"Where Hamburgers Sizzle on an Open Grill Night and Day"(?): Global Pop Music and Americanization in the Year 2000

Alex Seago

As the title quotation from Chuck Berry’s celebrated 1950s rock ‘n’ roll anthem “Back in the USA” suggests, few symbols of U.S. culture symbolize the nation’s domination of the mid/late-twentieth century as much as its popular music. From its nineteenth-century origins in the brothels of New Orleans, the plantations and gospel churches of the Mississippi Delta, and among the tunesmiths of New York City’s “Tin Pan Alley,” at the dawn of the millennium, U.S. pop music has become an integral element in the multi-billion dollar communications industry and a prime conduit of cultural globalization. It is therefore hardly surprising that many commentators, both academic and journalistic, regard U.S. (or Anglo-American) pop music as a prime culprit in the homogenization of global culture by what Bigsby (1975) once termed U.S. “superculture.”

The purpose of this paper is to review the current condition of global pop music in the light of debates spawned by globalization theory—and theories of cultural globalization in particular. To what extent do contemporary economic, cultural, and aesthetic developments in pop music reflect a global cultural hegemony of the United States at the beginning of the twenty-first century?

Pop Music and the McDonaldization Thesis

From around the late-1960s, discourses surrounding the term cultural imperialism tended to set the scene for the critical reception of globalization in the cultural sphere, viewing the process as a product of “the diffusion of American values, goods and lifestyles” (Friedman 1994,
Although this approach has come under sustained attack throughout the 1990s, particularly by those working in the field of cultural studies (for example, Alfino et al. 1998), it is still common to read articles and editorials influenced by theories of cultural imperialism—particularly in the aftermath of the latest merger of or buyout by a U.S. multinational corporation such as Disney or Viacom in the media/entertainment sector (Ellwood et al. 1998). The general line of the argument in such works is that rampant U.S. culture, promoted and supported by vast corporate wealth and U.S. military might, is threatening to overwhelm and annihilate vulnerable local cultures in other parts of the world in a morass of Coca Cola, Big Macs, Levis, Nikes, Leonardo DiCaprio, Britney Spears, and the Backstreet Boys.

Fear of U.S. cultural domination is nothing new, of course. After the Second World War, many Europeans expressed a distinct antipathy towards “Yank culture” and U.S. market domination. As Cohen and Kennedy point out, these forebodings were particularly strong in France where “when Coca-Cola applied for a license to begin local bottling in 1948, the French Communist Party won much public support when it implausibly argued that Coke’s incursion should be resisted because the company doubled as a U.S. spy network” (Cohen and Kennedy 2000, 239). Events that took place in August 1999 in the Southern French town of Millau, during which members of a “peasants’ confederation” protesting against the malign influence of U.S.—dominated globalization attacked and badly damaged a McDonald’s restaurant in the process of construction, could be regarded as a continuation of what has become something of a French tradition.

While most European supporters of the “cultural imperialism” thesis seem to be confined to the remnants of the left-wing press, there is a certain irony that the majority of prominent academics who continue to support aspects of this thesis have been or still are based in the United States. Essentially modernist in attitude, neo-Marxists and neo-Weberians such as Schiller (1985), Herman and McChesney (1997), Korten (1995), Ritzer (1993, 1998), and Ritzer and Liska (1997), see the capitalist world system in the guise of multinational corporations relentlessly incorporating and rationalizing national economies and societies while homogenizing and standardizing once distinct cultures. They also tend to posit an immediate elision between a new, dystopian capitalist monoculture and triumphant U.S. pop culture. Thus Ritzer associates the terms McDonaldization and McDisneyization with the worldwide “Americanization of local cultures” (Ritzer 1998, 84) in parts of the world where, despite local variations on a theme (“In Norway, McDonald’s sells McLaks. . . . Uruguayan McDonald’s sport McHuevo. . . . In Japan we find a Chicken Tatsuta sandwich. . . .”) (Ritzer 1998, 85), the worldwide spread of cultural artifacts such as fast food restaurants and credit cards is primarily “an Ameri-
canization of the world” because their “point of origin was the United States” (Ritzer 1998, 83).

However, as Tomlinson points out, this cultural imperialism thesis actually contains a number of fairly discrete discourses of domination—“of America over Europe, of “the West over the rest of the world,” of the core over the periphery, of the modern world over the fast disappearing traditional one, and of capitalism over more or less everything else” (Tomlinson 1999, 80). An analysis of the economics and aesthetics of global pop music may prove a useful means of disentangling some of these often contradictory discourses of domination. For this purpose it is useful to make a clear distinction between current economic developments in the music business itself and contemporary cultural trends in pop music styles and aesthetics.

