Missed Opportunities, Enduring Legacies: School Segregation and Desegregation in Kansas City, Missouri

Kevin Fox Gotham

Introduction

"I think Plessy v. Ferguson was right and should be reaffirmed."
William Rehnquist, Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court (quoted in Orfield 1996a, 10).

Over the last century, few issues have generated more controversy in U.S. metropolitan areas than school "desegregation." "Busing," "magnet schools," and "controlled choice" have become familiar academic and popular vocabulary and reflect a long history of struggles to integrate schools and ameliorate racial inequalities. These issues are particularly significant in Kansas City, Missouri, the site of one of the nation's most controversial and expansive desegregation orders during the 1980s and 1990s. Racial segregation in housing and schools have been defining features of the Kansas City metropolitan area for over a century. The Kansas City, Missouri School District (KCMSD) was racially segregated from its creation in September 1867. In the ensuing decades, school officials provided separate education facilities for blacks and whites, and the city and metropolitan area developed clearly defined patterns of racial segregation. By 1940, the block-level "index of dissimilarity" for nonwhite-white segregation stood at 88.0, indicating that at least 88 percent of all minorities would have had to change their place of residence in Kansas City to live in an integrated neighborhood.¹ This high segregation level remained relatively fixed throughout the postwar era, ranging from 91.3 in 1950 and to 90.8 in 1960, and 88.0 by
1970 (Sorensen, Taeuber, and Hollingsworth 1975, 128-30). In the 1990s, Massey and Denton (1993, 75-7) identified Kansas City as one of the nation's hypersegregated metropolitan areas due to the high degree of segregation in housing patterns on a range of indices. While the index of dissimilarity for the metropolitan area declined slightly to 73.15 in 1990 and 69.12 in 2000, Kansas City continues to be one of the most segregated metropolitan areas in the nation (Mumford Center 2001), a situation that is reinforced by continuing suburbanization, inner city disinvestment, and school segregation.

This paper has two goals. First, I point to the missed opportunities in the century-long struggle to dismantle the racially unequal system of education in Kansas City and discuss the enduring legacy of racial segregation in local schools. Drawing on archival data, newspaper reports, oral histories, and testimony and exhibits from the landmark Kansas City school desegregation case, Jenkins v. Missouri, I focus on the role of the State of Missouri in creating racially segregated schools before Brown; the impact of Kansas City, Missouri School District (KCMSD) school board policies and administrative decisions in reinforcing segregation after Brown; and the enduring consequences of these segregative actions by the state and local governments. U.S. Supreme Court decisions over the last two decades have forgotten or refuse to acknowledge the historical basis of racial segregation or consider how the vestiges of the past continue to affect the present. In the famous 1974 Detroit school desegregation case, Milliken v. Bradley, Justice Potter Stewart, in a concurring opinion for the 5-4 majority, asserted that social inequalities associated with racial residential segregation had been caused by "unknown and perhaps unknowable factors" (Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 756 n. 2 [1974]). In the 1995 Kansas City school desegregation case, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor claimed that racial residential segregation was a result of "natural, if unfortunate, demographic forces" (Missouri v. Jenkins, 63 U.S.L.W 4486 [1995]). U.S. Supreme Court decisions on school desegregation in the 1990s reflected an entrenched ideology that has come to accept racial segregation as natural or accidental, inevitable, and unsolvable. The historical narrative developed in this paper points to the key events and decisions underlying the origin of school segregation, identifies crucial turning points and missed opportunities in the struggle to desegregate schools, and reveals how a historical trajectory set long ago still molds contemporary responses to the problems of racial segregation in schools.

My second goal is to illustrate the reflexive relationship between schools and housing, especially the impact of school administrative decisions on racial housing patterns. I argue that, in addition to housing discrimination and segregation, school segregation was a critical factor in contributing to the creation of residential apartheid in Kansas City, Missouri. A number of scholars and court decisions argue that policy decisions by school boards and administrators, and the location of schools, are crucial to understanding the movement of racial groups and development of residential segregation. In the famous Swann v. Charlotte-
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Mecklenburg Board of Education case in 1971, the Supreme Court ruled that “People gravitate toward school facilities, just as schools are located in response to the needs of the people. The location of schools may thus influence the patterns of residential development of a metropolitan area.” Orfield (1996c) and Taeuber (1979), among others, have pointed to the reciprocal relationship between schools and housing, arguing that schools can have racial housing consequences and housing policies can have racial school consequences. This case study contributes to this literature by explaining how school administrative decisions affected the timing, pace, and direction of racial movement in Kansas City, Missouri, during the twentieth century. I focus first on the state of Missouri’s pre-1954 inter-district system of locating dual schools and segregating African American children. Next, I explore post-1954 segregative school decisions that impelled whites to move out of urban neighborhoods while channeling blacks into the southeast section of the city.

Finally, I examine the significance of Kansas City, Missouri’s school desegregation plan and the 1995 U.S. Supreme Court decision that effectively ended the desegregation effort that had begun in 1984. Despite the efforts of city leaders and civil rights activists, virtually every attempt in the last three decades to seek a metropolitan-wide solution to the problem of school segregation has met with fierce opposition from suburban residents, property owners, and political elites. More broadly, since the 1960s, the predominantly white suburbanites have shown little or no interest in addressing urban problems such as racially segregated public schools, concentrated poverty, blighted housing, and financial disinvestment—problems connected to neighborhoods now inhabited by racial minorities (Gotham 1998a; 1998b). As I show, the combination of the existence of the Kansas/Missouri state line that bifurcates the metropolitan area, interdistrict fragmentation, and the absence of a significant cross-district desegregation plan has reinforced racial segregation in housing and schools. Exploring the impact of schools and school administrative decisions on racial housing patterns is important in an era where the mechanisms of preserving racial segregation have become more covert and subtle, and the racial segregation of African American and Hispanic students is increasing (Orfield, Bachmeier, James, and Eitle 1997).

School Segregation From Plessy (1896) to Brown (1954)

During the Civil War, the Kansas and Missouri state line that bisects the Kansas City metropolitan area was a front of intense warfare between pro- and anti-slavery groups. The pro-slavery forces in Missouri, called the “bushwhackers,” sought to impose slavery on Kansas through coercion and ballot stuffing. On the Kansas side, free-state proponents, the “Jayhawkers,” sought admission of the state to the Union with slavery prohibited. This North/South conflict also affected public schools. As was typical throughout the South, the Missouri state constitution required segregated schools for whites and blacks. Indeed, Missouri was the northern-most of the states to require separate schools for whites and
blacks by state constitution. Under mandates enacted in 1865, 1868, 1869, 1875, and 1889, the State of Missouri made it a criminal offense for “any colored child to attend a white [public] school” (1889 Mo. Laws 226) and extended the bar to private schools in 1909 (1909 Mo. Laws 770, 790, 820). The Missouri Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of these provisions in 1891 and, in 1910, the State Attorney General alerted all Missouri school districts that the State would prosecute school officials operating racially integrated schools. Until 1929, the state of Missouri exempted school districts from providing schools for African American children whose enumeration dropped to below fifteen and required school districts to eliminate African American schools if attendance fell below eight. After 1929, the State gave school districts the option to discontinue schools for blacks, no matter what their enumeration.6

The development of racially segregated schools in Kansas City stemmed from a series of discriminatory government actions, U.S. Supreme Court decisions, and dramatic demographic shifts during the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century (for overviews, see Gotham 1997, chapter 1; Clevenger 1941; Glaab 1993; Schirmer and McKinzie 1982, 41-60). Table 1 shows total and black population for Kansas City, Missouri, 1880-1930.

