Between Accommodation and Usurpation:
Lewis Evans, Geography, and the Iroquois-British Frontier, 1743-1784

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Reading a Cartouche:
Native Americans, Geography, and Empire

In 1750, England’s Lords of Commissioners of Trade and Plantations, better known as the Board of Trade, retained the Virginia naturalist and physician John Mitchell to draw a map of British America. The result was an exercise in imperial administration. Responsible for regulating the Crown’s affairs with its colonies, and recognizing that geography served those purposes, the Board of Trade opened to Mitchell its voluminous archive of correspondence, patents, smaller maps and surveys, nautical records, exploration journals, and the like. Five years later, the magisterial Map of the British Colonies in North America appeared. It was composed of eight folio sheets, ranging from Nova Scotia to the Caribbean, from the Atlantic Coast to the Missouri River Valley, and it marked British boundaries alongside indigenous territories. The tensions that culminated in the Seven Years (or French-Indian) War lent the work its urgency, and drove a paradox that was typical for its time—Mitchell understood the tactical importance of native Americans, and recognized their claims, even as he imagined the continent under England’s eventual control.

Given this view, unsurprisingly, Mitchell’s representations of indigenous people often veered toward caricature. In the map’s stylized cartouche, Mitchell
depicted two caciques in feather headdresses, flanked by products of the land (corn, coconut trees, something resembling a wolverine), staring vacuously into space (Figure 1). In a book-length polemic published two years later, *The Contest in America*, Mitchell insisted upon removing rival outposts on the British frontiers, and restoring “our lost credit with those people, who do us so much mischief, and the French so much service.” But what motivated the same “mischievous” people in the coming war? Such questions remained unexamined in his book.¹

Critics from Mitchell’s time to our own, of course, have criticized the arrogant ambitions often embedded within imperial geographies. Samuel Johnson called maps a branch of political action, and he fretfully monitored the spike in cartographic activity that accompanied the Seven Years War. None other than J. Hector St. John de Crèvecoeur sketched a *Carte des limites du Canada avec les colonies anglaises* for the Marquis de Montcalm in the late 1750s, and an acceleration in British expansionism after the 1763 Peace of Paris fed a hungry market for descriptions of the land—for works like William Stork’s *An Account of East Florida* (1766) and Thomas Hutchins’ *A Topographical Description of Virginia, Pennsylvania, Maryland and North Carolina* (1778).

As contemporary scholars have convincingly demonstrated, maps and map-based writing presumed usurpation as they anticipated future economic and political gain. Frontier historian Gregory H. Nobles writes that they reflected “an attempt not just to depict or define the land but to claim and control it, to impose a human and, most important, political order over it.” The influential geographer J. B. Harley argues in more theoretical terms that mapping provided “a medium in a wider colonial discourse for redescribing topography in the language of the dominant society,” and literary critics like William Boelhower are inclined to agree, noting that redrawn boundaries “desemanticized” an existing geography. Perhaps the best known paradigm comes from Benedict Anderson, who argues that imagined nations replaced existing ones through the repetition of images in print. As invented boundaries acquired the status of legitimacy through repeated publication, Anderson maintains, new “property-histories” became fixed within the colonized space; a separate “political-biographical narrative of the realm” would thus come into being.²

Certainly this criticism explains a great deal about the mechanics of dispossession, but an important question remains: what role did native Americans play in spatially-defined struggles for empire? “Indians” did not simply resign themselves to the vacuity of a cartouche, after all, and current scholarship has taken a corrective turn—examining indigenous geographies alongside the colonial archive. Starting from Christopher Columbus, Louis DeVorsey, Jr. wryly notes, explorers “depended upon local pathfinders” to direct them through (what the newcomers called) *terra incognita*. G. Malcolm Lewis observes in a landmark volume of *The History of Cartography* that even as the scope of Euroamerican exploration expanded, the “traces” of native sources remained
Figure 1: Cartouche of John Mitchell's Map of the British Colonies in North America (1755). Courtesy the Library of Congress.
Travelers, settlers, and invaders alike incorporated ephemeral maps that native Americans arranged with sticks and stones; that were drawn in the ground, on deer skin, or on birch bark; or that were narrated verbally and with hand gestures. Literary critic Martin Brückner cites a crisis of geographic understanding in that classic narrative of imperial expansion, the Lewis and Clark Journals. Although Jefferson and company provided a base map for the expedition in 1803, the company realized into its second season that the President's vision of the continent conflicted with more accurate data gathered in the field. Brückner reads the Journals accordingly against the instability of "Native American authorship" and republican "geo-graphic authority." Colonial maps, the current thinking holds, unfolded from both ideological intentions and from specific points of contact on an open frontier.

The same view of geographic work parallels how many scholars—historians especially—have been approaching the American West. Over the past two decades, the "new" western and Indian histories have drawn attention not only to "legacies of conquest," but to the points of intersection between different groups upon a liminal zone. On a "middle ground" (to cite the popular term), native Americans shaped their own interests, cultures converged, and products of the frontier—like maps—may be read not only as imperial manifestos but also as documents of the encounter.

