world war ii and the pacifist controversy

IN THE MAJOR PROTESTANT CHURCHES

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We have become accustomed to viewing the Second World War as a war to which Americans responded with unprecedented unity and lack of self-doubt. Richard Polenberg's collection of documents *America at War: The Home Front, 1941-1945,* for example, begins rather predictably with a section entitled "The Quest for Unity," recognizing, as Polenberg points out, that total war creates a need for national cohesion.[1] Yet we have probably minimized the degree to which the war experience was accompanied by significant social tension, ferment and change. As the sociologist Francis E. Merrill observed in 1948, reflecting on the nature of social disorganization in American society during World War II: "Total war is the most catastrophic instigator of social change the world has ever seen, with the possible exception of violent revolution."[2]

We also may have minimized the way in which the shock waves leading up to American entry into the war persisted in significant ways into the actual war years for important groups within the society. One such group was the American left, whose disarray after the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939 Norman Holmes Pearson called one of the "crucial episodes in American history."[3] But an equally significant, though generally neglected, story is the wartime experience of pacifists and of groups strongly affected by pacifist sentiment.[4] The major Protestant denominations—the Baptists, Congregational Christians, Episcopalians, Methodists and Presbyterians[5]—represented one of the largest constituencies in the general peace movement of the inter-war years, as Charles Chatfield and

other students of twentieth-century pacifism have pointed out.[6] If not fully committed to a pacifist position, their pacifist sentiment ran deep. Consequently, the great debate over American intervention between 1939 and 1941 was nowhere more heated than in the churches. While Pearl Harbor dealt a stunning blow to the pacifist cause from which defection was already rampant, nevertheless the pacifist controversy had been of such dominating force that it continued to produce cleavages and anguish for the mainstream denominations even during the years of American involvement and in the face of pressure for unity and cohesion in the nation's war effort.

The wartime legacy of the pacifist controversy was evident in the groping of pacifists for a viable position in a nation at war, the insistence of liberal nonpacifists that the church must repudiate pacifism and "moral neutrality," the continued attack of social conservatives upon pacifism and social involvement, the difficulty of the denominations in defining their position on the war and the attempt of liberals to heal their wounds by bringing former adversaries together in a common crusade for a responsible stance on the issue of postwar world order. The World War II experience of the major Protestant churches represents not only a traumatic episode in their debate over the issues of war and peace, but provides insight into wartime tension and change within an important social institution.

i. before pearl harbor

Pacifism was the social issue which dominated the consciousness of the Protestant churches during the late 1930s and into the period of the war itself. In revulsion from the uncritical way in which preachers had presented arms during World War I and from the disappointing failure of the idealistic hope for world order which had accompanied it, the churches in the 1920s strongly supported the international peace movement and in the 1930s moved substantially toward the position of the absolute pacifist that involvement in any war was morally wrong.[7] Many churchmen, like C. C. Morrison, the editor of the nondenominational *Christian Century*, based their opposition to war on pragmatic rather than absolute grounds, but together absolute and pragmatic pacifists represented a considerable force. Students of pacifism have pointed out that the religious pacifism so prevalent in this period differed from the essentially pessimistic position of the historic peace churches, bearing instead the distinctive marks of the optimistic Social Gospel hope for the reconstruction of society.[8] For many church liberals it became a keystone for general social commitment. In practical political terms pacifist sentiment led to strong support for American neutrality in the face of the international crises of the late 1930s.[9]

None of the major Protestant denominations, however, went so far

as to endorse the absolute pacifist position.[10] Instead, in the late 1930s, but particularly during the great debate over American policy between the German invasion of Poland in 1939 and Pearl Harbor in 1941, a growing nonpacifist position tended to polarize the discussion. Fundamentalist social conservatives, who viewed pacifism as one more manifestation of the social liberalism and theological modernism to which they had long objected, continued to renounce it as thoroughly misguided. More significant was the development of a nonpacifist position by many who shared the liberal or radical orientation of most pacifists and, unlike the social conservatives, also insisted upon church involvement in critical social questions.[11] This latter group criticized the pacifist position on its own grounds as a failure of moral judgment, insisting that there were other social evils which might be greater than the evil of war. Reinhold Niebuhr provided perhaps the clearest and most influential statement of those who had abandoned pacifism and attempted to define a positive nonpacifist stance for the churches. Niebuhr argued that the world of social realities was a world of coercion and relative choices, a world of tragedy which Christians must share.[12] Clearly, the pacifist issue represented a major crisis for liberal social activists in the churches.

The divisiveness of the pacifist controversy reached a climax during the great debate over American intervention between 1939 and 1941. The logic of events—the shock of the Nazi blitzkrieg, the fall of France, and the battle of Britain—dealt severe blows to the pacifist position. More and more churchmen began to make the transition to a nonpacifist position, but not without considerable personal anguish and public conflict.

It was clear that the denominations were in the midst of a general reorientation on the question of war, but their official meetings revealed the persistence of pacifist sentiment. In 1940 the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church U.S.A. (northern) felt compelled to recognize that on the issue of the morality of war "good and honest men differ violently upon what is the right and Christian thing to do," and the General Council of the Congregational and Christian Churches went so far as to adopt two distinct statements on the question, since they had "agreed to differ but resolved to love."[13] The Methodist General Conference in the same year came closest to endorsing the pacifist position: "The Methodist Church, although making no attempt to bind the consciences of its individual members, will not officially endorse, support, or participate in war."[14]

By 1941 pacifist sentiment had begun to erode considerably. The denominations clearly were swinging away from pacifism with the onslaught of the events which swept the United States into the war. Presbyterians in the North, for instance, for the first time in recent years distinguished between aggressive and defensive war in their annual statement.[15] The independent and pacifist northern *Presbyterian Trib-*

une lamented the growing defection: "Painfully vivid has been the recent spectacle of seeing men who a few years ago were utterly intolerant of militarism, now swinging completely to the proposition of crushing brute force with greater and more brutal force."[16] However, the hesitation and conflict which accompanied the transition in the churches' attitudes was unmistakable. When a pacifist-oriented statement condemning all war as "leading the world into moral, spiritual and economic bankruptcy" was defeated in the Northern Baptist Convention, the reporter for the *Christian Century* commented that the meeting had been marked by stronger tensions than any he had witnessed in recent church gatherings.[17] If pacifist sentiment waned considerably in the course of the great debate, its persistence was nevertheless impressive.

ii. the pacifist response

While the nation as a whole reacted with profound shock to the treachery of the surprise Japanese attack upon Pearl Harbor, the church press made a point of balancing a sense of outrage with explicit concern that the war be faced without hysteria and that righteous wrath not become self-righteousness, a clear reflection of self-consciousness regarding the churches' role in World War I.