Table 1 shows that the city experienced a dramatic population increase during the decades after 1880. The total population increased from 55,785 in 1880 to almost 400,000 by 1930. Black population increased from 8,143 in 1880, to 23,566 in 1910,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Percent Increase</th>
<th>Black Population</th>
<th>Percent Increase</th>
<th>Percent Black of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>55,785</td>
<td></td>
<td>8,143</td>
<td></td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>132,716</td>
<td>137.9</td>
<td>13,700</td>
<td>67.6</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>163,752</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>17,567</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>248,381</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>23,566</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>324,410</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>30,719</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>399,746</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>38,574</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

to 38,574 by 1930, the result of the beginnings of the Great Migration of southern blacks to northern and midwestern cities from 1915 to 1930 (Jones 1992; Lemann 1991; Marks 1989). During this period, the percentage of blacks living in the city declined from 14.6 percent in 1880, to 10.7 percent in 1900, to 9.5 percent in 1920.7

After the Plessy v. Ferguson decision in 1896 that institutionalized the doctrine of "separate but equal" in education, the State of Missouri imposed a racially segregated school system on a widely dispersed and largely rural African American population (Greene, Kremer, and Holland 1993, 107-8; Savage 1931). Table 2 summarizes total and black school enumeration in Kansas City, Missouri, and the counties surrounding the city on the Missouri side of the state line: Clay County, Jackson County (excluding Kansas City, Missouri), and Platte County. The Kansas City, Missouri City limits are contained within Jackson County.8

As table 2 shows, as of 1900, African Americans made up about the same proportion of school children in rural Clay, Platte, and Jackson Counties. Yet,

Table 2: Total and Black School Enumeration, 1900-1954
(Kansas City, Missouri, Clay County, Jackson County [excluding Kansas City, Missouri], and Platte County, Missouri).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Kansas City, Missouri</th>
<th>Jackson County</th>
<th>Clay County</th>
<th>Platte County</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1900 Total Pop.</td>
<td>59,407</td>
<td>10,538</td>
<td>5,997</td>
<td>4,871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Pop.</td>
<td>5,248</td>
<td>655</td>
<td>429</td>
<td>351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Black</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954 Total Pop.</td>
<td>103,085</td>
<td>44,009</td>
<td>13,103</td>
<td>4,054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Pop.</td>
<td>14,527</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Black</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>.3%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Change, 1900-1954</td>
<td>+76%</td>
<td>+318%</td>
<td>+118%</td>
<td>-17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Pop.</td>
<td>+177%</td>
<td>-77%</td>
<td>-64%</td>
<td>-82%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

from 1900-1954, the percentage of blacks attending schools in Kansas City, Missouri, skyrocketed 177 percent while the total school population increased only 76 percent. During the same time, the total school population of Jackson County (outside Kansas City, Missouri) increased 318 percent while the black school population declined 77 percent. Moreover, in rural Clay County, the total school population increased 118 percent while the black school population dropped 64 percent. In Platte County, the total school population declined 17 percent but the black school population plunged dramatically, 82 percent.

The demographic effect of this racially segregated system of schools is even more graphic when comparing white and black school enumeration. Table 3 shows white school enumeration in Jackson County (excluding Kansas City, Missouri), Clay County, and Platte County in Missouri at five year intervals from 1935 to 1954.

Table 3: White School Enumeration in Jackson County (excluding Kansas City, Missouri), Clay County, and Platte County, Missouri. 1935-1954.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Jackson County</th>
<th>Clay County</th>
<th>Platte County</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>14,429</td>
<td>7,118</td>
<td>3,361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>14,441</td>
<td>6,857</td>
<td>3,041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>16,082</td>
<td>7,443</td>
<td>3,914</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>32,340</td>
<td>9,174</td>
<td>2,982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>43,856</td>
<td>12,950</td>
<td>3,992</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percent of Loss (-) or Gain (+) in School Population, 1935-1954 +204% +82% +19%

As table 3 shows, from 1935 to 1954 the number of white students attending
schools in Jackson County (outside Kansas City, Missouri) increased from 14,429
in 1935 to 43,856 by 1954, a 204 percent increase. Likewise, the number of
white students attending schools in Clay County increased from 7,118 in 1935 to
12,950 in 1954, an 82 percent increase. The number of white students attending
schools in Platte County rose 19 percent, from 3,661 in 1935 to 3,992 by 1954.

For decades, scholars have documented the historically strong African Ameri­
can commitment to education in the face of considerable economic hardship and
racial discrimination (see Bullock 1967; Inniss 1995; Kantor and Brenzel 1993;
Walter and Jewel 1996). At the turn of the twentieth century, Booker T. Washing­
ton (1998 [1901], 29-30) drew attention to “the intense desire which the people
of my race show for education.” If it “had not been for the Negro school,” ac­
cording to W. E. B. Du Bois (1992 [1935], 667), “the Negro would, to all intents
and purposes, have been driven back to slavery.” In his classic study, An Ameri­
can Dilemma, Gunnar Myrdal (1944, vol. 1, 194-5) maintained that “[l]ike many
other oppressed people, Negroes place[d] a high premium on education,” and
were “stimulate[d] to migrate by a desire for access to more and better schools.”

The experience of African Americans in the Kansas City metropolitan area
between World War I and 1954 demonstrated the tenacity of that commitment.
During this era school districts in only six of the sixty-one African American
settlements in Jackson, Clay, and Platte Counties provided elementary schools
for African American children, creating pressures for parents either to move to
areas where schools were located or make their children travel long distances to
schools. At the secondary level, access to schools was even more limited for
African American students. Until 1954, Lincoln High School in Kansas City,
Missouri, and its feeder junior high schools in the city were the only schools in
the three-county area that provided post-elementary education to blacks.

Thus, for most of the decades before Brown, Missouri’s inter-district system
of racially segregated schools required African American families who wanted
their children to receive an education to attend schools in Kansas City. In 1924,
for example, one Missouri Education Commissioner found that “[o]n account of
the lack of school facilities in many small towns and rural districts there is a
desire on the part of negroes to move to larger cities . . . and congested centers,”
an “inclination . . . increas[ing] from decade to decade.”9 Eppie Shields, a life­
long resident whose parents had to pay for him to attend a parochial school in
Liberty, a rural area in the northeast part of Clay County, moved his own family
into the Kansas City, Missouri School District in early 1954 because “[t]here
wasn’t any black schools out there, and I didn’t plan to go through the frustration
and problems that my folks did to get . . . my children into school.”10 Jimme
Marie Thomas, a black migrant to the area from Texas, did not consider moving
to the growing suburban areas of Kansas City during the late 1940s because,

I planned to have children and I knew in the suburbs that black
children after they get out of elementary school came into
Kansas City for high school, and I certainly didn’t want to buy a home that would take us probably 15 to 25 years to pay for and have to transport my kids into Kansas City when they got out of elementary school.\(^{11}\)

While black and white schools were “separate,” they were not “equal.” Of the elementary schools that rural school districts provided for blacks, many were dilapidated, infested with rodents, and inadequate for education. In 1929, a Missouri Education Commissioner reported:

In these schools, if they may be so called, education opportunities are practically non-existent. The typical school is in operation for about six months a year. The teacher, usually . . . young and immature . . . , has had little if any training above high school and frequently not so much. The building is usually a miserable shack totally unfit for human habitation. Textbooks and reference books are scarce and usually dilapidated. They are unsanitary, totally unattractive and generally unsuitable.\(^{12}\)

In some cases, African American children endured long bus rides past neighborhood schools and over district school boundaries to attend schools in Kansas City. Unlike the intense controversies that busing elicited during the 1970s and 1980s, few blacks or whites protested against busing African American children during the 1930s and 1940s. Whites viewed busing as an easy way to segregate without maintaining a costly dual school system while blacks saw it as the only available means of obtaining an education in an era of rampant racial exclusion. School records, newspaper reports, and testimony in the *Jenkins v. Missouri* case suggest that the typical bus ride was anywhere from 20 miles for African American children living within the city limits of Kansas City to 60 miles for African American children traveling to Kansas City from rural areas.\(^{13}\) In Kansas City, from 1945 to 1954, approximately 100 African American school children from Independence, Missouri, were bused each year to attend schools in Kansas City, Missouri. African American children living in Park Hill in north Platte County, and Pleasant Hill and Harrison in rural Cass County, were transported to the KCMSD by bus or private car up to 1954.

