In 1951, the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) began regulating college football broadcasting on television with the claim that regulations served the public interest. The establishment of broadcast regulations transformed the NCAA from a confederation of semi-autonomous institutions into a powerful governing and policing body that controlled college athletics. Broadcast regulations further transformed the NCAA into a cartel that fixed the value of football broadcasts by limiting supply in order to gain monopoly profits.\(^1\) Claiming that regulations served the public interest enabled the NCAA’s restraint of trade by shielding it from a possible U.S. Supreme Court “rule of reason” test.

Situating the 1951 creation of broadcast regulations within a broader history of the NCAA during the twentieth century demonstrates how transformations in the economy are dialectically tied to cultural formations. Comparing the NCAA’s strategies of action in the 1950s to 1905 when the NCAA was established and to 1984 when the U.S. Supreme Court deregulated college football broadcasting highlights continuities and contradictions in U.S. liberalism. Economic and cultural conditions of the 1950s, which made cartelization a possibility for the NCAA, did not exist in either 1905 or 1984. Strategies of action in commercial sport must be consistent with existing market conditions and available technologies. At the same time, the choices made by social actors are not simply determined by impersonal economic and technological forces.\(^2\) The NCAA was not only responsive to market conditions, but also guided by prevailing systems of
thought in each period, specifically the social construction of reason. Comparing these three periods show how determinations of reason as well as economic practices in 1905, 1951, and 1984 were responsive to broader trends within U.S. society.

Football historian Ronald Smith (2001) states that the first priority of any institution is survival and then prosperity. While this is essentially true, capitalism’s competitive environment forces institutions to strive for prosperity in order to survive. This article shows how the NCAA charted different strategies of action to achieve prosperity as U.S. capitalism shifted from progressive era Corporate Liberalism to Postwar Fordism to Neoliberalism. The article begins in the Progressive Era with an outline of the NCAA’s establishment in 1905. The next section details at length how the NCAA used the conditions of the early Cold War and constructions of masculinity to establish its broadcast regulations. The last section analyzes the construction of reason in the 1984 National Collegiate Athletic Association v Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma decision that ended NCAA broadcast regulations and contextualizes the decision in the emergence of Neoliberalism. In each period, the balance of authority between colleges and the NCAA shifted up and back but the quest for prosperity remained constant. Another constant was the use of reformist rhetoric to legitimate a greater centralization of power and wealth in increasingly large institutions.

Corporate Liberalism and the Founding of the NCAA

Higher educational institutions formed the NCAA in 1905 in response to widespread condemnation of college football’s brutality and scandals. The impetus to create the NCAA grew out of conditions of the 1890s. To understand those conditions, we need to step back a few years. Young men began playing ball games on the campuses of northeastern colleges in the 1860s. The game of American football developed during the 1870s and 1880s. By the 1890s, the game had become very popular and spread to every region of the United States. With popularity came profitability and scandal. The progressive press reacted to cheating and violence that was perceived as rife in the game. Criticism of the excesses in college football created the conditions in which the NCAA could arise.

A group of schools that participated in a high level of intercollegiate football competition created the NCAA. Most, if not all, were motivated by financial and institutional interests. As a result, they designed the NCAA as a representative organization to reform the game and quell calls to ban it. In reforming football, NCAA member institutions had no desire to give up institutional control over their teams, high-level competition, or profitability. In fact, schools retained a high degree of individual autonomy in order to compete aggressively with other schools on and off the field. The NCAA constitution preserved institutional autonomy through the doctrine of Home Rule, which allowed schools to determine “eligibility rules, coaching salaries, stadium building, ticket sales, and, had
they been in existence, radio and television contracts.” Football historian John Watterson (2000) claims the creation of the NCAA, like other progressive era reforms, insulated an institution from attacks by the state, the media, or citizen groups while preparing it for economic growth.

Forming the NCAA produced what Gabriel Kolko (1963) calls market rationalization. Leading football competitors organized themselves to reform an unstable market in order to insure future economic growth and to protect themselves from potential political attacks coming from either the state or civil society. This formation of corporatism within college football is typical of progressive era Corporate Liberalism. The late-nineteenth century saw a dismantling of the “free market” and a new regulatory role of the government. Central to the thesis of Corporate Liberalism is an acceptance by the government and public of greater market controls and centralization of power. Corporatism would ensure the growth of large corporations in a stable economic environment that fostered capital accumulation. As evidenced by the doctrine of Home Rule, the Progressive Era did not give birth to a fully regulated society, but rather provided the necessary first step of forming alliances between the state and the corporate sector through “progressive” reform. Indeed, college football enjoyed tremendous growth and prosperity from the 1890s through the late-twentieth century despite slumps during the World Wars.  

As college football became more lucrative, remaining competitive grew more costly. Some of the basic costs for producing a winning team in the early twentieth century included full-time professional coaches that were often better paid than most faculty and some university presidents; fleets of scouts, and a feeder system to bring top “football material” (i.e. student-athletes) to campus; and both indirect and sometimes direct compensation for athletes. Whether it was an attempt to appease growing student demand for comfortable seating or a strategy to manage student behavior in controlled campus settings, building enormous concrete stadiums provided ever-greater revenue from gate receipts. As a result, stadiums grew in size during the twentieth century, as did the cost of college football. Schools ultimately became dependent upon stadium-based revenues if for no other reason than to pay down debt on the stadiums.

Market rationalization through the creation of the NCAA supported the formation of a tier of elite teams that dominated on-field competition. As the cost of fielding competitive teams soared in the twentieth century, generating revenue through winning became increasingly important. Schools in less significant markets that lacked large stadiums, especially smaller schools, were at a structural disadvantage when it came to purchasing football’s forces of production. At the same time, large schools, especially in affluent markets, generated more revenue to invest in maintaining dominance than smaller schools. By mid-century, a profitable group of elite football schools had formed. This elite group was composed mostly of public universities like Michigan, Oklahoma, and California as well as some private universities such as the University of Pennsylvania, Notre Dame, and the University of Southern California. Many smaller schools were
forced out of the football market by the cost of competition.\textsuperscript{25} Even the “Ivy League” that had created high-pressure athletics in the nineteenth century “de-emphasized” football as a cost-savings and a publicity strategy when they could no longer compete with the top schools.\textsuperscript{26} In short, the early twentieth century saw power steadily centralize in ever-larger football programs.

The NCAA itself began to grasp power in the mid-1940s despite the constitutional constraint of Home Rule. The NCAA quadrupled its dues in 1948 to $100.\textsuperscript{27} This increased the NCAA’s finances and confidence when added to revenues received from its basketball tournament and the sale of its rulebooks.\textsuperscript{28} The doctrine of Home Rule, however, remained an institutional barrier to its consolidation of power. The NCAA made its first attack upon Home Rule with the establishment of the Sanity Code that attempted to regulate and to police the recruiting of and the subsidies given to athletes.\textsuperscript{29} Adopted in 1948, the Sanity Code allowed the NCAA to expel schools that did not conform to its standards. Economist Andrew Zimbalist argues that the Sanity Code initiated the NCAA’s process of cartelization where colleges colluded to limit compensation given to the athletes, driving the cost of athletes’ labor below the value of their labor power—impossible in an unregulated market.\textsuperscript{30} However, the Sanity Code failed because it limited schools’ ability to pursue competitive advantage over other football programs. As a result, a group of schools known as “the Sinful Seven” rebelled, and by January of 1951 the Sanity Code was abandoned.\textsuperscript{31} Despite the setback, the Sanity Code was a harbinger of greater centralization and regulation that television broadcasting would make possible.

