

# Democracy, Development and the Monroe Doctrine in Richard Harding Davis's *Soldiers of Fortune*

Gretchen Murphy

A famous but possibly apocryphal anecdote describes an 1897 telegram exchange between artist Frederick Remington and his employer, newspaper editor William Randolph Hearst. Remington supposedly cabled from Cuba, where he was on assignment, to report, "Everything is quiet. There is no trouble here. There will be no war. I wish to return." And Hearst supposedly responded, "Please remain. You furnish the pictures and I'll furnish the war." This often-repeated anecdote, apocryphal or not, illustrates not only Hearst's sensationalism and bravado but also the power of culture to influence politics. Hearst's journalism may not have directly "furnished" the Spanish American War, but the anecdote still retains its appeal, perhaps because it suggests the power of representation to shape public consciousness and opinion, and the power of public opinion to influence foreign policy and military decisions. This power, impossible to quantify or definitively prove, was undoubtedly wielded by Richard Harding Davis, Remington's partner, who stayed and reported on conflicts between Cuban insurgents and the Spanish after Remington ignored Hearst's response and returned home.

The articles sent back by Davis, one of the most celebrated journalists of this era,<sup>1</sup> depicted proud rebels gunned down by ruthless firing squads and genteel Cuban women strip-searched by the crude Spanish, standard sensational fare for Hearst's jingoistic *New York Journal*. But interestingly, these reports of

doomed heroism and feminized victimization strongly resembled the fictional stories of Latin American adventure in Davis's best-selling novels, a resemblance that complicates the interactions commonly perceived between representation and real life, culture and politics. Davis based his fiction on what he observed as a journalist, but what he observed as a journalist was perceived and narrated through the writer's famous romantic and dramatic ideals, a circular relationship that makes Davis a striking figure through which to explore the interactions of culture and politics in U.S. foreign policy at the turn of the twentieth century.<sup>2</sup>

Indeed, recent critics of Davis's swashbuckling romance *Soldiers of Fortune* (1897) often point to its role in "prim[ing] the national psyche for the collective adventure in Cuba" and read Olancho, the imaginary nation that provides the setting for *Soldiers*, as loosely based on the island.<sup>3</sup> This article will consider the ways in which this novel both reflected and influenced debates about U.S. foreign policy. But instead of looking for a causal relationship between Davis's fiction and the Spanish American War, I will situate Davis's novel in a debate about an issue perhaps less violently explosive but more symbolically crucial to the course of U.S. empire: the status of the Monroe Doctrine at the turn of the century. In doing so, I hope to demonstrate and explore the discursive interaction of this fictional story with the conceptions of U.S. national identity that Davis was both influenced by and was significantly revising as he wrote *Soldiers of Fortune*.

Monroe's 1823 message stating that "by the free and independent status that they have assumed and maintain, the American continents are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for further European colonization," was never intended as doctrine, but by the late 1890s its status was secured as a sacred national tradition and cherished text, akin to the Declaration of Independence or Washington's Farewell Address. To follow the Monroe Doctrine was to adhere to a perceived tradition of anti-colonialism and isolation. Yet how one followed it was uncertain; its application at the turn of the twentieth century was a matter of debate, especially as questions about freeing Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines from the Spanish Empire arose. Was the Doctrine an injunction to protect only existing Latin American democracies, as Monroe stated, or would its spirit condone active intervention to liberate American peoples from Spanish rule? Did it confine the United States to its "home" in the Western Hemisphere, or did it encourage the nation to propagate democracy in the Pacific as well? Disagreements over the answers to these questions led both Democrats and Republicans in their 1900 presidential campaign platforms to claim their party's superior loyalty to the Doctrine, making its proper interpretation a major campaign issue as the country divided over the right of the United States to take possession of Philippines.<sup>4</sup>

Turn-of-the-century writings on the Doctrine thus afford a view into Americans' efforts to reconcile their perceived tradition of anti-colonial isolation with

the beginnings of extra-continental empire. Davis's *Soldiers of Fortune*, which was to become the third best-selling novel of 1897, crucially participated in these efforts, discursively responding to and shaping public perceptions of these questions through its romantic narrativization of U.S.-Latin American relations. The exact influence of Davis's novel over policy makers, however, cannot be causally traced; my argument is rather that through his widely-read novels he shaped a public discourse about the Monroe Doctrine and U.S. national identity that would in turn inform the decisions of policy makers. Dexter Perkins, whose history of the Monroe Doctrine's development from 1823-1906 remains the standard account, puts this issue of culture and causality into relief. Writing in 1927, Perkins asserts that a definitive statement of the authorship of the Doctrine is impossible because its power

lies in the fact that it expressed what many men, great and humble were thinking, and were to think in the future. The ideas that it set forth were in the air. . . . [T]he American people have, again and again, found something that appealed to their deepest instincts and traditions in its language, and to this fact the words of 1823 owe their influence.<sup>5</sup>

The Monroe Doctrine, Perkins acknowledges, does not have a concrete origin in the writing of Monroe or in the subsequent statesmen and diplomats who revised that idea. Rather, Perkins states that its influence comes from a broadly experienced reaction between language and individuals' "deepest instincts," a formulation that suggests the complex causal power of culture in the ascendancy of the Monroe Doctrine. To maintain the possibility of his historical project, Perkins proceeds, as scholars must do, by limiting his focus according to disciplinary conventions and by tracing a series of statements by policy elites who cited, reinterpreted or implemented the Monroe Doctrine. But to study its development through ideas that are "in the air" rather than in the correspondence and papers of "great men" requires us to call on the methodologies of cultural criticism and study the powerful images and narratives that writers like Davis created.

Davis became perhaps undeservedly known as an expert on the Monroe Doctrine two years prior to his trip to Cuba for Hearst, when his 1895 *Harper's New Monthly* article on the role of the Monroe Doctrine in a border conflict in Venezuela coincided with Grover Cleveland's presidential message on the same subject. Cleveland's speech, by suggesting that the nation might go to war to protect the Monroe Doctrine if a fifty-year-old quarrel about the border between Venezuela and British Guiana was not mediated, brought the status of the Doctrine to national attention. Davis's article (which would be revised as part of his 1896 travel narrative, *Three Gringos in Venezuela and Central America*) anticipated Cleveland's speech when he recommended that "there never was a

case when the United States needed to watch her English cousins more closely and announce her Monroe Doctrine more vigorously than in this international boundary dispute.”<sup>6</sup> As Davis wrote in a letter to his brother, “several of the papers have jokingly alluded to the fact that my article on the Venezuela border conflict inspired the President’s message.” Although such an influence was unlikely, Davis admitted that the article “was a very lucky thing and is greatly quoted and in social gatherings I am appealed to as a final authority.”<sup>7</sup>

But Davis’s journalistic comments on the Venezuela border crisis said little to suggest a coherent resolution of the difficult question of the Doctrine’s application. Arthur Lubow, Davis’s biographer, sarcastically quips that if the article established Davis as an authority at social gatherings, his friends must have had a “feeble grasp of foreign policy.”<sup>8</sup> The *Harper’s* article took a vague stance in the U.S. intervention, and its confusion was intensified when Davis revised the piece for *Three Gringoes*, leading a reviewer of the day to express regret that Davis had decided to include discussion of the Monroe Doctrine in his book at all, “because he evidently has only heard there is such a thing, and labours patiently to extract some profound thoughts about it.”<sup>9</sup> If Davis’s journalism on the subject was flawed by weak logic and empty rhetoric, his fiction made a far more significant contribution to public debates on the meaning and application of the Monroe Doctrine. Davis had just sold *Soldiers of Fortune* to Scribner’s as a serial when Cleveland issued his message to Congress, and gathering local color for the novel was in fact the reason for Davis’s travels through Central America and Venezuela.

