Queering the Color Line within the Color Line: W. E. B. Du Bois and the Transwar Transpacific

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> The greatest and most dangerous race problem today is the problem of relations between Asia and Europe: the question as to how far "East is East and West is West." There is in reality no difference between the reaction to this European idea on the parts of Japan and China. It is a question simply of the method of eliminating it.[1]
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> W. E. B. Du Bois, "Prospect of a World without Race Conflict," 1944

> Everywhere, massed and concentrated power is necessary to accomplish anything worthwhile doing in this muddled world, hoping for a divine Anarchy in some faraway heaven.[2]
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> W. E. B. Du Bois, *Dark Princess*, 1928

In his 1945 *Color and Democracy*, the African American intellectual and activist W. E. B. Du Bois reminded his readers that America thwarted both Japan's and China's proposals for "racial equality." First, at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference that concluded WWI, President Woodrow Wilson unilaterally vetoed Japan's Racial Equality Proposal on behalf of an Australia anxious about its white settlement policy. With the concept of racial equality bolstered by Asia's gradual material ascent, white settler-colonial states in the transpacific interpreted Japan's proposal

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as implying that Asian immigration ought not to be curtailed; they saw it as a violation of national sovereignty.[3] Du Bois had noted in 1937 how the anti-Asian racism underpinning the United States' 1924 Immigration Act—known in Japan as the *Hainichi iminhō* or "Anti-Japanese Immigrant Law"—had dovetailed with antiblackness:

> The people of the United States…excluded the Japanese by law, not because they were vagabonds and burdens but because they were too thrifty and too efficient; a political deal between the West and the South brought the Japanese exclusion law in return for the defeat of the anti-lynching bill in 1924. Thus America showed her clear attitude toward colored labor, whether it was her own black citizens or yellow foreigners.[4]

Then, as Du Bois recounted in *Color and Democracy*, America "suppressed" China's proposal for racial equality at the 1944 Dumbarton Oaks Conference where the United Nations took shape in the waning months of WWII. In Du Bois' view, China was slated to receive the only nonwhite seat on the emerging UN Security Council "because of Japan," who had threatened global white supremacy with its regionalist empire. China, he wrote, was imagined by the West as someday again "dominat[ing] Asia…[but] in collaboration with Europe and the United States…pushed forward in theory as the representative of Asiatic peoples and as [a] promise of Western sincerity toward the yellow race."[5] During the conference, China-novelist Pearl Buck warned readers of the *New York Times* that racial equality in 1919 had been the "one issue" on which Japan and China had been of "one mind"; "bitterness…expressed itself finally in the attack on Pearl Harbor," Buck opined, and a "new bitterness" might result if China were also rebuffed.[6] African Americans warmly anticipated the proposal, but after the conference, the *Chicago Defender* somberly reported that the "Chinese did not even bring up the subject in spite of the fact that it was part of their original plan."[7] The Chinese delegation led by Wellington Koo, who was also a representative for China in 1919, wanted only to condemn the Japanese and German theories of master races (Yamatoism and Aryanism), not antagonize America on its "Negro problem." Since the equality concept broached both matters, China dropped the proposal in the interests of affable Sino-U.S. relations.[8] Du Bois' sense of China as collaborating with the West would change with Mao Zedong's 1949 communist victory, which U.S. policymakers called the "loss" of China.

Du Bois' famous formulation that the "problem of the twentieth century" would be the "problem of the color line" included the shift in the distribution of material power between the white and nonwhite worlds

that, by the first decades of the century, compelled the leading powers to reevaluate how they dealt with racial otherness. Some measure of "equality" between the racial self and other—to include inter-Asian and Afro-Asian relations—was recognized as needing to be meted out if empire were to remain justifiable. As Takashi Fujitani and Lisa Yoneyama have framed the transwar transpacific, America and Japan, vying for material and moral primacy in Asia after decades of cooperation for liberalism's expanse, brewed liberal-pluralist governmentality to address the conundrum. With the British Empire fading and the Russian one collapsed, America and Japan shared a goal of supplanting the nineteenth-century model of "benevolent imperialism" for racial development while staving off Marxist-Leninism. As Fujitani puts it, the two powers competitively sought to develop a "new type of sovereignty that was both colonized and independent at the same time": a shift from the "vulgar racism" of colonial modernity to the "polite racism" of modernization.[9] Yoneyama summarizes the Americanization of racial justice during the early Cold War decades of decolonization and the U.S.-USSR competition, which included both the transition from segregation to integration and the lifting of Asian exclusion in U.S. immigration law, as a "discursive production of the U.S. relation with the enemy of color [Japan] that had earlier championed the rhetoric of racial justice [the 1919 racial equality proposal]."[10] The U.S.-Japan alliance, or the post-1952 cooperation of the two empires in an asymmetrical relation of power, has been an attempted stopgap in the *longue durée* of contentious racial capitalism[11] in the transpacific. Under duress, but also deepening due to China's rise, the alliance has contributed to the failure to redress both Japanese and American violence in Asia. Justice and sovereignty remain out of reach because racial capitalism—exploit the other or otherwise be exploited—incentivizes cyclical competition and legitimation of past and future violence. Today, the U.S. empire's postwar model of "benevolent modernization" competes with China's similar, but more illiberal approach, as the United States, in alliance with Japan, India, and Australia, seeks to "balance" against China. Liberal pluralism competes with reactionary ethnonationalism (e.g., Anglo, Slavic, Hindu, Han) during the U.S. imperial decline.

Du Bois' critique of liberal pluralism in the shape of American integrationism and multiculturalist democratization has been highlighted by scholars such as Penny Von Eschen and Mary Dudziak.[12] Cedric Robinson and Lisa Lowe have positioned Du Bois as an early theorist of racial capitalism itself.[13] Yet, little focus has been given to Du Bois' sense of liberal pluralism's earlier rise in the transwar transpacific, as he has been depicted as succumbing to its logics—an unfortunate irony, given the trenchancy of his postwar critique. In what follows, I will first briefly outline the debate concerning Du Bois' 1930s statements of support

for the pan-Asianist strategy of Imperial Japan, or Japanese liberal pluralism. I will then discuss how Du Bois' sense of Asia's emancipatory potential was in line with what Torsten Weber has called "pan-Asianism from below" or the anticolonial, regionalist sentiment in early twentieth-century Asia that predated Japan's appropriation of it in the 1930s for "pan-Asianism from above."[14] In particular, my focus is on the interpretative overlap Du Bois had with the Chinese revolutionary and pan-Asianist Sun Yat-sen regarding "realist-idealist" possibility in inter-Asian relations. As Robert Vitalis has pointed out, "realism" in the field of international relations was so termed during the transwar period. It concerned the twin material threats to Anglo-Saxon global dominance: the waning of *Pax Britannica* and the waxing of illiberal internationalism (both the Communist International and anti-/colonial regionalisms, such as pan-Asianism and pan-Africanism). Vitalis provocatively designates the white supremacist Lothrop Stoddard as the first American realist whose 1920s books warning the West of a rising tide of color predate E. H. Carr's 1939 *The Twenty Years' Crisis* (the latter usually cited as the first text outlining the realism-idealism binary in the international relations field).[15] During the transwar period, the field shifted from an earlier paradigm of interimperial relations and racial development, as seen in the title change of the first American international relations journal, the *Journal of Race Development* to *Foreign Affairs* (Du Bois published under both titles). "Idealism" includes the liberalism associated with Wilsonianism and the rise of *Pax Americana*, which was undermined by the 1933 exits of Japan and Germany from the League of Nations, America's own refusal to join the League, and the failure to prevent WWII. Idealism also includes the prefigurative politics of the anticolonial organizing that took nationalist (e.g., Indian, Korean), regionalist (e.g., pan-Asian, pan-African), and globalist (e.g., Communist International) forms. By describing Du Bois and Sun as "realist-idealists," I mean that their regionalist organizing was tempered by their *realpolitik*. After comparing their pan-Asianist rhetoric, I will then analyze Du Bois' 1930s grappling with Japanese empire and capitalism to argue that his politics remained consistently regionalist.

Finally, in the last section, my analysis turns toward genre. Whereas Du Bois often took a realist position in his political commentary that focused on material shifts on a global color line, in his fiction he could emphasize idealism and work with polyvocality. In his 1928 novel *Dark Princess,* "Japan" is curiously configured as the leading antagonist: the novel's pan-Asianist and eventually Afro-Asian organization for toppling global white supremacy is led by a problematically realist and anticommunist Japanese baron. The story features realist and idealist maneuvering by transpacific actors, and their separate and combined efforts to effect a postglobal white supremacy world. Du Bois' "color line within a color line"

formulation, found only in *Dark Princess*, is often mistakenly interpreted as between "Afro" and "Asian" that must be resolved before the color line between white and nonwhite can be successfully faded. When framed in this racially essentialist manner, the "line within the line" would seem to disappear with the realization of the realist-idealist Afro-Asian alliance and the novel's conclusion: the birth of an Afro-Indian child signifying an impending end of global white supremacy. Instead, I argue that the line names the *structure* of modern racism beyond the *content* of white supremacy or the nineteenth-century Gobineaurian hierarchy.[16] The phrase is Du Bois' warning that the dominative hierarchization generated by racial capitalism is not displaced by simply fading white supremacy. (For example, "civilized/civilizing" reconstituted as "developed/developing" became the dominant framework for global racial capitalism after the 1941–5 U.S.-Japan "race war."[17]) Accordingly, the color line within a color line is a problem for this twenty-first century that Du Bois in 1900 predicted shall see the re-ascent of a "brown and yellow world," or Asia.[18] Across the twentieth century, and in particular during the chaotic transition between British and American dominance, such a future was already foreseeable.

