A Case Study of Transnationalism: Continuity and Changes in Chinese American Philanthropy to China

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A result of transnational migration, transnationalism is defined as “the process by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origins and settlement.” As such, transnationalism is inevitably altered and reshaped by new and emerging trends in immigrant experiences in the age of globalization. This is reflected clearly in the development and transformation of Chinese American transnationalism, which has entered a distinctively new phase as an outcome of cultural, political, and socioeconomic forces that have profoundly changed the makeup and dynamics of the Chinese American community since the 1960s. On the one hand, globalization, especially the rapid emergence of trans-Pacific migration and economic networks, has turned Chinese America into an increasingly transnational community. For one thing, because of continuing immigration, Chinese Americans have become a predominantly immigrant community: more than 70 percent of the three million Chinese Americans today were born in Asia while 90 percent of the immigrants arrived within the past 30 years. On the other hand, however, the civil rights movement and multiculturalism, coupled with their improved socioeconomic status, have helped integrate Chinese Americans more fully into mainstream U.S. society than at any other time in history. Such a dual change—that they have become simultaneously a transnational migrant community and a highly integrated American domestic
ethnic group—has added new dynamics to Chinese American transnationalism and inevitably altered its trends. Consequently, Chinese American transnationalism today has shifted from a near-exclusively ethnic basis to an ethnically inspired civic one. The change and continuity in Chinese American transnational philanthropy to China in recent decades are a case in point.

**Introduction**

Like their counterparts from other parts of the world, Chinese immigrants in North America have long been involved in philanthropic giving to their ancestral land. Together with contributions from other overseas Chinese (Huaqiao) communities, they have helped finance public welfare projects, social charities, and disaster relief in China. During one single fiscal year (July 1937-June 1938), for example, overseas Chinese donations to China totaled more than 43.6 million yuan (around $14.5 million). Such a large scale of giving has had an enormous impact on Chinese society, especially on traditional Qiaoxian (hometowns of overseas Chinese) in the Pearl River Delta in Guangdong Province and the Xiamen area in Fujian Province. Historically, it was the influx of money from overseas Chinese that transformed Qiaoxian into remarkably “modern” societies and made them quite different from other regions of the Chinese countryside. For example, in the late 1890s while kerosene lamps fueled nearly all artificial light throughout China, villagers at Meixi in the Peal River Delta used electricity thanks to generators bought by Chen Fang (C. Afong), a wealthy Chinese merchant from Hawai‘i. Until the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, over 90 percent of advanced public services at Xiamen, such as telephone and telegraph companies, electricity, and running water, resulted from donations or investment by overseas Chinese.

More significantly, financial contributions from overseas Chinese have played pivotal roles in China’s social and political development since the late nineteenth century. The Xinhai Revolution (1911), May 30th Movement (1925), Northern Expedition (1926-1927), and China’s Anti-Japanese War (1937-1945) all benefited from financial support by overseas Chinese, including those from the United States. Between June and December of 1911, for example, Zhigong Tong, a popular semi-secret society with branches all over Chinatowns in North America, alone collected more than $400,000 in donations to support the anti-Manchu uprising at the critical moment. In fact, it was the generosity and enthusiasm of overseas Chinese in contributing to the struggle to topple the Qing Dynasty that led Dr. Sun Yat-sen to say: “Overseas Chinese are the mother of the Chinese revolution.”

What are the characteristics of Chinese American transnational philanthropy? What is the nexus between Chinese American transnational politics, cultural life, and business practice and their giving to China? What has changed in their giving patterns over the years to transform it beyond narrow Chinese ethnocentric nationalism? In what ways do their philanthropic activities
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reflect changes in Chinese America in the age of globalization? What policies and organizational arrangements has China adopted to facilitate overseas Chinese giving? How do different generations and groups of Chinese Americans participate in giving to China? Does Chinese American philanthropy help ameliorate U.S.-China relations? And, finally, how can we understand their giving to China from the perspective of Chinese American transnationalism?

As the Chinese American experience has entered a new stage of development and as the U.S.-China relationship gains more prominence in the post-Cold War era, these are the questions that scholars and the general public will inevitably ask. This article will suggest some answers to these questions. It examines various factors that lead Chinese Americans to give to China and explores the development of and changes in Chinese American transnational philanthropy in order to better understand an important aspect of Chinese American transnationalism that thus far has not been adequately addressed.

Background of Chinese American Transnational Giving to China

Although individual Chinese migration to North America can be traced to the eighteenth century, it was not until the Gold Rush years of the mid-nineteenth century that Chinese immigration was large enough to impact American society. There were 325 Chinese forty-niners. Three years later, 20,026 Chinese had arrived in San Francisco, known as the “Big Port” among the Cantonese.9

As peasants from rural regions in Guangdong, early Chinese immigrants maintained strong loyalties and attachments to their native land because of the “sojourner mentality” in traditional Chinese culture. Such a mentality can be summarized in a dictum: “Luoye guigen” (“Falling leaves return to their roots”—meaning a man who resides away from his birthplace would eventually return to his ancestral land). Thus, many dreamed of returning home once they were able to make enough money. It is no accident, then, that they were actively involved in giving to their hometowns in China.

Chinese immigrants also carried with them a cultural heritage that advocates philanthropic giving as a vital part of spiritual life. They had long learned from religious teaching, philosophical moral imperatives, and stories of benevolent gentries and compassionate scholars that philanthropic giving could help “purify” an individual’s soul. Perhaps this is why in traditional Chinese folklore, popular heroes all dedicate their wealth and fortunes to the poor of their native places.10 Influenced by traditional culture and motivated by pragmatic considerations, Chinese immigrants in the United States felt an obligation to help the folks they had left behind. Despite the harsh conditions they encountered in the strange land, many started to give to their hometowns in China as soon as they saved some money in the “Gold Mountain.”11

Although few early Chinese immigrants made fortunes and were able to donate much, some did succeed in America and made substantial donations to
their homeland. Among them, Yung Wing (1828-1912) was a prominent figure. Brought to America by missionaries in 1847, he graduated from Yale College in 1854, and later became a naturalized U.S. citizen. A friend of President Ulysses S. Grant and writer Mark Twain, Yung made an important contribution to the development of early U.S.-China relations during his service as Co-Commissioner of the Chinese Educational Mission to America in the 1870s. He also set a record for diaspora philanthropic giving to China when he donated 500 taels of silver (around $500) to build a Western-style school in his hometown, Nanping Village in Zhongshan (Xiangshan) County in 1871. Named “Zhenxian” (Truly Benevolent), the school, according to Chinese documents, was the first public welfare project financed by immigrants in modern Chinese history. In fact, Chinese Americans funded the establishment of most of the elite missionary schools in Guangdong in the late nineteenth century, such as Peiying High School (1882), Lingnan University (1888), Peidao Women’s School (1888), and Peizheng High School (1889).

Chen Fang (C. Afong, 1825-1906) and Chen Yixi (Chin Gee Hee, 1844-1929) are two other prominent examples of early Chinese American philanthropic giving to China. Chen Fang, who emigrated to Hawai’i in 1849, made an enormous fortune in trade and sugar plantation business and later married a young woman from the royal family of Hawai’i. Throughout his life, he donated to numerous public welfare projects, including schools, hospitals, and social charities, in Guangdong. Because of his generous donations, he was twice honored by the Qing Emperor with the title Leshan haosh, meaning “Benevolent and Dedicated to Philanthropy.” After his death, the Guangdong provincial government erected a monument to commemorate his philanthropic contributions. Similarly, Chen Yixi, a successful Chinese American businessman in San Francisco, distinguished himself among overseas Chinese in giving to China. When he eventually retired to his hometown in Taishan in 1904, he raised $2.75 million from overseas Chinese to build the Xinning (Sunning) Railway in the Pearl River Delta. It was the first major railroad in the region and benefited Guangdong’s economy until it was seized by local warlords in 1926 and eventually destroyed during the Anti-Japanese War in 1938.

Furthermore, from the very beginning, Chinese American giving to their homeland had a sharp political edge—to “save the motherland and to modernize China.” Because they gained little support from the Chinese government in their struggle in the new country, Chinese immigrants attributed their hardships, especially the racial discrimination they encountered in American society, to the weakness of their motherland, and they believed that a strong China could help them improve their fate in the United States. Noticeably, African Americans at this time also attributed the plight of Chinese immigrants in part to the absence of a powerful homeland to protect them. To some extent, such a view was not baseless, especially when compared to America’s reception of Japanese immigrants around the turn of the twentieth century. The relatively more favorable
treatment Americans gave to Japanese immigrants contrasted sharply to the prejudice against Chinese. While reasons for this phenomenon are doubtlessly complex, a critical factor seems to be Japan’s emergence as a world power and its increased international prestige. As a result, Japan was able to protect the interests of its immigrants in America. This was clearly reflected in the “Gentlemen’s Agreement” reached between Tokyo and Washington in 1907. By contrast, Chinese immigrants received little support from a China weakened by deteriorated social and economic conditions and foreign invasions. As Wu Tingfang argued emotionally in an interview with white reporters in New York in 1901: “Why can’t you be fair? Would you talk (to me) like that if mine was not a weak nation?”