By suggesting that *Soldiers* responded to public debates on the status of the Monroe Doctrine, my argument questions the assumption that Davis’s setting of Olancho, a fictional country on the northwest coast of South America, stood in for Cuba in Davis’s imagination. However, neither am I insisting that Davis geographically located Olancho to hint that it was simply a fictionalized Venezuela. It seems more likely that Olancho, described by one of Davis’s characters as “one of those little republics down there” is an amalgamation through which Davis constructs a general mythic relation between the United States and its southern neighbors. Rather, I insist that the historical context of the Venezuelan border conflict is significant because the crisis over the Monroe Doctrine that it sparked is at the thematic center of Davis’s novel. *Soldiers of Fortune* not only generated enthusiasm for U.S. intervention in Cuba; the novel also narratively resolved larger conflicts over imperialism and the global role of the United States inside and outside of the Western Hemisphere.

As Davis wrote to his brother after Cleveland’s 1895 message on the Venezuela border crisis, New Yorkers were consumed with interest in the subject:

You never saw anything like the country after [Cleveland’s] war message. . . . Everybody talked of it and nothing else. I

went to a dinner of 300 men all of different callings and I do not believe one of them spoke of anything else. Cabmen, car conductors, barkeepers, beggars and policemen. All talked of war and Venezuela and the doctrine of Mr. Monroe.<sup>10</sup>

One reason that Cleveland's 1895 message caused such remarkable excitement was an exchange of letters he appended to it. The letters were the lively correspondence between Cleveland's secretary of state, Richard Olney, and the British foreign minister, Lord Salisbury: Olney's somewhat swaggering and righteous interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine, countered by Salisbury's condescending dismissal of it, created a dramatic exchange that sparked fervent expressions of patriotism when reprinted in newspapers. However, this excitement quickly died down, and as war fever cooled, some raised questions about the strict interpretation of Monroe's hemispheric binary between democracy and monarchy that Olney argued in his letters. "Europe on the whole is monarchical," Olney writes to Salisbury in one; "America, on the other hand, is devoted to exactly the opposite principle."<sup>11</sup> This was undoubtedly the basis of Monroe's 1823 message, but that binary to many Americans had begun to seem obsolete. Olney claims that while the Eastern and Western Hemispheres are thus destined to remain separate, a friendly alliance between North and South America was determined "by geographic proximity, by natural sympathy, [and] by similarity of governmental institutions."<sup>12</sup> But whether looked at geographically, culturally, or politically, these supposed bonds between the Americas seemed to some an ideal of the past.

Lord Salisbury did not hesitate to point out problems with the application of early-nineteenth-century ideas to late-nineteenth-century politics. Monroe's apprehension of the Holy Alliance's monarchism had been valid in 1823 when he spoke against future European colonization in the New World, Salisbury granted; at that time many thought it possible that Spain would use its allies to help recapture its recently lost South American colonies and squelch the spread of democracy in the Americas. But in worrying that Great Britain would expand its empire in South America by annexing part of Venezuela, Olney was now perceiving "imaginary dangers." The British foreign minister reminded Olney that "Great Britain is imposing no 'system' upon Venezuela and is not concerning herself in any way with the nature of the political systems under which the Venezuelans may prefer to live."<sup>13</sup> Such a statement might not have been entirely accurate for the sizable populations of Venezuelans inhabiting the large territory in question, but for some Americans it seemed quite correct that the Venezuelans were not in danger of losing personal liberties to British government, especially in light of the corruption of Latin American politics that writers like Davis were pointing out. European powers, no longer autocratic monarchies, were seldom thought to be endangering *democracy* in the New World at the turn of the century. In fact, their interests in South America—to invest capi-

tal, extract raw materials and gain markets—appeared to many as not so different from those of the United States. Rather than viewing the United States and Great Britain as pitted against one another in a clear-cut struggle of democracy versus monarchy, it became more common to view the nations as competing in their efforts to secure foreign markets for goods and capital.

The fragility of the binary between New and Old Worlds was more readily apparent in 1900 in part because many U.S. citizens had begun to believe that some version of extra-continental imperialism (whether it was merely economic or included varying degrees of territorial annexation) was vital to the prosperity of the United States, if not the advance of “civilization.” According to Olney, again stating Monroe’s 1823 arguments, the United States was vitally interested in the cause of popular self-government and guided by the belief that democracy was “the healing of all nations, and that civilization must either advance or retrograde accordingly as its supremacy is extended or curtailed.”<sup>14</sup> But while Olney here links the advance of “civilization” directly to the advance of democracy, this formulation would be complicated by what had come to be perceived as more immediate racial and economic factors.<sup>15</sup> Scholar John W. Burgess responded to Olney’s letter in a *Political Science Quarterly* article titled “The Recent Pseudo-Monroeism,” charging that fighting the British would be a “fratricidal war” working *against* the progress of liberty and civilization. Burgess complained that “public opinion” usually perceives the British Empire as “a gigantic system of land robbery” that prospers by stealing the wealth of its colonies, when in fact “the lands taken were wildernesses, the peoples made subject were barbarians, and the wealth acquired was created by British enterprise and capital employing and paying for labor which had before lain dormant.”<sup>16</sup> Burgess displaces empathy with the decolonized with contempt for the uncivilized. As Charles Dole, father of the Hawaii pineapple magnate, explained in an *Atlantic Monthly* article on the Doctrine, despite past sympathy for liberated Spanish colonies, “it would be hypocrisy to claim to-day that our people are seriously concerned over the[ir] troubles. . . . We are apt to say that they are unfit to govern themselves.”<sup>17</sup>

From this racial perspective, Olney’s championship of democracy against monarchy seemed utterly naïve. One writer designated only as “An American Business Man,” summed up this objection in the title of his 1903 article in the *North American Review*: “Is the Monroe Doctrine a Bar to Civilization?” The American Business Man argues that by preventing European political interference in South America, enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine was in effect preventing European capitalists from making the investments necessary to “civilize” the volatile region. Preventing new colonization to protect democracy meant sheltering barbarism. The area’s volatility supposedly resulted from the racial composition of its militaristic ruling class, described by the Business Man as a mixture of Spanish, Indian and Negro blood. This ruling class exploited the “docile and easily managed” peasantry and extorted foreign capitalists, and these peasants and capitalists would both be denied democratic liberties until South

American governments were under the strict control of a world power. Whether that world power be Britain or Germany or the United States was unimportant; for the American Business Man, “civilization” was defined by primarily race and economics. Without the intervention of a world power—intervention that the Monroe Doctrine prohibited—capitalist enterprise in South America would fail, and without the “civilizing” forces of capital and whiteness, its foundering democratic political systems would continue to succumb to corruption. The Business Man warns, “nothing except capital invested in these countries by American, English and German business men stands between them and the utter blackness of barbarism.”<sup>18</sup>

Scientific discourses of racism buttressed this newly-forged alliance between U.S. and European missions to civilize. Historian Stuart Anderson has argued that the Venezuelan border conflict catalyzed the rising movement for Anglo-Saxonism precisely because the notion of taking the side of the Venezuelans against the British offended these emerging configurations of racial identity.<sup>19</sup> Monroe called the newly-independent republics of South America “our brethren” in 1823, but in 1898 Anglo-Saxonist and pioneer sociologist Franklin Giddings expressed thanks that “at last we recognize our [British] kinsmen over sea as our brethren and as our co-workers in the tasks of civilization.”<sup>20</sup> Monroe had claimed that the safety of the newly-formed United States would be protected by preserving democracy in South America, but Dole observed that American liberties would be *more* secure “if Germany were by some magic to fill South America as full of sturdy German people as Canada is now full of friendly English.”<sup>21</sup> This new perception led some to the conclusion that U.S. identification with South American republics had always been misguided: Monroe had simply hoped for democratic behavior and civilized qualities that South American peoples were racially incapable of developing.