On the one hand, the internationalism in *Dark Princess* imitates realist strategies of war and racial reproduction, the birth of a messianic mixed-race child marking the consummation of the text's primary heterosexual dyad. On the other, because the story is told from the perspective of its ever-conflicted and idealist protagonist who infuses the reader with ambivalence and doubt, the color line within the color line is intentionally unresolved. *Dark Princess* thus presents Du Bois' deeper aspirational political ontology that his protagonist expresses in the second epigraph as a "divine Anarchy in some faraway heaven." The novel is, I suggest, queer praxis, because it addresses the emancipatory limits of racial reproduction, the clash of realist and idealist futurities, and the negotiation of the provincial and the cosmopolitan—all of which today fall under a queer heuristic. The text is arguably a precursor of today's queer regionalism frameworks that, in centering supranational relations, provincialize the heteronormative nation-state as the chief administrative apparatus extending racial capitalism.[19]

Du Bois and Imperial Japan: The Debate

In 1934, Du Bois resigned from the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), which he helped found in 1909, over disagreement regarding the organization's tacit acceptance of liberal integrationism. He called for a more socialist, if even separatist, strategy for better addressing the needs of the U.S. black working class.[20] The following year, in 1935, he published his magisterial *Black Reconstruction in America*, which highlighted black agency in both

ending American slavery and in seeking a more democratic and equitable postbellum. But then, after a 1936 trip to Japan and Manchukuo, he justified Japanese imperialism and settlement in Manchuria as more benevolent than Euro-American ambitions in Asia, citing Manchukuo's semi-socialist racial pluralism. Commenting in 1937 on the puppet state's *Gozoku kyōwa* or "Five races, one union" policy, Du Bois described Japanese liberal pluralism as potentially devoid of a "caste of Superiors and Inferiors."[21] He considered whether "colonial enterprise by a colored nation need not imply the caste, exploitation, and subjection…always implied in the case of white Europe."[22] However, by the end of the Asia-Pacific War, he had resolved that Japan's "Asiatic caste system under a 'superior' Japanese race…for the domination and exploitation of the peasants of Asia by Japanese trusts and industrialists…offer[ed] Asia no acceptable exchange for Western exploitation."[23] His statement showed recognition of the shape racial capitalism took in the Japanese imperial context.

Bill Mullen has interpreted the 1935–45 decade as a kind of about-face for the then-septuagenarian thinker. Mullen writes that Du Bois rethought Japan's violence and exploitation against his own "racialist nationalism in favor of Japan, motivated by anti-Eurocentrism [that] bleaches capitalism of its universal particulars."[24] According to Mullen, Du Bois applied a more robust Marxian analysis that included greater reflection on the world-historical implications of the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, as Du Bois had visited the Soviet Union in 1925 and became better aware of communism's advance in China. From Du Bois' postwar perspective, Mullen writes, "what the world needed was a colored nation that was clearly committed to smashing capitalism itself": Maoist China.[25] Yuichiro Onishi has summarized Du Bois' 1930s support of Japan thusly: a "preoccup[ation] with giving moral, epistemic, and political authority to the concept of race at a scale exceeding the nation-state wedded to gendered and heterosexual normativity…made him unable to extricate himself from the strong shaping force of colonial and capitalist modernity."[26]

This prominent narrative of Du Bois as an underdeveloped Marxist and simple Japan apologist, then China apologist, has been disputed by Etsuko Taketani. In her meticulous unpacking of Du Bois' support of Manchukuo in the context of rapidly shifting interimperial relations in Asia, Taketani observes "mutual implications" in Du Bois' rhetoric on Japan, China, and Russia.[27] Du Bois, in other words, exhibited a regionalist orientation toward Asia similar to his pan-Africanism. For Taketani, the matter of whether and when Du Bois "(wrongly) defended imperialism or (rightly) condemned it" is a superimposed concern that obfuscates his tendency to take realist positions for idealist ends. Taketani warns that Mullen's concept of "Afro-orientalism" to describe

Du Bois' splitting of modernity along the East–West axis for imagining Asia as helping liberate, either willfully or by sheer material ascent, the world from white supremacy renders the transpacific dialogue of which he was part as unidirectional: America outward.[28] Furthermore, a nation-centric, "teleological narrative of interpretation" of Du Bois as shifting from pro-Japan to pro-China portrays the leading twentieth-century black intellectual as "naively credulous of, or misguided by, a utopian vision of a transpacific alliance of peoples of color."[29]

In the analysis of Nahum Dmitri Chandler, Japan's ascent after its Meiji Restoration and the West's reactionary Yellow Peril rhetoric was for Du Bois the material antecedent for naming, early in his career, the "possibility of an Asian future as other than that bequeathed by the West." Chandler suggests that Du Bois applied his notion of double-consciousness from his 1903 *The Souls of Black Folk* to the matter of Asia in colonial modernity.[30] As Chandan Reddy has usefully summarized double-consciousness: Du Bois "refused the integration of blackness into a white-nonwhite binary, whose system of operation will always already position the black subject as simulacrum and copy." Rather than a "reduction of black existence to the position of the 'other,' [Du Bois developed] a nonbinary understanding of racial formations…[whereby] true self-consciousness existed outside the binary constructions of race."[31] Arguably, then, Du Bois was theoretically equipped to critique orientalism and strategically deploy the West's anxious particularization of the East, or what Asian Americanists today call the peril-model binary. (I chose the first epigraph to accord with this interpretation: Du Bois as a wielder of strategic orientalism.) Conversely, when Du Bois is framed as an "Afro-orientalist," he is seen as uncritically duplicating the peril-model binary with a configuration of Imperial Japan and then Maoist China as the "Yellow Promise" and China under Chiang Kai-shek as an Asian Uncle Tom.[32]

Du Bois, Sun Yat-sen, and the "Shadow of Asia"

In a 1925 article in *Foreign Affairs* entitled "Worlds of Color," Du Bois revisited his turn of the century color line formulation to update it with Bolshevism and the anticolonial, regionalist organizing of which he was part. He described the color line as having cast "shadows" of exploited and exploitable labor, and due to provincialism qua racism, white laborers as rejecting their plights as aligned with nonwhite laborers around the globe. He witnessed an exception to this pattern in the Soviet Union during his visit that year and described the nascent state contra what would become South Africa's apartheid regime, as "seeking a rapprochement with colored labor…making her peace with China and Japan…her leaders…in close touch with the leaders of India." He cited how Vladimir Lenin "himself grappled with the question of the American

Negros."[33] He explained that Euro-America, confronting both Marxist-Leninism and a rising tide of color, sought to maintain control over their respective imperial shadows, both materially and ideologically, lest they be forced to acknowledge that "over all Europe there stretches the yellow shadow of Asia that lies across the world."[34]

This "shadow of Asia" might seem to harken to Yellow Peril discourse that saw threat in Imperial Japan and Chinese republicanism (the monarchy ended with the 1911 Xinhai Revolution, during which Sun Yat-sen played an instrumental role) potentially conjoining in their goals with the Indian and African independence movements. But for Du Bois, the shadow was more than mere racial otherness of Europe. He described it as "worlds of color," a phrase that evoked the Afro-Asian commerce and cultural exchange that orbited China and India for several centuries before Vasco da Gama's voyage, the transatlantic slave trade and the Dutch and British East India Companies—the material history of Afro-Eurasia before the white supremacist claim on civilization. Indeed, a sense of nonwhite civilization in contradistinction to Europe's false monopoly on it fueled Du Bois' "Afro-Asian" imagination.[35] Still, in thinking about the imposition of colonial capitalism on global nonwhite cultures who had "little in common, either today or yesterday…pounded together artificially and not attracting each other naturally," Du Bois named a "shadow of shadows."[36] This conundrum of the "artificial" over the "natural" in modern inter-Asian, inter-African and Afro-Asian relations he would express in *Dark Princess* a few years later as the "[loom]ing…[of] the shadow of a color line within a color line."[37]

A sense of artificiality of relations also pervaded contemporaneous pan-Asianist views. In his famous 1924 speech "Pan-Asianism," delivered in Kobe, Japan, Sun Yat-sen coaxed his mostly Japanese audience to imagine a possible different future for "Asia." Describing Japan and China as "natural friends, unnatural enemies," and both as "not independent" thirty years earlier—by which he meant their territorial integrity largely retained, but choked by unequal treaties—Sun applauded Japan for managing to lift the treaties on itself, reminding that they still plagued China in part because of Japan.[38] Du Bois, in 1900, had described Japan's deflection of the treaties and extraterritoriality after the 1895 First Sino-Japanese War as the "greatest concession to the color line which the nineteenth century has seen," indicating his sense of how modern Sino-Japanese tensions were driven by a larger "struggle between East and West."[39] In his speech, Sun recounted how the Japanese triumph in the 1904–5 Russo-Japanese War (which Du Bois, in 1937, cited as "breaking the myth of white world domination"[40]) was celebrated as far away as Egypt, leaving Britain, Japan's ally, both delighted by Russia's humiliation and "painfully surprised…for the victory was certainly not a blessing for the white peoples."[41] Without explicitly naming colonized

Korea (Sun's speech would be criticized in Korean newspapers as "careless" and "clumsy"[42]), he warned his audience that Japan was at risk of becoming the "hawk of Western civilization" that ruled with "Might," and needed to "retain the characteristics of the Oriental civilization of the rule of Right." To distinguish the two, Sun cited "European civilization" or what today would be called the Westphalian system versus the then almost-defunct Chinese tributary system. Whereas colonized India had "always entertained the thought of independence" and would, if Britain were to weaken, "overthrow British rule and regain independence within five years," Nepal still continued to send tribute to China even when the "status of China had deteriorated to such an extent that it [was] inferior even to that of a British colony."[43] Sun then described the nascent Soviet Union as "expelled from the Family of Nations by the White races" and as "join[ing] with the Orient," indicating his non-racially essentialist vision for Sino-Soviet-Japanese cooperation to resist Euro-American domination for the welfare and improvement of "Asia."[44] His dream would never come to pass.

