

the doughboy

formation of a military folk

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The contribution of the American soldier to the pageant of American folklore is as lasting as that of the cowboy or the logger. The “master workman” became the chief folk subject of the era of capitalist expansion in the years after 1860.¹ Although he seldom received attention from folklorists, the soldier is a comparable figure in the nation’s drive for global power. There are a few heroes of expansion such as The Rough Rider, Theodore Roosevelt, but he never became legendary like Mike Fink or John Henry. A folklore of the common soldier, however, does exist and provides a rich body of documentation for the social historian.

In recent years scholars have shown interest in the effect of the military on civilian society. Perhaps the most important conduit for military influence is the ex-soldier. When James Donovan wrote his study of militarism in 1970, he found that 45 percent of the adult males in the United States were veterans.² Not many men fell trees for a living anymore, stoke blast furnaces or drive railroad spikes with their hammers, but since 1917 more men have been exposed to the occupation of soldiering than almost any other. Modern American society had, without noticing, undergone a massive shift to direct experience with military life as great as the simultaneous shift from rural to urban life.

Central to the formation of a folk is the individual’s longing for group acceptance. Few people felt this need more urgently than did the trench soldier of World War I. The doughboy saw himself as a member of a special group, experiencing what Eric Leed called “collective estrange-

ment” from the rest of society.³ The conviction that life in the Army during the Great War would remake the man and stamp him with an indelible sign emerges clearly in a soldier’s diary: “We talked much of comradeship in the coming civilian life. Like mystics, we are conscious of an association that will bind us into a passionate group different and superior, as we think, to all others.”⁴

There is a hint in this passage of the mysterious alchemy by which such passionate group feeling may alter the individual’s perception of traditional national ideals, with no outward sign that they have changed. Americans have been called to fight for independence in their own country and have at times fought to deny independence for others. In every case they have drawn moral nourishment from the familiar ideological vocabulary that includes “freedom,” “liberty” and “rights.” The soldier of 1898, for example, went off to free Cuba from “Spanish tyranny” but stayed to suppress an independence movement that was thirty years old. Soldiers sent to the Philippines found themselves in an ugly war against Filipinos who had risen in opposition to Spanish forces in their own war of independence. The period since World War II is replete with examples of American policy requiring support for autocratic regimes instead of popular revolutionary forces. After the Vietnam debacle, returning GIs often have had serious problems reconciling their participation in that war with the moral and political principles on which they were raised.

The soldier participating in World War I did not often examine the discrepancies between the traditional ideals and the reality of army orders or contemporary national policy. He was driven by forces that shaped him into a member of a specialized folk group more concerned with the health and survival of the group than with lofty abstractions.

Prior to 1917, the Army made almost no effort to influence the folk patterns of the American soldier even though the importance of the soldier’s immediate group to success in arms has been known to all armies probably since armies first came into being. As it changed rapidly from a rural constabulary to a modern force in World War I, the Army found it expedient to acknowledge the importance of the small group and its folk patterns in the interest of building a mass army acceptable to an anti-militarist democracy from which recruits were to be drawn by coercion.

The last sizable military effort by an American army before 1917 was the Spanish American War, which had been a disaster of ill-preparedness. Volunteer units looking like small, private armies and National Guard units with their shoe-clerk sergeants and elected officers jostled with the regulars from the Southwest to get transport to Cuba. The thought of Lt. Colonel Theodore Roosevelt commandeering a ship so that his horseless cavalry could reach the battle while Colonel William Jennings Bryan rocked away the war on the porch of the Hotel Tampa is a fitting image of that spirit of enterprise and invention which characterized the Army’s conduct of the war.

The American Expeditionary Forces were not like that. For the Army, World War I was the stage on which the nineteenth-century romantic view

of war, with its reliance on the exploits of inspired amateurs, came face to face with the hard, new realism of the preparedness enthusiasts led by Theodore Roosevelt, Elihu Root and General Leonard Wood.

Volunteerism would not survive the war. It was sacrificed for the efficiency and discipline of a professional army fit to carry out America's global destiny as the preparedness clique saw it.

A strong element in the doughboy's thinking was the conception of war as competing virtues. Citizen soldiers armed with moral superiority would defeat Prussian militarism precisely because Prussians were militaristic. While representative of prewar popular thinking, such notions were an example of cultural lag. Military planners had been working since the 1890s to remodel the American Army along Prussian lines.

Ever since the Army slipped into its "dark ages" of neglect in the 1870s, preparedness leaders, with General Emory Upton their chief publicist, had agitated for an end to volunteer armies and haphazard staff organization. Many of Upton's proposals were taken up by Secretary of War Elihu Root in the atmosphere of recriminations against his predecessors' handling of the recent war. Root had Upton's major work published by the government and helped to secure legislation for a European-style general staff and for federal control of state militia.⁵

The call for preparedness went well beyond the immediate needs of the military and into fundamental changes in custom and belief. Military service, one advocate claimed, makes better citizens "by curbing the spirit of disobedience which has made the American deservedly a byword for lawlessness and lack of true patriotism. . . ."⁶ Preparedness advocates wanted a military coordination of society—its industrial, financial and transportation systems. Schools and colleges would teach military skills and attitudes; from the pulpit would come sermons on a militant Americanism.⁷

To succeed, preparedness advocates had to counter the American bias against militarism and to explain how their plans could be carried out without brutalizing youth or endangering democracy. Theodore Roosevelt's answer was typical: compulsory military service is democratic because rich and poor serve together.⁸ Elaborating on this theme, the Army's Chief of Staff, General Leonard Wood, rose to mystical heights in claiming that young men from all classes serving together will help America "fulfill what we believe to be our destiny and become a real melting pot" in which all Americans "will be fused into one homogeneous mass of Americanism" Military service, he said, would eliminate racial and ethnic loyalties and drive out the unfit, the anarchist and the slacker.⁹

The most powerful argument of the advocates was that the United States simply did not have an army by the standards of the day. Events during the Mexican Revolution—resulting in the occupation of Vera Cruz by American troops in 1914 and the Punitive Expedition led by General John J. Pershing against Pancho Villa in 1916—combined with the European war to soften resistance to the preparedness campaign. The

