hearing Manlapit emphasize nonviolence in a speech she had heard. Another remembered the discourse of the workers in similar terms: “That was really the understanding, that the strike would be won and would be pursued by the strikers not through a troublesome kind of way, but it would be done through a peaceful way. They really didn’t want to use arms.” This discourse of nonviolence also circulated through the union newspaper, Ang Batay (Beechert 1985:219).

Up until the Hanapāpcā Massacre, the strike was indeed remarkably free of violence. A striker in Kāpa‘a, on Kaua‘i, remembered, “So, we continued living down there on the beach [in the strike camp], and we lived in a very peaceable kind of way. We didn’t make any trouble and we didn’t want any trouble.” Similarly, Hilo experienced no rise in crime as it took in a huge influx of strikers from the Big Island’s plantations; the island was where the strike grew to be the largest. Even the decidedly antistrike newspapers, Hilo Tribune-Herald (28 June
1924) and Honolulu Advertiser (15 August 1924), made notes of the unexpected
calm in Hilo (Reinecke 1996:52, 56). Admitting grudgingly that, before the
massacre, the strikers “never made trouble,” those who regarded Filipinos as
uncivilized and violent reconciled their beliefs with this inconvenient fact by
suspecting that the Filipinos “were scheming what to do.”

Exemplifying what I refer to as symbolic violence, the dominant haole elite
could not go against, or even question, their belief of Filipinos’ violent nature to
recognize or engage the workers’ discourse and practice of nonviolence. Instead,
the sugar industry and the territorial government prepared, quite literally, for
battle, as the former funded the latter to hire “special police” and as both
stockpiled weapons. A week after the HWM’s “Strike Proclamation” and ten
days before the start of the strike, the HSPA, as a part of its establishing a strike
claims committee, set up funds for “hiring special policemen.” With these funds,
the HSPA paid the government to hire more police for the express purpose of
quelling the strike, all but erasing the line between corporate interests and the
state. On O‘ahu, over a hundred special police officers were hired. On Kaua‘i, 110
would be paid off at the end of 1924. On the Big Island, the number on
active duty reached over 300. At its peak in Lāhainā, Maui, 107 police officers
patrolled 600 strikers; at one particularly absurd point, 95 kept watch over 230
strikers (Reinecke 1996:36).

Two uneventful weeks into the strike on O‘ahu, the HSPA sent out a directive
to the plantations on the outer islands, ordering that “arms, ammunition, belts,
badges, etc. which are able to be recovered and salvaged will be brought out to
Honolulu, put in condition for use and ready for immediate distribution, if
necessity should arise.” Two days before the directive, the HSPA assessed
each plantation 40 cents for each ton of the average produced for the years
1921-23 to pay the premiums for insurance against arson and violence (Beechert
1985:220). In June, an HSPA bulletin instructed plantation managers, “If there
are any violent speeches made, or any threats, or actions violative of the anti-
picketing statute, it is hoped that the plantation managers will be able to cause
the civil authorities to arrest Manlapit at once and prosecute him or any of his
gang.” Unfazed by evidence contrary to his belief, J. K. Butler, HSPA’s secretary,
lamented, “It is unfortunately true that despite our surveillance we have not
been able to get a good case against him. This would be highly desirable because
there is no question of his many violations of law.” Targeting the leadership
may have been especially urgent, since Butler deemed the “majority of the
Filipinos [to] have the mentality of 13-year-old children.”

A self-fulfilling prophecy, the arms build-up in anticipation of violence set
the stage for its realization. On 9 September 1924, Kaua‘i county’s deputy sheriff
and 40 police officers, most of whom were special police, went to Hanapāpu to
retrieve two Ilocano men, “perhaps waverers on the question of striking,” who
had been detained forcibly by a group of Visayan strikers the day before
(Reinecke 1996:75). As the police took custody of the two men and were taking
them away, the deadly violence broke out. After the armed conflict, the police
arrested well over a hundred, rounding up all surviving Filipino men in Hanapçpç. Filipino labor leaders from the other side of Kaua‘i, who had no connection to the violent conflict, were also arrested. Over 90 National Guards were dispatched to Kaua‘i the next day. Kauai’s sheriff “form[ed] a company of 30 sharpshooters from among his 200 special deputies, who drilled under the direction of the Guardsmen” (Reinecke 1976:83).