Although the record does not show Sun and Du Bois met, they had a mutual acquaintance in the Indian nationalist and pan-Asianist Rajpat Rai who met Sun many times in Japan, and to whom Du Bois dedicated *Dark Princess.*[45] Sun also appears twice in the novel featuring a pan-Asian alliance.[46] Curiously, both Sun and Du Bois hoped for a Sino-Soviet-Japanese alliance for reshaping global relations. In Du Bois' reflections, in fact, Sun's death in 1925 is rendered as the turning point when such an ideal loses its potential becoming. He wrote in 1937 that "China, after hesitation, after losing her great and far-sighted leader, Sun Yat-sen, turned…toward the leadership of modern industrial imperialism as represented in China, especially by England." With the Kuomintang falling under the leadership of Chiang Kai-Shek who carried out the 1927 Shanghai Massacre to suppress communism, thereby initiating civil war—and with China thereafter coordinating with Britain and America against Japan and the Soviet Union—Japan, both anticommunist and under containment by its white former allies, chose to, Du Bois wrote, "fight Europe by attacking China."[47] As Taketani has put it, Du Bois' "seemingly proimperialist narrative of the [Second] Sino-Japanese War," which features prominently in scholarship as the "illustration of his radical failure of vision with regard to Japanese imperialism," is actually sublated within a realist-idealist vision.[48] Namely, were a Sino-Soviet alliance to have come to pass under Sun or otherwise, Du Bois wrote in 1937, "the salvation of China…would not have rested upon Japan, and two-thirds of the world would have been arrayed against the industrial imperialism of Europe."[49]

My sense, then, is that even if an explicit Du Bois-Sun dialogue is not present in the archive, Sun's navigation of the interimperial arena

strongly influenced Du Bois' own sense of the parameters of inter-Asian possibility. As late as the 1931 Manchurian incident, Du Bois appealed for Sino-Japanese cooperation to "unmask [the Western leadership]… tear apart their double faces and double tongues and unite in peace."[50] Because both Sun and Du Bois shared a realist-idealist orientation, I believe it is worth revisiting the former's views on thorny historical matters that are less elaborated in the latter's writings, but on which scholars have problematically filled in the gaps. I will take two examples.

The first is regarding Korea. Du Bois wrote next to nothing about colonized Korea, which has been interpreted to mean that the Korean peninsula was a mere sacrifice in his "pro-Japan" orientation.[51] Conversely, Sun is known for organizing with Korean independence leaders exiled in China and offering his support from afar at the Paris Peace Conference for Korean independence from Japan and the 1919 March First Movement.[52] Yet, in his 1917 *The Vital Problem of China,* Sun described the 1910 annexation in realist terms: as a matter of "life and death" for Japan, a view to which Du Bois also subscribed.[53] In idealist terms, Sun stressed that for America, who had inveigled both Japan in 1853 and Korea in 1871 to open to liberalism, the annexation was only a matter of a "slight loss of trade": a power "whose Constitution is based on the principles of equality and liberty [but] was the first to advocate discrimination against the Yellow race [the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act]." For "thousands of years Korea was a tributary state of China…[but] perished," Sun wrote, because America pressed upon it a duplicitous model of self-determination and prosperity that "seduced Korea into separating herself from China…persuad[ing] it into a declaration of independence and then [leaving] it in the lurch."[54] "When Britain and Japan entered into an alliance [in 1902], and Korea was about to be annexed by Japan," Sun went on, "the United States was the first to recall her minister from Korea, instead of responding to the Korean appeal for assistance. Resentful as the Korean intellectuals are toward Japan on account of the annexation of their country, they are even more so toward the United States."[55] In this narrative, the question of who was to blame for Korea's predicament (Japan, Russia, Britain, America, China) is less important than the problem of an order imposed on the region: the Westphalian system and its deleterious doctrines of balance of power and sphere of influence, which pan-Asianists organizing from below sought to alleviate. In Sun's view, Korea had gullibly "relied upon somebody who could not be relied upon."[56] I suggest that were Du Bois to have written more on Korea, he would have derived a similar narrative.

The second example is regarding Sino-Japanese relations. As Lei Zhang has pointed out in an article in *American Studies*, the scholarly recounting of Du Bois' sense of Sino-Japanese relations has a 1920s gap such that he is rendered in simplistic terms "pro-Japan" following

the 1931 Manchurian incident.[57] Du Bois' postwar reflections give an indication of further overlap with Sun's views on the matter of squandered opportunity for Sino-Japanese cooperation in the late 1910s and early 1920s. To explain the overlap, I must first highlight their contrasting views on the emancipatory utility of WWI. During the war, Du Bois leaned into Allied rhetoric that Germany was "barbaric," because Wilhelm II's *Weltpolitik* in Africa included the 1904–7 Herero and Nama genocide, and in Asia, the Kaiser notoriously instructed his army to treat the Chinese Boxers like Attila's Huns treated Rome in their fifth-century "barbarous" raids. "Huns" would become the racialized slur directed at the German Army by the WWI Allied forces. Du Bois supposed that a German victory would result in a "crucifixion of darker peoples unparalleled in history," whereas an Allied one might assist in a fading of the global color line. This potential fading was because a coalition of "black Africans, brown Indians, and yellow Japanese…fighting for Britain and France" (the latter two, compared to Germany, as more experienced colonizers who had "at least begun to realize the cost and evil of race prejudice") might lead to a cascade of "new ideas about the essential equality of all men."[58] Du Bois would be disabused of his wartime optimism by the mistreatment of black servicemen during the war, the 1919 Red Summer, Wilson's veto of Japan's Racial Equality Proposal, as well as postwar imperial inertia on the colonization question (vis-à-vis the vision of the 1919 Pan-African Congress that Du Bois organized with Ida Gibbs Hunt). His miscalculation is often paired with his 1918 "Close Ranks" error for which the African American community excoriated him: he coaxed the readership of *The Crisis* to, "for as long as the war lasts…forget our racial grievances and close our ranks, shoulder to shoulder with our own white fellow citizens and the allied nations that are fighting for democracy."[59] Notably, Du Bois' reasoning during WWI can be likened to that found in Mohandas Gandhi's June 1918 leaflet entitled "Appeal for Enlistment" wherein Gandhi argued that "the easiest and the straightest way to win swaraj [home rule] is to participate in the defence of the [British] Empire."[60]

In contrast to reluctantly siding with experienced colonizers, Sun did not regard Germany as more "barbaric" than the Allies, but instead as "the least aggressive, and also the least ambitious" toward China.[61] The above-outlined lesson on Korea's gullibility Sun applied to what he called the "vital problem" of China's decision to join the Allies, rather than remaining neutral, in its hopes to gain sovereignty in a Westphalian system ill-designed for it. He decried China's leaders for naively choosing to side with Britain and France, who had conducted the Opium Wars, and against Germany to try to reclaim Shandong Province and lift unequal treaties, including the indemnities of the Boxer Protocol. Japan's initial request that China remain neutral, Sun described as a "kindness in saving China from danger" that also affected Japanese security. Chinese

leaders, however, interpreted this "kindness" as "depriv[ing] China of her diplomatic freedom." Sun warned that out of national pride and misguided tactics—namely, a "traditional, stupid policy" of "attacking the neighbor [Japan] with friends from a distance"—China would assuredly find itself suffering the longstanding British strategy of "sacrificing friends to befriend the enemy" in order to safeguard control over its crown jewel, India.[62] Put differently to highlight Sun's *realpolitik*, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (in place from 1902 in order to check Russia) superseded any Sino-British arrangement on Germany or Japan, but because Japanese power in the region could be offset by Anglo-U.S. cooperation, Sino-Japanese cooperation for "Asia" was, in Sun's view, practical. Instead, he saw China as choosing to forfeit the "opportunity of cooperating with Japan in developing East Asia, and played into the hands of the White peoples."[63] In his 2007 book *The Wilsonian Moment*, Erez Manela explains how the 1919 May Fourth Movement as the local response to China's humiliation at the Paris Peace Conference (Shandong transferred from defeated Germany to Japan with Anglo-French approval) was a turning point for Chinese nationalism. "Bolshevism as an alternative path for resisting imperialism" quickly gained appeal over the failed Wilsonian promise.[64] America would attempt to remedy the situation in favor of liberalism a few years later at the 1921–2 Washington Naval Conference by shifting Shandong back to China and curbing Japanese expansionism and Bolshevism with a long-sought internationalization of its open door policy: the Nine-Power Treaty.

But Du Bois, reflecting on this sequence of events in 1950 (the anticommunist enticement of China and various Anglo-U.S. measures to contain Japan: the Anglo-Japanese Alliance severed in 1923, the 1924 Immigration Act, and the restraining of Japan's naval buildup through the pretense of maintaining a "peaceful" balance of power) observed a "color prejudice in America, South Africa, Australia and even Britain… [an] unwillingness to link [their] fortunes with yellow people." He wrote that, after the 1922 conference, China was left "open to the Revolution under Sun Yat-sen"; but with the leader's 1925 death, the civil war after 1927, and Japan's 1931 seizure of "that part of China that was nearest anarchy…and England, America and the white world howled," China "let her bitterness toward Japanese aggression become a leading motive in her quest for a new unity and strength, forgetting all about the worse and longer aggressions of white Europe."[65]

By the time Du Bois visited Manchukuo in 1936, Sun's pan-Asianism had been appropriated for Japanese liberal pluralism and settlement. Wang Jingwei would later cite Sun for his collaborationist Reorganized Nationalist Government (1940–5) that claimed to be the true succession to the Kuomintang over Chiang Kai-shek's rule.[66] Still, my argument in this section is that describing Du Bois as capitulating to pan-Asianism

from above is too nation-centric and decontextualizing of the longer trajectory of pan-Asianism from below, of which he was well-aware, if not a participant. Du Bois adhered to a Sunian realist-idealist praxis for a pan-Asianism from below that by the 1930s had no practicable options. As he lashed out at a reporter in 1939 in response to a rumor that he was a spokesperson for Japan whose moral standing after the 1937 Nanjing Massacre had reached a new nadir: "It is not that I sympathize with China less, but that I hate white European and American propaganda, theft, and insult more. I believe in Asia for the Asiatics and despite the hell of war and fascism of capital, I see in Japan the best agent for this end."[67]

The Matter of Japanese Capitalism

I would contend that Du Bois explicitly bracketed liberal pluralism's rise in the transwar transpacific. In 1937, he described "two irreconcilable faces of white alarm" that were fixated on Japan's ruin. The first was a "white economic reaction based on imperial exploitation of colored peoples [that] wants Japanese capitalism to collapse lest it undermine white domination." The second was a "white economic reform [that] wants Japanese capitalism to collapse in order to advance the universal collapse of industrial imperialism." Both the "reformers and investors cheer heartily," he wrote, facing Japan with a "unanimity…[that has] too familiar earmarks of the Color Bar."[68] In this passage, Du Bois presents the moralistic teleology of the "end" of industrial imperialism, like the "end" of slavery before it, as enfolded into competition on the color line: the surplus generated by slavery and imperialism contributed to their transformations into more "ethical" modes of exploitation (e.g., America's free-trade empire against the European models). As he would summarize in 1947, "when looking at the facts frankly, slavery was a matter of economics…rather than a matter of right and wrong…[W]hen slavery became a source of vast income…[only then] there followed a frantic search for moral and racial justifications." Despite the tune of racial justice after America's delinquent abolishment of slavery, the nation did not aim for "freedom and higher wage for black labor, but its control under such forms of law as would keep it cheap."[69] Moon-Ho Jung has summarized the coinciding trajectory of racial capitalism in the transpacific: Asian immigrant labor to America from the mid-nineteenth century onward, and the empire's increased efforts for trade with Asia—beginning with the 1853 "humanistic" opening of Japan contra Britain and France's Opium Wars—helped assuage the material and moral contradiction of slavery and freedom in the United States.[70] Postbellum anxiety about unmanageable racial difference on the U.S. frontier resulted in the gradual exclusion of immigrants from Asia, beginning with the Chinese in 1882, until the empire became comfortably rooted in Asia by way of victories over waning Spain (1898) and waxing Japan (1945). During the

transwar period, Du Bois saw as enfolded into the competition on the color line both the moralistic conceits of Wilsonian self-determination for a compulsory liberal world order, as well as Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere for consolidating power beyond Euro-American dominance. That is to say, he saw the transpacific emergence of liberal pluralism as symptomatic of the color line, not the American or Japanese versions as exits from it.