Many churchmen felt that Pearl Harbor would mark the end of pacifism. Roy Smith, the editor of the Methodist *Christian Advocate,* had taken a middle-of-the-road position in the pacifist controversy, and his reaction seemed to illustrate the impact of the war upon many churchmen whose attitudes had been undergoing change: "The problem of the war has been vastly simplified for the consciences of many Americans by Japan's duplicity and initiative."[18] L. O. Hartman of the independent Methodist journal *Zion's Herald,* Guy Emery Shipler of the Episcopal *Churchman,* and William Gilroy of the Congregational Christian *Advance*—all liberal editors who had been leaders in the opposition to pacifism and neutrality—insisted that Pearl Harbor confirmed the validity of their critique. They contended that in the face of such aggression the United States had no choice but to join with those who sought to defend themselves. Surely, Shipler felt, Japan had taught some "needed lessons."[19]

Pacifists responded with sorrow and a sense of failure to the fact that war had indeed come. Carlyle Adams, the editor of the *Presbyterian Tribune* and a staunch absolute pacifist, mourned the failure of the churches to prevent war: "The war has come because we have reached the end of our age in history. . . . We must admit, too, that war has been partly caused by those who have loved peace. . . . The church has become all but impotent in the path of materialism."[20] C. C. Morrison of the *Christian Century,* a pragmatic pacifist during the period of the great debate, felt that the war presented the Christian with "an almost

unrelieved tragedy—a tragedy which need never have happened had it not been for sins of omission and commission."[21]

The entry of the United States into the war presented pacifists with hard choices. Those who clung to the absolute pacifist position, always a minority in the denominations, were now a small band, but some nevertheless expressed the determination to keep their witness. Ernest Fremont Tittle, the Methodist pacifist clergyman, explained the hope of the consistent pacifist shortly after the American declaration of war: "Those who respond to a divine persuasion are always a minority. . . . They believe that in this world of ours brute force is not the ultimate power. . . . Real progress there has been in moral behavior and human welware . . . [p]artly in consequence of the judgment of God on all unrighteousness . . . and partly in consequence of the steadfast devotion of valiant minorities who, responding to a divine persuasion, allowed themselves to be used of God in the working out of His purpose for mankind."[22] While some absolute pacifists hoped that their position might continue to influence the churches, many others, including pragmatic pacifists like Morrison, felt that they must accept the necessity of the war now that it had begun. Morrison, who had argued all along that the absolute could not be applied to social issues, now viewed the fact of war as "an unnecessary necessity."[23]

The greatest challenge for pacifists was to define a positive role for themselves in a nation at war. In editorials in 1942 and 1943 Morrison attempted to carve out a middle position between the view of the pacifist and that of the soldier, arguing that pacifism was irrelevant now that the pacifists' nation was engaged in the war. To oppose war at such a time, he argued, was to oppose the undertaking of the nation, to open one's self to the charge of treason, and to refuse comradeship with one's fellows on behalf of an abstract ideal. Morrison's conclusion was that in wartime the actual behavior of the Christian pacifist and the Christian nonpacifist should be essentially the same.[24] Although absolute pacifists quarrelled with Morrison's view that war must be accepted as necessity, there is no doubt that he had caught their dilemma and described the practical alternatives which confronted them. In June, 1942, Albert Palmer, a staunch absolute pacifist, sought to outline a role in an article entitled "What Should Pacifists Do Now?" He argued that the pacifist must avoid obstructionism in the war effort and avoid promoting division within the church by seeking to win converts to pacifism. Rather, the pacifist must continue to express good will, seek to relieve suffering, and cooperate with nonpacifists in studying the causes of war and planning for a better peace.[25] In spite of Palmer's effort to confront the dilemma, the question of a positive position for pacifists seemed less than resolved.

Pacifists concentrated their efforts on the insistence that the church not bless war. In this endeavor absolute pacifists, pragmatic pacifists and many former pacifists could no doubt unite. Morrison continued to insist

that the church as a church must not compromise its witness by becoming an ally of war. The church, he contended, must make it clear that it was not *at* war, although both God and the church were *in* the war.[26] When several denominations which met in 1942 refused to approve resolutions identifying the cause of the United Nations in the war as righteous, pacifists were heartened. Adams wrote: "The fact that within six weeks three great national church assemblies have been urged and have refused to say that war is an instrument of Divine Will or that on its outcome depends the perpetuity of historic Christian faith means that modern society, with all its sin and degradation, has moved forward in at least one respect."[27]

During the years of American involvement in the Second World War pacifists generally avoided political positions on the policies of the war. From time to time some ventured to propose a negotiated peace.[28] The risky nature of such proposals was illustrated when in 1944 A. J. Muste and the Fellowship of Reconciliation felt compelled to dissociate themselves from the Peace Now movement, whose supporters they felt were extreme isolationists and reactionaries.[29] The one issue upon which pacifists did take a concerted stand was what Adams described in the *Presbyterian Tribune* as "the apparent promiscuous bombing of enemy cities, without regard for the lives of innocent persons."[30] Pacifists raised this issue of obliteration bombing in 1943 and 1944.[31] In a statement in 1944 a number of leading religious pacifists—among them Henry Hitt Crane, Georgia Harkness, Albert Day, E. Stanley Jones, Ralph Sockman, and Ernest Fremont Tittle—called upon Christians "to examine themselves concerning their participation in this carnival of death."[32] Pacifist protesters insisted that churchmen who accepted the necessity of war could not afford to conclude that all was to be permitted in war and instead must draw a line.[33] The protest of obliteration bombing suggested a determined effort to define a positive role for pacifists in wartime, but this isolated outcry also tended to underscore the minority status of absolute pacifism by the late war years.

iii. liberal nonpacifists

The pacifist position met determined opposition from liberal nonpacifists who shared with pacifists the general Social Gospel commitment to church involvement on social issues. The intensity of their renunciation of pacifism must be understood in the context of the major reorientation in social thinking which accompanied the coming of war, since many of them were former pacifists or had been profoundly influenced by pacifism during its inter-war ascendancy. While agreeing that the church must not yield to hysteria or make the war a holy one, these churchmen were very sensitive that the pacifist insistence upon the church not blessing war might be construed as complacency about the

outcome of the war. For them social responsibility now required that the churches adopt a positive nonpacifist position that the war must be won, repudiating pacifism and delineating the moral issues involved in the conflict.

