Religion and New (Post-1965) Immigrants: Some Principles Drawn from Field Research

R. Stephen Warner

From the Puritans and Padres onward, religion has been a central topic for Americanists, and now, as often in the past, the world of religion in the United States is undergoing dramatic change. This paper relates some of what I have learned about “new immigrants” and their religions over the past decade (Warner 1991, 1993, 1994, 1997, 1998a, 1998b, 2001). Already, it has become increasingly difficult for an American to tell what “a Christian” or “a Buddhist” or “a Muslim” looks like. American Christians, Buddhists, and Muslims come in all colors and speak a babel of languages. Race, ethnicity, and religion are no longer, if they ever were, hard-linked to one another. Moreover, places of worship increasingly fit old cultural molds: a small-town Protestant church—red brick walls, high-pitched roof, and white steeple—may be packed with Asians, those who sit for meditation at a Buddhist temple today are quite likely to be white Americans, and Muslim students gather for Friday prayer on the campuses of colleges where attendance at Christian chapel was once required. Much of this racial-religious uncoupling is due to the new immigration, a huge topic on which, with respect to religion, research is just now beginning.

After a forty-year hiatus between the restrictive laws passed at the end of World War I and the statutory reforms of 1965, legal immigration to the United States has returned to its historically high levels and is now running at the rate of about 1 million per year, making the United States once again a nation of immigrants. (See Warner 1998a for details on the following sketch.) What is particularly “new” about the post-1965 immigration, distinguishing it from the similarly sized stream coming at the turn of the last century, is that most of the new
immigrants come from parts of the world other than Europe, especially from the former "third world" of Latin America, the Caribbean, East and South Asia, and the Middle East and Africa. (Chicago, where I teach, has substantial recent immigration from Europe, including Ireland, Poland, and the former Soviet and Yugoslav republics.) Only 13 percent of the 5 million immigrants who came to the United States between 1985 and 1990 were born in Europe, Canada, Australia, or New Zealand. The new immigration is more truly global than ever before. Much of this demographic diversification is attributable to the Immigration Act of 1965, which abolished discriminatory 1920s-era country-of-origin quotas and substituted occupational preference and family reunification provisions, by means of which the legislators had looked forward to an infusion of skilled workers into the U.S. economy and an end to decades-long separation of families with one branch in Europe and the other in the United States. What we now recognize to be among the main effects of the law—especially the brain drain of professionals from Asia and subsequent reunification of their families in the United States—was largely unanticipated. But for many reasons the de-Europe- anization of the new immigration is only partly attributable to the 1965 reforms: not all newcomers from abroad are technically "immigrants" nor are all legal, and not all people from the "third world" are recent arrivals. During the forty-year immigration hiatus and especially after the Great Depression, guest workers were imported from Mexico at the behest of western agricultural interests in the "Bracero Program" of 1942-1964, and the stream of Mexicans seeking work in the United States has scarcely abated since. From the 1860s through the turn of the century, sugar and railroad interests imported workers from east Asia to the plantations of Hawaii and the hills and valleys of California. West coast Chinatowns, Buddhist temples, and Japanese and Korean Protestant churches founded a century or more ago served many years later as community nuclei for post-1965 Asian immigrants. The U.S. conquest of the Philippines and Puerto Rico in the war with Spain eventually led to several streams of migration from these countries. At 1.4 million in the 1990 census, Americans of Filipino origin are the second largest Asian population in the United States; Puerto Ricans—legally citizens, not immigrants—reside in the States by the millions; Mexicans have come to the United States in several waves since the mid-nineteenth century, many to augment communities incorporated into the United States by the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. Hundreds of thousands of U.S. allies from lost Cold War causes in China, Cuba, and Vietnam have gained asylum over the past half century, and they have established solid enclaves in San Francisco, Miami, and Orange County. Hundreds of thousands of other victims of Cold War conflicts in Central America, having sought asylum unsuccessfully because they were not on the U.S.-backed side, have nonetheless taken long-term refuge in Los Angeles, and thousands of their children are American citizens. In countless ways, the globalization of the U.S. population in the past third of a century is the result of very old chickens come home to roost (Warner 1998a, 8).
As we shall see, many of these immigrants (as I shall refer to them generically) are deeply involved in their religions, but we know a lot less than we should about their religious identities, participation, and institution-building (Christiano 1991). It would be reasonable to expect that, for information on religion and the new immigration, we could look to many different research communities, but in my experience such expectations have been mostly disappointed (Warner 1998b). For example, you might think that demographers would be interested in the topic, but that seems not to be the case, probably because the official governmental statistics with which demographers work, especially the U.S. Census, do not include information on religion. (For an attempt by demographers to overcome these limitations, see Hofrenning and Chiswick 1993.)

Because the new immigrants are so diverse racially and ethnically, and so different from the dominant Euro-American population, ethnic studies scholars should have a lot to report about their religious identities and involvements, but, sadly, such is not the case. For many reasons—disciplinary anti-clericalism among them—ethnic studies scholars in the United States, with the exception of a few of those in Asian American studies, have had little to say about the religious institutions of new immigrants (Yoo 1996).

My own colleagues in sociology of religion have done little better, not because of anti-clericalism but because, as predominantly white Protestants, Catholics, and Jews, we tend to lack both the personal cultural capital to have easy entré to immigrant communities and the compelling personal interest to want to study their religious lives. As a field, we have spent far more time studying the involvement of a few thousand of our co-ethnics in so-called “new religious movements” than that of millions of immigrants in their mostly conventional religions.