Mullen has argued that Du Bois' support of Japan showed his critical fault to reduce "the fight against capitalism to the fight against racial/colonial oppression, not exploitation and expropriation of labor."[71] I would instead argue that Du Bois' sense of competition on the color line advancing more "ethical" forms of exploitation made him doubt economically deterministic Marxism. In 1936, he wrote that the "essential truths" of Marxism concerning labor and class did not imply an "automatic power [of] socialism to override and suppress race prejudice."[72] While the surest means of fading the global color line he saw in regionalist organizing, he wrote in 1937 of Japan's world-historical calling as pertaining to capitalist exploitation: whereas the empire in the late nineteenth century had "saved the world from slavery to Europe" by altering the balance of power in Asia and revealing the limits of white dominance, early twentieth-century Japan was positioned to, albeit would fail to, "save the world from slavery to capital."[73]

To make his case for Japan's potential to meet the challenge, he experimented with strategic orientalism:

> Japanese industry is controlled by the great groups of capitalists [*zaibatsu*]. They are generous and patriotic men. …But they are capitalists, completely subjected to the domination of the private profit motive. They are allied with international capital. They fear communism. Yet their supremacy in government influence is not as great as in many European lands. Above them stands the tradition of Imperial authority, the power of the essentially communistic Japanese family and the deep belief in the Japanese people.[74]

Mullen has interpreted this passage as uncritical orientalism and as a symptom of Du Bois' failure to grasp basic Marxist tenets. I propose a different interpretation given what Iyko Day, in her 2016 book *Alien Capital*, has called "romantic anticapitalism." As seen in the rhetoric behind the passage of the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act, American orientalism implicitly linked a white harnessing of capital with "good" (romantic) social reproduction against yellow/Asian harnessing with capital's abstract "evils." Romantic anticapitalism is not anti-capitalist, but

the ideology that splits the material and abstract dimensions of capital, facilitating racialization of the "other" as the living albatross of capital's dehumanizing effects (Day suggests a link between anti-Semitic and anti-Asian racism in this regard).[75] As alluded to in my opening paragraph, Du Bois recognized romantic anticapitalism in the passage of the 1924 Immigration Act: Japanese immigrants viewed not as "vagabonds and burdens but…too thrifty and too efficient"—that is, racialized as a material threat to the white working class, rather than capital itself as the culprit. He also saw romantic anticapitalism at work in Anglo-U.S. propaganda depicting Japanese imperialism as barbaric mimicry vis-à-vis the "more civilized" Wilsonian vision for international relations.[76] He seems to have been interested in neutralizing white romantic anticapitalism with an opposing idealism, or strategic orientalism.[77] To further explicate such an idealized path for Japanese modernity, Du Bois cited the Meiji Restoration as the consolidation of Japan's emperor system with the chief goals of unifying and modernizing the archipelago to deflect western incursion. Such deflection, he wrote, meant that the "Marxian interpretation must be changed to accord with a different set of facts."[78] These "facts" included his sense of how "primary [primitive] accumulation of capital in Japan [became] largely a government function, [so that] government control of capital is natural and awaited…. [C]ommunal welfare [is] considered far more than in Europe and America," resulting in a "contrast in class incomes [that] is not nearly as great as the money wage would indicate, since in the distribution of social satisfactions there is wide equality."[79] Given the more illiberal shape of Japanese capitalism in service of the nation as a whole, class-reductionist Marxism seemed to Du Bois too limited for grappling with the race-capital bind on the East–West axis, just as in his *Black Reconstruction* he treated such Marxism as inadequate for analyzing America's white–black labor relations.

Du Bois' sense of Japan's potential overlapped with Japanese thinkers who also configured the empire as materially capable and morally obliged to assist the region and world in "overcoming modernity."[80] For example, the philosopher Nishida Kitarō in his 1942 essay "The Principle of the New World Order" (*Sekai Shin-Chitsujo no Genri*), in making an argument generative for both pan-Asianism from above and below, reasoned that regionalism had the potential to move the world beyond the European models of empire, the Chinese tributary system that was too provincial and practically defunct, Wilsonian self-determination that would sustain liberal exploitation, and Marxist-Leninism that "still derives from the eighteenth-century abstract conception of the world based on individualism." Regionalism had the potential to serve as "formative globalism" where various peoples engaged not in self-determination, but "self-transcendence…in accordance with [their] own regional tradition."[81]

Significantly, Du Bois also applied strategic orientalism to China in

the same years he did to Japan, as he visited not only Japanese, but also Chinese universities during his 1936 trip.[82] In his unpublished 1937 "A World Search for Democracy," he paraphrased responses he received from interlocutors at Shanghai University on why China's tactics for reaching self-sovereignty were directed toward both Japan and the West:

> [The Chinese] were going to build a new Chinese industry which should emancipate them from European industry…they bitterly resented the intrusion of Japan coming in as though she were a western power destined to dominate orientals; as though she, the child culture of China, was going to show China…. The intrusion of Japan was resented because of its very success and because of its all too apt imitation of western technique. They were not called upon to take hold of the hands of their yellow brother and march side by side toward freedom and domination. They were asked rather to put their millions at the mercy of Japanese exploitation and let Japan finish what England and Germany and France had begun, but should never complete.[83]

Although Mullen and others have described Du Bois as stirred to reverse his support of Japan in the late 1930s and support China's march toward communism instead, the nation-centric teleology is unnecessary and unduly collapses the realist and idealist registers of Du Bois' rhetoric. Evinced in phrases such as Japan as "the child culture of China" and a potential Sino-Japanese "march…toward freedom and *domination*" (my emphasis), Du Bois' color line concept and positioning of nonwhiteness were, to borrow language from Vincent Schleitwiler, "not an appeal to a transcendent conception of justice." Rather, his strategic orientalism was historically contingent idealism against realism, or anticapitalist navigation of the "fissures between the disparate sites of racialization that competing imperialisms are unable to fuse together," including those of Japanese and Chinese empire.[84]

When liberal pluralism rooted with the postwar U.S. ascendance and a renewed anticommunist pact with Japan for the Cold War, and Third Worldism built upon the earlier regionalism from below, idealist pan-Asianism remained impressed on Du Bois' mind. Instead of shifting from pro-(Imperial) Japan to pro-(Communist) China, per se, he pondered in his unpublished 1950 manuscript "Russia and America" a world where communism might indeed fail. In this future scenario, he surmised that a just, global economic system would perhaps require a "new way of thinking on Asiatic lines." With a "stress on character, on goodness, on

spirit, through family loyalty and affection," a new system "out of India, out of Buddhism and Shintoism, out of the age-old virtues of Japan and China itself" might "stop the tendency of Western socialistic states to freeze into bureaucracy."[85] In the context of the 1955 Bandung Conference, he hoped such thinking would make common cause with an "ancient basic socialism" of Africa.[86]

When Japan Was the Antagonist of the Darker Races

I title this last section as a riff on Ernest Allen, Jr.'s seminal 1994 essay "When Japan was the 'Champion of the Darker Races.'"[87] Given that Du Bois is usually placed in the camp of African American thinkers who viewed pre-1945 Japan as a potential champion for nonwhite emancipation, the fact that his main Japanese character in his 1928 novel *Dark Princess* is the principal antagonist is a curiously underanalyzed counterpoint. Mullen has posited that the "color line within a color line" concept is "perhaps reflective of Du Bois' ambivalence…about Japan's rising national ambitions," but he and other scholars have not dwelt on the meaning of Japan across the text, focusing almost exclusively on the Afro-Indian heterosexual romance.[88] An exception is Lei Zhang, who has linked 1920s events to the novel's Japanese and Chinese characterizations, foregrounding Du Bois' doubts about Japan and his "embryonic" support of Communist China. In Zhang's view, neglect of the "other" Asian characters with sole attention on the romance has contributed to a view that "Asia" in *Dark Princess* is an "anticolonial unity" and points to "U.S.-based American studies scholars' lack of interest and efforts" in considering inter-Asian relations and overlooking Du Bois' own efforts.[89] This presumption of an anticolonial unity has likely effected interpretations of the meaning of "a color line within a color line" as between "Afro" and "Asia," rather than including the nuance of, say, India as colonized and Japan as colonizer.