There was little uncertainty in the dominant discourse concerning the culprit: The Filipino strikers were to blame. According to a police captain at the scene,

The Filipinos were right up against us when they started firing. They had flourished guns and brandished knives. . . . When they began firing we returned the fire, but they kept coming until as one after another fell they scattered and fled into a banana grove beside the road. From their shelter in the grove the rioters continued to snipe at us with a scattering fire for a quarter of an hour (Honolulu Advertiser 12 September 1924, as quoted in Reinecke 1996:77).

The National Guard’s report to the governor closely followed the police account: “The strikers kept pressing closer and closer on the officers as they neared their cars, when finally a shot was fired at the police by the strikers which was returned by the police.” An assistant manager of a nearby plantation echoed these accounts as an eyewitness (Reinecke 1996:77). The mainstream newspapers—Kauai’s Garden Island, Honolulu Advertiser, and Honolulu Star-Bulletin—likewise placed all of the blame on the strikers, taking their cue and quotes from the police involved (Chapin 1996; Taniguchi et al. 1979). The Star-Bulletin (10 and 11 September 1924) referred to it as “mob-murder” and “strike murders,” condemning not only the strikers in Hanapçpç but also the “criminal labor agitators and all their ilk” (quoted in Reinecke 1996:81). The Advertiser (12 September 1924) stated that the “riot was premeditated” (quoted in Kerkvliet 2002:52). Predictably, the HSPA’s position was that the “Kauai tragedy [was the] result of strikers’ efforts to terrorize”:

[T]he Filipino strikers fired, killing one police officer and generally attacking the police with firearms, knives, clubs and other weapons, killing four officers and wounding several others, including the Deputy Sheriff, who suffered knife wounds.

Not until attacked murderously did the police use force. The president of the HSPA also cited the prevalence of guns among the strikers: “It seems very unfortunate that such a large number of these people have firearms in their possession, many of which were obtained through mail order houses on the mainland.” Likewise, among the general public, the police came under
criticism not for their deadly use of force but for not having taken away the Filipino strikers' firearms beforehand; not to be dissuaded by lack of evidence, when a subsequent search of the strike camp in Kâpa’a by the police and the National Guard, armed with a machine gun and fixed bayonets, turned up only two pistols, the explanation became that the strikers had already thrown their weapons into the ocean. Asked much later if the bloodshed at Hanapâpê could have been avoided, one Kaua‘i couple responded, “Nah, at that time, Filipinos was just like cannibal, eh. . . . Filipinos, ho shit; they think kill[ing] people nothing.”

As before the killings, Filipino strikers’ contrary discourse continued to be ignored as a matter of course, not as a conscious strategy to silence. For example, that the Filipino strikers were not wholly responsible for the violent outbreak did not seem to be within the realm of possibilities in the dominant accounts, requiring no mention, even to dismiss. The killing of the sixteen strikers by the police failed to elicit scrutiny, much less reproof, in the dominant discourse. Accordingly, the families of the dead police officers received prompt compensation from the HSPA, while the dead Filipinos were buried together in a mass grave.

Though not recognized at the time, the Filipino strikers’ interpretation of events did indeed differ markedly from the dominant discourse and the doxic beliefs about Filipinos that shaped it. No firsthand accounts were taken from the strikers’ point of view (Reinecke 1996), but some would eventually get to tell their stories, if only long after the fact (ESOHP 1979). To begin with, there was a general mistrust of the police. According to a striker on Kaua‘i,

And we were hoping that the police could see that our intention was not to hurt anybody or to cause any kind of trouble. You know, but as a matter of fact, the kind of police that they had during that time, they were the first ones to make some kind of trouble. The police themselves were against the strikers. And you know, that’s really at base, what happened there at Hanapepe. That’s why a lot of people died.

More specifically, the strikers disputed the dominant assumptions that they had possessed many guns, that they had taken the first shot, and that the killing of strikers by the police had been only in self-defense. These contentions turned out to confirm the one atypical newspaper account that had come “the closest to giving the strikers’ version”: a paper with a fleeting existence of less than a half-year, Honolulu Times reported the first shot being fired by the special police, only two Filipinos having pistols and only one firing, and eleven Filipinos being shot from behind (Reinecke 1996:167).