National Defense Act of 1916 dropped the volunteers as a reserve and put in their place the National Guard with new federal controls. Gone were the fixed-term enlistments; the doughboy of World War I would serve for the duration of the war; gone were the state names and insignia, and gone were the officers appointed by governors. The new Army of 1917 presented the War Department with a great challenge: how to transform civilians into soldiers on a mass scale and to employ them overseas in an unprecedented alliance with foreign powers. This task called for a change in methods of training and social control of soldiers, not only because of the size of the AEF but also because it was to be an army of civilians. Whereas General Upton had tried to meet the challenge of a mass army by taking it away from civilian control and thoroughly professionalizing it, the more realistic leaders of 1917 set about to civilianize the Army. If conscription was to work it needed public support. This could be achieved by reversing the negative image soldiers had acquired as scruffy, diseased louts. The War Department set out to convince the public that its sons would be morally safe in camp. Prostitutes and alcohol were banned from the vicinity of army cantonments. To the towns nearby with their red lights and bars, the message from the government was: "Here comes a soldier. Clean up."¹⁰

The older army method of social control based on domination and intimidation gave way to one based on "professional paternalism."¹¹ Pershing ordered that the "uncompromising obedience" of West Point be the disciplinary standard of the AEF.¹² But his general orders also reflected his concern with morale which was considered the prerequisite for "uncomplaining obedience" in the new Army.

Army life was made to approximate contemporary civilian life with much of the latter's underlying progressive tone. Cantonments were built like small towns with movie houses, sporting fields, libraries, social halls and chapels. Professional musicians were hired to lead the men in song, to build a "singing army."¹³ Organizations like the YMCA and the Knights of Columbus came to the camps to raise the intellectual and moral level of the new Army. Their services constituted an essentially middle class program designed for men "from fair home surroundings."¹⁴ Secretary of War Newton Baker wanted the soldiers to have an "armor made up of a set of social habits replacing those of their homes and communities which will protect them overseas."¹⁵ Trained as soldiers but bound to civilian moral precepts, accompanied everywhere by civilian service agencies, the men of the AEF were expected to return from war with their ideals intact.

The new army had to stimulate an *esprit de corps* to take the place of the volunteer's spontaneous enthusiasm. Discipline based on group loyalty became fundamental to *esprit*. To at least one general, the working definition of discipline was "the spirit of the team."¹⁶ Manuals advised officers to use indirect means to teach proper military behavior. They were told to learn the soldiers' names, to show an interest in the quality of the mess and to pay sympathetic attention to the problems of adjustment to army life.¹⁷ Officers were told that leadership could be improved if they

could win the confidence of their men by such means as displaying a sense of humor (“It will only go to show that you are human.”) and keeping rank and class in the background. (“They recognize that you have superior advantages, but you must never make the mistake of letting them know that you know it.”)¹⁸

Manuals for noncommissioned officers cautioned them not to swear at privates, to refrain from “inconsiderate behavior” and to explain reasons for symbolic practices like saluting.¹⁹ Close-order drill, competitive sports and ceremonial exercises, though largely irrelevant in modern warfare, were thought to be the surest way of building the pride in squad and company upon which *esprit* and discipline rest.²⁰ A private at Camp Oglethorpe testified to the unifying effects of company inspection:

Saturday inspection is one of the best things discovered. When we arrived at Oglethorpe we had no ideals left. . . . We thought no more about cleanliness than a wolf in a hard winter. . . . But the preparations for our first inspection brought back all our latent pride. . . . and, although we grumbled at inspection, we secretly like it.²¹

It was essential to the new professional Army that state identities be eliminated in favor of a national one. Old units were broken up obliterating divisional identities and pride. New identities had to be invented with new insignia and idiosyncratic names. National Guard units were federalized and made up of men from several states. Eventually the War Department dropped the distinctions among volunteers, and the regular army and the national army (draftees). Nationalization had practical advantages, chief of which was greater central control of the ranks as local political and emotional ties were suppressed. Soldiers were effectively cut off from civilian life and thrown upon the paternalistic society of the new Army in its ersatz civilian setting. In France, the soldiers’ newspaper, *Stars and Stripes*, stopped printing local place names in its datelines after the first year. From then on all news from home came simply from “America.”

society of the doughboy

The soldiers of 1917 thought of themselves as individualists. In most of their wars, Americans had exercised their individualism by choosing whether or not to participate. Volunteering for the military was part of the “test of manliness” for the prospective soldier.²²

It was not as an individual, however, that the soldier went to war but as a member of a group bound by formal and informal ties to patterns of thought and behavior beyond his individual will to alter. Military theorists like Ardant du Picq and S. L. A. Marshall have stressed the primacy of the peer group in combat, indeed, of its almost overwhelming importance in most circumstances of military life. It is the soldier’s immediate comrades in his “primary group” giving or withholding approval who determine how well the individual will behave in combat. Marshall’s well-known theory, stated simply, is that fear rules the battlefield and that men

advance into it only because they fear the opprobrium of their fellows more than death.²³ The group dictates attitudes toward officers, imposes its “code of manliness” and arbitrates through its unofficially recognized powers many of the conflicts between orders from above and reluctance from below. The new recruit soon realizes that the Army wants him to disregard personal comfort, self-expression and safety in the service of military necessity. He responds by establishing affiliations with his squad and company, securing a measure of protection and winning a sense of identity through social acceptance. A military folk complete with customs, language, internal order and an array of other shared cultural patterns inducts the soldier into its midst. There is an eerie confirmation of this primary group authority in Charles MacArthur’s memoir of his service in the Rainbow Division. An entire secret fraternal order was established in one of the battalions, complete with ranks, secret passwords, ceremonies and a bey as leader. Advancement within the ranks was based on a scale of inverted merit so that telling off a lieutenant was rewarded with immediate promotion. “Before very long,” wrote MacArthur, “all authority that the captain might have hoped to wield was vested in the Bey. . . . Furthermore, there was none of the laxity in saluting that so distressed the captain.”²⁴

“Youth,” Erik Erikson reminds us, “has always found ways of reviving more primitive ‘initiations’ by forming exclusive cliques, gangs, and fraternities.”²⁵ Part of this initiation into what Robert Jay Lifton called “the immortal chain of manhood,” was, in 1917, to enlist in the Army in time of war and to embrace the code of manly behavior required by the Army and by the primary group within it.²⁶ In his short story, “The Death of a Soldier,” Edmund Wilson’s upper-class hero quickly “got the hang” of the foul Army language and such other fundamentals as the correct form for complaining. “Now, he felt, he was almost a man.”²⁷

At the lower levels of Army organization the doughboy’s group ties were like those of a surrogate family. Divested of the associations of his previous life at the outset of his military career, the soldier turned in an almost instinctive desperation to “buddies,” forming bonds of surprising intimacy and devotion.²⁸ This is well recorded in all wars and memorialized in the clichés of Hollywood films. Private Wunderlich supplies faithful miniatures of his comrades and a map of their exact position in relation to his own as he goes over the top to lose his leg in no-man’s-land.²⁹ “They were my buddies,” writes Sergeant York. “That’s a word that’s only understood by soldiers who have lived under the same blankets, gathered around the same chow can, and looked at death together.”³⁰

The division—small, self-contained armies of 27,000—seemed to be the largest group to which the individual could forge mystical links. Divisions were the tribal societies of the AEF. Doughboys wore a small “U.S.” on their collars but festooned themselves with divisional emblems and brawled in bars for the honor of their units.