As explained above, the line within a line concerns nonwhite relations "pounded together artificially" by colonial capitalism, as Du Bois put it in 1925. A bit like bone and marrow, the outside line is the imposed global white supremacy over the past several centuries, whereas the inside line is the replication of modern racism, not merely the type in service of white supremacy, but nevertheless dominatively hierarchical given how colonial racial capitalism functions. The outside and inside lines have historically been mutually reinforcing (e.g., U.S.-Japan cooperation for transpacific liberalism featuring both white and nonwhite hierarchies), but as the content of the outside fades with the decline of white dominance, the inside structure still remains. Homi Bhahba has explained that even as the inside line might seem to refer to the problem of antiblackness among Asians, it is actually not a "special pleading for the African American cause, [but] Du Bois [making] a larger point about the politics

of minoritization and its consequences for global solidarity…the risks and ruses that exist within revolutionary groups who claim to represent the wretched of the earth."[90] As Nico Slate has noticed, the novel "does not even attempt to resolve the challenges facing colored unity…the potential for a color line within a color line remain[ing] to haunt readers, as it would continue to occupy Du Bois."[91]

Dark Princess not only includes Asian characters beyond the princess herself, but the Japanese character, I argue, is vital to its formula. By choosing the romance genre that has formal requirements of a hero/ine, their lover, and a barrier who/that prevents the lovers from uniting until the end, Du Bois inserted "Afro America," "India," and "Japan," respectively, to develop a triangular relationship that explores the risks and ruses of an Afro-Asian alliance. The triadic arrangement consists of the African American protagonist Matthew Towns, the Indian princess Kautilya of Bwodpur, and a Japanese baron who later becomes the Prime Minister of the Darker Races. To outline the three constitutive dyads: the Afro-Indian one is a site of anticolonial idealism wherein the distance between provincialism (Matthew) and cosmopolitanism (Kautilya) is successfully traversed in the form of a heterosexual romance. The Indo-Japanese dyad is cosmopolitan and realist, taking the shape of a mentee/mentor relationship: the colonized (the princess) and a colonizer (the baron) are part of a realist-idealist pan-Asian alliance that eventually becomes an Afro-Asian one, albeit minus Matthew. Finally, the Afro-Japanese dyad registers the failed traversal of the realism-idealism binary in the form of a homosocial clash. Whereas the "black-brown" romance is realized as Matthew becomes a more cosmopolitan semi-realist, the "black-yellow" barrier is not overcome. In effect, the text's Afro-Asian alliance is intentionally rendered suspect.

I will now detail the narrative arc of the triad to showcase what I consider to be Du Bois' queer praxis. In an early scene at a Berlin dinner party, the Japanese baron insists that the pan-Asian alliance that Matthew happens upon "know[s] no line of color." A Chinese woman explains that "it is dominating Europe which has flung this challenge of the color line, and we cannot avoid it." But the baron then draws lines of civilization, describing Asia as having "millenniums of history where Europe counts her centuries," while the black race has questionable "abilities, qualifications and…possibilities." American Negros in particular the baron describes as "cowards," for which he does not "blam[e] them, poor things"—stripped by slavery of the necessary world-historical consciousness and self-actualization needed to "fight unless put up to it like dumb cattle by whites," unlike the Japanese and Indians who as "Samurai have been lords a thousand years or more; the ancestors of her Royal Highness [Kautilya] who have ruled for twenty centuries." In *Black Reconstruction*, Du Bois would combat the view of the enslaved as lacking agency by

incorporating slave revolts into Marxist historiography; in *Dark Princess,* Matthew sings a slave song of emancipation hoping to persuade the pan-Asian alliance of a black capacity for both "civilized" culture and political effectiveness. This early scene is where Du Bois presents the color line within a color line, the princess and the baron portrayed as cosmopolitan realists who lack the virtues of the protagonist's provincial idealism. Kautilya barely takes exception to the baron's framing of black ineptitude, envisioning American Negros instead as proto-Bolsheviks without a leader. When alone with Matthew, the baron instructs him to exit the princess's life, describing her as idealistically immature: after an "unfortunate visit to Russia"—a nod to Du Bois' own 1925 trip—"[she is] inoculated with…a Bolshevism of a mild but dangerous type."[92] The baron's anticommunism accords with real-world Japan's sizeable force that contributed to Woodrow Wilson's 1918–22 Siberian Intervention. Matthew will later describe Japan as "aping the West."[93]

Returning to Harlem, Matthew adheres to a mission that Kautilya gave him: to investigate a Marcus Garvey–like figure named Perigua and assess the possibility of a dark proletariat uprising in America. Rather than revolutionary, Matthew finds Perigua unorganized and dangerous and writes as much to Kautilya, but he receives no reply because he assumes the Japanese baron is intercepting his letters.[94] Working as a Pullman porter, Matthew witnesses the lynching of a friend named Jimmie. In response, he ineffectually tries to organize the porters (the real-world unionization success of A. Philip Randolph still years away). In a whirlwind of frustration and vengeance, and to prove wrong the "sneer of the Japanese" regarding Negros as provincial cowards, Matthew participates in Perigua's scheme to derail a trainful of Klansmen en route to a national Ku Klux Klan meeting in Chicago.[95] The terrorist plot is halted by the sudden reappearance of the princess on the train who is herself planning to attend the meeting, the Klan having invited "certain Japanese and other Asiatic guests" in an attempt to "adroitly…pit the dark peoples against each other."[96] Although scholars have suggested the princess appears serendipitously for the sake of the romance, her connection with the baron has been overlooked. As if forbearers of Whiteness studies, the baron and princess plan to investigate the rising-tide-of-color rhetoric at the meeting that aims to "discount in advance" their "Great Cause." The princess in this scene describes the baron as recently "converted" on the matter of the "tremendous possibilities of the American Negro." But rather than the romantic barrier removed at this early juncture, Matthew becomes "dumb and bewildered" at the "intricacies of the tactics of the Japanese," a symptom of his doubts, incapacity, and/or unwillingness to stand above the fray of antiblack racism in America for a more cosmopolitan outlook.[97] For Matthew, attending a Klan meeting for research is not a relatable course of action. His character arc is not

coward-to-hero or follower-to-leader, but provincial idealist-to-worldly semirealist. After a public trial attended by the princess and the baron, Matthew commits himself to prison where he will mull over his being a "mass of quivering nerves and all too delicate sensibility…liable to be a Perigua [an extremist] or a hesitating, complaining fool."[98]

Released from jail and convinced Kautilya is forever gone from his life, Matthew tries to adopt a realist perspective, finding himself entrenched in a Chicago political machine with social climbers Sara Andrews and Sammy Scott. Now a politician, he is drained of "all his enthusiasm, all his hope, all his sense of reality."[99] To solve for himself the "woman problem once and for all," with a view that marriage will stop "secret longings and wild open revolt," he marries the mixed black-white Sara who moves shrewdly between the black and white worlds, even making deals with the Klan in order to secure power for herself, Sammy, Matthew, and the local black community.[100] Sara's goal is to transform Matthew into a senator so that they can become a power couple. As Roderick Ferguson has described their relationship: "marriage, according to the novel, is a technique of liberal governmentality that gives legitimacy to black middle-class efforts to assimilate into liberal democracy, and acquire power according to its rules of engagement."[101] Their marriage implies the prospect of reproduction as a method for advancing the fledgling U.S. liberal-pluralist state, wherein multiracial bodies do not undermine, but instead prop up the state, as Sara's mixed-raceness and politics attest. Since Matthew and Sara's marriage is written as destined to fail, Du Bois' narrative in this section is queer in the sense of his rejection of the reproduction of the burgeoning interwar U.S. liberal pluralism.

In Alys Eve Weinbaum's reading, though, because Du Bois portrays Sara as unsuitable for reproduction with Matthew in terms of "sterile whiteness" against Kautilya's "fecund brownness," the novel extends heteropatriarchy and orientalism. Citing the birth of the black-brown child at the conclusion, Weinbaum describes Du Bois as advancing "heterosexuality and reproductivity as twinned motors of black internationalist anti-imperialist politics" and legitimizing "by reversal" racial requirements for belonging through an "uncritical naturalization of the heterosexual matrix out of which spring 'properly' gendered and sexed reproductive subjects."[102] Weinbaum's analysis is undermined by a couple of oversights. First, a now-canonical debate in Queer studies concerns the matter of reproductive futurity and the "child" as the sign of heteropatriarchy vis-à-vis racialization that undercuts futurity.[103] Rahul Rao has incisively pointed out that the very canonicity of the debate points to scholars presuming a global heterotemporality against which critical intervention is imagined.[104] Du Bois' web of relations in *Dark Princess* are organized under both the U.S. nation-state and a supranational Afro-Asian space (a fictional conjoining of real-world

pan-Asianism and pan-Africanism), but the heteropatriarchy of both are rendered incompatible with the text's prefigurative, emancipatory future. In order for racial reproduction to undergird this future, the birth of the child would need resolve the color line within a color line, but this is not the case (since, as I have explained, the line is not Afro/Asian specifically, but the structure of modern racial hierarchies generally). Matthew and Kautilya's relationship is consistently undercut by the elitist, masculinist members of the pan-Asian alliance: the Japanese baron and Indian members of Kautilya's entourage who view Matthew as unworthy and seek to control the princess's future. The baron is noticeably absent when the birth is celebrated, capping the ambiguous cohesion of the Afro-Asian alliance. In other words, Du Bois not only queerly forecloses racial reproduction of the liberal-pluralist U.S. state through the failure of the Matthew-Sara dyad, but also queerly targets its disciplining beyond America through the fought-for success of the Matthew-Kautilya one. Secondly, just because idealist Matthew chooses Kautilya's optimistic internationalism over Sara's cynical navigation of Chicago's political machine does not mean that Du Bois himself prioritizes one over the other. As Eric Strand has suggested, Sara, who expertly rallies black women voters, is perhaps the story's "American Dark Princess," which would suggest a contemporaneity of intra- and international tactics.[105] Evidence for this is the happy ending Du Bois gives Sara with Sammy after her divorce from Matthew, while the Matthew-Kautilya dyad does not spell full liberation.