This essay focuses upon Lewis Evans, a Philadelphian who collaborated with Benjamin Franklin, and whose work was defined by Pennsylvania's relationship with the nearby Iroquois. As Evans' maps passed through several editions over a number of decades, they provide a valuable marker to the turns in native-white relations, revealing in particular how different groups saw the land and one another. Lewis Evans first ventured onto the Pennsylvania backcountry in 1743, when he joined a diplomatic envoy to the Iroquois capital of Onondaga (present-day Syracuse, New York), and he incorporated data from that trip into a 1749 map of the mid-Atlantic colonies. In 1755, he folded that smaller work into what was his defining achievement: A General Map of the Middle British Colonies of America. Evans died a year later, but the General Map was amended, pirated, and revised in later editions. The colonial governor Thomas Pownall issued the most famous revision, publishing a version of the 1755 map with an explanatory essay entitled A Topographical Description of North America (1776, revised 1784). The map's publication history basically followed the trajectory that Benedict Anderson describes: Evans provided the "container" as well as an implicit historical narrative, which Pownall then used to advance his vision of a British civilization expanding across space. The latter's baldly imperial perspective, as I will demonstrate, marked a decided break from the 1743 journey to Onondaga.

To interpret maps solely as figures of dispossession, however, potentially misses the rich stories that one might read in colonial texts. Not only did native Americans contribute to Evans' work (the evidence as such is unassailable), but
pressing concerns of native-white relations shaped what he published; backcountry politics informed what he chose to emphasize, include, or omit. The very possibility of drawing a decent map depended upon a certain state of affairs, and in Evans' case, border politics and geography intersected in revealing ways. His maps registered the often subtle turns in native-white relations, which were inherently complex, as the British empire during this period was seeking to claim the continent as its own.

A Path Taken Together: Lewis Evans and the Iroquois

Any discussion of Evans should not begin not with cartography then, but with diplomacy, which for the middle British colonies began with the Iroquois Confederacy. Known to themselves as the People of the Haudenosaunee, the Iroquois met through a formidable Grand Council that was established in the fifteenth century and united the Seneca, Cayuga, Oneida, Onondaga, Mohawk, and (after 1722) Tuscarora nations under a “Great Tree of Peace.” Several “dependent” nations, notably the Shawnees and Delawares, also took shade under this “Great Tree.” The Iroquois peace thus provided the foundation for an indigenous empire, but it was an empire that was both subject to fracture and (by the mid-eighteenth century) dependent upon a European balance of power. With widely-documented success, the Confederacy exploited the rivalry between England and France and used its position on the diplomatic front to exercise influence from Canada to Pennsylvania and through the upper Ohio Valley.

Even as Iroquois council leaders projected the image of a stable Confederacy, however, politics were decidedly local. The Iroquois traditionally made their decisions in village and clan councils, and geographic advantages were often weighed against the Confederacy’s larger interests. The Six Nations held a remarkable influence as a result, yet they often split along an East-West axis—the Mohawks and Onondagas traded with the British, for example, while the Senecas logically gravitated toward the French. The “dependent” Shawnees and Delawares, likewise, managed their own political affairs despite the more visible influence of an all-powerful indigenous empire.6

It was against this complicated milieu that Lewis Evans published his first map—with Pennsylvania making obeisance to an Iroquois empire that was not as cohesive as colonial officials sometimes wished. His Map of Pensilvania, New-Jersey, New-York, and the Three Delaware Counties (1749) drew heavily from a trip to Onondaga six years before, and that trip emerged from British efforts in forest diplomacy (Figure 2). With the French rivalry simmering through the better part of the decade (finally erupting into King George’s War in 1745), British officials courted the Six Nations and their so-called dependents. A border skirmish around Winter 1742-43 put those relations at risk. The details of the skirmish were in themselves insignificant (a group of Iroquois had a scrape with Virginia backwoodsmen); what mattered was the colonial response. Pennsylvania assembled a peace party that journeyed to the Onondaga for the pur-
Figure 2: Lewis Evans' Map of Pensilvania, New-Jersey, New-York, and the Three Delaware Counties (1749). Courtesy the Historical Society of Pennsylvania.

pose of settling the “heart burnings,” or diplomatic fallout, with the Six Na-
tions. Evans joined this trip which, it is essential to recall, had diplomatic, not
cartographic origins. Translator and mediator *par excellence* Conrad Weiser
took the lead; rounding out the party was the botanist John Bartram, an Oneida
from the Susquehannah Valley named Shickellamy, and Shickellamy’s son. In its very composition, Weiser’s group epitomized the meeting of cultures that formed the basis of much cartographic activity.  

The need for appeasement and accommodation, moreover, resulted in a substantial record of indigenous beliefs about the land. Evans, Bartram, and Weiser all kept journals (with Evans later publishing a map), and their accounts covered the full range of white responses—from the usual tendency to imagine white uses of land, to accounts of native customs and beliefs. On the more imperial end of the spectrum was Lewis Evans, who emphasized future growth. His 1749 map was the picture of an expanding economy. It portrayed cities unfolding from the eastern seaboard, ships hugging the Atlantic shores, and the tidal readings of ports. A longitudinal scale on top and bottom (one from Philadelphia, the other from London) suggested an emerging, if provincial, metropolis—a thriving toehold on the coast, poised to expand into the blank West of his map. On the other end of the spectrum was John Bartram, whose 1751 account was published in London under the cumbersome title, Observations on the Inhabitants, Climate, Soil, Rivers, Productions, Animals, and other matters worthy of Notice. Made by Mr. John Bartram, in his Travels from Pensilvania to Onondago, Oswego and the Lake Ontario in Canada (1751). At a basic level, this combination of travelogue, ethnography, and natural history supplemented the image of Evans’ west-reaching Susquehanna River. Bartram rated the future of Iroquois lands, describing the soil as “poor and stoney,” “midling,” “fruitful,” “good level rich,” “excellent,” and so on. Even as he imagined ground broken under the British plow, however, Bartram at least noted native Americans’ beliefs about the surrounding countryside.  