Consequently, Chinese immigrants widely shared the view that a strong and progressive China would help win their acceptance in American society. This intense desire to reform China undergirded Chinese American giving to their homeland. Even poor Chinese laundrymen would identify China’s fortunes with their own and believe that a powerful motherland would benefit and protect them in America. This explains why when asked by Chinese leaders for donations to help China, Chinese immigrants would respond enthusiastically even though many of them lived in poverty. Such politically motivated donations were reinforced with the rise of Chinese nationalism during the anti-Manchu revolution launched by Dr. Sun Yat-sen at the turn of the twentieth century.

Political donations reached another climax when China fought Japan’s invasion during the 1930s and early 1940s. Between 1937 and 1945, Chinese Americans donated more than $25 million to help China’s war against Japan, an enormous amount of money in those years. In October 1938, for example, San Francisco’s Chinese community gave more than $530,000 to the Air Force Funds set up by the Chinese government to solicit donations for purchasing planes during China’s war with Japan in the 1930s. Other studies reveal that in 1939 alone, overseas Chinese contributions to China, including both donations and remittances, totaled 1.1 billion yuan (around $350 million), accounting for 61 percent of China’s defense budget that year.

Aware that the overseas Chinese were a valuable financial resource, successive Chinese leaders and governments actively solicited contributions from abroad. Dr. Sun Yat-sen, a native Cantonese who grew up in Hawai‘i, was instrumental in obtaining financial support from Chinese Americans during the anti-Manchu revolution. The Kuomintang (KMT) government, after it was formally established at Nanjing in 1927, set up a special cabinet-level Qiaowu weiyuanhui (Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission) to cultivate and manage relationships with overseas Chinese. Over time, KMT built up a vast network among Chinese communities abroad. Weng Shaoqiu, who was sent by the KMT government to help edit Chinese-language newspapers in Canada in 1944, recalled vividly how KMT sponsored various Chinese media in America in order to promote its influence in local Chinese communities.
Similarly, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has understood well the giving power of overseas Chinese and has competed with KMT for support in America’s Chinatowns. Some veteran CCP leaders themselves were well connected with Chinese Americans. Zhang Wentian, for instance, worked as an editor for Tatong Daily, a progressive Chinese newspaper in San Francisco’s Chinatown as a student at the University of California, Berkeley, from 1922 to 1924.\textsuperscript{20} Liao Chengzhi was born in an overseas Cantonese family deeply rooted in the Chinese community in Hawai’i.\textsuperscript{21} Tang Mingzhao, nominated by Beijing as Deputy Secretary General of the United Nations in the early 1970s, had been a community activist in New York’s Chinatown before his return to China in 1950. His daughter, Tang Wensheng (Nancy Tang), who served as Chairman Mao Zedong’s personal interpreter during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), was born in New York and is currently Vice Chairman of Qiaolian (All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese), one of China’s five major organizations responsible for overseas Chinese affairs.\textsuperscript{22}

During the Yenan era (1935-1948), donations from overseas Chinese often were the only Western support available to the Communists. Yenan’s kindergarten for Party cadres’ children, for example, was named the “Los Angeles Kindergarten” because the facility was paid for by the Los Angeles’s Chinese community.\textsuperscript{23} As early as in 1942, under Mao’s proposal, the CCP established an “Overseas Affairs Committee” to implement missions among Chinese abroad. In order to show his concern for overseas Chinese affairs, Mao gave much advice on how to carry out work among Chinese abroad and win their support, and wrote the personal inscription “Overseas Chinese should get united to support the revolution at home and improve their status abroad” for Yilianhui (Chinese Hand Laundry Alliance of New York) at its fifth anniversary in April 1938.\textsuperscript{24}

It is not surprising then, that after founding of the People’s Republic in 1949, China (PRC) quickly set up an official organization, later named Qiaoban (Overseas Chinese Affairs Office), in its central government to formulate policies on and develop relations with overseas Chinese. Headed by Liao Chengzhi, Qiaoban directed and supervised Beijing’s overseas Chinese affairs. It held the same status as that of the Foreign Affairs Ministry and enjoyed the privilege of direct access to Premier Zhou Enlai.\textsuperscript{25} During the following years, Qiaoban established both provincial and prefecture offices to carry out its work in China. It also had its own representatives in many Chinese diplomatic missions abroad. Such an organizational arrangement at home and abroad helps Beijing maintain close relations with overseas Chinese, reach local Chinese communities, and tap resources from overseas Chinese for political and financial support.

Of course, Chinese American donations to China after 1949 declined because of the hostility between Washington and Beijing. The U.S. government was vigilant about external money flowing into China and considered it support for an enemy country. For various reasons, most Chinese American community leaders also identified with Taiwan; and Chinatowns throughout North America
were dominated by pro-KMT forces until the late 1970s. As a result, channels of giving to China were almost non-existent between 1949 and the 1970s. While remittances from some Chinese Americans to their families and relatives in Qiaoxian continued through clan and hometown associations, other forms of financial support to China completely stopped.

This did not mean, however, that China ceased soliciting money from overseas Chinese in the 1950s. On the contrary, to break down the economic blockade imposed by the United States, Beijing stepped up efforts to obtain donations and remittances from overseas Chinese. Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, the Chinese government issued numerous decrees, documents, and instructions on how to attract overseas Chinese giving. In practice, Beijing gave many privileges and favors to family members of overseas Chinese. They were allowed to keep their houses and other personal property during China’s massive land reform (1949-1952) and were often exempt from participating in various manual labor tasks. They were also given some protection from radical movements, provided with quotas in purchasing special food and luxury goods in Huaqiao shangdian (Overseas Chinese stores), and received favorable consideration in their children’s education.

In order to claim legitimacy and expand networks among Chinese abroad, both China and Taiwan frequently invited overseas Chinese to visit their homeland, offered scholarships for the education of their children at schools in China and in Taiwan, and appointed prominent overseas Chinese leaders as representatives in their respective governments. Shitu Meitang (1868-1955), an eminent Chinese American leader, for example, served as a non-CCP member at the first CPPCC (Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference) held at Beijing in 1949. When Beijing convened its first National People’s Congress in 1954, it invited thirty overseas Chinese as representatives to attend the conference. Indeed, it is an irony that despite sharp differences in ideology, China and Taiwan share one thing: both are fully aware of the potential influence of overseas Chinese and have worked hard to court donations from and maintain their respective power base among the Chinese abroad. As Him Mark Lai, a Chinese American historian born in San Francisco, observes:

Successive Chinese governments have successfully wooed . . . [overseas Chinese] support, as evidenced by the large amounts which the Chinese abroad have donated to various causes in the mother country. . . . The home government also encouraged remittances and investments in China, much of which went towards modernization of the native villages of overseas Chinese. Other amounts were invested in enterprises both in their native areas and in other parts of China.
Such efforts have been beneficial. China has received various forms of financial support from overseas Chinese over the years. For example, remittances from abroad provided a major source of hard currency when the United States imposed economic sanctions on the newly founded People’s Republic after 1949. In Jinjiang City alone, remittances from abroad totaled around $160 million between 1950 and 1953, which substantially helped ease China’s financial trouble during that difficult time.  

China gradually moved to a radical phase after 1959 and eventually entered the Cultural Revolution in 1966. As Beijing became increasingly isolated from the outside world, it severed relations with overseas Chinese and its overseas Chinese organizations stopped functioning. The interests of overseas Chinese in China were seriously damaged: their properties were confiscated and their relatives persecuted. Naturally, their giving to China dwindled drastically. The only financial contributions from overseas Chinese to China during the decade-long Cultural Revolution were small remittances to family members in Qiaoxian.  

Changes that Facilitate Chinese American Giving to China since the 1970s

The late 1970s, particularly the year 1979, represented a turning point in overseas Chinese philanthropic contributions to their old country. Two historical events occurred in that year which significantly affected Chinese American giving to China. On January 1, Washington and Beijing finally normalized their diplomatic relations. The new relationship allowed Chinese Americans to “reconnect” with their loved ones and their hometowns in the old country and greatly opened the channels of giving to China. The end of 1979 saw another great change. In December, China convened a nation-wide working conference at Quanzhou near Xiamen to map out new policies to facilitate contributions from overseas Chinese. Soon afterwards, the Qiaoban system was fully restored as part of Deng Xiaoping’s strategy to attract investment and financial support from abroad for his new economic policies. Liao Chengzhi was reinstalled to head Beijing’s overseas Chinese affairs. After his death in 1983, his eldest son, Liao Hui became the new director of Qiaoban while Ye Fei, former Party Secretary of Fujian Province who was born in a Chinese family in the Philippines, took charge of China’s over-all policies and organizational arrangement regarding overseas Chinese. The new policies adopted by Beijing after 1979 greatly facilitated contributions from overseas Chinese to China. As a result, there was a substantial growth of remittances from overseas Chinese to Qiaoxian after 1979 (see Table 1).
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Table 1: Overseas Chinese Remittances to Two Counties in Guangdong Before and After 1979

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Taishan (Million)</th>
<th>Kaiping (Million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>$20.6</td>
<td>$12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>$22.7</td>
<td>$13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>$23.4</td>
<td>$23.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>$36.4</td>
<td>$25.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Financial contributions—both remittances and donations—from overseas Chinese have become an integral part of China’s economy since the late 1970s, particularly in Qiaoxian. In 1978, remittances from abroad accounted for 30 percent of Jinjiang’s GNP while donations from overseas Chinese amounted, in 1984, to around 85 percent of the total financial budgets of Taishan and Enping in Guangdong (see Table 2).