Most of the Army’s forty-two divisions took on some sort of name denoting qualities such as fierceness (“Wildcat”), accomplishment

("Marne" for the division which held at the Marne) or lack of accomplishment ("Sight-Seeing Sixth" for the division which arrived late for every battle). One scholar says that the AEF awarded the Sixth its name in derision, but one might speculate that having no other cognomen, the Sixth managed to wring a tribal identity even from derision.³¹

General Douglas MacArthur, Chief of Staff of the Forty-Second, suggested the name "Rainbow," as befitting a division scraped together from twenty-six states.³² The men took the name seriously, smearing rainbows on caissons and limbers and calling themselves "rainbows." Rainbows appeared to them before battle over enemy positions when no rainbows were possible. Notions of heresy developed to account for doubters of these preternatural events. A hysteric was thought to be a soothsayer; omens and portents made their appearance.³³ Shoulder patches, unknown in the AEF except for one that was forced upon a luckless unit for failure in combat, now appeared throughout the Army.³⁴ By the end of the war, observed a member of the Forty-Second, the AEF was divided into "mutually jealous" units whose practices "bound the members of each group together and enabled them to present a united front against other groups."³⁵ All of this was a kind of primitive urge, released by war, to erect totems and to prevent through taboo the appropriation of totemic signs by outsiders. The individual takes on the special powers and attributes of the namesake and receives its protection.³⁶ Thus, the imperatives of a massive social organization and the uncertainties and terror of war enveloped the doughboy in a culture in many ways independent of the industrial culture which brought the Army into being. It was precisely the transference of identity from civilian to military the new Army sought.

the doughboy sense of self and others

The doughboy's military training set him apart from others. In less obvious ways as well, life in the Army contributed to the creation of the doughboy folk. The Army issued each man one of the newfangled safety razors. The Army taught the doughboy to stand naked in line to be deloused and to submit to its relentless curiosity about the condition of his private parts. The cigarette came into vogue. The wristwatch, long considered an effeminate device, became a popular item, partly because there was no place on the uniform for the old pocket watch and fob and because a famous war correspondent, Richard Harding Davis, wore one.³⁷ The Army proscribed for sexual behavior by declaring unreported venereal disease an unlawful affliction and by training men in the use of the prophylaxis station. Basic training shaped the soldier's ideas of what the correct pose of the accomplished warrior should be. It served to blur all former social attachments—"knifing off" the old associations which interfere with group assimilation.³⁸ The severe haircut and the many personal indignities jarred loose the civilian outlook and rearranged it into an army outlook in a process which Robert Jay Lifton described for men of

a later war as “a form of symbolic death and rebirth.”³⁹ An incisive comment on another aspect of the same subject comes from Private Pottle describing the scared, fake toughness of the recruit:

To come unawares upon frank grossness, the filth and depravity, the moral meanness of man, is at any time a disheartening experience but to go through the experience in [Camp] Slocum was the refinement of misery. . . . We believed that every other man we saw was old and wise in iniquity, and in self-defense pretended that we too were above doing a decent act, or speaking a decent word.⁴⁰

At other times the game was to mock the officers. Soldiers’ folklore is full of commentary on the “ninety-day wonder” and the “shavetail general.” Among the hundreds of verses to “Mademoiselle from Armentières” one finds:

The general won the Croix de Guerre,
Parlez-vous,
The General won the Croix de Guerre,
Parlez-vous,
The general won the Croix de Guerre,
But the son of a bitch wasn’t even there,
Hinky Dinky parlez-vous.⁴¹

Doughboy humor about superiors invariably made officers appear inept and supercilious, often defeating missions through their own bumbling. The war effort which officers were supposed to direct was thus hampered by their very presence. Sometimes the officer was shown as less manly than the enlisted men. The “etiquette” columnist for *Stars and Stripes* advised his readers to avoid showing up the major with exhibitions of skill in cigarette rolling and especially to avoid the one-handed trick if on horseback.⁴² This impertinence did not necessarily signify true contempt for military hierarchy. Most soldiers regarded authority as imperative. Petty complaints and derision of officers, however, played an important part in certifying the soldier’s folk identity. Had officers not existed, the doughboy would have invented them, just as the Rainbow Division had invented the bey.

Encounters overseas with the foreigner were a powerful force shaping the doughboy folk culture. Against the utter strangeness of France, the immigrant American soldier in the AEF no longer seemed so different to the native-born. The theme of Sergeant York’s memoir is not his heroism but his Jewish, Greek, Polish and Italian buddies and how he “larned to love them.”⁴³

Apart from waging war, the main activity of an army abroad is to make invidious comparisons, and the doughboy’s most indelible first impression of France was the lilliputian railroads. Narrow-gauge trains took soldiers to their destinations in tiny boxcars they called “side-door pullmans,” marked “hommes 40, chevaux 8.” Countless jests derived from travel in those accommodations: “Captain, I loaded the forty men all right, but if you put the eight horses in they will shore trample the boys to death.” In minstrel song the doughboys heard:

What's dat song dere hummin in de A.E.F.?
What's de banjo strummin 'till you're almost deaf?
It's de one grand song
Dat you used to hate—
De Old Homme Forty
An de Chevaux Eight.⁴⁴

The French Army was tough and worthy of respect, but French men and women urinated in public and drank prodigious amounts of wine:

The Frogs don't work either day or night,
Parlez-vous,
They gotta get drunk before they'll fight,
Parlez-vous,
When you took over from the French,
Put chloride of lime in every trench,
Hinky Dinky parlez-vous.⁴⁵

The doughboy also could not help noticing that the British were a bit strange about their tea:

The English are a funny race,
Parlez-vous,
The English are a funny race,
Parlez-vous,
They fight like hell 'till half-past three,
And then knock off for a cup of tea,
Hinky Dinky parlez-vous.⁴⁶

The doughboy reserved his rankest cynicism for another group. Slackers and war profiteers formed an "outlaw" element more despised than the Germans who, after all, served in their country's army. Besides ordinary slackers there were loafers, conscientious objectors and first paper slackers—alien residents of the United States who renounced their intention to become citizens in order to avoid the draft. There were athletes like Jack Dempsey who worked in shipyards to avoid the draft and profiteers who many believed got rich selling swill to the Army.

the expression of doughboy folk culture

The AEF was, if anything, self-aware. It wrote and read about itself from induction to discharge. There were soldiers' publications in training camps, on troop ships and in hospitals. The most important and most widely read of these publications was *Stars and Stripes*. To help boost morale, Pershing had ordered that a soldiers' newspaper be published. An officer assembled the editors and directed the newspaper though enlisted men had editorial control.⁴⁷ *Stars and Stripes* not only mirrored doughboy culture, but it also helped to establish some of the AEF's identity: its uniform, name and language.

The uniform underwent several changes, all of them inconsequential from a sartorial point of view, except for the hat. The soldier of 1898 had

dressed like a cowboy with broadbrimmed campaign hat, blue work shirt, tan trousers, pistol and boots. The doughboy of 1918 resembled a hotel messenger. All that was left of the old uniform was the venerable and crushable campaign hat, and it was replaced in 1918 by the uninspiring overseas cap. The change was not well received, especially when the campaign hat was reissued to the cordially despised men of the supply service. Eulogizing the old hat, a soldier wrote: "Fedora style I did my bit in jungle sun and dirt,/ And now I've got a mortal hit, just like the old blue shirt."⁴⁸

The editors of *Stars and Stripes* sensed that the uniform, regardless of style, served a vital symbolic purpose; it set off the AEF from all other armies, signifying an American presence. It was all right to borrow "details of proved practicality" from others; but whatever the design of the new uniform then under consideration, it must "brand its wearer as an American soldier as distinctively and as unmistakably as does 'U.S.' on his collar."⁴⁹

To brand himself as an American the soldier also needed a distinctive name. "Sammy," "Yank" and "Doughboy" were in use but none was universally acceptable for one reason or another.⁵⁰ "Sammy" came either from "Uncle Sam" or from the French habit of greeting Americans with *nous amis*. In either case it was detested by the American soldiers. "Yanks" seemed to offer a slight to Southerners. "Doughboy" had historically referred only to infantry troops. Its origin has been variously attributed to (a) adobe dust on infantrymen serving in the Southwest which prompted the cavalry to call them "adobes" and eventually "doughboys"; (b) clay pigeons, thus, the soldier as target; or (c) flour from which soldiers on maneuvers made biscuits.⁵¹ Eventually "doughboy" came to mean "soldier," while "Yank" settled upon the AEF with less finality. "Doughboy" was a cocky name which allowed a man to think of himself as part of an old profession, the weight of the army's heroes and history upon him. The "GI" of the Second World War, on the other hand, was a name with links to nothing but the bureaucracy of war production. Henry Elkin remarked that "GI" (government issue) indicates that the American soldier saw himself as an "item of mass-production."⁵²

Without a language that was intelligible within the AEF and incomprehensible to outsiders, the American soldier would remain linguistically undifferentiated from his Canadian or British allies and from his countrymen who had stayed at home. New American coinage was slow to develop and never approached the thick volumes of neologisms published by the French after the war. The British had created their own vast store of jargon long before the Americans arrived, making the doughboys' efforts less urgent and less productive.⁵³

Doughboys borrowed liberally from the lexicon of the old Army regulars: "hombre," "short-arm" (penis, from "short-arm" or venereal inspection), "S.O.L." (shit out of luck), "jawbone" (credit), "corn willie" (canned corned beef), "belly robber" (mess sergeant) and "Jewish cavalry" (supply service). From the British Tommy they borrowed:

“cooties” (lice), “dugout,” “trench coat,” “potato masher” (German hand grenade) and “whizz-bang” (small artillery shell). From the mire of the Army’s bureaucracy came “A.W.O.L.,” “C. in C.” (commander-in-chief) and “O.D.” (olive drab). From his own invention the doughboy added “cootie bill” (franc note) and “submarine” (bedpan). Many forced coinages did not go into general use. “Aery” for air service and “airnat” for pilots in the aery are two of the failures.

The doughboy laced this mixture with elementary French, gleefully mangled: “cognac,” “*ce soir*,” “*fromage*,” “*promenade*” and the indispensable “*combién*.” His French vocabulary was heaviest in the areas of food, drink, money, military terms new to Americans like “barrage” and in the niceties of commonplace transactions and sexual assignations. Much of this French drifted from its moorings so that “*parlez-vous*” became a verb meaning ability to speak, as in “Do you *parlez-vous* English?” “*Ici*” came to mean “dog.” Many AEF mascots were named “*Ici*” in the belief that when a Frenchman addressed his dog in that manner he was calling the pet by name. “*Boche*” (German) became “busher,” the reference being to the minor leagues.⁵⁴ Thus the enemy was sometimes consigned to the minor leagues of soldiering. “Three bean” had once been “*tres bién*.” “Toot Sweet” was formerly “*toute de suite*,” and its relative “Toot Finny” had been “*tout fini*.”

There were three forms of AEF language, or rather, three layers that were peeled off for display depending upon the audience. Mary Keeley heard one of them in her canteen—the rough and clean version reserved for chaplains, canteen girls and General Pershing. She knew there was more to S.O.L. than “soldier out of luck,” but concluded that it was “so obscene that no woman ever knew what it meant.” She also rarely heard “Hun,” “Heinie” or “Fritz,” though invariably she did hear “Jerry.”⁵⁵ These terms were in fact used interchangeably in soldiers’ diaries and letters as well as in their newspapers. What this suggests is that there was a second version, a “literary” language not intended for conversation—colorful but clean and more suited to prose. It can be seen in some of the gaseous doughboy letters to hometown newspapers. The true language of the soldier was neither of these but a full-blown obscenity-based argot. The Army has always sworn, and obscenity has provided the core of its folk speech. Several veterans of the war interviewed in later life said they had not used much obscenity before their army service. “It [the Army] taught us how to swear,” said one.⁵⁶ After studying an unpublished “Vocabulary of the A.E.F.,” compiled following the war by Edmund Wilson and E. A. Hecher, H. L. Mencken concluded that 25 percent of the terms were more or less indecent. “The everyday speech of the troops was extraordinarily dirty.”⁵⁷ It may not have been a rich or original language, but its most important feature was that it was not spoken in mother’s kitchen, at Princeton or down at the plant.

