Review Essay

Up South and Down South: Insurgents and Counter-insurgents in the Political Struggle to Define America

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On June 23rd 1963, in Detroit, Martin Luther King Jr. addressed one of the largest rallies in the country supporting the civil rights movement prior to the March on Washington. King charged his audience at the Great March to continue in their support of the civil rights struggle in the South by challenging racial inequities in Detroit. He stated:

What can we do here in Detroit to help in the struggle in the South? Well, there are several things that you can do. One of them you’ve done already, and I hope you will do it in even greater dimensions before we leave this meeting... Now the second thing that you can do to help us down in Alabama and Mississippi and all over the South is to work with determination to get rid of any segregation and discrimination in Detroit... No community in this country can boast of clean hands in the area of brotherhood. Now in the North it’s different in that it doesn’t have the legal sanction that it has in the South. But it
has its subtle and hidden forms and it exists in three areas: in the area of employment discrimination, in the area of housing discrimination, and in the area of de facto segregation in the public schools. And we must come to see that de facto segregation in the North is just as injurious as the actual segregation in the South... And so if you want to help us in Alabama and Mississippi and over the South, do all that you can to get rid of the problem here.¹

King knew from firsthand experience that the North was not a racial panacea.² In 1950, King had experienced overt racial discrimination while attending Crozier Theological Seminary in Pennsylvania and had filed a complaint against a New Jersey diner for denying him and a group of interracial friends dinner. While Northern racial discrimination was a harsh reality, it was not as visually dramatic as in the South. Although civil rights leaders focused their attention on actions in the South after the *Brown* decision, they were never under any illusion that what had been occurring in the South was a separate movement from what was going on elsewhere in the United States. For civil rights leaders the political movement to fully enfranchise black Americans was never simply a southern movement—down South was also up North too. “Up North” had its “Down South” sides too, or, as black Philadelphians coined the matter, the North was “Up South.”³

From 1954 until 1965, in every northern and western city, civil rights protest and organizing efforts took place in the shadow of what was occurring throughout the South. The southern movement, with its emphasis on moral suasion and non-violent protest, garnered the lion’s share of journalistic coverage until the Watts neighborhood in Los Angeles ignited.⁴ From fundraising events to large protest rallies, along with other strategies—consumer boycotts, sit-ins and freedom rides—the southern movement followed the northern precedent of civil disobedience. If there was anything original in the southern movement, it was the ability of organizations like King’s SCLC and SNCC to mobilize black southerners into concerted action, which in turn motivated black people “Up South” to ramp up their local struggles.⁵ Yet until recently the historical writing about civil rights protest outside the South had been on the back burner of American history. However, in the last decade there has been a rich bevy of local and regional histories about the black-led civil rights protest in the north and the west.⁶

Thomas Sugrue’s *Sweet Land of Liberty* is a wide sweeping political history of the black-led civil rights movement from north of the imaginary Mason-Dixon line. In this history, politics are broadly defined “to encompass organizing, intellectual advocacy and engaged journalism, electoral politics, policy making, and litigation.” He elaborates that the efforts by ordinary citizens and civil rights activists to push at the boundaries of citizenship, to incorporate African Americans
into an economy that had marginalized them, into a consumer culture that held out false promises of inclusion, into schools that deemed them uneducable, into neighborhoods where they were viewed as pariahs. It is a history of the efforts to change the law, to gain a voice in electoral politics, to influence public debate.

To a large extent, Sugrue is successful in tackling such a Promethean task in a single volume.

Sugrue’s narrative weaves through a variety of characters and organizations that attempted to redefine what it meant to be an American and how the American government ought to respond to the various concerns of its citizens. He correctly assessed that the “New Deal rhetoric provided blacks with a robust language of rights and democracy that they made their own.” African Americans, however, in reality benefited the least from Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal and Harry Truman’s Fair Deal. Throughout the North, as Sugrue makes abundantly clear, African Americans were locked into a mutual reinforcing system of cultural racial bigotry and systematic economic exclusion almost as suffocating as the South.

Sugrue explains that civil rights activism throughout the 1940s centered on building broad-based coalitions of black people—labor supporters, feminist activists, the March on Washington Movement, Garveyites, and Communists led by notables and the little known. The narrative winds through the 1960s with such organizations as the National Urban League (NUL), Congress on Racial Equality (CORE), the Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM), the Black Panther Party, the Republic of New Africa, and many even lesser known organizations, each with its own set of fascinating leaders. All of them grappled with endemic structural inequalities that faced blacks in the North as American society became increasingly segmented and urbanized.