Table 2: Overseas Chinese Remittances and Donations to Three Cities in Qiaoxian

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>City/County</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Percentage of City Budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Jinjiang</td>
<td>Remittances</td>
<td>30 of Jinjiang’s GNP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Taishan</td>
<td>Donations</td>
<td>85.9 of Taishan’s Budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Enping</td>
<td>Donations</td>
<td>84.7 of Enping’s Budget</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Beijing has further revised and developed its overseas Chinese policies since the 1990s. For example, it has learned that not all overseas Chinese want to establish businesses in their hometowns. Many actually shy away from investing in their “old home” because they find it such a challenge to handle relations with local people, many of whom are family friends or relatives of overseas Chinese and are difficult to manage once hired. Some overseas Chinese also worry that if they set up businesses in their hometowns and make profits, they might be accused of exploiting poor and less fortunate folks. Thus, when they plan to invest in China, they prefer to build factories, especially if they are low-wage and labor-intensive sweatshops, in regions other than their hometowns. Studies also indicate that Chinese abroad today, particularly the post-1979 immigrants, no longer possess the same loyalty towards their
hometowns as did their predecessors, and their donations are likely to go to a wide range of projects and places in China.

The decline of hometown loyalty among new immigrants is caused by several interconnected factors. Unlike in the past, Chinese immigrants today are no longer peasant boys who had never left their villages in the Pearl River Delta before going abroad, but transnational migrants who have lived in various places in China prior to their settlement overseas. The massive political and socioeconomic reforms in China in the post-Mao era have pushed and pulled many Chinese, especially ambitious young men and women, from their hometowns to seek better job or education opportunities throughout China. As a result, most Chinese immigrants today have worked or studied outside their hometowns for significant amounts of time before venturing abroad. In this sense, they represent a sharp contrast to the old timers. Savvy and cosmopolitan, they do not possess the same emotional attachment towards their birthplace as village boys used to, and they are not bound by a sense of narrowly defined hometown loyalty; rather, they tend to identify with places in which they started their careers or began their education. That many PRC student immigrants in the United States have given money to their alma maters in China rather than to their hometowns is an outstanding example.

The profound changes in backgrounds and sensibilities of Chinese immigrants have prompted the Chinese government to adjust its existing policy and definition regarding overseas Chinese hometowns. Qiaoban officials in Guangdong, for example, have expanded the concept of “Cantonese” to include anyone who once studied, worked, or lived in the province prior to their settlement abroad. Obviously, this new and innovative concept aims at bringing greater investment and donations into the province from overseas Chinese.

Another example of such policy change is China’s extraordinary effort to woo former students and scholars who have settled abroad to return to their “old home.” As Migration News recently noted,

Since 1979, when the late leader Deng Xiaoping broke with China’s isolationist policy, more than 400,000 mainland Chinese students have traveled abroad for graduate study, but only 10 to 25 percent have returned. China is now trying to woo some of these Chinese graduates home. Many cities have buildings labeled hopefully in Chinese: “Returning Student Entrepreneurial Building.” Foreign science and technology degrees convey high social status in China, and some Chinese established in the US attempt to work in both the US and China.

The new strategy seems to have been working well, particularly during the recent economic recession in the United States. As Wang Yunxiang, Consul General of the PRC at San Francisco, concludes, “We think some Chinese engineers will
go back to China because they have been laid off here. . . . In comparison, the overall situation in China is very good.\textsuperscript{38}

Meanwhile, China has expanded its organizational arrangement for overseas Chinese work. As the list below shows, there are today five official and semi-official organizations and political bodies at the central government level that deal with overseas Chinese affairs:

1) \textit{Qiaoban} (Overseas Chinese Affairs Office): This is a cabinet-level department under the State Council. It is also the most comprehensive government organization to coordinate and supervise all kinds of work and policies related to overseas Chinese.

2) \textit{Qiaolian} (All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese): This is a semi-official body under the United Front Department of the CCP. It enjoys the same status as that of the All-China Youth League, All-China Women's Federation, and All-China Trade Union.

3) \textit{Qiaowei} (Overseas Chinese Committee): This is an organization under the National People's Congress.

4) \textit{Gang-Ao-Tai-Qiao weiyuanhui} (Hong Kong-Macao-Taiwan-Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission): This is an organization under the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

5) \textit{Zhigong} Party: This is one of China's eight officially designated "democratic parties" and is under the leadership of the United Front Department of the CCP. Its members are either returned overseas Chinese or students and scholars who came back after finishing their education abroad.\textsuperscript{39}

There is another major change in terms of Beijing's organizational arrangement regarding overseas Chinese. China has set up overseas Chinese affairs offices at grassroots levels throughout the country in recent years. The change responded to the reality that Guangdong and Fujian are no longer the only provinces that send large numbers of emigrants abroad. Overseas Chinese today come from almost all the regions in China,\textsuperscript{40} especially such urban centers as Beijing, Shanghai, and Nanjing. In some provinces, \textit{Qiaoban} also serves as a government organization to control not only overseas Chinese affairs but also issues related to Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan. Such an arrangement and streamlining of the organizations enable China to elicit more effectively and manage giving from abroad. In short, to meet its growing needs for economic development, China, both by desire and by necessity, has turned more active in soliciting support from abroad and become more flexible in handling and approaching Chinese diaspora philanthropy.

While the fast developing economy and social stability in China since the late 1970s have provided opportunities for diasporic Chinese philanthropy to the old country, the Chinese American community has also undergone dramatic changes. Its population has grown rapidly, its socioeconomic status has substantially improved, and the transnational nature of the community has provided additional impetus to its philanthropic activities to China. As a result,
the past thirty years have witnessed a significant increase in contributions from Chinese Americans to their ancestral land. Chinese sources indicate that there are now 3.6 million Americans of Chinese descent while U.S. census reports put the figure as around 3 million. This is because Chinese sources include ethnic Chinese from Southeast Asia who do not put “Chinese” on their census forms and recent illegal immigrants from China who are not always covered by the U.S. census. For example, about 40 percent of refugees from Vietnam and Cambodia are of Chinese descent. They identify themselves as Chinese in ethnicity and maintain close ties with their native places in China though they may not claim themselves as Chinese on their census forms. In addition, it is estimated that more than 500,000 smuggled Chinese from the PRC, especially from Fujian Province, have entered the United States since the 1980s. Not all of them are covered by U.S. census reports.41

Perhaps the most important change is that Chinese today are not only the largest Asian American ethnic group, but also mainly a first-generation community. Ever since the 1970s, immigrants have outnumbered the U.S.-born in the Chinese American community (see Table 3).

Table 3: Chinese American Population, 1940-2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Percentage Foreign Born</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>106,334</td>
<td>48.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>150,005</td>
<td>47.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>237,292</td>
<td>46.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>435,062</td>
<td>53.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>812,178</td>
<td>63.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1,645,472</td>
<td>69.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>3,003,086*</td>
<td>70.9*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


* Includes 144,795 respondents who checked the “Taiwanese” response category on the census questionnaire.

For Chinese American philanthropy, the numbers are only the tip of an iceberg. For one thing, while the Chinese American population has grown, its income level has also risen. The annual median household income of Chinese immigrants is 23 percent higher than that of the general U.S. population while the percent of Chinese immigrants who completed college education is twice as much as that of the larger society (see Table 4).
Table 4: Median Personal and Household Income and Percent of Educational Attainment by Chinese Immigrants, 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emigration Origin</th>
<th>Percentage of Bachelor’s Degree or More</th>
<th>Personal Income</th>
<th>Household Income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China (PRC)</td>
<td>46.7%</td>
<td>$25,000</td>
<td>$51,060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>51.9%</td>
<td>$38,090</td>
<td>$65,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>67.9%</td>
<td>$40,100</td>
<td>$65,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Population</td>
<td>24.4%</td>
<td>$21,587</td>
<td>$41,494</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Tabulated from Integrated Public Use Microdata Samples (IPUMS), 5% Data for 2000 U.S. Census, “China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan”; and Summary File 1 and File 3, U.S. Census Bureau, 2003.

In this respect, the arrival of large numbers of well-educated immigrants has had an impact on Chinese America. Unlike in the past, many recent immigrants from the Chinese world are highly skilled in terms of training and education, creating a striking distinction between the new and the old. Although there were Chinese students and scholars in the United States in the early years, not until the late 1940s did Chinese student immigration gain momentum. Between 1950 and the mid-1980s, nearly 150,000 students from Taiwan came to America for education and advanced training; a large majority of them stayed on in the United States after graduation. During the last two decades approximately 250,000 students and scholars from China studied in American institutions of higher learning. Most of them eventually settled in the United States, including more than 80,000 who adjusted their status under President George H.W. Bush’s Executive Order #12711 and “Act 106 Students-at-Large,” subsequently passed by Congress in 1990. Known as the “Chinese Student Protection Act,” the bill granted PRC citizens who entered the United States “after June 4, 1989 and before April 11, 1990” permission to stay. Adapting well to the American job market, these student immigrants have succeeded in their careers to an extent unimaginable among the earlier Chinese. The impact of so many affluent and professional immigrants on Chinese America is twofold: they have raised the giving ability of the community as a whole, and their knowledge of and familiarity with Chinese society provides another great incentive for Chinese Americans to donate to programs of their choice in China.

