Acceptance for Admission: Administrations of Japanese American Relocation and the Midwestern University

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Introduction

On March 18, 1942, the University of Minnesota's President Walter C. Coffey corresponded with sixteen Midwestern university administrations to question the feasibility and willingness of admitting "Americans of Japanese extraction who may be forced to leave the restricted areas on the west coast."[1] The problem, as Coffey alluded to in his letter, related to President Franklin D. Roosevelt's signing of Executive Order (EO) 9066 one month prior, which gave the Secretary of War and military commanders the power to prescribe military zones and determine "from which any and all persons may be excluded."[2] Coffey's foresight into the "Japanese problem" proved accurate, as the forced removal of Japanese Americans living in parts of Washington, Oregon, Arizona, and California would begin only three days later.

Coffey's questions initially reflected anxieties rooted in requests to admit Japanese American students previously enrolled at universities in the military exclusion zone. These anxieties were realized in May 1942 when the National Japanese American Student Relocation Council (NJASRC), under the direction of the War Relocation Authority (WRA), allowed incarcerated Japanese Americans to continue their collegiate education at universities in the American interior. At every stage of the process, from removal to resettlement, the U.S. government and the WRA reiterated the necessity of insularity for the broader success of their resettlement project.[3] As the American heartland, the insularity, isolation, and unquestioned

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Americanness of the Midwest provided the perfect location for extending internment policies under the facade of granting Japanese American students relief from incarceration. In this way, the Midwest operated as a process, rather than a place, marked by a racialization toward whiteness for the Japanese Americans involved.

Aligned with the broader policies of Japanese American resettlement in the years during and following World War II, prioritizing the movement of Japanese American students to universities in the interior, or colleges spanning "the Rockies to Ohio" as deemed by the WRA, reinforced notions Midwestern insularity (Fig. 1).[4] Throughout this article, I refer to the Midwest as a process of racialization towards whiteness to explain the way that the Midwest, and its geographic interiority and metaphorical insularity to shifting politics often shaped by the coasts, absorbs and counters racial differences. Like Kristin Hoganson[5], whose theorization of the heartland myth sees the Midwest's perceived insulation, locality, and isolation as the ultimate safe space to maintain Euro-American national mythology, I argue that administrations of relocation employed the Midwest as a process to turn Japanese American students into assets for the expansion of the wartime national security project. Employing this process, however, depended on an interplay of the region's real and figurative boundaries or what I refer to in this article as its imagined geography.

To be clear, for the WRA the Midwest existed as an actual geographically designated space between the "Rockies to Ohio," yet, I argue that this classification relied heavily on how the region was imagined. The geographical determination of the region based on an ideal of insularity depended on an "endless flexibility to anything under the state's real or contemplated control: peoples, regions, religions, languages, products, monuments and so forth."[6] Building on Benedict Anderson's *imagined communities'* framework, the WRA's conceptualization of the Midwest's interiority ultimately constructed the region as a representative body for their broader Americanization project. The importance of how symbolic narratives are transmitted, as Richard Slotkin explored with *mythic spaces,* explains how symbol making, interpretation, and imaginative projection evoke the role of ideology in "shaping the life, thought, and politics of the nation."[7] Despite the Midwest not being fully abstract in the same way as the frontier, this article pulls from Slotkin to demonstrate how myths associated with the Midwest are drawn from a "dramatizing of moral consciousness—with all the complexities and contradictions that consciousness may contain."[8] Lastly, I take inspiration from Tina Chen's *imaginable ageography*, to employ the "use of geographical imagination not only in terms of imperialist or colonization practices but also decolonial, multidisciplinary means of establishing new conceptual frontiers."[9] Extending on Anderson, Chen, and Slotkin, this article demonstrates how the Midwest, as an imagined geography, embodies the power of homog-




Figure 1: Map produced by the WRA detailing college attendance by Japanese Americans during the war. Retrieved from the University of Oregon Archives, Office of the Dean of Personnel Administration. National Japanese American Studies Relocation Council records, 1942–1946.

enization and how its ascribed insularity indicates its ability to conceal and normalize structures of white supremacy that deem non-white residents as perpetually "other."[10]

Reflecting the legacy of discrimination toward non-white people in education, the federal government failed to attend to how the soon-to-be incarcerated Japanese American college students would continue their education upon the passing of EO9066, but knew it was imperative to the success of the war. As Midwestern universities and colleges scrambled to establish consistent policies, community members and students shared their concerns with school administrations. In a town hall held in October 1942 to address questions on whether American citizens of Japanese ancestry should be able to attend Indiana University, one Hoosier wrote in an anonymous comment, "A university education does not have anything to do with Japan's policies," while others noted "Swell idea, but wouldn't work. Student and town opinion are against it—too idealistic" while maintaining that "Anyone is entitled to his education."[11] The sentiments found in these students' responses reflects the necessity of admittance not only into the Midwestern university, but to their communities as vital to the success of the student relocation program. Nodding to higher education's relationship to national policy, the comments also expressed a desire to

maintain the abstract democratic ideal of education for all, while limiting Japanese American students' access to education at their institution.

For President Franklin D. Roosevelt, education was the true safeguard to democracy and, thus, the preservation of an Anglo-American world order. As tensions escalated overseas, prioritizing an Americanized version of education became a key component of maintaining the ideals of Roosevelt's New Deal liberalism, a policy program that led to increased efforts to educate all Americans through the expansion of higher education. If "education patterns suggest assimilation," as historian Ellen Wu states, then maintaining the education of Japanese Americans despite their incarceration during World War II meant that the tenets of New Deal liberalism could be maintained. As a testing ground for a potential "solution to America's race problem," prioritizing student relocation and the resettlement programs to the Midwest introduced a process of a "state-engineered cultural and structural assimilation."[12] As a result, I join scholars such as Gary Okihiro, Greg Robinson, and Wu in viewing the process of Japanese American incarceration and subsequent education and resettlement programs as in line with, rather than an aberration of, Roosevelt's broader goals and liberal policies.

The University of Minnesota and Indiana University ultimately voted to bar American citizens of Japanese ancestry from their campuses for most of the war's duration.[13] Regardless, the Student Relocation Council (SRC), the predecessor to the NJASRC, successfully convinced fourteen other universities—all in Midwestern states except one—to accept Japanese American students in the immediate months following incarceration.[14] The prioritization of inland universities not only upheld ideas of New Deal liberalism through supporting education and student welfare, it also played an important role in broader wartime policy by making the Midwest a place for the erasure and assimilation of Japanese American students. In this way, the student relocation program, although temporary in nature, served as a liberal extension of the WRA's resettlement process and the broader goals of Americanization and assimilation.

Racialization toward whiteness for Japanese Americans during World War II does not presume that they saw whiteness as achievable or the intentions behind demonstrations of their ability to assimilate into the predominately white communities of the Midwest. As Wu demonstrates, "international imperatives of the 1940s and the 1950s anchored the nation's recasting of Asian Americans into *assimilating Others*—persons acknowledged as capable of acting like white Americans while remaining racially distinct from them."[15] Building on Wu's *The Color of Success*, this article examines similar interrogations of liberalism and its shaping of the process of resettlement to demonstrate how preconceived understandings of the Midwest and Midwestern colleges and universities informed

decisions by the WRA and how the Japanese American students who participated in these programs reified these ideals.