The failure of the Sanity Code demonstrates limits on the trend towards market rationalization. U.S. universities exist in a competitive market environment. Participating in competitive athletics provides financial capital and publicity for competing in that market.\textsuperscript{32} The Sanity Code attempted to use calls in civil society for the reform of college football to legitimate increased market regulation.\textsuperscript{33} It impeded, however the ability of leading football schools to compete in the football market and accrue capital. This suggests that desire for reform in civil society alone cannot sustain market rationalization without the promise of stable capital accumulation for competing institutions. The establishment of the NCAA in 1905 also suggests that regulations address broader cultural conditions to insulate institutions from political attacks.\textsuperscript{34} In other words, market regulations must address the cultural and political interests of civil society at the same time as the economic interests of capital.

The Television Age and the New National Collegiate Athletic Association

The advent of television in the late 1940s created an opportunity for cartelization far beyond that of the Sanity Code. To understand how television created this opportunity, we need to look at the conditions engendered by television. Televising sports got off to a slow start in the United States on May 17, 1939 when
NBC broadcasted a Princeton-Columbia baseball game. Newspaper reviews were critical of television’s inability to reproduce large, sport spectacles since the coverage lacked sophisticated broadcast techniques and technology. With a single camera fixed near third base, coverage was fractured and discontinuous. The handful of viewers in Manhattan that saw the broadcast found it a disorienting and disappointing experience.

Despite poor reviews in 1939 and the suppression of television’s development during the second world war, the television age was coming. The University of Pennsylvania (Penn) invested in and experimented with football broadcasting throughout the 1940s. After World War II regional networks were established and vast improvements were made in the techniques for broadcasting mass sport spectacles. With improvements, football broadcasting looked like a great source of publicity to top football schools like Penn. Beginning in the late-1940s, the sales of television sets grew exponentially going from 7,000 sets in 1946 to 1 million in 1948 to 3 million in 1949. By 1954, over 35 million television sets had been sold. With greater access to television and improvements in broadcast technology, the popularity of sports broadcasting surged. As early as 1947, cafes in Pasadena charged $20 for seats next to a television set and $10 for standing room to watch a local broadcast of the Rose Bowl. Fan appreciation of televised games was so significant that a 1948 NCAA survey in the Boston-New York-Philadelphia corridor found that 80 percent of fans preferred televised games to live performances.

The rapid expansion of television sets in the Northeast and Midwest coupled with surveys indicating fan appreciation of televised games triggered extreme reactions to the quickly approaching television age. Network executives viewed the future through rose tinted glasses. Robert Sandeck, vice president of ABC, wrote in 1950, “[W]e’ll have silent football. . . . It will be played indoors under perfect conditions. The weather will always be just right, the grass just the proper height, the ball will never be slippery. In this test-tube football, the players won’t be bothered by the roar of the crowd, because the crowds will be watching at home, and they’ll be comfortable. There’ll be no one at the game except the sponsor—and he’ll be behind a glass cage.” Sandeck’s enthusiasm for sterile purity probably owes more to postwar enthusiasm for social engineering and scientific futurism than to fans’ actual desire to evacuate stadiums.

Administrators of football programs struggling to survive on gate receipts saw the potential loss of attendance caused by television as a technological threat akin to an alien attack from outer space. Whereas Sandeck gleefully imagined a new business model of controlled corporate sponsorship with fans comfortably ensconced at home, many athletic directors felt imperiled. As Asa Bushnell, Commissioner of the Eastern College Athletic Conference (ECAC), stated to the first annual ECAC meeting in 1947, “television is the scientific method which has been developed to consign all athletic directors to the Smithsonian Institute and to make football stadiums of interest only to archeologists.” While holding contrary positions on broadcasting itself, Sandeck and Bushnell did agree that
television had the potential to transform the business model of college athletics and profoundly affect U.S. society. Implicit in these statements was also a larger concern over control of college football broadcasting and its revenues.

Critics of football broadcasting gained ammunition in 1950 when gate receipts fell into a nationwide decline. Live attendance had increased every year following a slump during World War II, and in 1949 ticket sales reached a record high. The 1950 season then saw a surge in television broadcasts. Schools like Michigan, Notre Dame, and Penn were free to aggressively pursue commercial broadcasting with the networks in an open market. Fear of television was then fanned by a NCAA-sponsored study done by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) that found areas broadcasting games had a 4 percent drop in gate receipts whereas areas without broadcasting rose 4 percent in 1950. Though certainly not conclusive, NCAA members saw this pattern as sufficient reason to take action.

The television age created new conditions that made old practices appear obsolete to many within the NCAA. The doctrine of Home Rule that previously ensured the tradition of institutional autonomy now limited television revenues to schools that could negotiate broadcast rights with the networks. This disadvantaged not only small schools but also large schools in small markets. For instance, Penn and Notre Dame could negotiate lucrative contracts with the networks in 1950, but Oklahoma, a dominant football program during the 1950s under its coach Charles “Bud” Wilkinson, could not.

Fear of television’s impact on gate receipts provoked a variety of attempts to stave off losses at the gate. Several regional conferences such as the Big Ten and the Big Seven blocked live broadcasts and forced delayed broadcasts of games in 1950. However, popular desire for live coverage led to threats of legislative acts blocking the widespread use of delayed broadcast. Another strategy was theater television—a live broadcast piped to a theater charging admission. The University of Michigan experimented with closed circuit broadcasts in movie houses in 1950, as did Illinois and Northwestern, not only to slow the erosion of stadium and movie theater attendance, but also to recreate the gridiron spectacle. A Newsweek article described the presentation of a Michigan-Indiana game: “As at Ann Arbor there were cheerleaders, a band, hot-dog and pop vendors. The difference was that the movie crowd—for 80 cents—saw the game, plus a feature movie and a stage show.” The NCAA also hoped that pay-per-view systems such as skiatron and phonovision would take hold. Both theater television and pay-per-view followed the older ticket-sales model, and neither provided a sufficiently robust economic model. The television age had created new social and economic conditions and it demanded a new economic model.

**Football Broadcasting and Cold War Fear**

Between the unstable 1950 football market and the attempts by schools to impose stability, television had created the conditions for a larger institution to
provide order through market rationalization. The NCAA as an umbrella organization proved to be the best instrument to rationalize the market, which was a primary reason for its creation. The consolidation of broadcast power by the NCAA, however, was certain to raise antitrust concerns. As a result, the NCAA acted conscious of a possible Supreme Court “rule of reason” test. Under prevailing interpretations of the Sherman Antitrust Act, the court could allow a restraint of trade if it were deemed reasonable—that is if a restraint fostered stable capital accumulation. Therefore, the NCAA constructed its broadcast regulations with this in mind. The NCAA used the conditions of the early Cold War (1947-1964) as a prism for the state and civil society to view collegiate athletics and television broadcasting in order to sell its regulations as reasonable in the 1950s.

The early Cold War engendered great anxiety in U.S. society. Three particularly relevant sources are: technology, centralization, and conflict. Nuclear annihilation was certainly a primary technological threat that hovered over the entire Cold War. But the early 1950s saw a welter of new technologies invading postwar homes that made nuclear warfare only the most glaring and dramatic source of technological anxiety. Prominent in the technological invasion of postwar homes was television. Television historian Lynn Spigel argues many people in the early 1950s experienced television as an alien force that transformed the social space of their homes. Debates over television’s impact on the home, Spigel contends, refracted a broader anxiety that modern technological society had an effeminizing effect upon men.

