

dissent and peace negotiations at ghent

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The War of 1812 was one of the more unpopular wars in United States history, and active protest against it was evident from its inception. Centered primarily among New England Federalists, opposition took a variety of forms. Dissenting Massachusetts, Connecticut and Rhode Island governors obstructed the use of their states' militias for national service. The Federalist-controlled legislature of Massachusetts, seeking to undermine support for the conflict, advised citizens not to volunteer except for defensive wars. Town meetings and county conventions offered memorials condemning the war while New England capitalists withheld funds. Federalist newspapers—a few going so far as to suggest New England secession—contributed to the discord.

Such tactics seemed justifiable to those who considered England the guardian of civilization and France its despoiler, for America's apparent favoritism toward France confirmed Federalist suspicions that Madison's administration was an extension of European anarchy and atheism. Equally irritating, the war was an impediment to commercial interests that were heavily dependent on English trade. In addition Federalists found that their economic and ideological opposition had political significance. By 1814 every New England state was led by Federalists. "Madison's war," like Jefferson's embargo, accomplished for the party what it had been unable to do for itself. As a result, dissent was closely related to Federalist hopes of regaining their former power.

Following the active protest of the first summer of war and until December, 1813, the voices of dissent seldom rose above a murmur. But when Madison proclaimed an embargo curtailing coastal trade, vociferous opposition again surfaced. In April the discontinuance of the embargo subdued discontent, but by no means ended it. The intensity of dissent fluctuated during the spring and summer of 1814, and in October Massa-

chusetts Federalists called for the Hartford Convention. The most constant and vehement opposition to the war and to the Madison administration that ever occurred filled the remainder of the year.

Peace negotiations took place at Ghent during the same period. Over a year of continual efforts by the American government had passed before the conference finally began in August, 1814. The American commissioners perceived their position to be weakened by military defeats, a near-bankrupt treasury, and a divided nation. As Bradford Perkins notes, they also faced an enemy who was neither defeated nor thought himself to be beaten.¹ We now know that this was a rare experience for American diplomats, for the War of 1812 was one of the few wars where the United States had to negotiate for peace rather than to dictate it to a conquered enemy. Under such circumstances peace negotiators especially resent any sign of discord within their own country, because to their minds it undermines their demands and necessitates concessions. They presume that the enemy will take advantage of internal divisions and will be more reluctant to compromise, thereby prolonging war. Such were the views of the American commissioners at Ghent.

When a treaty eventually was signed on December 24, it was as good as Albert Gallatin considered possible; but he claimed that New England dissent had been an obstacle. "The attitude taken by the State of Massachusetts and the appearances in some of the neighbouring States," Gallatin lamented to Secretary of State James Monroe, "had a most unfavorable effect." Whether his judgment was accurate is open to question.

Long the target of Federalist abuse, Gallatin was predisposed to exaggerate the influence of his political opponents. He frequently had been attacked for his economic policies as well as for his foreign birth. At the time of his nomination to the original peace commission in 1813, criticism of his management of the Treasury was particularly virulent. Political dissent having made his tasks no easier at home, it is understandable that Gallatin would project his experience to the situation abroad, and months before negotiations began he did so. If vocal Federalists had not swayed a majority in America, he argued, they had had no difficulty convincing the newspaper-reading British public that the United States' declaration of war was unwarranted. Although he did not believe that the Cabinet held such sentiments, he feared that because of public opinion strenuous efforts were required on its part to make peace. This was especially true, he contended, since the Cabinet shared the thought that "a continuance of the war would produce a separation of the Union, and perhaps a return of the New England States to the mother-country." In a letter to fellow delegate Henry Clay notifying him that the end of the European war would free additional British troops for American service, Gallatin reiterated these points and added that "above all our own divisions and the hostile attitude of the Eastern States give room to apprehend that a continuance of the war might prove vitally fatal to the United States." Based on this concern of

increased British strength and of the effects New England dissent might have on British policy, he advised James Monroe to modify the commission's instructions. In particular he thought that the resolution of the issue of impressment should be removed as a *sine qua non* for peace. The "most favorable" terms he hoped for were the *status quo ante bellum*. The Madison administration came to the same conclusion, provided that an article be included in the treaty stipulating that separate negotiations concerning impressment and commerce would follow shortly. Almost immediately it retreated further by instructing that the article was preferable but not necessary.