The national identity expressed in these formulations shifts from geography to genealogy. Archibald Cary Coolidge, whose 1906 *The United States as a World Power* was one of the inaugural works of U.S. diplomatic history, elaborated on what might be called a racial re-location:

Educated Americans know not only that the United States is nearer in almost every way to Europe than to South America, but that the average American has more in common, not with the Englishman alone, but with the German, the Frenchman, or the Russian than with the Mexican, the Peruvian, or the Brazilian. This has, indeed, always been true; but it was less realized at a time when it seemed possible to divide civilized peoples into two categories,—those who were ruled by irresponsible authority and those who enjoyed self-government. Such a division is now out of date, and race feeling, on the contrary, is more active than ever.<sup>22</sup>

Coolidge's racial "re-location" describes a shift in both spatial and racial perceptions of proximity. Not only does he point toward the new significance of "race feeling," but he closely links it with a reconsideration of hemispheric spatial constructions, which became less important in this turn toward genealogy.

Olney's 1895 letter to Salisbury claimed that the Monroe Doctrine rests upon "facts and principles that are both intelligible and incontrovertible": for example, the "3000 miles of intervening ocean" that separated England from South America, making any cross-Atlantic union "unnatural and inexpedient."<sup>23</sup> But this concern with distance seemed obsolete at the dawn of the twentieth century, when a steamer trip from New York to London took a fraction of the time of a trip to most parts of South America. The idea of two divided hemispheres, always an artificial geographic construct, began to show its seams under changing global conditions. Monroe's geographical conception of the world in 1823 did not account for advancing technology, or for U.S. interests in the Pacific, or for what Coolidge called in 1906 "the growing tendency among all nations to be interested everywhere."<sup>24</sup> It divided the world into discrete hemispheres, but, as early diplomatic historian Albert Bushnell Hart concluded, "there really was no such separation in 1823, and every year draws the ends of the earth closer together."<sup>25</sup> This globalizing tendency resulted from both economic and technological changes, including what historians have described as a move toward "informal" or commercial empire emphasizing markets and trade routes over the political domination of large expanses of territory.<sup>26</sup>

But while technology and commerce were drawing the ends of the earth closer together, these centripetal forces of modernity made certain kinds of divisions as well. The United States was being "drawn closer" to Europe as well as to South America and Asia, but being drawn into the European political and economic core as an equal and being drawn toward the South American and Asian periphery as a commercial power were different processes, enabled by different forms of racial and national identification and disidentification. The reconfiguration of the capitalist world system and the movement of the United States toward its core required U.S. citizens to revise national sympathies that the Monroe Doctrine expressed for South America. In place of Monroe's radical division between east and west, monarchy and democracy, the turn of the twentieth century brought a more pronounced division in the conceptual location of the United States between north and south, civilization and "barbarism."

Yet despite these criticisms, the Monroe Doctrine maintained its power to compel public opinion. The reasoning of the American Business Man did not triumph in this discursive battle, because bound up with the Monroe Doctrine was a compelling exceptionalist national identity. The Doctrine's ability to hold together a fragile fiction of U.S. anti-colonialism despite a history of national expansion made it difficult to outgrow and reject, even in the face of such obvious geographic, political and economic changes. When anti-imperialists such as Charles Francis Adams, Andrew Carnegie and Carl Schurz publicly embraced the Doctrine, they created not only an argument against future imperialism, but



a claim to the mythic purity of U.S. origins—a national history free from aggressive expansionism, a Western Hemisphere removed from European-centered politics.<sup>27</sup> This emotional investment in the Doctrine explains, for example, Christian Science founder Mary Baker Eddy's tribute to the Doctrine on its centennial in 1923: a full page ad in the *New York Times* testifying the "I believe in God, the Constitution and the Monroe Doctrine." And it was this sense of tradition that explains why, as Dexter Perkins pointed out, by 1933, "all parties pa[id] lip-service, at least" to the Monroe Doctrine.<sup>28</sup>

However, the Doctrine's ascension in these years was by no means a victory for anti-imperialism, as students of U.S.-Latin American relations well know. In the twentieth century the Doctrine came to be synonymous with exploitation of Latin America, a legacy hinted at in Olney's claim that the United States had a right to intervene in Venezuela because it was "practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon subjects to which it confines its interposition."<sup>29</sup> Instead, the Doctrine's ascension offers an example of how exceptionalist ideologies were sustained in an era of changing national identity and shifting global economy. The Doctrine evolved through these debates as a policy that could adhere to a sense of tradition by locating the United States in "its" hemisphere and avoiding the overt language of the empire, yet still authorizing a global role for the United States. Policy statements like Theodore Roosevelt's 1904 Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, quite explicitly "updated" the Monroe Doctrine and affirmed its place in the popular mind as well as foreign policy.

But just as important were changes taking place "in the air," as Perkins wrote, in the larger discourse of U.S. national identity and global location, changes enacted through, in many cases, popular novels like Davis's *Soldiers of Fortune*. Without explicit mention of the Doctrine, a political issue that enhanced his early career, Davis's novel reconstructs a coherent national narrative by linking the supposedly exceptional past with a mobile, progressive future, by reconciling the tradition of New World difference with new racial and economic relations among the United States, South America and Europe. In other words, his novel updates the Doctrine to reconcile perceptions of U.S. tradition with global destiny. While statements by policy makers undoubtedly had more direct power to effect foreign policy, Davis's imaginative work revised the cultural narratives that made reasoning like Roosevelt's possible and compelling. In *Soldiers* Davis is not constrained by merely logical arguments. The semiotic systems that he sets up—of tradition versus modernization, New World democracy versus U.S. empire—are bound together by a story of romance and heroic individualism that invites reader identification in a personal search for coherence and fulfillment.