Comparative religion is another field that we ought to be able to look to, and here there have been significant research reports from Raymond B. Williams on the religions of south Asians in the United States, from Paul Numrich on Buddhists and Muslims, from Diana Eck’s “Pluralism Project” especially on non-Christian religions, and from the work of Gary Laderman and his associates on the immigrant component of the new religious diversity of Atlanta (Williams 1988, 1996; Numrich 1996, 2000a, 2000b; Eck 1996, 1997; Laderman 1996). By and large, though, to judge from papers presented at the annual meetings of the American Academy of Religion, comparative religionists are too text-oriented to bother with the difference it makes when a group carries its religion across borders and oceans (Laderman’s project, sponsored by the AAR, is a notable exception).

One can look to the various denominations to find how they are ministering to new immigrants, or to metropolitan interfaith groups to connect with those predominantly immigrant communities that are represented among them (e.g., Hindus), but the result will be a biased sample of those groups that are organized in these ways, neglecting non-denominational congregations (common among Chinese Protestants) and those who are not ecumenically minded. Thus, the
wonderful religious diversity manifested at the 1993 Parliament of the World’s Religions in Chicago severely underrepresented one of the largest sectors of immigrant religion—that of Pentecostal and evangelical Christians from Latin America and East Asia.

To fill these lacunae was the goal of the New Ethnic and Immigrant Congregations Project (NEICP), which, with funding from the Lilly Endowment and the Pew Charitable Trusts, I directed from 1992 to 1997, leading to the publication in 1998 of GATHERINGS IN DIAPORA: RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES AND THE NEW IMMIGRATION (Warner and Wittner 1998). NEICP was a research training and support program open to graduate students and postdoctoral scholars across the United States that was intended both to augment the research literature and to nurture a new generation of researchers. We wanted especially to encourage scholars with roots in new immigrant communities to study their own traditions, as has been the source of many studies of religion in U.S. history (Warner 1998a, 11). As it happened, half of the twelve fellows chosen by NEICP from among the fifty applicants were more or less “native anthropologists,” members of the linguistic, religious, or national-origin groups whose religious institutions they proposed to study, whereas the others either had less in common with them (language or religion but not both) or were in the situation of the classical anthropological “outsider.” (For a discussion of complexities surrounding the concept of the “native” anthropologist, see Narayan 1993.)

In order to orient the work of the fellows, NEICP drew on the scant literature extant at the time our proposal was written (1992), but as project director I also had a more particular, less public grounding for knowledge on new immigrant religion, namely insights gained from field trips to religious institutions I have taken with students in my sociology of religion classes at the University of Illinois at Chicago (UIC) since 1978. UIC is an urban state university with fairly demanding entrance requirements that especially serves students who are of the first generation in their families to attend university (or to have grown up in the United States). According to the US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT publication, “America’s Best Colleges,” UIC is the fifth most diverse of 228 institutions of higher learning in the United States (Burton 2000), a “minority-majority” campus with significant representation of students of Latino, east Asian, south Asian, and Middle Eastern, as well as African American, backgrounds. It is largely because of my students’ invitations to their houses of worship that I know as much as I do about Catholics and Pentecostals from Latin America, Protestants from Asia, Hindus, and Muslims from India and the Arab world.

For this article, I draw on my own observations and the previously extant literature, the now completed researches of the NEICP fellows, and a newly growing literature (e.g., Ebaugh and Chafetz 1999; Ebaugh, O’Brien and Chafetz 2000) to develop five general principles about new immigrant religion, which I will illustrate with specific examples. My thesis is that those of us who track the ramifications of new immigrant religion in the United States must be mindful of
both differences and similarities. Thus we should neither blandly assume that, for religious purposes, the new immigrants are just like those who came at the turn of the last century, but at the same time we should not accept the facile view that they bear nothing in common with their predecessors. (Indeed, in the controversies developing within the new literature, I side—Warner 1998, 14-15—with those who stress how much we have to learn from the historians who study the last “new immigration” of a hundred years ago.) Thus, for example, we should recognize that the extent of the new religious and racial diversity in the United States is unprecedented but also not forget that most of the new immigrants are Christian. I will return to this matter.

**Principle I: Religion Is Typically Salient for Migrants.** This is so for several reasons:

A. Migration promotes reflection on the meaning of the group’s history; in the words of Timothy Smith (1978), it is a “theologizing experience.” Reflective people among immigrants ask of their presence in the United States “why are we here?” Theologian Sang Hyun Lee, of Princeton Theological Seminary, has especially articulated a “theology of liminality,” giving theological reasons why Korean immigrants find themselves in a new and strange land and a mission for them to live out (Lee 2001). Under this concept, Lee urges Korean Americans to recognize their own situation in the biblical story of sojourners from Abraham onward. Such awareness gives them a perspective from which to judge the theological, social, and cultural imperfections of the society in which they find themselves and to join with other marginalized people to create a more just society.