William Gilroy of *Advance* echoed the public views of many other liberal nonpacifists in challenging the pacifist insistence that the church was not at war: "Just what some of our contemporaries mean by their insistence that the church as such is not at war, and by making such point of their insistence when thousands from our homes and churches very definitely are at war, is not quite clear. . . . If the church can be neutral and not at war in the presence of such facts and situations, it is so much the worse for the church."[34] Gilroy argued that for the church to appear to abdicate its moral judgment at a time when moral judgment seemed so clearly called for would be disastrous for its social conscience: "Does the fact that the church, as the church, cannot 'bless war' mean that the church cannot pronounce moral judgments, that it cannot take sides where issues are clearly defined, or even when one side is better than another? . . . Have we done our part when we have deplored, and confessed, the shortsightedness, the mistakes, and the deeper sins from which no country or people has been entirely free and that have had much to do with bringing on this war?"[35]

The stress which liberal nonpacifists placed upon the question of moral judgment was an effort to confront directly the fact that the pacifist issue hit directly at the heart of the social commitment of the churches. Now that the war had come and alternatives seemed more clear, these nonpacifists looked back upon the pre-war period as one during which the churches had floundered before a serious social challenge. They felt that the pacifist orientation had blinded the churches to the real issues confronting the world, and the churches had been ill-prepared to meet the crisis of actual war. Now, liberal nonpacifists maintained in frequent statements, particularly in 1942, the confusion over pacifism must be ended. This line of argument, interestingly enough paralleling the harsh judgment which social conservatives also placed upon pacifism in the churches, was clearly an effort to rally the ranks of the socially committed within the churches behind a firm nonpacifist position on the war.

The call of liberal nonpacifists for an end of pacifist confusion of the social mission of the church was sometimes stern. Occasionally it was accompanied by a reminder that the right of the pacifist minority to its freedom of opinion would be meaningless if the nation lost its life-and-death struggle or by a warning that the pacifist consider the disastrous consequences of the possibility that he was wrong.[36] Since they insisted that the war must be won, nonpacifists were quick to criticize any suggestion of a negotiated peace. Similarly, when the issue of obliteration bombing was raised at a time when attention to pacifism had consider-

ably tapered off in the church press, editors still pounced on it as another example of pacifist unrealism. Even Morrison of the *Christian Century* criticized the position, arguing that since war had became a necessity, obliteration bombing must be accepted as a part of the atrocity which was war.[37] Long-term nonpacifists objected in even stronger terms. *Zion's Herald,* for example, endorsed a statement by the liberal Methodist bishop G. Bromley Oxnam that the "best military judgment is that, to end war as speedily as possible, this bombing is necessary."[38]

The liberal nonpacifist attack upon pacifism generally avoided the militant extremes of World War I in its effort to speak unequivocally on the necessity for military victory. However, its occasional intensity, even as pacifist ranks were drastically thinned, suggested a measure of uncertainty, possibly insecurity, in the effort to "salvage" the tradition of social commitment and to place it on a new footing during the war.

iv. social conservatives

Social conservatives continued their attack on pacifism unabated, bolstered now by the involvement of the country in the war and by the general swing toward nonpacifism. Whereas liberal nonpacifists expressed the hope that the war had put an end to pacifism so that the Social Gospel tradition could speak clearly on the issues in the war, these churchmen viewed the war not only as discrediting pacifism, but as discrediting the tradition of social commitment and theological modernism in the churches as well. Paradoxically, while generally opposed to church commitment on political and social issues, they seemed to find no contradiction in asking the churches to identify with the cause of the nation in the war. They tended to see the war primarily in nationalistic terms. To the extent that they placed it in a theological context, they pronounced it the judgment of God, the price of individual rather than social sin. The coming of the war reinforced their belief that the roots of evil like war could be eradicated only as the churches devoted themselves to their proper concerns—evangelism and individual salvation—not to efforts to change society.

The most strident note in the approach of social conservatives was their attempt to discredit pacifists by charging that they were responsible for the lack of preparation which led to Pearl Harbor. The Kentucky Baptist *Western Recorder* declared in 1943: "We are paying a terrible price in both men and money for our folly in listening to the pacifists during the period between November 11, 1918, and the date of Pearl Harbor."[39] L. N. Bell, editorial writer for the reactionary and fundamentalist *Southern Presbyterian Journal,* called pacifism the "back door to treason" and pointed out that the "Church, through the Federal Council, thwarted preparedness before Pearl Harbor."[40] Social conservatives argued that pacifism during the 1930s had been a great help to

Hitler and the dictators, a charge Stewart Robinson specifically repeated editorially in the northern *Presbyterian.*[41] Thus, for social conservatives in the churches, as so often has been the case on the political right, a primary weapon in the effort to denigrate the opposition was the resort to scapegoating.

Social conservatives frequently moved from this kind of attack upon pacifists to an attack upon social commitment and theological liberalism as alike discredited by the present crisis. Pacifism, they argued, was simply the final proposal of a theological liberalism which had watered down the supernatural and put its faith in the "inevitable social progress taught by the evolutionists."[42] On this point they were not seriously at odds with the judgment neo-orthodox and Christian "realist" critics of theological liberalism and pacifism had made. But their conclusions were quite different—the neo-orthodox realists like Niebuhr trying to construct a new foundation for social commitment; social conservatives contending that the emphasis of the churches upon involvement in social problems had been entirely misplaced. William Bradbury, the editor of the Northern Baptist *Watchman-Examiner,* on several occasions dwelt upon this theme that liberalism in its pacifist form had failed the church and the nation: "The creedalists of the universal fatherhood of God and the universal brotherhood of man, in their blind optimism, furnished the soporific which lulled the democracies to sleep while beastly tyranny prepared its ghastly campaign of world conquest." Instead of the church devoting attention to its proper task, said Bradbury, it had been engaged in "anti-theological fiddling." It now had paid the price for its misplaced emphasis: "In both the modernism in this country—which has produced so much social confusion, national weakness, and susceptibility to war-begetting attack—and the modernism in Germany, the evolutionary philosophy it sponsored denied that the moral system was fixed for all time by God through Moses on the top of Mount Sinai."[43]

Bradbury's position suggested the facility with which social conservatives linked the issues of pacifism, theological liberalism and social commitment as alike discredited by the war. Sensing pacifism's vulnerability, they proceeded to appropriate it to impugn other social causes which they associated with it. Thus, during the war social conservatives linked what they considered to be a discredited pacifism with such targets as liberal denominational leaders,[44] the Federal Council of Churches,[45] church unionism,[46] postwar planning[47] and Social Gospelism generally.[48]

The attack upon the loyalty of pacifists suggested a willingness among social conservatives to move from argument to scapegoating, and the effort to use the pacifist issue to discredit other targets identified with social commitment indicated that these churchmen viewed this as one more chapter in their struggle against an orientation of the churches to

which they objected violently. The intensity of both thrusts was one more indication of the continued impact of the pacifist controversy during the war.

v. denominational divisions

The difficulty experienced by the denominations in defining their relation to the war provided the most dramatic evidence of the persistence of the pacifist legacy. Although Pearl Harbor and the entry of the United States into the war considerably chastened the pacifist controversy, and pacifist influence waned during the war years, differences stemming from the inter-war debate continued to trouble some of the major denominations. The central question which emerged in their deliberations was whether the church as a church should take a position on the necessity for military victory. When the relative unanimity of the nation after Pearl Harbor is kept in mind, the lack of agreement within the churches on this issue—while it should not be exaggerated—is remarkable.