*Soldiers of Fortune* tells the story of Clay, a rugged-yet-dashing engineer hired by an American capitalist named Langham to run the Olancho Mining Company. The plot is romantic, but hardly simple: Clay falls in love with

Langham's eldest daughter, has a crisis of identity and falls for the younger daughter, whom he marries in the end, after an adventure that saves Olancho and the mines from the hands of both revolutionaries and monarchists. Driving both the romance and adventure subplots is Clay's search for self, which is bounded by two sorts of monuments marking the semiotic systems at work in the novel: Langham's mines and the statues of Latin American revolutionary heroes in Olancho's capitol. The former monuments, the mines, provide an intersection for the semiotics of capital, class, civilization and masculinity at the center of Clay's identity crisis. The mines are crucial to the plot on several levels, but gain their "monument" status in their role as the critical factor that transfers Clay's romantic interest from Alice Langham to her younger sister Hope. In this plot twist, Alice's lukewarm opinion of the mines is the catalyst for Clay's confusion and loss of confidence over his work's social status and moral value, and his subsequent search for a mate who will "sympathize with his work in the world."<sup>30</sup> Alice fails to give credit to the noble cause for which the mines will stand as a lasting reminder, the cause of civilization. Indeed, because of her circumscribed conventions, Alice seems unmoved by this great cause: for her, the mines are merely a crude, instrumental business venture, and Clay's work as their manager and general director is competent but somewhat degrading. "You should be doing something bigger and more wide-reaching and more lasting," she tells Clay; "Indeed, it hurts me to see you wasting your time here over my father's interests" (140). But while Alice feels that Clay's work on the mines indicates he is a mere "salaried servant" (145), for Clay the mines are a testament to his work as a civil engineer—as, in the words of another character, "the chief civilizer of our century" (13). "When I come to die," he explains, "and they ask me what I have done with my ten fingers, I want to feel that I have accomplished something outside of myself—something that will remain after I go. . . . It is the work that will tell" (209-10).

One critic of the day observed that "[Clay's] hypersensitiveness as to whether he is loved as a man or as an engineer is harder to follow than even his military exploits from the Nile to Peru via Zanzibar."<sup>31</sup> But as a plot device, this conflict is critical not only because Alice's failure to recognize the mines' monumental significance disqualifies her as Clay's romantic interest. It has a deeper meaning for the novel's negotiation of cultural narratives of U.S. imperialism: Clay's identity crisis over the mines resolves the contradiction of U.S. national identity that *Soldiers of Fortune* brings to the fore.

This contradiction is apparent in the disjuncture between the missions signified by the mines and the statues. If the mines bear the semiotics of class, capital, civilization, and masculinity, the statues are etched with the semiotics of the Monroe Doctrine and the tradition of New World democracy. Overlooking the President's palace is a statue of Anduella, "the treaty maker," the liberator of the imaginary republic of Olancho, and out in a forgotten plaza of the city stands a statue of Bolívar, commemorating the liberation of Venezuela, Olancho's "sister

republic" (175). These statues seem marginal to the plot—the first is an object of attention during one of Clay and Alice's *tête-à-têtes*, and the second overlooks the secret meeting place where Clay and the mercenary Captain Stuart counterplot against the novel's villain, General Mendoza. Symbolically, however, they attest to the tradition of revolutionary identification between the United States and Latin America.

Davis elaborated on the identifying significance of such monuments in *Three Gringos*, where he began his chapter on Venezuela with a tale of two real statues. One of these monuments, an "odd, bizarre, and inartistic" equestrian statue in New York's Central Park, depicts Simon Bolívar, "the liberator of Venezuela"; the other, in a "pretty little plaza" in the capital of Venezuela, depicts George Washington. The parallel monuments symbolized, Davis argues, a parallel history: "the careers of Washington and Bolívar bear so striking a resemblance, and the histories of the two countries of which they are the respective fathers are so much alike, that they might be written in parallel columns."<sup>32</sup> This parallelism was visually emphasized in *Three Gringos* through photos of statues of Washington and Bolívar. The first depicts the statue of Washington that Davis describes in the text, decorated and attended by Venezuelan soldiers, but with no date or context provided to understand the reason for the decoration. The other photo shows a statue of Bolívar, although not the one that Davis described in Central Park. This photo instead reminds the reader of how prophetic Davis's original article on Venezuela seemed when it first appeared in *Harper's* just weeks prior to Cleveland's message. Dated December 18, 1895, the day after Cleveland's message to Congress, this photo shows a statue of Bolívar in Caracas, decorated and draped with U.S. and Venezuelan flags, surrounded by American foreign ministers clearly making a statement in support of the President's position.

Thus in the text and photos of *Three Gringos*, the parallel monuments and histories come to signify both U.S. patronage of Venezuelan independence and Venezuelan emulation of U.S. democracy. In all of Bolívar's statues, Davis tells us, he wears a miniature portrait of Washington affixed with a lock of Washington's hair, his prized possession. Davis explains the origin of the miniature: during General Lafayette's 1824 visit to the United States, in the final year of Monroe's presidency, Henry Clay stood at a banquet in Washington and "asked the six hundred Americans before him to remember that while they were enjoying the benefits of free institutions . . . , their cousins and neighbors in the southern continent were struggling to obtain the same independence." Clay's speech deeply affected Lafayette, the guest of honor, who asked to send to the Latin American revolutionaries "some token of sympathy and admiration" and subsequently forwarded the picture. Reading Davis's quotation of Henry Clay, one can't help but wonder whether Davis's fictional Clay is named for the senator who outspokenly countered Monroe's reticence to fight for South American and global democracy, and who envisioned the United States as a mobile and

militarily active vanguard of liberty in the Americas and beyond. Davis represents Henry Clay, Washington and Lafayette as patrons of Venezuelan liberty, a patronage that the reader is encouraged to support empathetically: "The next time you ride in Central Park," Davis proposes, "you might turn your bicycle . . . into that little curtain of trees . . . and see if you cannot feel some sort of sympathy and pay tribute to this young man who loved like a hero, and who fought like a hero . . . and whose inspiration was the calm, grave parent of your own country."<sup>33</sup>

As two types of monuments, then, the statues and the mines emblemize the two conflicting narratives of U.S. foreign policy that I described in the first section of this article. One appeals, along with Cleveland and Olney, to the nineteenth-century construction of New World democracy, the other to the new economic conception of empire described by the American Business Man. *Soldiers of Fortune* binds these two narratives together by uniting these monuments in the conflict between political factions attempting to rule the South American republic.

Three factions vie for control in the novel, and the fate of democracy as well as the ownership of the mines hangs in the balance. One side is the Royalist Party, headed by the current President Alvarez but driven by his ambitious wife, a Spanish countess who is said to want her husband to declare a dictatorship and turn Olancho into "a sort of dependency of Spain, as it was long ago" (131). The Royalist cause is unpopular; the people believe that Madame Alvarez intends to "convert the republic into a monarchy, and make her husband king" (131). The villain General Mendoza leads the faction that opposes Alvarez's plans, but he intends to make himself president by force, and the novel makes it clear that under his corrupt rule Olancho would become a dictatorship in all but name. He rallies the people not just against Alvarez's monarchism but also against the capitalist control that the U.S.-based Olancho Mining Company holds over the republic's most valuable resource: the five iron-filled mountains. The third faction, led by "old General Rojas," holds little power, but we are told that he would be the leader chosen by the Olanchan people "if [they] were ever given a chance to vote for the man they want" (132). This conflict is both the central element of the plot and the crux of the Monroe Doctrine: will monarchy be able to reclaim power on the American continents? Yet Davis complicates the conflict by showing the dangerous tendency of "uncivilized" democracy to erupt into revolution and sink into corruption. And because the mines are at risk, Davis's complication reflects the capitalist concerns of the American Business Man.