B. Religious institutions are “free social spaces” under the American system of religious disestablishment. Unlike their experience in workplaces and schools, immigrants in their own mosques, temples, and churches are not subject to outside pressure to speak English and conform to American ways. Homesick immigrants find in religious institutions a place that feels a bit like home, a little piece of Zion in the midst of Babylon. Will Herberg’s portrayal of American religion in the 1950s can be faulted on several grounds but not on his appreciation of its deep roots in the immigrant experience (Herberg 1960, 27-28):

> Of the immigrant who came to this country it was expected that, sooner or later, either in his own person or through his children, he would give up virtually everything he had brought with him from the “old country”—his language, his nationality, his manner of life—and would adopt the ways of his new home. Within broad limits, however, his becoming an American did not involve his abandoning the old religion in favor of some native American substitute. Quite the contrary, not only was he expected to retain his old religion, as he was not
expected to retain his old language or nationality, but such was the shape of America that it was largely in and through his religion that he, or rather his children and grandchildren, found an identifiable place in American life.

To a great extent, today’s immigrants also find their place in American society through their own religion, although, as we shall see below, immigrants do not simply “retain” their religion as regards its institutional structure.

C. As their children enter school, immigrants often find that the language and discourse of religion as well as religious rituals themselves are a key to cultural reproduction, a vehicle through which to inculcate the children into their cultural heritage, to give them grounds to understand the differences they experience between themselves and their classmates, differences that at some stages of their upbringing they often wish they could forget. Religion, especially the religious specialists immigrants find in their churches, mosques, and temples, helps immigrant parents answer their children’s pained “why?” questions.

D. For many immigrants who suffer indignities in the jobs that they are forced to accept in the new country, the social roles that are made available to them in their religious communities—for example, holding church office—can help them reclaim honor denied in the host society. Election to church offices is thus often an honor to be eagerly sought, rather than an obligation to be borne stoically. This is one reason that “politics,” in the narrow sense of who runs the show, is a serious issue in many immigrant churches, often leading to schism (Shin and Park 1988, Hurh and Kim 1990, Min 1992).

E. For those experiencing demands for adjustment to new circumstances, a new religion or newly understood religion may facilitate personal transformation. Thus, born-again Christianity smooths the break from their parents’ culture that the mobility aspirations of Korean-American youth demand (Yep et al. 1998); observant Islam helps second generation Indo-Pakistani college students find a place in America that is both proudly different from the perceived corruption of the host society and autonomous from the patriarchal demands of immigrant parents (Martel and Warner 1998); and contemplative Buddhism, brought here by monks who minister to immigrant communities, allows European Americans also to transcend the banality of the society in which they were raised even as it allows them to keep on living here (Numrich 2000b).

In general, in U.S. history, religion has mediated difference. Religious difference in the United States is the most significant group difference our society allows. Thus for immigrants religion is a public space, not just a psychological fact. Hence there are thousands of new immigrant churches and other religious institutions and worship centers in the United States. To give a few widely cited counts and estimates (see Warner 1998a, 5), there are about 3,000 Korean Protestant congregations, 700 Chinese Christian churches, and perhaps 7,000 Latino Protestant churches (most of the last named very small) now in the United States. About 3,500, or one-sixth, of all Catholic parishes in the United States,
celebrate the mass in Spanish (and more do so in other languages such as Portuguese, Vietnamese, Kannada, Tagalog, Kreyol, Polish, and Lithuanian); most of these parishes are very large. There are some 1,200-1,500 Islamic centers in the United States, including Muslim Student Association chapters on scores of college campuses, as well as hundreds of Buddhist and Hindu temples and centers. There are also Jain, Sikh, Zoroastrian, and Rastafari centers, as well as countless home altars and house meetings for the practice of Hinduism, popular Catholicism, Vodoun, and Santeria. Of course not all of these are new immigrant institutions, but most are, and very few have received the scholarly attention that is their due.

As NEICP anticipated, several applicants to our program were anthropologists who had been unable to arrange travel abroad to their proposed field sites, but had found a community of the same culture in the United States, centered in, of all places, a church. It was in religious institutions that these anthropologists’ “people,” whoever those people were, had gathered. These anthropologists had discovered what Smith, Herberg, and other scholars had known—that religion is typically salient for immigrants.

**Principle II: Migration Is Not Random with Respect to Religion** (Warner 1998b). Although the lack of census data makes it difficult to estimate religious demography, the information we do have suggests that the immigrants who come to the United States from any particular country often represent a religiously (as well as socio-economically) skewed sample of its population. For example, (South) Korea now is approximately 25 percent Christian, but 50 percent of emigrants from that country to the United States are Christian at the point of embarkation, and half of the remainder join Christian churches as they settle into the United States. The result is that approximately 75 percent of Korean immigrants in the United States are Christian (Kwon et al. 2001). Vietnam is another historically Buddhist country, with a minority of Christians, stemming from relatively recent Western colonialism and proselytization, many of whom had good reason to leave with the communist victory in their homeland. Thus many Vietnamese in the United States are Catholic (Rutledge 1992, Zhou and Bankston 1998). Similarly, India is about 2 percent Christian, 12 percent Muslim, and 85 percent Hindu, but it is very doubtful that the Asian Indian population in the United States simply mirrors these percentages. Raymond Williams (1996) estimates that 10 percent of Indians in the United States are Christian, and it is clear in places like Chicago that Indian Muslims are a major presence in the United States as well, although I haven’t heard a reliable estimate of their numbers. For understandable if regrettable reasons, immigrants from the Levant—Lebanese, Jordanians, and Palestinians—are also disproportionately Christian, just as those from the former Soviet Union are disproportionately Jewish and those from Iran are disproportionately Christian and Baha’i as well as Jewish. Both in regard to “pull” factors in migration—the presence of welcoming co-
religionists and co-ethnics as well as jobs in the United States—and “push” factors—targeted persecution and discrimination as well as poverty—religion is one of many variables that must be taken into account if we are to understand who comes to the United States and why.