A significant landmark was Ogarechny Mountain, a site south of Onondaga (or present-day Syracuse), from which the Iroquois believed staple crops originated (Figure 3). Evans’ map provided a cursory tag that explained where “the natives” first found “Corn, tobacco, Squashes and Pompions [pumpkins].” Bartram included a longer version of the same story. An “Indian (whose wife had eloped) came hither to hunt,” the Observations explained, “and with his skins to purchase another” woman, the jilted husband, espied a young sqaw alone at the hill; going to her, and enquiring where she came from, he received for answer, that she came from heaven to provide sustenance for the poor Indians, and if he came to that place twelve months after he should find food there. He came accordingly and found corn, squashes and tobacco, which were propagated from thence and spread through the country.  

This passage captured the ambivalence of an ethnographer who recognized native beliefs but who privileged a Euroamerican perspective nonetheless. On the surface, the anecdote accounted for two of the “three sisters” of Iroquois
agriculture (the third being beans). Yet the tone of Bartram’s prose was also
dismissive. He recited the legend but added in an awkward appositive that “this
silly story is religiously held for truth among them.” Politics shaped the tenor of
his language in illuminating ways. In the journey to Onondaga, the Pennsylva-
nians depended upon their native neighbors (albeit reluctantly); the colonial
deviation courted the Confederacy, not vice versa, and the white travelers
showed some deference to native beliefs as a result. Bartram rated soil as “poor
and stoney” and “good level rich,” imaginatively colonizing the heart of Iroquoia,
but he at least recorded the significance of places like Ogarechny Mountain.

By way of quick summary, I present the 1743 journey as a baseline for
reading later texts. Works like the Map of Pensilvania, New-Jersey, New-York,
and the Three Delaware Counties and Bartram’s Observations reflected an
awareness of native geography—even if the recognition was absent elsewhere
in the literature. It remains enough to say that colonial cartography did not fol-
low a one-direction narrative of usurpation; Evans and Bartram initiated a new
"political-biographical narrative of the realm," to recall Benedict Anderson, but they started from a well-traveled path, they followed an Oneida guide, and their destination was not London but the diplomatic capital of Onondaga. Bartram accordingly recognized the "excellent soil on a charming vail" alongside significant native landmarks. Sites like Ogarechny Mountain offer an important point of comparison for the more aggressive statement of empire that one finds in Lewis Evans' later maps. As the diplomatic balance shifted, one is led to ask, how did images of the interior and human relations there change as well?

The Geography of Empire: Evans' General Map of 1755

An answer would come six years later. As the Seven Years War shifted the British-French rivalry to a continental scale, Lewis Evans' career as a cartographer reached its second and most important stage, in 1755, with the publication of A General Map of the Middle British Colonies in America and its accompanying Analysis (Figure 4). This benchmark in colonial geography was activated by concerns of the war, and it charted lands from the Atlantic coast to the Great Lakes in an effort to stem French designs to the West. In unsurprising ways, Lewis Evans accordingly outlined an aggressive imperial agenda. Yet the General Map also evolved from the same paradox that shaped his earlier work: it was both a statement of imagined usurpation and the product of collaboration with native people. In the Analysis that accompanied his map, Evans credited a "very intelligent Indian called The Eagle." Stylistic discontinuities in the western and eastern portions of the work, indeed, indicate a heavy dependence upon indigenous sources—particularly in areas that Evans had not seen first-hand. His rivers on the eastern portion of the map curved, for example, while rivers off the Great Lakes were depicted with straight lines. This was an obvious "trace" from an earlier work. Native Americans were more concerned with navigation than they were with literal accuracy; the data that they shared with whites, accordingly, was directional or suggestive. The information was published as received from its original source. With the straight rivers that ran from the Great Lakes, the influence of individuals like the "Eagle" can still be detected.9

And of still more immediate concern to this essay, the General Map evolved from a crisis on the Iroquois-British frontier. Evans worked in the shadow of the Albany Congress of 1754, the famous summit that led to a statement on colonial policy but that also began from an attempt to restore bridges between the British empire and the Six Nations. I would date the origins of the map here: with the Mohawk sachem Hendrick addressing the governor of New York about white encroachments upon tribal lands outside Albany. Fully aware of British paranoia about the French, Hendrick threatened to end the long-standing treaty of friendship known as the Covenant Chain. In Hendrick's words,

we will send up a Belt of Wampum to our Brothers the 5 Nations to acquaint them the Covenant Chain is broken between
you and us. So brother you are not to expect to hear of me any more, and Brother we desire to hear no more of you.¹⁰

Whether the Mohawk sachem could speak for all Iroquois or not, he nonetheless achieved his intended results. The Board of Trade instructed Crown officials to settle the issue immediately. When "we consider how great consequence the friendship and alliance of the Six Nations is," the Earl of Halifax warned, "We cannot but be greatly concern'd and surprized" that New York had been so inattentive to their native neighbors. Halifax ordered a renewal of the Covenant Chain "in his Majesty's name," and delegates from seven states met the Iroquois (with the Mohawks in front) that following summer.¹¹

The full details of the Albany Congress lie beyond my focus. I would simply point out that from a colonial gathering that began with Hendrick's ultimatum, new ideas about imperial space and native-white relations were galvanized.¹² The vast literature surrounding the Albany Congress followed general themes, all relevant to the General Map: the spatialization of empire, the vul-

Figure 4: Lewis Evans' *A General Map of the Middle British Colonies in America* (1755). Courtesy the Library Company of Philadelphia.
nerability of backcountry claims, and the essential but liminal status of the Six Nations in the British-French rivalry. Boston physician William Clarke provided a view that was typical for the time, describing the mid-Atlantic backcountry for future settlement: the region could hold “as many Inhabitants at least as any Kingdom in Europe,” he wrote (with the emphasis his). In the 1754 “Plan for Settling Two Western Colonies,” Benjamin Franklin argued similarly, that the “great country back of the Apalachian mountains” was “one of the finest in North America” for agriculture and trade.