The setting of Sweet Land of Liberty is post World War II America, just as the United States ascended into the dominant political leadership position in the western world. It is within this context that civil rights activism was rife with internationalism. In fact civil rights activists saw their struggle intimately linked to nationalist independence movements taking place in Asia and Africa. The struggle in the northern ghettos was linked to the famous Bandung Conference that defined the term “Third World.” If there were three worlds, as the Bandung Conference proposed—the developed world, the developing world, and un-developed world—the plight of African Americans were “third world” concerns. Historic racial and structural inequities remained firmly intact within the United States despite its global leadership of the “free world.” They lingered like a bad hangover throughout the Great Depression and World War II and the decades of the Cold War. What is remarkable is that African American activists pursued a new political order both at home and abroad in spite of their long-term exclusion. What makes Sugrue’s history important is his synthesis of this steadfast determination to transform the United States from an exclusively white
democratic government, built on the labor of the enslaved, to a truly inclusive and antiracist democratic government based upon laws and fairer enactment of social policies.

While the goals of civil rights activists were laudable, the story that Sugrue tells is not harmonious or triumphant. The history of the northern civil rights movement is full of battles fought at the local, state, and national levels against de facto segregation filled with internecine conflicts between a variety of leaders and organizations. They faced challenges big, intractable and overwhelming—open housing, police brutality, poorly funded schools, de-industrializing cities, and persistent high unemployment. In addition, the politics of Cold War anti-communist rhetoric were used deliberately to block the political gains of African Americans. Opponents constantly characterized civil rights activists as communist or communist sympathizers and subversives. Yet these activists stayed committed to civil rights regardless of their varying political philosophies. They sustained public democratic agitation for nearly three decades. Even when misunderstood, misinterpreted, and mischaracterized, they held onto an unswerving belief in the righteousness of their cause. They worked tirelessly through organizations like the NAACP, the National Urban League, and forgotten umbrella organizations such as the National Negro Congress. They brought lawsuits, initiated consumer boycotts, joined labor protests, held rallies, and collectively voted in their own interests.

The rich paradox of Sugrue’s history is that the exodus of southern blacks provided the numerical and electoral strength in many northern cities to make civil rights advances viable. Before the Great Migration, most northern cities had miniscule black populations. It was southern blacks gone north that joined the rank and file of industrial workers, established working-class enclaves, participated in the Democratic Party, and created the basis of reformist middle-class politics that changed the American political landscape.

As a result of southern migration, in cities like Chicago where black voters elected politicians to national office, a shift in American politics slowly began. Black voters in the large metropolitan areas made the difference in President Harry S. Truman’s startling upset victory over Thomas Dewey in the 1948 presidential election. While Sugrue wonderfully describes black grassroots activists, he gives very little attention to the handful of black elected officials who were elected in the 1940s and 1950s—William Dawson, Adam Clayton Powell, and Charles Diggs. Nor does he give enough focus to the even more colorful local black politicians and apparatchiks who were ward heelers and neighborhood party bosses that directly influenced civil rights gains in northern cities through political appointees and patronage jobs. Although some of these men were later accused of being “Toms” and “Sellouts,” in the 1960s they too played important roles in keeping lines of communications open through the national Democratic Party.

Interestingly, the most radical turning point in Sugrue’s account came in 1963, the hundredth anniversary of Abraham Lincoln’s issuance of the Emancipation
Nothing captured that year like Louis Lomax’s aptly titled book *The Negro Revolt*. By the spring of 1963, the revolt was in full bloom. It could be seen everywhere as the Birmingham, Alabama campaign led by SCLC and the March on Washington helped to radicalize northern civil rights activists to push harder to respond to racial exclusion in the industrial cities and states. As Sugrue reports, when King came to Detroit to participate in the Great March, other more nationalistic and militant views of black freedom struggle circulated widely. For example, the Reverend Albert Cleage, Jr. saw the march not as a way to integrate the black masses into white society, but as a way of fostering black solidarity. By the end of the year, two things radicalized black northerners even more: the terroristic bombing of the 16th Street Baptist Church in Birmingham, Alabama, which killed four Sunday School girls, and the censuring of Malcolm X by the Nation of Islam for saying that the violence the Kennedy administration permitted in the South had finally come full circle and the president’s assassination—“chickens had come home to roost.”

By 1964, however civil rights activists differed philosophically, they all agreed that the laws and culture of the United States had to be radically amended. As activists aggressively pursued passage of civil rights legislation, more violent reactions erupted. Vicious racist and terrorist acts were many, as were the long unaddressed complaints of police brutality throughout the country. If we add northern white ethnic revolts against racial integration and realtors’ block busting, there appeared no way out other than to fight block-by-block, in the state houses, and the nation’s capital. Activists had no choice but to urgently demand that the Congress enact stronger laws to protect civil rights.