Ostensibly Midwestern universities were prioritized because of their distance from key military sites on either coast, I argue that it was the national imaginary attached to the Midwest as a space that made it the ideal location for the transformation of the wartime national security project to a postwar assimilation policy. Previous scholarship has addressed the role that student relocation and grant programs played in building citizenship responsibilities or strengthening the relationship between the United States and Japan during the postwar period, but it has yet to address how the Midwest, and its perceived characteristics, impacted choices made by these institutions and government organizations to relocate Japanese American students into the interior. Through an examination of war time administration's documents and Japanese American recollections of their participation in the program, this article demonstrates how the Midwestern university, through its perceived insularity, was prioritized for Japanese American student relocation.[16]

Addressing the "Japanese Problem"

As a result of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt signed EO9066 on February 19, 1942, establishing the West Coast as a militarized zone and paving the way for the incarceration of more than 100,000 people of Japanese descent. The order, signed in the early months of the second semester of the academic year, thrust university administrations across much of Arizona, Oregon, Washington, and California into chaos. Conversations about the potential impacts of EO9066 and how it would impact the Japanese American student population began almost immediately. By March, both uncertainties would be addressed as Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9102 to establish the WRA, and the locally organized West Coast SRC began the formal process of student relocation. Reflecting the long-standing relationship between higher education and U.S. policy, the simultaneous development of the WRA and the SRC demonstrates how the process of student relocation reconciled the tensions between Japanese American incarceration and the maintenance of Roosevelt's New Deal liberalism.

In the immediate days following EO9066, General John L. DeWitt of the Western Defense Command implemented curfews and encouraged voluntary relocation for Japanese Americans on the West Coast in the immediate days following the order. Although these actions made sense in the short term, the eventual mass removal of Japanese Americans needed greater institutional support. To meet these needs, Roosevelt appointed Milton S. Eisenhower, former Director of Information for the Department of Agriculture and a major proponent of the New Deal, as the WRA's first

director. A process that he describes in his memoir as "the most difficult and traumatic task of his career," Eisenhower noted that military officials already had begun the mass removal to the "Zone of the Interior" when he assumed the directorship in March 1942.[17] Eisenhower worked in haste, calling upon his colleagues from the Department of Interior's Indian Service, Irrigation Service, and Public Land Office, as well as consulting with military leaders such as DeWitt, to construct systems of removal through the building and operating of the incarceration camps, managing inmates' personal property, and establishing relocation programs. Between May and August 1942, more than 112,000 Japanese Americans found themselves incarcerated at camps across Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Idaho, Utah, and Wyoming.[18]

The camps established by the WRA mirrored educational policies of the time—separate, but supposedly equal. During the process of incarceration, the WRA attempted to cultivate new Japanese American communities that reinforced Americanization efforts through the building of recreational centers, newspapers, gardens, and elementary and secondary schools. The WRA, however, did not have the means or the capacity to provide university education. West Coast universities and college administrations, often in opposition to EO9066, saw this as an opportunity to institutionalize the process of student relocation out of the camps and restore rights to education. To these concerns, the Vice President and Provost of the University of California (UC), Monroe E. Deustch, responded, "Can democracy do less? If we do not, we shall make the loyal American-Japanese (and I believe there are many of them) ask themselves why they should be devoted to a country that assumes that because their parents were born in Japan, that they are to be suspected and uprooted."[19] As Eisenhower scrambled to address evacuation orders in March 1942, West Coast college presidents Robert Gordon Sproul (UC), Lee Paul Sieg (University of Washington), and Remsen Bird (Occidental College) alongside the Pacific College Association and the YMCA/YWCA sought to arrange the immediate transfer of Japanese American students to campuses east of the military exclusion zone.[20] Their actions culminated in the establishment of the localized and independent West Coast SRC in Berkeley the same month.

Divided into three regional committees—the Pacific Northwest, northern California, and southern California—the SRC set its sights on relocating the roughly 2,500 students impacted by EO9066 to colleges in the American interior by fall 1942. Early actions by the SRC included convincing communities to support student relocation, finding financial aid for Japanese American students whose assets were then frozen, and creating a process of selection and certification for applicants.[21] More importantly, the relocation of Japanese American students to schools outside the military exclusion zone needed to allay the dual concerns of

subduing the perceived enemy while still promoting ideals of New Deal liberalism as outlined by President Roosevelt in the previous decade.

When Roosevelt assumed the presidency in 1933 amid a global depression, his policies emphasized freedom and the expansion of an educated citizenry as a key strategy of national security. In a proclamation for American Education Week in 1936, Roosevelt sought to generate support for public education, stating that "universal education [was] essential to national progress."[22] Two years later, as rising totalitarianism in Europe and Asia threatened the influence of American democracy, Roosevelt reinforced these notions specifying that

> The real safeguard of democracy, therefore, is education. It has been well said that no system of government gives so much to the individual or exacts so much as a democracy. Upon our educational system must largely depend the perpetuity of those institutions upon which our freedom and our security rest.[23]

In championing universal, or public, education as essential to national progress, Roosevelt "held fast to the ideals of freedom" by reinforcing the vital role of education to the United States' ascendancy to the world stage.[24]

The infrastructure connecting public education to national prowess, however, existed well before Roosevelt's presidency. Enacted to meet the demands for a free and open-access education targeted at the nation's growing labor force, the Morrill Land Grant Act of 1862 opened access to a university education to the nation's laboring and growing middle class through the creation of the land-grant university. In addition to finalizing the expropriation of more than ten million acres of Indigenous lands, the Morrill Land Grant Act of 1862 and its extension in 1890 that prohibited racial discrimination in admission policies prioritized agricultural science and mechanical arts as well as embedded military training into the curriculum. In this way the United States could consistently maintain a citizenry prepared for all aspects of war without financing a large standing army.

Backing the national goals of infrastructure building and imperial expansion was easier in the late nineteenth century as Americans sought to unify and strengthen the nation through an expansion of the East's industriousness to the conquered West. By the turn of the twentieth century, however, the university began to operate differently. Prioritizing academic freedom and scholarly inquiry, the rising professoriate and the universities that employed them began to see themselves as more than actors of state policy and separate from the nation's interest, which raised concerns over how to continue developing good, loyal citizens.[25] The federal government responded in two forms: the National Defense Act of 1916, which established the Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) in

civilian colleges and high schools, and the National Defense Act of 1920, which, following the close of World War I, reinforced its incorporation.[26] In other words, making university education accessible to all was not only necessary to craft a good citizenry at home, but also was needed to ensure the promotion of national and imperial ideals abroad.