In general, the new immigrants have chosen to keep close ties with China. Their arrival in the United States has coincided with China’s opening up to the outside world in the post-Mao era, and they have been influenced by the powerful trends of globalization—the massive economic, technological, political, and socio-cultural changes that have occurred throughout the world in recent decades. As such, two parallel and interconnected developments have critically affected the growth of transnational linkages in Chinese America. One is the tremendous
increase in trade, finance, and other business activities between China and the United States, which has spun a rich and complex web of networking between Chinese Americans, especially new immigrants, and their family members and friends across the Pacific. Another is the reverse flow of large numbers of Chinese Americans, both immigrants and U.S.-born, who return to their native land to start businesses or are hired by U.S. companies to manage local offices in China. According to Zhuang Guotu, a prominent scholar on overseas Chinese studies, among those who run foreign companies and businesses at Beijing, 50 percent are of Chinese descent. Many of them are Chinese Americans. Ping K. Ko, a former professor of microelectronics at UC Berkeley who now runs a high-tech venture capital company in China, comments,

It used to be that if you went to the U.S., it was “By-by, see you when you’re 65.” But opportunity now is worldwide. [Working in China] is no different than working in California and looking for job opportunities in Texas.

Because they maintain their involvement in both societies, these Chinese American migrants have carried with them a network of connections that enhances the flow of capital, entrepreneurial talent, and philanthropic activities between the two countries.

Chinese America’s growing philanthropy is also a result of the huge amount of Chinese capital flowing into the United States. Stories about the average Chinese immigrant family bringing assets of $200,000 to the United States are obviously exaggerated. However, there is little doubt that the inflow of Chinese capital to North America from economically prosperous Chinese throughout Asia is indeed astounding, ranging from several billion to over $10 billion a year since the 1970s. According to a well-documented source, $1.5 billion of Taiwan’s capital wound up in the Los Angeles area alone each year between 1985 and 1990. Another study shows that while the Chinese population in the Los Angeles County has grown six times between 1970 and 1990, the number of Chinese-owned businesses has increased more than 15 times, from 1,100 to over 16,600. The majority of these businesses are set up with Chinese capital from Asia.

The inflow of Chinese capital has not only expanded the size of the Chinese American economy; it also has helped establish a trans-Pacific Chinese network. Like their counterparts elsewhere, profit-driven Chinese American entrepreneurs have demonstrated considerable enthusiasm in the China market. They see that China’s stunning transformation from a centrally planned economy into a free market set off an economic explosion that has provided extraordinary investment opportunities. They believe that they can take advantage of their Chinese heritage to reap huge profits from such a rapidly growing economy. Those who carry on trade with or invest in China naturally wish to develop relations with Beijing
through means such as philanthropic contributions because close ties would enable them to benefit from the available opportunities in the China market. In other words, the emergence and development of the trans-Pacific migration and business networks have transformed Chinese America into an increasingly transnational community, raising its interests in giving to China. As a result, diaspora Chinese philanthropic contributions to China, including those from Chinese Americans, have grown significantly since the 1970s. This is clearly reflected in a report on the economic development of Jinjiang City in Fujian Province.

As mentioned earlier, Jinjiang, with a population of 1.07 million, is one of the best-known traditional Qiaoxian in China, and it has continued to send large numbers of emigrants in recent years. During the period between 1991 and 1995, for example, 35,523 of its residents settled abroad legally. Since 1979, there has been a dramatic increase in donations from overseas Chinese to Jinjiang (see Table 5).

Table 5: Donations from Overseas Chinese to Jinjiang, 1949-1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Donations (RMB in Millions)*</th>
<th>Average Donations Annually (RMB in Millions)</th>
<th>Percent Change Annually</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1949-1978</td>
<td>25.56</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979-1984</td>
<td>65.84</td>
<td>13.17</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985-1990</td>
<td>191.61</td>
<td>31.94</td>
<td>+240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991-1996</td>
<td>472.52</td>
<td>78.75</td>
<td>+250</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Tabulated from Yang, ed., Reform Policies and Overseas Chinese from Fujian Province, 213-216.

*The exchange rate between RMB and U.S. dollar has been around 8:1 since 1994.

The impact of such large financial contributions has been enormous. During the period between 1993 and 1995, donations from abroad to education amounted to about two-thirds of the total budget allocated for education by the Jinjiang Municipal Government. In 1995, taxes from businesses set up with overseas Chinese-investment reached 37.4 percent of Jinjiang’s entire revenues. Again, production by overseas Chinese invested businesses accounted for more than half of Jinjiang’s entire GNP in 1997. The financial impact of overseas Chinese has been instrumental in boosting dramatically the annual growth rate of Jinjiang’s economy, which averaged nearly 30 percent during the past 20 years, almost four times China’s national rate during the same period.

In fact, of the $336 billion foreign direct investment in China between 1980 and 2000, more than half comes from Chinese overseas. Chinese American capital ranked fourth largest among the $220 billion foreign investment in China by
1995, following Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia.\textsuperscript{50} This substantial influx of money demonstrates that overseas Chinese, including Chinese Americans, have played a critical role in China’s social and economic progress.

**New Channels and Changing Methods in Chinese American Giving to China**

While Chinese American philanthropic contributions to China have increased since the 1970s, they have also become highly diversified in terms of giving channels and methods. On the one hand, traditional channels of giving still exist and remain popular vehicles for Chinese Americans for donations to China, especially those with origins in old Qiaoxian. On the other hand, many new transnational Chinese American organizations have emerged to contribute, in one way or another, to China’s social, economic, and political development. In addition, Chinese Americans today are more likely to give money to mainstream U.S. institutions and designate it specifically for programs that directly or indirectly benefit China. Based on their funding patterns, giving methods, and other characteristics, we can divide Chinese American transnational philanthropy today into four major categories:

1. **Traditional Philanthropists:** These are mainly community organizations based in America’s urban Chinatowns such as various Cantonese clan and district associations and Fujianese lineage organizations. They also include individual Chinese Americans who prefer to give to China for traditional social charities through personal contacts.

2. **Mainstream U.S. Institutions:** These are nonprofit U.S. organizations that are heavily involved in China-related projects with significant donations from Chinese Americans. Many of these institutions are headed by Chinese Americans or have a large Chinese American membership.

3. **Chinese American Transnational NGOs:** These include various professional organizations and academic societies established by Chinese Americans with a mission specifically oriented towards China.

4. **“New Immigrant” Organizations:** These are mainly organizations founded by recent PRC immigrants such as transnational alumni associations or fraternities with hometown networks.

**1. Traditional Philanthropists**

Despite the lapse of time, traditional Chinatown-based clan and district organizations remain active in fundraising for China. Their donations, usually in modest amounts, are often collected informally and given through personal connections to a particular program or locality in China. In general, their giving intends to support public welfare programs, help disaster relief, or develop social charities in traditional Qiaoxian regions. Of course, donations from Chinatown-based clan and district organizations today, particularly for disaster relief, have also gone to non-Qiaoxian regions in China and benefited a wide range of...
different causes. For example, in 1995, *Sanyi* (Three-District) Association in San Francisco’s Chinatown, a traditional Cantonese hometown organization, donated $50,000 to the Chinese government to help flood disaster relief in Southeast China; and in 2001, it gave $30,000 to the Beijing Youth Performers Group when the artists had a serious traffic accident during their tour in the United States.\(^{51}\)

More significantly, the newly emergent trans-Pacific community and migration networks have strengthened links between the Chinese American communities and traditional *Qiaoxian* in China. For example, during Willie Wong’s term as Mayor of Mesa, Arizona, in the early 1990s, Kaiping, a town at the Pearl River Delta in Guangdong, became Mesa’s sister city. Several Chinese cities had sought an association in the United States, but Wong selected Kaiping because most Chinese in Mesa, including Wong, have family roots in that traditional *Qiaoxian* city in the Pearl River Delta. In the following years, Mesa has developed close relations with Kaiping. It has sponsored trade fairs for Kaiping in Arizona, exchanged official delegations, and established an English-language program at a Kaiping high school. The new network allows many local Chinese at Mesa to make financial contributions to their “old home,” including an entire school donated by a U.S.-born Chinese whose family originated from Kaiping.\(^{52}\)

Indeed, there has been a dramatic increase in single individual donations from Chinese Americans to sponsor educational programs, scholarships, and libraries in China. Yin Yanheng, an immigrant from Taiwan with extensive business operations in both China and the United States, for instance, has donated $10 million to help build the Guanghua School of Management at Beijing University. The school is named “Guanghua” because the donations mainly came from Yin’s Guanghua Education Foundation based in Hong Kong.\(^{53}\)

2. Giving Through Mainstream U.S. Institutions

Giving to China through institutions in mainstream American society has become a new and increasingly popular channel for Chinese Americans. There are two types of institutional givers. One is mainstream U.S. institutions with funds raised from Chinese Americans and earmarked for China-related projects. The other involves institutions with a large Chinese American membership or is headed by Chinese Americans who play an important role in missions of these institutions.