Southern Baptists, southern Presbyterians, and Episcopalians were probably least influenced by pacifism during the inter-war period and displayed less difficulty than the other denominations in dealing with the issue of war after Pearl Harbor. They generally endorsed the view that both the nation and the church had a stake in the war.[49] In 1942 the Southern Baptist Convention, in a belligerent mood, declared: "This is 'an all-out' war. . . . We did not start this war but now it is ours. We will end it."[50] The General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church U.S. (southern) was more careful in recognizing the tragic nature of war, but its positions in 1942 and 1943 made clear that it considered the country to be engaged in a necessary struggle with which the church could be identified. The General Assembly in 1943 specifically rejected the view that "all war is mass murder" and instead pronounced: "It is our duty as Christian citizens to do all we can, that is consonant with our faith, to help in its gigantic struggle the nation which has afforded the Church a fair and favorable opportunity for development, and to preserve the Christian values which have been attained in this and other lands."[51] These denominations avoided the appearance of serious divisiveness in developing a position on the war.

Among the other major denominations the problem of defining the relation of the church to war was more troublesome. In the Congregational Christian General Council the issue emerged as a relatively clear-cut one between non-pacifists and absolute pacifists. Congregational Christians in 1940 reflected their division over the duty of the Christian regarding war by the inclusion of two separate statements. In 1942 efforts to reconcile these differences were to no avail, and the Council concluded that no compromise was possible. It therefore resorted to the

1940 solution of emphasizing the points upon which all could agree—the tragedy of the present world situation; the need for the church to stand for justice, human rights, and spiritual freedom; and the ominous threat to the democratic way of life—while including two separate statements where there was no agreement. One statement supported the war effort of the United States: "Many of us, in obedience to Christian conscience, support the present effort of our country at whatever sacrifice of life and treasure. They do this because the aggressions of the Axis powers are so unspeakably cruel and ruthless, and their ideologies are destructive of those freedoms we hold dear. . . ." A second statement took the pacifist position: "Others of us, convinced of the futility of war as a method to achieve the goals which should be sought, feel that they cannot, in loyalty to their Christian consciences, accept the way of violence and bloodshed. They are convinced that reconciliation, intelligent good will, Christian love and suffering are the most effective ways of meeting cruelty and wrong."[52] Of the 544 delegates voting, 409 favored the former paragraph. Reporting on the issue in *Advance,* Gilroy noted that most of the laymen had supported the former statement and that the great division seemed to be among ministers. The nonpacifist Gilroy was surprised and concerned by the amount of division within the Council: "Unity since Pearl Harbor, whatever may be the situation in the country at large, is not found within our own fellowship; and the Council has spoken in terms of its division on that issue, rather than in any commanding and united way."[53]

In 1944 when the Council next met it still recognized divergent positions within the fellowship, this time distinguishing between a majority who felt that armed aggression must be met with force and a minority convinced of the futility and wrongness of the war method.[54] Although by this latter year the policy of stating two separate views may have been accepted simply as standard, the degree of division among Congregational Christians after Pearl Harbor had been noteworthy.

While differences among Congregational Christians resulted in clear-cut statements, differences among northern Presbyterians and Baptists in 1942 produced considerable confusion. In the Northern Baptist Convention a resolution offered from the floor which would have stated support for the war effort was considered and then tabled.[55] Instead, the final resolution avoided the issue by simply expressing willingness to do anything for the welfare of the country "which lies within the full sanction of our individual consciences."[56] Bradbury of the *Watchman-Examiner* felt the Congregational Christian solution would have been preferable to this side-stepping of the issue.[57]

The General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church U.S.A. in the same year adopted a resolution from the floor which denounced militarism, but declared that "the cause for which our nation is at war is just and righteous and that our freedom, our culture and our historic

faith are dependent upon the outcome of this conflict." However, delegates apparently had second thoughts about this resolution and on the last day deleted the portion quoted above.[58] The section of the resolution which remained expressed gratitude for the sacrifice of the men in the armed forces, support for the President, and a warning against hysteria.[59] It was after the 1942 actions of these three denominations that pacifists hailed the wisdom of the churches in refusing to define their role as necessitating either blessing war or becoming a party to war.[60]

The northern Presbyterian General Assembly in 1943 reclaimed the territory from which it had retreated in 1942. The statement on war had been removed from the jurisdiction of the Committee on Social Education and Action—one wonders if because of its pacifism—and instead assigned to a temporary committee of nine who were responsible for drawing up a larger report on a righteous peace. The statement adopted by the General Assembly declared that although the church abhorred war, "[t]his war . . . began by an act of aggression, which to oppose is both necessary and right." The church, according to this statement, could identify itself with the necessity for victory: "If peace is to be made secure, the war must end in the overthrow of the governments that have caused these desolations."[61] Robert H. Nichols, the nonpacifist writer in the *Presbyterian Tribune,* was extremely pleased that northern Presbyterians finally had spoken unequivocally on the use of force against aggression: ". . . the General Assembly, after hesitant and confused words in the last two years, at last found a clear utterance. Probably the previous statements reflected some uncertainty in the Church's thought. If so, this is ended."[62]

The Northern Baptist Convention, which did not meet in 1943, continued to experience division in its effort in 1944 to define its position on the war. The Convention initially approved a statement that "God has a stake in this war," which it later retracted.[63] The final resolution was more cautiously worded: "We do not pray for man's mere triumph over his brother man, for 'all have sinned and come short,' and each is to God equally precious. . . . We will not bless war, but we will not withhold our blessing from our sons who fight and from our country's cause in which they, with the sons of the Allied Nations, now engage."[64] The difficulty which northern Baptists and Presbyterians experienced in developing a wartime position was indicative of the strength of persisting pacifist sentiment.