The promise of economic expansion and worries about France, in turn, prompted ambivalent assessments of the Six Nations. British accounts shifted with the political winds. New York councilman Archibald Kennedy forcefully argued in 1751 that “the Preservation of the whole continent” would depend “upon a proper regulation of the Six Nations.” But the end of the Seven Years War in 1763 brought a change in mood. With the French threat removed, William Johnson explained, “our Principles of negotiating with the Indians are quite changed.” Abandoning the prior restraint of his Observations, John Bartram recklessly argued that “unless we bang the Indians stoutly,” they would “never keep peace long with us.” Potential allies during the war became enemies afterwards. The previously accommodating Franklin later came to blast the “savages” who “massacre our planters” and caused “the certain diminution of our peace and the contraction of our settlements.”

The pamphlets and private correspondence map out a set of contradictions, in short, in which British Americans imagined an expanding empire but through the agency of native alliances. And what made the literature all the more problematic was that authors anticipated the dismissal of those alliances in the future.

The General Map and its Analysis unfolded from the same paradox: from the attempt to define an expanding empire while accounting for an existing population. Through two related texts (one visual and the other textual, both cartographically-framed), Lewis Evans essentially provided the ammunition in a pamphlet war. Picking up the arguments of Franklin and William Clarke for colonies in Ohio, the geographer directed public view to the trans-Appalachian West. Franklin published the work, and the collaboration between a draftsman and a printer led to a narrative whose function was to show how the British empire could expand. The Analysis served as a supplement to the map, with typographical symbols in the printed text literally connecting the prose to geographic coordinates. As a footnote early in the essay explained to the reader: “Carry your Eye from the Capital Westward till you come into the Square, under the small Letter, and there you will find the Place referred to.” The resulting publication was a strange hybrid of type fonts, one that knit together two different kinds of text. To cite a representative selection: “The settlements made by the English may be considered as extended to No. 4|| * on Connecticut River, and thence to Saretoga† on Hudson’s River, and to Case’s§ on the Mohock’s River; thence back, by the Lakes ¶, at the Head of Susquehanna, to the Head of
Delaware, and thence down the last mentioned River to the Mouth of Legheiwacksein||^_||, and so on (Figure 5). The coupling of a written and cartographic mode then allowed Evans to predict the history of a spatially-defined realm. As he moved from East to West, tellingly, he would imagine changes over time: the back regions of Virginia and Carolina, Evans wrote, “yet remain undisturbed” (emphasis mine).14

The suggestion of a future empire, however, distanced the author from more immediate points of cultural contact. To put it differently: the focus upon expansion distanced the text from its setting, making it less possible to provide an accurate portrayal of the actual frontier. Evans basically caricatured forest diplomacy. Going against reports by better-informed commentators and public officials, he depicted the Six Nations as all-powerful place holders who served the British interest. Canadian “Beaver-Hunting Country,” his map explained, belonged to England; Ohio was “by the Confederates allotted for the Wiandots;” Pennsylvania appeared unoccupied except for the Delawares. With even more license than in the General Map, the Analysis constructed the interior through an imagined Iroquois hierarchy. “The Notion that every little society [in Ohio] is a separate nation,” Evans argued, was “without the least foundation;” the Shawnees were “subdued by the Confederates, and the Country since become their property;” the Delawares were “entirely subdued.” Such claims are worth noting because very few of them squared against more reliable sources. Writing the same year that Evans published his General Map, Robert Hunter Morris of New York worried that “the Delawares, & the Shawanese, have taken up the Hatchet against us.” William Johnson warned repeatedly about fractures in the Iroquois Confederacy, and acknowledged that native “dependents” were in “Defiance of the Six Nations.” A 1754 letter recognized “the present Shattered State of the Six Nations and their Allies.”15

What then does one make of the disparity between a map and the less optimistic reports from Morris and William Johnson? Evans constructed a workable fiction, a story of the frontier that justified British interests through native agency—if only to anticipate the elimination of indigenous claims altogether. In the conclusion of the Analysis, he tellingly anticipated the conflict that became the Seven Years War as an affair exclusively between Europeans. Making a case for the Ohio Valley (which he held as the key to the entire continent), he presumed possession of the continent for either France or England, but not for native people. In the Middle West, he wrote:

we may reckon as great a Prize, as has ever yet been contended for, between two Nations; but if we further observe, that this is scarce a Quarter of the valuable Land, that is contained in one continued Extent, and the Influence that a State, vested with all the Wealth and Power that will naturally arise from the Culture of so great an Extent of good Land, in a happy Climate, it will make so great an Addition to that Na-
The Extent of the English Settlements and Trade.

The Settlements made by the English are bounded on one Side by the Ocean, and on the other by no certain Line or Distance, for in some Places they are not above 30 or 40 Miles from the Heads of Tide, and in others 150 or 200. In general, they may be considered as extended to No. 4, on Connecticut River, and thence to Saretoga on Hudson's River, and to Cæfà's on the Mohock's River; thence back, by the Lakes, at the Head of Susquehanna, to the Head of Delaware, and thence down the last mentioned River to the Mouth of Ledgeciwaklem, from whence to include those of Pennsylvania, you cross over to Susquehanna River by the Purchase Line laid down in the Map, and further along Westward, so as to include the Southern Branches of Juniata, Frank's Town, and Ray's Town. The scattered Settlements thence to Ohio along Youghiogani and Monninghakel are lately broke up by the Inroads of the French in that Quarter. Thence on Green Brier and its Branches, and downward to the Fork, and thence Southward by Stahlmakers, at the Head Fork of Holston River, to the Line dividing Virginia and Carolina, complete the Line, and yet remain undisturbed. This may be supposed to include our remotest Settlements, but for many Miles in Breadth, they are very widely scattered, not so much for want of People to improve and plant, but in almost every Colony to prevent them.

