

# A New Global Capitalism? From “Americanism and Fordism” to “Americanization-Globalization”

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“Americanism is swamping us.”  
Luigi Pirandello (1929)

## Introduction

This paper has two parts. First, we discuss the development of the discourse on Fordism and post-Fordism and its transition into a broader rubric about globalization. In the second part, we analyze dimensions of *neoliberal globalization*. Throughout the paper we elaborate and illustrate a socio-cultural approach to “economic” matters—*regime analysis*—that challenges the neoclassical and neoliberal paradigms which dominate among American policy elites and which the United States exports globally through its political and economic power. Our main focus is on the American role in and hegemonic ideological vision of neoliberal globalization.

## Socio-Cultural Rupture and Regime Theories of Capitalism

*Fordism: Marxian-Gramscian Origins*

During the late 1970s, British and Continental thinkers revived the thought of early twentieth-century social theorist Antonio Gramsci. By the mid-1980s the revival was global, spread by new cultural studies approaches that employed his ideas and embraced him as a leading precursor. Stressing his concept of *hegemony*, cultural theorists shifted from postwar Marxist structuralism to revised or

post-Marxist perspectives, forged fresh critiques and politics, and stirred debate about the composition and very idea of the “left.” About the same time, other thinkers, attempting to come to grips with substantial changes in economic conditions and public policy, revived Gramsci’s concept of Fordism ([1929-1935] 1971).<sup>2</sup> Paralleling cultural theorists, they rejected economic determinism and acknowledged the importance of culture. But following Gramsci’s own break with “mechanical” Marxism, they continued to engage problems framed by Karl Marx and kept political economy and capitalism at the center of their work.<sup>3</sup>

Generally Gramsci’s concept of Fordism built on Marx’s analysis of the transition from small-scale capitalism, which retained important premodern elements, to a complex, increasingly global capitalism that employs science/technology as its leading productive force, mechanizes production, deskills workers, and generates big firms, big states, and big unions (i.e., Marx’s shift from “manufacture” to “modern industry”).<sup>4</sup> Although prescient about major features of twentieth-century capitalism, including globalization, Marx focused primarily on the early phase of the Second Industrial Revolution, which occurred in England nearly forty years earlier than in the United States and economically advanced parts of Europe. Marx did not live long enough to witness the onset of the era of mass production and mass consumption described by Gramsci.

By contrast, Gramsci theorized developments after World War I, when the new type of capitalism was being consolidated in the United States. He stressed the sweeping rationalization of production, the central role of finance capital, and the linkages between “petty bourgeois savers” (i.e., middle-class stockholders) and financial elites. However, his core concept of hegemony also emphasized the increasingly significant role of mass culture, mass media, mass consumption, and the enlarged state (e.g., expanded regulation, planning, and propaganda). His discussion of “Americanism and Fordism,” a titled section of his *Prison Notebooks*, articulated his view that the capitalist economy is embedded in broader, historically specific socio-cultural regimes, each with distinct structures and processes, dominant and subordinate strata, hegemonic and counterhegemonic blocs, and patterns of struggle.

The term *Fordism* signifies the importance that Gramsci attributed to the assembly-line production, managerial hierarchy, and technical control introduced by automobile magnate Henry Ford. However, Gramsci’s vision of the new capitalism featured distinct political and cultural, as well as “economic,” dimensions. He held that the Fordist labor process relied centrally on Taylorist rationalization, which simplified necessary operations, eliminated others, and radically routinized, deskilled, and intensified labor.<sup>5</sup> Accordingly, managers and technicians did all the thought work and instituted comprehensive top-down control, which required operatives to work faster, more continuously, more mechanically, and in a more coordinated fashion. Gramsci claimed that Fordist elites were aware of the physically and psychologically demanding nature of the new labor process and that they recognized that conventional methods of labor

control, which relied on simple force, could not cope adequately with the new work regime's consequences—mounting worker dissatisfaction, high turnover, and workplace sabotage. Contending that the emergent strategy was to regulate workers by consent as well as by coercion, Gramsci held that Fordists improved wages and fringe benefits, provided more stable employment, and expanded the state's role in protecting worker well-being. At least indirectly, he anticipated the post-World War II era's capital-labor compromise and welfare state. Decrying the American "ideology" of equating higher wages with democratization, however, Gramsci argued that the new policies were manipulative responses to meet the demands of the Fordist labor process (1971, 310-13).