The Music Business in 2000

The last three decades have witnessed a complete restructuring of global and national media industries. Increasing competition, market saturation, and the fusing together of the distinct technologies upon which different media sectors once depended have led to a very rapid concentration of ownership and control. In many countries this concentration has paralleled a significant shift from the public to the private sector, with the growth of an increasingly transnational hierarchy of communications corporations that compete with one another by establishing local subsidiaries and by purchasing local firms, titles, and labels. The 1980s and 1990s in particular witnessed the emergence of new mega-corporations (such as News International and Time-Warner) that began to diversify across an entire range of previously distinct media products, leading to an increasing number of mergers between cultural producers (such as companies specializing in sound recording, film production, and book and magazine publishing), telecommunications companies and, more recently, firms specializing in computer hardware and software (see Held et al. 1999, 346-350).

The neoliberal economic orthodoxy of the last twenty years has greatly facilitated these trends including, for example, the 1997 World Trade Organization Agreement on the Global Liberalization of Telecommunications Industries. As Held points out, the simultaneous deregulation of telecommunications and media industries has been “accompanied by an increasingly complex web of interlocking alliances and co-funded projects [in which the] digitalization of information, including music, visual images and text, has seen major links develop across the entire communications sector” (Held et al. 1999, 349). However, it is in those companies that actually create the products to be distributed through the new telecommunications, broadcasting, and computing infrastructures that are the real heart of this process, and it is here that a truly global set of media-entertainment-information corporations have come into being and continue to evolve.
That the vast majority of the twenty or so multinational corporations that dominate global markets for films, television, music, news, books, and magazines are based in a mere handful of the 29 countries belonging to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)\(^1\)—with the majority having their headquarters in the United States—would seem to support Ritzer’s assumption of the close ties between McDonaldization, globalization, and Americanization. However, in the recorded music sector of the communications industry the recent spate of merger activity has seen U.S.-based corporations lose something of their global dominance. The period between 1990 and the first six months of 2000 has seen RCA (Radio Corporation of America) absorbed by the German publishing giant Bertlesmann, and the Japanese firms Sony buying CBS and Matsushita purchasing MCA (Music Corporation of America) before selling it to Canadian giant Seagrams, which first purchased the U.S. Universal Music Group before taking over PolyGram from Dutch electronics multinational Phillips. By the first month of the new millennium the only (albeit huge) U.S.-based multinational left in the music business was Time-Warner, now renamed Warner-EMI after its virtually simultaneous mergers with Britain’s last remaining major recording company, EMI, and the internet giant AOL.

While evidence of this corporate feeding frenzy seems to support the economic aspects of Ritzer’s thesis (i.e., the capitalist-inspired drive toward ever greater instrumental rationality and the subsequent creation of ever larger bureaucratic structures), it also throws other aspects of the McDonaldization thesis into doubt—particularly the contention that there is any necessary relationship between cultural globalization and the “Americanization of the world.” For to what extent can we refer to contemporary pop music as being specifically “American” or even “Anglo-American”? |

Global Pop and Americanization

Until about twenty years ago, the very concept of “pop” (not simply as applied to music but also as associated with aspects of design, fashion, architecture, etc.) was synonymous with a particularly Anglo-American cultural sensibility (see Whiteley 1987).

Pop began in the sphere of U.S. industrial design in the 1920s as a direct consequence of Fordist mass production and the necessary creation of a market for mass consumption. The inevitable association of American culture and pop culture during the mid-twentieth century was intimately linked to the development of a mass consumer society in the United States long before the arrival of mass consumerism in Europe. The economic and political hegemony of the United States over most of the capitalist world throughout the mid-late-twentieth century only served to enhance the radical differences between U.S. culture and society and those of its competitors. For example, the early British pop music that began to develop from the mid-1950s was based almost entirely upon the longings of working- and lower-middle-class British youth for the culture and glamor of
an imagined United States. The essentially camp styles of impresario Larry Parnes’ stable of British “proto-American” rock ‘n’ rollers of the late-1950s, (all of whom were burdened with ersatz American names such as Billy Fury, Duffy Power, Vince Eager, Johnny Gentle and Marty Wilde) were entirely based on “authentic” U.S. originals such as Elvis Presley, Buddy Holly, Gene Vincent, and Eddie Cochran. Just as in Continental Europe (where the Elvis imitators of the 1950s and 1960s included France’s Johnny Halliday or Italy’s Little Tony), Pop meant America—Coca-Cola, Harley J. Earl’s Cadillac tail fins, Raymond Loewy’s Lucky Strike pack, Marlon Brando’s leather jacket and James Dean’s hairstyle and Levis.

The Beatles, the definitive British pop group and the act that first fused a distinct Anglo-American pop alliance in the mid-1960s, were also almost entirely a product of this European longing for the pop sounds, styles, glamor, and excitement of a (largely imagined) America that, as the German film maker Wim Wenders explained, had “colonized the subconscious” of a large portion of mid-twentieth century European youth. Not until the later 1960s, with the release of Revolver (1966) and Sgt. Pepper’s Lonely Hearts Club Band (1967), did the Beatles begin to define a distinctly British pop sensibility—the product of a particular national cultural fusion of “fine art” attitudes to pop music production and promotion, which culminated in the punk subculture of the late 1970s (see Frith and Horne 1987; Walker 1987; Seago 1995).