As three major television networks began to stretch across the United States, sociologist C. Wright Mills lamented changes in the United States during the twentieth century that led to the rise of a “power elite.” Mills saw the centralization of power and wealth in three massive institutions (the military, the federal government, and the economy) as producing the “higher circles of power” that controlled postwar U.S. society, and ultimately formed what Eisenhower named the “military-industrial complex.” Mills’ critique of mass society joined a chorus of critics warning against the rise of giant institutions that dominated all aspects of social life and that left “the little guy” vulnerable to external control. Historian James Gilbert (2005) argues mass society critiques expressed and provided a means for working out changing gender relations during the postwar period of which the critiques of television, mentioned above, were a part.

Fear of invasion and vulnerability were made most palpable by the United State’s conflict with the Soviet Union. The openness of liberal society evoked fears of a communist invasion that would penetrate deep into the heart of America. In an example of “patriotic pageantry,” the residents of Mosinee, Wisconsin staged a one-day take over of their own town in 1950 to dramatize the dangers of global communism. Similarly, the popularity of science fiction films like *It Came from Outer Space* (1953) expressed a fear of Soviet invasion and nuclear technology. George Kennan, the architect of cold war foreign policy, was keenly aware of the period’s climate of anxiety. In the “Long Telegram” that outlined
the strategy of containment, Costigliola argues that Kennan described the Soviet leadership as, “engaging in the driving, aggressive behavior conventionally associated with masculinity.” And he repeated “the word ‘penetration’ five times in reference to the Soviet’s insistent, unwanted intrusion.”65 Cold war historians argue the culture of containment transcended all aspects of cold war society in the 1950s.66 Cold war anxiety allowed reactionaries to equate homosexuality to a soft, deviant masculinity open to communist penetration to justify anti-gay repression, such as purging homosexuals from government positions.67 Indeed, fear of invasion and vulnerability was the very basis of the strategy of containment that guided foreign policy throughout the Cold War.68

The strategy of containment was a two-pronged plan of attack for fighting the Cold War.69 The first prong attempted to contain the Soviet Union to limited spheres of influence through military force.70 This prong led to the arms race and the establishment of the military-industrial complex. The very technological nature of Cold War weaponry helped to further centralize power in large institutions.71 The second prong or “cultural Cold War” attempted to win the hearts and minds of people throughout the world with cultural and economic development.72 The United States waged the cultural Cold War by forming the “Free World” as a system of trading alliances led by the U.S. and buttressed by a pluralistic image of the “American way of life.”73

The “American way of life” described a lifestyle associated with postwar prosperity and was based on a notion of the good life promised by U.S. liberalism. It also included practices and beliefs that countered the “slave world” of the Kremlin. Suburban homes stocked with a wealth of consumer goods and located in ethnically integrated neighborhoods became symbolic of the American way of life.74 Richard Nixon equated the good life with consumerism when he argued that a modern home stocked with labor saving devices symbolized capitalism’s greater ability to provide for its people during the kitchen debate with Nikita Khrushchev.75 The nuclear family and suburban home emerged as central to citizenship and identity during the early Cold War despite also being sites of isolation and anxiety.76 Leisure activities, and especially sports, were a major part of this consumerist lifestyle. From the Olympics to college football to little league baseball, sports participation and consumption were central to the American way of life and hence patriotic.77 Further, leisure activities like watching football were “just reward” for men who submitted to the alienating environments of large corporations in order to pay for their suburban homes and technological comforts. This is why in the 1950s sociologists like Mills, William Whyte, and David Riesman saw the suburbs as extensions of the corporate world.78

Addressing cold war anxieties was central to how the NCAA framed its regulations. Positioning the regulations as furthering institutional interests was unlikely to be accepted as a reasonable restraint of trade. Instead, the NCAA framed television and football broadcasting as a technological threat not only to colleges but also to the nation. Television, according to the NCAA, created
a “free ticket” that drew fans away from the stadium. The football programs of small colleges would become vulnerable in a market dominated by a “TV aristocracy” where fans enjoy football from the comfort of their own homes. The vulnerability of small schools is of national concern, the NCAA argued, since they form the foundation of the U.S.’s system of higher education. The NCAA further claimed that football funds physical education and intramural athletics, so the loss of football revenues would curtail the physical training of the nation’s business and military leaders—harkening to both prongs of containment. Furthermore, attending football games historically has been a component of the college experience and therefore part of the American way of life. The NCAA did not simply frame television as a threat to schools that had grown accustomed to profiting from the business of college football; it framed television as a threat to the nation and the American way of life. This frame suggested that television’s technological threat would increase centralization and impede America’s ability to wage the Cold War by undermining the masculinity of its youth. The NCAA’s emotion-laden appeal at a time of geopolitical struggle could make a mere restraint of trade seem quite reasonable.

The framing of NCAA broadcast regulations did not suddenly spring forth in 1951. Looking closely at the reports of the Television Steering Committee demonstrate that it crystallized over a period of years even though important aspects were in place at the beginning. Annual reports show a narrowing and clarifying of the frame by subsequent steering committees. Framing the regulations was not simply a response to the concerns of the state and civil society, the frames also responded to NCAA member institutions, the networks, and sponsors. The new economic conditions of the television age and the cultural conditions of the Cold War allowed the NCAA to remake itself as a regulatory agency with the power to police its members. A range of possible responses to the challenge of television lay before the NCAA. The NCAA neither embraced nor rejected television; instead it decided to contain it. The NCAA’s strategy of television containment began in 1951 when member institutions voted to regulate football broadcasting by calling for a moratorium—though critics saw it as a ban—on broadcasting to “test the effects” of television on gate receipts. The moratorium was the NCAA’s first step towards becoming an actual cartel. The defining term of NCAA containment was “limit”: limit the number of broadcasts and limit schools’ broadcast appearances. The regulations also made the NCAA television committee a clearinghouse that the networks and colleges had to work through when setting broadcast schedules. The television committee also asked for 18 percent of the royalties from the 1951 season.

**NCAA Broadcast Policy Formation**

Creating broadcast regulations was a three-step process. The first step was negotiating with the myriad, competing parties involved in college football broadcasting in order to win their support for the NCAA regulations. Therefore,
the NCAA took advice and counsel from, “networks, stations, TV set manufacturers, pay-as-you-see TV companies, advertising agencies, sponsors, press, TV committee consultants, delegates from conferences, [and] representatives of various areas” to formulate its policy. NCAA broadcast policy was written to bring the varying competing interests necessary for broadcasting into a coalition. The financial and publicity benefits of football broadcasting were inequitably distributed amongst coalition members in favor of top football schools despite the NCAA’s emphasis on revenue sharing.

The written policy was then pitched to the association itself. Member institutions, including the ones that had participated in its formation, ratified the policy at the annual NCAA conventions to which the television committee reports were presented. The reports were an important tool for winning support for the policy by informing the coalition about the current state of college football from a NCAA perspective. The reports framed television as an eternal financial threat upon college athletics that only the television committee could effectively contain. The reports maintained this position even after 1956 when college football embarked upon decades of stable financial growth. The reports suggested that the NCAA’s supra-institutional position allowed it to provide the solution to television because it acted on behalf of all of the schools without bias. The reports went on to stress that the NCAA formed its policy through study of the trends in both broadcasting and stadium attendance made available by the NORC reports. The policy also served the greatest number of parties, albeit imperfectly for everyone, because of the democratic participation of a representative sampling of the individuals and the institutions with vested interests in college football broadcasting. And lastly, the reports claimed that the policy protected the many small schools that felt more embattled than ever by the emergence of television and that made up a majority of the NCAA membership.