For every child that was transported daily, there were many sent by poor families in rural towns to live with relatives in the KCMSD. “[I]t was a very common practice to move in with relatives or ministers of black churches because of the gross inconvenience [of having to travel long distances to school],” remembered Edward Fields, Associate Superintendent for Kansas City schools in 1977, “[i]f you took a figure of 5 or 10 percent of our enrollment in the 1920s and 1930s, that might be a low estimate.”\(^{14}\) Overall, the inter-district system of segregated education in the metropolitan area meant that rural blacks were forced
to travel long distances to attend schools or uproot themselves and move to Kansas City to have any reasonable hope for any kind of education. As one local resident put it,

[The segregated school system] affected everyone that was trying to get [an] education. . . . [Families and school children that wanted to receive a high school education in this area were sent to central Kansas City, which was about the only place to get a high school education. . . . We also know that there were areas like North Kansas City that did not maintain elementary schools for children. They had to come into Kansas City. Lee’s Summit closed the elementary school down in 1910. They first went to Kansas City then to Independence. Independence closed Young High School [in the 1920s]. They came into the city. . . . In all the areas that did not maintain schools for blacks, it had an effect because [blacks] could not live there and have any access to education. 15

The process of black in-migration to Kansas City and white exodus to the suburbs was reinforced by a wide range of discriminatory mechanisms, especially the housing policies of the Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC), the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), and the Veterans Administration (VA) that barred blacks from purchasing homes in the suburbs (Gotham 2002; 2000a; 2000b; Jackson 1985; Massey and Denton 1993; Quadagno 1994, chapter 4; Weiss 1987, 151; Abrams 1971, 230-37). From the 1920s through the 1950s, the Kansas City Real Estate Board (formed in 1900) subscribed to a national code of real estate ethics that endorsed the view that all-black and racially mixed neighborhoods were inferior to all-white homogenous neighborhoods (Gotham 2000b). During this time, the FHA’s Underwriting Manuals referred to the “infiltration of inharmonious racial or nationality groups” as “adverse” to neighborhood stability and advised appraisers to lower the rating of properties in racially mixed or all-black neighborhoods (Quadagno 1994, 90-91; Jackson 1985, chapter 11; Massey and Denton 1993, 54-55; Helper 1969, 201-16). Although the FHA removed explicitly racist language from its manuals in the 1950s, later manuals continued to refer to the necessity of maintaining “homogenous” neighborhoods and warned of the risk of “dissimilar” groups as “unstable” and “inharmonious” (Federal Housing Administration 1936; 1938; 1947; 1952). In short, the systematic housing discrimination by private and public actors, which reinforced the state-enforced segregated school system, restricted both the housing and educational choices of blacks and influenced their decisions to move from rural areas to the inner city.

African Americans migrating from rural areas in Missouri, as in many areas of the country without racially segregated school systems, such as Michigan,
Indiana, and Iowa, were drawn by jobs to the metropolitan areas but were prevented from settling in the suburbs because of widespread housing segregation, which was supported and bolstered by the federal government. Yet part of the lure of Kansas City, Missouri, was that the rural school systems available to blacks were rudimentary at best and nonexistent at worst. While jobs and economic opportunities might pull people into the city, the availability of schools would more specifically influence housing choices. In short, discriminatory federal housing policies and *de jure* segregated school systems formed a mutually reinforcing set of institutional barriers that prevented blacks from participating in the suburbanization process that benefitted millions of whites. While the promise of employment opportunities may have lured blacks to migrate to Kansas City, once in the city housing discrimination relegated them to racially segregated neighborhoods, where their children attended racially segregated schools.

**School Segregation and Desegregation After Brown, 1955-1977**

The U.S. Supreme Court's historic 1954 *Brown v. Board of Education* decision ruled that the "separate but equal" precept of *Plessy v. Ferguson* (1896) was unconstitutional and that state-sanctioned segregated school systems are "inherently unequal." A year later, in *Brown II*, the Supreme Court ruled that school districts should begin desegregating their schools with "all deliberate speed" but set no standard or deadline for desegregation to occur. In response, in 1955, the KCMSD eliminated explicitly racial attendance zones, replacing them with neighborhood attendance zones. This decision to adopt neighborhood attendance zones was based on the State of Missouri's decision to relinquish state control over how and where local school districts educated African American children after 1954. Before the Supreme Court's decision, the education of African American children, including their separation from white children, was considered a state government responsibility. After *Brown*, the State of Missouri adopted the policy that school desegregation was a matter of local discretion, choice, and control. A month after the *Brown* decision, the Missouri Attorney General ruled that local districts "may... permit 'white and colored' children to attend the same schools," but left it up to local school districts to decide "whether [they] must integrate."

After maintaining a policy of explicit racial segregation in schools for more than 50 years, the State of Missouri now delegated to local school districts responsibility for remedying the problem. Pursuant to the neighborhood attendance zone plan, the KCMSD school board eliminated explicit racial school attendance zones and drew new attendance zones using ostensibly non-racial criteria such as building capacity and student travel distance. Over the next two decades, from 1955 through the mid-1970s, the school board made frequent shifts in the attendance areas of its schools, typically removing white areas from the western-most portions of its racially transitional zones and attaching them to all-white zones farther west. While north/
Map 1: Location of High Schools and Elementary Schools, KCMSD
south school attendance boundaries changed often, the east/west boundary along Troost Avenue—a major north/south boulevard—remained fairly constant, setting in motion a process of rapid racial transition in neighborhoods and schools east of Troost.\textsuperscript{17} Map 1 shows the location of Troost Avenue in Kansas City Missouri, in relation to the Central Business District and various elementary schools and high schools south of Interstate 70.

According to U.S. Census Bureau data, from 1950 through 1970 the number of white residents living in neighborhoods east of Troost plunged dramatically, declining from 126,229 in 1950 (75 percent of the total population) to 33,804 (25 percent of the total population) two decades later. In contrast, the number of black residents living in this area increased from 41,348 (25 percent of the total population) in 1950 to 102,741 (75 percent of the total population) by 1970. The overall decrease of 92,425 white residents living in neighborhoods east of Troost from 1950 to 1970 was accompanied by an increase of 61,933 black residents living in the same area (Gotham 2002, chapter 5).

Table 4 shows the racial makeup of KCMSD Elementary Schools located east and west of Troost Avenue, south of 31st street, at five-year intervals between 1955-56 and 1974-75. Elementary schools are arranged from north to south and located on Map 1.

As table 4 shows, almost all elementary schools located east of Troost experienced racial turnover at various times over the two decades after Brown. Linwood went from 18.2 percent black in 1955-56 to 89.9 percent five years later while Ladd went from 4.7 percent black in 1955-56 to 99 percent black in 1960-1. Mann, Kumpf, Meservey, Chick, Willard, Troost, Pershing, Pinkerton, and Blenheim elementary schools all went from all white in 1955-56 to over 90 percent black by 1974-75.

Table 5 shows the population and racial make-up of each KCMSD high school, south of I-70, from 1954 to 1975. From the 1950s to the 1980s two sets of high schools were located on either side of Troost (see map 1). To the west were Westport and Southwest, to the east were Lincoln, Central, Paseo, and Southeast, each with its own feeder junior high and elementary schools.

As Table 5 shows, the racial composition of high schools east of Troost changed dramatically after 1954. Lincoln, the state-mandated black high school before 1954, started out at 100 percent in 1954-55. Central, all white in 1954, became more than 90 percent black by 1960-61. Paseo, all white in 1954 and 9.7 percent black in 1960 became more than 99 percent black by 1970-71. Southeast, all white in 1954 and 1.7 percent black in 1960-61, became more than 97 percent black by 1974-75. During this period, the schools west of Troost remained predominantly white. Southwest had only .01 percent blacks in 1955 and only 0.8 percent in 1970-71. As tables 4 and 5 show, by the mid-1970s, every high school east of Troost was more than 90 percent black and sixteen out of eighteen elementary schools located east of Troost were more than 90 percent black. In contrast, every elementary school and high school west of Troost was less than 50 percent black.\textsuperscript{18}
Table 4: Racial Makeup of Kansas City, Missouri School District Elementary Schools at Five-Year Intervals, 1955-56—1974-75.

Elementary Schools located east of Troost Avenue, west of the Blue River, south of 31st street.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School</th>
<th>1955-56 % Black</th>
<th>1960-61 % Black</th>
<th>1965-66 % Black</th>
<th>1970-71 % Black</th>
<th>1974-75 % Black</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Linwood</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>89.9</td>
<td>98.8*</td>
<td>99.8</td>
<td>98.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ladd</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>99.0*</td>
<td>99.8</td>
<td>99.8</td>
<td>99.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moore</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>72.1</td>
<td>92.6</td>
<td>93.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faxon</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>54.6*</td>
<td>92.5</td>
<td>95.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seven Oaks</td>
<td>0*</td>
<td>65.1</td>
<td>96.8*</td>
<td>99.4</td>
<td>98.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melcher</td>
<td>not open</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>89.9</td>
<td>96.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mann</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>84.2</td>
<td>97.9*</td>
<td>99.1</td>
<td>98.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bancroft</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>66.6</td>
<td>84.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kumpf</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>62.2</td>
<td>96.8*</td>
<td>99.4*</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meservey</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>76.7</td>
<td>98.2</td>
<td>97.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graceland</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>89.6</td>
<td>99.0</td>
<td>99.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chick</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td>83.6</td>
<td>90.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willard</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>92.2</td>
<td>98.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troost</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>93.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pershing</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>99.5</td>
<td>98.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pinkerton</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>84.3</td>
<td>94.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blenheim</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>53.9</td>
<td>92.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marlborough</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>30.6*</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>73.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Elementary Schools located west of Troost Avenue, east of the Missouri-Kansas state line, south of 31st street.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School</th>
<th>1955-56 % Black</th>
<th>1960-61 % Black</th>
<th>1965-66 % Black</th>
<th>1970-71 % Black</th>
<th>1974-75 % Black</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Longan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>4.2*</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volker</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swinney</td>
<td>0*</td>
<td>0.5*</td>
<td>18.6*</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nelson</td>
<td>0*</td>
<td>0*</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>14.6*</td>
<td>41.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bryant</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border Star</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>19.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cook</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>25.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Boundary change occurred within the noted five year interval.