Gramsci argued that Fordist business elites developed novel cultural mechanisms to exert control in the wider society and to create the "standardized individuals" called for by Fordism's highly regimented forms of work and mass produced products. For example, he explained that Fordist owners and managers expressed increased interest in the moral and psychological condition of their workers. He contended that Henry Ford's surveillance of workers' family life, sexuality, and other activities outside the workplace exemplified efforts to nurture the voluntary submission of workers to the labor discipline required by this new order. Gramsci claimed that the Fordist cultural project was executed, as well, by public organizations and even voluntary associations (e.g., the Rotary Club, YMCA, and YWCA). In his view, American Puritanism, especially its emphases on monogamy, female subordination, and repressed sexuality provided a cultural basis for worker compliance. He believed that Prohibition and other resurgent remnants of Puritanism, which Ford supported, fostered a social psychological climate that harnessed workers to their jobs and contributed to the rise of the emergent Fordist regime of capital. But Gramsci held that the effort to revive this austere form of cultural discipline was aimed primarily at workers, while elites and middle classes were permitted and sometimes even encouraged to engage in wider alcohol use, increased sexual freedom, and experimentation with new types of culture and consumption (Gramsci 1971, 294-306).

Gramsci viewed Fordism as more than a system of material production, insisting that it relied on cultural resources and forged new personality types. However, he held that the new capitalism was in an early phase and was mostly an unrealized ideal even in the United States (1971, 286, 317). He also argued that the Great Depression left everything open to question. Understanding that regional patterns of hegemony influenced capitalist development, Gramsci held that the remnants of Europe's parasitic, privileged, semi-feudal elites resisted Fordist "rationalization" and could block the full development of Fordism there. He thought that these traditionalist remains provided U.S. Fordism a significant advantage over European capitalism (1971, 305). He also argued that European elites might attempt to fuse elements of Fordism to divergent types of regimes (e.g., fascist corporatism). As illustrated by Gramsci's description of the "backward" cultural characteristics and social organization of his native Italy and the

emergence of fascism and Nazism, it is clear that he saw Fordism as an important but contested possibility of global capitalism. Regardless of the contingencies, however, Gramsci thought that Fordist elites in the United States, by then the leading capitalist power, were creating a “planned economy” that was replacing earlier capitalism’s “economic individualism.” He believed that the need to balance mass production with mass consumption and avert economic crises required comprehensive bureaucratic planning and cultural coordination (Gramsci 1971, 279, 306-16).

*The Post-World War II Era: “From High Fordism” to the “End of the American Century”*

We use “High Fordism” to signify the triumph of Fordist capitalism in post-World War II era advanced capitalist societies.<sup>6</sup> As Gramsci argued, the United States was the main innovator and leader of the early phase of the Fordist transition. Although Fordist development was interrupted by depression and war, the United States began the postwar era with its productive system intact and as the world’s hegemonic military and economic superpower. The United States’ geopolitical split with the communist bloc and with procommunist and unaligned postcolonial nations prevented a consolidated global capitalism under U.S. leadership and helped generate its “permanent war economy.” U.S. “military Keynesianism” or “guided capitalism” lacked comprehensive income redistribution, social welfare programs, and planning of European social democracy, but it did substantially increase state expenditures, state regulation of the economy, and social welfare and public goods.<sup>7</sup>

While most major capitalist societies were forced to rebuild after the war, U.S. manufacturing firms dominated their huge home market and much of the world market in the 1950s and 1960s. Despite major growth of the service sector, manufacturing still drove the U.S. postwar expansion. Explosive growth of federally subsidized suburbs (single-family homes and highway systems) and of the standard middle-class consumer package (e.g., autos and home appliances) forged a new mass consumer society. Employing breakthroughs in mainframe computer and other information processing technologies, managers of the primary sector’s vertically integrated, corporate firms increasingly rationalized, centralized, and automated their operations. The dramatic expansion of higher education facilitated a new wave of managerial professionalization; increased the upper middle-class ranks of highly trained technical, financial, and legal specialists; and expanded basic research for the military and corporate sectors. Innovations and growth of mass media and mass entertainment, especially TV, and expansion of the retail sector (e.g., shopping centers and chain stores) revolutionized marketing. The private sector’s much enhanced methods of advertising and marketing and the state’s Keynesian managing of aggregate demand (e.g., through state spending, monetary regulation, economic “fine-tuning”) fostered

High Fordism's unparalleled ability to balance production and consumption and to maintain low unemployment, steady accumulation, and high rates of profit.

During the postwar "capital-labor accord," union membership peaked, but unions generally cooperated with management. They traded aspirations for stakeholder rights in capital and shared control of the labor process for higher wages and benefits and stable employment. There was increased affluence, social security, and educational opportunity, especially for white males, and much upgraded standards of living for unionized blue-collar workers, the middle class, and above. Policy intellectuals and the press proclaimed the United States to be a new type of ultramodern, middle-class democracy that escaped classical capitalist crises and class conflicts and effectively ended debates over basic ideology (Hodgson 1978, 67-98).