According to the strikers at the Hanapêpê strike camp, they had very few guns and perhaps even fewer bullets. A then newcomer to Kaua‘i from the Philippines, who did not strike, corroborated the strikers, “And you could hear
the shooting all at once. And the strikers only had a weapon or two, if any, and almost no bullets. And so, that much shooting, it would have to come from the police. Pieces of wood don’t shoot bullets.” On the question of who proximately touched off the violence, one recalled that “everybody was saying among the strikers, ‘It was the police who started it.’” Others were less sure: “I really don’t know who started it.” In either case, Filipino workers had not internalized the dominant belief of their violent nature to presume that the strikers had been the instigators. As to the accepted narrative that the police had reacted only in self-defense, the strikers were clear in their disagreement. According to them, right after the initial outburst, the strikers ran away from the gun fire: “Really wrong, because if he [strikers] run like that, he protecting body, he no like die, that’s why he run. But what? He [police] shoot.” The police, some of them positioned on a bank, continued to fire their rifles: “They just kept shooting and shooting and of course, a lot of strikers died. . . . The police were up there on a small hill and they had the advantage. They were just picking off the strikers.”

In line with the strikers’ account, a Filipino minister who saw the dead Filipino bodies remembered that most had been shot in the back.

With regard to the dominant, but not the dominated, I agree with Bourdieu (1977:168) that they can recognize what they took for granted and misrecognized as natural “only retrospectively, when they come to be suspended practically.” Indeed, this idea is borne out in the case of the Hanapçç Massacre, evincing further that the dominant’s nonrecognition of the Filipinos’ discourse in 1924 had been tacit. Over a half-century after the massacre, during which Hawai’i underwent vast transformations, some of the dominant voices of the 1920s, from plantation management and mainstream press, came to hold opinions quite contrary to the then dominant discourse. According to the manager of an unstruck Kaua’i sugar plantation in 1924, who arrived at the scene of the violence in Hanapçç shortly after it had begun, “Nobody knows who fired the [first] shot.” He remembered, “[B]y the time I got there, the strikers weren’t shooting back. They were just the police themselves.” “Last[ing] half an hour or so,” up to a dozen police officers shot at “anybody that was running from behind the bushes there, they’d take a potshot. . . . It wasn’t a real battle, it was a slaughter, really.”

Similarly, the then reporter of the Garden Island, who had witnessed and covered the massacre, recalled, “When they began dropping, everybody began taking off. And some of the goat hunters [police] were still taking potshots at ‘em as they ran. . . . This is my opinion—I think a lot of unnecessary shooting happened after it was over, on those that were running.” Neither the Garden Island nor the Honolulu dailies carried such stories in 1924. It would be easy but mistaken to conclude that this journalist, and others, had consciously misrepresented the event in 1924; he gave no indication for such a conclusion. Rather, the unthinkable, doxa, became thinkable: “It’s odd. I can look back on it, I wasn’t shocked or anything [at the time]. It was just one of those things.”

The legal proceedings reproduced the symbolic violence against Filipino strikers, once again legitimating the massacre. As the Garden Island reporter
characterized the process much later, “It was an open-and-shut case, of course.” In other words, there was no other outcome that was possible or thinkable: it was a matter “of course.” The arrested were kept in jail without being charged. Though not unusual for the time, they were also not provided with lawyers or interpreters. Fifty-seven of the indicted pled guilty to assault and battery. The only evidence against them, in most cases, was their presence in the strike camp in Hanapepe—“hence,” Reinecke (1996:84) wryly notes, “their moral complicity in the riot.” In fact, according to an arrested striker, the procedure for processing all of the arrested Filipino men was that they were paraded, one by one, in front of police officers who determined whether “they were there at the strike camp or not.”

A grand jury indicted seventy-six others on charges of rioting. At the insistence of an arrested leader, one public defense attorney was then appointed to represent all of the accused. In contrast, directed by the territorial governor, Hawaii’s attorney general appointed special deputy prosecutors in consultation with the HSPA, which also paid for them (Reinecke 1996). The dominant discourse in the courts and the public was that the violent “rioters” had been led astray by their own leaders and, evoking the dominant discourse during the 1920 strike, possibly even the Japanese (Kerkvliet 2002:52). Unfortunately, “[c]ourt records and documents which may have provided insights from the perspective of the strikers have been routinely destroyed along with other records of the same era” (Taniguchi et al. 1979:x-xi).

