

# **martial and imaginative values: the greater appeal of brooks adams' man of fear**

michael d. clark

Americans have always been vulnerable to the charges of native and foreign critics that they are a mercenary and avaricious people, capable of creating nothing higher than a business civilization. At certain times in American history, as in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, such indictments have been particularly sharp and cogent. Frequently the critics are most interesting for the standards and values which they oppose to those of business, and historians have paid considerable attention both to those who attacked American capitalism from a reformist or socialist point of view, and to those who attacked it from a patrician or traditionalist standpoint.

Not all the criticism fell neatly into such categories, however. The "Warrior Critique of the Business Civilization," described by John P. Mallan,<sup>1</sup> involved a conflict of values not entirely definable in conventional class and political terms. Brooks Adams and Homer Lea especially, and to some extent Theodore Roosevelt, Mallan showed, feared that a commercial society such as that of the United States was inadequately virile and aggressive to hold its own in the struggle between nations. These critics believed that business timidity and material prosperity worked against an expansionist foreign policy, and they championed the martial virtues as essential for a people which might have to combat the military society of Japan or Germany.

The warrior critique seemed a bit eccentric even in an age steeped in the social Darwinist notions of struggle, which in America were commonly used to justify the business civilization anyway. Yet the tendency to glorify martial qualities was more widespread than might first appear, and it was not limited to imperialists. Furthermore, there was a peculiar disposition on the part of some late nineteenth and early twentieth-century thinkers to relate the martial to the imaginative, con-

trasting both with the supposedly soft and dull world of business. As imagination and the ability to fight seem not to have any necessary or universally acknowledged connection, it is worth asking what there was in the American mentality that made such a juxtaposition plausible.

The basic terms for this investigation are furnished by Brooks Adams' famous tour de force, *The Law of Civilization and Decay*. First published in 1895, *The Law* was a bitter indictment of commercial civilization, in the thin guise of an objective and scientific study of history. Like the Calvinists whom he came self-consciously to emulate, Adams with a grim determinism sifted the historically elect from those he wished to condemn. The rhetoric of Adams' determinism was scientific, based on the assumption that thought is simply one form of human energy, as obedient to natural laws as any other manifestation of energy. Yet the blind movements of mental energy resulted in historical cycles dominated alternately by Fear and Greed, qualities which bore for Adams obvious subjective values.<sup>2</sup>

Cycles of Fear and Greed, according to the author, were related directly to the degree of centralization and concentration achieved by a given society. In the early stages of the cycle, when the social movement toward centralization is little advanced, Fear is the channel through which mental energy finds its readiest outlet. This is the age of imagination, and military, religious and artistic types of men are in the ascendancy. Fear of the visible enemy produces the warrior, fear of the invisible enemy produces the priest, and the artist celebrates the triumphs of both.<sup>3</sup>

In the more advanced stages of concentration, surplus wealth can be produced, and energy is increasingly channeled into its acquisition and manipulation. Capital becomes autocratic, "imagination fades, and the emotional, the martial, and the artistic types of mankind decay." As the Man of Fear becomes extinct, a usurer-dominated civilization advances to the practical limits of Greed. When the exploitation of capital can proceed no further, there is either a period of stagnation, as Adams thought had been the case with the Eastern Roman Empire, or disintegration sets in at once, as with the Western, and Fear again dominates. Using this formula, Adams traced western history from the decay of Rome to the zenith of chivalry and imagination in the Middle Ages, to the avarice of the new economic man personified by Henry VIII, and finally, to the domination of the Rothschilds and great concentrations of wealth. The current Age of Greed, Adams thought, would reach the limits of its possibilities about 1900, and a new disintegration was in prospect.<sup>4</sup>

Not many critics were prepared to swallow whole Adams' grand and tragic view of history, but in some thoughtful readers *The Law of Civilization and Decay* struck a responsive chord. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. was torn between empathy and critical reserve. "It hardly

strikes me as science but rather as a somewhat grotesque world poem, or symphony in blue & gray," he wrote to Sir Frederick Pollock, "but the story of the modern world is told so strikingly that while you read you believe it."<sup>5</sup>