This viewpoint not only justified the actions surrounding EO9066, it reflected how Asian discrimination had grown for generations in conjunction with the development of American public schooling. The precariousness of the relationship between the Asian student in American education systems stemmed back to the landmark California Supreme Court case *Tape v. Hurley*. In 1885 Joseph and Mary Tape, first-generation Chinese immigrants residing in San Francisco, filed a lawsuit against the San Francisco Board of Education for denying admission to a nearby public school to their American-born daughter, Mamie.[27] The Tapes' success in winning the case confirmed the priority to educate all children, regardless of citizenship status, while simultaneously representing white fears of integrated education. Legislation passed later that year by the California State Assembly established separate schools for children of Asian descent, invalidating Tape and reaffirming the perceived threat of Asian Americans being educated alongside white children well before the 1896 Supreme Court case *Plessy v. Ferguson* justified segregation in public institutions.

Japanese American students would face similar challenges in San Francisco nearly a decade later. In October 1906 the San Francisco Board of Education, under similar pressures that informed the Tape case, attempted to force students of Japanese descent to attend the then-established segregated Chinese school. Angered by growing accounts of racism and restriction, Japanese government officials expressed their frustration to the U.S. government, highlighting how restricting Japanese students from public education violated the tenets of the U.S.-Japanese Treaty signed in 1894. In another example of the corroboration of education and state policy, then President Theodore Roosevelt, whose "Big Stick" diplomacy in the Pacific often instigated these tensions, responded in his address to Congress on December 3, 1906, by addressing the controversy in San Francisco explicitly. "To shut them out from public schools is wicked absurdity," Roosevelt noted, "when there are no first-class colleges in the land, including the universities and colleges of California, which do not gladly welcome Japanese students and on which Japanese students do not reflect credit."[28] As the quote foreshadows, despite the ongoing segregation of U.S. schools, limiting higher education to Japanese American populations was perceived as a violation of American democracy. Yet, as subsequent conversations between the U.S. and Japanese officials would reinforce, maintaining Japanese rights to American education by rescinding the segregation policy did not mean a reckoning with racist perspec-

tives toward Asian populations. These correspondences, now known as the Gentlemen's Agreement, would uphold U.S. promises to education while restricting further immigration from Japan in hopes of assuaging nativist tensions on the West Coast that defined the next generation.

In similar ways to student relocation during World War II, the Tape case and ensuing challenges to restrict Japanese students can be seen as a way for American ideologies of education to be upheld while still actively discriminating against racialized populations. The debate surrounding segregation Asian students from public schools, however, did not appear at odds with the goal of educating individuals in the values and ideologies of a globalized U.S. nation-state. Between the period of the Tapes' case and 1940, American literacy rates rose from 87 percent to 98 percent, a clear testament to the increased enrollment rates in public schools, which rose from 51 percent to 75 percent in the same period.[29] While half of the country had at least an eighth-grade education by 1940, only 6 percent of men and 4 percent of women had completed four years of college education.[30] For Japanese American communities that would be impacted by mandatory removal, approximately 5 percent of men and 2 percent of women had completed at least four years of college education.[31] In conjunction with the growing number of colleges and universities as a result of federal and state support through the Morrill Land Grant Acts, there was plenty of opportunity for educational advancement of all citizens.

Despite efforts to separate higher education from national goals in the early decades of the twentieth century, strengthening efforts to support collegiate education became key to supporting U.S. ascendancy as a global power and to the maintenance of American liberalism in the tumultuous decades of the 1930s and 1940s. With larger numbers of individuals completing secondary education and greater governmental support for institutions of higher education, more students sought to enroll at colleges and universities. In addition to supporting New Deal liberalism's goals, increasing enrollment at institutions of higher education addressed growing concerns about the scientific and military prowess of Japan and Germany. President Franklin D. Roosevelt alluded to these concerns in the Four Freedoms speech, noting that he was "not satisfied with the progress" of war production. Instead, he prompted Congress to increase support for the Army and Navy and encouraged the American public to put forth "our energies, our resources and our organizing powers to give you [democratic nations] the strength to regain and maintain the free world."[32] In response, Roosevelt signed Executive Order 8807 in June 1941, which created the Office of Scientific Research and Development. Just months before the United States would officially declare war, EO8807, as Richard M. Abrams argues, "endorsed, essentially for the first time, the view that the proper functions of government included support for basic research

by university scientists."[33] The signing of EO8807 further solidified Roosevelt's commitments to education through U.S. policy and, arguably, addressed the anxieties involving the lack of preparedness for war. Given the low percentage of college-educated Americans at the time, the success of the office of Scientific Research and Development necessitated the maintenance of college enrollments, including the thousands of students the WRA had recently displaced. In this way, Japanese American students became an asset to the state, and their education became a means of production for ongoing war efforts.

Addressing the "Japanese problem" required the maintenance of Roosevelt's New Deal liberalism while addressing the perceived threat of Japanese Americans on the West Coast without curtailing their rights so far that they would fail to contribute to the war effort. Members of the SRC also recognized that EO9066 and the movement of Japanese Americans to camps violated tenets of New Deal liberalism, an ideology to which many of them subscribed. To negotiate the orders by the federal government, UC President Robert G. Sproul wrote to campus leadership seeking direction and guidance on the role of EO9066's impact on the student body. At the time of EO9066, the UC estimated that between 300 and 500 Japanese American and a dozen Japanese students would be impacted by the orders; they constituted a small part of the broader population of 2,500 Japanese American students across all the campuses in the exclusion zone.[34] Providing the opportunity for students to avoid incarceration by enrolling them in universities in the interior allowed West Coast campuses to abide by the federal government's wartime calls for action, while subverting the WRA's calls for incarceration.

Although establishment of the SRC reflected the council's dissatisfaction with EO9066, the material realities of the orders manifested quickly in the Japanese American student body. Harvey Itano, a premedical student at UC Berkeley, noted to friends in 1942, "it's tough to be an American imbued with ideas of democracy and then looked upon as a potential enemy."[35] Despite being sympathetic to the difficulties Japanese American students would face, some SRC leaders viewed student relocation as an opportunity to redefine attitudes directed toward Asian American communities. Ernest O. Holland, president of Washington State College, noted in a letter to U.S. Representative John Tolan of California that Japanese American citizens "who complete university work during this critical time period will provide leadership for their minority group in the difficult years following the successful termination of this great conflict."[36] Thus, maintaining Japanese American students' collegiate education not only upheld a portion of their democratic ideals, but also offered space to put racial liberalism into action. In meeting notes from April 1942, the SRC established a plan of action that included contacting schools where

Japanese American students could mix well, personally and academically, with White students and in communities that would be favorable to their arrival. At the conclusion of the meeting, the SRC identified 300 Midwestern communities to be contacted "immediately."[37]

Although the program did not prevent Japanese Americans from attending eastern colleges, few readily accepted the committee's request to admit incarcerated students, expressing hesitation about the potential declaration of the East Coast as a militarized zone. As the lack of engagement in administrative documents and Figure 1 demonstrates, the WRA rarely considered student relocation to the South. Though the geographic location of the Gulf Coast presented similar anxieties to those of the East Coast, arguably, the legalized discrimination toward Black Americans in the Jim Crow South and known hostility toward Japanese Americans at the Rohwer incarceration camp was not an ideal canvas for promoting the potential of racial liberalism.[38] Given the urgency to launch the program, the SRC decided "we should not advise students to go East, but concentrate on good Mid-Western colleges. Practically speaking, this means principally the states from the Rockies to Ohio, omitting the Gulf and Great Lakes regions, since the latter are also important military areas."[39] Of the thirty-two universities initially contacted by Sproul, fourteen universities responded favorably across Colorado, Idaho, Utah, Wyoming, Kansas, Nebraska, Iowa, New Mexico, Arkansas, and South Dakota.