Many NCAA members felt that television accentuated the already inequitable distribution of football revenues that had produced an elite tier of winning teams. The early NCAA television committee reports spoke to the fears of small schools when they described, under the subheading of “commercialization,” the emergence of a “TV aristocracy” that would dominate on-field competition and monopolize network revenues. The 1952 report states that although protecting the gate is imperative, “there is perhaps an even more disturbing threat to the future of intercollegiate football inherent in the premium financial and publicity rewards which can be realized from live television.” One of the few things that the NCAA television committee stated confidently about television was that it would eventually generate large sums of money and accentuate the commercialization of college football by producing a TV aristocracy. Even large schools, for publicity reasons alone, would support limited measures to maintain competitive balance in a structurally unequal environment.

The final step in the process was selling a policy of limited broadcasting to a public that desired freedom of choice as consumers. This was a trickier step since fans simply wanted to watch the game of their choice whereas members
of the broadcast coalition from schools to networks to advertisers had a common interest in stable capital accumulation. As a result, fans and sports writers reacted critically to the NCAA's limited broadcast schedules. Responding to criticism in the media, the NCAA undertook a program to “correctly inform” the public on controlled broadcasting in order to shape public opinion in favor of its limited broadcast schedule. The article “Why Football on TV is Limited” by Asa Bushnell, NCAA director of television programming and secretary of the U.S. Olympic Committee, is an example of how the NCAA responded to consumer dissatisfaction. Bushnell defends the NCAA’s policy of limiting broadcasts to one game per week against fans’ apparent desire for free market conditions by describing the NCAA as the steward of college football that saved it in 1905. Bushnell argued that fans’ unrestrained desire for free football would have “catastrophic” effects upon college football that funds all other intramural and intercollegiate athletics. Therefore, protecting gate revenues against television and evenly extending televisual representation to all regions and schools regardless of size best serves the public interest. The connections that Bushnell draws between football, revenue flows, masculinity, and public interest highlight the NCAA’s framing of television broadcasting, discussed below, and resurfaces decades later in title IX debates.

The NCAA disseminated publicity by a variety of means. One of the stated criteria for selecting a network was its willingness to aggressively promote the NCAA. The television committee instituted a “liaison officer” in 1953 that interfaced with the contracting network to ensure clear, consistent, and broad dissemination of NCAA publicity. While the liaison officer dedicated time to producing content like the “Will-To-Win” packages, his primary charge was organizing an array of publicity channels to educate the public. This included press kits, pre-game and post-game packages, newspaper ads and articles, radio interviews and spots, and talks given to special groups, “such as Sportswriters and Sportscasters associations, [and] college booster and alumni clubs.” The messages focused on how NCAA regulations serve a public interest that was defined in line with broader cultural tendencies of the early Cold War.

**Football As Remedy For Depleted Masculinity**

The NCAA needed to develop a clear frame in order to present its vision as reasonable. NCAA reports described fans’ desire to watch the game of their choice for free without enduring weather conditions, crowds, or parking as a threat to intercollegiate athletics since football financially supported all other athletic programs. Whether college football actually benefited other athletic programs or not is open to question, and it was questioned in the 1950s. Nevertheless, the NCAA held football’s economic beneficence as axiomatic. The NCAA reasoned that since football funds all other athletic programs, any challenge to football’s preeminence on college campuses would curtail other sports. And a reduction in intercollegiate and intramural athletics would jeopardize the physical training of
U.S. youth at a time of international crisis. Therefore, to protect football was to protect the nation at large.

The success of the Soviet Union at the summer Olympics beginning with the Helsinki games in 1952 added urgency to the NCAA’s claim. Critics claimed that the Soviet Union was using the Olympics to wage the Cold War in a cultural sphere. The United States responded by turning its universities into a training ground for preparing athletes to meet the Kremlin on a global stage of Cold War athletics. The use of university athletics provided a liberal strategy for harnessing the nation’s resources during the cultural Cold War by outsourcing athletic production to “non-state” institutions. But university athletics played a larger role than just preparing elite athletes for Olympic competition. John T. McGovern, a U.S. Olympic official, clarified the larger purpose of U.S. Olympic performance: “[T]he most important thing of all is to impress on our young people the soundness of constant training and conditioning.” This suggests that university athletics were a site for waging the Cold War and young people’s bodies were weapons in the geopolitical struggle.

Concern over the declining physical fitness of U.S. bodies reached a heightened pitch during the 1950s. Fear that the bodies of U.S. youth were growing soft and flabby in relation to Soviet bodies was named the “muscle gap” in 1954 following the publication of the Kraus-Weber Minimal Fitness Tests and the release of Korean War draft rejection rates. Muscle gap fears claimed European youth were more physically fit than U.S. youth and that the development of physical education programs was necessary to close the gap. Muscle gap fears intensified after Eisenhower suffered a heart attack in 1955; the Soviet Union launched Sputnik in 1957 and continued to show Olympic success; and peaked in the early 1960s when Kennedy wrapped his presidency in muscle gap rhetoric.

The muscle gap was part of a larger “crisis of masculinity” during the 1950s manifested in the language of mass culture critiques. At the heart of the crisis was a concern that modern society had an effeminizing effect upon men and that was leading to the replacement of “traditional” masculine characteristics of rugged independence for the passive conformism of the companionate family and large corporation. Despite having a vested interest in becoming a large, controlling institution through the establishment of its broadcast regulations, the NCAA found great cultural resonance with the claim that college football was a part of the national mission at a time of widespread concern over men’s physical development. Rear Admiral Tom Hamilton, chairman of the 1951 Television Steering Committee, attempted to cultivate that link when he claimed that football broadcasting created a “perplexing problem, which threatens the maintenance of our national physical training and competitive sports programs . . . .” Along with Ralph Furey, co-chairman of the 1952 steering committee, Hamilton reiterated the connection between broadcast regulations and the physical development of the nation’s youth. “As the sports public comes to understand the issues [via NCAA publicity], it will recognize the NCAA efforts in this field as the best and
only means of protecting the physical well-being and physical development of the sons and daughters of the nation.”

The NCAA continued to cultivate that link in its publicity campaigns by arguing college football supported a broad array of athletic programs necessary for supporting national fitness programs. Robert Hall, former Yale athletic director and NCAA Television Steering Committee Chairman in 1955, argued in *Sports Illustrated* that television would siphon off gate receipts from small schools causing them to divert money from intramurals to support their football teams. Curtailing intramurals is a problem, Hall reasoned, since “[l]ack of adequate exercise is deemed at least partly responsible for the increasing number of rejections for physical reasons by the armed forces.” By 1955 the NCAA had refined its frame into a 7-point plan intended to structure all NCAA publicity. The plan emphasized public interest and the traditional role of athletics in college education:

1. College football is a character-building activity which performs an essential and worthwhile function in the over-all academic life of the student.
2. Intercollegiate sports competition aids in the development of the youth of our nation and prepares them for positions as future national leaders.
3. The 1955 Plan as devised offers the American public a true cross-section of collegiate football and at the same time protects the athletic budgets of member colleges.
4. Intercollegiate competition—
   a. develops will-to-win;
   b. teaches self-discipline, self-sacrifice, and self-control;
   c. builds sound minds and bodies through mental and physical training and coordination;
   d. develops a spirit of loyalty and team-work which is the foundation of success in American industry, government, and the military.
5. Small colleges have important sports programs, and their football produces keen, close competition.
6. Good attendance at college football games throughout the nation each Saturday will support the year-round campus sports program.
7. College football is the original football; it is great football.