By the 1990s, however, the link between pop music and an Anglo-American cultural axis had become increasingly diluted. An analysis of the national origins of performers featured in the “charts” of OECD countries other than the United States during the 1990s (the only country in which sales of popular music have risen significantly during the last three years) reveals that the traditional Anglo-American pop axis can no longer be taken for granted. While a nostalgic historian of twentieth century popular music such as Clarke (1990) once found it easy make “no apology” for concentrating on the English speaking world and “particularly on the U.S.A., because that is where the economic power of the music business ... developed” (Clarke 1990, x), no serious cultural historian of the development of global popular music since the 1980s could now justify such ethnocentrism.

By the final decade of the twentieth century national boundaries mattered little in a new deterritorialized music market in which “a Detroit producer may have more in common with a London-based DJ and a Belgian remixer than anyone in his or her immediate geographical environs” (Harley 1993, 225). This observation is certainly applicable in the case of Derrick May, the influential Detroit-based producer whose “techno” sound was originally derived, not from any U.S. original, but from the work of 1970s German pop avant-gardists Kraftwerk. With its entirely simulated sound and almost total lack of lyrics, techno has since spawned a bewildering array of thoroughly international electronic dance music genres (house, garage, trance, jungle, balearic beat, acid jazz, drum and bass, trip hop, goa trance, etc.), providing the soundtracks to a
plethora of hybridized youth subcultures throughout the world. Electronic dance music has only the shallowest of roots in specific national cultures. Indeed, electronic musical genres such as trance can be regarded as constituting the first wholeheartedly global forms of pop music, "leaping boundaries of culture, race and language with athletic ease [and] making converts in countries little associated with a vibrant youth culture such as Mexico, Russia and Israel (now one of the heartlands of the trance scene)" (Richardson 2000).

In Dangerous Crossroads George Lipsitz points out that one of the fascinations of studying contemporary culture is that the cultural sphere is one in which people are able "to rehearse identities, stances, and social relations not yet permissible in politics...[P]opular culture does not just reflect reality, it helps constitute it" (Lipsitz 1994, 137). The case of techno and trance music provides an excellent illustration of this phenomenon, for it is here that the relationship between cultural artifact and national identity has become almost completely disembedded. In the case of these completely simulated musical forms, Baudrillard's (1995, 75-77) dictum that the map quite literally precedes the territory holds true. Here are forms of music that are pure simulacra—entities that have no original in the actual world. In contrast to earlier forms of pop music, there are no "originals" to ape, only a vast plethora of global sources to plunder, cut, and remix.

In sharp contrast to the 1960s, when English-speaking aficionados held in contempt Japanese, French, or Dutch versions of "beat music," contemporary pop can and does come from almost anywhere. For example, apart from the essentially nostalgic "Britpop" phenomenon (an attempt by bands such as Oasis, Blur, and Pulp to recapture the links between national identity and pop music that characterized the British "Swinging Sixties"), in the 1990s European influences dominated the U.K. charts. British consumers often seemed to have more in common with their European Union neighbors than with a U.S. market absorbed in local genres such as rap from New York City's Brooklyn and Los Angeles' Compton and grunge rock from the Pacific Northwest.

As Frith has pointed out, changes in the international music business, as well as in the aesthetic nature of much pop music itself, mean that we can no longer sensibly define the music market in nationalistic terms with some countries such as the United States imposing their cultures upon others. In the contemporary music business the major multinationals "do not share some supranational identity, something to be imposed culturally around the globe, [but rather control] an information network, so that whatever sells in one country can be mass marketed in another." In this model, local music is increasingly made from a global perspective. Global culture can no longer be equated with American culture but with a "post imperialist model of an infinite number of local experiences of (and responses to) something globally shared" (Frith 1991, 267).

The history of the development of MTV music television serves as a further illustration of this deterritorialization of contemporary music. At first glance
MTV might seem to epitomize both the McDonaldization of the cultural sphere and the insidious relationship between Americanization and cultural globalization. Indeed, Weinstein and Weinstein see a direct parallel between the notorious rationalized hamburger and MTV's "deconstructive, eviscerating" pop videos, which leave the viewer with "impressions and feelings, not with focused experiences. Like a Big Mac, MTV is sizzle without substance" (Weinstein and Weinstein 1999, 67). The question to be asked here, however, is whether or not the global presence of MTV in itself signifies the development of a uniform, Americanized capitalist monoculture.