In the end, 58 received four years in prison, while two received four years and eleven months; sixteen were acquitted. Many of the convicted, likely those identified as the leaders in Hanapepe, were later deported to the Philippines. At the sentence hearing, the presiding judge William C. Achi scolded the convicted strikers:

> Your principal trouble lies and your greatest danger is in the radicalism of some of your most prominent leaders. You must not be misled by any queer notion that in order to be successful in your strike you must take law into your own hands and commit acts of violence (quoted in Reinecke 1996:86).

As the strike’s principal historian Reinecke (1996:85) observes, the judge’s statement “enunciated clearly the prevalent view of the strike, which included throwing the blame for Hanapepe upon the top union leaders, whose public utterances (and their private ones, too, so far as is known) had been consistently against violence.” The incarceration and deportation of convicted Filipinos added but another layer of physical violence that was made legitimate by the symbolic violence to which they were subject.
Conclusion

Since the world is not in a state of perpetual revolution, much of the social order, though pervaded by myriad inequalities, goes unquestioned, not only by the dominant but also by the dominated—"or else the world is a madhouse" (Sahlins 1985:153). More than any others', Bourdieu's social theory and research forcefully and convincingly argue this point. Scaling back the importance and purview of consciousness and discourse, he emphasizes the role of symbolic violence—tacit consent, or doxic submission, of the dominated—in reproducing and legitimating relations of domination.

Bourdieu's conceptualization of symbolic violence, however, has several drawbacks. Conceived as tacit consent, it overly distends the notion of violence toward irony or obliquity. Consequently, the theoretical relationship between symbolic violence and physical violence is not analogous but negatively complementary: The use of physical violence—naked brute force—to conserve the established order proceeds from and indicates insufficient symbolic violence. Bourdieu is also unclear on how the state successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of symbolic violence. Above all, his assumption of the "unanimity of doxa" exaggerates the consensus with regard to what "goes without saying because it comes without saying" (Bourdieu 1977:167-168).

Patricia Hill Collins (1991:8) writes, "On some level, people who are oppressed usually know it." For Bourdieu, the level of this knowledge is limited to the universe of discourse, the restricted realm of consciously conflicting opinions between the dominant and the dominated that is mutually exclusive of the realm of unconscious unanimity, the universe of doxa. Du Bois's concept of double consciousness, I argue, contributes a valuable critique, inserting a third realm that contravenes the assumption of doxic unanimity. One effect of domination on the dominated is to be "gifted with second-sight" (Du Bois [1903] 1965:214): Forced to see the world from the viewpoint of the dominant as well as from their own, the dominated are conscious of much of what remains unconscious for the dominant. Put simply, the dominated take less of the established order for granted than the dominant. Inversely, the dominant take more of it for granted. In other words, relations of domination entail asymmetry, not unanimity, of doxa.

The asymmetry of doxa implies that some subaltern discourses are disregarded by the dominant as a matter of course. I propose that this tacit nonrecognition—not tacit consent—constitutes symbolic violence: It is the explicit disagreement of the dominated that is implicitly ignored by the dominant. The dominant are ignorant in a deep and true sense. Most relevant for this paper, the proposed reconceptualization helps to explain the legitimate use of physical violence against the dominated: Symbolic violence renders its victims—whose contrary discourses are tacitly unrecognized and unengaged by the dominant—vulnerable to conservative acts of physical violence, among other forms of discrimination. It is through the delegitimation of the dominated's "knowledge"
that acts of physical violence against them are made legitimate. Symbolic violence is a necessary condition of possibility for the legitimate use of physical violence.

How did the police kill sixteen Filipino strikers on the island of Kaua‘i in 1924 with unquestioned and uninterrupted legitimacy? To this day, the killings are more likely to be remembered, if at all, as a riot, a battle, an incident, or a tragedy than as a massacre. How was the nakedness of the deadly brute force not seen? After all, the sugar industry had paid the government for the hiring of hundreds of special police, many of whom took part in the massacre, specifically in anticipation of and response to the strike.

Constituting common sense, or doxa, Filipinos in prewar Hawai‘i were believed to be inferior to and by others, foremost haole. One inferior characteristic ascribed to Filipino men, in particular, was a natural predisposition toward violence. Filipino workers, however, did not internalize this dominant belief as common sense: there was no unanimity of doxa, no tacit agreement between the dominated and the dominant. Rather, leading up to and during the 1924 strike, Filipino workers were conscious of the dominant belief of their violent nature and explicitly advocated nonviolence: there was asymmetry of doxa, as the dominant took for granted what the dominated did not. Tacitly not recognizing the Filipino men’s discourse and practice of nonviolence, the sugar industry and the territorial government together took extreme measures, including the stockpiling of weapons and the hiring of special police, to counter the violence that they could not fathom would not materialize, even as it did not materialize in the initial months of the strike. Believing was not seeing, or hearing.