Much of this language may have been a transitory affectation. Much, too, served the purpose of naming the paraphernalia of war in a manner which gave the soldier power over it or reduced it to inconsequential

absurdity. Thus, a shell became the harmless “G.I. can” (trash can); a grenade became the homey “potato masher,” and the excruciating lice were transformed into pesky “seam squirrels.” Soldiers likewise stripped officers of their authority by renaming them. Second lieutenants, already the lowest known form of officer life, were demoted to “third lieutenant.”⁵⁸

One collector of army slang suggests that the soldier used it in self-deprecation as in “pup-tent,” “dog-tag,” “butcher” (surgeon) and “meat wagon” (ambulance).⁵⁹ It seems more likely that through these terms the soldier showed an awareness of his personal insignificance in the massive machinery of warfare which processed him in batches. It shows as well the soldier’s perverse satisfaction in possessing the manly qualities needed to confront such a war and to achieve a sense of mastery over it by placing his own name upon its works and contraptions.

Secretary Baker might have favored singing soldiers but there was little precedent for them in the United States Army. Doughboys would neither sing the national anthem while marching to battle, as the Italians did, nor were they always eager to sing the commercial material Tin Pan Alley supplied—such as “Hello Central, Give Me No-Man’s-Land.” Twice each week black soldiers of the 371st Infantry were assembled to learn such songs from divisional song leaders, but they and their white officers preferred spirituals.⁶⁰

It may be true that no American folk ballads came out of the war, as G. Malcolm Law claims, but the doughboy did have his folk songs.⁶¹ He sang about the army:

Home, boys, home
That’s where I want to be.
Home, boys, home
In the land of liberty.
We’ll hang Old Glory
To the top of the pole,
And we’ll all re-enlist
In a pig’s asshole.⁶²

He sang about sex:

Banging away on Lulu
Banging all the day,
Where’m I going to get my banging
When Lulu goes away.⁶³

The hardest of all doughboy songs, “Mademoiselle from Armentières” or “Hinky Dinky,” was borrowed from British troops. According to Melbert Cary, the song was based on one sung by British soldiers in the 1890s. Doughboys brigaded with Tommies in the Armentières took over the basic theme:

Oh, Mademoiselle from Armentières,
Parlez-vous,

Oh, Mademoiselle from Armentières,
Parlez-vous,
Oh, Mademoiselle from Armentières,
She hadn't been kissed in forty years,
Hinky Dinky parlez-vous.⁶⁴

They composed hundreds of their own variations:

The Mademoiselle from gay Paree
She had the clap and give it to me
The Mademoiselle from Bar-le-Duc
She'll f--- you in a chicken coop⁶⁵

We have seen how the doughboy sang disparagingly of his allies in the trenches, but for the German he harbored little animosity:

Oh, I don't know why I totes dis gun,
I ain't got nothing against the Hun.⁶⁶

Of the YMCA he sang:

The Y.M.C.A. went over the top
To see how much money the doughboy's got.⁶⁷

Typical of his view of the slacker was:

Dempsey helped to build a ship
But couldn't see the ocean trip.⁶⁸

Melbert Cary insisted that such verses "preserved" the doughboy's personal commentary on his world, and that they were the "spontaneous and unstudied" compositions of no single author but of the A.E.F.⁶⁹

the culture of the trenches

The culture of war in the trenches was a thing unto itself. One had to master its ways: how to stay hidden by day and move by night underground like moles; how to cook without smoke; how to find one's way about in no-man's-land as one might creep about in the violence of a great Hobbesian landscape. One learned to avoid lingering at crossroads because they always drew artillery fire. One learned about the booby trap before it acquired its name and learned how to lob grenades against the enemy when he was just around a curve in the same trench.

By the time doughboys reached the trenches, there was already a sizable body of field lore. There was among British troops, for example, "the spectral soccer player"—the ghost of a well-known player who kicked a soccer ball into play, leading the troops on the attack. After that, British officers frequently were said to have started offensives by kicking soccer balls toward enemy lines.⁷⁰ There were stories of mysterious enemy officers who appeared and disappeared inside allied lines, of deserter armies living underground in no-man's-land, of a tallow works where German dead were rendered into fat, among numerous other tales.⁷¹

Doughboys passed many of these along and added their own tales of crucifixions and of rainbows appearing as signs of divine favor. There was a Bunyanesque German, “Joe the Lamplighter,” who hung out the rocket flares at night and fired mortars. Some of the most persistent bits of lore were the ubiquitous stories of German Amazons firing machine guns and flying planes.⁷²

“The Western Front,” remarked John Ellis in his study of no-man’s-land, “became a self-contained nightmare whose rules and traditions became ends in themselves, the only thing a man could cling on to in the midst of chaos.”⁷³ Soldiers “read” the war as if it were a text.⁷⁴ The doughboy viewed his initiation into this world as the supreme test. Virtually every personal narrative written by soldiers facing combat speaks of it with an almost giddy anticipation. Men who were assigned to rear units were seen as deprived: “Soldiers condemned to the S.O.S. cheered us wistfully as we passed.”⁷⁵

The first sight of wounded men always seemed to heighten the desire to get into the trenches. Corporal Washburn of the Yankee Division saw men “straighten up, for they saw for the first time what war meant, and they were more anxious than ever to get into it. . . .”⁷⁶ Upon first entering the trenches at Soissons, Private Wunderlich wrote: “We were fifteen proud and happy fellows. . . .”⁷⁷ If a plane flew past when the Yankee Division moved into position at Soissons, “every man gazed as long as it could be seen. At each distant explosion of gun or shell, the whole column remarked ‘Powie!’”⁷⁸ Echoes of this “gee-whiz” contemplation of battle could be heard in the early issues of *Stars and Stripes*. Editor Winterich later admitted that there was “a faint scent of the college annual—sometimes even of the high school annual—about them. . . . The war, so far as America was concerned . . . had not yet emerged from the lark stage.”⁷⁹ “In letters home, every man is hot for the fray,” wrote a lieutenant who censored mail. “All dread thought of going home without taste of ‘action.’ Sight of wounded makes for reflection. A *taste* would be enough.”⁸⁰

Things look different, however, after immersion in combat. Wunderlich’s first dead men were two French soldiers killed by a shell and “stuck against a wall like mud babies. . . . There weren’t many suppers eaten that night.”⁸¹ The Yankee Division “no longer howled with ignorant enthusiasm. . . .”⁸² “I was scared stiff from the first shell,” said Wunderlich, “I couldn’t run; I couldn’t duck. My feet were glued to my tracks.”⁸³ About their bravery, he had no doubts, and yet in the trench he and his buddies often sang:

I want to go home,
I want to go home;
I don’t want to go
To the trenches no more;
I don’t want to go
Where those big cannons roar.