In common with Ritzer, several academics have a tendency to make the inferential leap from the simple presence of cultural goods to an attribution of deeper cultural effects. The recent (post-1995) history of MTV illustrates the dangers of this process in the analysis of global pop music. Owned by the media giant Viacom (majority shareholder in Paramount Pictures, Blockbuster videos, the Nickleodeon TV channel, and international publishing house Simon and Schuster), MTV is in many ways the epitome of a global, multinational success story. However as Philo (1999) has pointed out, the recent history of MTV reveals a company which is "uncertain and provisional in its cultural effects." Beginning in 1981 in the United States, with an undiluted diet of Anglo-American pop and rock, the controllers of MTV mistakenly assumed that this cultural product would be consumed with uniform enthusiasm by teenagers the world over. By the early 1990s, however, MTV was beginning to lose its European audiences and advertising revenues to a number of new music video stations that appeared across the continent. All of these stations (such as the French M6, the German Viva and Turkey's Kral TV) contained a high proportion of homegrown pop sung in national languages and local dialects. Not only does this phenomenon testify to what might be termed the "indigenization" of contemporary pop culture; it also appears to support Bourdieu's observation of the desire of consumers all over the world to express their own special "habitus"—the desire to express and display preferences for a cluster of distinctive tastes in consumption and lifestyles (Bourdieu 1984).

This local challenge to the global influence of MTV is even stronger outside Europe, where exponents of varieties of the cultural imperialism thesis might expect local cultures to be even more vulnerable to the onslaught of Americanization. This is especially the case in India where, as Philo points out, "far from being mesmerized by the spell of the West, Indian TV audiences seem unenamoured by its products... as evidenced by the success of the Hindi Zee TV and the resounding flop of Rupert Murdoch's Star TV channel (upon which MTV broadcasts)" (Philo 1999, 4), which vividly illustrates the perils of conflating economic and cultural aspects of globalization processes.

It is important to note that this dilution of the link between pop music and the Anglo-American cultural axis occurred during the same time period as a major crisis in the Fordist economic model of mass production and mass consumption that originally had produced pop. As Hall (1997) has argued, declining corporate
profits since the 1970s, caused by international competition, the growing burden of wages indexed to productivity, and a shift of consumer patterns from mass to individualized consumption, have caused corporations to reorganize their production processes. These must now respond much more flexibly, not only to changes in the labor market, but also to changes in consumption markets in which an understanding of consumers' ever more sophisticated desires for distinctiveness, "originality," and diversity has become a key to survival.

A new, more flexible post-Fordist economic paradigm, characterized by "just-in-time" production techniques, the geographical dispersal of production processes, and related centralization of command functions, has been made possible by the same technologies of information and communication that have rendered pop music an increasingly global cultural commodity. Since the early 1990s this switch to post-Fordism has also witnessed a steep increase in investment in the entertainment and information industries that produce postindustrial cultural commodities. The rise of postmodern cultural sensibilities associated with post-Fordist economies is intimately linked to the much more central role that consumption and leisure play in the lives of many citizens in the more affluent OECD nations.

Rather than being a trivial pursuit of working class youth, in the post-Fordist global economy pop music and associated industries such as video production, animation, computer game design, dance club-related enterprises (including DJ-ing, DJ equipment, lighting design, etc.) have become vital exports and key contributors to national balance of payments budgets. Nowhere is this more relevant than in Britain, once the mother of the industrial revolution and now a nation in which pop culture has become a key to national economic health. According to Chris Smith, the U.K's first Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport,

The best figures for 1995 show a full time employment figure (in the British music industry) of somewhere between 90,000 and 115,000 people in music, part-time employment of around 70,000; consumer expenditure of between £2.4 billion and £2.9 billion; exports outstripping imports for every one of the last ten years; a balance of trade surplus of nearly two-thirds of a billion pounds; and a contribution to the balance of payments greater than that of the steel industry. (Smith 1998, 11)

**Deterritorialization, Creolization, Indigenization, and "World Music": Trajectories of Millennial Pop**

Although the majority of citizens living in what are now the OECD countries were relatively less affluent during the Fordist era, class consciousness, nation-
alism, and deep local loyalties to family and community featured prominently in the lives of many. As Castells has pointed out, the post-Fordist reorganization of capitalism has now undermined the material basis of many peoples' sense of personal and national cultural identity by "the flexibility and instability of work, and the individualization of labor. By a culture of real virtuality constructed by a pervasive, interconnected, and diversified media system. And by the transformation of material foundations of life, space and time, as expressions of dominant activities and controlling elites" (Castells 1997, 1). In this new post-Fordist scenario, where increasing numbers of households have access to global media flows via cable, satellite, and the internet, the local and the global can appear to be so intertwined that the national level no longer matters.

Appadurai's (1996) idea of a new world order characterized by 'scapes'—global flows of people (ethnoscapes), money (finanscapes), images and sounds (mediascapes) and ideas (ideoscapes) that transgress the boundaries of the nation-state and undermine previous securities and ontologies—is particularly germane to contemporary developments in the field of popular music. For, as we see in the case of recent corporate mergers in the global music industry, the traditional Fordist relationship between industrial enterprise (e.g., a major British firm such as EMI) and national identity (e.g., British pop music in the form of The Beatles) also erodes. Indeed, few cultural commodities more vividly illustrate Hall's point that the old "logic of identity . . . is, for good or ill, finished" (Hall 1997, 4) than contemporary pop.