Reviewing *The Law for The Forum* in 1897, Theodore Roosevelt declared that "few more powerful and more melancholy books have ever been written," and called it a distinct contribution to the philosophy of history. Adams, thought Roosevelt, had captured brilliantly the spirit of the Crusades and was at his best in describing the imaginative man, especially the man of arms. There was indeed much that was petty in our materialistic capitalist system, a "certain softness of fibre in civilized nations," and a danger that the race would not continue adequately to reproduce.<sup>6</sup>

Roosevelt could not, however, accept Adams' deterministic gloom. It was not impossible, the reviewer thought, for an individual to mold destiny; nor was the modern world so degraded as Adams pictured it. The Germans, for instance, were as martial as they had ever been. President-elect William McKinley was a martial man. Adams' categories of Fear and Greed, moreover, did not always work out: the "economic" Englishman or American was a better fighter than the "imaginative" Spaniard.<sup>7</sup> The book's pessimism seemed to grate increasingly on Roosevelt; several months after the publication of his review, he wrote to Cecil Arthur Spring Rice that he thought Adams to have shown "extraordinary intellectual and literary dishonesty," not out of any moral shortcoming, but because "his mind is a little unhinged."<sup>8</sup> Roosevelt found no fault with Adams' values, but he was unwilling to admit that the martial and imaginative life was no longer possible.

Direct responses to Brooks Adams' association of martial and imaginative qualities are perhaps less significant than independent expressions in which the same association was made. Two of Adams' contemporaries especially, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. and William James, help to throw light on the theme of *The Law of Civilization and Decay* and to explain its appeal. Holmes and James belonged to the patrician and intellectual world in which Adams moved, but they represented divergent possibilities within it. If Adams was an armchair warrior, Holmes was a Civil War veteran who had known the awful reality of combat. James, like Adams, never fought in the military sense, but unlike Adams he is remembered for his anti-imperialism and his hope that war could be made psychologically unnecessary. Holmes and James had been close friends and continued to share a pragmatic point of view, despite Holmes's casual characterization of pragmatism as "amusing humbug."<sup>9</sup> Holmes remained more strictly committed intellectually to the scientific and positivistic spirit which both had absorbed in their youth; he suspected that James's "will to believe" was simply an attempt to make room for the "interstitial miracle" which he thought that his

generation had banished.<sup>10</sup> For both, Adams was a somewhat eccentric friend; James could not accept his determinism, nor was Holmes sympathetic with the dust-and-ashes Adams temperament. Yet despite these differences, a similar vision persisted in each.

Holmes was a curious combination of skeptic and enthusiast, doubtful that man had much significance in the cosmic scheme, but believing that “the joy of life is living, is to put out all one’s powers as far as they will go. . . .”<sup>11</sup> He emerged from the Civil War uncertain of its greater meaning, but indelibly impressed with the desperate truths of combat—“touched with fire.”<sup>12</sup> Holmes later summed up life as “a roar of bargain and battle”;<sup>13</sup> he could see no true measure of men except in the human energy which they embodied. “The final test of this energy,” he surmised, “is battle in some form—actual war—the crush of Arctic ice—the fight for mastery in the market or the court.”<sup>14</sup>

There was much more to Holmes than this vein of combative strenuosity, of course. In his more apprehensive moments, he feared for the future of imagination; he was obliged to admit that the scope for intellectual as well as physical adventure seemed to be narrowing.<sup>15</sup> Although unwilling to join those who indiscriminately abused capitalists, Holmes could not help regretting that the ideals of the world had become those of commerce, and that mystery and daring had fled. The comfortable Utopias of “do-gooders” and Socialists offered nothing more inspiring. Even science had

pursued analysis until at last this thrilling world of colors and sounds and passions has seemed fatally to resolve itself into one vast network of vibrations endlessly weaving an endless web, and the rainbow flush of cathedral windows, which once to enraptured eyes appeared the very smile of God, fades slowly out into the pale irony of the void.