The preceding tacit nonrecognition, or symbolic violence, secured the immediate legitimacy of the police violence in Hanapcpc that took the lives of sixteen Filipino strikers: The legitimacy of the physical violence against them rested upon the “prerflexive” illegitimacy of their contrary discourse. For the haole elite and, as far as is known, the public at large, the massacre only confirmed their preexisting beliefs about Filipinos. No justification for the sixteen Filipino deaths was needed, because no justification was ever called for; it was self-evident. Reproducing the symbolic violence, the Filipino strikers’ discourse of what had happened in Hanapcpc was also ignored as a matter of course in the aftermath, ensuring the “open-and-shut” criminal cases against scores of Filipinos and legitimating, once again, the state’s use of physical violence—their incarceration and, in many cases, deportation.

The fact that the Hanapcpc Massacre was the deadliest conflict in Hawaii’s labor history has led to the assumption that it was anomalous. But, as this paper demonstrates, the legitimate use of physical violence against Filipino workers was predicated on symbolic violence that “normal” unequal social relations produced. It is not hard to identify, either historically or contemporarily, examples of symbolic violence that lead to the use of physical violence whose legitimacy does not come into serious question. Particularly at the present historical moment, victims of symbolic and physical violence, foreign and domestic, are not in short supply. Whether they be Arabs, the poor, prisoners, Muslims, or
undocumented migrants, their “voicelessness”—more accurately, their silent but unheard voices—routinely legitimates the physical violence, and other forms of discrimination, they face regularly.

How is symbolic violence, and the legitimate use of physical violence that it makes possible, to be resisted? I suggest that one answer lies with coalition politics. Symbolic violence works, in part, through isolation. For example, in 1924, Filipino workers’ discourse of nonviolence was tacitly unrecognized not only by the haole elite and the territorial government, their direct adversaries, but also by many others of the non-Filipino public, even those who supported the strike. It is through coalitions among victims of different forms of symbolic violence, who may be more able to hear one another through analogical reasoning and empathy and therefore to construct a coherent politics, that their respective realms of symbolic violence may be pushed back. In the late 1930s and the 1940s, Hawaii’s workers formed such a coalition across extant racial divisions to struggle successfully against haole capitalists. One effect of the interracial working-class movement was that acts of physical violence against Filipino workers, like the Hanapèpè Massacre, could no longer take place with unquestioned legitimacy (Jung 2003). Likewise, to recognize and engage tacitly unrecognized subaltern discourses and practices and to construct meaningful articulations across them are some of the key opportunities and responsibilities of critical scholarship.