That globalization has fundamentally transformed peoples' relationships between the places they inhabit and their cultural identities, practices, and experiences seems self evident, but as Lipsitz has pointed out in his analyses of the relationships between globalization, local identity, and popular music, this process of deterritorialization is complex and ambivalent: "... even under these circumstances of global integration, local identities and affiliations do not disappear. On the contrary, the transnational economy often makes itself felt more powerfully through the reorganization of spaces and transformation of local experience—especially within and across urban areas" (Lipsitz 1994, 5).

Although the increasingly sophisticated communications technologies that have led to a growing awareness of global forces impinging on citizens' lives have led some "hyperglobalist" commentators (e.g., Albrow 1996) to regard globalization and consequent deterritorialization as the harbinger of a new cosmopolitan consciousness, they also represent a profound loss of cultural certainty, often resulting in profound anxiety, xenophobia, and racism. The loss of former cultural identities, however, should not be read as implying that differences between cultures are being wiped out. The global "mediascapes" and "ethnoscapes" upon which the sounds of pop music flow and within which they are interpreted can and do create very different sets of meaning in different cultural contexts as global consumers and producers become increasingly adept
at decoding messages, altering their meanings, and imposing their own interpretations. Contemporary global trends in pop music clearly reflect these ambiguities and also the essential unevenness of the processes of cultural globalization in which global consumers and producers of music project their own particular versions of identity into social space.

Hannerz's (1992) concept of creolization is particularly useful in understanding the complex interaction of music cultures and local identities in the context of globalization. A creole culture develops from the interaction of several different cultures in such a way that the new culture serves as a better meaning system for sustaining communal life than the cultures from which it was developed. Hannerz's work is particularly useful in the context of understanding contemporary developments in pop music because he does not conceive of the world as a collection of cultures bound to specific nation-states; his analysis of contemporary creolization is more prone to transcending national boundaries and thereby deterritorializing cultures. For Hannerz, therefore, contemporary culture is essentially dynamic, developing in a process of absorption and appropriation of internal and external influences.

Nowhere are these processes simultaneously more clear and yet more complex than in the eclecticism of contemporary cultural developments in the world's few "global cities," which Sassen defines as cities that function as centers in four new ways:

first, as highly concentrated command points in the organization of the world economy; second, as key locations for finance and specialized service firms . . . ; third as sites for production, including the production of innovations, in these leading industries; and fourth, as markets for the products and innovations produced. (Sassen 1991, 3)

Magnets for international capital, "first order" global cities such as London and New York also attract an increasing number of global migrants to staff all levels of the economy. Recent statistics reveal, for example, that foreign workers and their families account for approximately one-seventh of London's seven million people, almost half of the foreign workers in Britain (Hall 2000). Thus, increasingly, global cities have less and less in common with the culture of their national hinterlands (of "Middle America" or "Middle England") and more and more in common with each other. It is in these increasingly cosmopolitan cities that the hybrid sounds typical of the creolized culture of contemporary global popular music are often originally fused and disseminated.

An example of these new hybridized, creolized cultural forms can be heard in the work of Talvin Singh. The award to Singh of the 1999 Technics Mercury
Music Prize, which was established in 1992 to celebrate the best contemporary music by British and Irish artists, can be interpreted as representing a radical reconception of the essential nature of British pop at the millennium. In sharp contrast to the Anglo-American rock and pop sounds of previous winners, Singh’s album OK is a fusion of classical Indian tabla drumming and “Drum and Bass” electronic dance music. Although Singh was trained in classical tabla drumming in India, his music reflects instead the multicultural hybridities (first, second, and third generation West Indian, Somali, Bengali, Punjabi, and white English) of the local community of Shoreditch in East London in which his influential “Anokha” club nights were based. As Singh has explained, the “tablatronic” sound developed in this local setting “is not about being Asian...; it’s about being a Londoner, digesting all these things around you” (Singh interviewed in Das 1999, 42). The conservative Indian classical music community in Britain has little interest in his fusion music. It has, however, enabled him to develop a radically new musical form that involves “reinventing classical forms by knowing them first,” a musical process in harmony with the hybridized, multiple identities his ethnically diverse inner city audiences negotiate in their everyday lives.

Both Lipsitz (1994) and Taylor (1997) make similar points in their analysis of the “very British sound” of another contemporary artist of South Asian ancestry who has moved beyond the familiar Anglo-American pop/rock axis—the Birmingham, U.K.-born musician Apache Indian. Emphasizing that his work, which “falls between the cracks of bhangra and dancehall reggae,” exploits the “free-floating signifiers so evident in Appadurai’s ethnoscape,” Taylor points out that Apache Indian’s music itself “juggles and juxtaposes identity conceptions, with India sometimes far, sometimes near, reggae up front one moment, gone the next... [T]he multiple subject positions newly available in the global postmodern is only part of the picture; equally important is they way they are lived and deployed, negotiated and renegotiated” (Taylor 1997, 163).