Gallatin was not the only American commissioner who, before negotiations began, was alarmed by what he interpreted to be the effects of dissent. John Quincy Adams shared the sentiment. Adams, a former Federalist, had substantial cause for grievances and for suspicions about his prior associates and fellow New Englanders and possessed a temperament ready to conjure the worst at the slightest offense. His dislike and distrust for such Federalists as Timothy Pickering had arisen during the intraparty skirmishes of his father's administration and had intensified as the party became more narrowly sectional. He was appalled by the separatists of 1804 and attributed similar motives to those who opposed Jefferson's embargo. Following his shift from the Federalist Party to the Republican Party in 1808, he continued to view Federalists as potential traitors. On June 29, 1812, unaware that war had been declared, he wrote: "The present time is less favorable for the British intrigue to dismember our Union than that [1809 when the Canadian agent, John Henry, was in New England] was, but whenever we have a war with England, we shall have to contend against an internal struggle of the same spirit." Learning of the war and of the accompanying Federalist dissent, he thought his beliefs confirmed. Not even Russian winters could cool his passions, nor distance make his heart grow fonder. Even so, he considered the war to be unnecessary since the Orders in Council had been revoked, and he too hoped for an early peace. His desire for peace, however, did not alter his attitude towards the Federalists. Adams interpreted their demands for peace as an attempt to regain political power; and although his apprehension of disunion wavered, the thought lingered on.

The last member of the delegation appointed to negotiate under Russian mediation, Federalist Senator James A. Bayard of Delaware, held a different view of anti-war activity. Bayard disapproved of the war but did not sympathize with the British. Yet out of desperation he had thought that "the experiment [of war] may be worth what it will cost to have it determined whether we are better-off[f] in being at peace or war with her. This will nearly settle the question whether the Feds. or demos. have pursued the wiser course." Bayard was appointed to the peace commission to appease dissenting Federalists, and at least one of his friends cautioned him that he might be used to provide

legitimacy for a fraudulent mission.² Bayard thought differently. “If the negociation should fail (the worst event which can happen),” he reasoned, “the nation can sustain no injury from my having been a member of the mission. *I can only be called upon to attest the true grounds upon which the negociation may have terminated, and it certainly will be important to the country to be informed of the truth upon the subject.*”

When the British refused to accept Russian mediation but agreed to direct negotiations, Henry Clay and Jonathan Russell were added to the American commission. Clay, an ambitious westerner, was a strong supporter of the war and an equally adamant desparager of those who opposed it. Early in the conflict, he attempted to rally public opinion against dissenters, and he shrewdly picked as the springboard for his comments one of the more extreme Federalist newspapers, the *Boston Repertory*. On June 26, 1812, the *Repertory* printed an inflammatory article. It asked its readers whether they would prefer to be “the slaves of the slaves of Bonaparte” or freemen. Should they choose the latter, resistance and separation were implied as proper courses of action. Clay introduced the article in the administration newspaper, the *National Intelligencer*, with an extended preface. He first attacked the editor of the *Repertory* for suggesting resistance against a free government under which “every blessing of which we are susceptible is enjoyed.” He then let his imagination roam further. What if a “few ambitious demagogues” should try to subvert the Constitution by force, he pondered. “The virtuous people of that State” would quell it. What if “these leaders” should be assisted by “the myrmidons of a foreign power,” he questioned next. The state militia should be competent; but if need be, they would be helped by “myriads of freemen” from other states. But what if “misguided faction[s]” in the New England states actually achieved disunion, he asked, allowing his “improbable suppositions” to develop to their fullest. This he thought too preposterous for consideration; and thus hoping to have discredited the *Repertory* and, more importantly, Federalist dissenters, he presented the article. Understandably Federalists were displeased with Clay’s appointment as well as with Russell’s, but prior to negotiations Clay tended to disregard them as a real threat. He believed them to be merely playing “a game of swaggering and gasconade.” Apparently not even the warning that Eastern discontent would lead the British to demand recognition of impressment persuaded him differently.

Jonathan Russell was unquestionably the least distinguished of an otherwise highly competent delegation. Even though he was a New Englander, he continually supported Clay rather than Adams. Whether he opposed or was even concerned about dissent prior to negotiations is undetermined, but in the midst of the talks his attitude became clear. “I will not forgive the man who indulges the prejudice of party in

times like these," he wrote. "All must rally now in defense of their country."

Such were the attitudes of the American commissioners when they began negotiations on August 6. Gallatin and Adams expected dissent to be detrimental to their efforts while Bayard and Clay anticipated no difficulty from that quarter. Russell's preconception is unknown.