Who, he asked, could endure a world, which, though “cut up into five-acre lots” and without material want, lacked the “divine folly of honor” and the passion for knowledge and unattainable ideals?<sup>16</sup>

In a way which is difficult to appreciate today, Holmes found an alternative to this unimaginative world of five-acre lots in the martial experience. Holmes was well aware that war, while you were at it, was “horrible and dull,” yet in retrospect, it seemed to him, “its message was divine.”<sup>17</sup> “High breeding, romantic chivalry,” he apostrophized, “—we . . . [who have seen men in battle] . . . can never believe that the power of money or the enervation of pleasure has put an end to them. We know that life may still be lifted into poetry and lit with spiritual charm.”<sup>18</sup>

Such poetry as this could only be sustained by supposing the soldier to fight for ideals, and this seemed not to square with Holmes’s skeptical reluctance to find ultimate significance in events like the Civil War. Yet he was impressed that the ideals of men had traditionally been

drawn from war, as those of women had been drawn from motherhood. A man must be ready, he urged, to work, to fight and to die for ideal aims; at best he should fight with a "kind of desperate joy."<sup>19</sup> How indeed could the martial imagination be dispensed with? "From the beginning," he told the graduating class at Harvard in 1895, "to us, children of the North, life has seemed a place hung about by dark mists, out of which come the pale shine of dragon's scales, and the cry of fighting men, and the sound of swords."<sup>20</sup>

The contradiction between Holmes's skepticism and his association of ideals with warfare was partially resolved by the simple philosophy which Holmes referred to as the "soldier's creed." The soldier is not told the plan of the campaign, he pointed out, but he must obey orders and fight. If he were dying, Holmes wrote a friend late in life, his last words would reflect this necessity: "Have faith and pursue the unknown end."<sup>21</sup> The formula was attractive, perhaps because it gave meaning to life in an age in which philosophical and even scientific certainties were dissolving; it suggested the possibility of an ideal without defining it, and thus preserved the imagination necessary to acting upon an ideal. In a similar vein, William James had written in his younger days that "the stoic feeling of being a sentinel obeying orders without knowing the general's plan is a noble one."<sup>22</sup>

Military rhetoric came naturally enough to James. His anti-war and anti-imperialist activities did not cause him to reject the martial qualities as such. He felt, in the first place, that bellicosity was inherent in human nature. Biologically considered, man seemed simply the most formidable of all beasts of prey, although, indeed, the only one which preyed systematically on its own species. The truth was, thought James, that people wanted war: "It is a sacrament. Society would rot, they think, without the mystical blood-payment." As the war-like spirit could not be done away with, the only solution, for James, was to channel it in a constructive direction.<sup>23</sup>

It was this solution, of course, which James proposed in "The Moral Equivalent of War." This celebrated essay drew a clear distinction between the evil of war and the value of those qualities of character associated with it. "Militarism," James stated, "is the great preserver of our ideals of hardihood, and human life with no use for hardihood would be contemptible."<sup>24</sup> The war-party, he thought, was entirely correct in affirming that the martial virtues, even though achieved traditionally through war, were "absolute and permanent human goods."<sup>25</sup> The problem was the creation of new energies and hardihoods to maintain the manliness of which militarism had been the custodian, and although James suggested no truly adequate answer, his intent was clear. Should the war-like spirit be rechanneled, still, he was sure, "martial virtues must be the enduring cement; intrepidity, contempt of

softness, surrender of private interest, obedience to command, must still remain the rock upon which states are built. . . .”<sup>26</sup>

The martial man and the imaginative man met in the philosophy of William James. Temperamentally and intellectually, James preferred a world of uncertainty and struggle. Monistic systems, postulating closed, deterministic universes where human volition was an illusion and human imagination ultimately futile, were repugnant to him; consequently, he found Herbert Spencer’s synthetic philosophy, for all its glorification of competition, ultimately tame.

If now I [James wrote in 1879], a defective and imperfectly evolved creature, full of the joy of battle and other survivals from a savage state, say to Mr. Spencer: “I know nothing of your highest life, or knowing, despise it”; and if I add to my other riotous deeds the sneering at evolution and the writing of sarcasms on its eventual milk-and-water paradise, saying I prefer to go on like my ancestors and enjoy this delicious mess of fears and strivings, and agonies and exultations, of dramatic catastrophies and supernatural visions, of excesses, in short, in every direction, which make of human life the rich contradictory tissue of good and evil it now is, how shall Mr. Spencer reduce me to order or coerce me to bow the knee?<sup>27</sup>