To have a greater impact, Chinese Americans today frequently make concerted efforts to work together or with institutions that have an interest in developing projects in China. The Hopkins-Nanjing Center in China sponsored by the Johns Hopkins University is a case in point. Launched in 1983, this joint venture was proposed by Qian Zhirong (Chih-Yung Chien). A Professor of Physics at Johns Hopkins and a special assistant to the university president at that time, Qian chose Nanjing University as host institution in China for the
program because of his father’s attachment to Nanjing. Since the joint venture was first initiated, many Chinese Americans have contributed to the program. Clyde Wu, a Johns Hopkins alumnus, is an example. During his service on the Board of the Hopkins-Nanjing Center, Wu donated $500,000 to the program. A cardiopulmonary specialist who graduated from the College of Physicians and Surgeons at Columbia University, Wu has also helped forge relations between Columbia and various leading medical schools at Hong Kong, Shanghai, and Beijing and has worked to promote cultural exchanges with China through the Michigan China Commission.

Richard Liu, a Taiwan-born Chinese American with strong ties to Texas, is another example. In 1998, he donated $1 million to the College of Business at the University of Texas at San Antonio to create the U.S.-China Business Education Initiative. The largest single donation at UTSA’s history, the fund supports research collaborations and joint programs between the College of Business and five top universities in China: People’s University, the University of International Business and Economics at Beijing, Fudan University, Shanghai Jiaotong University, and Tongji University.

In addition, Liu has sponsored many China-related cultural and educational activities with funding from the Liu Ranyuan Foundation, which is named after his late father. A member of the Board of the UC Berkeley Foundation, Liu has also donated to UC Berkeley to set up exchange programs with Chinese institutions. As a cultural affairs advisor to the Tianjin Municipal Government in China, Liu has worked with Chinese institutions to promote traditional Chinese arts and culture. Recently, he sponsored the Tianjin Cultural Festival in Belgium. It brought many rare Chinese antiquities to Europe for exhibition through the Liu Sino-European Foundation for Culture and Education in Belgium.

Born Liu Shangchien, Liu’s family originated in Henan Province in China. His early success began in 1973 in Texas, with Tandy Brands, a leather products company. Since then, Liu has created a thriving business empire, including a factory at Guangzhou and a company at Hong Kong. In 1998, Liu thought it was “payback time.” Of his gift to UTSA, Liu says, “I want my gift to help a new generation of business students in the United States and China realize their dreams.”

Charles Bing Wang is another major philanthropist in giving to China-related programs through mainstream U.S. institutions. Founder of Computer Associates, he was born in Shanghai in 1944 and emigrated to the United States with his parents in 1952. Wang established his company in 1976 and has developed it from a single product enterprise into a global company with a complete array of eBusiness solutions. Over the years, he has been active in charitable causes such as The Smile Train, Make-A-Wish Foundation, and the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children. In October 2002, he presented $40 million to establish an Asian and Asian American Studies Department and build a 120,000-square-foot Charles Bing Wang Center for Asian and Asian American Culture at SUNY, Stony Brook. It is the largest single private gift ever received
By the SUNY system. Of course, few Chinese Americans could afford to give such enormous amounts of money as Wang and Liu did, but many others have made their own contributions to mainstream U.S. institutions to support, directly or indirectly, various China-related programs. An anonymous Chinese American donor, for example, has consistently contributed from several hundred to a few thousand dollars annually to a scholarship for students to study Chinese languages at Arizona State University. He has also donated to the Center for Asian Studies and the Center for Asian American Studies at ASU, including a fund of $8,000 to help them purchase books in Chinese language. Similarly, Henry Fong, a businessman from Hong Kong, donated $65,000 to the University of Victoria in Canada for initiating an advanced course in Chinese language, supporting a visiting scholar in Chinese studies, and sponsoring student travel to China. Such giving from Chinese Americans, though modest, directly helps promote U.S.-China relations and indirectly benefits socioeconomic development in China.

Furthermore, Chinese Americans have headed or founded emerging mainstream U.S. institutions that are interested in giving to China. This is an entirely new phenomenon, reflecting the improved economic status of Chinese in American society because until recently, institutional contributors to China were usually major organizations directed by Caucasian Americans. In this sense, the rise of mainstream U.S. institutions led by Chinese Americans and interested in China-related programs represents a new trend in Chinese diaspora philanthropy. The Asia Foundation is a case in point.

With headquarters in San Francisco and 15 offices in Asia, the foundation makes more than 1,500 grants annually to government agencies and Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) in 31 Asia-Pacific nations. Several prominent Chinese Americans have served as officers or trustees of the foundation. They include Nancy Yuan, Vice President and Director of the foundation; the late Chang-lin Tien, Chancellor of UC Berkeley; William H.C. Chang, President and CEO of Westlake Development Company; Talin Hsu, Chairman of Hambrecht and Quest Asia Pacific; and Linda Tsao Yang, Special Advisor to Lombard Investments of San Francisco. The foundation has also received large donations from Chinese Americans such as Joseph Cai, William H.C. Chang, Anjun J. Jin, and Ailing Li. Collaborating with partners from both public and private sectors in Asia, the foundation has helped foster greater openness and the sharing of prosperity with Asia-Pacific nations. One of its recent projects has assisted local groups in South China to ensure that women workers have access to legal aid, health care, and better working conditions. It has also organized book donations to China’s educational programs. Under an agreement with the Ministry of Education of the PRC, it sent 160,000 volumes of books and research materials in 2002 to more than 1,000 colleges and universities throughout China.

China Foundation in Washington, D.C. is another example. Founded in 1997...
by Jane Hu, it aims to improve basic health services and elementary education in China's vast underdeveloped rural areas. While former President Gerald Ford serves as its honorary chairman, Hu heads the foundation's board and is responsible for international coordination, fundraising, program planning, and implementation of the organization's mission. The foundation has maintained strong ties with the Chinese American community, and several other prominent Chinese Americans have served on its board or as its chief officers. For example, the foundation's former President, Alfred Liu, and current President, Mark O.M. Tso, are both Chinese. The foundation operates with a minimum overhead budget because the board members and chief officers, who are responsible for daily operations, are volunteers.

As a China-oriented charity, China Foundation focuses on health care and education programs in rural areas in Northwest China, Inner Mongolia, and Tibet. In 1999, the foundation raised a total of $2.1 million, including contributions from the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and Charles Bing Wang Foundation as matching funds, to help Beijing activate loans from the World Bank for providing health care and building health centers in the poorest counties in China.

Another good example of a mainstream U.S. transnational NGO led by Chinese Americans is Bridge to Asia, a foundation committed to helping projects in architecture and planning, and to donating books to China. Since 1997, the foundation has given 5 million books to some 1,000 universities and colleges in China. Bridge to Asia is able to accomplish such an extraordinary mission because it has received donations from foundations, corporations, and agencies as well as from nearly 4,000 individuals, many of whom are Chinese Americans. With a $237,500 grant from the Freeman Foundation, Bridge to Asia is currently extending its support to higher education in China and Southeast Asia. In order to raise funds to purchase more books in law, medicine, architecture, and other fields, it plans to spread the costs over a greater number of donors and to build a website called DONORSCLUB which allows individuals to give scholarships directly to China and countries in Southeast Asia. It also solicits small donations from individuals throughout the world and aggregates the gifts to create grants from $500 to $1500 for individual students in China and Southeast Asia who have passed their college entrance exams but cannot afford to enter colleges because of financial difficulty.

Bridge to Asia is chaired by Tunney Lee, who graduated from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and later became a professor at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. Its Director Emeritus, S.S. Chern (Shiing-shen Chern), a world-renowned geometrician at UC Berkeley, has served as an informal advisor for the Chinese government on educational policies. Its vice president and program manager is Newton Liu, a BTA Board Member since 1987. A graduate from Jilin University in Northeast China with a Ph.D. from UC Berkeley, Liu supervises book projects and assists with the foundation's online programs.
Several foundation directors, such as Deborah Yang, are also student immigrants from the PRC. Its partners in China include the National Library and Information Committee for Universities and Colleges, the Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences, Xi’an Medical University, Tsinghua University, Dalian University of Technology, Qingdao Oceanography University, and Tongji University. Because of their familiarity with the Chinese higher education system, Chinese Americans have made Bridge to Asia a successful philanthropic organization in the China arena.\textsuperscript{64}

3. Chinese American Transnational NGOs

Another new channel of giving to China are the various professional and academic NGOs that are predominantly based in the Chinese American community and have contributed mainly to China. The 1990 Institute at San Francisco is a telling example. Founded in 1990 by a group of Chinese Americans who had strong ties with China, they shared the view that economic problems were the root cause of the Tiananmen Incident in 1989. The Institute’s executive committee members are mostly Chinese Americans, including C. B. Sung, Chairman of the Board; Hang-sheng Cheng, President; Rosalyn C. Koo, CFO; and Wei-Tai Kwok, William Lee, and Charles McClain\textsuperscript{65}, Directors at Large. The Institute’s honorary chairs, however, are mostly mainstream American dignitaries. They include Donald Kennedy, President Emeritus of Stanford University; Steven Muller, President Emeritus of the Johns Hopkins University; Robert T. Parry, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco; Robert A. Scalapino, a prominent China scholar; Harold T. Shapiro, President Emeritus of Princeton University; and Adlai E. Stevenson, former U.S. Senator (Illinois).\textsuperscript{66}

The 1990 Institute started with a meeting between Hang-sheng Cheng and C. B. Sung in November 1989. Cheng and Sung both left China in the 1940s to study in the United States. Cheng headed the Pacific Basin Program at the San Francisco Federal Reserve Bank until his retirement in 1989. Sung was vice president of a major U.S. corporation (Bendix) and, subsequently, a successful entrepreneur running his own company (Unison). As the partner of the first major U.S.-China joint venture, the Great Wall Hotel in Beijing, Unison later organized thirty-six joint ventures in the manufacturing sector in China.