A clear though complicated image arises from the NCAA’s framing of college football. First, it suggests that football serves an important academic function in cultivating desirable characteristics in (male) citizens that includes the desire to work as a team to dominate others while remaining loyal to author-
ity, the development of a hard body and mind, and the ambition to lead peers. Second, college football as both a local and national practice represents the many diverse regions of the nation. For instance, the September 30, 1961 halftime program titled, “All-American sport for all Americans” suggested that college football creates a cultural sphere that brings the diversity of the nation together in pluralistic harmony. This makes football a pluralistic representation of the nation that allows fans to experience what Homi Bhabha calls the “double-time” of nationalism, in which fans are simultaneously pedagogical objects learning about the nation, its regions, and its people and are performative subjects participating in the “American way of life” by attending college football games and watching the limited broadcast schedule. Third, point 6 constructs a sort of “consumer citizenship” by suggesting regular attendance at live games sustain the nation’s health. The idea of consumer citizenship implies that citizens have an obligation to act as responsible consumers by supporting the games of local schools. The obligation is based on the assumption that the nation’s health is tied to gate receipts because football funds other athletic programs on campus. The “spend locally, act nationally” logic of consumer citizenship offers another way for citizens, once properly educated, to become performative subjects of the nation. My second and third points highlight the active, participatory nature of sports fandom. Not only does fandom produce football, participation in the American way of life simultaneously produces the nation and a fan’s position in it. Fourth, point 7 brands college football as original and authentic in opposition to its primary economic rival, the National Football League. When put together the NCAA constructs football as a tradition of college life that expresses national spirit and produces masculine Cold War citizens who will participate in the nation as active consumers. All seven points of the plan are expressed in the text of a 1956 halftime message:

The Army-Navy game, perhaps the most colorful of the hundreds of contests making up the intercollegiate football schedule each autumn, illustrates graphically the many fine features of this greatest of all contact sports. Similarly college football accurately characterizes the diversified competitive athletic program which the NCAA and its member institutions from coast to coast consider indispensable if on-campus training of the country’s youth is to be complete, comprehensive, and effectively preparatory for the future. Collegiate football does not need the de-emphasis sometimes suggested for it; but it should not be handicapped by over-emphasis. The correct treatment of collegiate football is its continuing strong emphasis as a worthwhile ingredient of the nation’s educational process.

Eventually the NCAA believed that its publicity swung the public in its favor. The 1958 report stated, “Although there are indicators that the public
would like to see the game of its own choice, the development of understanding by the public has resulted in an acceptance of a controlled program.\textsuperscript{119} College football broadcast ratings consistently grew throughout the following decades.\textsuperscript{120} As college football broadcasting experienced steady economic growth, fans became acclimated to the NCAA’s controls and limitations on consumer choice. But before realizing that growth, the NCAA needed to quell internal challenges to its cartel.

**Policing the Coalition—Penn’s Revolt**

The strongest challenge to NCAA regulations came from a NCAA-member institution. Ingham, Howell, and Schilperoort argue that a cartel functions effectively when member firms stick to collusive agreements that are based on mutual interest. However, if a member firm sees greater interest as an individual agent outside of the cartel then they are likely to bolt and the cartel must act to discipline the transgressor or risk disintegration.\textsuperscript{121} This is an important point for both the NCAA that enjoyed new authority following the recent setback of the Sanity Code\textsuperscript{122} and for schools that could negotiate lucrative television contracts individually. Notre Dame chafed under NCAA controls since it had the most to gain from Home Rule. However, Notre Dame bided its time and let Penn directly challenged NCAA authority.\textsuperscript{123} Flouting the NCAA’s policy of controlled broadcasting, Penn struck a deal with ABC worth $250,000 to televise its 1951 season.\textsuperscript{124} The NCAA reacted by ruling that no NCAA school could play Penn as long as it acted outside of the cartel. Ultimately, Penn backed down and agreed to work with the Television Steering Committee in scheduling its broadcasts.

The rift between the NCAA and Penn lasted for three years and served as a warning to schools wishing to break broadcast containment.\textsuperscript{125} The NCAA exerted direct, disciplinary force by blocking Penn’s broadcasts and attempting to bar its athletes from events like the prestigious Ohio Regatta.\textsuperscript{126} But the NCAA also acted more in line with the conditions of the early Cold War than did Penn. The NCAA did not frame its regulations as a restraint of supply that artificially inflates value, but positioned its policies as steps to protect public interest by defending small schools and their overall athletic mission to fortify masculinity in the nation. The NCAA successfully framed uncontained broadcasting as a technological threat to the nation’s human resources that would lead to greater centralization of wealth in large institutions. It also situated its regulations as a bulwark of defense against that attack. With the NCAA framing its regulations as protecting youth and small colleges, Penn’s actions appeared as crass egoism in the conformist 1950s despite its adherence to the NCAA’s tradition of institutional autonomy. Arthur Daley of the New York Times chided Penn’s actions as poor behavior from a school associated with Ivy League respectability rather than public school ambition.\textsuperscript{127} Critics berated Penn’s president, Harold Stassen, for his ambitions in football and politics. One critic wrote to Penn’s Board of Trustees that, “Mr. Stassen is having difficulty subduing his political tendencies
and wishes to ingratiate himself with the Roman Catholics [Notre Dame].”

The success of the NCAA’s frame was tied to a general tendency during the early Cold War to suppress individual liberty in favor of order and consensus. This tendency was driven by cold war anxiety and referred to as the “liberal consensus.”

NCAA broadcast regulations were more consistent with what David Harvey (1990) refers to as Postwar Fordism than the entrepreneurial strategy of Penn. Fordism was a logical development of Corporate Liberalism that involves a high degree of corporate regulation of both the economy and society. It relied on a tripartite pact struck between big business, big labor, and big government. Although Fordism’s flowering was contained early in the century, it blossomed following the success of centralized planning during World War II, the rise of cold war unity against communism, and the establishment of new regulatory schemes for government. Fordism ensured the formation of a disciplined workforce compensated in rising wages and increased leisure time that was the foundation of the American way of life in addition to consolidating capital in enormous corporations and increasing the nation’s productive capacities.

The state did not formally question the NCAA’s collusive and restrictive regulations until the 1980s. In fact, the NCAA felt emboldened in 1953 by the United States v National Football League (U.S. v NFL) decision that upheld the right of a league to limit broadcasts as a measure to protect attendance, especially of smaller institutions. Judge J. Grim stated in his decision that the overriding public interest is healthy market competition. “The purposes of the Sherman Act certainly will not be served by prohibiting the defendant clubs, particularly the weaker clubs, from protecting their home gate receipts from the disastrous financial effects of invading telecasts of outside games.”