Many critics and advocates alike held that High Fordism worked so well for the enlarged and politically decisive middle class that alternatives were hard to imagine. However, sharp class, racial, and gender inequalities remained entrenched. Criticizing American intellectuals' acquiescence to injustice and regimentation, radical sociologist and social critic C. Wright Mills warned that a "postmodern" world of "Cheerful Robots" was arising. Similarly, Herbert Marcuse, the leading theoretician of the 1960s "New Left," asserted that the United States was a "society without opposition." He held that its structure of "total administration" and technical coordination retained "stupefying" and "exhausting" types of work, but integrated the working-class into the system by effectively and widely delivering entertainment and consumer goods that "indoctrinate and manipulate" and destroy critical sensibilities and the desire for liberation. Contesting these views, the era's leading sociological theorist, Talcott Parsons, contended that the American "working-class" approximated "the leisure class," while "upper occupational groups" were among the hardest "working" groups in human history." He argued that postwar America's unparalleled affluence and democratization were realizing the promise of liberty and equality and were earning the genuine support of the populace, rather than mere formal or ideological legitimacy. Portraying the United States as the "lead society," Parsons held that "Americanization" would extend the advantages of progressive modernization's latest evolutionary breakthroughs to the rest of the world. He decried the New Left's "ideological pessimism" and premature claims about the rise of a repressive "postmodern society." In his view, progressive modernization had more than a century to go before it would lose impetus (Mills 1961, 165-76; Marcuse 1964; Parsons 1971, 86-7, 112-14, 129, 140-3).

By the late-1960s, race riots and campus disturbances, increased inflation, slower economic growth, and socio-political fragmentation had begun to erode High Fordist consensus. Numerous crises during the 1970s (racial tensions, oil shortages, recession, Watergate, the lost Vietnam War, the Iran-hostage crisis, increased taxation, and stagflation) increased socio-political fragmentation. Also, American manufacturers faced stiff challenges from European and Asian

competitors in the U.S. home market, profit squeezes, and diminished corporate profits. The rise of anti-Western movements (e.g., Islamic fundamentalism), worldwide challenges to Western modernization models, and new political alignments (e.g., OPEC) threatened U.S. dominance in international politics and economics. By the mid-1970s Western Europe also faced slower economic growth, increasing threats of terrorism, growing tensions over immigration, political fragmentation, and other problems. Critics declared that the High Fordist state was in a “legitimacy crisis” that derived from its inability to coordinate effectively or to deliver on its promises to provide social benefits, public goods, and regulation, on the one hand, and to insure economic growth, on the other (O’Connor 1973; Habermas 1975).

In this climate, the U.S. corporate right mobilized politically and culturally against the social side of Keynesian liberalism; well-funded conservative foundations and think-tanks initiated an effective ideological counteroffensive against regulation, income and wealth redistribution, and taxation (Akard 1992). Ascendent “neoconservatives” revived free-market economics, and fused it with cultural conservatism. They charged that Lyndon Johnson’s vision of a “Great Society” empowered a “New Class” of welfare state bureaucrats and policy intelligentsia, backed by an “adversary culture” of young radicals, who imposed egalitarian agendas that overreached realistic possibilities for reform, overloaded the state, rewarded free-riders, and undermined authority, civic morality, and labor discipline.<sup>8</sup> By the end of the decade, a number of politically diverse thinkers stressed an “end of consensus,” “the decline of American morale,” “the erosion of American power,” or “the end of the American Century.”<sup>9</sup>

The election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 marked the political ascendance of neoconservative forces, who blamed High Fordist strategies for American economic and socio-cultural decline and framed a project of “American renewal” that instituted “neoliberal” economic policies and, with less success, a right-wing cultural agenda.<sup>10</sup> The U.S. left, with libertarian support, resisted the cultural changes, but mounted little opposition to the neoliberal economic tide. Even postwar liberalism’s timid version of “equal opportunity” disappeared from the vocabulary of both political parties. Envisioned a little more than a decade before as the chief motor of postwar growth, High Fordist strategies were now seen as crippling “rigidities”—nefarious inefficiencies and the prime causes of American socio-economic decline.