One of the most significant wartime debates occurred in the Methodist General Conference in 1944. Methodists entered the war committed to the 1940 position that "[t]he Methodist Church, although making no attempt to bind the consciences of its individual members, will not officially endorse, support, or participate in war."[65] In 1944 the report of the majority of the Committee on the State of the Church reaffirmed the 1940 position that the church as a church could not participate in

war and added several important paragraphs. One recognized that moral issues were involved in the war, but fell short of sanctioning the use of force:

> The Church cannot be indifferent to the issues at stake in the present conflict. It is deeply concerned in the human values in jeopardy and in the ultimate effect of the conflict upon the cause of justice, freedom, and brotherhood. As a corporate body seeking to declare the will of God, the Church must express its moral judgment and use its moral force against tyranny, aggression, persecution, and all the forms of political dictatorship and totalitarianism which run counter to our Christian belief in the worth and dignity of every individual.

A second noted that God had a stake in the outcome of the war, but refused to identify it simply with that of the nation: "Believing that God has a stake in the victory of peace with justice in the present conflict, we commend our cause to him, praying 'Thy kingdom come, thy will be done.' "[66]

A minority of the members of the committee were dissatisfied with the report and presented an alternative for consideration by the General Conference. The minority insisted that the stark question which must be answered was, "Must the Christian Church condemn all use of military force?" Their answer clearly stated that the church could approve the use of force against aggression and that the church could pray for victory:

> . . . we speak unequivocally regarding the attack upon civilization which has been made by the forces of aggression. . . . God himself has a stake in the struggle and he will uphold them [those in the armed forces] as they fight forces destructive of the moral life of man. In Christ's name we ask for the blessing of God upon the men in the armed forces and we pray for victory. We repudiate the theory that a state, though imperfect in itself, must not fight against intolerable wrongs. While we respect the individual conscience of those who believe that they cannot condone the use of force . . . we cannot accept their position as the defining position of the Christian Church. We are well within the Christian position when we assert the necessity of the use of military forces to resist aggression which would overthrow every right which is held sacred by civilized men.[67]

The debate over the two alternative reports in the General Conference was extensive, but seldom bitter. Several attempts to amend each report by those who sought some compromise were defeated when the leaders of both sides pleaded against amendments in order to keep the issues clear-cut. Nevertheless, the reports did not meet each other head-on as pacifist and nonpacifist alternatives. Ernest Fremont Tittle, chair-

man for the majority position, pointed out that it did not say that the church must condemn all war, nor that war was never justifiable, nor that the state had no right to fight against intolerable wrongs. Rather, the point at issue between the two reports, he insisted, was in essence, "Is the Church to give moral or spiritual sanction to war or is it not?"[68]

It was clear, however, that adherents of the minority report considered the issue to be whether the Methodist Church would dissociate itself clearly from pacifism and take an unequivocal position on the winning of the war. They argued that the majority report was not representative of a cross-section of the denomination. Their view was not without justification, since, as their spokesman pointed out, the chairman of the general committee was Tittle and the chairmen of the subcommittees responsible for the statement on the war had been Henry Hitt Crane and Albert Day: "Thus we were chaired by three of the most outstanding, most spiritual, most powerful, most eloquent, most lovable pacifists in our land."[69]

The two reports, although not directed to the same question, did provide a test of the issue of whether the church as a church could sanction war. After unusually lengthy debate the General Conference approved the minority report that "God himself has a stake in the struggle." Sentiment for the minority report among lay delegates was clear (203 to 131), but among ministers the margin of approval was hair-line (170 to 169).[70]

By the end of the war most of the denominations had committed themselves to the nonpacifist position that the church, without becoming militarized or presenting arms, could declare that the United States must win the war. However, the degree of difference among Methodists as late as 1944, coupled with wartime divisions within other denominations, indicated the persistence of the pacifist legacy as the churches struggled to establish their position on a war in which the nation was fully engaged.

vi. efforts at reconciliation

One further symptom of the impact of the pacifist controversy was the tendency of liberal pacifists and nonpacifists to seek reconciliation on the issue of postwar world order. Interestingly, that question emerged even before Pearl Harbor, usually as an adjunct of a partisan position in the pacifist controversy. Pacifists tended to argue that the United States should stay out of the war in order that it could emerge from the struggle in a strong position to lead the effort to build a lasting peace.[71] This argument was particularly attractive to pacifists because it provided an opportunity to separate themselves from nationalistic isolationists. Liberal nonpacifists were sensitive to pacifist appropriation of this issue and began to make use of the argument themselves by insisting

that only a responsible position on the war could lead to a responsible position in the peace. Thirty-three prominent nonpacifist churchmen contended in early 1940: "The United States cannot hope to have a part in determining a just and stable peace unless, during the conflicts, she proves herself alive to the deeper issues involved, sympathetic with the warring peoples in their bitter struggles, and prepared to make her contribution to a better world."[72] Thus, even before Pearl Harbor both liberal nonpacifists and pacifists had appropriated the rhetoric of responsible participation in the establishment of a system of postwar peace.

While the issue of postwar world order could be used to justify partisan positions in the pacifist controversy, it also offered the possibility of a basis for reconciliation within the fractured liberal camp. Some churchmen had begun to call attention to this alternative even before December, 1941, but United States entry into the war appeared to hasten the desire to find common ground. Pacifists, in their effort to define a viable position in a nation at war, were first to sound this note. Harry Emerson Fosdick, for instance, who had declared after World War I that he would not take his pulpit into another war, pointed out in the *Christian Advocate* in January, 1942, that although the church had been divided over the question of war, it now must unite on a common platform that "despite war's accumulated bitterness, all this agony shall not be wasted as it was the last time, but shall issue in a world . . . organized for co-operation instead of war."[73] Liberal nonpacifists took care that such sentiment not neglect the fundamental point that the war must be won, but, having made their point, joined enthusiastically in the growing concern for the nature of the postwar peace. Symptomatic of the conscious effort at reconciliation on this basis was the culmination of the long and divisive debate among the editorial writers in the *Presbyterian Tribune* early in 1943 with the recognition by each side that "pacifist and non-pacifist can agree wholeheartedly" on the desire "for a world order in which a righteous and just peace shall reign over the earth."[74] Similarly, the Congregational Christian General Council in 1942 concluded its divided statements on the war issue with the view that pacifists and nonpacifists could join together as churchmen in study and preparation for a just and durable peace.[75]