Convincing Midwestern universities relied heavily on the early efforts of the SRC. In communications with Midwestern universities, the SRC wrote letters and sent representatives to meet with university presidents in hope they would express support for the idea of student relocation. SRC member Reverend Robert Inglis of Oakland visited thirteen colleges in the Midwest and reported back to the committee the promise of work opportunities with good wages and cheaper living costs. He further noted that small, private, denominational colleges seemed more favorable than larger state universities, which expressed hesitation acknowledging their preestablished relationships with the military and "their state political connections" or fear of "being swamped with too many applications."[40] State schools, in efforts to gain greater direction from the government officials, however, "would do their share, if there were a Federal committee to distribute students fairly."[41] The planned dispersion of students, as alluded to this in quote, reflected prioritizations to minimize the concentration of Japanese Americans in the Midwest as it had existed on the West Coast. Breaking up concentrations of Japanese American students would, of course, achieve the Americanization project of resettlement by giving space to absorb them into the white, Midwestern, mainstream.[42]

Although Roosevelt's New Deal intended to reconfigure American citizenship through an investment of its citizenry, EO9066 seemingly

challenged his, and his supporters', commitment to these ideologies. Roosevelt's presumption of the inability of Japanese people, "dangerous and immutably foreign," to fully and properly integrate into American society justified the easy overlooking of rights guaranteed to citizens of Japanese descent, relegating them to the margins of the American democracy project and outside the promises of his liberalism.[43] Additionally, maintaining and further strengthening the relationship between the military and the university during his presidency reveals another possibility—that the incarceration of Japanese Americans was in line with his liberal policies. For supporters of New Deal liberalism, such as Milton Eisenhower, the complete evacuation of Japanese Americans on the West Coast occurred so quickly that it afforded little time to ponder "the moral implications of the President's decision."[44] "Personally and painfully aware of the tragedy of [the] relocation," Eisenhower would resign after ninety days as the WRA's director. Following a year-long stint in the Office of War Information, Eisenhower transitioned into an enduring career as a university administrator that he began at his alma mater, Kansas State University.

In the absence of state concern, universities and colleges thus played an important role in supporting the nation's commitments to the ideals of liberalism, while also supporting the containment and restriction of Japanese Americans. By prioritizing inland universities for relocation, the United States could, at least on the surface, remain committed to notions of anyone being entitled to their education. Keeping Japanese American collegiate students enrolled served the multiple concerns of removing the enemy from the West Coast while building a repository of educated citizens whose skills could become valuable for the war effort. The success of Japanese American student relocation to the Midwest, however, remained contingent on their acceptability as not only students but as members of Midwestern communities.

Acceptance for Admission

In May 1942, after recognizing the demands of relocating Japanese American students to the interior by U.S. officials, the formerly autonomous SRC developed into the National Japanese American Student Relocation Council (NJASRC), a subsidiary of the WRA. The expansion of the program would bureaucratize the grassroots efforts by West Coast university presidents, the YMCA/YWCA, and the Pacific College Association and transform student relocation into a wartime military project under the leadership of the new WRA director, Dillon S. Myer. Tasked with creating systems of resettlement, Myer, a colleague of Eisenhower's from the Department of Agriculture, established the first WRA Resettlement Offices in Salt Lake City and Chicago in January 1943. To assist universities and colleges in evaluating the loyalty of students applying for the program, Eisenhower, before he left his appointment as director, assigned Clarence

E. Pickett, head of the American Friends Service Committee, to form the representative committee and administer the relocation of students outside of the West Coast exclusion zone.[45] Programs for resettlement, as Myer recalled in 1970, generally received support given their "very strict conditions" that allowed leave for incarcerated Japanese Americans so long as they "stay[ed] within [a] certain limited area."[46] Pickett, a Midwesterner, understood these implications about the Midwest and its role in the success of the WRA's programs.[47] By July 1943, the NJASRC had successfully relocated more than 1,000 Japanese American students to universities in the interior.

The NJASRC's emphasis on Midwestern universities reinforced notions of insularity as a necessary wartime tactic. In letters written to university and college administrations, the NJASRC noted a debt for the action of relocation: "we owe it to them and owe it to ourselves by way of validation of our democratic professions, to provide a maximum of freedom and opportunity along the lines of our best American traditions."[48] The traditions, of course, relied heavily on Japanese American citizens completing their education in "preparation for useful service and fuller assimilation" into the national life.[49] Given the prioritization of assimilation, the NJASRC limited the student relocation program to Japanese American citizens—often the second-generation *nisei*—rather than the *issei* (first-generation) and *kibei* (Japanese Americans who returned to the U.S. after receiving education in Japan), whose loyalty it was assumed could not be proven. Disguising the relocation of Japanese Americans from the West Coast as justifiable wartime policy, however, needed more than effective propaganda; it needed a space to hide.

The Midwest, as an imagined geography shaped by policies, and the Midwestern university, with its assumed characteristics of insularity, served as a camp with no barricades. For administrations of relocation, the Midwest obscured the contradictory impulses to uphold universal education, on the one hand, while discriminating against Japanese Americans on the other. As Britt E. Halvorson and Joshua E. Reno discuss in *Imagining the Heartland*, the Midwest has an ability to conceal structures of white supremacy in plain sight. Key to the circulation of these structures is a need to see whiteness as an ordinary set of values tied to the ideological construct of the nation. In other words, the Midwest as the American heartland reveals how the region enables the articulation and definition of "exclusionary national narratives of race and belonging."[50] In effect, the Midwest was able to absorb and counter racial difference by effectively assimilating Japanese American students into the fabric of their campus communities.