After the Tiananmen Incident in 1989, Cheng teamed up ten economists in the United States with ten economists in China to create policy models for China, and then passed on the proposal to Sung. He took it to a meeting in February 1990 with his Chinese American fraternity because it was looking for a social service project to endorse for its eightieth anniversary at that time. Sung persuaded his fraternity brothers to adopt Cheng’s proposal and named the newly founded organization “The 1990 Institute.”

According to its mission statement, the objective of the Institute is to “enhance understanding of the economic and social problems that are impeding China’s modernization and to contribute to the search for their solutions—through
independent, objective, and policy-oriented research—for the benefit of the people in China, and peace and prosperity of the world.” As an action-oriented NGO, it sponsors in-depth studies on Chinese economy and organizes conferences to facilitate an ongoing dialogue between scholars in the United States and China. Since its founding in 1990, the Institute has organized, jointly with Chinese and U.S. partners or on its own, many activities and conferences. They include “Women, Leadership and Sustainability,” a forum to bring together women from China and the United States to share best practices and identify common concerns in the area of sustainable development; and “Bank Supervision and Bank Management,” an international conference held at Nanjing and co-sponsored by The 1990 Institute and the People’s Bank of China. On October 23, 1993, Sung and Cheng represented The 1990 Institute at the celebration of the 80th anniversary of China’s Western Returned Scholars Association in Beijing. Sung spoke to a crowd of 6,000 at the conference and presented the Institute’s first book, *China’s Economic Reform*, to President Jiang Zemin and Vice Premier Zou Jiakua. In that same year, a nine-member delegation from the State Economic and Trade Commission of China, hosted by the National Committee on US-China Relations, visited The 1990 Institute and the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. The delegation, led by Vice Minister Xu Penghang, spent two weeks learning about American entrepreneurship and the role of public and private institutions in promoting growth, quality, and productivity in U.S. business.

In addition, The 1990 Institute has published books and articles on China’s economic policies, including *China’s Economic Reform*, *Foreign Business Law in China—Past Progress and Future Challenges*, and *Fiscal Policy in China—Taxation and Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations*. These publications seem to have found receptive audiences among China’s top policymakers. For example, a leading Chinese economist reported in 1994 that then-Vice Premier Zhu Rongji had read the Institute’s *Issue Paper* (No.10), “Should China Tolerate High Inflation?” According to the economist, “Vice Premier Zhu . . . felt that this paper was very helpful and beneficial to this long-term problem and should be read by more people in the academic and economics circle.”

The accomplishment of The 1990 Institute highlights the expanding role that Chinese Americans are playing in transnational philanthropic activities. Of course, how much influence Chinese American transnational NGOs can actually have on China is debatable. In reality, to what extent Beijing’s leaders would adopt suggestions made by Chinese Americans depends on whether they truly share their views and concerns. The efforts made by Chinese American transnational NGOs such as The 1990 Institute in introducing Western theories and knowledge to China, however, have played an undeniable part and positive role in China’s development, and toward its leaders’ increased understanding of the outside world.

Furthermore, in recent years Chinese Americans have established a variety
of transnational scholarly organizations that have volunteered to teach and work in China for modest or virtually no financial compensation. Such a pattern of donating time, labor, and expertise to society has been recognized by studies of philanthropy as a legitimate method of donation.69 This method of giving has gained popularity, particularly among academic societies founded by student immigrants from the PRC. The Chinese Economists Society (1985), Association of Chinese Political Studies (1986), Association of Chinese Historians in the United States (1987), Association of Chinese Professors of Social Sciences (1995), Association of Chinese Scientists and Engineers (1996), and Overseas Young Chinese Forum (1999) are a few such examples. All are registered nonprofit organizations in the United States; are based on voluntary participation, democratic elections, and transient membership; and have actively engaged in organizing academic conferences on China and arranged teaching and lecture tours as well as other service-related activities in China.

Among these transnational scholarly organizations, the Chinese Economists Society (CES), with more than 750 transient members, is by far the most successful association because of China’s need for economic advice and CES’s extensive networks with Chinese institutions. That CES’s leaders during the 1989 Tiananmen Incident decided to keep a low profile on political controversies has also helped its activities in China. Throughout the years, CES has successfully organized many conferences on China’s development, provided consultation about economic policies for the Chinese government, and contributed to Beijing’s adaptation to a market economy. Some former members of the organization have even become China’s economic decision-makers.70

Despite its relatively short history, the Association of Chinese Professors of Social Sciences (ACPSS), has been actively involved in volunteer work in China. Its teaching program has been well received in China partly because of its extensive networks with Chinese institutions, and also as a result of Beijing’s renewed enthusiasm to expand academic ties with the outside world. For these reasons, ACPSS has gained institutional support from the Chinese government, and its teaching program has been quite successful. In 2002, for example, ACPSS organized a 14-member delegation and carried out a lecture tour to several universities in China, including those in the northwestern region.71

The Association of Chinese Scientists and Engineers (ACSE) is another independent, nonprofit academic transnational organization founded by student immigrants from China. Its mission is to promote friendship between the United States and China as well as to exchange professional information and experiences in science and technology. Over the past few years, ACSE has helped facilitate China’s communication with the West. For example, it co-sponsored the Business Information Session for Trade at Weihai in Shandong Province (2002), hosted the Zibo Municipal Government Delegation during its visit to the United States (2002), organized talks on investment environment and business opportunities in Suzhou Industrial Park (2002), sponsored the Business Financing and
Marketing Strategy Seminar and US-China Economic Development Forum (2002), and assisted the reception of the Suzhou Hi-Tech Zone Delegation during its visit to Chicago (2002). ACSE has also initiated fundraising campaigns for various traditional social charities in China. In 1996, for example, its division in the Phoenix area alone donated more than $40,000 to the flood disaster relief in Southeast China. 

The Overseas Young Chinese Forum (OYCF) is another new Chinese American transnational scholarly society. Its mission is to exchange ideas with China, facilitate cross-disciplinary dialogue, and popularize abstract ideas for the purpose of education and socioeconomic development in China. Its online journal, *Perspectives*, has both English and Chinese versions. Some of the articles that first appear in *Perspectives* are later published in OYCF’s affiliate journals in China. OYCF launched its teaching program in China in 2000 and received financial support from programs such as East Asian Legal Studies at Harvard and the U.S.-China Legal Cooperation Fund. Since then, OYCF members have made three teaching and research trips to the Law School of People’s University at Beijing, concentrating mainly on securities and corporate law. In January 2002, OYCF obtained a three-year grant from the Ford Foundation and received funding from several mainstream U.S. institutional and individual donors. As a result, OYCF has expanded its teaching to legal issues in the humanities and social sciences, and it set up eight teaching fellowships in China in the 2002-2003 academic year and four in the 2003-2004 year.

In summary, it takes an enormous amount of time and goodwill for Chinese American transnational academic societies to volunteer their teaching, consulting, and other services in China. Because they are often under-funded, these scholarly organizations have to rely heavily on donations of time, labor, and knowledge of their members. Serving as a crucial link between the United States and China, they have made unique contributions in promoting China’s social, economic, and political development.

4. “New Immigrant” Organizations

The past decade has also witnessed the rise of another new vehicle for Chinese American transnational philanthropy—organizations established by recent Chinese immigrants in the United States, especially alumni associations set up by student immigrants from the PRC. These new organizations have become powerful and effective vehicles for recent immigrants in giving to China. Of course, donations to one’s alma mater in China has long been a common practice among Chinese Americans. Robert Chang is such an example. A graduate from Shanghai Jiaotong University, Chang, after settling in the United State in the early 1950s, worked for Northwest Airlines, Merrill Lynch, and Morgan Stanley and became a successful businessman. While a student at Jiaotong, Chang benefited from financial aid from a relative. This experience inspired him to set up the Robert Chang Foundation, a family foundation based in the San Francisco Bay Area, to promote higher education in China by providing scholarships for
Continuity and Changes in Chinese American Philanthropy

financially disadvantaged students. Together with Give2Asia, an independent U.S. nonprofit organization established by the Asia Foundation, they provided 38 scholarships in 2002 for mostly first-year students at Chang’s alma mater, and will provide 76 new scholarships while continuing funding for current recipients.\(^7^4\)

In contrast to the Robert Chang Foundation, however, the transnational alumni associations established by recent student immigrants from the PRC represent a different and unique pattern of giving. China’s elite universities such as Beijing University, Tsinghua University, Nanjing University, Fudan University, Zhejiang University, and the Chinese University of Science and Technology all have large numbers of alumni in the United States thanks to their academic prominence, large size, and long history of sending graduates to study abroad. Alumni associations of these elite universities in the United States—some are newly established while others have been reinvigorated in recent years—collect donations from their members and earmark the money for their universities in China. Among them, the USTC (University of Science and Technology of China) Alumni Foundation is especially noteworthy because of its relatively long history and efficient fundraising.