A widely read, controversial, and influential work of this period, Daniel Bell’s *Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism* ([1976] 1996) held that capitalist work and productive organization were historically undergirded by Puritan morality and character structure and that this nonmarket culture constrained the desires unleashed by capitalist acquisition. In his view, however, bourgeois culture’s workaday values and habits were being ravaged by the hedonistic popular culture that had emerged in the postwar era. Bell argued that the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries’ avant garde fashioned an “aesthetic”

modernism contradicting Protestant “asceticism.” He contended that the reconstructed “postmodern” version of avant garde aestheticism, revived by the 1960s counterculture revolt against bourgeois culture and then commercialized by the mass media and entertainment industry, universalized artistic alienation and shock, exhausted modernism’s creative impulses, and neutralized values of work, saving, prudence, rationality, and responsibility.<sup>11</sup> In this view, popular culture had evaporated the Puritan views of sexuality and work that Gramsci had argued were central in regulating the American working-class in the early days of Fordism. By contrast to the support that Gramsci claimed that American culture provided Fordist production, Bell asserted that a radical “disjunction of realms” had emerged (1996, 3-171). His cultural critique resonated with neoconservative pleas to revive authority, religion, and Puritan austerity and work habits.

Bell agreed with some neoconservative charges about postwar liberals’ mismanagement of economic affairs and welfare. However, his views on these issues were more nuanced and politically ambiguous than usual neoconservative positions. Most important, Bell emphatically rejected neoliberal economism. He supported the welfare state and its central entitlements and stressed the need for a “fiscal sociology” and “public household.” Bell argued that the Keynesian revolution and postwar affluence had transformed “economic growth” into a “secular religion” that holds politics hostage and produces severe “contradictions” (e.g., resource and environmental problems, inflation, and class wars between the middle-class and working-class over taxation, the state budget, and entitlements) (1996, 237-82). Bell contended that American liberalism possessed the resources to cope with the “national crisis,” but that this required liberals to rethink their “public philosophy” and their conceptions of “social compact.” Political ambiguities aside, Bell’s broad purview and, especially, his argument that “*economic issues are embedded [in] a larger ‘cultural’ question*” [emphasis added] anticipated or even called for a revival of discourse about regimes of capitalism (Bell 1996, 242, 251-60, 278-82).

### *Revived Dialogue over Regimes of Capitalism: Post-Fordism versus (post)-Fordism*

New Fordism discourses arose during the late-1970s in response to these mounting signs of political and cultural crises and reorganization of postwar capitalism. Like Gramsci, the new approaches contended that the economy’s cyclical growth and contraction phases were intimately interwoven with the rise, consolidation, and erosion of wider institutional and socio-cultural complexes or *regimes of capitalism*.<sup>12</sup> However, the revived Fordism discourses were, in part, shaped by earlier approaches to capitalism and by an intellectual climate on the left that favored regime analysis. Interest in these topics increased in the mid- and late-1960s and flourished, during the early- and mid-1970s, as refugees from the New Left attained academic prominence and crises in the postwar regime

mounted. The new approaches overlapped at key points with Gramsci's analyses of organizational rationalization and cultural justification, but they usually did not address his thought. For example, Harry Braverman's *Labor and Monopoly Capital* (1974), a widely read study of the maturation of postwar capitalism, explored more comprehensively and systematically than Gramsci the Taylorist mechanisms of control in large U.S. firms. Braverman was highly influential among left sociologists and even stimulated a great deal of mainstream research and conceptual debate. During the early-1970s, the broad studies of the British social historians, such as E.P. Thompson, E.J. Hobsbawm, and Christopher Hill, and of the French *Annales* school of social history, were widely read in the United States and Europe.<sup>13</sup>

The dominant European approach in Marxist theory during the late-1960s and early-1970s—Louis Althusser's structuralism—employed conceptions of "social formation" and "ideology" that broke sharply with classical historical materialism and helped pave the way for the cultural turn in theory and the reappropriation of Gramsci's thought. During the same period, Marxian-rooted dependency theory and world-systems theory analyzed capitalism in broad historical perspective, stressing unequal relations between rich and poor countries in the global system.<sup>14</sup> French Marxist Ernest Mandel's *Late Capitalism* ([1972] 1978) was important because it revived N. D. Kondratieff's early-twentieth-century concept of 50-year "long waves" of alternating, roughly 25-year boom and bust cycles. Mandel framed a regime vision of capitalism involving sequential long waves of technological advance, economic growth, and institutional and cultural innovation followed by socio-economic stagnation, crisis, and decline.<sup>15</sup> He held that the early-1970s was the end of the fourth long wave's growth period and that erosion and crisis would follow. Predictions aside, Mandel's idea that capitalism's economic cycle is governed by long waves of social and institutional change was integrated into important discourses on Fordism. Moreover, Fredric Jameson (1984; 1991) brought Mandel's ideas into broader debates over cultural theory by crediting *Late Capitalism* as the source of his overall view of contemporary capitalism in his famous argument that postmodernism represented the regime's "cultural logic."