The internal complexity of sending countries must be taken into account in our attempt to understand the religious factor in immigration. For example, one of the important categories of immigrants who came in response to the occupational preference provision of the 1965 law was nurses from such countries as the Philippines, Korea, and India. Because in India Christians tend to be concentrated in states like Kerala, with its high levels of education, and because Christian women in India are less subject to Hindu-based strictures against “polluting” occupations, Indian nurses are very likely to be Christian. It is largely for these reasons that Indian Christians are an important presence in the United States (George 1998, Williams 1996). Cubans in America are largely self-selected refugees from a communist regime and thus represent a disproportionately middle class, white, and conventionally religious (i.e., Roman Catholic) slice of the home island’s religious, racial, and social class diversity (Tweed 1997). To take another example, judging from their crowded pews, Catholic churches in Chicago’s Mexican neighborhoods appear to be flourishing, despite gloomy prognostications about Latinos’ fading loyalty to the Catholic church. One reason may be that so much of Chicago’s Mexican population stems from religiously conservative regions in central Mexico, especially the state of Michoacán, rather than from the more secularized north.

Because a disproportionate share of Asians in the United States (almost all Filipinos, half of Koreans, many Vietnamese, some Indians) as well as almost all Latin Americans immigrate as Christians and others (a growing number of Chinese) convert after arrival, the great majority of new immigrants are at least nominally Christian. Thus the new immigration is bringing about not the de-Christianization of the United States (which, if it has happened, has causes internal to Christian denominations [Warner 1999]), but the de-Europeanization of American Christianity (Hernandez 1995, Williams 1996). This is especially apparent on college campuses today, where those who attend well-publicized Bible study groups and those who hand out religious tracts in student unions are likely to be Asian-American students, especially Korean, Chinese, and Filipino Americans.

By the same token, America is seeing the de-Asianization of Buddhism because of the participation of so many middle-class whites in Buddhist institutions (Numrich 1996, 2000b), many of which were founded by expatriate and immigrant monks (Fields 1992). Immigration is also implicated in the Sunnification of American Islam through the convergence of African American Muslims and immigrant Muslims, a process long underway before the recent dramatic rapprochement in Chicago between Minister Louis Farrakhan and Imam Warith Deen Mohammed (Anonymous 2000; Kloehn 2000). These are among the
reasons that racial phenotype and ethnic identity are decreasingly reliable indicators of religious affiliation, an observation that leads to the third principle.

**Principle III: Identities—Individual and Collective—Aren’t Primordial** (such that what you were in the home country is what you will be or become in the United States) **But “Negotiated.”** Religious identities, to use other language, are “constructed,” or “transmuted” (in Will Herberg’s term) on the basis of home country materials (especially including religion and language) and group alignments in the receiving country (especially pre-existing social groups and categories and the presence or absence of critical masses of co-ethnics).

As was true a century ago of “Italians” and “Poles” (some of whom had previously been Sicilians and Galicians), so today “Asian Indian,” “Indo-Pakistani,” “Soviet Jew” (as a religious category), “Afro Caribbean,” “African American,” “Asian,” “Pacific Islander,” and “Hispanic” (or “Latino”) are identities “made in the U.S.A.” (as Raymond Williams [1988] puts it). I think and hope that we have gone beyond sterile either/or debates over “assimilation” versus “the persistence of difference” and can now look dispassionately at the way such changes are occurring today among new immigrants.

As between religious, national-origin, and language identities, some become more salient than others in the new country, and, for example, many second-generation Korean-Americans seem more eager to be known as “Christian” than “Korean” (Yep et al. 1998). Muslim Pakistanis and Indians in the United States—at least in Chicago—seem more interested in centering their collective life in Islamic Centers than are Muslim Arabs, probably because the cross-cutting Palestinian identity links many Muslim and Christian Arabs. Evidently, some Asian Indians feel torn between loyalties to their language group—Hindi, Urdu, Gujarati, Punjabi, Telugu, Tamil, Malayalam—and their religion—Hindu, Jain, Sikh, Muslim, and Christian—and it is not clear which identity will prevail (Williams 1988). Nonetheless, Indians in the United States seem concerned to project a religious identity rather than one that locates them in the American racial hierarchy corresponding to the color of their skin (Kurien 1998), a strategy that some black West Indians employ but with less success (Waters 1999). Thus “race” is *both a conditioning factor in these negotiations and is itself conditioned by them* (McAlister 1998, Wittner 1998, Mittleberg and Waters 1992). American Jews expect Jews from Russia to join synagogues, but many Russian émigrés do not experience their Jewishness as a religious identity (Gold 1987), and they may wind up abandoning it. By contrast, according to Shoshanah Feher (1998), the longer the Islamist regime in Iran persists, the more willing Persian Jews in Los Angeles are to abandon their Persian identity in favor of their Jewish one.