Notes

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1. An early use of the term, "Hanapepe Massacre," appears in Manlapit (1933:67).
2. HSPA was the powerful decision-making body of the industry.
3. My intention is not to minimize the killing of the four police officers. Never deemed legitimate, their deaths lie outside the analytical focus of this paper.
4. Weber (1946:78; emphasis in original) defines the state as “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopolistic use of physical force within a given territory.”
5. But, not fully redundant. Bourdieu (1994) finds doxic submission, or symbolic violence, as the source of legitimacy. Hence, in relation to physical violence, the presence of both “legitimate” and “symbolic violence” in his definition of the state appears redundant. In relation to symbolic violence, however, the definition’s reference to its legitimate use seems to indicate not a redundancy but a symbolic violence of a second order: symbolically violent use of symbolic violence. But, exactly what that would be—or, negatively, exactly what an illegitimate use of symbolic violence would be—remains unclear.
7. Though not discussed or critiqued here, Jackman (2001) offers an original approach to theorizing legitimacy and violence that differs from, but also overlaps with, both Bourdieu and Gramsci—greatly expanding the definitional scope of violence, somewhat like Bourdieu, and highlighting the ways in which the dominant’s ideological construction of violence conceals their own preferred forms of violence, somewhat like Gramsci.
8. “Symbolic violence is the coercion which is set up only through the consent that the dominated cannot fail to give to the dominator (and therefore to the domination) when their understanding of the situation and relation can only use instruments of knowledge that they have in common with the dominator, which, being merely the incorporated form of the structure of the relation of domination, make this relation appear as natural” (Bourdieu 2000:170).
9. “The state does not necessarily have to give orders or to exercise physical coercion in order to produce an ordered social world, as long as it is capable of producing embodied cognitive structures that accord with objective structures and thus of ensuring the belief of which Hume spoke—namely, doxic submission to the established order” (Bourdieu 1994:15).
10. For example, a child’s persistent string of “why” questions points to our own unquestioning, or no longer questioning, assumptions about the world and, as evidenced by our eventual “I don’t know” or irritation, to what Bourdieu refers to as their cultural arbitrariness.
11. “All the agents in a given social formation share a set of basic perceptual schemes” (Bourdieu 1984:468).
12. As a thought experiment, imagine how bizzarely newspapers and magazines would read, especially to whites, if “white” were used as compulsorily as “black” as an identifier.
13. However, the datedness of all past writings—for example, their tacit assumption at the turn of the last century that race was real in a biological sense—attests to Bourdieu’s notion of doxa.
14. The degree of doxic asymmetry would be empirically variable. Complementarily, the degree of doxic submission would also be empirically variable.
15. Using Du Bois’s concept of double consciousness, Rawls’s (2000) study of interactions shows how Blacks and whites often talk past each other in contentious discourse. She also finds that, particularly for whites, this unintelligibility is coupled with an unawareness of it.
16. “Crisis is a necessary condition for a questioning of doxa but is not in itself a sufficient condition for the production of a critical discourse” (Bourdieu 1977:169). In this regard, Calhoun (1995; see also Sewell 1992; Wacquant 1987) rightly points out that Bourdieu’s theory of practice, relying on exogenous crises as precipitators of change, does not allow for endogenous social transformations.
17. By “conservative,” I do not mean any narrowly political sense of the term.
18. Though convincing that the state holds privileged powers of effecting symbolic violence, Bourdieu (1989, 1994, 1996) is less persuasive in claiming the state’s monopoly of its use—especially beyond the French case. Rather, the degree of state control would appear to be empirically variable, irrespective of whether symbolic violence is thought of in Bourdieu’s terms or mine.
19. In these analyses, Bourdieu argues that agents misrecognize, for example, taste in art or ideal body image as personal and unrelated to social inequalities, thereby legitimating and contributing to their reproduction.
20. Merry (2000) also notes the lack of focus on violence in the study of Hawai‘i. See Liu (1985) and Okihiro (1991) for critiques of the long dominant assimilationist framework.
21. In fact, the very prevalence of symbolic violence may have had the enduring epistemological effect of reproducing Hawaii’s pacific image.
22. Within the U.S. colonial scheme, “incorporated territories” like Hawai‘i were accorded the same tariff protection as states on the continent, protection that was denied “non-incorporated territories” like the Philippines (Littler 1929:40-41).
23. The total area under sugar cultivation expanded from 26,019 acres in 1880 to 254,563 acres in 1934 (Schmitt 1977:357-60). The number of employees grew from 3,786 in 1874 to a peak of 57,039 in 1933 (Hawaiian Annual 1934:20; Schmitt 1977:359). Sugar production soared from 12,540 tons in 1875 to top one million tons three times in the 1930s (Hawaiian Annual 1940:33; Taylor 1935:166).
24. The “Big Five” were Alexander and Baldwin, American Factors (formerly H. Hackfeld and Company), C. Brewer and Company, Castle and Cooke, and T.H. Davies and Company. By 1930, the plantations controlled by these corporations produced 95.2 percent of Hawaii’s sugar (Hawaiian Annual 1931:132-35).
25. Haole is the racial category in Hawai‘i referring to non-Iberian people of European ancestry, mostly of U.S., British, and German origins.
26. The total value of sugar exports was $74,896,568, and the total value of all exports, including sugar, was $108,632,223. The total value of pineapple exports was $28,292,485 (Hawaiian Annual 1925:19, 21).
27. Both before and after U.S. annexation, migrants from Asia were excluded from naturalized citizenship and the franchise on racial grounds. The term issei refers to first-generation migrants from Japan. Nisei refers to their children.
28. The numbers and percentage for 1924 were based on men only, as the 3,250 women counted were not broken down racially. The vast majority of them were likely Japanese.
30. After the 1920 strike, which the haole elite and mainstream press, all but ignoring the Filipinos, interpreted as an anti-American movement of the Japanese to colonize Hawai‘i, Japanese workers left the labor movement for over two decades. The most important factor for the interwar exodus was a redoubled, racist Americanization movement that relentlessly focused exclusively on the Japanese (Jung 1999; Okihiro 1991; Weinberg 1967).