There have been British Subjects scattered over many Places, besides those above-mentioned, especially on Ohio, Wawawgtais, and the Branches of Cherokee River to the West, and the Lake Ontario Northward; but they cannot with any Propriety be said to be Settlers, because they have not acquired Titles to the Soil under their King, nor cultivated the Land by Husbandry; two Things necessarily to denominate a Settlement there.

At the Wawawgtais, the English, from the Lower Ohio, and many Places on Ohio and Lake Erie, our Traders have occasionally entered a Trade, and purchased Ground for their Houses; and those might not be deemed Settlers as Planters or Colonists, they may with the greatest Propriety be such as Traders.

The Longitude at the Top is computed from Philadelphia; at Bottom from London, according to the late Mr. Thomas Godfrey's Observations and my own at Philadelphia. And I was induced to give the Preference to

Figure 5: Page from Evans' *Analysis of a General Map of the Middle British Colonies in America* (1755). Courtesy the Library Company of Philadelphia.
sion, would be admitted to partake of the Privileges of the Conquerors; but for a vast Country, exceeding in Extent and good Land all the European Dominions of Britain, France and Spain, almost destitute of Inhabitants, and will as fast as the Europeans settle become more so of its former Inhabitants.

The argument was dismissed as extreme even in the author’s own time. Having rendered territory “destitute of inhabitants,” Evans cast the interior as a “prize” for one of two trans-Atlantic powers. There was “no third state,” meaning (one presumes) that the Iroquois mattered only in terms of a Euroamerican struggle for empire. British commentators like Samuel Johnson chafed under this arrogant, imagined usurpation. In a London review of the Analysis, Doctor Johnson wrote that two European nations were “now disputing their boundaries, and each is endeavouring the destruction of the other by the help of the Indians, whose interest is that both should be destroyed.”

Many native Americans, in fact, would have agreed with Samuel Johnson. A famous map conceived by the Delaware prophet Neolin, made during the war, revealed a sharpened discontent among the Iroquois “dependents.” In 1762, Neolin sketched out what he believed to be a path from this world to the afterlife (Figure 6). The map fit within a larger religious message, one in which the eastern woodland natives sought to preserve cultural continuity in a world that was being shaped increasingly by English colonization. The inner square, which represented the afterlife, previously had two doors; exposure to Europeans had blocked one door, however, forcing the dead to enter through the more distant and dangerous portal. The image suggests a clear alternative to the General Map. Neolin’s picture circulated widely: he used it throughout his far-ranging lectures, and listeners hung it in their homes. And it was the same great issue for Lewis Evans, possession of the continent, that anchored the message of the Delaware prophet: “The land on which you are,” the Great Spirit instructed, “I have made for you not for others; Wherefore do you suffer the whites to dwell upon your lands? Can you not do without them?”

Such questions make Evans look out of touch, to put it mildly. Neolin’s message circulated around the same time as Pontiac’s pan-Indian uprising from the Middle West and would explain the hostility to the British; it gave a cultural foundation to reports of groups that “have taken up the hatchet against us.”

Certainly Neolin’s urgency would flatly debunk any suggestion that the Delawares were “entirely subdued.”

An awkward insertion in the General Map in fact revealed the widening gap between a narrative of empire and an accurate portrayal of frontier politics. A short note in the upper left corner described the Illinois as “mostly inclined with the French at the Treaty of Utrecht and to the English at Aix la Chapelle” (Figure 7). The assessment was suspect, however, as the Analysis explained that
Figure 7: Illinois River valley, from Evans’ *A General Map of the Middle British Colonies in America* (1755). Courtesy the Library Company of Philadelphia.
the same nation acknowledged the “Superiority” of the Iroquois and maintained a “close Friendship with the English.” The map would deconstruct in its attempt to lay this imperial hierarchy over the land. In order to bring the Illinois Valley (which feeds into the Mississippi) into the existing frame (and into an imagined geography of Iroquois domination), Evans created the illusion of one sheet of paper superimposed upon the other. False shadows distinguished the insert from the larger map. This assessment of tribal relations failed to match reality, or at the very least the reports of William Johnson, just as the insert fell outside the space being described. A corner of the upper image would unroll just enough to reveal the claim, “These parts were for the Confederates allowed for the Wiandots, when they were lately admitted into their League.” As the observation held true only through the artifice of Evans’ account, the illusion functioned only on the surface of the map. False shadows and a curling corner suggest that the Iroquois served as “place holders” in the region, but this existed primarily as a fiction that was imposed upon the country. Like the two sheets separating the Illinois and Ohio Valleys, the story of a landscape and the actual country (as well as its inhabitants) occupied separate planes. The trick to reading Lewis Evans lies in understanding where the two planes split apart.¹⁸