Given the overriding interest of supporting commerce, Judge Grim further reasoned that, “The League is truly a unique business enterprise, which is entitled to protect its very existence by agreeing to reasonable restrictions on its member clubs.” In U.S. v NFL, the court saw protective regulations that fostered stable capital accumulation as reasonable restraints upon trade. Despite being a ruling on professional football, the NCAA, correctly, believed that U.S. v NFL would shield its regulations from legal or political scrutiny. The NCAA further claimed congressional support of its regulations in 1961 when the House blocked both live and tape-delayed broadcasts of professional games on Friday evenings and Saturdays during the college football season. The House Committee on the Judiciary explained it acted so that, “college football, upon which substantial educational programs depend for revenue, is not unduly prejudiced.” In both instances, we see state acceptance of regulations that limit competition as serving public interest in order to stabilize market chaos and foster conditions for predictable capital accumulation.

Originally drafted as a defensive measure to contain television’s technological invasion, the NCAA plan provided a stable environment for predictable capital accumulation. The first step in building a robust economic model was the NCAA’s effective cartelization of athletics and selling its restrictions as reasonable. The
final step was the establishment of an effective sponsorship model. From 1951 to 1953 the NCAA contracted with a single, large sponsor that could afford and benefit from national advertising. The NCAA, however, lost General Motors (GM) as its sole sponsor when switching from NBC to ABC in 1954. Unable to find a replacement for GM, the NCAA was forced to cobble together a group of smaller companies interested in regional advertising. It turned out, however, that using several smaller sponsors and a regional marketing strategy lowered the cost to individual advertisers while increasing the pool of potential sponsors. The regional marketing model also matched the regional broadcast model that the Big Ten and Pacific Coast Conference successfully pushed through in 1955 over the resistance of many small and Southern schools.137 NCAA regulations coupled with a multi-sponsor model set the conditions for accruing significant financial revenues from football broadcasting at the same time that stadium attendance was reaching new highs. The NCAA began to embrace television when it realized that college football and broadcasting could form a symbiotic relationship; what Sut Jhally calls the “sport/media complex” where sport and media become economically intertwined.138 When the NCAA embraced television, discussion of commercialization and a TV aristocracy disappeared from the steering committee’s reports.139 Control over television revenues bought more than just positive feelings. Broadcast domination produced enough capital for the NCAA to buy support throughout the Cold War and discipline wayward schools like Penn.140

Neoliberalism and the End of NCAA Regulations

Football broadcasting generated ever-growing revenues throughout the Cold War. In 1951 the NCAA sold its broadcast rights for $679,800; $3.1 million in 1961; $12 million in 1971; and $31 million in 1981.141 It brought thirty years of rapid growth that more than doubled between 1971 and 1981 (see Figure 1). However, controlling for inflation modifies the image of consistent financial growth with the greatest gain achieved between 1971 and 1981.

Standardizing the contracts at their dollar value in 2005 controls inflation. The value of the 1951 contract in 2005 is $5.2 million, the 1961 contract $19.5 million, the 1971 contract $57.1 million, and the 1981 contract $69.3 million.142 Football broadcasting was not of significant, immediate value to the NCAA or most NCAA member institutions in 1952, yet its value increased by over 13 fold in just 30 years (see Figure 2). But most of that increase occurred in the first 20 years with the greatest increase in value coming between 1961 and 1971. Despite the largest growth in raw dollars between 1971 and 1981, the period saw only an 18 percent increase in value—the least of any period. The 1970s, of course, saw high levels of inflation and transformations in the political economy of the United States. Broader changes in U.S. society were likely to trigger a reaction within the competitive world of college football.

Dissatisfaction from within the NCAA over the diminishing flow of broadcast revenues triggered a new challenge upon the NCAA’s cartel. Sixty-two
Figure 1 - NCAA Broadcast Contracts, 1951-1981

Figure 1: Andrew Zimbalist, *Unpaid Professionals*, p. 95.

Figure 2 - NCAA Broadcast Revenues vs. Value in 2005

Figure 2: Andrew Zimbalist, *Unpaid Professionals*, p. 95.
elite football schools formed the College Football Association (CFA) in 1977 in order to challenge the NCAA’s controls and gain a larger proportion of broadcast revenues. Members of the CFA felt that the enforced limitations of the NCAA system hindered their television appearances and profits. The NCAA responded to the CFA’s challenge by liberalizing its broadcast regulations. In 1982 the NCAA contracted with three networks (ABC, CBS, and TBS). Unlike the single network contract of the previous thirty years, the multi-network contract significantly increased broadcast content. The rewards were large (see Figure 3). The NCAA and its member institutions were rewarded for the more liberal broadcast schedule with a $64.8 million contract (worth $131.4 million in 2005 dollars). The multi-network contract demonstrated that the days of limited broadcasting and protectionism were coming to an end.

The CFA was not satisfied by the NCAA’s concession and continued its challenge. The multi-network contract gave CFA members much of what they wanted; top football schools saw both their television appearances and revenues increase. The multi-network contract, however, was only a step in the direction toward which capitalism was moving and that top schools like Oklahoma wanted to follow. David Harvey (1990) argues that by the mid-1970s the rigidity of Fordism limited its ability to respond to and profit from growing consumer markets. Capital then reconfigured as Neoliberalism, which is characterized by an emphasis on market-based competition, deregulation, privatization, cutting public expenditures, and replacing a concept of “public good” for “individual responsibility.” Released from Fordist regulations and by harnessing new

Figure 3 - Multi-Network Contract, 1982

Figure 3: Andrew Zimbalist, *Unpaid Professionals*, p. 95.
technologies, the new economy capitalizes on consumer markets by providing individualized commodities to niche markets in globalized systems of production, marketing, and distribution without sacrificing economic efficiency.\textsuperscript{146}

Neoliberalism describes not only the political economy of capitalism but also the cultural conditions of U.S. society. The muscle gap was quickly forgotten following John F. Kennedy’s assassination in 1963 and the breakup of the liberal consensus in 1964.\textsuperscript{147} With the breakup of the liberal consensus, self-sacrifice for the state gave way to a new individualism. For instance, the counter-culture movement re-imagined exercise and fitness not as an individual’s obligation to society embodied in the nation-state but as an ethic of self-improvement and care of self. The United States also experienced decades of success at the summer Olympics in a variety of sports. So even though constructions of masculinity remained central to football as well as a Reagan-era crisis of masculinity that celebrated violence and hard-bodies, the relationship between collegiate athletics, masculinity, and public interest did not resonate as it had in the 1950s. The fit body in the 1980s signified personal responsibility as the citizen’s social obligation to care for self, and exercise increasingly moved from high school gyms and YMCA’s into the commoditized space of commercial gyms.\textsuperscript{148} The re-imagining of consumer citizenship that took place by the mid-1980s undermined the NCAA’s ability to claim its regulations served the public interest.