“But don’t get the idea that we were ready to quit. . . . We sang that song to kid ourselves along.” The ambiguity of trench songs surfaced in

the next remark: “[the song] expressed what was really on our minds more truly than any of us cared to admit. We did want to go home. . . .”⁸⁴

A paradox of ground fighting in World War I was that advances in the technology of war placed new emphasis on primitive combat. Long-range artillery coupled with machine guns and barbed wire entrenchments made hand-to-hand fighting more frequent than it had been for centuries. Doughboys were issued double-edged trench knives with steel knuckles in addition to the bayonet. The Germans carried a “clean-up club,” with a large iron knob covered with spikes.⁸⁵ There were lurid accounts of men bashed and gutted with these weapons. Although the Allies did not encourage use of shock weapons, there are stories of Indian Gurkhas savaging the German with their eighteen-inch *kukri* so often that the Germans complained to the International Court about it. The complaint was about a specific Gurkha who achieved fame in trench lore as “The Gurkha with the Silver Knife.” It was said that he went out on patrol one night and began cutting up Germans. He continued through the trenches disemboweling as he went, never to be seen again.⁸⁶

Presumably, wounds, inflicted with dirks and bayonets were too often fatal to appear in hospital statistics, for such wounds accounted for less than 1 percent of all wounds suffered during the war; bullet wounds accounted for 30 percent and shell wounds the remainder.⁸⁷ It was most often the death by shell and shrapnel that the doughboy chose to describe. Death by bayonet was personally inflicted at close range and usually left the victim more or less recognizably intact. Artillery blew men and horses apart. The impersonality and remoteness of the way artillery death was administered and the surrealistic remains of the dead always caught the doughboy’s attention:

By the light of the burning ammunition I saw a man’s legs lying by the road, buttocks up. The whole upper part of the body had been taken off by a shell, and the two naked legs looked exactly like giant frog’s.⁸⁸

Unlike the static war experienced by the European participants from the time the German advance bogged down on the Marne in 1914 to the end of General Ludendorff’s last great offensive in the spring of 1918, the AEF’s war was generally mobile and aggressive as the German resistance collapsed all along the front. Nothing the AEF did matched in self-destructiveness the assault by British and French troops at the Somme in July, 1916, when 21,000 British soldiers were killed, most of them in the first hour of the operation.⁸⁹

During their first tentative deployment in the French lines in 1918, doughboys had clumped about in ignorance of the live-and-let-live understandings between German and French troops. Doughboys sometimes attacked by walking over barbed wire instead of waiting for it to be broken by Bangalore torpedoes. At Pershing’s headquarters, Colonel George C. Marshall concluded that the doughboys could not be used in exquisite French maneuvers but only “in a ‘steamroller’ operation . . . launched in an attack with distant objectives and held continuously to their task

without rest or reorganization until unfit for further fighting.’’⁹⁰ This impatience with finesse to which Marshall referred suggests the crusader fighting moral battles. When one reads some of the studies of European soldiery in the war, one gets a picture of men whose service deeply altered their faith in the rationality of modern civilization which was thought, in prewar times, to be immune from just such wars. The doughboy’s more brief, more positive experience, so unlike that of the front soldiers of virtually all other belligerents, reinforced much of his innocence despite the horrors of the trenches. To him even this war could serve a rational purpose, and could be won by spirit and character.

the citizen remade

“Back home we drooled about ‘democracy’ and ‘glory,’” wrote Lieutenant O’Brien. “Like Burgandy wine, that stuff doesn’t stand a sea voyage.”⁹¹ Sergeant Langer had the same doubts that the soldiers were motivated to fight out of a conviction that they were saving democracy: “I can hardly remember a single instance of serious discussion of American policy or larger war issues. They were simply fascinated by the prospect of adventure and heroism.”⁹² In the training camps, instruction was given on the causes of the war when questionnaires revealed that large numbers of recruits had no idea what it was all about. Some literate doughboys spoke of “mighty deeds” or “valor” but not of great principles anchored to facts. “I am anxious to go and get into the game,” wrote one young officer, “and then to get back home with you all again. . . . We all hope it won’t last long; only long enough for our battery to get into action over there.”⁹³

Sentiments of this sort underscore the ritualistic aspect of military service for the doughboy, as though war were sponsored at regular intervals to permit youth entry into manhood. A classic statement of this attitude, in a sentence which most young men of later wars would be unable to write, came from a Carnegie Tech enlistee: “the greatest test of character conceivable ensues when a man of fine instincts comes up against the army game and meets it without flinching.”⁹⁴ In his search through doughboy letters, Dixon Wecter found little of this stuff and even less of Woodrow Wilson’s idealism. Wecter noted that there was no “‘Battle Hymn of the Republic,’ but only ‘Hinky Dinky,’ ‘Good Morning Mr. Zip, Zip, Zip!’ and ‘Over There,’ with its parody ‘Underwear.’”⁹⁵

There were frequent allusions in *Stars and Stripes* to the “Kaiser’s tyranny,” but this rhetoric was hollow and lifeless compared to the robust talk among soldiers of cooties, corn willie and women.

However vague the doughboy was about the grand aims of the war, he felt that his service would count for something back home, for he would return a “citizen remade by the purging process of war and remolded in life and character by the discipline of army life. . . . He was going home an American.”⁹⁶

After the armistice the pressure to “bring the boys home” was

irresistible in Washington, and most of the AEF was quickly demobilized. Soldiers who remained with the Army of Occupation grew restive. They wrote "Lafayette, we are *still* here" on barracks walls and sang: "Darling I am coming back,/ Silver hairs among the black."⁹⁷ Few wanted to remain in the Army though most had positive feelings about their army experience. Many soldiers said they felt more patriotic and wished to continue fighting but for causes at home.⁹⁸ Wecter's compilation of soldiers' postwar attitudes shows considerable aimlessness among the veterans. One described himself as "strangely lonesome" and described the United States as "artificial and bare," with no romance left, "nothing to suffer for and laugh at."⁹⁹ For many veterans the American Legion and similar organizations filled this need to recapture the camaraderie of the front. They attempted in the years following the war to hold the AEF together in nostalgia and to supply it with a continuing purpose.