These capitalist concerns seem at odds with the narrative of New World identification. Clay's work extracting iron from the mines symbolizes to Hope and to himself a mission of civilization that is badly needed in Latin America. "The people know [the ore] is there, but they have no knowledge of its value, and are too lazy to ever work it themselves" (29), Clay explains, in a passage

that attempts to convince both Mr. Langham to invest his capital and the reader to suspend any doubt about the fictional corporation's right to the iron in the Olanchan mountains. *Three Gringoes* also describes the barbaric forfeiture of land. "The Central American citizen," Davis writes in his travel narrative, "is no more fit for a republican form of government than he is for an Arctic expedition, and what he needs is to have a protectorate established over him, either by the United States or by another power, it does not matter so long as it leaves the Nicaragua Canal in our hands"; such peoples are "like semi-barbarians in a beautifully furnished house, of which they can understand neither its possibilities of comfort nor its use."<sup>34</sup> In these passages, Davis seems, like the American Business Man, more interested in development, in advancing capitalism and Western civilization, than in preventing European systems from invading the New World. He comments on the irony of "protecting" Latin America from such European influence by noting that the only time he and his traveling companions enjoyed accustomed freedom and privacy in Central America was "when we were under the protection of the hated monarchical institution of Great Britain at Belize, but never when we were at any of these disorganized military camps called free republics."<sup>35</sup>

Thus although *Soldiers of Fortune* is typically read by contemporary critics in relation to Cuba and the impending Spanish-American War, it is more accurate to say that Davis's novel was inspired by Cleveland's citation of the Monroe Doctrine and the conflicting forms of revolutionary identification or racial disidentification that the Venezuela border crisis provoked. *Soldiers* resolves the conflict among the three vying political factions by having Clay lead a sort of fourth faction, representing the American interests of the mines, to defeat Mendoza, send Madame Alvarez back to Spain, and place Rojas in the presidency, leaving the mines safely in the hands of the Langhams and Olancho ruled by the forces of democracy. Clay's heroic intervention on behalf of political and economic freedoms thus suspends the apparent contradiction between the narrative of New World democracy and the relationship of economic inequality being created between North and South. However, this is not to say that Clay directly or allegorically represents the interests of U.S. capital in the novel. Indeed, Clay's fraught relation to capital is one of the ways *Soldiers* makes Clay's work compelling to the readers who made the novel a best-seller.

Davis's biographer, Arthur Lubow, would disagree about Clay's role in promoting U.S. empire. Lubow insists that while both *Three Gringoes* and *Soldiers of Fortune* may have helped prime the national psyche for the Spanish American War, Davis's novel is in fact subtly critical of the power U.S. capitalists hold and often use to prevent true democracy. Lubow writes that Clay, "an engineer with no commercial ties," is significantly similar to all of Davis's heroes in that he is neither a businessman nor a politician, two professions that Lubow claims for Davis tainted by the greed and ambition of U.S. imperialism. For Lubow this is evident in the overt contrast that Davis creates between Clay

and the novel's capitalist, Mr. Langham, and that in *Soldiers* "the native politicians and the American capitalists are equally corrupt."<sup>36</sup> While it is true that the capitalist Mr. Langham is ineffectual, he is hardly the dishonest, greedy coward that Davis creates in General Mendoza. But even granting Davis's deliberate contrast between the competent, virile Clay and the genteel, prudent Mr. Langham, Clay's relationship to capital is more ambiguous than Lubow admits. After all, it is because Alice sees Clay in a subsidiary relation to capital (as a "salaried servant" of her father and his interests) that their romance is doomed. *Pace* Lubow, Clay's position as an engineer and as Langham's manager does not render him *free* from commercial ties. Instead, the nature of those ties is a major factor in both Clay's character development and the novel's reconciliation of the conflicting global roles of the United States.

When Alice Langham chides Clay about wasting his time looking after her father's interests when "at home" he might be a respected statesman, general, or financier, she calls attention to a conflict in the professional identity of the engineer at the turn of the century. On the one hand, the engineer was one of the most prestigious careers arising out of the "culture of professionalism" in the second half of the nineteenth century. As a specialist trained in scientific principles, the engineer was distinct from the laboring tradesman and the craftsman as well as from the business man. "The professional," writes historian Burton Bledstein, "did not vend a commodity, or exclusively pursue a self-interest."<sup>37</sup> On the other hand, the engineer was closely linked to the rise of corporate culture, as historian David Noble notes when he describes professional engineers who emerged during the late 1900s as both "the foremost agents of modern technology" and "the agents of corporate capital."<sup>38</sup> As a designer of processes of production and, more important, as a manager, the engineer was a crucial part of the rise of corporate culture and modern business administration. One of Clay's first acts in Olancho emphasizes his role as manager: after he surveys the job done by his predecessor VanAntwerp and his assistants, he castigates the "laziness and mismanagement and incompetency" that he sees (34). Time and money had been wasted, rusting machinery and unsanitary work conditions had produced nothing, and Clay, after lecturing the men, immediately sets about creating and managing a more efficient workplace. In this light, Clay's "rationalization" of the mines bears a resemblance to the "scientific management" of Frederick Taylor, an engineer who was working out his own systems for increasing efficiency in Davis's native Bethlehem, Pennsylvania. As Daniel Nelson observes, the number of articles on techniques for managing workers in professional engineering journals more than doubled in the last five years of the nineteenth century from the previous half-decade, indicating a trend toward management of which Davis, who attended Lehigh University where 90 percent of the students majored in engineering, was probably aware.<sup>39</sup>

While engineers were transforming modern business and technology, they were also creating for themselves a new class identity that distinguished them

from both owners and laborers, and we might read Clay's crisis of identity in this context. In one of his moments of self-doubt, Clay gauges his class position against the old-money Langhams. As an employee of Mr. Langham, was he really only one of "the thousands of young men who were working all over the United States to please him, to make him richer, to whom he was only a name and a power, which meant an increase of salary or a loss of place"? (95) In this scene, as in others like it later in the novel, Clay moves from self-doubt to reassurance by considering his accomplishments as an engineer. He reminds himself "that he was not in that class [of laborers]; if he did good work it was because his self-respect demanded it of him; he did not work for Langham or the Olancho Mining Company (Limited)" (95). According to Bledstein, late nineteenth-century professionals resisted any representation of themselves as selling a service by a contract; instead "through a special understanding of the universe, the professional person released nature's potential and rearranged reality on grounds that were neither artificial [nor] arbitrary."<sup>40</sup> Getting rich from the business of South American iron is not, as Lubow correctly notes, glorified in the novel; instead, it is Clay's ability as a manager and his ability to perceive nature's potential that is glorified. As Clay tells Alice,

I don't say, "I'm a salaried servant of Mr. Langham's;" I put it differently. I say, "There are five mountains of iron. You are to take them up and transport them from South America to North America, where they will be turned into railroads and ironclads. . . . It's better to bind a laurel to the plow than to call yourself hard names." (145)

The classed comparison between Clay, on the one hand, and Mr. Langham and Reggie King, one of Alice's blue-blooded suitors, on the other, is not mediated solely by gender — Clay is not simply a more authentically masculine man than those wealthy elites. Instead, Clay is valorized by his professional position; he differs from Mr. Langham or Reggie King through his competence in work rather than in investment or consumption.