Founded in 1995, USTC Alumni Foundation claims to be the first alumni network organized by student immigrants from the PRC. It is a nonprofit organization whose mission is to coordinate efforts of USTC alumni in America to help establish scholarships and research funds at USTC and make the institution a world-class university. Currently located at Landenberg, Pennsylvania, the foundation has branches across America with a special donation account in China. All its officers are elected and work as volunteers. They make independent decisions on how USTC should use alumni gifts, give detailed instructions on various methods of giving to the foundation, and publicize all donations online. Thus far, 2,170 USTC alumni in the United States have donated money to their alma mater, ranging from a few dollars to $34,500, given by Xinyu Zou in July 2000; some of the alumni have donated thousands of dollars to the foundation annually. The foundation has also received matching grants for employee donations from Intel, Microsoft, Abbott Laboratories, Adobe Systems, and Amoco. Aiming to reach a membership of 5,000 and establish assets of over $1 million, USTC has collected $441,181 as of Nov. 21, 2004, and channeled more than half of the fund to the alma mater in China.\(^7^5\)

Beijing University Education Foundation (BUEF) is another well-organized new alumni association established by Chinese student immigrants in America. Unlike USTC, it was founded under the auspices of Beijing University, not as an alumni organization outside China. BUEF members can make donations for general and unrestricted use or designate their gifts to a specific program at Beijing University. The foundation states explicitly, however, that the use of donations by Beijing University must be consistent with BUEF’s tax-exempt status as approved by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service.

To celebrate the founding of BUEF, Xu Zhihong, President of Beijing
University, headed a 12-member delegation, which attended the ceremony on April 14th, 2001, and then made a ten-day fundraising tour throughout the United States. In the following two months, many alumni donated money to BUEF, ranging from $20 to $11,895. Although most donations are moderate, BUEF’s fundraising methods are new and unique, reflecting the influence of the American system on student immigrants from China. For example, BUEF has clearly spelled out its by-laws, publicized donation details, made contact persons and information available, and established bank accounts in multiple locations.\textsuperscript{76}

Such practices are completely different than fundraising campaigns organized by PRC student immigrants in the past. In those campaigns, recognition of donors was sporadic and transient, and the public had no knowledge of how the donations were used. There were widespread scandals, for example, about the abuse of funds during the 1989 Tiananmen Incident, which undermined the incentive to give for many Chinese Americans. In this sense, the professionalization of these transnational alumni associations increases transparency in giving.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{Donations from Selected PRC Alumni Associations in the United States}
\begin{tabular}{llll}
\hline
Institution & Alumni in the U.S. & Total Giving from the U.S.* & Largest Single Donation \\
\hline
Nanjing & 4,500 & $1,500,000 (2003) & $1,000,000 \\
Beijing & 10,000 & $64,379 (2001-02) & $11,895 \\
USTC & 2,170 & $441,181 (Nov. 21, 2004) & $34,500 \\
Zhejiang & 2,000 & $208,815 (1996-99) & $50,000 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

Source: Quoted or calculated from publications and websites of these alumni associations.\textsuperscript{77}

* The figures include direct donations by alumni in the United States to their institutions in China.

Despite their successful organizational strategies, however, these Chinese American transnational alumni associations have not yet raised large amounts of money (see Table 6)—perhaps because they are still new and most alumni are relatively young. Moreover, individual alumni tend to donate directly to their alma mater in China. Yang Dandan (Dan Yang), alumna of Nanjing University, is a case in point. In 2002, she gave $1 million directly to Nanjing University to build a post-doctorate studies complex at Nanjing. This is the largest single donation ever made by any PRC student immigrant in North America. The building is named after her late father, a biology professor of Nanjing University, who died of cancer during Yang’s study abroad.\textsuperscript{78} Similarly, Xiong Xiaoge, senior vice president of IDG (International Data Group), donated
one million RMB ($125,000) in 1996 directly to his alma mater, Hunan University, to establish student scholarships.\textsuperscript{79} Ding Shaoguang, a successful artist and head of the Beijingers Association in Southern California, gave 400,000 RMB ($50,000) to the Beijing Institute of Arts in 1992 to establish a foundation in memory of his mentor, the late Professor Zhang Guangyu, at the institution.\textsuperscript{80} Tom Y. Tang and his wife Jane, both alumni of Zhejiang University, contributed more than $50,000 directly to their alma mater to serve as part of the Zhu Kezheng Education Fund, a foundation set up in the name of the past president of Zhejiang University.\textsuperscript{81}

In addition to various alumni associations, recent immigrants from the PRC are known for founding new and fraternity-style associations based on their hometown origins. Beijing Tongxianghui (Beijingers Association), Nanjing Tongxianghui (Nanjingers Society), Shanghai Tongxianghui (Shanghai Club), and Daxinan Tongxianghui (Southwestern Regional Association of China) are a few such examples.\textsuperscript{82} While their records and the amounts of their donations to China are not always available, many of the societies appear to be highly successful in fundraising, thanks to their extensive networks for China-related philanthropic activities. When an earthquake hit the Nijiang area in Yunnan Province in 1996, for example, Zhong Meng, then-President of Southwestern Regional Association of China, initiated a fundraising campaign in the Chinese community in Southern California that collected $1.5 million for disaster relief.\textsuperscript{83}

Of course, China had not welcomed all donations from Chinese American transnational NGOs. This is especially true in the case of Chinese American religious and human rights organizations. According to Fanggang Yang’s well-documented study, 24 percent of Chinese Americans today are Christians, and they have contributed to a wide range of causes in China, in part because of the efforts among Chinese churches in the United States. Most Chinese American churches have “mission funds,” which cover disaster relief, education, and other programs in China. Some have endowments specifically set up for religious efforts in China while others have extensive connections—both officially approved and underground—with Chinese churches. Through these channels, Chinese American Christians help church members in China in their religious activities and in improving their daily lives.\textsuperscript{84}

Since the 1980s, many Chinese American Christian organizations have also mobilized Chinese Americans to teach English in China. They dispatch young men and women to remote interior regions in China to teach English and spread the gospel. The Culture Renewal Research Center (CRRC), based in Vancouver with a large branch in the United States, is an example. Led by Thomas Leung (Liang Yancheng), an evangelist-scholar, it has sent funds to some of the poorest counties in China to improve living conditions of teachers and students there.\textsuperscript{85}

\section*{Conclusion}

The new generations of Chinese Americans, including both recent immigrants as well as those from more established backgrounds, have
demonstrated an extraordinary ability to network across the Pacific. The channels of their philanthropic giving to China have been expanded from donations motivated by personal contacts or clan and hometown organizations in America’s traditional urban Chinatowns to broader and more professional networks based both in mainstream U.S. society and transnational Chinese communities. Furthermore, Chinese American donations today have moved from funding social charities and public welfare projects in old Qiaoxian regions to benefiting a wide range of new programs throughout China. In general, their financial contributions have helped enhance the political, social, and economic development of their ancestral land and played a significant role in China’s progress towards modernization. In this sense, the changes and continuity in Chinese American philanthropy to China can be viewed as an exemplary illustration and epitome of the unfinished process of Chinese transnationalism, especially as it has been transformed from an ethnic-based network of trans-border relationships into a civically inspired process that crosses geographic, economic, cultural and political boundaries between nations in the age of globalization. It is against this background that when Maxine Hong Kingston, a U.S.-born daughter of Cantonese immigrants, comforts her mother over the loss of their “old home” in the Pearl River Delta, her comment also symbolizes the changed status of Chinese American transnationalism: “We belong to the planet now, Mama. Does it make sense to you that if we’re no longer attached to one piece of land, we belong to the planet? Wherever we happen to be standing, why, that spot belongs to us as much as any other spot.”

Notes
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1. Linda Basch, Nina Glick Schiller, and Christina Szanton Blanc, Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments, and Deterritorialized Nation-States (Langhorne, Pa: Gordon and Breach, 1994), 7. The authors further argue that, influenced by transnationalism, immigrants “take actions, make decisions, develop subjectivities and identities in embedded in networks of relationships that connect them simultaneously to two or more nation-states.”

2. In addition, census reports show that nearly half of all the Chinese immigrants in the U.S. arrived in 1990s. See Integrated Public Use Microdata Samples (IPUMS), 5-percent 2000 U.S. Census data, “China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan.”