The process of erasure occurred in multiple forms to allow the duel goals of the WRA's engineering of "the assimilation and absorption of an entire people" and the NJASRC's ideals of "foster[ing] the education

advancement of a generation."[51] In addition to upholding the ideals of Americanness, students participating in the program had to demonstrate their ability to assimilate into Midwestern communities, as doing so would be evidence of the program's success in maintaining the ideals of Roosevelt's New Deal liberalism. The NJASRC's prioritization of "good middle-western colleges" fulfilled requirements to be away from military exclusion zones, while simultaneously pushing Japanese Americans into areas of the country that would be less impacted by the stereotypes of war. This was presumptuous, however, as the NJASRC and WRA overlooked the already well-established Japanese American communities that existed in the Midwest and the Japanese American students at Midwestern universities that did not experience incarceration. Reflecting these confusions in a speech to the Commonwealth Club in 1944, World War II fighter pilot and WRA darling Ben Kuroki detailed his process of enlisting:

> Two days after Pearl Harbor, my brother Fred and I drove 150 miles to Grand Island, Nebraska, to enlist in the Army Air Forces. We were held up for nearly a month because of all the confusion and misunderstanding in Army camps at the time. For the first time in our lives we found out what prejudice was.[52]

Fighting the dual battles of the war and intolerance, Kuroki's experience illustrates the impossibility of Japanese Americans like himself being from the Midwest. Lumping relocated students within the accounts of Japanese American students from Midwestern states created a narrative of success around student relocation that ignored the diversity of the Midwest. In both cases, the Midwest as an experience of racialization toward whiteness served to uphold the desires of the NJASRC and the broader goals of the war.

The Midwest, as a stand-in for the ideals of the nation, would be able to pacify the concerns of a nation at war with Japan while upholding access to education. As a reflection of the priorities of the nation, Japanese American students benefiting from the relocation programs would be required to uphold the ideals of Americanness to appease the NJASRC and increase chances of being accepted at Midwestern universities. Applications to the program mandated previously enrolled college students to get letters of reference from professors at their home universities, which included ranking the students' "ability to meet with good spirits crises that arise from this time" and an "ability to create good feeling and thus open the way for others to be relocated later."[53] This was further reinforced in conversations with students as they began leaving the incarceration camps. One student relocated to Washington University in St. Louis explained this process of creating a genealogy for the program, stating "The

National Student Relocation Council gave us a pep talk at first when we came about being the representatives of the nisei and that we should make good because so many were going to be judged by how we acted."[54] The performance and procedure of student selection, as Gary Okihiro argues, reinforced the priority of model minority identity among incarcerated Japanese American students.[55] In short, performing Americanness and one's ability to assimilate into the community determined the success of both the NJASRC program and its participants.

The NJASRC, embodying notions of U.S. benevolence, required Japanese American students to demonstrate their ability—not their willingness—to assimilate into Midwestern communities. Yet the process of matching students to respective universities outside the exclusion zone involved more than the mobilization of federal and state organizations; it required local community support. Despite Midwestern universities accepted Japanese American students at high rates, many school administrators expressed skepticism about their attendance, though they had committed to participating in the program. The NJASRC noted repeated concerns by Midwestern college administrators about the loyalty of students to the United States, wanting to safeguard themselves from public anti-Japanese pressures.[56] Other concerns involved the financial costs needed to support relocated students. Initially, the committee sought scholarships and housing for students being displaced from their West Coast campuses. Notably, public response to this was unfavorable, however, lower living costs in the Midwest incentivized many students to apply for admission even without support.

As ambassadors of the NJASRC, Japanese American student accounts of their relocation often reflected an internalization of differences between Midwestern universities and their home campuses on the West Coast. One relocated student at Macalester College in St. Paul, Minnesota, reported in a campus study of newly arrived Japanese American students, "Here I move about with other Americans, and although they seem to look at me with strangeness in their eyes, I have never encountered any fear or resentment."[57] Others reports concluded similar notions, stating that the "atmosphere here is much freer" and that "there was much less discrimination here than at universities on the West Coast."[58] One student went so far as to state, "I can see now that the movement of the Japanese colony from the West Coast was a good one. We had segregated ourselves and had never used the opportunity of mixing with people as we are doing now."[59]

The reflections culled from campus surveys, however, usually did not reflect the feelings of unpreparedness or uncertainty that coincided with feelings of relief from avoiding or getting out of the camps. Hisaji Q. Sakai, a student from San Francisco who avoided incarceration by gaining admission to Grinnell College, noted in an oral history interview from 2019

that a "kind" gentleman on the train asked him where he was going. Sakai responded with "I'm going east." When prompted to clarify by the passenger, Sakai revealed that he was headed to Grinnell, Iowa. Sakai recalls the passengers next statement very clearly: "He said, 'Son, Iowa is not the east.' I [Sakai] remember that, that's about the only thing."[60]

As America's heartland, the WRA curated the Midwest to Japanese American students as the champion of liberalism. As a result, students often reinvigorated these ideas of the Midwest in their reflections of campus life. A previously incarcerated student from Gila River commented on the positive outcomes of enrolling at the University of Nebraska, stating that she was able to "pursue [her] education without inhibitions or discrimination" as the "people of the community were so kind."[61] Another University of Nebraska student stated similarly that "Lincolnites (and Nebraskans) seem to have represented the better qualities of America" and that "these seemed to have been inborn qualities."[62] In short, communities in the Midwest did not need to provide anything further than what already existed. It was a place where American ideals, and by extension whiteness, could be experienced naturally.

As a setting, the Midwest served the purpose of pacifying Japanese Americans through a submergence into whiteness. Being aware of their racial difference, Japanese American students and university administrations made a point for Japanese American students to demonstrate their loyalty. Students enrolled at the University of Nebraska had opportunities to tour smaller towns in the state to experience "amity and brotherhood," an activity that had initially been produced before the war for international students attending the school.[63] Another student from Washington University noted that, while he felt "people in the middlewest are more friendly than in California," he believed it to be a result of their recent arrival.[64] The fact that so few Asian people were in the Midwest, in the words of another student, did not provide sufficient protection from racial prejudice. Assimilation would occur only after the population would be educated to accept them.[65]

Admission into the Midwestern university, and by extension acceptance into Midwestern communities, relied heavily on the ability of the student to display their commitment to the ideals of the nation. Often attributed to the militaristic goals (i.e., weapons production), meeting wartime demands also required academic training in "other" cultures and geographies. As Piya Chatterjee and Sunaina Maira note, the distilled study of "other cultures" became important not only in external theaters, but also in the "surveillance and containment of 'others' *within* the nation-state."[66] As foreigners in their own country, Japanese Americans not only were required to service the ideological purposes of the state through their demonstration of patriotic citizenship, but also served as the subjects of

study and the method for informing Japanese culture.