Sugrue argues that the assassination of Malcolm X in 1965 symbolized another important change among northern civil rights activists. Malcom’s break with his mentor, Elijah Muhammad, and late death, would allow for multiple interpreters to use blackness to represent the new militancy. Blackness became the defining trope of African Americans’ newfound cultural and political awareness in the late 1960s and through the mid-1970s. Despite Malcom’s death and lack of organizational accomplishments, he lived on in the hearts and imagination of many young black people as a radical nationalist hero. His iconic legacy took root in a number of smaller grassroots organizations—RAM, the Black Panther Party, and black religious groups, as well as in the various inchoate nationalist sentiments expounded on inner-city street corners.

The confrontational rhetoric of black power and urban unrest combined was believed to be combustible fuel for revolution in the streets. According to Sugrue, many local and national politicians feared that the insurgency led by northern black activists threatened to topple the social order that undergirded their political prerogatives. And it was true! The insurgency led by grassroots women battling for welfare reform, radical-oriented black political parties, and economic redevelopment schemes all attempted to empower people who had been historically denied access to even basic governmental services. The mantra of the Black Panther Party, “all power to the people,” well represented the moment.
After the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Bill, the 1965 Voting Rights Act, and finally the 1967 Open Housing Act, the civil rights coalition fragmented. The large sweeping coalitions that formed to address national issues of civil rights in the late 1940s became even more fractured as a government at war in Vietnam tried to solve poverty on the cheap by dispersing limited funds to locally based programs. Sugrue points out that A. Philip Randolph openly worried that “the plethora of programs and scarcity of funds Balkanizes the community internally.” Randolph’s fears, according to Sugrue, were warranted because increasingly local efforts superseded national coalition-building as poverty, poor schools, and urban blight spread across every American city where black people concentrated. Poorly funded programs such as Community Action Programs could hardly make a dent in these large-scale national issues.

In 1972, with the number of black elected officials growing fourfold and mass public boycotts ending, African Americans leaders once again tried to reassert a broad coalition strategy at the National Black Political Convention in Gary, Indiana. The convention was a ruckus and colorful affair, but it did not, in the end, build a broad-based black political coalition to counter public policies that aided the growth of white suburbanization and the flight of economic capital from the urban core. Sugrue describes the divide between nationalists/separatists, black elected officials, and the NAACP’s national officialdom as being filled with too much distrust. Truthfully, African Americans could not collectively solve large-scale urban problems without the aid of national policies.

President Richard Nixon’s urban advisor, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, suggested in a memorandum the policy of “benign neglect,” a concept he believed would cool down black anger and activism. The Moynihan policy, however, in point of fact gave further justification to neglect the needed overhaul of national urban policy in light of urban renewal and the highway act. Indeed, as Sugrue has pointed out elsewhere, urban renewal and the highway act had been used as vehicles for white flight, which sent both jobs and capital resources out to suburbia. Therefore there was little hope in gaining fairer national urban policies to stem the tide of decaying cities other than electing black politicians. The good news was that black citizens did exactly this wherever they held electoral advantages or political advantages. By the 1970s, blacks “had become the Democratic Party’s most loyal supporters.” And more importantly, in Sugrue’s words, “Black Democrats brought a distinctive cast to liberal politics. On nearly every issue, the majority of black state legislators and members of Congress were left of center.” Perhaps, out of necessity, African Americans resisted the country’s rightward turn politically.

Black resistance proved politically exploitable as urban unrest and antiwar protest gave Richard Nixon campaigning sloganeering—“law and order” and “the silent majority”—its currency. In 1969, Nixon’s campaign strategist, Kevin Phillips, outlined in *The Emerging Republican Majority* that the American two parties had shifted as a result of the heavy influx of black voters into the Democratic Party. Philips noted that white Mississippians had overwhelming voted
for Barry Goldwater in 1964 in reaction to the civil rights movement, and he closely watched former Alabama governor George Wallace’s success in Mississippi during the 1968 Democratic presidential primary. Phillips “wrote to John Mitchell, Nixon campaign director, with obvious glee, ‘Wallace should take enough Democratic traditional votes to leave the Democrats with little more than Negroes—and they should soon take over the Democratic Party!’” The white political South was disgraced and largely defeated in both their legal and extra-legal efforts to defeat the civil rights movement. The conservative political movement, which suffered a disastrous defeat with Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater’s lopsided loss in the 1964 presidential race, needed the white south, and white southern politicians needed new branding as reasonable rather than reactionary. Through trial and error, conservatives and Southerners found each other.