Indigenization, defined by Cohen and Kennedy as “the local appropriation and re-elaboration of the global and its transposition into forms compatible with indigenous traditions” (Cohen and Kennedy 2000, 243), provides another key to understanding the inadequacies of the McDonaldization thesis in relation to pop music. Rutten (1999) illustrates this process by focusing upon the ways in which increasing numbers of contemporary European pop, rock, and hip hop musicians are combining global sounds with local languages and dialects. Good examples of this phenomenon can be heard in the development of new forms such as the Turkish folk-rock known as yeni turku, the highly disturbing and extreme “porno-nationalism” (Monroe 2000) of contemporary Serbian “turbo-folk,” the French/African/Arabic hip-hop of MC Solaar, the quirky Arctic pop of Iceland’s Bjork, or the classical/folk/jazz fusions of Azerbaijan’s Aziza Mustafa Zadeh. These radically new national repertoires based upon creolization, hybridization, and indigenization are increasingly attractive to the global music business, which, in
its belated appreciation of the limits of the appeal of English language pop and rock, is beginning to concentrate upon local releases of non-Anglo-American artists.\(^3\)

The “World Music” phenomenon can be used as a final example of the complexities of contemporary cultural globalization and its relationship to Americanization. The contemporary growth of interest in non-Western popular music is a complex and contradictory phenomenon that can be traced generally to the Beatles’ experimentation with Indian music of Ravi Shankhar during the mid-1960s and, in particular, to the emergence of Jamaica’s Bob Marley as a global superstar during the 1970s.

The concept of World Music is less than two decades old. The term was originally conceived as part of a marketing campaign during the late-1980s by the owners of London-based small record labels frustrated that their releases of African, Latin American, and other international artists were being ignored by retailers and consumers who found them difficult to place under existing “pop,” “rock,” or “folk” categories. Aided by the activities of a number of rock superstars including Peter Gabriel (founder of the influential WOMAD festivals and the Real World record label) and Paul Simon (whose highly controversial South African-influenced album *Graceland* won a U.S. Grammy award in 1988), many non-Western “World Music” artists gained popularity in OECD countries during the late-1980s and 1990s—a phenomenon that has continued with the huge success and critical acclaim of Ry Cooder and Wim Wenders’ superb 1999 documentary record of Cuban music, *Buena Vista Social Club*.

Despite the imprecision of the term, “World Music” has now been adopted as a category by the music industry to describe the work of any musician who originates from what used to be referred to as the “Third” (and often “Second”) World. At the same time, as Taylor (1997, 129) indicates, many of the more successful “World Music” artists have been vociferous in their rejection of the term.

A central problem with the concept of “World Music” can be understood by reference to the inadequacies of discourses of cultural imperialism, its relationship to Americanization, and in particular the tendency of some western critics and fans to misunderstand the centrality of agency in the dynamics of cultural globalization. The original followers of World Music in OECD countries consisted overwhelmingly of middle-class white liberals and radicals who believed that Anglo-American pop/rock music had become enervated, exhausted by a combination of cynical multinational music business marketing and the “soulless” rationalization of digital technology. World Music fans turned to the sounds of “the Other” for an “authentic” taste of traditional culture. Echoing the attitudes of white middle-class champions of “authentic” blues and folk music in the early 1960s, there has been a tendency to “cry Judas” at those “World” musicians who depart from the “authentic,” exotic behavior their western fans expect.

However, as Guilbault (1996) has pointed out, the means by which the World Music category was constructed reveal less about its content and
more about those westerners who became interested in music. The under­
lying construction was that World Music should be: “not from here (that
is, not from Northwestern Euro-American origins or influences), exotic (in
the sense of unusual), sensual (in relation to dance), mystical (in terms of
philosophy), attractive and yet not equal . . . and in need of documenta­
tion” (Guilbault 1996, 5). This implicit discussion was conducted in terms
of First-Third World relations and involved many of the familiar concerns
of discourses of cultural imperialism, including, for example, the threat of
cultural homogenization by western capitalism, and the subsequent loss of
local, national, and racial identity as a result of exposure to western media.
A dominant characteristic of this discourse was that the exoticized “Other,”
in the shape of “World” musicians and their “native” audiences, were
assumed to be “passive . . . and easily deceived” (Guilbault 1996).

Markets, Taylor uncovers the anger and resentment that these expectations to be
“primitive” and “exotic” can provoke in so-called “World Music” performers.
The Beninoise singer Angélique Kidjo, for example, whose work has sometimes
been criticized by World music purists for being “too Western,” is especially
scathing:

I won’t do my music different to please some people
who want to see something very traditional. The music I
write is me. It’s how I feel. If you want to see traditional
music and exoticism, take a plane to Africa. . . . I’m not
going to play traditional drums and dress like bush
people. I’m not going to show my ass for any fucking
white man. . . . I’m not here for that. I don’t ask Ameri­
cans to play country music. (Kidjo quoted in Taylor
1997, 140)

A glance at the career of Youssou N’Dour, perhaps the most successful and
best known of all the performers to emerge from the World Music boom of the
1980s, again reveals the dangers of both of exoticizing non-Western pop music
and of applying modernist theories of cultural imperialism to postmodern culture.
Born in 1959, as Senegal was emerging from French colonial rule, N’Dour is
descended from a long line of griots, the traditional keepers of tribal oral
traditions. By the age of sixteen he had joined Dakar’s Star Band, with whom he
began to fuse western rock and pop instrumentation with traditional Senegambian
Wolof rhythms to create the contemporary Senegalese pop hybrid known as
mblalax. Featured on Paul Simon’s Graceland and Peter Gabriel’s So albums
during the 1980s, he came to the attention of European and North American
audiences, a process that culminated in his “Seven Seconds” duet with Neneh
Cherry, which reached the top of the pop charts in eight countries and propelled
his 1994 album *Wommat (The Guide)* to sales of more than one million copies worldwide.