3. “Overseas Chinese” is a direct translation of the Chinese term “Huaqiao.” It has been used widely since the early twentieth century to refer to Chinese who live abroad, including both immigrants and foreign citizens of Chinese descent. Because it has subsumed a number of different categories, the term has generated much controversy. Wang Gungwu, the doyen of overseas Chinese studies, for example, suggests that the term be replaced with the “Chinese overseas” or “diasporic Chinese.” For discussions on the definition of “overseas Chinese,” see Wang Gungwu, China and Chinese Overseas (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1991); and Tu Wei-ming (ed.), The Living Tree: The Changing Meaning of Being Chinese Today (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994).
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5. The vast majority of early Chinese immigrants to America originated from Guangdong Province in South China. In fact, until the late 1940s, more than 80 percent of the Chinese in America came from five counties around the provincial capital, Guangzhou (Canton), in the Pearl River Delta. Similarly, people in Xiamen and its surrounding areas in southern Fujian have a long history of emigration abroad, especially to the Philippines and countries in Southeast Asia. A 1987 study shows that more than 1.24 million overseas Chinese originated from Jinjin city, which today has a population of only 1.07 million. See Yang Xuling, ed., Gaige kaifeng yu Fujian huaren [Reform Policies and Overseas Chinese from Fujian Province] (Xiamen: Xiamen University Press, 1999), 213; Xiao-huang Yin, Chinese American Literature since the 1850s (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2000), 12-52.


8. Quoted in Feng, History of Overseas Chinese, 137.


11. Chinese immigrants have used as a nickname for the United States "Gold Mountain," because of the nineteenth-century Gold Rush in California and the nation's image as "a land of opportunities."


15. Although the U.S. government was more considerate of Japanese feelings, especially after the Russo-Japanese War (1905-1906), in the popular mind, after 1880, Chinese immigrants were seen as less of a threat than the Japanese. In general, however, the Japanese were better received than other Asian immigrants until the 1930s when strong anti-Japanese sentiment in American society emerged. See Roger Daniels, Concentration Camps, North America: Japanese in the United States and Canada during World War II (Malabar: Robert E. Krieger, 1989), 1-25; Yin, Chinese American Literature, 2000, 11-52.


17. One source further estimated that around 10 percent of the 1.1 billion yuan contributions were donations while the rest were remittances. See Him Mark Lai, Cong huaqiao dao huaren [From Overseas Chinese to Chinese Americans] (Hong Kong: Joint, 1992), 296-302; Chen Gongchun and Hong Yonghong, Chen Jiagen xingchun [A New Biography of Tan Kah Kee]
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20. Zhang Wentian served as CCP’s General Secretary (1935-1942) and was a politburo member as well as PRC’s Executive Vice Foreign Affairs Minister until 1959. Tatong Daily (1902-1927), founded by Tang Qongcang, the first Chinese American lawyer, was known for its support to Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s republican revolution in the early twentieth century. Mei and Zhang, A History of Overseas Chinese from Five Counties in Guangdong Province, 207-208; Wang Linyu, Zhang Wentian yu Liu Yin [Biographies of Zhang Wentian and His Wife] (Beijing: Zhongyan wenxian, 2002), 10-11.


27. For more information on this issue, see Zhuang Guotu, Huang Qiu, and Fang Xiongpu, eds., Shiijizhijiao de haiwei huaren [Ethnic Chinese at the Turn of the 21st Century] (Fuzhou: Fujian renmin, 1998), 230; Zhuang, The Relationship between Overseas Chinese and China, 244-281; Li, et al., eds., A History of Guangdong Province, 326.

28. Shitu Meitang, a legendary Chinese American figure, was born in Kaiping in the Pearl River Delta, immigrated to the United States at the age of 14. In 1894, he founded Anliang Tong, which became one of the largest Chinatown organizations in North America with more than 20,000 members. Later, he was elected as the “Big Brother” of the Tong for 44 years (1905-1949). Shitu Meitang, a legendary Chinese American figure, was born in Kaiping in the Pearl River Delta, immigrated to the United States at the age of 14. In 1894, he founded Anliang Tong, which became one of the largest Chinatown organizations in North America with more than 20,000 members. Later, he was elected as the “Big Brother” of the Tong for 44 years (1905-1949). Shitu Meitang, a legendary Chinese American figure, was born in Kaiping in the Pearl River Delta, immigrated to the United States at the age of 14. In 1894, he founded Anliang Tong, which became one of the largest Chinatown organizations in North America with more than 20,000 members. Later, he was elected as the “Big Brother” of the Tong for 44 years (1905-1949). Shitu Meitang, a legendary Chinese American figure, was born in Kaiping in the Pearl River Delta, immigrated to the United States at the age of 14. In 1894, he founded Anliang Tong, which became one of the largest Chinatown organizations in North America with more than 20,000 members. Later, he was elected as the “Big Brother” of the Tong for 44 years (1905-1949).

29. For changes in Beijing’s overseas Chinese policies after the late 1950s, see Zhuang, The Relationship between Overseas Chinese and China, 244-281; Li, et al., eds., A History of Guangdong Province, 326.


33. For changes in Beijing’s overseas Chinese policies after the late 1950s, see Zhuang, The Relationship between Overseas Chinese and China, 244-281; Li, et al., eds., A History of Guangdong Province, 326.


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scholar visa but later adjusts to immigrant status.

36. Interviews with government officials and scholars in Beijing and Guangdong, June and December 2002. I have interviewed a wide range of Chinese and Chinese Americans in the course of conducting my research. Most of the interviewees wish to remain anonymous, however. For more information on the issue, also see Zhuang, The Relationship between Overseas Chinese and China, 369-391.

37. http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn. For detailed information on China’s new policy about returned students, see Shenzhou xuren [Chinese Scholars Abroad], 135 (May 2001). Shenzhou xuren, a monthly magazine published in Beijing, is China’s official organ on policies and services related to returned overseas students. It is available on website at www.chisa.edu.cn.


40. For example, the U.S. census data show that Cantonese account for only a tiny fraction—around 8 percent—of immigrants from China in 2000. See U.S. Census Bureau, IPUMS, 5-percent data, “China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan.”


42. Because census studies often undercount illegal immigrants from China, the percentage of foreign-born Chinese in the United States is probably much larger than recorded in the census reports.


47. The transnational nature of Chinese family and clan networks makes it difficult to pinpoint exact amounts of Chinese American giving to China. For example, a wealthy Chinese American scholar, who is the author’s friend, has never donated anything to his hometown in Guangdong although he has frequently given money to a wide range of programs in the United States. His brothers and sisters, who reside in Hong Kong and in countries in Southeast Asia but share with him their family properties in North America, however, have given large amounts of money to their hometown over the years. For general information on overseas Chinese family networks and their impact on Chinese communities abroad, see Alhwa Ong and Donald M. Nonini, eds., Ungrounded Empires: The Cultural Politics of Modern Chinese Transnationalism (New York: Routledge, 1997), 3-36; Zhuang, A Study of Hometowns of Overseas Chinese, 22-28.


49. Ibid., 9, 19, 41, 76, 137-138. Also see Yang, ed., Reform Policies and Overseas Chinese from Fujian Province, 213-221.

50. The transnational nature of Chinese family and clan networks also makes it difficult to obtain precise figures on Chinese American investments in China. For more information on this
54. Interviews in summer 2002 with faculty members at Nanjing University who were involved in the development of the Center. Also visit www.nanjing.jhu.edu.
55. Wu has also donated generously to a variety of projects and various institutions, including Columbia University, Art Gallery at Yale University, and Chamber Music Society of Detroit. For more information on Wu’s donations, visit www.sais.jhu.edu/Nanjing/partnerships/sponsors.shtml and www.columbia.edu/cwu/secretary/trustees/bios/Wu.html.
56. http://business.utsa.edu/giving/
59. Zhiyong Lan’s interviews with librarians at the Center for Asian Studies at Arizona State University, March 2003. The anonymous donor seems to be an old man with the family name “Wu.”
62. Hu served as Health Scientist Administrator at the Division of Research Grants, National Institutes of Health, between 1978 and 1997. She has also helped found two national networks to promote active participation of Asian Americans in politics—the Asian American Voters Coalition (1983) and National Republican Asian Assembly (1987) (http://www.chinafoundation.org/).
64. Charles McClain, a legal historian, is author of In Search of Equality: The Chinese Struggle Against Discrimination in Nineteenth-Century America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994). His wife is a third-generation Chinese American.
73. www.give2asia.org/brief_china.htm.
74. www.ustcaf.org/donation/rec.
76. USTC has the most open documentation of its U.S. donations, but access to donation information of other Chinese institutions is not always easy. However, because many of the elite Chinese universities are older than USTC and have more alumni in the United States, their alumni donations are perhaps larger than the USTC’s.
77. A graduate of the Physics Department of Nanjing University in 1988, Yang Dandan (Dan Yang) is currently Chairman and CEO of Dowslake Venture, USA. See Nanda xiaoyu [Nanjing University Alumni Magazine], 18 (Summer/Fall, 2002), 52. Also visit http://dowslakemicro.com/corporate.html.
78. TV interview with Xiong Xiaoge, North American TV Program, CCTV, summer, 1996. Xiong is also listed as Vice President of the Hunan University Alumni Association (http://xyh.hnu.net.cn/xyhdongtai/dabiaoodahuihaokai.htm).
80. www.tju.edu.cn/.
81. Daxinan Tongxianghui (Southwestern Regional Association of China) was founded in Los Angeles in 1995 by immigrants from China’s southwestern regions, including Sichuan, Yunnan,


85. E-mail correspondences with Yang. Also visit www.errchina.com.


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