James’s own philosophy of “pragmatism or pluralism,” he noted in his essay on “The Absolute and the Strenuous Life,” fell back on a “certain ultimate hardihood, a certain willingness to live without assurance”; this he thought a “more strenuous type of emotion” than faith in a monistic certainty.<sup>28</sup> The strong moralistic aspect of James’s thought required that conflict be a reality, for a thorough monism, in ultimately reconciling all differences, made it impossible to take a genuine moral position; evil existed only as part of a greater good. “The martial spirit,” Ralph Barton Perry noted, “was implied in James’s moral dualism.”<sup>29</sup> With real dragons of evil to slay, the imaginative leap implicit in the fight for an ideal became possible for James as it was to Holmes. “The solid meaning of life,” James wrote, “is always the same eternal thing,—the marriage, namely of some unhabitual ideal, however special, with some fidelity, courage, and endurance; with some man’s or woman’s pains.”<sup>30</sup>

Although the fight for an ideal was in a basic sense an imaginative fight, the combination of martial and imaginative qualities seems inherently unstable, because it joins opposites. The martial implies discipline, and the imaginative implies spontaneity. Balance between discipline and spontaneity is difficult to sustain. Theodore Roosevelt, for example, was better keyed to discipline. Martial virtue was a major theme of Roosevelt’s public and private writings. It was no doubt an extension of the “strenuous life” which had so much personal meaning for him; it is quite clear that it served also as an antidote to the softness

of a business civilization. Roosevelt railed repeatedly against the money-seekers and “men of softened fibre,” and at those whose only goals were “swollen, slothful ease and ignoble peace.”<sup>31</sup>

Roosevelt’s cure for the dullness of business contained more of the martial than of the imaginative, however. He recounted to John Hay a conversation with Brooks Adams, in the course of which Adams had “allowed his fancy a moment’s lurid play as to the possibility of my heading some great outburst of the emotional classes which should at least temporarily crush the Economic Man.”<sup>32</sup> Although he was amused by Adams’ categories, which now cast him as an “emotional” man, Roosevelt’s temperament and overriding concern for national unity gave to his pronouncements an emphasis at variance with that of James, or even with that of Holmes. Holmes, though a firm believer in discipline, derived the most profound qualities of imagination from the martial experience; Roosevelt had similar views of the significance of war and the roles of the sexes, but expressed them more in terms of duties. The normal, healthy man, he felt, should work hard and be prepared at any time to go to war; the normal, healthy woman should be a mother. Any race not based on these functions was not fit to “cumber the earth”: “Work—fight—breed—a race may do all these things, and yet be worthless; but unless it does them, it certainly *must* be worthless.”<sup>33</sup>

Brooks Adams, in his later years, went much farther than did Roosevelt in the direction of ultranationalism and militarism, so far, in fact, that with some justification he has been accused of proto-fascism.<sup>34</sup> His Man of Fear could then find employment only as a versatile, omniscient imperial administrator. His brother Henry took the opposite tack, and in exploring the imagination arrived at its highest possibilities in the religious and artistic sensibilities of Chartres Cathedral. Henry came to place the highest value on a spontaneity which allowed the imagination free play. He recalled such spontaneity from his boyhood summers in Quincy, and he rediscovered it in Tahiti and in the Middle Ages. The Virgin herself, unconstrained by the strict law of God the Father and the focus of popular adoration, was its embodiment.

The martial spirit was a secondary theme for Henry Adams. He described the “masculine, military energy” that characterized Mont-Saint-Michel, but this was a prelude to his celebration of the greater feminine energy of Chartres. Yet Adams readily associated the martial with the imaginative, if only because, as he complained in 1897, nothing but the military impulse was left to challenge the rule of capital.<sup>35</sup> In an account of Tahitian history, he was impressed that “the fight about a woman is the starting-point of all early popular revolutions and poetry. . . .”<sup>36</sup> Measured by imaginative and even martial standards, the twentieth century seemed decadent, and Adams clearly associated these values in complaining that his age had “lost much of its ear for poetry,

as it has its eye for colour and line, and its taste for war and worship, wine and women.”<sup>37</sup>