This class conflict, while hardly original, gives new meaning to the title "Soldiers of Fortune": the novel poses the troubling question of whether Clay is a mere foot soldier of Mr. Langham's and other men's fortunes, doing the bidding of their capital in the four corners of the globe. In this era of trusts and labor organization, when Americans were often suspicious of big business and its claims to beneficent expansion, the novel's response to this troubling question linked the interests of the new professional classes (the ostensible readers who made *Soldiers of Fortune* the third best-selling novel of 1897) to the interests of capital and economic expansion.<sup>41</sup> Through this alignment, the novel reinforces the notion of unified national interest while denying a right to dominate based on merely economic grounds or wholly self-interested motives. While the Ameri-

can Business Man argued that capital is the only means to civilization, Clay's formulation of the civilizing mission emphasizes his own "work" and not merely the capital of Mr. Langham. Ultimately Mr. Langham's ownership of the mines is not secured by his capital or by brute force, but by Clay's managerial stewardship. Clay explains to Mendoza that while the mines had always existed, "there was not the capital to open them up, I suppose, or—and it needed a certain energy to begin the attack" (50). That Clay falters here ("or—and . . .") is unusual in light of Davis's idealization of the eminently cool and articulate Clay, and the mistake suggests that his uncertainty is not about the question of whether development grants ownership but whether it is "capital" or "energy" that guarantees this ownership. The crisis of Clay's professional identity resolves this doubt; it is his "energy" as an engineer, not his man-power as a laborer bought and controlled by capital, that drives civilization and justifies U.S. ownership of the mines. Indeed, Clay's "energy" as a manager is what ultimately enables him to defeat Mendoza by securing the loyalty of the local soldiers who had been contracted to the mines. When the revolution breaks out, Clay reminds the soldiers "how much better their condition had been since they had entered the mines" and promises them "an increase of wages if they remained faithful to Mr. Langham's interests" (240). Such a promise was valid only because of Clay's recent performance: before he took control of the mines, the native workers had been unpaid, underfed, and housed in an undrained "fever-camp" (35).

Clay's managerial skills thus empower him to bring both democratic liberty and capitalist stability to the Olancheans. Valencia's monuments to the legacy of republican democracy are all closely identified with Clay; it is Clay who tells Alice the story of Anduella, Clay who addresses the neglected statue of Bolívar in its forgotten park as "a great soldier—the greatest this God-forsaken country has ever seen" (181), and Clay who jokes that one of his plans follows the military strategy of Bolívar (223). When Clay defeats Mendoza, the Olancheans embrace him and call him the "Liberator of Olancho," a name the narrator had earlier used to identify the statue of Anduella (111, 330). Yet while this identification links Clay with the historical bonds of the Monroe Doctrine, it is also clear that Clay's maintenance of democracy is always contingent on his "energy" as a manager, which given widespread racial assumptions, was a quality especially characteristic of Americans. Clay addresses the native soldiers again before the final battle for control of the palace, reminding them that they were fighting Mendoza for two reasons. The "greater reason," the one that Clay says he believes truly motivates them, is the maintenance of democracy, their "desire to preserve the Constitution of the Republic." But the "less worthy and more selfish" reason was that if Mendoza were to rule, the mines would be converted into a poorly-run monopoly where they would be forced to continue to work without payment (318-319). Clay's speech to the men places the ideals of "democracy" above their self-interests as workers, but that hierarchy seems somewhat ironic; the reader gets the sense that Clay is deliberately flattering them,



that Clay insightfully realizes that the proud men are in fact motivated more out of practical “self-interest” (a “self interest” linked to the interests of capital) than they are by the ideal of democracy. Thus, democracy without economic development and foreign intervention to protect investments is untenable. Davis therefore links but also prioritizes democracy and development.

The rationalizing power of Clay’s managerial energy relieves anxiety not only about the exploitation of South Americans and single-minded corporate greed, but also about the insurgent labor unrest that many historians argue was impelling U.S. expansionist policies and that loomed in the expansionist arguments of men like Secretary of State Olney. Latin American historian Charles Berquist has recently commented that while revisionist historians have been exhaustive in demonstrating that fears of economic stagnation were a driving force of turn-of-the-century U.S. expansionism, they have devoted insufficient attention to one aspect of those economic anxieties: what Berquist calls the “phantasmagoric popular social threat” of labor unrest.<sup>42</sup> The sense that the frontier had closed was alarming not only because U.S. capital would become, in the words of the day, “congested,”<sup>43</sup> but also because declining profits and production would cause lay-offs and declining wages, sending laborers into violent protest. Berquist points out that the career of Richard Olney embodied these close relations among U.S. labor unrest, growing corporate power and expanding U.S. empire. Olney, acting as Attorney General a year prior to his letter to Salisbury, broke the American Railway Union and Pullman strikes in one of the most violent labor conflicts in U.S. history. And before that, Olney had worked as a railroad corporation lawyer who saw in his experiences battling organized labor the beginnings of a dangerous “labor revolution.”<sup>44</sup> Berquist, seeing in Olney’s career an overlooked but perhaps significant link between labor and empire, speculates that this perception perhaps influenced the Secretary of State’s decision to protect U.S. commercial interests in South America by positioning the United States as “practically sovereign upon this continent” during the Venezuela border crisis.

Berquist’s insight into the link between labor unrest and post-1898 U.S. empire offers more evidence that Davis’s Olancho is, as Amy Kaplan has argued, an extension of a Frederick Jackson Turner’s conception of the frontier that releases pressure and regenerates the stultified interior.<sup>45</sup> However, while class lines in general are destabilized among the U.S. Americans in Olancho, Davis does not cast Clay’s managerial mediation of the narratives of the Monroe Doctrine as a result of an escape into essential or primeval manhood, or into a romantic world where gender wholly subsumes class. Instead, Clay does his work by assuming a certain recognizable construction of a class-bound professional identity. Here I mean to extend and complicate Kaplan’s argument that *Soldiers of Fortune*, like other historical romances of the time, conventionally enacts in the imperial romance an escape from effete traditions of class and corporate control into essential, rejuvenated gender roles of the “new man” and

the “new woman” on the South American “frontier.” The rejuvenation engineered by Clay escapes the revolutionary threats of labor and Latin American “barbarism” through his mastery of modern, professional rationality. The adventure in Olancho does not strip away a veneer of civilization to reveal a more essentially gendered, essentially American self underneath; instead it emphasizes the need to reject out-moded tradition while embarking on the forward-looking, heroic project of modern professionalism.

The novel’s rejection of outdated “tradition” functions through the romantic triangle of Clay, Alice, and Hope and its representation of traditionally circumscribed U.S. global power. After the fighting in Olancho is over, MacWilliams, Clay’s assistant, warns that marriage to Hope would mean settling down to a safe, domestic and respectable existence (living on Fifth Avenue and wearing a high silk hat) where his wife and the policemen will control his urges to re-live his adventures in Olancho. Pages later, in the novel’s conclusion, we are assured that MacWilliams is not entirely correct; Clay may be giving up management to work as an independent consultant, but this does not entail permanent residence in the confines of conventional domestic life. The novel ends with Clay and Hope fantasizing about their future travels, a closure that suggests the power of the United States has itself been decentered, made mobile, and freed from the confines of national boundaries. These national boundaries double for Alice’s stratified “society”: “the narrow world she lived in,” which had “crippled her and narrowed her and marked her for its own” (314). If Alice’s traditional values are spatially located on Fifth Avenue, the novel’s ending refuses to situate Clay and Hope’s marriage fully within either the confines of “traditional” womanhood or national boundaries. Domestic confinement, whether it be through the conventions of femininity or in North America, is too limiting to Clay and Hope’s modern sensibilities. Alice’s tendency to move “by rules and precedents, like a queen in a game of chess” and her final pairing with the safe, “comfortable” Reggie King provide a contrast to her sister, the more mobile and active new woman. While Clay and Hope intend to travel the world on his business, Alice, Reggie and Mr. Langham return to New York, a location that emphasizes to us that these characters are fatally “narrowed” by their flaws: Alice’s rules and precedents, King’s passionless courtesy, and Mr. Langham’s “policy of non-interference”—which nearly brought about the loss of his mines because of his lack of preparation to fight Mendoza (203). These flaws suggest complacency with staying at home and a blind adherence to doctrine—both flaws of which adherents to the nineteenth-century conception of the Monroe Doctrine were accused.