Matthew never joins the alliance of which Kautilya is part. When the Japanese baron reenters Matthew's life in Chicago to inform him that the alliance has now, some years later, "full representation" of the black race and that Matthew is invited to hold the position of "Negro chairman," Matthew rejects the offer immediately, recalling the internationalist "dream in Berlin [as] false and misleading." He is unsure if his feelings are driven in part by animus toward the baron for having "wrecked his world."[106] Although the baron exits the story after this encounter, which permits the romance to advance, the baron-as-romantic-barrier appears one final time in the last section. Kautilya saves Matthew from being nominated to Congress where he would have become a cog servicing the cycle of U.S. liberal democracy; the reader learns that she has been laboring in Chicago, fulfilling her off-page character arc to ostensibly shed her elitist bias. Having finally overcome their provincial/cosmopolitan difference, Matthew and Kautilya debate how Asia's liberation can happen through emancipating black America and vice versa, both of them imagining in transpacific and regionalist terms. Kautilya recounts her school years in Britain, claiming to have transcended a colonial brainwashing before embarking on her present quest. Yet, her journey would have been impossible, she informs Matthew, without the council of her "great and

good friend whom you have met and dislike because you do not know him," the Japanese baron, whom she describes as "civilization":

> You do not realize him yet, Matthew. He is civilization—he is the high goal toward which the world blindly gropes; high in birth and perfect in courtesy, filled with wide, deep, and intimate knowledge of the world's past—the world, white, black, brown and yellow: knowing by personal contact and acquaintanceship the present from kings to coolies. He is a man of lofty ideal without the superstition of religion. He is our leader, Matthew, the guide and councilor, the great Prime Minister of the Darker World.[107]

Given their different perception of a man who had once described American Negros as "cowards" and "like dumb cattle," Matthew soon reverts to doubt about not just the Afro-Asian alliance, but his relationship with Kautilya. Before learning of the pregnancy, he begins to see with "increasing clearness, something that Kautilya, he thought, must begin to realize": that "her freedom from him and his people… from this entanglement from which the thoughtful Japanese and Indians had tried to save her—would mean an increased and broader chance for her own work in her own world. …[Their relationship] was self-deception."[108] Despite the birth of their child or even in light of it, Matthew's misgivings will undoubtedly remain. This is especially because, whereas Matthew learned from the train derailment sequence to reject violence as revolutionary (and Kautilya, a Gandhian, believes in "gradual emancipation"), the strongest group among a newly formed "Great Central Committee of Yellow, Brown and Black…believes only in Force." By democratic decree, they intend to, if necessary, "pound [white] arrogance into submission…kill them, conquer them, humiliate them." At this, Kautilya, who is the primary realist-idealist in the story, responds: "they may be right—that's the horror, the nightmare of it: they may be right."[109] The color line within a color line, across the text, only outstretches like a coil.

Du Bois' queer praxis in *Dark Princess,* beyond foregrounding the emancipatory limits of racial reproduction, can also be thought of in terms of the failed traversal of the realism-idealism binary and the negotiation of the provincial–cosmopolitan one. Jose Esteban Muñoz rendered "queer" as "not yet," given disidentification with the processes of nation-state, empire and race, and the attendant heteronormativity, which generates the pull between realist and idealist politics.[110] But following Rahul Rao's insight about presumptions of a global heterotemporality, "not yet" risks implying a cosmopolitan temporality that subsumes

provincial frames wherein queerness "was/is already." In *Dark Princess*, Matthew grapples not only with the universalizing temporality of white supremacy, but also elitist Asians who see themselves as on the cusp of a "global" history generated by the color line. As Chandan Reddy has noted, the concept of queerness as taken up in the Global South is used not only to challenge provincial heteropatriarchies and nation-statist models of selective inclusion of difference (liberal pluralism), but also for bridging the gap between the provincial (Reddy uses the term "vernacular") and the cosmopolitan, for claiming contemporaneity for transgressive raced/gendered sexual subjects in an era of global human rights.[111] Similarly, in a thought-provoking passage in the final section of the novel, Matthew posits in a letter to Kautilya the contemporaneity of emancipatory formations, leading him to wonder if any choice truly exists among "monarchy and oligarchy and democracy" or if the choice is only for "the objects for which we will enthrone tyrannical dictators… for the sake of aristocrats as in Czarist Russia, or dictators for the sake of millionaires as in America, or dictatorship for the factory workers and peasants in Soviet Russia." Kautilya responds: "Oh, my Matthew, your oligarchy as you conceive it…is democracy, if only the selection of the oligarchs is just and true…. [C]hoose well the Tyrants." Unlike her, Matthew remains unconvinced that what he calls a "divine Anarchy in some faraway heaven" will ever be reachable given the drive for "massed and concentrated power…to accomplish anything worthwhile doing in this muddled world."[112]

Sanda Mayzaw Lwin has made a useful conceptual link between Du Bois' political ontology in *Dark Princess* and Jacques Derrida's notion of "democracy to come" (*la démocratie à venir*) or ideal democracy as having a temporality of "never now."[113] To extend the link, democracy is contradictory and perhaps even self-destructing because of its implicit relation of individual/group sovereignty against the peril of the antidemocratic "other."[114] With democracy regarded as the only civilized form of social ordering, it has long been tangled in the mix of racial capitalism: since the Enlightenment, the "Oriental despotism" motif has been regularly reconstituted. Notably, today's strongest liberal democracies in the transpacific all but form a Sinophobic military bloc as they miscorrelate democracy with peace and freedom. Echoing the social contract theory of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Du Bois noted in 1938 that "democracy does not and cannot mean freedom. On the contrary, it means coercion…[the] submission of the individual will to the general will, justified in this compulsion only if the will is general and not the will of special privilege."[115] Perhaps to overcome democracy's paradoxical configuration on the global scale, the temporality of narration in the final section of *Dark Princess* sheds literary realism in favor of a "mythic rhythm," as Madhumita Lahiri has put it. The Afro-Indian child is

"bombastically produced": the "temporality of political possibility invested in that figure is more strictly messianic than futuristic."[116] Futurism connotes realism and realist-idealism and implies variables such as racial capitalism, racial reproduction, Westphalian relations, liberal democracy, and so forth. Utopianism is the end result of idealism, persistently "not yet." In contrast, messianism in both the religious and secular senses connotes a nonlinear, emancipatory "event" that is unforeseeable and unexpected—a queer temporality best apprehended through fiction. As the novel ends with the messianic event, Du Bois' use of it is an invitation for readers to imagine the route and shape of emancipation themselves.

Achille Mbembe has cautioned of a globally permeating "negative messianism": liberation believed no longer possible or even deserved, as liberalism would seem to no longer need democracy, while the anticipated Global North inaction/action in the decades ahead shall lead to planetary ruin and death, so why not "end it now?"[117] *Dark Princess* helps reorient readers from such pessimistic political paralysis. Du Bois' optimistic navigation of the tumultuous transwar period, when no single empire was dominant, can inform a sense of positive course plotting through the comparable present. Across this essay, I have resisted the too-common narrative that Du Bois' transwar optimism took a shape of simple support of Japanese empire as a speedy route to fade a global color line. *Dark Princess* shows that he pondered the problem of the durability of racial capitalism beyond the color line's fading. Notwithstanding his 1930s leaning into Imperial Japan's pan-Asianism, an incriminatory rhetorical strategy even if as an attempt to counterbalance Wilsonian moralism, I have argued that he more foundationally subscribed to regionalism from below as the main defense against the duplicity of the rising liberal pluralism. Had Du Bois been asked what would be the problem of this twenty-first century, I imagine he would have answered the problem of the color line within the color line.

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Notes

1. W. E. B. Du Bois, "Prospect of a World without Race Conflict," *American Journal of Sociology* 49 (March 1944): 451. "The idea of Japan was to invoke force—to drive Europe out of Asia and substitute the domination of a weak Asia by a strong Japan. The answer of China was cooperation and gradual understanding between Great Britain, France, America, and China. [But] Chinese leaders are under no illusions whatever as to the past attitude of Europe toward Chinese."

2. W. E. B. Du Bois, *Dark Princess: A Romance* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 204.

3. See Naoko Shimazu, *Japan, Race, and Equality: The Racial Equality Proposal of 1919* (New York: Routledge, 2003).

4. W. E. B. Du Bois, "The Meaning of Japan (1937)," *CR: The New Centennial Review* 12, no. 1 (2012): 241.

5. W. E. B. Du Bois, *Color and Democracy: Colonies and Peace* (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co, 1945), 6–7.

6. Pearl Buck, "Equality Issue Again Looms: China's Anticipated Request May Renew Bitterness of 1919," *New York Times*, 19 September 1944: 20.

7. "Chinese Drop Oaks Fight for Racial Equality," *Chicago Defender*, 2 December 1944: 3.

8. Marc Gallicchio, *The African American Encounter with Japan and China: Black Internationalism in Asia, 1895–1945* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 186–9.

9. As Takashi Fujitani, *Race for Empire: Koreans as Japanese and Japanese as Americans During World War II* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2011), 8, 25, has explained, Manchukuo and the United States' 1934 Tydings-McDuffie Act were parallel and competing experiments on the path to liberal pluralism, distinguished from the earlier cooperative practice of empire when Japan colonized Korea, and America the Philippines, to spread "civilization" to those deemed not yet developed enough for self-rule and/or too weak to defend themselves against "less benevolent" powers.

10. Lisa Yoneyama, *Cold War Ruins: Transpacific Critique of American Justice and Japanese War Crimes* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2016), 19.

11. The concept of "racial capitalism" inheres "race" as a substrate across the history of capitalism, such as in the account of Cedric Robinson's 1983 *Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2021), since Europe's grappling with ethnic difference in its feudal twelfth century. Race is a historically particularized composite that intersects with gender/sexual difference and so on, functioning as a modality of human differentiation for de/valuation that capitalism requires for its perpetuation. Thus, racial capitalism *is* capitalism, but the concept is distinguished from Marxist accounts of race as ideology for legitimating "primitive accumulation" during

feudalism and colonial modernity, but of secondary or residual importance to class stratification at a later stage. The racial capitalism concept rejects the stagist model as itself inscribed by race, given the unevenness of capitalist development and the contemporaneity of the enslaved or otherwise exploited and dispossessed across the rise and maintenance of industrial/postindustrial capital (e.g., settler-colonialism as ongoing).

12. Penny Von Eschen, *Race against Empire: Black Americans and Anticolonialism, 1937–1957* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997); Mary Dudziak, *Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000). In an appeal to the United Nations in 1947, Du Bois questioned a postwar international order led by a United States that saw a "chance to make inflated profits from the want which came upon the world": the "want" being decolonization and racial equality. W. E. B. Du Bois, introduction to *An Appeal to the World: A Statement on the Denial of Human Rights to Minorities in the Case of Citizens of Negro Descent in the United States of America and an Appeal to the United Nations for Redress*, ed. W. E. B. Du Bois (New York: NAACP), 11. In a 1956 speech, "The New Negro Liberation Movements (1956)," W. E. B. Du Bois Papers, Special Collections and University Archives, University of Massachusetts Amherst Libraries, 13, he described the 1948 integration of the U.S. military prior to its participation in the Korean War, and *Brown v. Board of Education* (1954), as a "partial breaking of the color line used to answer the stand of the Soviet Union against color discrimination and its fight on colonial imperialism…to split American Negros from union or sympathy for colonial people."

13. Robinson, *Black Marxism*; Lisa Lowe, *The Intimacies of Four Continents* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2015), 149–50.