Nixon’s “southern strategy,” as it would be widely called later, was built on the historic divisions and fissures of race that reverberated throughout the country. It was his vehicle to create a new political majority. The emerging Republican Majority would be cobbled together from the white southerners, the increase of white Sun Belt voters, and the angry white working class throughout the industrial northern cities.

Nothing dramatized this linkage between North and South in national politics more than the 1972 Democratic presidential primary in Michigan. George Wallace won the Michigan Democratic presidential primary, besting his nearest rival George McGovern by over 400,000 votes. Some Michigan Democrats claimed that the machinations and devious politics of the State’s GOP crossover votes aided Wallace’s victory, but it is clear that Wallace had tapped into national discontents. Had it not been for a failed assassination attempt, which left Wallace permanently paralyzed and wheelchair-bound, the 1972 Democratic presidential convention might have been more contentious than historians now recollect. What is certain in Wallace’s startling primary victory: “Up South” was openly linked to the politics of “Down South.”

In Crespino’s history of white Mississippi politics, white Mississippi voters gradually exited the Democratic Party for the Republican Party. If civil rights leaders led an insurgency to reshape America, white Mississippi political leaders comprised a counter insurgency to assure that their political dominance in the state remained intact. For most of the twentieth century, political power in Mississippi resided in the hands of conservative Democrats. With an insider’s nuanced understanding, Crespino analyzes the various camps, strategies, and calculations used to keep segregation in place. The use of extremist violence failed and more often discredited the image of the entire state. While terrorism and legal maneuvering slowed civil rights in Mississippi, they did not defeat black-led insurgency within the state. By the late 1960s, Mississippi political leaders were won over by the reasoning of practical segregationists (as opposed to ideological and populist segregationists). The practical segregationists took a page from northern-style apartheid and began justifying segregation spatially
in terms of public policies. By the 1970s, the GOP was on the rise in the state led by former U.S. Senator Trent Lott, and the state’s political culture was being rebranded as politically conservative rather than blatantly racist.

By 1980, this link had become palatable among mainstream political conservatives. Crespino’s *In Search of Another Country* is a valuable reminder of Alexis de Tocqueville’s aphorism, “In politics shared hatreds are almost always the basis of friendships.” The great national fear regarding enforced busing to achieve integrated schools and affirmative action policies in universities and government employment was sizable enough to create a backlash both in the North and the South. At the invitation of Trent Lott, Republican presidential candidate Ronald Reagan began his successful bid to be President of the United States in Philadelphia, Mississippi, at the Neshoba County Fair.

From 1964 until Reagan’s appearance, this small southern city had been synonymous with hateful white supremacy after three young civil rights workers—James Chaney, Andrew Goodman, and Michael Schwerner—were brazenly murdered while registering black Mississippians to vote during Freedom Summer. The extent of racist violence in Mississippi made it the most reviled and feared of all the southern states where the civil rights movement led protests. White Southerners rhetorical use of “states rights” to justify racial segregation was effectively submerged as response to civil rights politics. However, sixteen years later, Ronald Reagan was courting Mississippi white voters using the rhetoric of “states’ rights.” Crespino writes, “Reagan invoked a mantra that had sustained a generation of southern segregationists . . . Reagan pledged that, if he were elected, he would ‘restore to states and local governments the power that properly belongs to them.’” Reagan had never used this type of campaign rhetoric before. According to Crespino, however, “Republican candidates in Mississippi had designed the visit to Neshoba County to reach out to what the Republican national committeeman described as George Wallace inclined voters.”

What also makes Crespino’s account of white Mississippi politics thought-provoking is his description of how much religion, especially Protestant Christianity, was at the epicenter of white Mississippi’s reaction to the civil rights movement’s liberalism. Liberalism was not just a set of social policies about government; it was also a set of theological principles upon which political authority rested. The theological liberalism that civil rights leaders invoked undermined or challenged the religiosity that undergirded a good portion of the white South. In the epic struggle to destroy Jim Crow in Mississippi, one can begin to see the ground being laid for the emergence of Protestant conservative politics. The movement did not reach maturity until 1979 when the Reverend Jerry Falwell formed his rather invidiously named organization, the Moral Majority.