The eagerness with which liberals plunged into the wartime efforts of the churches in this direction indicated their desire to transcend the divisive pacifist controversy and to find a new unifying thrust for social concern in the churches. One important outcome was a series of wartime conferences to plan for the problems of the postwar period in a comprehensive way. Most noteworthy were the National Study Conference on the Bases of a Just and Durable Peace, sponsored by the Federal Council of Churches at Delaware, Ohio, in March, 1942, and its follow-up conference in Cleveland in January of 1945. The Delaware con-

ference deliberately chose to avoid the pacifist controversy by restricting its considerations to issues of the postwar peace, excluding issues of the war. The criticism which this decision received from both sides indicated that tensions were still high.[76]

A second important effort by the churches was a series of denominational programs, generally modelled along the lines of the Methodist "Crusade for a New World Order," which sought to educate church members to the necessity of United States participation in a new international organization. The call for an end to isolationism provided an effective rallying point—though a very generalized one—and the crusades appeared to have considerable influence within the denominations.[77] Perhaps one measure of the success of the liberals in finding a degree of rapprochement was the strength of the criticism by social conservatives who perceived that the tradition of Social Gospel activism was once more rearing its head, deflecting attention, as one writer put it in the *Presbyterian,* from "the field assigned to us by our dear Lord."[78] The effort to find common ground in concern for postwar order sometimes erred in the direction of vagueness, but it did serve to heal some of the divisiveness generated by the pacifist controversy among liberal churchmen.

vii. conclusion

Over against the evidence of the unprecedented unity with which American public opinion faced the Second World War, the degree to which ramifications of the pacifist controversy persisted in the major Protestant churches is truly remarkable. Clearly the issue had cut them deeply.

The churches were in fact left in considerable disarray on the question of war. One of the consequences was that the pacifist position, if not fully extinguished in the mainstream churches, clearly moved to the periphery, nourished by a small minority until the revival of its spirit in new form in the nonviolent resistance and direct action tactics of the Civil Rights movement and the campaign against the Vietnam war. Second, in spite of the effort to find an unequivocally nonpacifist position on the war and a new basis for social action, the churches seemed beset by considerable uncertainty in facing the new postwar world of the Cold War and the arms race. Indeed, the wartime reconciliation on the issue of postwar world order suffered from a kind of vagueness and ambiguity which seemed also to characterize the churches' response after the war, even at its best. The postwar mood seemed to match the strident nationalism of some of the social conservatives—who began to experience a resurgence[79]—as much as the new "political realism" of nonpacifist liberals. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the degree of intensity with which the effects of the pacifist controversy lingered

into the war years suggested the depth of trauma which it brought to individuals and to denominations. The shock was particularly acute among clergymen, as many of the wartime votes indicated—both for the majority who underwent the negative conversion from pacifism and for the minority who remained committed in spite of the circumstances. Some twenty years later when events produced a rebirth of pacifism and anti-war sentiment in opposition to a particular war, liberal churchmen in the major denominations seemed slow to move toward a firm position, perhaps influenced by the memory of their World War II trauma.

Largely as a result of their inter-war commitments and the intense debate over pacifism, the churches at the very least weathered the Second World War without the taint of having "presented arms" in the jingoistic fashion of some of their World War I statements. Instead, they approached it in somber awareness that they were witnesses of a world plummeting headlong into the next stage of the war system. This sober evaluation matched the battering the churches had received from their war experience. If the Second World War brought an unusual degree of national unity and self-assurance, it also produced an important measure of social tension and personal stress.

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footnotes

1. Richard Polenberg, ed., *America at War: The Home Front, 1941-1945* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1968), ix. I am not suggesting here that Polenberg's anthology neglects evidence of social tension, but only that in such works the apparent natural starting point has been the theme of national unity in the war effort. Polenberg's *War and Society: The United States, 1941-1945* (Philadelphia, 1972), does pick up from the earlier anthology in sketching some of the broad areas in which "the war acted as a catalyst for social change" (243). Chester Eisinger relates the pressure for conformity during the war to other forces in the 1940s acting to depersonalize the individual in his documentary collection, *The 1940's: Profile of a Nation in Crisis* (New York, 1969). John Morton Blum's essay, "World War II," in C. Vann Woodward, ed., *The Comparative Approach to American History* (New York, 1968), attributes the relative conservatism of American politics during the war to the unprecedented prosperity Americans were experiencing after a decade of economic depression, though he does also suggest that the war brought latent conflicts to the surface (319-22).

2. Francis E. Merrill, *Social Problems on the Home Front: A Study of War-time Influences* (New York, 1948), 2.

3. Norman Holmes Pearson, "The Nazi-Soviet Pact and the End of the Dream," in Daniel Aaron, ed., *America in Crisis: Fourteen Crucial Episodes in American History* (New York, 1952). Penina Migdal Glazer in "From the Old Left to the New: Radical Criticism in the 1940s," *American Quarterly*, XXIV, 4 (December, 1972), 584-603, has argued that with the wartime collapse of the Communist Party and other of the larger established radical groups it was the smaller, peace-oriented organizations which kept the radical spirit alive and began to "fashion a new form of radicalism" (603).

4. An exception to the general neglect is Lawrence S. Wittner's insightful survey, *Rebels Against War: The American Peace Movement, 1941-1960* (New York, 1969). While excellent as a comprehensive treatment of pacifism during two important decades, its discussion of the war years *per se* needs to be supplemented by more detailed studies of developments within particular groups, like the churches, which had played a role in the broad peace movement.

5. The denominations examined here are the Congregational and Christian Churches, the Methodist Church, the Protestant Episcopal Church, the Northern Baptist Convention, the Southern Baptist Convention, the Presbyterian Church U.S. (southern) and the Presbyterian Church U.S.A. (northern). They are designated as "major" because they dominated the Protestant mainstream, both numerically and organizationally. Lutherans have been excluded from the study because they were still splintered along ethnic lines. Similarly, the Protestant

sects and the historic peace churches deserve special treatment: the former because of their form and orientation, the latter because of their traditional peace stance.

The response of these denominations to the wartime issues of race, labor, and postwar planning, as well as to the pacifist controversy, is discussed in W. Edward Orser, "The Social Attitudes of the Protestant Churches during the Second World War" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of New Mexico, 1969).

6. Chatfield discusses the major Protestant churches as one of the important elements in the inter-war "search for an antiwar public," *For Peace and Justice: Pacifism in America, 1914-1941* (Knoxville, 1971), 124-5. For a similar view of the churches' role, see Wittner, *Rebels Against War*, 5.

7. Ray Abrams in *Preachers Present Arms* (New York, 1933) chronicled the considerable jingoism in the churches' response to World War I—and the *Christian Century* reminded churchmen by reprinting the book on the eve of World War II. Abrams played up the militants, however, and neglected the greater caution and self-searching on the part of many churchmen. See John Franklin Piper, Jr., "The Social Policy of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America during World War I" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Duke University, 1965).