A major split in the new discussions of Fordism was over the extent of the late-1970s and 1980s changes—whether features of the emerging phase of capitalism were "Fordist" or "post-Fordist."<sup>16</sup> Also, thinkers disagreed over whether the changes initiated a better capitalism or merely a revised capitalism in decline. Fordism was not always mentioned explicitly in these discourses, but, like Gramsci, they conceptualized capitalism not simply as an economic system but also as a socio-cultural regime and studied the substantial technical, organizational, socio-cultural, and political changes that lead to regime shifts. However, Gramsci's emergent Fordist regime, anticipating High Fordism, had stressed wider state intervention, increased planning, and higher social benefits. By contrast, the new discourses about Fordism arose in the wake of collapsing faith in public intervention and planning, falling social wages, and ascending eco-

nomic individualism. Reactions to the changes ranged from those trumpeting a capitalist, democratic renaissance to others decrying a downward spiral into a deindustrialized, dedemocratized wasteland. By 1980, *neoliberalism*, which stressed free markets and free trade and sharp reductions in the state's regulatory and welfare roles, was hegemonic among U.S. policy elites and was also on the rise elsewhere.

Optimistic arguments about a new progressive "post-Fordist" regime were animated, in part, by reports about the productive system and broader socio-cultural arrangements in Italy's central and northeastern provinces. The Italian sociologist Arnaldo Bagnasco's (1977) arguments about this region—the "Third Italy"—were further elaborated and thrust centrally into the wider debates over Fordism and post-Fordism by the American social scientists Michael J. Piore and Charles Sable (1984). They contrasted this region's decentralized and democratic yet highly effective capitalism both with the vertically integrated, bureaucratic, unionized, mass production of northwest Italy's great industrial cities and with the corrupt, underdeveloped, impoverished system in the south. They argued that innovations in new computer-driven machinery fit small-batch production and were affordable to small entrepreneurs. In the Third Italy, the new technologies were deployed in revived craft industries and new enterprises with reduced workplace hierarchies, highly skilled workforces, ample opportunities for workers to become capitalists, and flexible labor processes that adjusted more rapidly to changes in consumer tastes and customized goods for niche markets. The Third Italy thesis held that this new industrial system averted the costs and inefficiencies of managerial and union bureaucracy and provided satisfying work and good pay and benefits. It also contended that these changes built on the region's pre-existing culture of cooperation, trust, and social benefits, reflected in its socialist tradition, and propelled it from being one of Italy's poorer regions to its richest. Piore and Sabel's widely discussed account of the Third Italy stressed the region's pattern of "flexible specialization," which broke with postwar Fordism's Taylorized mass production and standardized mass consumption. In their view, the new system had the potential to be applied on a much wider scale and forge a more democratic form of capitalism and modernity that balances individual and collective needs. Although they acknowledged that Fordism persisted, they argued that the historical moment in which they were writing constituted a "second industrial divide," paralleling the nineteenth-century "divide" between simple crafts manufacture and ascendent mass production. In their view, flexible specialization and its wider regime was the superior model and, thus, the likely successor to a crisis-ridden Fordism.<sup>17</sup>

Other thinkers identified a parallel break with Fordism in the United States. Although speaking of a "postmodern" and "postmetropolitan" shift rather than of post-Fordism *per se*, Paul Leinberger and Bruce Tucker (1991) described an even more fundamentally restructured U.S. capitalism that was characterized by technically transformed workplaces, organizations, and neighborhoods; was

linked by knowledge-based “networks”; and that afforded able individuals nearly infinite opportunities for advancement or lateral movement. They portrayed a new generation of professionals forging a fresh “enterprise ethic” shaped to fit the post-postwar era. Leinberger and Tucker traced these post-Fordist tendencies to the “baby boomer” generational experience; in contrast to their parents’ experience of the Depression, wartime unity, and postwar corporate culture, boomers grew up in affluence, opposed the Vietnam War, and distrusted big organizations. After flirtation with alternative life-styles, they entered highly competitive labor markets and restructured workplaces, which lacked the security their parents enjoyed. Leinberger and Tucker described a generation receptive to taking risks, to being creative, and to balancing the desire for professional success with values that favor increased cultural diversity, and, who, overall, reject the conformist worlds of their “organization men” fathers and stay-at-home moms. Aside from a few tepid remarks about people left out of the economic gains, they glowingly portrayed “decentered” organizations, “flattened” hierarchies, and empowered workers. Their fast-moving, wired, “centerless capitalism” and “urban villages” integrated firms, communities, and families as never before, providing more choices, delivering goods more effectively, and nurturing more autonomy and difference. In their view, the former “counterculture” became the cutting-edge of the “new economy.”