Segregative school actions in this crucial period established Troost Avenue as a cognitive racial boundary—later to be referred to by local residents as the “Troost Wall”—that real estate “blockbusters” manipulated to stimulate white flight from neighborhoods east of Troost Avenue. “Blockbusting” is a practice in which real estate agents attempt to move non-white, usually African American families, into an all-white neighborhood for the purpose of exploiting white fears of impending racial turnover and property devaluation to buy up other property on the block at depressed prices (Orser 1994, 4; Feagin 1986; Helper 1969; Snow and Leahy 1980). Newspaper reports from the 1950s through the 1970s reveal that city council members, neighborhood coalitions, and civil rights groups were well aware of the destabilizing effects of blockbusting and panic selling (Gotham 2000c). Many residents engaged in intense mobilization efforts, including letter writing to state representatives, lobbying of state officials, protests at city council meetings, and the formation of vigilant neighborhood coalitions to persuade fellow neighbors not to succumb to real estate blockbusting (Gotham 2002, chapter 5). Yet neither the State of Missouri nor the Kansas City Real Estate Board investigated or halted blockbusting or other profiteering real estate practices, including racial real estate steering and redlining, that affected southeast neighborhoods.

On June 20, 1963, a group of African American and white residents staged a protest at a KCMSD Board meeting, charging that the district, via its attendance zone policies, was reinforcing neighborhood segregation by adopting “the unwritten law of the Troost line” as the boundary separating white and African American populations in Kansas City. More protests followed less than a month later as the local Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) launched a series of sit-ins and pickets at KCMSD Board meetings. On July 25, 1963, KCMSD Superintendent, James Hazlett, met with the KCMSD Board to review the Board’s position on the subject of school integration. Among other things, he proposed that the Board “accepts the principle of promoting integration as one of many factors to be considered, but it does not believe that priority should be given to this above all other factors.” On August 1, 1963, the Board adopted a policy statement declaring “that integration is a factor to be taken into account within the school system whenever it is possible to do so without destroying the fundamental principle of the school as a major service unit to the neighborhood of which it is part.”

Throughout the early 1960s, editorials in the local African American-owned newspaper, the Kansas City Call, repeatedly condemned the school board’s segregative practices, drawing attention to how racially identifiable schools contributed to the maintenance of segregated neighborhoods. Early on, the Call recognized that segregative school board policies interlocked with the discriminatory activities of local real estate firms and agents to perpetuate Troost Avenue as a racially identifiable school attendance boundary. Over the next decade, local civil rights groups and a number of neighborhood coalitions including the Blue Hills Neighborhood Coalition, the Forty-Nine Sixty-Three Neighborhood
Table 5: Racial Makeup of Kansas City, Missouri School District High Schools Located West of Troost Avenue and East of Troost Avenue at Five-Year Intervals, 1954-55 —1974-75

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School Year</th>
<th>Westport Total Enrolled Black</th>
<th>Westport % Enrolled Black</th>
<th>Southwest Total Enrolled Black</th>
<th>Southwest % Enrolled Black</th>
<th>Lincoln Total Enrolled Black</th>
<th>Lincoln % Enrolled Black</th>
<th>Central Total Enrolled Black</th>
<th>Central % Enrolled Black</th>
<th>Paseo Total Enrolled Black</th>
<th>Paseo % Enrolled Black</th>
<th>Southeast Total Enrolled Black</th>
<th>Southeast % Enrolled Black</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1954-55</td>
<td>1461</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2031</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1100</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>1604</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1657</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1575</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-61</td>
<td>1684</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1772</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>927</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>1522</td>
<td>90.2</td>
<td>1893</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>1883</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-66</td>
<td>1862</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>2469</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>1121</td>
<td>99.9</td>
<td>2648</td>
<td>99.4</td>
<td>1597</td>
<td>62.4</td>
<td>1781</td>
<td>22.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>1970-71</td>
<td>1766</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>2387</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>1323</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>2115</td>
<td>99.9</td>
<td>1545</td>
<td>99.4</td>
<td>1463</td>
<td>79.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>1974-75</td>
<td>1361</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>1312</td>
<td>99.9</td>
<td>2204</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>1466</td>
<td>99.9</td>
<td>2114</td>
<td>97.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Coalition, and the Marlborough Heights Neighbors, staged numerous protests at KCMSD board meetings demanding that the school board extend attendance zones across Troost Avenue. During this time, the school board repeatedly justified its segregative school attendance boundary policies on the grounds that “neighborhood unity,” “neighborhood autonomy,” and “neighborhood stability” had to be preserved before school integration could go forward. These claims provided the justification for changes in school district boundaries, which were redrawn dozens of times throughout the late-1950s and the 1960s to segregate blacks in schools east of Troost Avenue while maintaining the predominantly white composition of schools west of Troost Avenue. Not surprisingly, virtually every school the KCMSD built after 1954 opened either all-white or all-black. Until 1976, attendance zones did not cross Troost, despite overcrowding in African American schools east of Troost and underutilization of white schools west of Troost. Interestingly, the decision to eliminate the Troost Avenue attendance boundary came only after the Department of Health, Education, Welfare (HEW) sued the district in 1973 to compel it to adopt a comprehensive desegregation plan. Until 1968, no African Americans served on the school board, and the racial composition of the board remained predominantly white throughout the 1970s.

During the 1960s, the State of Missouri and the KCMSD board officials considered a number of school desegregation measures, including busing, equalizing funding across school districts, changes in school boundaries, and student transfer policies. However, school board officials refused to implement any of the proposed school desegregation measures, and, in the process, allowed attendance patterns to continue on a segregated basis. For example, in 1965, the school board rejected recommendations from desegregation consultants to build a series of integrated middle schools. Three years later, the board refused to endorse a proposal by Superintendent James Hazlett to establish a comprehensive system of racially mixed schools. Also in the 1960s, the school board adopted a district-wide busing program to relieve overcrowded conditions at various schools. However, the KCMSD’s “intact busing” policy had a racially segregative intent and effect as school administrators bused African American students to predominantly white schools but segregated them in demarcated classrooms and did not allow them to mix with the white students. Cortez Bradley, a teacher at the African American Linwood Elementary School, remembers how he and his class, along with five other classes, were bused to the mostly white Douglas Elementary School for three years and then to the mostly white Humboldt Elementary School for the 1965-66 school year: “We stayed intact. We had our own play schedules, lunch schedules and so on. We really stuck together and we really worked very well together as a team.”

In response to continued racial segregation both between and within schools, a number of civil rights groups mounted protests attacking what they perceived as efforts by an intransient school board to maintain the racial segregation of Kansas City school children. In September 1964, a group calling itself the Citi-
zens Coordinating Committee (CCC) staged a protest at a school board meeting, accusing the board of disregarding “the welfare of our children and callously ignoring the expressions of concern by apprehensive parents.” Later that month, the school district changed its policy and allowed bused students to mix into the regular enrollment. Justifying its actions as implementing the requirements of the 1955 *Brown II* decision to move with “all deliberate speed,” the school board maintained that the purpose of its new busing policy was to integrate schools “as expeditiously as possible,” a stance that the *Kansas City Call* immediately denounced as another “high-sounding phrase which really means ‘any old time’ or ‘maybe not at all.’” More protests followed in 1965, as the CCC and Freedom, Inc., a coalition of African American politicians, staged several demonstrations at school board meetings. In October 1965, Freedom, Inc. issued a “Black Paper” setting out points of “frustration and discontent” among blacks of Kansas City, listing wrongs that should be corrected by local political officials. According to one point in the paper:

We protest the continuing refusal of the Board of Education to provide adequate education facilities; the continuing overcrowded conditions which the vast majority of Negro children are required to seek an education; the continuing refusal to appoint qualified Negroes to administrative and supervisory positions in the school system; the continuing refusal to assign the best qualified teachers to those schools with the greatest need; and the aggravation of this situation by transferring the best and most skilled teachers to schools and areas where the need for their special talents is slight; . . . Freedom Incorporated and the Negro community will no longer be content or silent when we receive only the dregs of the tax dollars which we pay for the education of our children.