The WRA regularly adjusted its list of approved colleges and universities as the war continued, and the number of universities willing to accept Japanese American students grew rapidly between September 1942 and January 1943. The NJASRC successfully enrolled more than 3,500 Japanese American students to help meet the demands of the wartime university and to get as many *nisei* out of the camps. Enrollment numbers, however, would decline following the opening of Japanese American Army enlistment in February 1943. The ongoing impacts of the war on institutions of higher education became the topic of conversation for the House of Representatives' Committee of Education. In a report submitted to the House in January 1945, the committee noted that pressures to enlist students in the military, and the ongoing impacts of war on the study body caused a failure in meeting Navy and Army research goals.[67] The committee recognized the "present serious shortage of manpower to meet the demands of the war" to essential fields for national welfare (medicine, dentistry, engineering, physics, chemistry, and divinity) and suggested that the Selective Service reestablish student deferment because it was "essential in the national interest that higher educational institutions continue to function at high levels of effectiveness."[68] In other words, the WRA viewed both incarceration and education as military necessities. These concerns reflected on the universities that accepted Japanese American students as well. Although prior efforts by the NJASRC sought to enroll students at small liberal arts colleges or vocational schools, in August 1944 larger research universities, despite their explicit connections to the military, began enrolling Japanese American students in engineering and language training programs to meet the ongoing demands of the war. These actions provide further markers, in the words of Roderick Ferguson, of the "interlocking ways the state, capital and academy produce an adaptive hegemony where minority difference is concerned."[69]

In addition to reaffirming the region's insularity by choosing Midwestern universities, administrations of relocation hoped relocated students would remain in the Midwest after the war ended. Doing so would not only alleviate anxieties of Japanese Americans returning to ethnic enclaves on the West Coast en masse, it would allow Japanese American communities to extend their demonstration of loyalty to the United States and their belonging as true Americans. As Ellen Wu highlights, "from the perspective of federal authorities, resettlement presented the chance for [*nisei*] to abandon their injurious typecasting as enemy Japs if they conformed to the default settings of legitimate American citizenship."[70] As an emblem of American wartime policy and New Deal liberalism, the student relocation program continued to play important roles in relocating students to Midwestern communities. In a talk given to the Pacific Coast Committee

on American Principles and Fair Play in June 1944, Sproul noted that "[t]he Committee [NJASRC] believes that not all Japanese evacuated from California should return to their homes. On the contrary, it favors a policy of dispersed relocation, which is the policy of the War Relocation Authority."[71] In considering the role of student relocation in broader narratives about Japanese American resettlement after World War II, it is clear that the symbolism behind the Midwest played an important role in extending the policies of incarceration.

By 1944 the WRA had resettled nearly 35,000 people, roughly 30 percent of the incarcerated population, to areas outside the exclusion zone through student relocation, work study, and other programs. The band of resettlement in the Midwest as seen in Figure 1 also demonstrates the role of the NJASRC in establishing new congregations of Japanese Americans. For example, in 1940 only twenty-nine Japanese Americans lived in the state of Indiana.[72] Despite Indiana University not accepting Japanese American students, other nearby universities such as Purdue and Richmond did. These students, alongside the establishment of a WRA field office in Indianapolis in April 1943, would bring more than 250 Japanese Americans to the Indianapolis area between 1942 and 1946. Although relatively small numerically, the growth of the Japanese American community in Indiana reflected patterns seen across Midwestern states. Minnesota, which only had fifty Japanese American residents prior to the war and whose major state university also restricted students until 1944, saw a surge of more than a thousand because of the WRA resettlement programs. As the first WRA field office and one of administrative homes of the NJASRC, Chicago soon became home to roughly 20,000 Japanese Americans following the war, a massive growth from the prewar community of roughly 400.[73]

Though these numbers are demonstrative of the "success" of the WRA's relocation program, it reinforced notions of the Midwest's insularity and virtue, while simultaneously erasing Japanese Americans through processes of assimilation. Although the relocation of Japanese Americans alleviated anxieties about their return to the West Coast, it overlooked the potential impacts on communities in the Midwest. Because the Midwest was deemed virtuous, isolated, and truly American, surely a large influx of Japanese Americans into the Midwestern communities would not, or should not, cause alarm. Further, the NJASRC presumed that relocated Japanese American students would eventually blend into the White communities that they moved into, failing to recognize the already established communities of Japanese Americans as well as other minority populations residing in the Midwest.

For example, in a student directory published by the NJASRC in 1943, the University of Nebraska enrolled eighty Japanese American students, much higher than the initial quota of sixty. Going over the quota, however,

did not mean accepting more students from incarceration camps into the university. Of the eighty students listed, nineteen hailed from areas outside the exclusion zone, with a large portion of the students being from Colorado, Wyoming, and Nebraska, which at the time, was home to a population of roughly 1,000 Japanese Americans. Similar instances occurred for the University of Colorado, which listed forty-nine Japanese American students in the directory, forty-six of whom never experienced incarceration.[74] By grouping all Japanese American college students, even those who had not participated in the relocation program, in the directory, the NJASRC reinforced the foreignness of the students at American universities and erased the preexisting histories of Midwestern Japanese American communities. The ignorance about Midwestern Japanese American communities further demonstrates the ways the Midwest operated as a racialization toward whiteness for relocated students, regardless of their inability to achieve it as perceived perpetual foreigners.

Beginning in June 1944, Japanese American students could apply to colleges on the West Coast, and by December the Western Defense Command restored rights to incarcerated Japanese Americans, which slowly paved the way for the closure of the camps. Signaling a decline in need for the resettlement program and the eventual end of the war, nearly two-thirds of resettled Japanese Americans returned to their homes on the West Coast.[75] One such student, Hisaji Q. Sakai, whose journey "east" landed him in the Midwest, returned to UC Berkeley after two years at Grinnell College. While Sakai reflected that he "never had any problems" in Grinnell, he made clear in his interview that he avoided going into town. Sakai further recalled that although his initial arrival was warm and that "the whole freshman year class was there at three o'clock in the morning to welcome me," he was "sure the school was very careful" in how they approached his placement in the campus community. Sakai's experience on the train and his reflection of Grinnell illustrate how the WRA employed assumptions of the Midwest's insularity to establish a successful relocation program that was critical to the broader goals of resettlement.

When examining Japanese American student relocation during World War II, the Midwest's ordinariness, in the words of Halvorson and Reno, cannot be denied. "To be frank," as one student at Park College in Kansas City, Missouri noted, "I chose Park College at random just to get out of camp."[76] Another student, recalling the financial hardships associated with student relocation, noted that her experience was "no frills as were observed of native Nebraska."[77] Random and ordinary: these students' comments signal an understood national perception of the Midwest. As an imagined geography, the Midwest was not only outside the exclusion zone, it was refuge from incarceration—nothing more.

Conclusion

Between 1942 and 1945, the same years the National Japanese American Student Relocation Council was active, University of California social scientists embarked on the Japanese American Evacuation and Resettlement Study to examine the implications of incarceration. Led by sociologist Dorothy Swaine Thomas and researcher Richard S. Nishimoto, the study found three conclusions, one of which mentioned how some Japanese Americans status improved by "the process of settlement to the middle-western and eastern areas."[78] Their study, published in two volumes titled *The Spoilage* (1946) and *The Salvage* (1952), would be the first comprehensive study of Japanese American evacuation and resettlement.

Thomas and Nishimoto's research provide another example of the interwoven connections between the experience of Japanese American incarceration and the liberal university. In the years before incarceration, accessible education was reinscribed as a safeguard to American democracy that reinforced the relationship with the military and, thus, the expansion of President Roosevelt's ideals of New Deal liberalism. With the onset of World War II, higher education's relationship with the ideals of the nation strengthened as its research programs and production capacities became necessary to further American war efforts. Although the passage of EO9066 derailed these efforts, the institutionalization of Japanese American student relocation by the WRA and efforts to welcome them into communities in the interior nodded to a growing belief that the country's racial differences could be managed by and through assimilation and integration.