**Thomas Pownall: Revising the Map**

That brings me to a third phase in reading geography against the Iroquois-British frontier. In 1756, Lewis Evans died, but his work continued to circulate in print, and it evolved alongside changes in colonial policy. With the French threat removed after the Seven Years War and British land-hunger intensifying, the colonial official Thomas Pownall folded the *General Map* into a book-length essay, *A Topographical Description of North America*. Politics inclined Pownall (to whom Evans’ 1755 map had been dedicated) to portray the British colonies through a commercial lens. He first came to America under the auspices of the Board of Trade, who sent him to New York for the purposes of monitoring the Albany Congress, and he occupied a series of posts that put him at the center of imperial affairs—most notably governor of Massachusetts from 1757 to 1759—for the next ten years. In his administrative duties as well as in his considerable writings, Pownall advocated the “growth and increase of State,” the “natural progress” of society through agriculture, and the “civilizing activity” of trade. An untempered commercial zeal, in turn, fueled his portrayal of America as wilderness awaiting its “completion” by European settlement. In the preface to his *Topographical Description*, Pownall explained, “Many Tracks” on the “western Parts of the Map” were,

\[
\text{ mere Indian or Traders Paths through the Wilderness,}
\]
\[
\text{ . . . . . . . . . . per avia quà Sola nunquam}
\]
\[
\text{ Trita rotis . . . . . . . . . .}
\]
\[
\text{ But are now in the Course of a very few Years become great}
\]
Waggon Roads, & are here mark'd as such.
Et modo quae fuerat Semita, facta via.\textsuperscript{19}

From “Paths through the Wilderness” and where “birds alone had flown,” the classicist Pownall explained, “came roads.” This spirited revision recalls Anderson’s model of imagining colonial communities: as the governor-anti-quarian reproduced an image of America, he would suggest a new “biography of the realm,” a history for the visually charted space. Still, Anderson’s model needs qualification. The maps themselves did not bring about changes in the land; more accurately, the revisions made after the war reflected a shift in how officials perceived both the interior and political transactions there.

Yet once more, the tenor of native-white relations can explain changes in the geographic work. After the 1754 Albany Congress, the Board of Trade appointed William Johnson “Colonel of the Six Nations,” and Indian affairs from the Northeast to the Ohio Valley fell under his jurisdiction. Johnson’s ascension solidified a diplomatic hierarchy that put the Iroquois at the head (something that French intelligence called a “chimera”) and that fostered suspicion among the “dependent” tribes. Those suspicions deepened in 1763, when French cessions in the Peace of Paris left no rival European empire to check British expansion. By Johnson’s assessment, natives in the trans-Appalachian feared that the settlers would “surround them on every side & at length Exterminate them.”\textsuperscript{20} The Crown took steps to halt settlement, most notably drawing a famous boundary at the Appalachian Mountains with the Proclamation Line of 1763. But western natives knew that “white people covet the Land and Eat [us] by inches;” squatters trickled over the line; and lobbyists petitioned the Board of Trade to remove what they saw as a “temporary expedient.”

A prominent lobbying group that helped bring about the change was the “Suffering Traders,” a Philadelphia-based company that (under a variety of names) included William Johnson, Benjamin Franklin and—to no great coincidence—Thomas Pownall.\textsuperscript{21} Instructed by the Crown to close gaps in the settlement boundary, Johnson met with Iroquois sachems at Fort Stanwix (in western New York) in 1768. Evidence suggests that he had the “Suffering Traders” in mind at Fort Stanwix, for Johnson secured a massive cession under the most dubious of terms. Anxious to relieve the pressure on lands closer to home, the Iroquois offered a huge swath of territory that reached from Pennsylvania into the Ohio Valley, and that included most of present-day Kentucky. The response that followed the treaty was mixed: by Johnson’s own admission, the deal was far “more favorably than [what] was proposed by the Crown;” groups with legitimate claims to the ceded lands, the Shawnees in particular, resisted violently. And for Thomas Pownall, the widened compass of settlement seemed to offer new realms for economic growth.\textsuperscript{22}

Even if it was not the immediate outcome of Fort Stanwix, Pownall’s Topographical Description nonetheless expressed hopes for an expanding “civilization” that was equatable, or at least indicative of the trend towards, property-
creation. His book chronicled the history of a “Country whose Face [was changing] everyday,” telling the story of botanic “Aliens” (his words) that were “springing up and possessing the Land.” Pownall recounted his first arrival to New York Harbor, where he was greeted by the smell of burning cedar; he catalogued the features that were exceptional to America, like New England’s “Interval lands” and leaf season; he measured the potential of new and indigenous crops—thick skinned grapes that resisted the heat, wild rye, hemp, and sugar maple. All the while, he offered a view of civilization across space that led his descriptions to shuttle breathlessly between the past, present, and future. “This is not Poetry but fact and a Natural Operation,” Pownall assured his readers. While traveling American rivers, he explained with characteristic ebullience that “the Eye is lead on from Reach to Reach” and “the Imagination is in a perpetual Alternative of curious Suspense and new Delight” from changes in the physical environment. He wrote:

with what an overflowing Joy does the Heart melt, while one views the Banks where rising Farms, new Fields, or flowering Orchards begin to illuminate the Face of Nature; nothing can be more delightful to the eye, nothing go with more penetrating Sensation to the Heart.\(^{23}\)

The heart did not melt from the pleasure of viewing the terrain but from development. Farms, orchards, new fields: these typified a “completed landscape.”