Throughout the 1960s and into the 1970s, opponents of racial mixing in the schools, busing, and the elimination of racially identifiable school boundaries repeatedly voiced their resistance to school integration and equalization of school funding across districts on ostensibly non-racial grounds. For example, in 1969, State Representative James Spainhower introduced legislation to equalize school funding throughout the state by consolidating small school districts into larger regional school districts throughout the state. The objective of the “Spainhower Plan,” as it became known, was not to promote racial integration but to relieve overcrowding in smaller districts and to redistribute educational resources across school districts. However, opponents vehemently denounced his plan on the grounds that it would exacerbate inequalities between school districts, impoverish education in the suburban school districts, and lead to more harm than good. Spainhower remembered dozens of conversations with fellow state legislators concerning his school equalization proposal in which “there were some things
they would talk about with me in private that they would not talk about in public.”

Privately they would discuss the detrimental effects upon their own political careers if our proposals for school district reorganization were pursued... that it would compel them to take positions which could be harmful to them politically. The racial question was one which was discussed privately [but] was really not discussed publicly. It would cause them to have to face up to the issue of integration and they would just as soon not face up to that because to them it was a no-win issue.29

As Spainhower remembered, opponents of the plan perceived it as a policy for racial desegregation, though they never explicitly referred to it this way. He recalled that “generally it was phrased that, ‘We like our school district like it is, it is doing a good job, we don’t want to get part of Kansas City in our school district.’”30

Overall, the use of Troost Avenue as a school attendance boundary, coupled with a discriminatory busing system and refusal to implement various desegregation measures, perpetuated a school board policy of de facto school segregation. The KCMSD’s 1955 adoption of “neighborhood” attendance zones in response to Brown v. Board of Education was a means to circumvent the Supreme Court’s ruling and maintain separate white and black schools. The use of such “neighborhood” attendance zones meant that racially identifiable schools continued irrespective of the Supreme Court ruling in Brown. That white schools tended to be underutilized while black schools were overcrowded helped reinforce in the minds of white residents that black schools were inferior and substandard, a claim consonant with the negative stereotypes and prejudices of the day. These perceptions formed the bases of individual and collective decisions that led to white resistance to school integration and white flight from southeast neighborhoods from the 1950s to the 1970s.


By the early 1970s, the segregative policies of the KCMSD were coming under heavy and sustained attack by local civil rights groups such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), and the Southern Christian Leadership Committee (SCLC) and by the federal government.31 In January 1973, the SCLC filed suit asking for desegregation of all KCMSD secondary schools.32 A 1974-75 federal investigation of the KCMSD by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) found that the school district had illegally segregated schools, had taken actions in the past to perpetuate segregation, and had ignored and passed
up previous opportunities to desegregate its schools. Under threat to cut off federal funds to the district, HEW required that the school board dismantle its Troost Avenue attendance zone boundary and establish a long-range and comprehensive plan for school desegregation. In 1976, a district task force submitted to HEW an integration plan entitled “Plan 6C” that would realign attendance zones and bus students until every school within the school district was at least 30 percent minority. In July 1977, HEW responded that Plan 6C did not “satisfy constitutional standards because it would continue a substantially large number of schools which are either racially isolated or substantially disproportionate in their racial composition.” However, HEW could not accept or reject the KCMSD’s plan because Congress had not yet acted on proposed antibusing legislation that affected HEW’s powers. School board officials decided to implement Plan 6C, and schools opened in fall 1977 with the plan in place.

The school board designed Plan 6-C to attract federal money for the financially starved school district. “I may be the only person in this town that will admit that, but that’s what it was in the truest sense of the word, the school district needed dollars,” remembered Emanuel Cleaver, Executive Director of the Kansas City branch of the SCLC in 1981 and later mayor. “I don’t think any of us operated under the assumption that Plan 6C would desegregate the system.” When board officials implemented Plan 6-C in 1977, eight out of every 10 African American children in the district attended schools that were at least 90 percent black while the majority of white students attended schools that were more than 90 percent white. Four years later, enrollment figures showed virtually no significant change in the numbers and percentages of African American and white students attending KCMSD schools. By 1981, non-whites made up 72.6 percent of the district’s enrollment, up from 68.6 in 1977-78. White flight continued to cripple desegregation efforts as white enrollment plummeted by more than 4,000 students in four years, declining from 14,207 in 1977-78 to 10,191 in 1981.

Racial conflicts over schools reached a crescendo in the late-1970s and 1980s, setting the stage for a protracted and bitter controversy over whether the problem of school desegregation required a local or a metropolitan solution. In 1971, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board of Education that school boards could not adopt “racially neutral” student assignment plans that relyed on existing residential patterns, because these reinforced racial segregation in schools. In Swann the Court ruled that busing was a suitable means of desegregation because where schools are located influences patterns of residential development and has an “important impact on the composition of inner city neighborhoods.”

Protest and opposition against Plan 6-C busing plans were widely reported in the local Kansas City media. Some white activists and teachers opposed busing plans, believing that the quality of schools would decline as African American students were bused in from overcrowded black schools. One white resident living in Kansas City, Missouri, at the time asserted that “I’m afraid I’m going to
sound pompous by saying this but we’re paying for our ancestors’ sins.” Meanwhile, civil rights leaders such as Emanuel Cleaver (leader of SCLC), Vertis Swinton (NAACP), Alvin Brooks (CORE), and Charles Briscoe (a school board official) called for a metropolitan-wide solution to the problem of school segregation. As one African American former KCMSD board member remembered,

There was one feeling I came into contact that said “you cannot force this, force integration.” The same people, however, did not have anything to say about times just a few years before when we would walk by an all-white school to get to the black school, or be bussed by two or three all-white schools to get to a black school (Brian Charles. Interview by Author).

In May 1977, in what would become Kansas City’s landmark desegregation case, *Jenkins v. State of Missouri*, the KCMSD sued 18 suburban school districts in Kansas and Missouri, the states of Kansas and Missouri, and the federal government. Initially, the school district positioned itself as the plaintiff in the suit, claiming that an interdistrict (city/suburban) and interstate (Kansas/Missouri) desegregation remedy was necessary to integrate racially isolated city schools. In October 1978, the U.S. District Court dismissed the cases against the state of Kansas and its suburban districts, and the school district was realigned as a defendant. The case proceeded to trial with a group of plaintiff schoolchildren suing both the KCMSD and the state of Missouri and the KCMSD cross-claiming against the state.

In 1984, the District Court found that a segregated school system “still exists to a large degree today” in Kansas City and had “impacted blacks in the KCMSD and consequently caused public schools to swell in black enrollment” (*Jenkins v. State of Missouri*, 593 F.Supp. 1485 [1984] at 1491). Chief Federal Judge Russell G. Clark ruled that the state of Missouri and the KCMSD had “violated the Constitution by failing to eliminate vestiges of a racially segregated dual system previously required under law” (593 F.Supp. at 1487). The State of Missouri was found liable for causing segregation through its laws and other acts that “had the effect of placing the state’s imprimatur on racial discrimination.” The school district was castigated for the segregative intent and effects of its school attendance boundary changes, its 1960s “intact busing” policy that kept black students separate from white students, and its repeated disregard for considering integration plans when they were proposed.37

However, Judge Clark dismissed the suburban school districts from responsibility for Kansas City’s segregated school system, finding that “there is no credible or substantiated evidence of a constitutional violation by these suburban school districts.”38 With this decision, the problem of school desegregation was redefined as a local, rather than a metropolitan, problem. Any desegregation remedy would have to be accomplished within the geographical limits of the KCMSD, rather than through a metropolitan solution. Judge Clark’s decision to
release the suburban schools from the suit was based on the 1974 Supreme Court ruling in *Milliken v. Bradley* that suburban school districts that did not cause segregation could not be forced into complying with a desegregation plan for another neighboring city (418 U.S. 617 [1974]). The *Milliken* decision for Detroit was the turning point of school desegregation battles around the nation as the Supreme Court, in a narrow 5-4 decision, blocked efforts for inter-district, city-suburban desegregation remedies as a way to integrate racially isolated urban schools (Eaton, Feldman, and Kirby 1996). In this case, the Supreme Court erected a heavy burden of proof on the part of the plaintiffs—requiring them to show that the suburban defendants had acted in a racially discriminatory manner that caused racial segregation in another school district. The *Milliken* decision effectively precluded the option of requiring the predominantly white suburbs to help integrate urban school districts with large minority populations, even though, as Justice Thurgood Marshall pointed out in his dissenting opinion, this meant that because of the highly racially segregated residential composition of central cities, racial and economic segregation would only intensify (Wilkinson 1979, 216-26; Orfield 1978, 31-36; Kantor and Brenzel 1993, 373-77).