Any fear of failure they may have had must have been excited when the British revealed their objectives. They demanded most of the territory now composing the states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin as an Indian buffer state and presented it as a *sine qua non*. They sought a revision of the boundaries between the United States and Canada. They denied the previous American rights of fishing in British waters and of drying catches on British shores. Finally, they desired military control of the Great Lakes. Worst of all, the British offered little room for compromise. It appeared likely that the conference would terminate unsuccessfully by the end of the first month.

The American delegation were neither willing to capitulate to these terms nor instructed on all issues. Thus they debated with the British commissioners, waited for further instructions, contemplated their departure and hoped for a treaty they could accept. On at least one occasion, Bayard resorted to tactics of his own. Following a joint dinner of both commissions, he sought out the chief British negotiator, Henry Goulburn, for a private conference. Bayard argued that the terms offered by Great Britain were not only damaging to "all prospects of peace," but also to the Federalist Party. It was to Britain's advantage to support the Federalists, and this could best be accomplished by peace. Moreover, he assured Goulburn, there was no need to fear for Canada. Goulburn was unimpressed and suspected that negotiations would be discontinued.

As disheartened as the Americans were, they were reluctant to break off the talks. Should that event become unavoidable, the commissioners unanimously agreed that they must do so on a point which would unite the American people in support of the war. To put it differently, the delegation to a man had become concerned about dissent and its possible consequences. Rather than intensify internal disharmony, they decided to continue discussions until war protestors should concur that termination was proper.

The Indian question, therefore, became increasingly perplexing when the British reduced their *sine qua non* from a demand for a buffer state to an insistence that the peace include the restoration of Indian rights, privileges and territories as of 1811. Gallatin speculated that such an article would be rejected by the Madison administration "but that it was a bad point for us to break off the negotiation upon." Furthermore, the British were so committed on this issue, Gallatin reasoned, that "it was impossible for them further to retreat," and consequently American acceptance might be mandatory. Subsequent knowledge of the

British capture of Washington, D.C., made a decision no easier. When the British modified their proposal to a reciprocal article which did not include Indian tribes as parties in the peace but was an ultimatum, the American commissioners accepted it. Gallatin explained his own motivation by asserting that “having little hope of peace, I thought it much more favorable, with respect to public opinion in the eastern part of the Union, that we should break on other grounds, and particularly that of territorial rights, than on that of Indian pacification. . . .”

Almost simultaneous to the resolution of the Indian question, James Madison performed a clever act which affected British attitudes; he published the diplomatic dispatches as well as the June instructions. The intent behind the maneuver must have been primarily to quell dissent by showing British territorial ambitions. The result, however, was an increased discontent, but in Great Britain rather than in the United States.

Despite the disclosure of the dispatches, Federalist opposition to the war continued to mount. On October 15 the Massachusetts legislature decided to send invitations to the other New England states for the ostensible purposes of deliberating “upon the subjects of their public grievances and concerns,” of devising plans for protecting New England, and of considering whether an attempt should be made to amend the Constitution. The convention was to be held at Hartford, beginning December 15.

Few were certain what would happen. The major question in many minds was whether separation was the real objective. Madison for some time had feared that it was. Following an interview a day before Massachusetts decided to call the Convention, William Wirt observed that Madison’s mind was “full of the New England sedition.” Among his concerns were the effects such actions might have on the British. “You are not mistaken in viewing the conduct of the Eastern States as the source of our greatest difficulties in carrying on the war,” Madison wrote a few weeks before the Convention began, “as it certainly is the greatest, if not the sole, inducement with the enemy to persevere in it.”

By late November the American commissioners in general were not as apprehensive as Madison. Perhaps the favorable turn of events at Ghent lessened what alarm they might have had. John Quincy Adams, however, was not one to take the proposed Hartford Convention lightly. He wrote, “how fearfully does this mad and wicked project of national suicide bear upon my heart and mind, when I have the profoundest conviction that if we now fail to obtain peace, it will be owing entirely to this act of the Massachusetts legislature.” With just the questions of the fisheries and of ownership of Moose Island remaining, Adams thought that only the “prospect of the dissolution of our Union” encouraged the British to continue the war for such otherwise meager gains.