Henry Adams could almost casually invoke war and imagination together as aspects of human vitality; for certain of his contemporaries it was a more studied conjunction. The martial-imaginative mystique is not adequately explained by conventional labels such as militarism, romanticism or social Darwinism. It seems peculiarly characteristic, in the United States at least, of the several decades preceding World War I, and then it was pervasive enough to make such disparate types as Theodore Roosevelt and William James sound sometimes much the same, though their versions of the strenuous life differed. Part of it was a fear for the vitality of western civilization. There was a certain feeling, as Barrett Wendell wrote in 1887, that “over-refinement” was the “curse of the century,” and that there was need of renewed virility.<sup>38</sup> This was not necessarily a martial version of virility, but later Wendell himself half-welcomed the coming of World War I for the reason that “no less tremendous tonic could have saved the departing national life of England.”<sup>39</sup> The English “gentlefolk,” he wrote in December, 1914, had only a few months ago been “submerged in the sentimental vulgarities of base democracy . . .”; now they were again displaying the energetic qualities which had made them great.<sup>40</sup>

There were, of course, immediate sources of the mentality which could view a world war as a tonic. Wendell exemplifies a class consciousness, shared by some patricians, that looked down upon upstart millionaires and exalted the more aristocratic pursuits of war, art and religion as vastly superior to commerce. Certainly the Adams brothers manifested ample disdain for the capitalist type, and Roosevelt habitually contrasted the “base spirit of gain and greed”<sup>41</sup> with martial strenuosity. On a somewhat different plane, the martial and imaginative virtues offered a convenient rebuke to the vulgarity and stuffiness of bourgeois society, and to the ugliness and tedium of the industrial civilization in which it dwelled. William James, who like many of his contemporaries expressed revulsion at the middle class tameness and dead-level mediocrity of American society, once half-facetiously admitted a longing for “the flash of a pistol, a dagger, or a devilish eye, anything to break the unlovely level of 10,000 good people. . . .”<sup>42</sup> Roosevelt was similarly appalled by the “decorous hopelessness” in the lives of some of his acquaintances.<sup>43</sup>

Intellectual and class abhorrence of middle class values runs throughout modern history; what is interesting here is the form which it took. Materials were at hand for the martial-imaginative concept. Men like Roosevelt, Holmes, James and the Adamses were far from being simple social Darwinists, but their thinking was colored by a Darwinian emphasis on struggle and competition. Militarism, or a more broadly applicable ideal based on supposed martial qualities, was among the manifold

lessons which social Darwinism could teach. On the other hand, as Ernest Samuels points out, the late nineteenth century had for many intellectuals “produced the antidote for its maladies in the revived cult of the Middle Ages.”<sup>44</sup> Brooks and Henry Adams could easily seize upon medieval faith as the quintessence of imagination; they could find in the same age the ideal of the martial man. “So the crusaders rode out to fight,” Brooks wrote in explaining the spirit of the eleventh century, “the originals of the fairy knights, clad in impenetrable armour, mounted on miraculous horses, armed with resistless swords, and bearing charmed lives.”<sup>45</sup> James was able to build upon the empiricist tradition to develop a philosophy emphasizing innovation and indeterminacy, and therefore friendly to imagination and moral combativeness. Yet such categorical sources do not adequately explain the product.

Perhaps, in this context, the closest approach to a common element in the thought of men like Brooks Adams, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. and William James is the notion of the fight for an ideal. Yet in none of these men is this the simple and straight-forward notion of romantic tradition. Adams’ crusaders purportedly represent merely the outlet of mental energy through fear, and they are doomed to historical futility. Holmes prescribes a soldierly faith, but the end—or ideal—is not and cannot be known. James leaves it to the embattled individual to choose his own “unhabitual ideal.” The effect is to blur the distinction between means and ends that would ordinarily be apparent in the concept of fighting for an ideal. James makes this clear in summarizing the meaning of life as the “marriage” of an ideal with the martial qualities used in its pursuit. Holmes’s “soldier’s creed” and Adams’ description of the Man of Fear similarly found meaning in fighting for the ideal rather than in the ideal itself.