According to Judge Clark's interpretation, there was no evidence that the different racial composition between the KCMSD and the suburban schools was caused by official activity or collusion between the central city and suburban school districts that was tantamount to a constitutional violation. Throughout the preceding decades, many suburban Kansas City school districts had participated in numerous voluntary inter-district programs ranging from cooperative buying, joint data processing, shared facilities, special education, and transfers of students. However, they consistently and vehemently refused to participate in any inter-district desegregation proposals, ranging from voluntary student exchange and district-reorganization recommendations, to the contemplated dissolution of the KCMSD in 1975. Moreover, at the insistence of rural and suburban legislators, in 1957 the State of Missouri passed legislative statute H.B. 171 that permanently barred the automatic expansion of school district boundary lines when city boundaries expanded through annexation. Interestingly, after 1957, the geographical size of the Kansas City, Missouri, school district remained basically the same while the city annexed over 219 square miles of outlying land, creating new school districts for suburban whites. Without the enactment of H.B. 171, the KCMSD board officials would have automatically expanded school boundaries to become coterminous with city boundaries following annexations in 1958, 1959, 1961, 1962, and 1963. Because of H.B. 171, however, the KCMSD was unable to expand into all-white suburban areas to create a more racially balanced school district after 1957.

Moreover, that the Kansas City metropolitan area is split by the state line with Kansas made a true metropolitan desegregation difficult. Indeed, not even the *Milliken* case was across state lines, and the historically bifurcated nature of the metropolitan area provided for the growth of suburban bedroom communi-
ties, especially in Johnson County, Kansas, to which Kansas City whites could flee. Judge Clark's decision to release the suburban school districts from the desegregation suit was a decision he would later regret: "The very minute I let those suburban school districts out, I created a very severe problem for the court and for myself, really, in trying to come up with a remedial plan to integrate the Kansas City, Missouri, School District," the chief judge reflected years later. "The more salt you have, the more white you can turn the pepper. And without any salt, or with a limited amount of salt you're going to end up with a basically black mixture." In short, although the historic roots of school segregation in Kansas City, Missouri, were rooted in interdistrict actions, even Judge Clark failed to emphasize them in his decision. Even if *Milliken* had been decided the other way and Judge Clark had ordered an interdistrict remedy in *Jenkins*, it is unlikely that he could have ruled for an interstate remedy across the Missouri/Kansas state line.

Based on the 1984 district court decision, Kansas City's school desegregation efforts between 1985 and 1987 focused on rebuilding the KCMSD's schools and developing a comprehensive magnet school plan designed to attract suburban white students to the city school district within a system of controlled choice (Morantz 1996a). The guiding principle was that Kansas City schools would have to be improved substantially, both in image and substance, before whites from suburban districts could be persuaded to voluntarily enroll their children in the inner city schools (Benson 1995). In 1985, a set of educational improvements were implemented requiring smaller class sizes, more art and music classes for elementary students, more teachers and counselors, improved libraries, full-day kindergarten, before and after school programs, and a series of efforts directed at low-achieving students. In 1986, the court ordered that a comprehensive magnet school plan be designed and implemented to attract suburban students to the KCMSD in an effort to redistribute students and desegregate schools.

The court also directed that the State of Missouri pay the costs of renovating or replacing all schools in the KCMSD in an effort to remedy the deleterious effects of deteriorating educational facilities and to avoid financial bankruptcy. After the KCMSD's enrollment had become majority African American in 1970, the district's voters, who remained majority white, rejected school funding initiatives 19 times while schools crumbled and the district faced fiscal insolvency. During the two decades after 1970, schools fell into chronic disrepair and deteriorated to the point that broken toilets, leaky ceilings, and rodents became commonplace in inner city schools. Barbara Schell, a vice principle at Central Middle School in 1994, remembered conditions at the Manual Annex school during the 1970s.

We would see huge rats. We couldn't keep candy, food, anything in the closets because the rats would eat the candy. It was so terrible. . . . We had leaky roofs. We would freeze to death
In 1977, a *Kansas City Star* editorial referred to the KCMSD as “a neglected and financially starved entity that is merely awaiting official notice of its death.” As a result of the 1984 District Court order, however, by February 1996, $1.7 billion had been spent by the school district and the State of Missouri to rebuild the district’s crumbling schools, a process that in less than a decade brought a dramatic facelift to inner-city schools surrounded by poverty, deteriorating neighborhoods, and decaying infrastructure.

In June 1995, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the central legal tenet of Kansas City’s desegregation plan, ruling 5-4 in *Missouri v. Jenkins* that the district court had had no authority to order expenditures for the purpose of attracting suburban whites. The majority opinion by Chief Justice William Rehnquist said the district court had improperly tried to transform the KCMSD into a magnet district to draw white students from surrounding districts without evidence that suburban districts had done anything to cause school segregation by violating the constitution. Specifically, Rehnquist notified the district court that its ultimate objective was not to achieve racial integration but “to restore state and local authorities to control” of the school district. The majority opinion held that once the vestiges of legally enforced segregation were removed, it would not be illegal for the school district to maintain and run racially segregated all-black or all-white schools. As Justice Clarence Thomas explained, “The Constitution does not prevent individuals from choosing to live together, or send their children to school together . . . . ‘Racial isolation’ itself is not a harm; only state-enforced segregation is.” As long as school facilities are “equal” for all races, Thomas said, government has accomplished its goal: “The point . . . is not to enforce strict race-mixing, but to ensure blacks and whites are treated equally by the State without regard to their skin color.”

In 1996, Gary Orfield and Susan Eaton (1996c, 318) argued that the kind of desegregation plan envisioned by the Supreme Court in the Kansas City case—i.e., desegregate within the school system and not attract white students outside the school district—would make “all schools largely black in a largely white metropolitan area and would make no effort to compete with private or suburban schools—providing all the ingredients for maximizing white flight.” Not surprisingly, by the fall of 1996, the percentage of white students in the KCMSD dropped to a record low 22.1 percent as the percentage of minority students surged to a record high 77.9 percent. In 1996, the school board officials began closing schools, ended free transportation to schools for suburban white students, and initiated a series of staff layoffs, thus marking a return to the days of fiscal uncertainty and financial turmoil for the poverty-impacted school district. In November 1999, U.S. District Court Judge Dean Whipple dismissed the Kansas City, Missouri, school-desegregation lawsuit and refused to block a state decision to strip the KCMSD of accreditation. While an appellate panel rein-
stated the desegregation case in March 2000, in October 2000, the State of Missouri revoked the district’s accreditation and effectively ended the state’s responsibility for paying the costs of desegregation.\(^4\)

The Supreme Court’s 1995 *Missouri v. Jenkins* decision not only set the stage for an end to the Kansas City school desegregation case, but also sent ripple effects throughout the nation, as other cities moved to undo mandatory court-ordered desegregation (Eaton 1996; Eaton and Meldrum 1996; Eaton, Feldman and Kirby 1996; Morantz 1996b). Since the Supreme Court’s decision in June 1995, school boards and city officials in no less than eleven other metropolitan areas have begun to dismantle their school desegregation programs. Across the state line, the Kansas City, Kansas Board of Education adopted a five-year plan in 1996 calling for an end to mandatory busing. In 1996, the Minneapolis school board obtained a waiver of state guidelines requiring racial balance in the schools. The Indianapolis school board in 1996 began making plans to seek an end to the court-ordered busing of more than 5,000 inner-city students to surrounding suburbs.

In 1997, St. Louis began ending its 15 year court-ordered busing that sent 12,700 inner city kids to suburban schools. Moreover, school boards in Minneapolis, Denver, and Pittsburgh have proposed eliminating busing in favor of returning to “neighborhood schools,” many of which would be all-white and all-black. In Florida, plans are underway to end the 37-year court supervision of Hillsborough County schools, while Broward County has abandoned mandatory busing. The federal court has ended supervision of desegregation in Wilmington, Delaware, and in 1996 Louisville, Kentucky, initiated a reappraisal of its busing plan.\(^4\) The state of Ohio has asked the federal court to end desegregation in Cleveland schools which are at 79 percent minority. In April 2002, the Dayton, Ohio, school district settled a NAACP lawsuit from 1972 and has begun dismantling court-ordered busing in the city.