14. Torsten Weber, *Embracing 'Asia' in China and Japan: Asianism Discourse and the Contest for Hegemony, 1912–1933* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018).

15. Robert Vitalis, *White World Order, Black Power Politics: The Birth of American International Relations* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015), 83.

16. Du Bois provincialized the Gobineaurian hierarchy in a 1936 unpublished essay on miscegenation: "The effect of the growth of national consciousness and imperial rivalries has been an attempt to prove that all modern culture derives from an Aryan or Nordic race and that degeneration and relapses from cultural standards has been the result of racial mixture. This theory was first stated in its extreme form by Count Joseph A. Gobineau in the middle of the nineteenth century; and his thesis has been expanded and continued by H. S. Chamberlain in Germany, and Grant, Gould, Stoddard, and McDougal in America." W. E. B. Du Bois, "Miscegenation, 1936," W. E. B. Du Bois Papers, Special Collections and University Archives, University of Massachusetts Amherst Libraries, 4–5.

17. For the United States-Japan War as a "race war," see John Dower, *War Without Mercy: Race & Power in the Pacific War* (New York: Pantheon, 1986).

18. W. E. B. Du Bois, "The Present Outlook for the Darker Races of Mankind (1900)," in *The Problem of the Color Line at the Turn of the Twentieth Century:*

The Essential Early Essays, ed. Nahum Dimitri Chandler (New York: Fordham University Press, 2015), 118.

19. For queer regionalism, see, e.g., Gayatri Gopinath, *Unruly Visions: The Aesthetic Practices of Queer Diaspora* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2018).

20. He made this case in a 1934 essay, W. E. B. Du Bois, "A Negro Nation within the Nation," *Current History* 42, no. 3 (June 1935): 265–270.

21. The five races were Manchu, Japanese, Han, Mongol, and Korean.

22. W. E. B. Du Bois, "Forum of Fact and Opinion," *Pittsburgh Courier*, 13 February 1937, in *Newspaper Columns by W.E.B. Du Bois,* vol. I, ed. Herbert Aptheker (White Plains, NY: Kraus-Thomson Organization, 1986), 166–7. Du Bois further claimed as "immaterial the question of whether Manchukuo was an independent state or a colony of Japan" so long as Japan was not "reducing the mass of the people to slavery and poverty…stealing the land and monopolizing the natural resources." He overzealously determined this as not the case.

23. W. E. B. Du Bois, "The Winds of Time: War between Races," *Chicago Defender,* 25 August 1945.

24. Bill Mullen, *W. E. B. Du Bois: Revolutionary Across the Color Line* (Chicago: Pluto Press, 2016), 84–6.

25. Bill Mullen, *Un-American: W. E. B. Du Bois and the Century of World Revolution* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2015), 137–8, 144.

26. Yuichiro Onishi, *Transpacific Antiracism: Afro-Asian Solidarity in 20th-Century Black America, Japan, and Okinawa* (New York: NYU Press, 2013), 92.

27. Etsuko Taketani, *The Black Pacific Narrative: Geographic Imaginings of Race and Empire between the World Wars* (Hanover, NH: Dartmouth College Press, 2014), chap. 5.

28. Bill Mullen, *Afro-Orientalism* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2004).

29. Etsuko Taketani, "The Cartography of the Black Pacific: James Weldon Johnson's Along This Way," *American Quarterly* 59, no. 1 (2007): 81–3.

30. Nahum Dmitri Chandler, "Intro: On the Virtues of Seeing–At Least but Never Only–Double," *The New Centennial Review* 12, no. 1 (2012): 18–20.

31. Chandan Reddy, *Freedom with Violence: Race, Sexuality, and the US State* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011), 76.

32. The following 1937 quote from Du Bois has been read as evidence of uncritical orientalism: China under Chiang Kai-shek contra Japan as "licking the boots that kicked her," choosing to be a "coolie for England rather than acknowledging the only world leadership that did not mean color caste…the straight road to world dominance by the yellow race…ruined in Asia by the same spirit that animates the 'white folks' nigger' in the United States." W. E. B. Du Bois, "Forum of Fact and Opinion," *Pittsburgh Courier*, 23 October 1937, in *Newspaper Columns by W.E.B. Du Bois*, *vol. 1*, ed. Aptheker, 245. Rather, as I will suggest, the hoped-for Sino-Japanese cooperation inhered in this quote is not "Afro-orientalism," but drawn from pan-Asianist discourse as strategic orientalism. For

strategic orientalism, see note 77, this article.

33. W. E. B. Du Bois, "Worlds of Color," *Foreign Affairs* 3, no. 3 (1925): 442.

34. Ibid., 423.

35. As Du Bois would write in a chapter titled "Asia in Africa" in his 1947 *The World and Africa* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 122: "It is probable that Chinese ships traded directly with Africa from the eighth to the twelfth centuries [during the flourishing Song dynasty, in particular]. When the Portuguese came, they found the Arabs intermarried and integrated with the Bantu [peoples of sub-Saharan Africa] and in control of the trade." The "shadow of Asia" as "barbarism" for Europeans harkened to the Mongol Empire's siege on Kyiv and attacking as far west as Vienna in the thirteenth century, as well as the earlier fifth-century attacks by the Huns on Rome. The shadow of Asia as "lapsed civilization" concerned how the first Atlantic crossings by Europeans were searches for maritime trade routes to prosperous Ming China and Mughal India after the Ottoman Empire effectively closed the Silk Road in the mid-fifteenth century after conquering Byzantium. In sum, the threat of the Asian shadow for Europe was, to Du Bois' mind, the interlinked Afro-Eurasian past and a projected future of Asian reascendance that revealed the false equivalence of "civilization" with Europe.

36. Du Bois, "Worlds of Color," 443.

37. Du Bois, *Dark Princess*, 16.

38. Sun Yat-sen, "Pan-Asianism (1924)" in *The Vital Problem of China* (Taipei, Taiwan: Sino-American Publishing Company, 1953), 164. Japan and China as "natural friends, unnatural enemies" is at 109.

39. Du Bois, "The Present Outlook for the Darker Races of Mankind (1900)," 118–9. That the First Sino-Japanese War was the first indication for Du Bois of a "struggle between East and West" is mentioned in his 1940 autobiography *Dusk of Dawn: An Essay Toward an Autobiography of a Race Concept* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 15.

40. Du Bois, "The Meaning of Japan (1937)," 238.

41. Sun, "Pan-Asianism (1924)," 164.

42. Young-Seo Baik, "Conceptualizing 'Asia' in modern Chinese mind: a Korean perspective," *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies* 3, no. 2 (2002): 280–2.

43. Sun, "Pan-Asianism (1924)," 168–70.

44. Ibid., 173.

45. Rajpat Rai met Sun Yat-sen many times in 1915 when the latter was exiled in Japan. During his 1915–20 stint in America, Rai befriended Du Bois, and as the story goes, commented on a draft of *Dark Princess*. Du Bois dedicated the novel to Rai, who died in 1928 from injuries sustained after a beating by British police during a protest of the Simon Commission, an inquiry into constitutional reform for India that consisted of entirely British parliamentary members and no Indians. Books by Rai with pan-Asianist content include his 1916 *The United States of America: A Hindu's Impressions and a Study* (Calcutta, India: R. Chatterjee) and his 1918 *The Evolution of Japan and Other Papers* (Calcutta, India: R. Chatterjee).

46. Sun appears in Du Bois, *Dark Princess*, 177, when the princess Kautilya mentions having met him in Beijing during her travels, and at 209: "Oh, why is it that Sun Yat-sen must die so soon?"

47. W. E. B. Du Bois, "Forum of Fact and Opinion," *Pittsburgh Courier*, 25 September 1937, in *Newspaper Columns by W.E.B. Du Bois*, vol. 1, ed. Aptheker, 240–1. In contrast to his positive view of Sun, Du Bois' opinion of Chiang Kai-shek was quite low. In his 1950 unpublished manuscript "Russia and America," W. E. B. Du Bois Papers, Special Collections and University Archives, University of Massachusetts Amherst Libraries, 142, Du Bois described Chiang as a "greedy, crafty man of no ideals or integrity" who "pretended to keep Sun Yat-sen's principles of nationalism, democracy and people's livelihood, but he married into the rich Soong family and ended in such dictatorship and reaction, that that even when I was in China, in December 1936, both warlord and Communist resented his surrender to Japanese imperialism, kidnapped him, hiding on a rock in his nightshirt and without his false teeth; and held him until he promised to fight Japan." Du Bois was referring to the Xi'an Incident.

48. Taketani, *The Black Pacific Narrative*, 170.

49. Du Bois, "Forum of Fact and Opinion," 25 September 1937, 240–1.

50. W. E. B. Du Bois, "Listen, Japan and China (1931)," in *W.E.B. Du Bois on Asia: Crossing the World Color Line*, eds. Bill Mullen and Cathryn Watson (Jackson, MS: University of Mississippi Press, 2005), 74.

51. Representative of this view is Seok-Won Lee, "The paradox of racial liberation: W. E. B. Du Bois and Pan-Asianism in wartime Japan, 1931–1945," *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies* 16, no. 4 (2015): 523, who points out that colonial Korea was "not on Du Bois's itinerary [during his 1936 trip to Japan and Manchukuo]…. [T]his oversight, whether intentional or not, deprived Du Bois of an opportunity to see the wider reality of Japanese colonialism."

52. Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 129.

53. Sun, "The Vital Problem of China (1917)" in *The Vital Problem of China*, 110. Du Bois, "The Meaning of Japan (1937)," 238, on Korea and the First Sino-Japanese War: "[For control of] Korea which was almost a motherland to Japan and yet geographically a threat to her independence, Japan attacked China and in a short, swift war of a year, showed the weakness of the greater country and convinced Europe that the time for dismembering China and making her a colonial appendage to European commerce had come."

54. China was forced to relinquish suzerainty over Korea with the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki, but here Sun is talking about the U.S.' 1882 Shufeldt Treaty that weaned Korea from China with the enticement of commerce, "perpetual peace and friendship," and a seeming security guarantee "should other powers deal unjustly or oppressively with either Government."

55. To which Korean intellectuals Sun is referring is beyond my scope. However, he was speaking to a broad sense of betrayal in Korea when the

Theodore Roosevelt administration disregarded the Shufeldt Treaty in favor of the Taft–Katsura Agreement for the U.S.-Japan "civilizing" missions in the Philippines and Korea. For a microhistorical account, see John Edward Wilz, "Did the United States Betray Korea in 1905?" *Pacific Historical Review* 54, no. 3 (1985): 243–70.