Doniver A. Lund's study, "The Peace Movement Among the Major American Protestant Churches, 1919-1939" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Nebraska, 1955), is the most thorough account of pacifism in the churches during the inter-war period. Also valuable for their discussion of pacifism within the context of general social concern during the 1920s and 1930s are Paul A. Carter, *The Decline and Revival of the Social Gospel: Social and Political Liberalism in American Churches, 1920-1940* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1956), and Robert Moats Miller, *American Protestantism and Social Issues, 1919-1939* (Chapel Hill, 1958). Donald B. Meyer, *The Protestant Search for Political Realism, 1919-1941* (Berkeley, 1960), focuses on the efforts of Christian "realist" theologians, particularly Reinhold Niebuhr, during the inter-war period to construct an alternative to theological liberalism as a basis for social and political action.

8. Umphrey Lee, *The Historic Church and Modern Pacifism* (New York, 1943), considers inter-war pacifism to have been rooted in the disappointment during World War I and its aftermath of the Social Gospel hope for a better world (203-9). Vernon Holloway makes some helpful distinctions between varieties of pacifism in "A Review of American Religious Pacifism," *Religion in Life*, XIX (Summer, 1950), 372 (abstract of a doctoral dissertation, Yale University, 1949, "American Pacifism Between Two Wars, 1919-1941").

9. On general neutrality sentiment in the United States the standard references are Wayne S. Cole, *America First: The Battle Against Intervention, 1940-41* (Madison, 1953); Robert Divine, *The Illusion of Neutrality* (Chicago, 1962) and *Reluctant Belligerent: American Entry into World War II* (New York, 1965); and Manfred Jonas, *Isolationism in America, 1939-1941* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1966).

10. This was Lund's conclusion after examination of the denominational statements during the inter-war years (131).

11. In the context of this paper "social conservatives" will generally refer to those in the churches who rejected church commitment on social issues or who, in some cases, sought to enlist the churches in support of socially and politically conservative positions; "liberals" will refer broadly to those who stood in the tradition of church commitment on social issues and who often took moderate to progressive positions on social and political questions. While fundamentalists were not always "social conservatives," they often assumed that role in the major Protestant churches. For important differences in social attitudes among essentially fundamentalist sects in the South, see David Edwin Harrell, Jr., *White Sects and Black Men in the Recent South* (Nashville, 1971).

12. For helpful analyses of the place of Niebuhr's criticism of pacifism in the context of his social thought, see Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "Reinhold Niebuhr's Role in American Political Thought and Life," in *The Politics of Hope* (Boston, 1962), 97-125, and Gordon Harland, *The Thought of Reinhold Niebuhr* (New York, 1960), 215-24. Meyer also provides insight into the effort of Niebuhr to find an ethical basis for social action on the issue of war consistent with his neo-orthodox theology, particularly in his concluding chapter, "The Tragic Choice: War."

13. *Minutes of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America* (1940), 180. Hereafter cited as *Minutes*, Presbyterian U.S.A. *Minutes, General Council of the Congregational and Christian Churches of the United States* (1940), 43-5. Hereafter cited as *Minutes*, Congregational Christian.

14. *Daily Christian Advocate: Proceedings of the General Conference of the Methodist Church* (1940), 255.

15. *Minutes*, Presbyterian U.S.A. (1941), 167.

16. *Presbyterian Tribune* (January, 1941), 4.

17. *Christian Century* (June 4, 1941), 761-2.

18. *Christian Advocate* (December 8, 1941), 5.

19. *Churchman* (December 15, 1941), 9.

20. *Presbyterian Tribune* (January, 1942), 5.

21. *Christian Century* (December 17, 1941), 1566.

22. Ernest Fremont Tittle, "God and a Minority," *Zion's Herald* (January 7, 1942), 3-4.

23. *Christian Century* (December 17, 1941), 1565.

24. Morrison outlined his view on the proper approach to war and on the possibility of a middle way between pacifism and militarism in frequent editorials, particularly in 1942. *Christian Century* (January 7, 1942), 6-8; (January 21, 1942), 74; (January 28, 1942), 102-4; (February 11, 1942), 177; (April 1, 1942), 417; (May 6, 1942), 582-6; (August 26, 1942), 1022; (September 23, 1942), 1144; (October 28, 1942), 1310-12. Morrison's view involved acceptance of fighting for the Christian as not the right thing to do, but as what one must do. *Christian Century* (May 6, 1942), 585. Pacifists and nonpacifists objected to Morrison's view of war as amoral, since it neither said that war was unchristian nor that defensive war was justified, but simply that war was necessary once begun. See, for example, the nonpacifist view in Reinhold Niebuhr's review of Morrison's book, reprinted in *Zion's Herald* (December 23, 1942), 1230-6; or the letter of the absolute pacifist A. J. Muste to the editor, *Christian Century* (March 4, 1942), 289-90.

25. Albert Palmer, "What Should Pacifists Do Now?" *Christian Century* (June 10, 1942), 753-4.

26. *Christian Century* (March 25, 1942), 375; (June 3, 1942), 720; (October 14, 1942), 1246-9.

27. *Presbyterian Tribune* (July, 1942), 5. There were similar reactions in Ernest Fremont Tittle, "The Judgment and Mercy of God," *Christian Advocate* (August 6, 1942), 998, and in the *Christian Century* (June 17, 1942), 775.

28. See, for example, Albert Palmer, "Victory—for Humanity," *Christian Century* (September 30, 1942), 1178-80. A. J. Muste in an editorial called upon pacifists to insist that the government stop waging war and begin waging peace. *Presbyterian Tribune* (February, 1943), 6.

29. *Christian Century* (April 26, 1944), 521.

30. *Presbyterian Tribune* (April, 1944), 5.

31. The *Christian Century* took notice of the pacifist protest of civilian bombing in April, 1943, but Morrison disagreed with it. *Christian Century* (April 21, 1943), 478-9.

32. Quoted in *Zion's Herald* (March 15, 1944), 166.

33. A. J. Muste, "Obliteration Bombing Again," *Presbyterian Tribune* (May, 1944), 5.

34. *Advance* (May, 1942), 205.

35. *Advance* (August, 1942), 348.

36. Such views were expressed in editorials in the *Presbyterian Tribune* (July, 1942), 6-7, and *Advance* (September, 1942), 396.

37. *Christian Century* (March 22, 1944), 359.