The existing uses for, or ideas about, the same country disappeared behind prescriptions for environmental change. Pownall might cite the uses of wild rye and thick skinned grapes, but he practically ignored the human costs of altered habitats; as an unidentified native in Topographical Description explained, “You take a deal of Pains to spoil a good World.” Such a characterization was appropriate, as Pownall mostly celebrated the changes brought about by Europeans. In a print probably intended for the 1784 version of his book, he offered a stark illustration of how the colonies should expand: the “Design to represent the beginning and completion of an American Settlement or Farm” (Figure 8). This image followed the colonial “stage theory,” explaining the transformation of forests into farmland. The left side of the “Design” showed the first seeds of a settlement—a pioneer clearing trees around a primitive log cabin, with a mill in the foreground promising a happy future for still-dark woods. A river (symbolizing commerce) connected the scene. In the lighter distance to the right stood a framed house, outbuildings, straight rows of crops and stacks of hay. The image would have fit easily into any number of passages from the Topographical Description, and one in particular offered an exact match. While traveling along a “mere track” at dusk through the Pennsylvania woods, Pownall heard a “Trio of French-Horns playing a pleasing meloncholly Tune.” The description that followed resembled “an Incident in a Romance.” It was an émigré from Europe, the proper inhabitant of Thomas Pownall’s “Design”:
Figure 8: Thomas Pownall’s “A Design to represent the beginning and completion of an American Settlement or Farm.” From *Six Remarkable Views in the Provinces of New-York, New-Jersey, and Pennsylvania* (1761). Courtesy the John Carter Brown Library.
What pleasure must this Old Man, escaped from the Sovereign Tyranny of his European Lords & while here—placida â compôstus pace quiescit—feel in the Contrast: And yet I thought the melancholly of the Musick had a retrospective regret of his Native Country. I asked him. He said No & yet I thought he felt yes; so are we formed. We were most hospitably received & treated & I never lay in a more clearly comfortable bed in my Life.24

An operative word here, “Contrast,” split culture from wilderness. The anomaly of a backwoods horn concerto, every bit as odd as the shift from English to Latin, characterized an aesthetic that could only be called dislocating—one that drained the region of a prior history and replaced the recent past with a vision of the “Old World” transplanted. The story for Pownall effectively began on the other side of the Atlantic, as he privileged the escape “from the Sovereign Tyranny” and “European Lords” over local stories of the land. The passage was a long way from the 1743 tour made by Weiser, Bartram and Evans. What of the indigenous cultures on the same environs? What of the conflicts, points of exchange, or evidence of collaboration on a still-open frontier? The relationship between geography and frontier relations was axiomatic but tenuous, and as often as the two branches of cartography and map-making, the two fields also parted ways.

**Conclusion: Weiser and Evans Redux**

At a basic level, the Evans maps document the steps of effacement—an effacement that occurs at the textual level primarily, but nonetheless where the record of frontier relations was supplanted by the rhetoric of usurpation. The records of Evans’ 1743 trip to Onondaga captured how Iroquoian people viewed their surroundings; his 1749 Map of Pensilvania, New-Jersey, New-York, and the Three Delaware Counties accordingly noted native landmarks like Ogarechny Mountain. Any reference to the same site disappeared, however, as Evans shifted his focus from accommodation to imperialism on acontinental scale. Even as he drew from native sources like “the Eagle” in 1755, and even though he anticipated success in the Seven Years War through the engagement of native diplomacy, Lewis Evans ultimately saw the American interior as a “prize” for England to claim. The tenor of his map changed yet again after the Seven Years War, with Pownall’s revision, to reflect the intensifying market for frontier lands. Pownall’s *Topographical Description* provided the “narrative of the realm” that post-colonial critic Benedict Anderson would describe: circulated over several editions in print, the map defined a new history of the charted space. Yet as I have suggested repeatedly, this paradigm might lead to a false conclusion that effacement at a textual level can be equated with the removal of actual native people. The focus upon maps outside the context of their origins potentially
misses the myriad ways in which geography brought various groups together—or when the interests of those groups split apart.

I return to 1743. While visiting a native home during his trip to Onondaga, Lewis Evans committed a revealing faux pas. His party was sharing a meal when the unnamed host gave Conrad Weiser a “double-share” of venison. The most seasoned frontier traveler in the group, Weiser no doubt understood that eastern woodland groups like the Iroquois carried little food when they traveled; instead, they relied upon hospitality, which explained the ample portions they received here. Weiser could not finish his “double-share,” so he passed the venison to his proxy John Bartram. When Bartram could not eat the portion either, Evans took a turn and then threw the bones to some dogs. It was a mistake. To eastern woodland cultures, such unceremonious disposal represented an insult to the spirit of the slain species, and Bartram’s Observations described how the native host “religiously” covered the remains “with hot ashes.” An apology was necessary for the purpose of restoring the relationship between hunter and hunted. Bartram described “some kind of offering,”

perhaps first fruits to the Almighty power to crave future success in the approaching hunting season [and] celebrated with as much decency and more silence than many superstitious ceremonies: the bigotry of the popish missionaries tempt them to compass sea and land to teach their weak Proselites what they call the christian religion.

The passage captured how cultures intersected and diverged at several levels. As James H. Merrell notes, a path through the American interior brought people together, even as it “cast in sharp relief how far apart they were.” The gap in understanding was evident in the failure to recognize a “double-share.” Euroamericans tended to carry everything they would eat when traveling, while natives relied upon hunting and hospitality. The episode revealed differences as well between Christian and indigenous beliefs about nature: the “offering” was for “future success in the approaching hunting season.” And more directly to my point, Evans missed a key tenet of Iroquois spirituality—the reciprocity between the animal and human worlds—which leads to some key questions about geography. If Evans was the last in his party to recognize an obvious faux pas, what turns would his published work take? What recognition would he show to indigenous markers of place? Or to the existing “property-histories?” And what he learned from native informants? The person who established the space for a new “biography of the realm” threw animal spirits to the dogs.