The content and production of Youssou N’Dour’s album *Joko* (2000) exemplifies that the relationship between the artist, his or her audience(s), record company, band members, recording technologies, marketing strategies and formats of musical delivery have become thoroughly globalized and deterritorialized. Not intended for release in the domestic Senegalese market or for the Senegalese expatriates in Paris and Brussels (for whom N’Dour releases a steady supply of Wolof *mbalax* cassettes), *Joko* features an eclectic blend of *mbalax* sung in Wolof, Afro-Pop (the term, significantly, he prefers to “World Music”) sung in English (and featuring collaborations with western rock stars such as Sting and Peter Gabriel) and, strikingly, several hip-hop tracks featuring Wyclef Jean of the U.S. group The Fugees and co-produced by Wyclef Jean and N’Dour at the latter’s state of the art Xippi recording studio in Dakar.

Although critics might perceive this fusion between cutting edge African-American pop and “authentic” Senegalese music as another example of the creeping Americanization of “authentic” Third World cultures, N’Dour has pointed out that, rather than being a passive recipient of American pop, “Senegal is the fifth biggest country in the world for hip-hop and we have 300 rap bands . . . and Wolof is a great language for rapping” (N’Dour interviewed in Williamson 2000, 26). This provides a prime example of what Gilroy (1993) refers to as the “diasporic intimacy” characteristic of the Black Atlantic world. It represents a subversive act of solidarity that, as Lipsitz points out, goes far beyond their role as commodities. The diasporic conversation within hip hop, Afro-Beat, jazz and other Black musical forms provides a powerful illustration of the potential for contemporary commercialized leisure to carry images, ideas, and icons of enormous political importance between cultures. Whatever role they serve in the profit-making calculations of the music industry, these expressions also serve as exemplars of post-colonial culture with direct relevance to new social movements emerging in response to the imperatives of global capital and its attendant austerity and oppression. (Lipsitz 1994, 27)

Although N’Dour’s current international recording contract is with Sony/CBS, his active involvement in and determination of his artistic repertoire and the conditions under which his work is produced and distributed locally and globally bear no resemblance to any “grand narrative” of U.S. cultural imperialism or to the inevitabilities of McDonaldization. As Taylor points out, N’Dour (and many other so-called World Music performers such as Senegal’s Baba Maal and Algeria’s Khaled Hadj Brahimm) are concerned with “becoming global citizens and do this by
showing that their countries are neither backward nor premodern, that they
can make cultural forms as (post)modern as the west’s” (Taylor 1997, 143).

Conclusion

Despite the rejections of aspects of the McDonaldization thesis that have
characterized this paper, it would be foolish to underestimate the hegemony of
western, and particularly American, multinational media in many parts of the
world, particularly in the spheres of television, film, publishing, and now,
following the Time-Warner merger with AOL, perhaps even the future develop­
ment of the Internet.

Throughout this paper I have attempted to draw a distinction between
economic developments in the music business and contemporary cultural and
aesthetic trends in global pop music, the argument being that the oligopoly of a
few immensely powerful multinational entertainment corporations will not
necessarily result in the destruction of cultural difference by formulaic, bland,
global variants of Anglo-American pop music. Key aspects of pop music
production and, particularly, consumption render the medium fairly resistant to
the processes of McDonaldization.

First, in comparison to television and film, pop music remains relatively
cheap to produce. Because the cost of musical instruments and amplification and
recording equipment relative to performers’ incomes differs enormously from
country to country, this statement should be regarded with some caution. However,
when compared to the vast amounts of capital that are required to
produce a television series or a feature film, pop music remains a particularly
accessible form of cultural expression—especially to those marginalized and
disenfranchised by processes of economic globalization. The phenomenal devel­
opment and global diffusion of electronic dance music since the 1980s can be
partly explained in terms of the rapid decline in cost of the hardware and software
necessary for its production; this is music that can, quite literally, be produced
from many teenagers’ bedroom studios. The huge popularity of local variants of
rap music throughout the world can also partly be explained by reference to the
importance of agency in cultural production—it is an immediately accessible
music, a highly cost effective cultural form in a constant process of evolution.