56. Sun, "The Vital Problem of China (1917)," 110–11. American officials pressed for Korean independence only when it became instrumentalizable during the United States–Japan transwar competition.

57. Lei Zhang, "Imagining Japan and China in *Dark Princess*: W. E. B. DuBois' Transpacific Imagination of World Revolution in the Late 1920s," *American Studies* 58, no. 4 (2019): 75–95.

58. W. E. B. Du Bois, "World War and the Color Line," *The Crisis* 9, no. 1 (November 1914).

59. W. E. B. Du Bois, "Close Ranks," *The Crisis* 16, no. 3 (July 1918).

60. Mohandas Gandhi, "Appeal for Enlistment (1918)," in *The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, vol. 17* (Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1965), 84.

61. Sun, "The Vital Problem of China (1917)," 13.

62. Ibid, 47, 78, 80. Sun colorfully described British treatment of its allies as like the "delicate care usually shown by farmers in the rearing of silkworms; after all the silk has been drawn from cocoons, they are destroyed by fire or used as food for fish."

63. Ibid., 54–5. Sun further wrote that Japan's Twenty-One Demands upon China were "drawn up not at Japan's dictation," but by Yuan Shikai to appeal to Japan in his "eagerness to mount the Throne." Sun would, however, be frustrated with Japan for the transactional acquisition of Shandong, as if China were "a pig." Sun, "How to Remove China's Antagonism (1919)," in *The Vital Problem of China*, 143–7.

64. Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment*, 196.

65. Du Bois, "Russia and America," 148.

66. Weber, *Embracing 'Asia' in China and Japan*, 279–86.

67. Quoted in Gallicchio, *The African American Encounter with Japan and China*, 92.

68. W. E. B. Du Bois, "'Chapter 16—Jones in Japan': from *A World Search for Democracy* (1937)," *CR: The New Centennial Review* 12, no. 1 (2012): 260–1.

69. Du Bois, introduction to *An Appeal to the World*, 2, 5, 11.

70. Moon-Ho Jung, *Coolies and Cane: Race, Labor, and Sugar in the Age of Emancipation* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006).

71. Mullen, *Un-American*, 135.

72. W. E. B. Du Bois, "Social Planning for the Negro, Past and Present," *The Journal of Negro Education* 5, no. 1 (1936): 110–25.

73. W. E. B. Du Bois, "What Japan Has Done," *Pittsburgh Courier*, 20 March 1937, in *W.E.B. Du Bois on Asia*, eds. Mullen and Watson, 66–8.

74. Ibid.

75. Iyko Day, *Alien Capital: Asian Racialization and the Logic of Settler Colonial Capitalism* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2016).

76. Du Bois, "'Chapter 16—Jones in Japan,'" 261, on the Anglo-U.S. condemnation of Japan's 1931 invasion of Manchuria: "Why, [Japan] logically asks, is Europe, gorged with the loot of centuries, become suddenly so solicitous over the rights of backward peoples? Why is England today defending the integrity of that same China which she more than any people on earth, reduced to impotence and helpless disorganization? What new and lofty regard for human dignity is animating self-righteous America, which declares the yellow race even less worthy of citizenship in the republic than black slaves? And whose knight in shining armor refused at Versailles [Wilson], even to consider a League of Nations declaration in favor of racial equality?"

77. My sense of strategic orientalism follows the explanation from Homi Bhahba, "The Black Savant and the Dark Princess," *ESQ* 50, no. 1–3 (2004): 147–8, that the "anticolonial realignment of the spiritual and the material mimics the colonialist's color line of archaism and modernity, [only] up to a point.... [The] strategy introduces an inappropriatable or untranslatable element of juxtaposition that unsettles the temporal framing and the political spacing of polarities." Such "juxtaposition that unsettles" is consistent with Du Bois' and Sun's rhetoric of "natural" versus "artificial" relations, discussed above.

78. Du Bois, "'Chapter 16—Jones in Japan,'" 261–2.

79. Ibid.

80. For this discourse, see, e.g., Harry Harootunian, *Overcome by Modernity: History, Culture, and Community in Interwar Japan* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).

81. Yoko Arisaka, "The Nishida Enigma: 'The Principle of the New World Order,'" *Monumenta Nipponica* 51, no. 1 (1996): 100–105.

82. The most detailed English-language account of Du Bois' 1936 itinerary in Japan and Manchuria remains Reginald Kearney, "The Pro-Japanese Utterances of W.E.B. Du Bois," *Contributions in Black Studies* 13, no. 7 (1995): 201–17. Some additional detail on the Japan leg of the trip is at Furukawa Tetsushi **古川哲史**, "W. E. B. Dyuboisu no shōkai to jidai—Nihon hōmon (1936nen) nikakawaru shimon" **Ｗ・Ｅ・Ｂ・デュボイスの生涯と時代—日本訪問**（1936**年**）**に関わる試論** [Life and Times of W. E. B. Du Bois: His Visit to Japan in 1936], Ōtani daigaku kenkyū nenpō **『大谷大学研究年報』** [*The Annual Report of Researches of Ōtani University*] 69 (2017): 12–20. See Taketani, *The Black Pacific Narrative*, chap. 5, for analysis of the geopolitics.

83. W. E. B. Du Bois, "'Chapter 17—Jones looks back on China': from *A World Search for Democracy* (1937)," *The New Centennial Review* 12, no. 1 (2012): 276–7.

84. Vincent Schleitwiler, *Strange Fruit of the Black Pacific: Imperialism's Racial Justice and Its Fugitives* (New York: NYU Press, 2017), 46.

85. Du Bois, "Russia and America," 149–50.

86. Du Bois, "The New Negro Liberation Movements (1956)," 15.

87. Ernest Allen, Jr., "When Japan Was 'Champion of the Darker Races': Satokata Takahashi and the Flowering of Black Messianic Nationalism," *The Black Scholar* 24, no. 1 (Winter 1994): 23–46.

88. Bill Mullen, "Du Bois, Dark Princess, and the Afro-Asian International," *positions* 11, no. 1 (2003): 226.

89. Zhang, "Imagining Japan and China in *Dark Princess*," 77.

90. Homi Bhahba, introduction to *Dark Princess*, by Du Bois, xxvi–xxviii.

91. Nico Slate, *Colored Cosmopolitanism: The Shared Struggle for Freedom in the United States and India* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), 78.

92. Du Bois, *Dark Princess*, 15–22.

93. Ibid., 185.

94. Ibid., 44, 54.

95. Ibid., 61.

96. Ibid., 58.

97. Ibid., 67

98. Ibid., 77.

99. Ibid., 93.

100. Ibid., 101.

101. Roderick Ferguson, "'W.E.B. Du Bois': Biography of a Discourse," in *Next to the Color Line: Gender, Sexuality, and W.E.B. Du Bois*, eds. Susan Gillman and Alys Eve Weinbaum (Minneapolis, MN: University Minnesota Press, 2007), 284.

102. Alys Eve Weinbaum, "Interracial Romance and Black Internationalism," in *Next to the Color Line*, eds. Gillman and Weinbaum, 111, 116.

103. Lee Edelman, *No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004), critiqued by José Esteban Muñoz, *Cruising Utopia: The Then and There of Queer Futurity* (New York: NYU Press, 2009), 97; Reddy, *Freedom with Violence*, 179.

104. Rahul Rao, *Out of Time: The Queer Politics of Postcoloniality* (NY: Oxford University Press, 2020), 16–8.

105. Eric Strand, "The American Dark Princess: W. E. B. Du Bois's Antiracist Urban Sociology and African American Modernism" (paper presented at the Modern Language Association Annual Convention, Chicago, IL, January 5, 2019), abstract at https://scholars.ln.edu.hk/en/publications/the-american-dark-princess-w-e-b-du-boiss-antiracist-urban-sociol (accessed 21 January 2022). See also Eric Strand, "Du Bois's *Dark Princess*, Kautilya's *Arthashastra*, and the Welfare State," *PMLA* 136, no. 1 (2021): 83–85.

106. Du Bois, *Dark Princess*, 109–10.

107. Ibid., 188–89.

108. Ibid., 207.

109. Ibid., 213.

110. Muñoz, *Cruising Utopia*.

111. Jennifer DeVere Brody, Celine Parreñas Shimizu, Chandan Reddy, Ann

Cvetkovich, Carolyn Dinshaw and David Halperin, "GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies: Past and Present," *Institute for Cultural Inquiry,* video, 1:34:05, recorded 17 June 2021, https://www.ici-berlin.org/events/what-happened-to-lesbian-and-gay-studies/ (accessed 15 August 2021).

112. Du Bois, *Dark Princess*, 204–6.

113. Sanda Mayzaw Lwin, "Romance with a Message: W. E. B. Du Bois's *Dark Princess* and the Problem of the Color Line," in *Strange Affinities: The Gender and Sexual Politics of Comparative Racialization*, eds. Grace Kyungwon Hong and Roderick Ferguson (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011), 190.

114. For the "autoimmunity" of democracy, see Jacques Derrida, *Rogues: Two Essays on Reason*, trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005). I also see a conceptual link between Du Bois' rendering of democracy in *Dark Princess* and Friedrich Nietzsche's master–slave dialectic in his 1887 "The Genealogy of Morals" in *On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo,* trans. and eds. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale, 15–163 (New York: Vintage Books, 1989): although "slaves" reject the parameters of good and evil defined by "civilized" and materially dominant "masters," calling instead for a realization of concepts like equality, freedom and democracy, the risk is that the dialectic is soon reconstituted.

115. W. E. B. Du Bois, "Revelation of Saint Orgne the damned, June 8, 1938," W. E. B. Du Bois Papers, Special Collections and University Archives, University of Massachusetts Amherst Libraries, 13.

116. Madhumita Lahiri, "World Romance: Genre, Internationalism, and W. E. B. Du Bois," *Callaloo* 33, no. 2 (Spring 2010): 547.

117. Achille Mbembe, "Negative Messianism Marks Our Times," *Mail & Guardian*, 3 February 2017, https://mg.co.za/article/2017-02-03-00-negative-messianism-marks-our-times/ (accessed 21 January 2022).