The CFA’s challenge against the NCAA ultimately led to the landmark 1984 case \textit{NCAA v Board of Regents} in which the Supreme Court de-regulated college football broadcasting and ended the NCAA’s broadcast cartel.\textsuperscript{149} Unlike the 1950s when the NCAA’s restraint of trade appeared reasonable, in 1984 the court voted 7 to 2 against NCAA regulations. The reasoning of the court in \textit{NCAA v Board of Regents} highlights the reconfiguration of capital and the new cultural conditions of neoliberalism.\textsuperscript{150} In the majority decision, written by Justice John Paul Stevens, the court focused primarily on competition, the quantity of available broadcast content (output), and consumer choice.\textsuperscript{151} The court reasoned that free competition leads to quantitative increases in broadcast content; increased output provides the greatest consumer choice to the networks and fans. Restricting competition decreases output, artificially raises prices, and limits choice.\textsuperscript{152} Consistent with the logic of neoliberalism, the court saw the market as the best mechanism to serve the public interest since it maximized consumer satisfaction.\textsuperscript{153} Given the rise of cable television in the 1980s, the court held that deregulation would not just increase output but also increase regional content tailored to local, niche markets.\textsuperscript{154}

The NCAA’s defense in the case made two key points that echoed claims made in the 1950s. First, the NCAA argued that unregulated broadcasting would threaten live attendance. Second, regulated broadcasting allowed the NCAA to spread television revenues evenly amongst NCAA schools. The court rejected both points. On the first point, the court doubted the NCAA’s claim that live broadcasting threatened stadium attendance despite the NORC findings from the 1950s.\textsuperscript{155} More importantly, the court found the NCAA’s protectionist strat-
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egy (i.e. protecting ticket sales from competition with television broadcasts) as incompatible with the Sherman Act and, hence, an unreasonable restraint of trade. Instead, the court saw maximizing market competition as the means to increase consumer satisfaction. As Zimbalist writes, “The relevant datum [to the court] was not whether or not fewer people were in attendance, but whether the sum of fans in attendance plus fans watching on television would be greater if the TV restrictions were lifted.” The court rejected the second point because it doubted the efficacy of NCAA revenue sharing. Instead of working as a “pro-competitive” control, the NCAA plan limits one source of revenue among many other available sources, a source that is more important to some schools than others. The court viewed this as punishing top schools in order to boost less competitive schools. The court’s logic in 1984 proved different from attitudes in the 1950s.

Former All-American, Justice Byron “Whizzer” White wrote a dissenting position that further highlights changes in reasoning. White was disappointed that the court overlooked non-economic factors in its decision. White affirmed the NCAA’s claim that regulations reduced incentives to win and therefore fostered a climate more amenable to education. At the heart of his dissent, White criticizes the court’s decision to privilege the choice of individuals as a measure of public interest over group equity. Specifically, deregulation increases the liberty of schools and networks to negotiate and contract with each other; a condition constrained by NCAA regulations. White argues the NCAA Plan does in fact suppress the broadcast revenues going to top schools in order to inflate the revenues small schools receive. However, this more equitable distribution of resources within college football is a cost of doing business within the NCAA. Membership in the NCAA, White contends, adds value to all schools so revenue sharing is a legitimate cost for accruing the benefits of league membership. Unlike White’s position that large schools have a greater obligation to pay into the system since they accrue greater rewards from the system, the general trend of neoliberalism alleviates corporations from their financial obligation to society. White’s dissent was prescient by arguing deregulation would further benefit elite schools by giving them more television exposure and an even greater share of broadcast revenues. Unlike 1950s rhetoric that constructed protectionist strategies as a necessary defense against outside invasion, the 1984 decision opened up the gates of unconstrained competition and commercialism by turning to the free market as the mechanism for fulfilling the desires of as many individual consumers as possible.

Conclusion—Liberty and the Pursuit of Profit

The shifting terrain of U.S. liberalism has profoundly affected college football. The social conditions of the Progressive Era that made Corporate Liberalism possible also gave birth to the NCAA. The social conditions of the early Cold War that led to the emergence of Fordism also made the carteliza-
tion of football broadcasting appear to serve the public interest. Neoliberalism superseded Fordism and embarked upon a process of deregulation in order to maximize the economic power of the market and support individual profit. Neoliberalism, despite harkening to “classical liberalism,” only exacerbates the centralization of power in large corporations initiated by Corporate Liberalism. The hoarding of broadcast revenues by top tier football schools to the detriment of smaller programs has borne this out in the deregulated era of college football broadcasting. Capitalist development during the twentieth century is clearly written onto the pages of college football history.

It took thirty-three years before the Supreme Court agreed with Notre Dame that NCAA regulations were an unreasonable restraint of trade and returned Home Rule to football broadcasting. This shift in reason did not occur in isolation from broader social, political, and economic transformations. Notre Dame, during the periods under consideration, has proven itself a highly ambitious institution that used football as an effective part of its strategy to grow from a parochial Catholic school into a world-class university. Achieving national popularity allowed Notre Dame to remain independent from the obligations and costs of conference membership that most schools must bear. During the 1950s when it had the most to gain from Home Rule, Notre Dame did not directly challenge the NCAA’s broadcast regulations. In part challenging regulations was out of step with the economic tides of college football and capitalism more generally. At the same time, the entrepreneurial actions of a Catholic school in the 1950s would have been interpreted even more harshly than were Penn’s. After all, Penn was a member of the northeastern establishment that dominated the NCAA in the 1950s. In the 1990s, however, changes in the practice of capital accumulation as well as the meaning of both public interest and Catholicism allowed Notre Dame to realize its broadcast potential without serious repercussion. In 1990, Notre Dame left the CFA to sign an exclusive five-year contract with NBC worth $35 million. Whether by conscious design or not, Notre Dame and the NCAA both highlight the efficacy of acting in regards to broader economic and cultural formations that together structure society.

Notes

6. This section draws largely on the following sources: Michael Oriard, *Reading Football: How the Popular Press Created an American Spectacle* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina,

13. Kolko defines market rationalization as, “. . . the organization of the economy and the larger political social spheres in a manner that will allow corporations to function in a predictable and secure environment permitting reasonable profits over the long run.” Market rationalization is achieved by minimizing competition, planning for future economic growth, and minimizing political intervention by state or civil society. Gabriel Kolko, *The Triumph of Conservatism: A Reinterpretation of American History, 1900-1916* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), 3.


23. According to Marx, the forces of production consist of two parts: the means of production and labor power. The means of production include both the raw materials of production and the equipment or tools used in the production process. The capitalist mode of production separates workers from the means of production so that they are forced to sell their labor power on the free market. Capitalists generate profit by purchasing the forces of production in order to produce commodities that will be sold on the free market. In college football, the means of production include stadiums, training facilities, and training equipment. When schools purchase the means of production and the labor power of athletes, coaches, and scouts, they purchase the forces of production. This not only
advantages schools over their workers, it also advantages large wealthy schools over small schools. See Karl Marx, “From Volume One of Capital,” in Karl Marx: Selected Writings, edited by David McLellan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), 415-507.


26. Watterson, College Football, 243.

27. That the NCAA quadrupled its dues to only $100 indicates how power-relations favored member institutions over the administrative body before the 1950s. The cost of NCAA membership in 1948 is equivalent to $845 in 2005. This calculation was performed at The Inflation Calculator, http://www.westegg.com/inflation/ on Mar. 17, 2007.

28. Watterson, College Football, 209.

29. Ibid., 209-11.

30. Zimbilast, Unpaid Professionals, 10.


32. Smith, Sports and Freedom, 4, 10.


35. The first televised football game, between Fordham and Waynesburg College, on September 20, 1939 was similarly unimpressive. Smith, Play-By-Play, 51.


37. Smith, Play-By-Play, 53.

38. AT&T laid coaxial cables in the Northeast in 1946 just before doing the same in the Midwest, Ibid., 54.


40. Zimbilast, Unpaid Professionals, 92.


42. Robert W. Peterson, Pig Skin: The Early Years of Pro Football (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 197.