These were twentieth-century points of view—almost. It was still possible for Adams, Holmes and James, and perhaps emotionally necessary, to postulate ideals, but their nature had become obscure, and meaning had descended from their realization to their pursuit. Neither James nor Holmes nor even Adams lamented the absurdity of the universe, perhaps because this pursuit retained a vital fascination for them. To Holmes, criticizing the universe was simply a case of “damning the weather,”<sup>46</sup> and he was content to suppose that the “cosmos” might be bigger than significance: “it has significance in its belly.”<sup>47</sup> Educated men of Holmes’s generation, however, were troubled in another way. They were steeped in the lessons of nineteenth-century science: materialism, the primacy of force and the deadly serious reality of competition and struggle. These lessons made adequate sense of the universe for some; for others they pointed to chaos. But it was an unusual thinker who could genuinely divorce himself from a nonscientific sense of the ideal. Henry Adams’ *Virgin* and *Dynamo* symbolized a divided allegiance that characterized a significant number of his contemporaries.

It was in this respect that Brooks Adams' *Man of Fear* had an appeal beyond the covers of *The Law of Civilization and Decay*. Despite Adams' facade of scientific objectivity, his conception lifted struggle above the blind clash of opposing forces, while lending a dynamic quality to values that might otherwise have seemed genteel and sentimental. This martial and imaginative man was neither a stolid militarist nor an idealist in the traditional sense. His worth lay not in his fight for a particular and generally recognized ideal, any more than the actual medieval crusader had needed extraordinary imagination. For Adams, Holmes and James, worth lay in the man who could imagine the existence of an ideal and who would aggressively pursue it.

The peculiar mental patterns and associations which made Brooks Adams' *Man of Fear* a plausible figure in the period before the First World War could not well survive subsequent blows of history. The martial spirit sometimes degenerated into militarism, as it did for Adams himself. Holmes's vision of life as the "crush of Arctic ice" seemed to later critics dangerously cynical and amoral.<sup>48</sup> James's idea of struggle for a self-selected ideal, as well as Holmes's celebration of life for its own sake, had much in common with existentialism, but existentialist man has a stark and desperate aspect which the more sanguine figure of martial and imaginative man, though born of Fear,<sup>49</sup> managed to escape. Brooks Adams had hit upon an archetype keyed to a transient and thenceforth irrecoverable temper.

Louisiana State University in New Orleans

### footnotes

1. John P. Mallan, "Roosevelt, Brooks Adams, and Lea: The Warrior Critique of the Business Civilization," *American Quarterly*, VIII (Fall, 1956), 216-230.

2. Brooks Adams, *The Law of Civilization and Decay: an Essay on History*, introduction by Charles A. Beard (New York, 1943), 60 *et passim*.

3. *Ibid.*

4. *Ibid.*, 60-61 *et passim*.

5. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to Sir Frederick Pollock, October 21, 1895, *Holmes-Pollock Letters: the Correspondence of Mr. Justice Holmes and Sir Frederick Pollock, 1874-1932*, 2 volumes, ed. Mark Antony DeWolfe Howe (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1941), I, 64.

6. Theodore Roosevelt, Review of *The Law of Civilization and Decay*, by Brooks Adams, *The Forum*, XXII (January, 1897), 575, 578.

7. *Ibid.*

8. Theodore Roosevelt to Cecil Arthur Spring Rice, May 29, 1897, *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, 8 volumes, ed. Elting Elmore Morison, *et al.* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1951-1954), I, 621.

9. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to Sir Frederick Pollock, June 17, 1908, *Holmes-Pollock Letters*, I, 139.

10. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to Felix S. Cohen, March 13, 1925, "The Holmes-Cohen Correspondence," edited with a foreword by Felix S. Cohen, *Journal of the History of Ideas*, IX (January, 1948), 44.

11. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., "The Soldier's Faith," *The Holmes Reader*, ed. Julius J. Marke (New York, 1955), 154.

12. *Ibid.*

13. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., "Parts of the Unimaginable Whole," *The Mind and Faith of Justice Holmes: His Speeches, Essays, Letters and Judicial Opinions*, ed. Max Lerner (Boston, 1943), 27.

14. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., "George Otis Stattuok," *The Occasional Speeches of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes*, ed. Mark Antony DeWolfe Howe (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1962), 95.
15. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., "The Profession of the Law," *Holmes Reader*, 100.
16. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., "The Soldier's Faith," *ibid.*, 149-150.
17. *Ibid.*, 153.
18. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., "Memorial Day," *ibid.*, 15.
19. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., "The Soldier's Faith," *ibid.*, 150; Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., "Walbridge Abner Field," *Occasional Speeches*, 118.
20. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., "The Soldier's Faith," *Holmes Reader*, 151-152.
21. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to John C. H. Wu, April 10, 1924, *Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes: His Book Notices and Uncollected Letters and Papers*, ed. Harry Clair Shriver, introduction by Harlan Fiske Stone (New York, 1936), 175. Cf. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., "Natural Law," *Mind and Faith of Justice Holmes*, 398.
22. William James to Thomas W. Ward, January, 1868, *The Letters of William James*, 2 volumes, ed. Henry James (Boston, 1920), I, 132.
23. William James, "Remarks at the Peace Banquet," *Atlantic Monthly*, CXIV (December, 1904), 845-847.
24. William James, "The Moral Equivalent of War," *International Conciliation*, No. 27 (1910), 8.
25. *Ibid.*, 16.
26. *Ibid.*, 15.
27. William James, "Herbert Spencer's Data of Ethics," *The Nation*, XXIX (September 11, 1879), 179.
28. William James, "The Absolute and the Strenuous Life," *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*, IV (September 26, 1907), 548.
29. Ralph Barton Perry, *The Thought and Character of William James As Revealed in Unpublished Correspondence and Notes, Together with His Published Writings*, 2 volumes (Boston, 1935), II, 271.
30. William James, *Talks to Teachers on Psychology: and to Students on Some of Life's Ideals* (New York, 1922), 299.
31. Theodore Roosevelt, "Washington's Forgotten Maxim," *Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute*, XXIII (Number 3, 1897), 449, 452; Theodore Roosevelt, *The Strenuous Life* (New York, 1910), 21.
32. Theodore Roosevelt to John Hay, June 17, 1899, *Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, II, 1021.
33. Theodore Roosevelt to Helen Kendrick Johnson, January 10, 1899, *ibid.*, II, 905.
34. Arthur F. Beringause, *Brooks Adams: a Biography* (New York, 1955), 371.
35. Henry Adams, *Mont-Saint-Michel and Chartres* (Boston and New York, 1904), 40; Henry Adams to Cecil Arthur Spring Rice, November 11, 1897, *Letters of Henry Adams*, 2 volumes, ed. Worthington Chauncey Ford (Boston and New York, 1930), II, 136.
36. Henry Adams, *Tahiti: Memoirs of Arii Taimaie Marama of Eimeo, Teriirere of Toorai, Terrinui of Tahiti, Tauraatua i Amo: Memoirs of Marau Taaroa, Last Queen of Tahiti*, ed. Robert E. Spiller (New York, 1947), 20.
37. Adams, *Mont-Saint-Michel and Chartres*, 29.
38. Barrett Wendell to Colonel Robert White-Thomson, January 31, 1887, *Barrett Wendell and His Letters*, ed. Mark Antony DeWolfe Howe (Boston, 1924), 70.
39. Barrett Wendell to H. M. Kallen, August 25, 1914, *ibid.*, 239.
40. Barrett Wendell to Edward Bowditch, Jr., December 8, 1914, *ibid.*, 264.
41. Roosevelt, *The Strenuous Life*, 9.
42. William James to Mrs. William James, July 29, 1896, *Letters of William James*, II, 43.
43. Theodore Roosevelt to Anna Roosevelt, April 22, 1886, *Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, I, 99.
44. Ernest Samuels, *Henry Adams: the Major Phase* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1964), 208.
45. Adams, *Law of Civilization and Decay*, 123.
46. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to Sir Frederick Pollock, May 2, 1925, *Holmes-Pollock Letters*, II, 158.
47. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to John C. H. Wu, March 26, 1925, *Mind and Faith of Justice Holmes*, 427.
48. E.g., Ben W. Palmer, "Hobbes, Holmes, and Hitler," *American Bar Association Journal*, XXXI (November, 1945), 569-573.
49. Born of fear in a real sense for William James. James's personal crisis of 1870 has often been described, recently by Gay Wilson Allen in *William James: a Biography* (New York, 1967), 164-169. Allen notes (p. 167) that James worked out "a kind of crude existentialist philosophy" to assuage his severe anxiety and sense of helplessness. William Barrett also notes the existentialist aspect of James's thought, in *Irrational Man: a Study in Existential Philosophy* (New York, 1962), 18.