A similar, though less passionate and pessimistic, judgment was made

by Albert Gallatin. In understated terms, he considered it “extraordinary” that a peaceful conclusion of negotiations “depended solely upon two points, in which the people of the State of Massachusetts alone were interested.” To sacrifice them, he held, would be to give support to the Federalists and to the movement for separation, and therefore he argued against British demands. Should the United States be willing to allow British navigation of the Mississippi, it appeared that fishing rights and possession of Moose Island could be retained; but Henry Clay was in no mood to conciliate men whom he considered traitors at the expense of western interests. He pointedly warned the other commissioners “that there might be a party for separation at some future day in the Western States, too.”

At this juncture, negotiations might have terminated because of disagreements among the American commissioners—disagreements intensified by New England dissent. On the one side, Gallatin, Adams, and apparently Bayard were willing to grant navigation rights in exchange for concessions affecting dissident Massachusetts. On the other, Clay adamantly refused to approve such an event, and Russell apparently agreed. Clay preferred to leave both the fisheries and the Mississippi out of the treaty and went so far as to suggest this in private conversation with one of the British commissioners, Lord Gambier.

Omission eventually was the final solution. Neither the fisheries nor the Mississippi was mentioned in the treaty, and Moose Island was left to arbitration. The War of 1812 ended on the basis of *status quo ante bellum*. Throughout negotiations the American delegation had assumed that dissent in the United States influenced British decisions and had acted accordingly. Along with preconceptions and interpretations of British maneuvers a reason for the assumption was the incorporation in the pro-ministry British press of Federalist acts and speeches.

Pro-ministry newspapers, such as the London *Times* and the London *Sun*, were extremely belligerent and used American examples whenever possible to strengthen their case. Shortly before negotiations began the *Times*, for instance, claimed that “the feeling of the sounder and better part of the American people is strongly with us.” The *Sun* advised the British ministry to treat the United States punitively at Ghent; and as if to show that harsh measures were possible as well as desirable, it followed the comments with “communications” from America that the Federalists were seeking to impeach Madison. And so it went. When the threatened island of Nantucket declared itself neutral, the potential consequences appeared enormous to both papers. The *Times* had “little doubt” that should Lord Hill’s army be seen “in the heartland of the country” half the United States would follow Nantucket’s lead while the *Sun* thought it should be made known to the Madison administration and “to the world [which certainly included the British Cabinet], that the assurance of the unity of these States is very frail. . . .” There were

few weeks during the first three months of negotiations when notice of American dissent was not made in the pro-administration press.

The tone shifted dramatically, however, after it was learned that Madison had published the diplomatic dispatches. Reference to American disharmony temporarily was dropped. "We are told that the terms proposed by the British Commissioners have united all parties in the United States against us," the *Sun* explained to its readers. "So be it." The bellicose *Times* interpreted the new-found "unity" to be the "consequence of *talking*, instead of acting." Demands not enforced by adequate power had brought about the turn of events. "But why treat at all with Mr. MADISON?", it rhetorically questioned.

Upon hearing of the call for the Hartford Convention, the *Times* maintained its militancy but once again welcomed American dissent. As late as December 20, four days before the treaty was signed, it suggested that Britain treat separately with New England; and when peace came, it brought no satisfaction to that newspaper. The *Sun* was more reluctant to reacknowledge Federalist opposition. The Massachusetts resolutions condemning Madison were brushed aside as not being "worthy of being inserted at length, to the exclusion of more entertaining matter." Not until December 23 did the *Sun* re-embrace New England Federalism.

The chief opposition newspaper, the London *Morning Chronicle*, also may have led the American commissioners to assume that disharmony in the United States was influencing British policy and at least must have reinforced their awareness that American divisiveness was recognized in London. The newspaper and its supporters opposed the war not because they thought it unjust but because they believed whatever gains might be made would be outweighed by the expense incurred and by the disruption of trade. Moreover, they considered American disunity advantageous to the British in peace or war and therefore demanded that British terms for peace be moderate so that American wounds would not heal. "A lamentable thing," the *Morning Chronicle* argued, "if we should unite the whole population of America against us by our exorbitant demands, and thereby make known to them their own strength."

Whatever the effect of British newspapers on the perceptions of the American delegation and regardless of the commissioners' predispositions, there can be no doubt that dissent in the United States influenced British tactics at Ghent. Early in the negotiations when British objectives still included an Indian buffer state, boundary readjustment, and military dominance on the Great Lakes, the British attempted to justify these demands by charging that the United States, "of late years at least," sought to annex Canada. They supported the accusation partly with evidence coming from New England, in particular from Governor John Cotton Smith of Connecticut. The intent, presumably, was to confront

the American commissioners with American evidence and to make it difficult for them to break negotiations on a point accepted by American dissenters.³ This same tactic was used a month later, on October 8. Again the British claimed that the United States wanted Canada, and again New England evidence (in this case, a remonstrance from the Massachusetts legislature) was used. Late in the negotiations American opposition must have been in mind as well when the British denied previous American fishing rights and when they claimed Moose Island. No other issues at that time remained to be resolved but those which affected New England, especially Massachusetts. The American delegation, once more burdened by Federalist dissent, correctly interpreted British motivation in this instance.