31. Much that is known about the 1924 strike from the strikers’ point of view is through Pablo Manlapit’s *Filipinos Fight for Justice*. Prepared in 1924 but not published until 1933, it contains various reprints of original documents as well as his personal recollections.

32. “Petition to Hawaiian Sugar Planters’ Association” from signatories to president and board of directors of HSPA, [sent on 10 April 1923], as reprinted in Manlapit (1933:35-36); see also Pablo Manlapit and George W. Wright to the public, “Manifesto of the High Wages Movement,” 2 January 1924, pp. 1-2, Manuel Quezon Papers, Special Collections, University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa.


34. Ibid., pp. 3-5.

35. Executive Committee of the HWM, “Strike Proclamation,” 14 March 1924, as reprinted in Manlapit (1933:62-64).

36. J. K. Butler to HSPA trustees and all plantation managers, 11 May 1928, PSC33/15, HSPA Plantation Papers, Special Collections, University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa.

37. By contrast, the Portuguese and the Japanese, the other major groups of workers in the 1920s, were racialized as related to but distinctly inferior to haole and as inherently anti-American, respectively (Jung 1999).

38. “Sixteen of the judges were plantation managers while among the remainder of the group were head workers of social settlements, plantation doctors, and several educationists” (Porteus and Babcock 1926:90). The judges’ “race” went unremarked, indicating, in all likelihood, that they were all haole.

39. Puerto Ricans ranked last or second to last on six of the eight ratings in the Porteus and Babcock study. Both the Japanese and the Chinese held similarly negative assessments of Puerto Ricans. Suggesting the importance of colonization in racializing a people as inferior, Puerto Ricans were the only other group of migrant workers to be recruited from another U.S. colony.

40. A vast majority of Filipino workers were recruited from the Visayas and Ilocos regions of the Philippines. The editor of *Garden Island*, Kauai’s main newspaper, found Visayans—the primary participants of the 1924 strike, especially on Kaua‘i—to be particularly “quick tempered.” In his view, one perhaps shaped by the Hanapçpç Massacre itself, Ilocanos—who had “quite a bit of Chinese blood”—were by contrast “not belligerent at all” (Fern interview, p. 511).

41. See interviews of Cabico, De la Cruz, and Gueco. See also Fuchs (1961).

One fact that most commentators, sympathetic and unsympathetic alike, fail to note about the persistent association of Filipinos and knives, particularly cane knives, is that Filipino workers, holding the most physically taxing and lowest paid positions on the plantations, were predominantly the ones in the field actually cutting and handling cane.

42. See also Kojiri interview, p. 585; Ogawa interview, p. 223.

43. *Hawaii Hochi* also carried editorials in support of the strike (Reinecke 1996:168). Filipino strikers on Kaua‘i likewise remembered that some Japanese and Chinese businesses supplied food and money during the strike. See interviews of Agbayani, Anonymous A and Oroc, Cabinatan, Ganade, Lutao, P. Ponce, and Venyan and Juabot.

44. Kojiri interview, p. 585. The quotation is attributed to “SK,” Kojiri’s wife.

45. Behind the strikers’ specific demands was a broader opposition to the lowly treatment of Filipinos, who were “treated like animals,” according to a striker (Lagmay interview, p. 173). A nurse at the time of the strike, a Filipina later recalled that “in those days like that, you were paid according to the color of your skin” (Cortezan interview, p. 433).