*Soldiers of Fortune* thus destabilizes understandings of the domestic home as a source of national identity and insular virtue. Clay and Hope’s mobile, modern marriage suggests a national future released from particular spaces like home, the North American continent or the Western Hemisphere. This release from particular spaces is another point of dramatic tension that contributes to

Clay's identity crisis. Alice's concern that "back home" Clay might have a more respectable position criticizes not only his profession but also his self-imposed exile. Davis stresses the significance of Clay's exile by repeatedly staging conversations in which he and MacWilliams discuss the blightedness of their surroundings in contrast to the genteel society of the Langhams, conversations that stress that these men are haunted by a sense of homelessness. We are told that Clay has no home in the United States since his mother died and his father was shot as a filibuster attempting to incite revolution against Spain in Cuba. "I travel because I have no home," he tells Hope: "I go to other places because there is no home open" (169). This homelessness registers tragically, deromanticizing his adventures and suggesting to the reader that Clay's absence from home might threaten his national identification—might make him "cease to be an American, and become[ ] nothing" (22), as Theodore Roosevelt wrote of American expatriates in his 1894 speech on "True Americanism." The loss of his American identity might make Clay like the novel's duplicitous gun-runner Burke, a "soldier of fortune" who will be "a citizen of my own or any other country" (188), or like its tragic Captain Stuart, a dishonored British soldier who pledges his loyalty to President Alvarez because he cannot safely return to his own country.

Of course, Davis ultimately assures us that his idealized hero Clay remains quintessentially American despite his homelessness. In a final scene, a lieutenant of the U.S. Marines who arrives just moments after Clay and his men have defeated Mendoza and restored Rojas, insists on recognizing Clay as a fellow soldier: "Even though you haven't worn our uniform, you're as good, and better, than some that have, and you're a sort of commander and chief, anyway, and I'm damned if I don't give you a sort of salute" (336). As Clay rides through "the massed rows of his countrymen with their muskets held rigidly toward him," the natives on the surrounding housetops cheer, and Clay emerges from the salute with eyes "wet and winking" (336). In this cathartic moment, Clay's nationality is secured, reinforcing the sense that the home of the nation can be safely removed from its location within boundaries of a space that is domestic in both its meanings. His American-ness has been established by carrying out both his father's mission to establish democracy in Latin America and his namesake Henry Clay's injunction to support the cause of South American democracy, and it frees him to continue his adventures abroad.

Upon Davis's death in 1916, Theodore Roosevelt said that Davis's writings "form a text-book of Americanism," a comment that has indicated for many the affinities between Davis's fictional adventures and Roosevelt's strenuous foreign policy.<sup>46</sup> If *Soldiers of Fortune* served as a such a text-book, it also instructed U.S. Americans on their relationship with Americans to the south, reconfiguring cultural narratives to reconcile the constitutive divide between Old and New Worlds with emerging patterns of economic inequality between

Northern and Southern Hemispheres. *Soldiers* retains the tradition of New World democracy while justifying the civilizing mission of capital and its production of unequal economic relations of dependency. Written at a time when skepticism about burgeoning corporate power in the United States was prevalent, *Soldiers* counters the notion that the colonial imperative to “civilize” was a thin ruse for capitalist greed by aligning economic imperialism in South America with modern professionalism and national traditions of protective democracy. Furthermore, Davis holds onto this past tradition of the Monroe Doctrine while dislocating it. The notion of the Western Hemisphere retained its power to justify U.S. domination over Central and South America throughout much of the twentieth century, but Davis’s novel dematerializes the mission of the United States, revising narratives of isolation “at home” in the Western Hemisphere to allow for a more mobile and less restricted sense of a U.S. sphere of interest—one that might spread to wherever the causes of civilization and democracy arose. The novel both appeals to and updates sentimental traditions of home and nation, without adhering to antiquated dogmas or becoming stultified in insular comfort and self-absorption.

Davis’s fiction thus had a more far-reaching impact on U.S. foreign policy than merely raising the national temperature about Cuban revolution. *Soldiers of Fortune* revised the cultural narratives that Roosevelt’s 1904 Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine rested upon as it reconciled U.S. stewardship over Latin America with the tradition of New World identification. And it went further to dislocate the emotional affect that this tradition wielded, indirectly enabling Pacific expansion to appear not as a trespass beyond the traditional “home” of the United States in the Americas, but as a fulfillment of its modern vision of stable, well-managed productivity. This is not to say that Davis’s novel directly influenced Roosevelt or other statesmen, although given Roosevelt’s praise it seems likely he read the novel with great attention. Rather, my point is that *Soldiers of Fortune* more indirectly spoke to its large body of readers by revising discourses of the Monroe Doctrine and U.S. national identity. The novel inculcated and at the same time reshaped the meaning of “Americanism” in the popular imagination, so that when Roosevelt reaffirmed the Doctrine’s place in a modernizing and globally ambitious United States, his policy made sense to the majority of Americans. His corollary to the Monroe Doctrine appealed, in the words of Perkins, to the “deepest instincts and traditions” of the American people — instincts and traditions that were not fixed, but that were contested, shaped and negotiated in cultural texts like Davis’s.

My reading, then, offers an example of the power of representation and narrative to shape a popular political debate about U.S. national identity and foreign policy. By working in the interdisciplinary space opened by political historians like Michael Hunt and cultural critics like Amy Kaplan,<sup>47</sup> this article could be seen as a supplement to the work of a historian like Perkins, whose disciplinary boundaries restricted him to an account of a political history that

occurred mainly in the correspondence and papers of statesmen. This supplement may not tell a complete story, or measure causes and effects in the way that would be necessary to determine if Hearst's sensational news stories really did "furnish" the Spanish American War. But it does explore the ways in which narrative structure, fantasy, and romance shaped Davis's influential conceptions of political questions and crises and suggests that through the work of writers like Davis, such fictive elements become crucial to public understandings of U.S. national identity and global mission.

## Notes

1. Arther Lubow, Davis's biographer, writes that Davis embodied the essence of celebrity: "to be famous virtually all one's adult life and forgotten promptly at death." In addition to his fame as a journalist, dashing war correspondent, and best-selling novelist, Davis developed a conspicuous public persona and represented for many his generations's ideal of masculine beauty. Charles Dana Gibson used Davis as a model for the Gibson girl's square-jawed, clean-shaven escort in many of his illustrations, and college boys and girls were even known to pin up Davis's picture in their dorm rooms. *The Reporter Who Would Be King* (New York, 1992), 1-2.