Most optimists conceded that huge Fordist firms were still important and subcontracted to the type of firms emphasized by Piore and Sable and Leinberger and Tucker. However, they held that debureaucratized, decentered post-Fordist firms were ascendant. We employ a parenthesized (post)-Fordism to signify approaches that pose more measured arguments about the erosion of Fordism and that reject claims that a radically reorganized, democratized capitalism was on the rise. Although acknowledging the significance of flexibly specialized craft firms and decentered aspects of larger firms, (post)-Fordists contended that such changes were integrated into overall regimes dominated by Fordist bureaucracies and their vertical hierarchies of authority, class, and status. Rather than fading away, they argued, Fordism’s centralized, top-down bureaucracies still ruled core areas of capitalism and employed new computer and informational technologies to more effectively control, deskill, and regiment labor. In their view, recent technological and organizational innovations reflected a broader effort to overcome the problems of postwar capitalism by means of a more intensive and extensive, yet more complexly differentiated, rationalization process. Stressing technical, organizational, and spatial restructuring, (post)-Fordists agreed that the postwar regime had been substantially altered. However, they held that the affluent middle-class oases, such as the Third Italy or Leinberger and Tucker’s promised land of Irvine, California, and Silicon Valley were not the harbingers of an imminent utopian order, but were instead integral components of an emergent and highly segmented global production system that linked knowledge-based production in rich countries with harsh Third World manufacturing regimes, political repression, and poverty and with extensive employment of low-

wage service workers (often immigrants or minorities) at home. (Post)-Fordists held that this reconfigured version of Fordism increased accumulation. However, they also saw in its “decentered” or “postmodernized” features new possibilities for resistance and democracy as well as for reproduction of the old types of drudgery and injustice.

Starting in the late-1970s, the French “regulationist” school revived discussion of Fordism to address multiple crises of postwar capitalism (e.g., Aglietta 1979; Lipietz 1992; Jessop 1997). They contended that capitalism has cyclical periods of stability and crisis and that profit squeezes require a restructuring of the broader political and socio-cultural system as well as the economy. Breaking with the mechanistic Althusserian structuralism that dominated the continental left from the mid-1960s to mid-1970s, they took a more historicist approach to capitalist development that stressed agency. In their view, “regimes of accumulation” and “modes of regulation” emerge, stabilize, stagnate, and fail, but regime shifts are always contested terrains, shaped by dynamics between hegemonic and counterhegemonic blocs. Regulationists described a breakdown and transformation of postwar Fordism during the late-1970s and 1980s, but they held that the shift preserved major facets of Fordism (Sites 2000, 138). Aglietta (1979; 1982) argued that mass consumption was a vital new ingredient of the mature version of U.S. Fordism that flourished from 1945 to 1966. He argued that 1930s labor struggles were the decisive factor that later led to increased wages and benefits in the postwar regime. Aglietta believed that Fordism began to stagnate in the late 1960s when new cybernetic and information technologies were used to restructure work processes and firms, increasing centralization and control, raising rates of exploitation, and employing liberal ideology and extended state power to legitimate and enforce the changes.<sup>18</sup>

In the United States, the question of regime became acute during the crisis-plagued late 1970s and recessionary early 1980s. Outmoded manufacturing equipment, shoddy products, plant shutdowns, increased unemployment, social decline in the “rust belt,” capital flight to the “sun belt” and other countries, weakened labor unions, more polarized labor markets, reduced wages and benefits, and apparent shrinkage of the middle-class—all were interpreted as symptoms of the breakdown of High Fordism.<sup>19</sup> Paralleling French regulationists, American “structures of accumulation” theorists emphasized broader political and socio-cultural regimes and focused especially on the role of class alliances and struggles. These theorists held that U.S. capitalism’s cyclical expansions and recessions manifested four “long swings,” agreeing with Mandel’s earlier view that the fourth and most recent one (starting about 1950) had entered a stagnation phase (Gordon, Edwards, and Reich 1982). By the mid-1980s, certain thinkers in this group stressed that struggles for liberal rights and citizenship by women and minorities as well as labor struggles of predominantly white male workers had eroded Fordism and provided resources for creation of a more democratic, postliberal alternative (Bowles and Gintis 1986).