38. *Zion's Herald* (March 15, 1944), 166. Shipler concurred in the *Churchman* (March 15, 1944), 4. The socially conservative William Bradbury protested the comparison of Allied and Axis bombing as lacking moral distinction, because Allied "boys" took no glee in bombing. *Watchman-Examiner* (September 16, 1943), 887.

39. *Western Recorder* (January 28, 1943), 8.

40. *Southern Presbyterian Journal* (October, 1942), 2; (April, 1943), 5.

41. *Presbyterian* (April 23, 1942), 4.

42. *Presbyterian* (May 4, 1942), 5; (February 11, 1943), 4.

43. *Watchman-Examiner* (August 30, 1945), 840; (January 1, 1942), 8; (October 4, 1944), 969.

44. *Presbyterian* (October 1, 1942), 4. Conservative Baptists sometimes singled out the Methodists, whom they considered to represent the false roads of pacifism and Social Gospelism, as the objects of this kind of reasoning. *Watchman-Examiner* (December 17, 1942), 1232; (October 12, 1944), 992; (March 15, 1945), 247.

45. *Southern Presbyterian Journal* (May, 1942), 3; (April, 1943), 5.

46. *Southern Presbyterian Journal* (July, 1944), 2; *Western Recorder* (May 7, 1942), 9.

47. *Presbyterian* (March 26, 1942), 4; *Watchman-Examiner* (July 9, 1942), 680-1; *Southern Presbyterian Journal* (April, 1943), 5.

48. This connection was made in a review in the *Southern Presbyterian Journal* (May, 1943), 19-20.

49. The Episcopal House of Bishops in 1943 approved Roosevelt's conduct of the war. *Journal of the General Convention of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States of America* (1943), 51.

50. *Annual of the Southern Baptist Convention* (1942), 91.

51. *Minutes of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States* (1942), 34; (1943), 142-3.

52. Printed in *Advance* (July, 1942), 318.

53. *Advance* (July, 1942), 299, 316.

54. *Minutes*, Congregational Christian (1944), 37.

55. *Christian Century* (June 10, 1942), 762, 766.

56. *Yearbook of the Northern Baptist Convention* (1942), 269.

57. *Watchman-Examiner* (July 23, 1942), 728-9.

58. *Christian Century* (June 10, 1942), 762.

59. *Minutes*, Presbyterian U.S.A. (1942), 191-2.

60. See note 27 above.

61. *Minutes*, Presbyterian U.S.A. (1943), 156-7. For a report on the action, see *Christian Century* (June 9, 1943), 697.

62. *Presbyterian Tribune* (July-August), 5.

63. *Christian Century* (June 7, 1944), 5.

64. *Yearbook of the Northern Baptist Convention* (1944), 281-2.

65. *Daily Christian Advocate* (1944), 255.

66. *Proceedings, Forty-First General Conference of the Methodist Church* (1944), 176.

67. *Ibid.* For the debate on the two reports, see 177-89, 190-6.

68. *Ibid.*, 178, 186. Robert Moats Miller describes Tittle's leadership for the pacifist cause in Methodism in *How Shall They Hear Without a Preacher? The Life of Ernest Fremont Tittle* (Chapel Hill, 1971). He discusses Tittle's role in the 1944 debate, 460-4.

69. *Proceedings, Forty-First General Conference of the Methodist Church* (1944), 181.

70. A lay-clergy split had been narrowly averted, since one ministerial ballot was defective and one other minister did not vote. *Ibid.*, 200.

71. For examples of the pacifist argument, see editorials by Morrison in the *Christian Century* (December 13, 1939), 1536, and (April 30, 1941), 584; Ernest Fremont Tittle, "If America Enters the War—What Shall *I* Do?" *Christian Century* (February 5, 1941), 180; Albert Palmer, "A Road Away from War," *Christian Century* (June 19, 1940), 793-5. A similar hope was expressed in "Christian Pacifist Convictions: A Lenten Declaration from the Pacific Coast," printed in *Zion's Herald* (March 13, 1940), 255.

72. "American Churches and the International Situation: A Statement from Thirty-three American Leaders," *Zion's Herald* (January 24, 1940), 80.

73. Harry Emerson Fosdick, "Shall We Bless War?" *Christian Century* (January 22, 1942), 103. The sentence was in italics. Albert Palmer expressed essentially the same view in his article, "What Should Pacifists Do Now?" *Christian Century* (June 10, 1942), 754.

74. For evidence of these converging views in a journal whose editorial board had been badly split on the pacifist issue, *Presbyterian Tribune* (February, 1943), 5, and (March, 1943), 7.

75. The General Council action was printed in *Advance* (July, 1942), 318.

76. "The Churches and a Just and Durable Peace: Reports Adopted at Delaware, Ohio, March 3-5, 1942 . . . ," *Christian Century* (March 25, 1942), 393-7, and "The Churches and World Order: Message from the Second National Study Conference Held in Cleveland, Ohio, January 16-19, 1945 . . . ," *Christian Century* (February 7, 1945), 175. Morrison expressed disappointment that the Delaware conference had missed the opportunity to declare that the church was not at war, while the nonpacifist Gilroy criticized it for not recognizing that the issues of the war and the peace were integrally related. *Christian Century* (March 25, 1942), 271; *Advance* (April, 1942), 179.

77. For reports on the Methodist Crusade, see *Zion's Herald* (June 9, 1943), 536, and *Christian Century* (June 23, 1943), 733. Walter G. Muelder in *Methodism and Society in the Twentieth Century* (New York, 1961), 186-93, provides details of the Crusade based upon a document by one of its prime movers, Bishop G. Bromley Oxnam, *The Crusade for a New World Order: A Report by the Chairman.* Similar efforts at rallying the Protestant denominations on the world order issue were conducted by Northern Baptists, northern Presbyterians, and Congregational Christians.

78. *Presbyterian* (May 14, 1942), 7. The editorial was by David Burrell.

79. For views of the resurgence of a neo-fundamentalist revival after the war, see William G. McLoughlin, "Is There a Third Force in Christendom?" *Daedalus*, XCVI, 1 (Winter, 1967), 43-68, and Louis Gasper, *The Fundamentalist Movement* (The Hague, 1963). For the postwar connection between conservative religion and right-wing political views, see Ralph Lord Roy, *Apostles of Discord: A Study of Organized Bigotry and Disruption on the Fringes of Protestantism* (Boston, 1953); E. V. Toy, Jr., "The National Lay Committee and the National Council of Churches: A Case Study of Protestants in Conflict," *American Quarterly*, XXI, 2:1 (Summer, 1969), 190-209; and George D. Younger, "Protestant Piety and the Right Wing," *Social Action* (May 15, 1951), 5-35.