Some immigrant groups, notably Chinese, according to the research of Fenggang Yang (1999), evidently find in Christianity a way of maintaining their homeland identities even as they adjust to life in the United States. Not so much converts—they previously had no religious affiliation at all—as recruits, Chinese
Christians find in the independence of their typically non-denominational churches and in the family-oriented teachings of the conservative evangelicalism to which most of them adhere a social space conducive to the expression of Confucian values. The related pattern for Korean Christians has been called one of “adhesive assimilation” by sociologists Kwang Chung Kim and Won Moo Hurh (Kim and Hurh 1993): through their churches, Korean immigrants maintain their Koreanness even as they become American. Although many of their children elevate their “Christian” over their “Korean” identities, they do so in the context of overwhelmingly Korean youth groups, where they find a comfort zone between the traditionalism of their parents and the racism of American society (Park 1999).

In their study of Vietnamese American youth in New Orleans, Min Zhou and Carl Bankston apply the theory of “segmented assimilation” to show how religion helps these young people grasp one ingredient of assimilation to the American success story—academic achievement—even as they maintain their Vietnamese cultural and linguistic heritage. The more time they spend in church (Zhou and Bankston’s site is a Catholic church, but that may be incidental to the story), the more likely they will respect their parents’ conservative values and the less likely they will fall under the influence of the alienated American youth who live alongside them in their poverty-ridden community. Over time, these Vietnamese youth may succeed in becoming middle-class Americans even as they continue to be Vietnamese. In this case among others, religion plays a key role both in promoting adjustment to the United States and in preserving old-country heritage.

The study of “segmented assimilation” is a research frontier (Portes and Zhou 1993) especially in ethnic studies fields, where it is usually employed to look at race- and class-conditioned identities (“black,” “Chicano”) but not at religious ones. Except for the scholars I have just cited, this literature (e.g., Portes 1994, Rumbaut 1994) has mostly ignored the role of religion in the process of segmented assimilation. Indeed, two recent reviews of Zhou and Bankston’s book (in the International Migration Review and the American Journal of Sociology) mention the role of religious institutions, which is central to their analysis, not at all (Goyette 1999) or only in passing (Chong 1999).

For understanding the negotiation of identity, the role of religion—both as an identity immigrants bring from the home country and a mode of social participation in the host country—cannot be neglected without distorting the processes under study. But this doesn’t mean that religious identities automatically triumph, or even automatically survive. In the United States, a society of chronic social change, religion has to be worked at. It can’t be taken for granted (Warner 1991). That is something that immigrants discover, especially when their children start school. Religion may be thought of as a form of cultural capital, but capital is the result of investments. This leads to the fourth principle.

**Principle IV: Religion in the United States Is Subject To Processes of Institutional Isomorphism Toward Congregationalism.** However the reli-
Religious group is organized in the home country, there is a tendency for religious institutions in the United States to assume a “congregational” form (Warner 1994), just as formal organizations tend toward the isomorphism of “bureaucracy” (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). The religion may have been temple-centered in the old country, where families came at times special or convenient to them to receive the ministrations of monks or priests. But temples do not spontaneously dot the U.S. landscape. Someone has to build them. The religion may have been home-centered in the old country, where mother attended a home altar and grandmother provided religious instruction. But U.S. immigration law is biased toward nuclear families, not extended ones; mothers are often busy at work, and grandmothers are in short supply. The very air in the home country may have been suffused with religion, so as children grow up they see and hear about their families’ religion in the street, at school, and at the marketplace. But in the United States, immigrant children have reason to wonder whether their families’ customs are simply arbitrary and weird. To bring those children together with those of other families is a way their parents have of providing answers to questions the children may not even know how to ask and that the parents, as typically hard-working lay people struggling to survive in the new society, most likely would not know how to answer.

The “congregation” is a form of religious organization indigenous to and de jure with Baptists and Jews, as a tried-and-true way of concentrating religious energies in a society that approves of religion in general but doesn’t provide it as a public service (see Warner 1994). So the “congregational” form is increasingly adopted “de facto” by other groups, where the religious community becomes (1) a voluntary membership association, whose identity is (2) defined more by the people who form it than by the territory they inhabit (cf. the “parish” form of organization). Therefore it is common, though not universal, that immigrant families travel long distances to their places of worship. This is particularly true of Hindus and East Asian Protestants (although less true of Latinos and Muslims—Ebaugh et al. 2000). A congregation typically features (3) lay leadership (a board of elders, directors, deacons, etc.) and (4) systematic fund-raising and a system of trustees (who may overlap with the leadership board) with eventual incorporation for tax purposes as a non-profit entity, which is often, though not always, independent of any larger “denomination.” Because of its lay leadership and voluntary funding, there is (5) a tendency for clergy to be professionals hired as employees. Many immigrant congregations are wracked by conflict between those who exercise religious authority under home country expectations and those who control the power of the purse in the adopted country (Saloutas 1964, 129; Numrich 1996). Because of its voluntary, self-determined nature, the congregation also has (6) a tendency to ethnic exclusiveness. Because the people who establish the congregation have multiple needs, there is (7) a tendency for it to be multi-functional (featuring more than religious “worship,” including educational, cultural, social, political, and social service activities). Because
families tend to have the day off on Sunday, there is (8) a tendency for these
divides to be brought together under the roof of the institution on Sunday,
whatever the particular sacred day of that tradition.