A most influential (post)-Fordist work, David Harvey's *Condition of Postmodernity* (1989), similarly portrayed a new system of restructured firms and labor markets, weakened labor unions and working-class political parties, and diminished welfare rights. This English geographer's views about the recent structural changes complemented those of the regulationists and structures of accumulation theorists, and, like Mandel, Harvey stressed long-wave shifts of international capitalism. But he emphasized especially the spatial reconfiguration of capitalism on a global basis. Although speaking of "postmodernity," he held that these structural changes are simply the most recent phase of a technologically based long-term process of "time-space compression" that makes the world's farthest reaches increasingly accessible to each other. Under capitalism, he argued, time-space compression is accelerated in great bursts following major profit squeezes and market crises, during which capitalists seek technical innovations (e.g., steamships and railway trains, radio and electric power, TVs and computers) that could accelerate capital's "turnover time" and speed realization of profit and reinvestment.

Harvey stressed the importance of capital mobility, but he addressed its significance in the context of a comprehensive vision of broader socio-cultural change. He connected "flexible accumulation" with cultural postmodernization, attending closely to matters of representation (e.g., postmodern architecture, film, theory). Harvey treated postwar Fordism as a "total way of life" and the new ensemble of social changes as a much more segmented, simulated, global, postmodern version of the same capitalist system or (post)-Fordism (1989, 135). According to Harvey, the global markets, which favor rootless finance capital, are linked by new instant modes of communication, media, information and transport. In his view, these technical changes generated a crisis of representation manifested in highly differentiated, hybridized, restless, schizophrenic, postmodern culture. Harvey was ambiguous about the prospects for post-Fordist or post-liberal democracy, and he implied that postmodernization exhausts left politics. Although other thinkers have systematically explored the connections between postmodernism and capitalism (e.g., Bell [1976] 1996; Jameson 1984; 1991), Harvey provided a comprehensive vision of a capitalist regime shift that connected deftly new technologies, capital mobility, spatially reconfigured social relations, restructured organizations, and cultural transformation on a global scale. His work helped set the stage for the current discussion of globalization.

### **After the Postwar Era: Periodizing Capitalism in the Age of Globalization**

*The New World Order: From the "End of History" to "The Washington Consensus"*

By the mid-1990s, broader theoretical debates over neoliberal restructuring were carried out largely under the rubric of "globalization." Most of the core

issues from the earlier discourses over Fordism remained, but actual use of the terms “Fordism” and “post-Fordism” diminished. Globalization is not a new issue. Although the unique facets and intensity of globalization’s impact today are hard to deny, the process has been entwined with capitalist development from its inception (e.g., Held et al. 1999). Marx made this point emphatically in his youthful comments on capitalism, and he developed the theme in his mature work. Similarly, postwar-era Marxians stressed High Fordism’s growing international scope (Mandel 1978, 310-76). However, by the early 1980s, recession and deindustrialization brought international competition to the center of U.S. public policy debates. Later in the decade, Bennett Harrison and Barry Bluestone’s influential *Great U-Turn* (1988) identified globalization as a core (post)-Fordist strategy that enhanced “flexibility” through “capital mobility,” helping capital weaken labor unions, escape regulation, reduce social wages, and restore accumulation by cutting costs.

The 1989 collapse of Eastern European communism ended the Cold War, and the U.S.-led 1991 multinational intervention in Iraq began the post-postwar era. President George H. Bush’s oft-quoted reference to the “new world order” aptly expressed the new geopolitical realities that opened vast new areas of the world to capitalist investment, labor regimes, and products. A truly globally integrated capitalism was now possible. These events generated much wider discussion of globalization. Harking back to post-Allende Chile’s “economic miracle,” orchestrated by Milton Friedman’s “Chicago boys,” U.S. policymakers and economists prescribed neoliberal “shock therapy” to insure rapid postcommunist transitions to capitalism and insisted on austerity programs in Third World countries seeking World Bank or IMF loans. Armed with ostensibly “universal” knowledge about human nature and “the laws of the market” and ready-made data from mathematical models, U.S. economic experts disregarded the significance of local culture and institutions, confident that their policy recommendations would work in any aspiring capitalist region.<sup>20</sup> They did not, however, conceptualize the “economy” in the manner of the thinkers previously discussed in this paper—as a regime of social structures and processes embedded in and dependent upon a broader historical, socio-cultural complex. After the Cold War ended, economic inequalities increased, the “North-South” divide grew sharper as many of the poorest nations suffered economic and socio-political disintegration, and “retribalization”—a wave of populist uprisings, struggles for autonomy, and racial, ethnic, religious conflicts—intensified and sometimes reached genocidal proportions. Buoyed by the Reagan renaissance’s military build-up, economic restructuring, and stress on America’s special mission in the “free world,” the United States regained its confidence and eagerly embraced its role of the hegemonic power in a more complicated and dangerous world.