The American Legion was organized in Paris in 1919 to "perpetuate a one hundred percent Americanism and to preserve the memories and incidents of . . . [their] association in the Great War."¹⁰⁰ For Legionnaires of the 1920s, the war had more to do with consummating their Americanism and with becoming aware of domestic threats than with saving Europe or the world. *The American Legion Weekly* said of the delegates to the St. Louis convention which ratified the goals of the Legion, that they had "applied the great lessons of the war to the economic and social life of the country."¹⁰¹ These "great lessons of the war," led to a program far removed from the lofty internationalism of Woodrow Wilson, concentrating instead on veteran's benefits, deportation of "slackers" and an injunction against singing in German.

The war had brought men from all sorts of social backgrounds under a brief but powerful influence just as General Wood had said. The Legion's stress on "Americanism"—cultural and political uniformity—is an expression of the soldier's wish to extend to the nation the experience of his immersion in military folk culture. The period just after the armistice saw the self-conscious transfer of these folk patterns into permissible peacetime behavior. The constant call to battle in the political wars of the 1920s and after, provided a common focus to substitute for the old brotherhood in the struggle against the Kaiser's tyranny.¹⁰²

The AEF emerged from the war with little of the legacy of decimated ranks, defeats and mutinies which other armies took with them into the interwar period. Trench soldiers of the European armies were wracked with loss of morale brought about by shattered nerves and depletion of ego identity from the intense shelling and purposelessness of trench warfare.¹⁰³ In a sense, the AEF was an elite army. It was pampered and lavishly praised, trained longer than the allied troops of 1917 and 1918 and never used as replacement fodder in hopeless battles. Its recruits retained a degree of tentativeness, as though they were visitors in someone else's nightmare. The doughboy's adolescent, romantic views of war remained largely unaffected as if they had been confirmed, not negated by experience. For, after all, the experience most important to the doughboy was

not the task the Army was about but living the life of a soldier. His enduring memories came filtered through his folk group. These associations, observed S. M. Schneider, are "the only feature of the military for which Americans seem to have any nostalgia."¹⁰⁴ Nostalgia insulated the doughboy from some of the harsher elements of army life and from the full impact of the war's reality. He did not require a firmer understanding of the conflict because all meaning was invested in the group.

The doughboy's limited exposure to the war allowed him to retain innocent notions about the benefit war conferred upon young men. Nested in his group, drawing his spiritual sustenance from it, he took with him to France traditional patriotic myths and fantasies about his country's history and brought them back intact. The great change in foreign policy that came with American entry into the European war seems to have been little understood by the doughboy who thought of the event as repaying France for Lafayette's assistance to Americans in the War of Independence. For many men, the rituals and beliefs of the post-adolescent army folk culture are the high point in their lives.

In the 1980s the men who went to that war have just faded from the scene and from their roles in the institutions of American life. Some of them had gone on after 1918 to dominate the military and political conduct of the nation through subsequent wars. Instead of viewing the decisions made by that generation as merely historically logical outcomes, responses to the circumstances of the hour, we may see them better through the lens of a distant time when the doughboys went to France "to get into the game." The world view the doughboy adopted during the Great War may have become permanently frozen to his folklore to remain sacrosanct—beyond examination for a lifetime.

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notes

An earlier version of this paper was presented to an NEH Summer Seminar, "The Folk in American History," directed by Lawrence W. Levine, University of California, Berkeley, 1980.

1. Richard Dorson, *America in Legend* (New York, 1973), 124.
2. James A. Donovan, *Militarism, U.S.A.* (New York, 1970), 29.
3. Eric J. Leed, *No Man's Land* (Cambridge, 1979), 113.
4. Will Judy, *A Soldier's Diary* (Chicago, 1930), quoted in Peter Karsten, *Soldiers and Society* (Westport, Connecticut, 1978), 232.
5. Stephen E. Ambrose, *Upton and the Army* (Baton Rouge, 1964), 158.
6. Frederick Huidkoper, *The Military Unpreparedness of the United States* (New York, 1915), 552; Emory Upton, *Military Policy of the United States* (Washington, D.C., 1903).
7. Leonard Wood, *America's Duty* (Chicago, 1921), 176, 233.
8. Theodore Roosevelt, *Fear God and Take Your Own Part* (New York, 1916), 102-104.
9. *Military Training Camp*, introduction by Leonard Wood (Plattsburgh, New York, 1916), 3, 4; 179, 232.
10. Raymond B. Fosdick and Edwin Frank Allen, *Keeping Our Fighters Fit* (New York, 1918), 199.
11. Lawrence R. Radine, *The Taming of the Troops* (Westport, Connecticut, 1977), 55. It is called "managerial authority" in Morris Janowitz and Roger W. Little, *Sociology of the Military Establishment* (Beverly Hills, 1974), 61.
12. *United States Army in the World War, 1917-1919* (Washington, D.C., 1948), II, 296.
13. John M. Dickinson, *The Building of an Army* (New York, 1922), 10, 116.
14. *Ibid.*, 224.