Recasting the Japanese American student as an asset to the expansion of the ideals of U.S. liberalism, the Midwestern university ultimately contributed to the rebranding of Japanese Americans as assimilable others. As Ellen Wu notes, the reconfiguration of Japanese Americans into the vanguard of the model minority in the 1960s and 1970s often relied on recursive recollections of the success of their integration into universities and their nearby communities from the 1940s.[79] The success of university as center for the development of racial liberalism and the belonging of Japanese Americans, I argue, depended on the Midwest.

The Midwest served more than just the backdrop to Japanese American assimilation, *it was the process*. The Midwest, as a process of racialization towards whiteness, provided ample space for the perceived foreign threat to be removed and pacified, while simultaneously maintaining the liberalisms ideals. By maintaining the ideals of the American heartland as central to an unquestioned Americanness, Japanese American students and the Midwest became neutralized and turned into assets for the expansion of the wartime national security project, which extended

well after the end of World War II. Ultimately, the Midwest as an imagined geography served the ideals of the wartime nation by effectively absorbing and erasing Japanese Americans into their communities and their history.

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Notes

1. Walter C. Coffey, "Letter to President Hutchins," March 18, 1942, Japanese American National Museum.

2. Executive Order 9066, February 19, 1942, General Records of the Unites States Government, Record Group 11, National Archives.

3. Clearly, the NJASRC's program of student relocation is a part of the WRA's process of resettlement. When referring to student's attending college, I use the term relocation as it implies the temporary nature of the student's attendance at the school, whereas I use the term resettlement referring to the broader ideals or goals or the WRA and other government administrations.

4. Executive Committee Notes, Student Relocation Council, 6, UC Berkeley, Bancroft Library.

5. Kristin L. Hoganson. *The Heartland: An American History.* New York: Penguin Press, 2019.

6. Anderson, Benedict R. O'G. (Benedict Richard O'Gorman). Imagined Communities : Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. Rev. and extended ed. London ;: Verso, 1991, 184.

7. Richard Slotkin, *Gunfighter Nation: The Myth of the Frontier in Twentieth-Century America* (New York: Atheneum, 1992), 4.

8. Ibid, 5.

9. Chen, Tina. "The Imaginable Ageography of Global Asias." *Verge: Studies in Global Asias 7*, no. 1 (2021): 39-48. doi:10.5749/vergstudglobasia.7.1.0039.

10. Put simply, Michael Omi and Howard Winant's racial formation theory defines racialization as the extension of racial characteristics to something devoid of racial meaning. Michael Omi and Howard Winant, *Racial Formation in the United States*, 3rd ed. (New York: Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group, 2015).

11. Japanese Student Relocation, 1942, Frank O. and Daisy Beck papers, Collection C168, Indiana University Archives, Bloomington.

"'Can't Be Done—This Is War!': The Admission of Japanese Students during World War II," Indiana University Archives, University of Indiana Bloomington Libraries, April 18, 2016.

12. Ellen D. Wu, *The Color of Success: Asian Americans and the Origins of the Model Minority, Politics and Society in Twentieth Century America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 13.

13. Discussions on whether to enroll Japanese American students at the University of Minnesota continued between the years of 1942 and 1944. Eventually, the University of Minnesota's Board of Regents would admit students in November 1944, and small numbers of Japanese American students would attend during the spring semester 1945. University of Minnesota Board of Regents, 1944, University of Minnesota Board of Regents Minutes, November 4, 1944, University of Minnesota. Retrieved from the University of Minnesota Digital Conservancy, https://hdl.handle.net/11299/43006 (accessed July 14, 2022).

14. According to an *Oakland Tribune* article, "The fourteen responding favorably were the universities of Colorado, Utah, Denver, Idaho, Wyoming, Kansas City, Nebraska, Kansas, Nevada, Iowa State College, New Mexico A&M, Colorado State A&M, Arkansas A&M, and Yankton College of South Dakota." "Fourteen Inland Colleges Open to Jap Students," *Oakland Tribune*, April 6, 1942.

15. Wu, *The Color of Success*, 4.

16. Much of this article's research draws on both digital and material archival documents made available from the following institutions: the Online Archive of California, the University of California Berkeley's Bancroft Library's Japanese American Evacuation and Resettlement records and digital archive, the Japanese American National Museum collections (Los Angeles), and the University of California, Santa Barbara's "The American Presidency Project" media archive and presidential records.

17. Milton Stover Eisenhower, *The President Is Calling* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1974), 98.

18. United States, ed., *WRA: A Story of Human Conservation* (New York: AMS Press, 1946).

19. United States War Relocation Authority, "Student Relocation Committee," UC Berkeley, Bancroft Library https://oac.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/k6nk3p3x/?brand=oac4 (accessed July 14, 2022).

20. War Relocation Authority, National Japanese American Student Relocation Council, 1945, *From Camp to College: The Story of Japanese American Student Relocation*, April 17, 1945, 3.

21. For greater information on the formation of the SRC and WRA see Allan W. Austin, *From Concentration Camp to Campus: Japanese American Students and World War II* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2004).

22. Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1936, Proclamation 2199, "American Education Week," online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/357440 (accessed August 30, 2022).

23. Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1938, "Message for American Education Week," online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/209209 (accessed August 30, 2022).

24. Ibid.

25. Richard M. Abrams, "The U. S. Military and Higher Education: A Brief History," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 502* (1989): 15–28, 16–18.

26. Ibid., 19.

27. Tape v. Hurley, 66 Cal. 473, 6 P. 129, 1885 Cal. LEXIS 474 (Supreme Court of California March 3, 1885).

28. Ibid.

29. "National Assessment of Adult Literacy (NAAL)" (National Center for Education Statistics, 2003), https://nces.ed.gov/naal/lit_history.asp. (accessed August 31, 2022).

30. Ibid.

31. The 1940 Census reported that roughly 4.5 percent of individuals residing in the United States (including foreign-born residents) had received a four-year college degree. However, statistics on college graduates in 1940 are tricky given the limited information provided by Census data. Noting an emphasis on concentrations of populations, Census data on educational attainment for Japanese American communities included statistics from only the following states: California, Colorado, New York, Oregon, Utah, and Washington. Because of this skewed nature, I selected to include data about the communities impacted by removal. Ellen Wu reports in her book that "[i]n 1940, 9.5 percent of Japanese Americans had some college education, compared to the 12 percent of native-born whites and 3 percent of blacks. Ten years later [1950], 19.1 and 14.7 percent of Nikkei men and women, respectively, had acquired some higher education, compared to 14 percent of all whites, and 4.2 percent of black men, 5.2 percent of black women." Wu, The Color of Success, 147. U.S. Census Bureau, "1940 Census of Population: Characteristics of the Nonwhite Population by Race," Census.gov, October 8, 2021, https://www.census.gov/library/publications/1943/dec/population-nonwhite.html, 104 (accessed June 11, 2023).

32. Roosevelt, Four Freedoms speech, January 6, 1941.

33. Abrams, "The U.S. Military and Higher Education," 20.

34. "From Camp to Campus," *Oakland Tribune*, March 4, 1942.