46. Executive Committee of the High Wage Movement, 14 March 1924, as reprinted in Manlapit (1933:62-64).

47. Ibid.


50. The strike up to that point had not been completely free of violence, but it had been probably less, certainly no more, violent than other major strikes in Hawaii’s history.
51. P. Ponce interview, p. 286.
52. Kojiri interview, p. 585; the second quotation is attributed to “SK,” Kojiri’s wife.
55. J. K. Butler to plantation managers on Hawai‘i and Maui, 6 June 1924, MKC1/8, HSPA Plantation Papers, Special Collections. See also Kerkvliet (2002:49).
56. J. K. Butler, as quoted in Honolulu Times, 8 August 1924, in Reinecke (1996:3).
57. Oral history accounts of the strikers in Hanapepí vary with regard to the two Ilocanos. They were plantation spies or passers-by; treated well or beaten; and convinced to stay and strike or frightened into silence. For examples, see interviews of Anonymous B, Ganade, Lagmay, and Venyan and Juabot. See also endnote 40 concerning distinctions between Ilocanos and Visayans sometimes drawn by haole.
58. For the deputy sheriff’s account, as told to his son, see Crowell interview, p. 223.
60. According to the recollections of the then Garden Island reporter, neither the Honolulu Advertiser nor the Honolulu Star-Bulletin sent reporters to Kaua‘i. Apparently, they both received the story from the Garden Island, the former directly and the latter via the Advertiser and Associated Press. Fern interview, pp. 534-535.
61. A.W.T. Bottomley, A Statement Concerning the Sugar Industry in Hawaii: Labor Condition on Hawaiian Sugar Plantations; Filipino Laborers Thereon, and the Alleged Filipino “Strike” of 1924, November 1924, pp. 43-44, Hawaiian Collection. Bottomley wrote this pamphlet as the president of the HSPA.
63. Reinecke (1996:79); C. Ponce interview, p. 308. Even a sympathetic historian like Reinecke (1996:36) writes, “Widespread purchase by Filipinos of cheap mail order handguns caused worry, which at Hanapepe was justified by the event.”
64. Kojiri interview, p. 585; the first sentence quoted is attributed to “SK,” Kojiri’s wife. Kojiri had been a taxi driver who took to Hanapepí, on 9 September 1924, some of the police later involved in the violence.
65. Reinecke (1996); Cortezan interview, p. 431; ESOHP (1979:A-6); Fern interview, p. 526.
66. There is a bias to ESOHP’s (1979) interview sample: “It does not include those convicted and later deported or those who became dissatisfied with plantation life on Kauai and left. It includes those found not guilty and released, by definition only peripherally involved in the strike organization and decision making, and those who for whatever reasons elected to stay on Kauai” (Taniguchi et al. 1979:xi). In all likelihood, then, the discourse of Filipino strikers on Kauai’i as a whole was even more at odds with the dominant discourse than presented here.
67. P. Ponce interview, p. 287. He added, “That’s what made it so difficult, when we were on strike before. Because our enemies were not only the plantations, but the police themselves” (Ponces interview, p. 323).
68. Anonymous A and Oroc interview, p. 771; Anonymous B interview, p. 851; Cabinatan interview, p. 65; Ganade interview, p. 104; Lagmay interview, p. 195; Plateros interview, pp. 355-356, 360; Venyan interview, p. 811.
71. Ganade interview, p. 104.
72. Anonymous B interview, p. 849. See also Ganade interview, p. 85; Lagmay interview, p. 171.
74. Runes interview.
75. Faye interview, pp. 470-473. In 1924, Lindsay Faye, and his fellow plantation managers, no doubt would have found it impossible that he would end up agreeing with Manlapit’s (1933:67) interpretation: “The Hanapepe Massacre, in which four police officers were killed and 16 Filipinos lost their lives. An unnecessary slaughter by sharp-shooters placed in ambush, using soft-nosed bullets on men who were trying to escape.”
76. Fern interview, pp. 523-525.
77. Ibid., p. 526. Charles Fern attributed his lack of shock in 1924 to professional focus.
78. Fern interview, p. 534.
80. Bakiano interview, p. 608. See also Fern interview, p. 534.
81. Determining that those who killed the four police officers were themselves killed in the conflict, the authorities did not charge anyone with homicide.
82. The Honolulu Star-Bulletin was particularly inclined toward this view (Reinecke 1996:81-83).
83. Perhaps indicative of the “open-and-shut” nature of the case, newspaper reporting was “very scanty” (Reinecke 1996:85).
84. Anonymous B interview, p. 859; Ganade interview, pp. 90, 99; Plateros interview, p. 366; Rivera interview, p. 898. The exact number of deportations remains unclear.
85. As Mae Henderson writes about Black women, “It is not that black women . . . have had nothing to say, but rather that they have had no say” (1989:24 as quoted in Collins 1998:44).
86. The Japanese in prewar Hawai‘i confronted a different racialized form of symbolic violence, based on the unshakable belief of their anti-Americanism, that isolated them.
87. But, engagement should not be confused with uncritical acceptance, however well intentioned, for even a second sight leaves many blind spots.

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