A variation of the tactic may be seen in a communication from Earl Bathurst, head of the Colonial Office, to Goulburn earlier in the year. Having learned of military success at Washington, Bathurst attempted to capitalize on the Federalist desire for power. He instructed Goulburn to inform any Federalist with whom he might converse that an immediate peace would be advantageous to the Federalist Party. Recent events led to the conclusion that the Madison administration would be driven from office and would be replaced by Federalists. Expecting further victories, Bathurst contended that a harsher peace would be demanded in three months; should a Federalist administration sign, "they might become unpopular. . . ." Events, however, developed differently.

Yet although American dissent clearly influenced British tactics, it had little impact on determining particular British objectives and had no effect on policy decisions. In none of the three major stages of policy during peace negotiations can its consequences be seen. The British initially sought a territorial re-arrangement which would protect Canada from future American threats. They also desired to protect Britain's Indian allies and to satisfy a touch of vindictiveness. In October British policy makers shifted and decided to settle on the basis of *uti possidetis*. They established their final position in November when they determined that *status quo ante bellum* was acceptable. Quite clearly, British demands diminished as negotiations continued. At the same time, dissent in the United States was intensifying. This alone should demonstrate how little American protest entered the minds of the British leadership. Other evidence also is available.

Only infrequently was American dissent noted in the correspondence of British officials, and then it was not necessarily presented as being beneficial. At one time, for example, chief negotiator Henry Goulburn commented that among the few things he had learned at the conference was that "the Federalists are quite as inveterate enemies to us as the Madisonians." The head of the Colonial Office, Earl Bathurst, similarly distrusted the Federalists but hoped somehow they might be useful. "I make no doubt they hate us," he wrote of them, "but their hate to

the opposite party may lead them, very unintentionally, to give us some assistance." Prime Minister Liverpool certainly was aware that there was disaffection in the United States for the Madison administration, but it in no way influenced his decisions. His one hope was that dissent would incline Madison towards peace, presumably on British terms.

Not even when the British ministry learned of the call for the Hartford Convention nor when they were led to believe that New England separation was imminent did their attitudes shift. They had decided to treat for peace on the basis of *status quo ante bellum*, and apparently only an American refusal to accept those terms would have affected their commitment. This was evident late in the negotiations on December 13 when Bathurst was informed that Massachusetts allegedly wished to sign a separate peace. A self-identified "agent" of Massachusetts Governor Caleb Strong had given this information to British officials in New Brunswick, and they had relayed it to Bathurst.⁴ Bathurst responded immediately; but rather than change policy, he ordered that in the event of the collapse of the negotiations or of the refusal of Madison to ratify a treaty a separate peace would be arranged, provided the agent identified himself with official documents. More significantly, Liverpool favored the same course if the treaty should not be ratified.

If opposition to the War of 1812 had any influence on British policy, it was British opposition, not American. The *Morning Chronicle* was not the only voice of discontent in Britain. Speeches in both houses of Parliament continued to condemn the war. No one suggested that British involvement had been unjustified, but some thought that there was no need to prolong it; possible territorial acquisitions were not worth the expense. Anger also was expressed at military ineptitude, particularly after Plattsburg.

The British ministry were wary of such dissatisfaction. Foreign Secretary Castlereagh advised Liverpool to "call Parliament at such a period as will give you the means of avoiding discussion, especially on the American question. . . ." Bathurst contended that "there are many political reasons to make us anxious to conclude a Peace if we can do it on proper Terms." British dissent even may have contributed to the decision to end the war on the basis of *status quo ante bellum*. Liverpool included fear of opposition to increased taxes for continuing the war as one of his reasons for concluding peace; neither Bathurst nor Goulburn did, however.⁵ At any rate British dissent, at most, had slight impact on this decision, and American disaffection had none.