15. *Ibid.*, 202.
16. M.B. Stewart, "Discipline and Leadership," in *The Officer's Guide*, 9th ed. (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, 1943), 508-511.
17. David C. Shanks, "Management of the American Soldier," in Stewart, 487-492.
18. Stewart, 517.
19. James A. Moss, *Noncommissioned Officer's Manual* (Menasha, Wisconsin, 1909), 12, 44.
20. Stewart, 511.
21. Frederick Pottle, *Stretchers* (New Haven, 1929), 4.
22. In World War II merely giving a good account of oneself was enough. The ante was higher in World War I. David G. Mandlebaum, *Soldier Groups and Negro Soldiers* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1952), 59.
23. S. L. A. Marshall, *Men Against Fire* (New York, 1947), 149.
24. Charles MacArthur, *War Bugs* (Garden City, New York, 1919), 155-156.
25. Erik Erikson, *Identity, Youth and Crisis* (New York, 1968), 87, 88.
26. Robert Jay Lifton, *Home from the War* (New York, 1973), 241.
27. Edmund Wilson, "The Death of a Soldier," in *A Prelude* (New York, 1967), 186, 187.
28. Hoard Brotz and Everett Wilson, "Characteristics of Military Society," *American Journal of Sociology*, 51 (March, 1946), 374.
29. Raymond Wunderlich, *From Trench to Dugout* (Stockton, California, 1919), 64.
30. Alvin C. York, *Sergeant York* (Garden City, New York, 1928), 213.
31. Mary Paxton Keeley, "A.E.F. English," *American Speech*, 5 (1930), 375-376.
32. Douglas MacArthur, *Reminiscences* (New York, 1964), 46.
33. Ralph Linton, "Totemism and the A.E.F.," *American Anthropologist*, 26 (April-June, 1924), 296-303.
34. "Shoulder Insignia of Combat Divisions," *Infantry Journal*, 15 (April, 1919), 832-836.
35. Linton, 298.
36. *Ibid.*, 300.
37. Allen Churchill, *Over Here!* (New York, 1968), 88.
38. Brotz and Wilson, 374.
39. Lifton, 28.
40. Pottle, 4.
41. Melbert B. Cary, Jr., "Mademoiselle From Armentières," *Journal of American Folklore*, 47 (October-December, 1934), 371.
42. "Etiquette Talks for Doughboys," *Stars and Stripes*, May 24, 1918, 5.
43. York, 309.
44. "De Old Homme Forty," *The Martian*, February 16, 1919, 5.
45. Cary, 371.
46. *Ibid.*, 371.
47. John J. Pershing, *My Experiences in the World War* (New York, 1931), I, 317-318; John Winterich, ed., *Squads Write* (New York, 1931), 15.
48. "The Ol' Campaign Hat," *Stars and Stripes*, September 27, 1918, 4.
49. "The New Uniform," *Stars and Stripes*, October 4, 1918, 4.
50. "A Picture Without a Title," *Stars and Stripes*, February 15, 1918, 1.
51. Lawrence Stallings, *The Doughboys* (New York, 1963), 5; H. L. Mencken, *The American Language* (New York, 1921), 370.
52. Henry Elkin, "Aggressive and Erotic Tendencies in Army Life," *American Journal of Sociology*, 51 (March, 1946), 408.
53. For doughboy slang I have relied on Elbridge Colby, *Army Talk* (Princeton, 1942); Arthur Guy Empey, *Over the Top*, (New York, 1912); Keeley; Howard O'Brien, *Wine, Women and War* (New York, 1926); Mencken; C. Aphonso Smith, *New Words Self-Defined* (Garden City, New York, 1920). Keeley's understanding is quite crabbed because she never heard language stronger than "hell" while overseas.
54. The British "Jerry" was more common. "Hun" was used in writing but probably not in conversation. Keeley relied on oral usage for her glossary and claims "Hun" was not heard; Keeley, 379.
55. Keeley, 379.
56. Henry Berry, *Make the Kaiser Dance* (Garden City, New York, 1978), 183.
57. Mencken, 369. Wilson subsequently lost the manuscript.
58. Keeley, 382-386.
59. Colby, 132.
60. Chester D. Heywood, *Negro Combat Troops in the World War* (Worcester, Massachusetts, 1928), 9.
61. Cited in Jan Harold Brunvand, *The Study of American Folklore*, 2nd ed. (New York, 1968), 167.
62. Berry, 411.
63. *Ibid.*, 238.
64. Cary, 373.
65. Berry, 409.
66. Cary, 371.
67. Atcheson L. Hatch, "Communal Composition of Ballads in the A.E.F.," *Journal of American Folklore*, 34 (January-March, 1924), 386.

68. Berry, 409.
 69. Cary, 369.
 70. Arch Whitehouse, *Heroes and Legends of World War I* (Garden City, New York, 1964), 181.
 71. Paul Fussell, *The Great War and Modern Memory* (New York, 1975), 115-123.
 72. Charles MacArthur, 106, 143; [Robert J. Casey], *The Cannoneers Have Hairy Ears* (New York, 1927), 166; Hervey Allen, *Toward the Flame* (New York, 1926), 110; Frederick Trevor Edwards, *Fort Sheridan to Montfaucon* (Deland, Florida, 1954), 250.
 73. John Ellis, *Eye-Deep in Hell* (New York, 1976), 190.
 74. Leed, 35.
 75. Pottle, 88.
 76. Slater Washburn, *One of the YD* (Boston, 1919), 10, 11.
 77. Wunderlich, 17.
 78. Frank P. Sibley, *With the Yankee Division of France* (Boston, 1919), 58.
 79. John Winterich, ed., *Squads Write* (New York, 1931), 4.
 80. O'Brien, 127.
 81. Wunderlich, 19.
 82. Sibley, 92.
 83. Wunderlich, 20.
 84. *Ibid.*, 20.
 85. Frederick P. Todd, "The Knife and Club in Trench Warfare, 1914-1918," *Journal of the American Military History Foundation*, 2 (Fall, 1938), 139.
 86. Whitehouse, 104.
 87. John Keegan, *The Face of Battle* (New York, 1976), 264.
 88. Allen, 185.
 89. Keegan, 255.
 90. George C. Marshall, *Memoirs of My Service in the World War, 1917-1918* (Boston, 1976), 197.
 91. O'Brien, 96.
 92. William Langer, *Gas and Flame in World War I* (New York, 1965), xviii.
 93. Edwards, 137.
 94. *Soldier's Progress*, 11.
 95. Dixon Wecter, *When Johnny Comes Marching Home* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1944), 174.
 96. "He Was Going Home an American," *Trench and Camp* (Camp Kearney, California, 1918), 141.
 97. Wecter, 173-174.
 98. "Our Military System as it Appeared to America's Citizen Soldiers," *Infantry Journal*, 15 (April, 1919), 771-787.
 99. Wecter, 320.
 100. "The Legion Today," *American Legion Weekly*, June 4, 1919, 10.
 101. "What is the American Legion," *American Legion Weekly*, July 18, 1919, 11.
 102. Marcus Duffield, *King Legion* (New York, 1931), 18.
 103. Erikson found that shell shock came from a loss of ego identity in World War II but that a sense of identity was often enhanced in highly trained or special units, 62.
 104. S. M. Schneider, "The Culture of the Army Clerk," *Psychiatry*, 9 (December, 1946), 292, quoted in Mandlebaum, 45.