Second, as Lipsitz (1994) explains in great detail, many forms of pop music
retain an intimate relationship to the “poetics” of local space. As we saw in the
case of Talvin Singh, while traditional national identities may be becoming less
important, local gigs and local club “scenes” remain central to the production and
aesthetics of both pop music and new identities. Music is a powerful and easily
recognizable marker of often complex cultural identities that come “to stand for
the specificity of social experience in identifiable communities when it captures
the attention, engagement, and even allegiance of people from many different
social locations” (Lipsitz 1994, 6). Local pop music performance and production
continue to provide an area of autonomous cultural space for many otherwise
culturally disenfranchised groups, and it is difficult, if not impossible, for those who manage the music divisions of the multinationals of the entertainment business to predict, direct, or control original developments in this area.

Third, in contrast to other media, the grip of multinationals over the global distribution and marketing of pop music has loosened significantly in recent years. The piracy and bootlegging first made possible by cheap cassette recorders and now by ever more affordable CD disc writers have made copyright protection and the collection of royalties a nightmare for the "majors." In addition to these problems, the development of Internet-based MP3 files, containing copies of digital-quality music taken straight from CDs and left online for any listener to download and play on their computers, threaten to completely destroy the traditional relationship between artists, recording companies, and the distributors and retailers of music. While the music industry is currently fighting to protect its profits, it seems inevitable that unless multinational corporations can gain control of the Internet, their influence over the production and distribution of popular music will be very seriously weakened. As Whittle has pointed out, as increasing numbers of consumers, especially those outside the United States, gain access to the Internet, "existing distribution channels . . . will be bypassed as artists and listeners engage in two-way communication, without geographic restrictions" (Whittle 1995, 1).

To summarize, therefore, I have argued that in the field of global pop music there is little danger of McDonaldization. Despite the omnipresence of Anglo-American pop and rock, music at both local and global levels is being characterized more than ever before by a plethora of unpredictable, creolized, indigenized stylistic hybrids. As Whittle points out, we may even be witnessing the death of pop music and the return of an era of "folk" music in which much of the music listened to by consumers will be produced by amateurs and shared online free of charge (Whittle 1995, 1).

At the dawn of the twenty-first century we are faced with a contradiction between the rapid centralization and rationalization of the music industry and the development of a global culture in which the relationships between identity, locality, and nationality are becoming disembedded. The constant desire of the music industry to create global cultural products clashes headlong with the social trend toward what Hall has termed "multicultural drift—the explosion of cultural diversity and difference that is our lived daily reality" (Hall quoted in Jaggi 2000, 8). The current trend toward multicultural, deterritorialized musical fusion questions the extent to which the manipulation of cultural tastes can be assumed from structures of media ownership.

Notes

1. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development was founded in 1961 and brings together 29 countries sharing the principles of the market economy, pluralist democracy, and respect for human rights. The original 20 members of the OECD are located in Western countries of Europe and North America (United States, Canada, United Kingdom, Ireland, Greece, Turkey, The Netherlands, Sweden, Austria, Germany, Belgium, Italy, France, Spain, Norway, Denmark, Iceland,
Switzerland, Portugal, Luxembourg). They were followed by Japan (1964), Australia (1971), New Zealand (1973) and Finland (1969). More recently, Mexico (1994), the Czech Republic (1995), Hungary, Poland (1996) and South Korea (1996) have joined. For more information on the OECD see http://www.oecd.org.

2. Bhangra music is a fusion of folk songs from the Indian state of Punjab with disco, pop, hip hop, reggae, and house music. Since the early 1980s bhangra has become the distinctive sound of South Asian youth in Britain. (See Lipsitz 1994, 129-130 and Taylor 1997, 157-158).

3. The following report of the 2000 Sofia, Bulgaria Music and Film Festival gives some indication of the ways in which local interpretations of global ethnoscapes and mediascapes are currently being mediated:

From 15-31 March 2000 Sofia was host to a vast musical scene that set the youth life of the capital virtually on fire—[—]with guest bands and DJs from Macedonia, Poland, Great Britain, France, Columbia and Venezuela. . . . For ten days the club scene in Sofia saw a bricolage of the most famous Bulgarian . . . bands such as Weekeda, Animacionerite, Blueba Loo and other well established bands including Signal, Akaga and BTR. There were also guest bands and appearances from abroad such as Infinity Bobby’s Band (Poland), Transglobal Underground (UK), VJ Sheikh AD Helik (UK) and Galaspace (UK). A joint performance by Java French House Diego Drum ‘n’ Voice . . . where musicians from Bulgaria, France, Columbia and Venezuela came up with a well-prepared trans-national musical program which fascinated the clubbers with original generic combinations and stylistic creativity.” (Apostolov 2000)

4. At the time of writing Napster Inc. is being sued for copyright violation by the heavy metal band Metallica and for “contributory copyright infringement” by Record Industry Association of America (RIAA). The music industry is also extremely alarmed by Freenet, another system that, like Napster, allows users to swap data files over the Internet but is designed through a complex remote server system to render any file provider or recipient completely anonymous (See Paton-Walsh 2000 and Harding 2000).

References