The high court’s action on the Kansas City desegregation case and the actions of local school systems to end school desegregation efforts are based on the assumption that school segregation is a past injustice that has been sufficiently corrected; thus, federal administrative and judicial involvement is no longer warranted as a remedy to what is increasingly seen as a local problem. More important, the Supreme Court’s *Missouri v. Jenkins* decision symbolizes and reinforces the broader societal shift away from a national concern with the problems of racial inequality and racially unequal access to education and other resources (Yinger 1995). Like retrenchment in other spheres of federal activity including housing provision, civil rights enforcement, and urban aid, the high court is withdrawing federal authority for the enforcement of desegregation and implicitly reaffirming a return to the “separate but equal” tenet of *Plessy v. Ferguson* (Orfield 1996b, 23-51; Gotham 1998b).

In the 1960s, the Civil Rights Movement challenged the federal government to acknowledge racial inequality and segregation as a national problem and make
strides toward alleviating racial injustice and poverty. While racial segregation and polarization have remained basic to the fabric of U.S. cities, the federal government and the Supreme Court have now surrendered responsibility for addressing and remedying the social problems of racism and poverty to the local level. Federal support and action for racial inequality and desegregation in the 1960s has seemingly reverted to one of indifference and even hostility in the 1990s (Orfield 1988; Orfield and Ashkinaza 1991; Edsall and Edsall 1992). For Kansas City, as well as the rest of the nation, the federal retreat from desegregation will likely perpetuate bitter racial divisions and segregated living patterns.

Conclusion

In this paper, I have focused on the major themes underlying efforts to reinforce school segregation, the links between school administrative decisions and racial population movement, and the tenacity and persistence of segregation despite the erosion of overt and legally sanctioned discrimination over the last three decades. It has been over a century since the U.S. Supreme Court decided Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), the landmark case that legitimated public policies of “separate but equal.” Two generations later, the Supreme Court ruled in Brown v. Board of Education (1954) that state-sanctioned segregated schools are “inherently unequal” and ordered that school districts integrate their schools. For decades after Brown, many state governments and school boards throughout the nation worked to evade Brown’s anti-segregation doctrine. Even after the passage of civil rights laws, fair housing, and court-ordered busing in the 1960s and 1970s, school desegregation proceeded at a snail’s pace. In the 1970s and 1980s, a broad-based conservative backlash against school desegregation gained momentum and was successful in recasting desegregation as symptomatic of “big government” and a threat to democracy and free choice (Fuller and Elmore 1996; Orfield and Ashkinaza 1991; Edsall and Edsall 1991). Today, the Supreme Court under the direction of Chief Justice William Rehnquist has divested Brown of much of its scope and reach. As Orfield and Eaton (1996, xv) have noted, “The Supreme Court decisions of the 1990s offer instruction not about how to further desegregation but how to dismantle it.” Indeed, the 1995 Supreme Court decision in the Kansas City, Missouri school desegregation case, Missouri v. Jenkins, requires that desegregation policies be limited in time and extent and requires the restoration of local control as the primary goal in desegregation cases. In short, by tacitly supporting the “separate but equal” doctrine that Brown outlawed, the Supreme Court is embracing a return to unequal public schools (Orfield 1996b), a trend that is exacerbated by persistent racial inequalities in housing, employment, and other areas of American society (Gotham 1998b; Gotham and Wright 2000).

Clearly, the Kansas City case belies any notion that the historical development of racial segregation in schools and housing was “natural,” accidental, immutable, or caused by remote and uncontrollable demographic forces or migra-
tion processes. For decades before Brown, the State of Missouri and local school board officials—in both Kansas City, Missouri, and the surrounding Missouri counties that form its metropolitan area—engaged in practices explicitly intended to create and maintain a racially segregated school system in the city. School districts in the surrounding counties discriminated against African American students in ways that both encouraged and forced the migration of students into the racially segregated Kansas City school system. These segregative practices interlocked with intentionally and explicitly discriminatory housing policies and real estate practices to create the racially identifiable neighborhoods and schools that came to characterize Kansas City (Gotham 2000b). After the Brown decision, school boundary decisions established Troost Avenue as a racial boundary separating white neighborhoods to the west of Troost and black neighborhoods to the east of Troost. During this time, the school board wielded the “neighborhood” school policy as a shield with which to ward off claims of intentional school segregation leveled by civil rights groups. The KCMSD’s insistence upon preserving the almost all-white composition of its schools west of Troost made it impossible to keep its schools east of Troost racially integrated, putting pressure on white families to move out of the area and resulting in virtually complete racial turnover in the southeast part of the city (Gotham 2002, chapter 5).

These school actions were felt throughout the metropolitan area and exerted a profound influence on the residential development of the metropolitan area in the post-World War II era. Segregative school policies combined with discriminatory public and private housing actions restricted the choices of blacks to inner city housing and schools. In turn, the creation of quality schools in the suburbs combined with new housing primed by FHA and VA housing subsidies expanded the housing and school choices of whites and stimulated them to move out of the city. Yet the Kansas City experience is not unique. With slight variations, what happened in Kansas City and its surrounding metropolitan area during the past century occurred in cities throughout the entire country—indeed, in almost every metropolitan area where racial minorities have sought to gain access to quality education and housing (Massey and Denton 1993).

Today, the fragmentation of local government, including school districts, has powerfully influenced the pattern of racial segregation in metropolitan areas. In Kansas City, the existence of the Kansas/Missouri state line exacerbates this political fragmentation and, more important, has effectively shut off the option of drawing from the heavily white suburbs on the Kansas side of the state line (in Johnson County) to integrate city districts. More than two decades ago, Karl Taeuber (1979, 158) noted that the system of school districts in a metropolitan area “creates and sustains the identification of residential neighborhoods that vary in perceived quality. . . . Just as a good neighborhood tends to create and sustain a good school, a good school tends to create and sustain a good neighborhood.” In Place Matters: Metropolitics for the Twenty-First Century, Peter Dreier, John Mollenkopf, and Todd Swanstrom (2001) maintain that suburban municipalities have become powerful sorting mechanisms for racial and class divisions.
Where people live, as Dreier and colleagues point out, has a profound influence on the choices people have, the economic resources they have access to, and their capacity to achieve a high quality of life. Racial segregation has always been America's "dilemma," as Gunnar Myrdal (1944) observed decades ago, and the vast racial differences in resources and school financing across metropolitan areas mean that segregated schools will continue to be unequal schools because segregation concentrates poverty and disadvantage (Orfield and Yun 1999; Massey and Denton 1993). In conclusion, I want to offer three suggestions for thinking about school segregation and housing segregation and related contemporary social policies in an era where the legal foundations of Brown are being quietly eroded, and the federal government's commitment to ending racial segregation in schools diminishes. Thinking about these issues helps us confront the continuing significance of race and the impact of what George Lipsitz (1998) calls the "possessive investment in whiteness" that public policy reinforces in today's society.

First, the Kansas City experience suggests that the impact of schools on housing patterns continues to be important, but linkages between the two are more subtle and covert today than in the past. Civil rights lawyers in the early days of school desegregation routinely proved how school segregation was imposed by public agencies and had incremental and segregative effects on housing patterns (Inniss 1995). Yet court decisions in the 1990s now require civil rights attorneys to provide evidence of "overt" and "intentional" discrimination on the part of public and private actors and to prove that contemporary segregation is directly linked to past discriminatory actions. Racial real estate steering, racial redlining, and a variety of covert types of housing discrimination continue in housing markets and reflect the systemic basis of racial segregation (Gotham 1998c; Gotham and Wright 2000; Yinger 1998). At the same time, schools have become infused with a host of race-coded meanings, serving as a marker of racial territory, a measure of housing value, and a symbol of neighborhood quality. Although race is no longer an explicit exclusionary device, it has become an unspoken but tacitly understood element of other seemingly non-racial factors—exclusionary zoning, gated neighborhoods, property values, and school quality—that work together to perpetuate exclusionary practices and mitigate against the creation and preservation of racially mixed settlement spaces and schools (Gotham 2002; Smith and Feagin 1995; Bullard, Grigsby, and Lee 1994; Feagin 2001; 1994). Given the interconnectedness of the present and past, and public and private action, solutions to school segregation may lie in resolving the deeper issues of why racial housing discrimination persists, why race continues to influence the value and desirability of a school and neighborhood, and why institutionalized patterns of residential segregation remain despite the passage of fair housing and a host of anti-discrimination statutes over the last few decades.