One of many possible examples of such congregationalism is the “Chinese
Fellowship Church” studied by Fenggang Yang (1998, 1999). CFC is a non-
denominational evangelical church with a big parking lot run by a lay board
jealous of its perquisites and a tradition of keeping its senior pastor on a short
leash. Church activities consist of much more than worship, and many of them,
including a regular congregational supper, take place on Sunday. Although they
represent a wide array of the linguistic and national origin identities of Chinese
Americans, the members (but not the clergy) are exclusively Chinese. Yang’s
church is Protestant, so we are not surprised that it takes a congregational form.

More surprising is the Church of Haile Selassie I in New York, whose story
Randal Hepner (1998) has told. Stemming from the diffuse and liminal Rastafarian
movement, the CHSI is a settled congregation with a storefront location, regular
worship services, a women’s organization, Sunday School for the children;
counseling services, social events, and a prison ministry. This is a remarkable
transformation for a movement founded in Jamaica on the idea that Africans in
the diaspora should repatriate to Ethiopia and in the meantime live as sojourners
in rural camps. Celebrating weddings, baptisms, and funerals, as well as Sunday
services, the CHSI is a far cry from the originally anarchic and egalitarian but
masculinist Rasta movement whose typical gatherings were in public parks and
dance halls and whose protagonists followed scripture in letting the dead bury
their dead (Hepner 1998, 217). Not a lay-led organization, CHSI is the particular
creation of its founder, the Jamaican-born Abuna Asento Foxe, who moved back
and forth between Kingston and London and between radical and conservative
readings of Rastafarianism before bringing the CHSI to New York in 1990, where
he found a receptive audience for his vision of institutionalized religion.

Another example of de facto congregationalism is provided by an earlier
study of the Japanese-origin, west coast-centered Buddhist Churches of America.
Tetsuden Kashima (1977) shows how the BCA, partly under World War II-era
pressure to look “American” and partly because of constituent demands, came to
look less like a lineage of Japanese Buddhist temples and very much like a
denomination of American Protestant churches, with men’s groups, women’s
groups, drum corps, professional clergy, weddings, and church suppers.

Catholics in the United States are still organized for the most part into
geographical parishes and for much of this century have managed to have
ethnically distinct congregations primarily because of their concentration in
neighborhoods, which is why I can talk about a sizable number of “Mexican
Catholic Churches” in Chicago. Yet informally designated “magnet parishes”
have appeared all over the country, where people commute from the suburbs into
a parish in their old neighborhood or at the intersection of major expressways
(Wedam 2000). When the local parish doesn’t quite suit them culturally, other
Catholics keep their traditions together in saints’ associations that meet in private
Religion and New (Post-1965) Immigrants

homes. A telling example of how one group of immigrant Catholics do this is provided in Nancy Wellmeier's (1998) study of Mayan Indian refugees from Guatemala living in Los Angeles. They encounter a Catholic archdiocese whose determination to serve the masses of Mexican-origin and other Hispanic Catholics now resident in that city they perceive as an insensitive imposition of an unwanted mixed European-indigenous identity on people who are proud to be Indians.3 While they do attend mass on Sunday, their religious life really centers on Friday night home-based meetings of an association devoted to the patron saint of their highland Guatemala village, where they read scripture, discuss its implications, pray communally, share bread and their favorite soft drink, catch up on the news, and play a room-sized marimba that is their most powerful reminder of the homeland many have not seen in years. Although they are lay led and have no professional clergy, they are formally organized, with a board of trustees and elected officers.

Depending on the availability of subcultural critical masses, Hindus in America do similar things. Hindus in America have built huge ecumenical temples with donations from community members that are overseen by professional administrators and usually situated near expressways in the suburbs. (I have visited Hindu temples meeting this description in the New York, Pittsburgh, Nashville, Chicago, and Los Angeles metropolitan areas.) In order to realize economies of scale as well as to help unite the community, such temples often make room for the worship of Gods who in India would not be found in the same space; they are ecumenical temples, and in that respect they are not ethnically exclusive. But in order to socialize their children into their particular language and traditions, members of a Malayalee-speaking Hindu group in southern California meet in members' homes to offer pooja to their own Gods, sing their own bhajans and instruct their own children in their idea of Hindu essentials (Kurien 1998). When, in the company of Prema Kurien, I joined them one evening, a member explained to me that their home-based gatherings were an “experiment”—he used that word—intended to reproduce the tradition in the younger generation.

Of course, in theological terms, a house of worship belongs to God, not to this or that group, and for that reason congregationalism is offensive to many deeply religious people. Islam and Christianity in particular make much of their principled universalism, that people of all races, languages and nationalities are welcome. Many mosques in the United States, including the Islamic Mission (Brooklyn) approximate this ideal on Friday, when the congregation, those gathered for jum'ah prayer from their nearby places of work, tends to be multiethnic. But things are different on Sunday, when the gathering tends to be an ethnically distinct one of families taking the day off (Abusharaf 1998). (For a recent explicit application of the concept of de facto congregationalism to two different immigrant religious communities, see Bankston and Zhou 2000.)
Principle V: Congregations (and other religious institutions) Become Vehicles For or Venues Of Intragroup Dynamics, places where relations between generations, genders, and immigrant cohorts are worked out. I will mention three such dynamics:

A. There Is an Immigrant Generational Gap. Despite cultural flows from the home county, the American-raised and American-born second generation of most new immigrant groups are for the most part acculturating very rapidly, becoming English-dominant and losing fluency in their parents’ native tongues. At a minimum, they often find immigrant religious activities incomprehensible and boring, and many first generation leaders are worried that their children will leave the fold. One answer is religious instruction in English, and a further development—seen among Korean, Chinese, Filipino, and pan-Asian Protestant groups as well as Muslim Student Association chapters—are English-language worship services. Especially among Asian American youth, these rites are very different from those of the parental generation (Chai 1998, 2001), informal where their parents’ are formal, using keyboards and drums instead of organs and overhead projectors instead of hymnals. One question is whether the older generation will cede space for such rites to take place within the precincts of the immigrant congregation—with generational succession only a few years down the road (Goette 2001)—or whether independent, and in principle, pan-ethnic second generation churches will become the norm. (I hear that such congregations consisting of Korean, Chinese, and Filipino young adults are flourishing in Chicago.) Nonetheless, we can expect generational conflict, because the first generation typically wants the religious institution to be a reminder of what they left behind in the country of origin, a reminder their children don’t need in the same way and often don’t want.

I would like to see the study of second generation religion become a research frontier, as is true of the study of the “new second generation” in general (Portes and Zhou 1993, Portes 1994), but that is unlikely to happen until immigrant religion begins to be studied by immigrant communities themselves (especially by members of their own second generation), rather than being monopolized by white anthropologists or expatriate scholars, who are more inclined to focus on “difference.”

B. Gender Relations Change. One way that second-generation-led religious groups typically differ from those of the first generation is the higher status assigned to women in formal religious roles: women are likely to serve on boards of directors and even to be worship leaders. But the elevation of women’s status happens even among the first generation. So, for example, women are more of a presence in many American mosques than they are in the countries of origin (Haddad and Lummis 1987). I recall the first time I visited New York forty years ago, when, as an undergraduate, I saw Bernstein’s West Side Story on Broadway and its vivid portrait of immigrant gender relations in the banter that introduces the song-and-dance number “America.” Men are often the movers, crossing the
Religion and New (Post-1965) Immigrants 281

...ocean in search of better opportunities. But women are typically the settlers and stayers, who find unanticipated freedoms in the new land, even the freedom for a Puerto Rican woman to flout the wishes of her patriarchal family and date a "Polack," while the men dream of going back home crowned with material symbols of their sojourn in America—a Cadillac, a television, and a king-sized bed ready for women who still know their place (Laurents et al. 1958, 45-54).

With such expectations, I was not surprised by Randal Hepner's (1998, 215-217) story of the Daughters of Zion, the organized women of the Church of Haile Selassie I, who, with evident church blessing, proclaimed emancipation from the "colonial," "medieval," and male-centered conception of themselves as "Rastawomen," insisted on monogamy and the ritual exclusion of the men's "extra wives and girlfriends," and declared the family, no longer the brotherhood, to be the "cornerstone of society." I had suggested to the NEICP fellows that they be on the lookout for such developments.

That makes the story told by NEICP fellow Sheba George (1998) all the more remarkable. George's site was an Indian Orthodox Christian church, peopled primarily by families of nurses from Kerala who, as I have related, came to the United States under the occupational preference provisions of the 1965 immigration law. These women got good jobs in the United States, securely establishing themselves before bringing their husbands and children over some years later. The husbands sought what work they could find, but they often remained underemployed in comparison to the positions they had held in India. It was the husbands who then found in the church a space to reassert their patriarchal authority in the face of the diminution of status they experienced in both the workplace and their homes in the United States. In an unforgettable story, "Caroling Among the Keralites," George narrates the tragedy of the men's rejection of their daughters' offer to join them in their joyous Christmas custom of peripatetic caroling through the Indian community of the metropolitan area, when they sing religious texts in Malayalam set to popular Indian movie tunes. The men didn't want their special turf—for years they had gone caroling house to house without members of their families tagging along, frequently indulging in alcoholic beverages illicit in their culture—traipsed upon by yet another reminder of the power of women. Indira Gandhi and their well-employed wives were enough. Thus, the renegotiation of gender roles in the immigrant congregations is not always to the advantage of women. On the basis of their Houston-based RENIR research, Ebaugh and Chafetz (1999, 608) propose this general rule: "To the extent that male congregants perceive themselves to have suffered status loss in the process of immigration, they try to recoup their sense of worth through incumbency in prestigious congregational roles."

Moreover, when women have managed to carve out for themselves a new space in the transplanted religious institution—they may be Sunday school or Arab language teachers, even religious day school principals; they may run the bookstore or the media ministry—a new, more religiously conservative cohort of
immigrants may arrive and put a halt to such instances of perceived Americanization. That brings me to the third and last occasion for intragroup conflict that I will speak of.

C. Relations Between Older and Newer Cohorts of Immigrants May Occasion Conflict in religious communities. Fenggang Yang’s (1998, 1999) study of a Chinese Christian church in an east coast city shows how this evidently typical Chinese church renews its ethnicity by successfully incorporating wave after wave of immigrants from an astonishing array of diasporic Chinese communities: speakers of Mandarin, Cantonese, Hakka and other dialects, nationals of the People’s Republic of China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, and other countries; fierce anticommunists and those who before coming to the United States had never known a political system other than communism. According to Yang, this diverse array was kept together both by Christian and Confucian ideals of unity and a frequently adjusted system of smaller “fellowship groups” to facilitate the ethnically distinct social relations members wanted.