2. In claiming an interrelation of culture and politics, I am drawing broadly from interdisciplinary work in cultural studies that, in the words of Susan Jeffords, "mov[es] away from identifying explicit 'causes' and 'effects' of events," and instead "analyzes the way in which discourses shape meaning and, thereby, the employments of power relations based upon such meanings." According to Jeffords's assessment of the field, cultural studies defies "the more simplistic logics of linear causality," and instead assumes that "a complexity of interactions . . . are dynamically in play, whose meanings are always open to negotiation, error, and interpretation." Jeffords, "Commentary: Culture and National Identity in U.S. Foreign Policy," *Diplomatic History* 18 (Spring 1994), 91-96.

3. Lubow, *The Reporter*, 124.

4. Donald Bruce Johnson and Kirk H. Porter, eds, *National Party Platforms, 1840-1972* (Urbana, Ill., 1973), 113.

5. Dexter Perkins, *The Monroe Doctrine 1823-6* (Cambridge, Mass., 1927), 103. Perkins's work has been contested and updated, however; revisionist William Appleman Williams argues that the Doctrine was an overtly defensive statement that concealed a more offensive, expansionist claim in *The Contours of American History* (New York, 1972), while Ernest May explores the way that the political climate at home and abroad influenced policy decisions in *The Making of the Monroe Doctrine* (Boston, 1975). I emphasize Perkins here not because his is the most current or correct account, but because despite his exhaustive traditional methodology, Perkins acknowledges what I see as a cultural gap in his work.

6. Richard Harding Davis, "The Paris of South America," *Harper's New Monthly Magazine*, 92 (December 1895), 115.

7. Davis, *Adventures and Letters of Richard Harding Davis*, ed. Charles Belmont Davis (New York, 1918), 172.

8. Lubow, *The Reporter*, 123.

9. "Three Gringos in Venezuela and Central America," Review, *The Bookman*, 3 (1896), 369.

10. Davis, *Adventures and Letters*, 172.

11. United States, *Congressional Record* (Dec. 17, 1895), 195.

12. *Ibid.*, 197.

13. *Ibid.*

14. *Ibid.*, 195.

15. Defining "civilization" as a product of racial advancement was of course not entirely new—see Frederick B. Pike's *The United States and Latin America: Myths and Stereotypes of Civilization and Nature* (Austin, 1992) for a study of what he calls the myth of "civilization versus nature" in US discourse about Latin America throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. However, at the turn of the century justifications for US expansion had largely shifted from a mission to spread free democratic republicanism to the spread of whiteness and Anglo-Saxonism. This is not to say that previous discourses of "civilization" and US expansionism were not "racist," but that scientific racism and social Darwinism became explicitly stated rationales in the latter half of the nineteenth century. See Reginald Horsman, *Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origins of American Racial Anglo-Saxonism* (Cambridge, Mass., 1981), 1-3, and Robert L. Beisner *From the Old Imperialism to the New, 1865-1900* (New York, 1975), 4-5.

16. John W. Burgess, "The Recent Pseudo-Monroeism," *Political Science Quarterly*, 11 (January 1896), 66.
17. Charles F. Dole, "The Right and Wrong of the Monroe Doctrine," *Atlantic Monthly* 95 (April 1905), 570.
18. An American Business Man, "Is the Monroe Doctrine a Bar to Civilization?" *North American Review*, 176 (1903), 525.
19. Stuart Anderson, *Anglo-Saxonism and Anglo-American Relations, 1895-1904* (Madison, 1981).
20. Franklin H. Giddings, "Imperialism?" *Political Science Quarterly*, 13 (1898), 601.
21. Dole, "The Right and Wrong," 571.
22. Archibald Cary Coolidge, *The United States as a World Power* (Orig 1906; repr. New York, 1919), 108.
23. United States, *Congressional Record* (Dec. 17, 1895), 194.
24. Coolidge, *The United States*, 119.
25. Albert Bushnell Hart, *The Foundations of American Foreign Policy* (New York, 1901), 223.
26. Influential discussions of this shift from territorial to "informal" empire are Walter LeFebvre's *The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1963); Thomas McCormick's *China Market: America's Quest for Informal Empire* (Chicago, 196); and William Appleman Williams's *The Contours of American History* (New York, 1972).
27. See, for example Charles Francis Adams's *Tracks of Our Forefathers* (Boston, 1899); Andrew Carnegie's "Parting of the Ways" in *The Gospel of Wealth and Other Timely Essays* (New York, 1901); and Carl Shurz's "Thoughts on American Imperialism" in *Speeches, Correspondences and Political Papers of Carl Shurz*, vol. 5, ed. Frederick Bancroft (New York, 1913).
28. Dexter Perkins, *The Monroe Doctrine, 1826-67* (Cambridge, Mass., 1937), 191.
29. United States, *Congressional Record* (Dec. 17, 1895), 195.
30. Richard Harding Davis, *Soldiers of Fortune* (Orig 1897; repr. Upper Saddle River, 1969), 137. Subsequent references to the novel will be noted parenthetically within the text.
31. "More Fiction," *The Nation* 66.1699 (1989), 54.
32. Davis, *Three Gringos in Venezuela and Central America* (New York, 1896), 225.
33. *Ibid*, 237.
34. *Ibid*, 146, 147.
35. *Ibid*, 146.
36. Lubow, *The Reporter*, 124.
37. Burton J. Bledstein, *The Culture of Professionalism* (New York, 1978), 89.
38. David Noble, *America by Design: Science, Technology and the Rise of Corporate Capitalism* (New York, 1977), xxiii.
39. Daniel Nelson *Managers and Workers: Origins of the New Factory System in the United States* (Madison, 1975), 48-9. On Lehigh University, see Lubow 18-24. On Taylor in Bethlehem, see also Nelson's *Frederick Taylor and the Rise of Scientific Management* (Madison, 1980), 76-103.
40. Bledstein, *Culture of Professionalism*, 54.
41. On the young, urban and middle-class demographic group who bought and read best-sellers, see Erik Löfroth, *A World Made Safe: Values in American Best-Sellers, 1895-1970*, (Stockholm, 1983), 15-18.
42. Charles W. Bergquist, *Labor and the Course of American Democracy: US History in Latin American Perspective* (London, 1996), 55.
43. This sense that US capital needed new territories for new investments was a widespread economic justification for expansion into Latin American and the Pacific. See, for example, Charles Conant's *The United States in the Orient: The Nature of the Economic Problem* (Boston, 1900) and Josiah Strong's *Expansion Under New World Conditions* (New York, 1900).
44. Berquist, *Labor and the Course*, 56.
45. Kaplan makes this argument in her essay "Romancing the Empire: The Embodiment of American Masculinity in the Popular Historical Novel of the 1890s," *American Literary History*, 2 (Winter 1990), 659-690.
46. Quoted in Davis, *Adventures and Letters*, 408.
47. Michael Hunt's *Ideology and US Foreign Policy* broke new ground in the field of diplomatic history by taking seriously the impact of culture (New Haven, 1987). Amy Kaplan argues for the importance of studying culture in U.S. foreign policy in the introduction to *Cultures of United States Imperialism*, eds. Amy Kaplan and Donald Pease (Durham, N.C., 1993).