Crespino insightfully writes that white Mississippians were evangelical and conservative Protestants. Theologically, white and black Mississippians had a common heritage of Evangelical Christianity—Methodism, Baptist, Holiness, and Pentecostalism. The biggest difference between Mississippi white and black Protestants was not in terms of doctrine, but in the form of activism and political
liberalism that the civil rights movement supported. It was the community-organizing tactics and government initiatives that black religious activists employed in the Delta Ministry that especially disturbed white Mississippi Protestants. By 1966, the Delta Ministry, in alliance with the National Council of Churches of Christ (NCCC), had become one of the primary advocates in the region for social justice. White Mississippian believers believed that the kind of politicization of religious faith that the Delta Ministry evoked was abhorrent to the more individualistic notions that white southern Evangelicals held. White Mississippian believers held to a radical separation of church and state when it came to political activism against the Mississippi political structure.

Paradoxically, white southerners never saw their own linkages between white political power in Mississippi and church support. Though they were often ambivalent about the biblical grounds of racial segregation, they nevertheless resisted racial integration in public education by instituting the Christian School movement in Mississippi. As Crespino explains, freedom of religion was deployed in part to racially separate children and people. Support of Christian Schools through the first amendment became a part of the Republican Party’s platform in the Reagan era. Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, a central focus of this Evangelical Christian concern and Republican strategy was the support that Bob Jones University (South Carolina) received. The university lost its IRS tax-exempt status because of its racially segregated policies, and conservatives howled that the government interfered with the school’s religious beliefs. Crespino reminds us, however, that the roots of Bob Jones University’s legal and congressional appeals were supported and found in the Mississippi Christian School Movement, which sprang up in response to court-enforced school integration.

The struggles among white Mississippian believers to reconcile themselves to and deal with the political insurgency of African Americans is quite instructive. The counterinsurgents in Mississippi, even though they did not ever fully defeat the civil rights movement, coalesced with their white brethren “Up South,” the Reagan Democrats in the industrial Midwest and Great Lakes cities, and the newly populated Sun Belt cities of the American West. For nearly three decades beginning in 1980, conservatives—anti-communists, white Evangelical Christians, and conservative intellectuals—coalesced to try to stem the “rights revolution” in the United States. By defining issues in terms of conservatism and not race, it freed Mississippi white politicians to overwhelmingly swing to the Republican Party. Political conservatism was a highly coded term for the racial politics that had become dominant in the state of Mississippi. Under Reagan’s governing coalition, the nation would catch up quickly with Mississippi in seeing it that way, too. Political liberals, just as Kevin Phillips predicted, were blacks and highly educated white urbanites in a weakened national Democratic Party. In the 1980s, Mississippi’s practical segregation using the banner of conservatism ruled the country.
There is another reality in Mississippi today, as Crespinio observes. The state has elected the most black officials of any state in the union. The political fight for civil rights in many ways succeeded. Today, Mississippi has the largest percentage of black politicians in the country. Most of these elected officials are at the local and county levels. The state still does not have any black politicians who have been elected to statewide office with a broad coalition of whites and blacks. Nonetheless, however one wishes to define political progress, there have been some gains in Mississippi. Perhaps jazz artist Nina Simone’s “Mississippi Goddamn” (a show tune parody of the state’s vicious reactionary politics) is a tragically funny song of the past.

Both Sugrue and Crespinio have done outstanding work in reassessing this period of history from two rich dynamic regional angles of civil rights history. They both remind us that the civil rights era of American political history was indeed a radical reorientation of the country’s politics. These books remind us as well that the United States still has a long way to go before it becomes what contemporary pundits have been loosely calling a “post-racial society.” Indeed, these books vividly show the depth of America’s racial past.

Civil rights activists in the late 1960s were correct in their assessment that American racial history was intricately interwoven into the fabric of economic inequality. In this regard, we should take heed and remember that those issues that northern militants tried to redress are still with us. Especially significant were those confrontations concerning racial and sexual disparities, joblessness, access to a quality education, health care, affordable housing, wages, and welfare in the urban core. The structural inequities fought in the de-industrializing North were always a part of the urban South, if New Orleans and the Gulf Coast of Mississippi in the devastating aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in 2005 is an indicator.

These respective histories, along with the current historiography being written about the civil rights movement, remind us that the civil rights movement was never really a bifurcated up North/down South social movement. “Up South” and “Down South” had cultural and economic differences to be sure, but their histories were forever linked as they had always been throughout the American past. Thus civil rights leaders always knew that the movement was national in scope and held broad international ramifications for other oppressed groups and people. By including African Americans in the messiness of democratic politics, they believed that the United States could demonstrate its true global leadership. One thing that both Sugrue and Crespinio have convinced me of is that the kind of civic nationalism that the civil rights activists promoted forced even the most resistant political white conservatives to relent on viewing America as solely a white man’s country. Perhaps they did not “redeem the soul of America,” as SCLC’s motto trumpeted, but they did open the door to include many other Americans and their histories fully into the country’s national political saga.
Notes