Yet it is not uncommon for newcomers to reject what their predecessors have shaped. When the NEICP fellows convened for our six-week summer training institute in 1994, each of them was assigned as an ethnographic intern to a Chicago-area institution corresponding religiously to the one they had proposed to study in their home site. Rogaia Abusharaf, an émigré Sudanese Muslim anthropologist, was assigned to a local mosque where I had reason on the basis of previous field trips and personal contacts to believe that she would be welcomed as a scholar and ethnographer. But in the few years since I had been there, newer Islamist activists at the mosque had reintroduced stricter gender roles—including restrictions on women’s freedom of movement within the mosque—that earlier leadership had relaxed. Abusharaf’s assignment was less comfortable than I had expected, yet it helped prepare her for a similar phenomenon she encountered at the Brooklyn mosque that was her research site. In the Brooklyn case, newer immigrants from another part of the Arab world, namely Yemen, were far less welcoming to women’s participation than had been previous groups at the mosque, including Abusharaf’s Sudanese countrymen (Abusharaf 1998).

Difference, even antagonism, between cohorts of immigrants is an old story in American immigration history, from the reaction of settled German Reform Jews to the arrival of Eastern European Jews at the end of the nineteenth century (Herberg 1960) to the grudging welcome extended to new Polish and Lithuanian immigrants in Chicago by those long settled here who fled Soviet regimes after World War II (Erdmans 1998, Kuzmickaite 2000). Religious institutions are one important place that these dramas are played out. In providing themselves a religious space, new immigrants may address one set of problems only to open up new ones.
Conclusion: On the basis of the small literature I have surveyed, the unsystematic site visits I have taken with my students in Chicago, and the advisory role I have played with the outstanding scholars whose work was funded by the New Ethnic and Immigrant Congregations Project, I have offered five generalizations about the religious activities and organizations of post-1965 immigrants (and other newcomers to this country) and have been bold enough to call them “principles” that pertain at least to immigrants and their religions in the United States: (1) religion is salient for migrants; (2) migration is not random with respect to religion; (3) identities aren’t primordial but “negotiated”; (4) religious institutions tend toward congregationalism; and (5) congregations become venues of intragroup dynamics between parents and children, men and women, and earlier and later cohorts of immigrants. I hope that these principles and the observations abstracted by them may help make sense of glimpses readers may gain of new immigrant religion from local newspapers and public radio stations, among the few media that I have found to pay attention, and that they might serve future scholars as points of departure, “sensitizing concepts” or “hypotheses,” for their own research. (One such concept I hope scholars will take up is the idea that we are in the midst of a process of the de-Europeanization of American Christianity, not the de-Christianization of American society.) But more than anything, I hope to have stimulated the demand and the appetite for more research and more literature on a huge, still largely neglected world.

In fact, new research is very much in the offing. The Pew Charitable Trusts, having funded Houston’s RENIR project, have promoted that project as a model for grants to projects on religion, immigration, and civic incorporation in a selection of what they call “gateway cities.” In contrast to the NEICP’s close focus on ten “congregations” scattered about the United States, Helen Rose Ebaugh and her RENIR associates took the city of Houston as the ecological unit of analysis, and they were thus able to propose comparisons across and linkages among individual religious institutions (Ebaugh and Chafetz 1999, 2000; Ebaugh et al. 2000). As of July 2000, six additional large scale “gateway cities” projects had been funded by Pew, in New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Miami, Washington, and San Francisco, and results should begin to appear before the middle of the decade. With the city instead of the congregation as the focus and with generous funding for scholars working together on interrelated issues, it should be possible to learn more from the gateway cities projects how immigrant religious institutions are linked to other local non-religious institutions, to each other in local ecumenical associations, to such large and important national denominations as the Catholic and Southern Baptist churches, and to religious and other communities in the countries of origin. NEICP will have helped pave the way by bringing the attention of immigrant religion to funders and scholars and by nurturing a new generation of scholars eager to work on the topic.
Notes

1. Revision of address delivered at New School University, New York City, October 12, 1999; the author expresses his thanks to Peter Benda and Jose Casanova for their encouragement and hospitality.

2. The occasion for the address on which this article is based was the inauguration of the project on Religion and Immigrant Incorporation in New York (RJINY), housed in the International Center for Migration, Ethnicity, and Citizenship at New School University and funded by the Pew Charitable Trusts. Pew had earlier funded RENIR (the Religion, Ethnicity, New Immigrants Research project) at the University of Houston (see Ebaugh and Chafetz 1999, Ebaugh et al. 2000) after helping fund the NEICP (New Ethnic and Immigrant Congregations Project) at the University of Illinois at Chicago (see Warner and Wittner 1998).

3. See Warner 2000 for a sympathetic portrayal of the efforts of Virgilio Elizondo to serve the religious education needs of a culturally and racially mixed (mestizo) immigrant and ethnic population in San Antonio, another major center of migration from Mexico.

4. The author is an advisor for RISCS, the Chicago gateway cities project on “Religion, Immigration, and Civil Society in Chicago,” housed in the MacNamara Center for the Social Study of Religion at Loyola University of Chicago, the co-principal investigators of which are Dr. Paul Numrich and Professor Fred Kniss.

References


Burton, Bill. 2000. AUIC Honored for Campus Diversity by National Student Affairs Group.” UIC News (March 1).


Religion and New (Post-1965) Immigrants 285