44. Smith, Play-By-Play, 59.

45. Ibid., 60; Watterson, College Football, 265.


47. Lawrence, Unsportsmanlike Conduct, 77-78.


49. Smith, Play-By-Play, 68.

anti-trust concerns until the late 1950’s. “Football TV Plan Aides All Colleges,” Skiatron.

required viewers to purchase plastic cards with a hole-pattern punched into them. Every broadcast needed its own card that slipped into a de-scrambler box on the television; cost was either fifty cents or a dollar. Establishing an efficient system of distribution was a major limitation of Skiatron. Phonovision required an AT&T operator to plug a viewer into a given broadcast but faced anti-trust concerns until the late 1950’s. “Football TV Plan Aides All Colleges,” New York Times, Apr. 29, 1951, S7; NCAA, “Report of the 1960 N.C.A.A. Television Committee to the Fifty-Fifth Annual Convention of the National Collegiate Athletic Association,” (Pittsburgh: National Collegiate Athletic Association, 1961).


See Sklar, Corporate Reconstruction, 111-17.

Paul Boyer argues that conscious fears of atomic warfare waxed and waned throughout the Cold War in a cycle of “activism and apathy.” Apathy describes periods when atomic fears were less conscious than at times when people were moved to social action. See Paul Boyer, By the Bombs Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), 352-67.


The DuMont Television Network was an important network in television’s early days but was pushed out of the broadcast market by 1956.


75. May, Homeward Bound, xxiv-xxv.

76. For further discussion see Betty Friedan, The Feminine Mystique (New York: Dell Books, 1963); James Burkhart Gilbert, Men in the Middle: Searching for Masculinity in the 1950s (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005); May, Homeward Bound; Spiegel, Make Room For TV.


78. May, Homeward Bound, 16.


84. Zimbalist, Unpaid Professionals, 93.

85. The proposed regulations for the 1951 season worked as follows: 1) One game per Saturday from September 29th to November 24th would be televised, generally, in a school’s particular region. The bowl games and the Army-Navy game coming after November 24th would not be regulated. 2) At least three games would be blacked out during the season to test the effect of television on gate receipts. 3) No team would get more than 2 games (a home game and an away game) televised during the season in order to protect smaller schools that do not have the popularity of schools like Notre Dame, Michigan, or Army from being overlooked by the networks. “One Saturday Football Telecast For Each Area Set By NCAA,” New York Times, Apr. 19, 1951, 52.

86. NCAA Committee Recommends Football Video on Limited Basis,” New York Times, Apr. 12, 1951, 55. Westinghouse Electronics Corp. paid $663,142 for the rights to sponsor the 1951 season, out of that total the NCAA collected $119,365 (18 percent) and the sum went to the teams that played in the 19 televised games. “College Football Limiting TV Again,” New York Times, June 3, 1952, 40. According to Ronald Smith (2001), the NCAA initially wanted to take 60 percent of revenues to redistribute to non-television schools but top schools like Notre Dame balked. Eventually, the royalties were forced down to 5 percent and never redistributed effectively. Smith, Play-By-Play, 87; Smith, Play-By-Play, 87.


89. The process of giving audience to the concerns of interested parties was also well documented in the meeting minutes of the television committee.


91. Consistency between press coverage of the NCAA’s policy and the Committee’s reports suggest that journalists were also reading the reports.
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of the imagination a device for making money for educational purposes." Ralph C. Hutchinson, intercollegiate sports are very costly to most of the country's higher schools and are by no stretch accounts were straightened out and the cold facts brought to light it would be found that football and fractured campus, Ralph Cooper Hutchison, president of Lafayette College, concedes, "But if the

100. While making an argument for football's value of creating social solidarity on an otherwise fractured campus, Ralph Cooper Hutchison, president of Lafayette College, concedes, "But if the accounts were straightened out and the cold facts brought to light it would be found that football and intercollegiate sports are very costly to most of the country's higher schools and are by no stretch of the imagination a device for making money for educational purposes." Ralph C. Hutchinson, "Football: Symbolic of College Unity," The Christian Century, Apr. 6, 1952, 461. Also "College Football: Has It Really Gone 'Pro'?," US News and World Report, Oct. 26, 1956, 56-58; Robert M. Hutchins, "College Football is an Infernal Nuisance," Sports Illustrated, Oct. 18, 1954, 34-36; Allen Jackson, "Too Much Football," Atlantic Monthly, Jul./Dec. 1951, 27-33.


103. Jeffrey Montez de Oca, "The 'Muscle Gap': Physical Education and U.S. Fears of a Depleted Masculinity, 1954-1963" in More Than Just a Game: Sports in American Life Since 1945, edited by Stephen Jay, More Than Just a Game; Sports in American Life Since 1945; Thomas, "The Good Negroes': African-American Athletes and the Cultural Cold War." 104. While a thorough review of the Olympic debates is beyond the scope of this article, the following selection of citations provides an outline of the discourse during the period under discus-


109. Gilbert, Men in the Middle, 48.

110. Rear Admiral Tom Hamilton, chairman of the NCAA’s TV steering committee cited in “NCAA Committee Recommends Football Video on Limited Basis,” 47.


117. See Oriard, King Football, 200-01; Smith, Play-By-Play, 94.

118. In postwar debates about the role of football programs on university campuses, the term “emphasis” refers to the amount of capital a university invests in its football program. “De-emphasis” suggests a program of divestment that minimizes the role of athletics in university life while “over-emphasis” suggests a win-at-all-costs attitude that leads to unscrupulous practices. NCAA, “Report of the 1956 N.C.A.A. Television Committee,” 33-34.


120. Zimbalist, Unpaid Professionals, 95.


122. Watterson, College Football, 263.

123. Smith, Play-By-Play, 65-66, 68; Watterson, College Football.


128. Smith, Play-By-Play, 68.


134. Ibid.

135. Ronald Smith describes the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961 as helping professional football to expand by giving the NFL a television monopoly on professional football broadcasting.
The NCAA claimed victory since the act also gave some protection to college football by blocking the NFL from broadcasting Saturdays when colleges typically played and Fridays when high schools typically played. See Smith, Play-By-Play, 95-97.


137. Smith, Play-By-Play, 89-90.


140. Watterson, College Football, 284-85.

141. Zimbalist, Unpaid Professionals, 95.

142. These calculations were performed at The Inflation Calculator, http://www.westegg.com/inflation/ on Aug. 18, 2006.

143. Zimbalist, Unpaid Professionals, 97.

144. Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity, 142.


147. Montez de Oca, “‘As Our Muscles Get Softer,” 151.


150. Watterson, College Football, 342.

151. NCAA v. Board of Regents, 97, 102, 17, 20.

152. Ibid., 99, 103, 20.

153. Watterson, College Football, 347.

154. NCAA v. Board of Regents, 124ff 68.

155. Ibid., 115-16.

156. Ibid., 116-17.


158. NCAA v. Board of Regents, 119.

159. Ibid., 126, 30. Zimbalist argues that Whites’ position was historically out of step with a scandal filled era in college football. Zimbalist, Unpaid Professionals, 100.


161. Ibid., 128.


163. NCAA v. Board of Regents, 128.

164. Watterson, College Football, 347; Zimbalist, Unpaid Professionals, 100.


166. Zimbalist, Unpaid Professionals, 101-03.

167. Smith, Play-By-Play, 168.


169. Ibid.

170. In this instance, I refer to administrative domination not on field competition. When looking at persons holding executive position within the NCAA during the 1950s, we see an over-representation of Northeastern universities.
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171. Notre Dame’s contract with NBC would lead to the disintegration of the CFA cartel. Watterson, College Football, 350.

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