35. "UC's Highest Honor Goes to Japanese," *San Jose Chronicle,* May 14, 1942.

36. "Educators Agree on Education of Japanese Group," *Monterey Peninsula Herald*, April 28, 1942.

37. Summary of Minutes, April 28/29, 1942, Student Relocation Council. BANC MSS 67/14 c, folder T5.11, UC Berkeley, Bancroft Library.

38. Chrissy Yee Lau. *New Women of Empire: Gendered Politics and Racial Uplift in Interwar Japanese America.* University of Washington Press, 2022, 150.

39. Executive Committee Notes, Student Relocation Council, 6. UC Berkeley, Bancroft Library.

40. Letter to Friends of Student Relocation, "National Japanese American Student Relocation Council," November 11, 1942, BANC MSS 67/14 c, folder T5.11, UC Berkeley, Bancroft Library.

41. United States War Relocation Authority, "Student Relocation Committee: Summary of Minutes of Meetings on April 22 and 29 at Berkeley, CA," UC Berkeley,

Bancroft Library, https://oac.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/k6nk3p3x/?brand=oac4 (accessed July 14, 2022).

42. Gary Y. Okihiro and Leslie A. Ito, *Storied Lives: Japanese American Students and World War II*, Scott and Laurie Oki Series in Asian American Studies (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1999), xi.

43. Greg Robinson, *By Order of the President: FDR and the Internment of Japanese Americans* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001), 7.

44. Eisenhower. *The President Is Calling*, 98.

45. Robbins W. Barstow, "Letter to President Guy Stanton Ford," June 17, 1942, Japanese American National Museum.

46. Helen S. Pryor and Dillon S. Myer, Oral History Interview with Dillon S. Myer, other, Dillon S. Myer Oral History Interview, chap. IX–XIII (National Archives, n.d.) https://ddr.densho.org/interviews/ddr-densho-1000-475-1/ (accessed June 10, 2023).

47. In his memoir, Pickett highlights that "Friends [American Friends Service Committee] across the county were most helpful, especially those connected with our regional offices on the West Coast and in the Midwest" and that the relocation to "inland colleges" facilitated a possibility for "friendship and citizenship." Pickett, Clarence. *For More Than Bread: an Autobiographical Account of Twenty-Two Years' Work with the American Friends Service Committee.* Massachusetts: Little, Brown and Company, 1953, 158-159.

48. Ibid.

49. Ibid.

50. Britt E. Halvorson and Joshua O. Reno, *Imagining the Heartland: White Supremacy and the American Midwest* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2022), 12.

51. Okihiro. *Storied Lives*, 127; Wu, *The Color of Success*, 243.

52. Ben Kuroki, "An Address by Sergeant Ben Kuroki, U.S. Army Air Force," presented at the Commonwealth Club, San Francisco, February 4, 1944, 3.

53. National Japanese American Student Relocation Council, 1942–1944, "Student Evaluation," July 9, 1944, BANC MSS 67/14 c, folder T5.11, UC Berkeley, Bancroft Library.

54. "Interviews with Students, Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri, Nos. 1–8," November 1943, BANC MSS 67/14 c, folder T1.861, UC Berkeley, Bancroft Library, https://oac.cdlib.org/ark:/28722/bk0013c539j/?brand=oac4, (accessed July 14, 2022).

55. Okihiro *Storied Lives*, 37.

56. United States War Relocation Authority, "Student Relocation Committee," UC Berkeley, Bancroft Library, https://oac.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/k6nk3p3x/?brand=oac4 (accessed July 14, 2022).

57. BANC MSS 67/14 c, folder T1.869, Study of the Relocated Japanese Americans in Minneapolis (1943), 52

58. "Interviews with Students, Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri, Nos. 1–8," November 1943.

59. Japanese American Evacuation and Resettlement Study, compiler, "A Study of the Relocated Japanese-Americans in Minneapolis, University of Minnesota, Sociology Class," 1943, BANC MSS 67/14 c, folder T1.869, Japanese American Evacuation and Resettlement records, cubanc6714_b278t01_0869.

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60. Patricia Wakida and Hisaji Q. Sakai, Hisaji Q. Sakai Interview, other, Densho Visual History Collection, Densho Digital Repository, April 12, 2019, https://ddr.densho.org/interviews/ddr-densho-1000-475-1/ (accessed August 28, 2023).

61. "Nisei Reunion, A Commemorative Album," University of Nebraska–Lincoln, November 4, 1994, Japanese American National Museum, 52.

62. Ibid., 31.

63. Ibid., 5.

64. "Interviews with Students, Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri, Nos. 1–8," November 1943, BANC MSS 67/14 c, folder T1.861, UC Berkeley, Bancroft Library, https://oac.cdlib.org/ark:/28722/bk0013c539j/?brand=oac4 (accessed July 14, 2022).

65. Japanese American Evacuation and Resettlement Study, compiler, "A Study of the Relocated Japanese-Americans in Minneapolis, University of Minnesota, Sociology Class," 1943, BANC MSS 67/14 c, folder T1.869, Japanese American Evacuation and Resettlement records, cubanc6714_b278t01_0869.pdf (accessed September 10, 2022).

66. Ibid., 16–17.

67. Committee of Education, "Effects of Certain War Activities upon Colleges and Universities," H.Res. 63, House of Representatives, February 23, 1945), University of Michigan, Bentley Library.

68. Ibid., 8.

69. Roderick A. Ferguson, *The Reorder of Things: The University and Its Pedagogies of Minority Difference, Difference Incorporated* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012), 6.

70. Wu, *The Color of Success*, 17.

71. "Sproul, Robert G. Papers," UC Berkeley, Bancroft Library, https://oac.cdlib.org/ark:/28722/bk001307f5j/?brand=oac4 (accessed July 14, 2022).

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73. Paul C. Dougherty, "Communication from the War Relocation Authority Concerning Japanese-Americans Relocated in the Chicago Area," letter, December 6, 1943, Illinois State Archives, https://www.ilsos.gov/departments/archives/teaching_packages/illinois_at_war/doc31.html (accessed September 12, 2022).

74. Calculations made by the author. *Directory of American Students of Japanese Ancestry in the Higher Schools, Colleges and Universities of the United States of America, Including Students Currently Working but Intending to Enter College*. Philadelphia, Pa: Printed for private circulation by the National Japanese American Student Relocation Council with the collaboration of the National Council of Christian Associations, New York, N.Y., 1943.

75. Megan Asaka, "Resettlement," *Densho Encyclopedia*, https://encyclopedia.densho.org/Resettlement (accessed June 14, 2023).

76. "Park College, Application for Admission," August 10, 1942, Japanese American National Museum.

77. "Nisei Reunion, A Commemorative Album," 60.
78. Sproul, Robert G. Papers, UC Berkeley, Bancroft Library, https://oac.cdlib.org/ark:/28722/bk001307f5j/?brand=oac4, 54 (accessed July 14, 2022).
79. Wu, *The Color of Success*, 4.