Second, the Kansas City experience suggests that current calls by local leaders and conservative policy makers for a return to "neighborhood schools" and "lo-
cal control” will only reinforce school segregation and exacerbate social inequalities. One of the key claims made by opponents of school desegregation plans in Kansas City and elsewhere is that magnet schools and other forms of court-ordered school desegregation undermine neighborhood solidarity, undercut the power of African American communities, and do more educational harm than good for African American students (Allen and Jewell 1996). This assumption rests upon a nostalgic view that all-black schools before *Brown* were sources of neighborhood unity and pride, a view that also echoes Justice Clarence Thomas’s claim that “black schools can function as the center and symbol of black communities” (*Missouri v. Jenkins*, 115 S. Ct. At 2065). Yet the desire to return to so-called “neighborhood schools” ignores that racial segregation in the years before *Brown* meant that African American students were bused out of neighborhoods, typically passing white schools to attend segregated and inferior schools. In 1995, more than 40 percent of children in the KCMSD changed addresses twice a year, a mobility that is common in urban school systems with high concentrations of poverty (Benson 1995). Urban poverty, lack of rent money, and periodic unemployment make families highly mobile, thus disrupting school continuity and stability (Kantor and Brenzel 1993; Taylor 1996). As school districts around the country debate the so-called merits of neighborhood schools and local control, we should seriously reconsider the implications and long-term consequences of these proposals not only for urban school children, but for the quality of life of all U.S. citizens. The corrosive combination of separate and unequal in education will likely translate into low levels of academic success, higher dropout rates, restricted avenues for upward mobility, deteriorating schools and neighborhoods, and urban disinvestment, among other intense problems (Bankston and Caldas 1997; 1996; Bullard, Grisby and Lee 1994).

A final suggestion is that we direct our attention to the newest battleground over school desegregation: the suburbs. As the majority of the U.S. metropolitan population has come to live in suburban areas, metropolitan cooperation around the issues of housing and school desegregation has proved elusive, and the continued creation of new suburbs and cities on the urban fringe has been guided by efforts to exclude low-income people and racial minorities (Gotham 1998a; Kirp, Dwyer, and Rosenthal 1995; Haar 1998; Reardon and Eitle 2000). In *The Suburban Racial Dilemma*, Dennis Keating (1994) maintains that a crucial mechanism maintaining the color-line in housing is suburban opposition to court-ordered school desegregation and low-income government-subsidized housing. As the case of Kansas City shows, efforts to desegregate schools have often fostered racial conflict and contributed to the emergence of a powerful form of defensive activism that historian Gregory S. Jacobs calls “educational NIMBY” (*Not In My Back Yard*) (1998, xiii). I suggest that the mobilization of suburban whites against school desegregation is a consequence of the perceived threat that state-led integration efforts have posed to white privileged access to, and control over, suburban housing practices (i.e., single-family home ownership, racially exclusive neighborhoods and schools, and so on). Sociologists Susan Olzak (1992)
and Lawrence Bobo and James Kluegel (Bobo and Kluegel 1993; Bobo 1983) indicate that school and housing desegregation policies can portend substantial changes in relationships between racial minorities and whites by bringing these spatially isolated groups into contact and competition with each other for access to valued resources, such as quality suburban housing and schools. By threatening to redistribute resources across racial boundaries, school desegregation policies can upset existing patterns of resource control, destabilize meanings of racial and class identity, and cause racial conflict. The politics of housing and school desegregation in the suburbs are struggles over racial identity, status, and resources that link the concerns of home and neighborhood with those of race and class. For this reason, schools and housing represent contested space in the ongoing competition between racial groups for resources and identity.

**Notes**

1. The index of dissimilarity measures the proportion of a racial group that would have to move in order to live in a racially mixed neighborhood. A value of 60 or above is considered very high and implies extreme segregation. A value of 40 or 50 suggests moderate segregation and a value of 30 or below means that only a minority of residents need to move to a different census tract in order for racial groups to be evenly distributed (for overviews, see Mumford Center 2001; Massey and Denton 1993).

2. Hypersegregation is based on the measurement of five dimensions of residential segregation: uneven distribution of African Americans within a metropolitan area, geographic isolation of African Americans, concentration of African Americans within spatially dense areas, clustering of black neighborhoods into one large ghetto, and centralization of African Americans near the Central Business District (Denton 1994; Massey and Denton 1993). A racial group is said to be "hypersegregated" if they are segregated on at least four of the five above indices. The hypersegregation of African Americans is important for three reasons. First, not only are African Americans more segregated than other racial groups on any single dimension of segregation, but they are more segregated on all dimensions simultaneously. Second, African Americans are the only racial/ethnic group that was hypersegregated in selected American cities according to analyses of 1980 and 1990 census tract data. Third, hypersegregation operates as a "multiplier effect" that concentrates disadvantage in the urban core and deprives predominantly African American communities of the social supports and opportunities for socio-economic betterment. Not only does living in hypersegregated neighborhoods restrict opportunities for upward mobility through access to jobs and income, quality schools, and housing equity, but it is also closely associated with higher crime and poor living conditions (for overviews, see Bullard, Griggsby and Lee 1994; Yinger 1995).

3. The Kansas City metropolitan statistical area (MSA) is a bi-state, 11-county area, containing more than 460 municipalities. The counties that have traditionally made up the urban core of the metropolitan area include Johnson County and Wyandotte County in Kansas; Cass County, Jackson County, and Platte County, in Missouri. The Kansas City, Missouri School District (KCMSD) is located within Kansas City, Missouri, which is in Jackson County. Over the last few decades, Johnson County, Platte County, and Cass County, have experienced tremendous economic growth and burgeoning suburban housing construction as jobs, wealth, and people have flowed to these outlying regions. In contrast, both Wyandotte and Jackson Counties exhibit declining economic fortunes, with declining population, blue collar work force, rising poverty rates, and increasing percentage of minority residents (see Gotham 2002).

4. In addition to accessing the primary sources in the Jenkins v. Missouri case, I consulted hundreds of pages of court testimony, depositions, and the plaintiffs' exhibits themselves. The citations used in this paper take the following form: plaintiff's exhibit (X) followed by the exhibit number, title of the exhibit, box containing the exhibit, the archive number for collection (KC 250), the name of the collection—(e.g., the Arthur Benson papers), and the location (Western Historical Manuscript Collection—Kansas City [WHMC-KC]).
5. In the South, school districts were generally coterminous with county lines. In the North, however, school districts served children within walking distance. After the Civil War, seventeen states, including Missouri, superimposed patterns of racial segregation upon their school districts, requiring that schools be kept separate for blacks and whites. Four states, including Kansas, allowed towns with more than 15,000 people to set up segregated schools only through elementary schools. In 1904, Kansas City, Kansas, passed an ordinance that required separate schools for blacks and whites, and Sumner High School opened as the city's only black high school (Greenbaum 1982).

6. 1865 Mo. Laws 177; 1869 Mo. Laws 86-7; 1870 Mo. Laws 149; 1877 Mo. Laws 264; 1893 Mo. Laws 247; 1909 Mo. Laws 790-91; 1929 Mo. Laws 382; Savage 1931.

7. During these decades, Jim Crowism was extended to almost all public and private organizations and institutions in Kansas City. Local ordinances in Kansas City, St. Louis, and elsewhere mandated racially separate public parks, restaurants, hotels, theaters, department stores, swimming pools, and health care facilities (Martin 1982). In Kansas City, Missouri, for example, the city council passed an ordinance in 1914 making it illegal to establish "any school . . . for . . . persons of African descent" within one-half mile of a school for "persons not of African descent" (Lehew v. Brummell, 15 S.W. 765).

8. In 1873, the city limits of Kansas City, Missouri spread over only 5.25 square miles. Land annexations in 1873, 1885, 1897, and 1909 increased the city's size to approximately 60 square miles. The next annexation drive would not occur until 1947, which increased the city limits to 62 miles. From 1887 to 1950, the KCMSD school board consistently and repeatedly expanded its school district territory after the city expanded its boundaries by annexation (Act of July 6, 1957, 1957 Mo. Laws 454; Act of July 6 1965, 1965 Mo. Laws 275, 276-77 (1965) codified at Mo. Rev. St. 162.71).


10. Testimony of Eppie Shields, A30-1, Joint Addendum A (Excerpts From Record) of Kalima Jenkins, et al. And the School District of Kansas City, Missouri (KCMSD), Appellants. Folder 13, KC 250, Arthur A. Benson, II. Legal Papers. WHMC-KC.


edging Requests Made by the Kansas City Congress of Racial Equality.” X716. Box 202. KC 250, Arthur A. Benson, II. Legal Papers. WHMC-KC.
27. “Phrases, Local and National,” Kansas City Call, 6 November 1964, 17.


39. The population of Johnson County increased dramatically after 1940, from 33,327 in 1940 to 62,783 in 1950; 143,792 in 1960; 220,073 in 1970; 270,269 in 1980; and 335,034 in 1990; a ten-fold increase in fifty years. By 2000, the population of the county was over 450,000 people. By this time, less than ten percent of the population of the county was minority and less than five percent was black.


References