In short, Albert Gallatin exaggerated the influence of American dissent on British decisions. He, like his fellow commissioners, was led astray by preconceptions, British newspapers and British diplomatic tactics. The critical element determining the impact of dissent on peace negotiations was the military situation. Had Britain been defeated, dissent would have been little more than an irritation—a mere domestic

problem—to the American delegation. But confronted by a military stalemate, the American commissioners incorrectly concluded that British officials considered themselves strengthened by the words and actions of American dissenters. The British, in fact, were as distrustful of dissenters as were American officials; and, as a result, American opposition to the War of 1812 was felt primarily by American negotiators, and it was only American policy which was affected. Conversely, British dissent affected only British officials, and there is no evidence that Americans considered such opposition while forming their decisions. Dissent on neither side of the Atlantic prolonged the war but rather it shortened the conflict by making negotiators more circumspect about breaking discussions and more willing to achieve peace.

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footnotes

Only secondary sources are included in the footnotes. Upon request the author will provide a complete list of footnotes.

Primary sources for American diplomatic instructions and correspondence are Documents relating to the Negotiations at Ghent, National Archives (microfilm) and *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, III. The opinions of the American negotiators that were expressed in their correspondence may be found in the following: Charles Francis Adams, ed., *Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, Comprising Portions of his Diary from 1795 to 1848* (Philadelphia, 1874-1877), III; Henry Adams, ed., *The Writings of Albert Gallatin* (Philadelphia, 1879), I; Elizabeth Donnan, ed., "The Papers of James A. Bayard," *American Historical Association, Annual Report 1913* (Washington, 1915), II; Worthington Chauncey Ford, ed., *Writings of John Quincy Adams* (New York, 1913-1917), IV; and James F. Hopkins and Mary W. M. Hargreaves, eds., *The Papers of Henry Clay* (Lexington, Ky., 1959-), I.

British diplomatic instructions and correspondence may be found in the Goulburn Papers, Clements Library, University of Michigan; in Francis Bickley, ed., *Report on the Manuscripts of Earl Bathurst* (London, 1923); in Charles W. Vane, ed., *Correspondence, Despatches, and the Papers of Viscount Castlereagh, Second Marquess of Londonderry* (London, 1852), X; and in Arthur R. Wellington, ed., *Supplementary Despatches, Correspondence, and Memoranda of Field Marshall Arthur Duke of Wellington, K.G.* (London, 1862), IX. Memoirs of Henry Goulburn are printed in Wilburn Devereux Jones, ed., "A British View of the War of 1812 and the Peace Negotiations," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XLV (December, 1958), 481-487.

Other primary sources that are listed in the footnotes are: Gaillard Hunt, ed., *The Writings of James Madison* (New York, 1900-1910), VIII; John P. Kennedy, *Memoirs of the Life of William Wirt, Attorney-General of the United States* (Philadelphia, 1856), I; the Harrison Gray Otis Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society; the *Boston Repertory*, London *Morning Chronicle*, London *Sun*, and London *Times*; and *Hansard's Debates*.

1. Bradford Perkins, *Castlereagh and Adams: England and the United States, 1812-1823* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1964), 57.

2. Frank A. Updyke has written that not only the appointment of Bayard but also the entire step towards mediation was partially an attempt to mollify the disaffected New England states, *The Diplomacy of the War of 1812* (Baltimore, 1915), 145-146.

3. Both Samuel Flagg Bemis and Charles M. Gates have written that the British note of September 4 was designed to attract favorable Federalist opinion. See Bemis, *John Quincy Adams and the Foundations of American Foreign Policy* (New York, 1949), 205-206; and Gates, "The West in American Diplomacy, 1812-1815," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XXVI (March, 1940), 504.

4. J. S. Martell, "A Side Light on Federalist Strategy," *American Historical Review*, XLIII (April, 1938), 553-566. Considering that the threat of separation was only a tactic at this date for the goals of constitutional amendment and state control of military affairs, the authenticity of the uncredentialed agent is highly suspect.

5. A. L. Burt and C. K. Webster both include dissent in their interpretations of this policy decision although Burt believes that Wellington's evaluation was the essential cause; Burt, *The United States, Great Britain, and British North America: From the Revolution to the Establishment of Peace after the War of 1812* (New York, 1961), 362-363; Webster,

"The American War and the Treaty of Ghent, 1812-1814," in A. W. Ward and C. P. Gooch, eds., *The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, 1783-1919* (Cambridge, 1939), I, 540. Bradford Perkins, on the other hand, considers all explanations rationalizations for a policy "unconsciously" determined before, *Castlereagh and Adams*, 110-111.