For reasons that are obvious here, Evans was not always welcome in the territories that he described. A postscript to the 1743 tour suggests a strain in his collaborations with the frontier diplomat Conrad Weiser. The year was 1750, and the Pennsylvania Assembly wanted Weiser to tour the Ohio Valley, near
present-day Pittsburgh. The usual motives were at work: the Virginia-based Loyal Company intended to exercise its claim in the region, Pennsylvania officials wanted more information to counter rival efforts, and native-white relations remained a priority. In an effort to secure his own role in the journey, Evans penned a memorandum that outlined his potential contribution; he promised to survey western rivers, locate potential trade entrepots, and take notes on natural resources, basically laying out the land for future colonization. But Weiser would not collaborate. He recognized that straying from the usual paths of diplomacy could ruin his mission, maybe get him killed. Geographic work often began from diplomatic ventures, it seems, but sometimes the two were at cross-purposes. The Middle West that Evans imagined would generate conflict and at a certain point Conrad Weiser wanted nothing to do with him. Their stalled collaboration underscored the ways in which different groups came together, or in this case divided, in the production of a map. Diplomacy did not just shape maps, it made map-making possible. The failed collaboration in 1750 spoke volumes about cartographic activity. Cut off from Weiser, Lewis Evans missed the chance to see the Ohio Valley for himself. Who was excluded from the imagined British possessions? Sometimes the geographer himself.

Notes


12. At the risk of oversimplifying, the Albany Congress (1) gave the Mohawks an opportunity to air their grievances about infringement upon their lands; (2) occasioned a platform of colonial policy, one that included the protocol for fair treaty proceedings; (3) gave corrupt land agents the chance to pursue new cessions. On native grievances before the Congress, see Nammack, *Fraud, Politics, and the Dispossession of the Indians*, 41-43; Jennings, *Empire of Fortune*, 101-08. The Mohawk Canadaraga explained, “We understand that there are writings for all our lands, so that we shall have none left but the very spot we live upon and hardly that”: see *New York Colonial Documents*, 6:865-66. On land deals, see especially Shannon, *Indians and Colonists at the Crossroads of Empire*, 130-34. Franklin provided a draft that argued strength through unity, proposing a Parliament, President, central land offices and a common forum for negotiating treaties. For a discussion of the Albany Plan, see Franklin, *Papers*, 6:387-92; Shannon, *Indians and Colonists at the Crossroads of Empire*, 184-97; Lawrence Henry Gipson, *The British Empire Before the American Revolution* (New York: Knopf, 1939), 5:123-42. On the fate of the plan

13. William Clarke, Observations on the late and Present Conduct of the French with Regard their Encroachments upon the British Colonies in North America (Boston: S. Kneeland, 1755), 38; Franklin, Papers, 5:457, 9:78; 9:62; Archibald Kennedy, The Importance of Preserving the Friendship of the Indians to the British Interest (New York: James Parker, 1751), 7; Johnson, Papers, 11:786; Bartram, Correspondence, 163. Shannon reviews the imperial and colonial context in Indians and Colonists at the Crossroads of Empire, 56-76. An insightful reading of Franklin's pamphlets in an economic context is Gerald Stourzh, Benjamin Franklin and American Foreign Policy (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1969), 40, 49; on Franklin and native Americans, see Carla Mulford "Caritas and Capital: Franklin's Narrative of the Late Massacres," Reappraising Benjamin Franklin: A Bicentennial Perspective, ed. J. A. Leo Lemay (Newark: Univ. of Delaware Press, 1993): 355. A personal memo by William Johnson written after the war reads, "Such Indians as are yet our Friends to be kindly used and make it their Interest to continue so, untill we are better able to do without them": see Papers, 4:325.

14. Gipson, Lewis Evans, 146.


16. Gipson, Lewis Evans, 175; Samuel Johnson, Political Writings, 188. In Lewis Evans and His Maps, 27 Klinefelter notes that Evans was “one of the most vocal of colonial advocates” for expansion to Ohio. Wroth discusses the attacks on Evans in the colonial press in An American Bookshelf, 52-54.


18. See Hinderaker, Elusive Empires, 144. Evans allows that “Nations on the further Side of the Lakes are subdued by the Confederates; but I am not enabled to relate the Particulars with any Certainty,” and he writes elsewhere that the Shawnees have lost their “Property” while noting that they “bear [the Confederates] with great reluctance”: see Gipson, Lewis Evans, 156-57.

19. Thomas Pownall, Memorial to the Sovereigns of Europe on the Present State of Affairs, between the Old World and the New World (London: J. Almon, 1780), 63, 29-31; Pownall, A Topographical Description of the Dominions of the United States of America, ed. Lois Mulkhearn (Pittsburgh: Univ. of Pittsburgh Press, 1949), 9-10. My thanks to Viki Soady for the translation. Pownall has not received much scholarly attention, although Leonard Woods Labaree provides a short biography in Dictionary of American Biography (New York: Scribners, 1935): 6:161-63; John Seelye uses Pownall as a touchstone for progress across space in Beautiful Machine: Rivers and the Republican Plan (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1993), 48-55. What makes Pownall’s ideological geography exceptional is that he provided a rare, clear-eyed assessment of white-native relations. A confidential report to the Board of Trade in the Albany Congress observes that there “was a matter which does not appear on the face of it.” The Iroquois Confederacy lacked its former cohesion; as Pownall notes, when the “Covenant Belt was deliver’d & receiv’d by the Indians,” the participating Iroquois failed to give a “Yo heigh-eigh,” their form of assent. Instead they sounded “but one great Indiscriminate Yo heigh-eigh, till being reminded that the other was expected of them, they afterward give the Yo-hieh-eigh according to the usual Custom.” see Thomas Pownall, “Personal Accounts of the Albany Congress of 1754,” Mississippi Valley Historical Review 39:4 (1953), 741.

20. New York Colonial Documents, 10:243, 6:897, 6:997; see also Jennings, Empire of Fortune, 261. The Shawnees and Delawares attacked frontier settlements despite British demands that the Iroquois keep their “dependents” in submission: see Johnson, Papers, 2:413-15. On the sum required to maintain the hierarchy and the growing fear of western confederacies, see Johnson, Papers, 1:505, 10:461.