Written at the very moment that the Soviet bloc was disintegrating, Francis Fukuyama’s (1989; 1992) “end of history” thesis proclaimed a new age of

unchallenged global neoliberalism. Widely discussed in the popular media and debated by social theorists, his essay became a prime textual marker of the victory of the U.S.-led “West” and end of the postwar era. Fukuyama believed that, in the wake of collapsed communism and failed postwar liberalism (both of which reflected misguided economic egalitarianism and social-engineering), “liberal democracy” (i.e., free-market capitalism) was the *only* option for any nation aspiring to be modern. He speculated that we may now be “at a point where we cannot imagine a world substantially different from our own, in which there is no apparent or obvious way in which the future will represent a fundamental improvement over our current order . . .” (1992, 51). Fukuyama revived triumphal postwar ideas of progressive modernization and the end of ideology, but his minimalist view of democracy (i.e., free markets, formal equality, legal rights) scuttled the Parsonsian emphases on social justice and the welfare state. Although Fukuyama embraced neoliberalism, he still feared a possible weakening of the legitimacy of liberal democracy and stopped short of an unrestrained celebration of its triumph.<sup>21</sup> Fukuyama was roundly attacked by left-leaning critics for his fervent neoconservatism, but they often grudgingly accepted his assertions about neoliberal hegemony and the lack of political alternatives (e.g., Bauman 1992, 175-204; Offe 1996, 3-30).<sup>22</sup>

However, during the mid- and late-1990s, the U.S. stock-market boom generated a “new optimism” and more celebratory views of the new global capitalism appeared in a genre of books aimed at high-tech and dot-com entrepreneurs, investors, managers, symbolic analysts, and other successful professionals. Often draped in postmodern attire, this type of post-Fordism is reminiscent of 1960s claims about a “post-industrial society,” “end of ideology,” and post-Marxian and post-Weberian capitalism free of the rigid bureaucracies and class contradictions of earlier capitalist regimes and so drastically altered that an entirely new socio-economic world appears on horizon. In part, the new optimism emanates from the belief that communication and information technologies, which connect global markets, overcome the divides of space and culture. TV commercials for computer and internet products often have a multinational theme. But they also express optimism about matters closer to home. A popular TV commercial and poignant expression of these sensibilities features a young “punk” employee instructing his buttoned-down, past middle-age boss how to buy stock on-line and winning him over. The “new economy” bridges the cultural gap between the now exuberant (i.e., after the successful trade) boss and hip young friend. Correspondents for the venerable free market-oriented *Economist*, John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge (2000, 341-2) argue that neoliberal globalization is creating the best of all possible worlds—a wired economy that approximates neoclassical theory’s perfect markets, where “rational individuals pursue their interests in light of perfect information, relatively free from government interference and geographical obstacles” and a political world that approaches liberal theory’s perfect freedom, where individu-

als have the ethical autonomy to choose “the good life wherever they find it.” The authors’ glowing faith in neoliberalism, which has a religious quality, is manifested in their book’s title: *A Future Perfect*.

Thomas L. Friedman’s best selling *Lexus and the Olive Tree* (2000) is, perhaps, the most comprehensive (albeit not the most extreme) expression of the optimistic view of globalization.<sup>23</sup> The mainstream media have celebrated this work as the guidebook to globalization and its author as the process’ leading pundit. This book is the exemplar what of has been termed the “Washington consensus”—the idea that the U.S. neoliberal or laissez-faire model should guide globalization. Friedman argues that the United States is perfectly situated for global competition and for its role as globalization’s “ultimate benign hegemon and reluctant enforcer.” Referring to “Americanization-globalization,” Friedman unabashedly resurrects the postwar idea of the United States as the world’s *lead society* (2000, 367, 383). He admits that globalization can be disruptive and elicit an occasional dangerous “backlash,” but is less cautious than Fukuyama in his embrace of neoliberalism. However, the *Lexus and the Olive Tree*’s back cover still bears Fukuyama’s imprimatur, declaring that it captures “the real character of the new world order.”

Friedman contends that an “integrated,” “cosmopolitan” “globalization system,” “composed of global free markets, new technologies and organizations, and rational investors, has replaced the “divided,” “frozen,” “Cold War System.” The new order, he claims, represents a global revolution—a *democratization* of technology, finance, and information that has created a “fast world,” or nonhierarchical, open, dynamic “web” with the “internet as its backbone” (2000, 8-9, 44-72, 200). Exalting the virtues of neoliberal globalization and believing that modernization is driven by global free markets and investor choices, Friedman claims that the “Electronic Herd” of e-trading individual investors and multinational companies grow the economy so effectively that all nations aspiring to be modern must converge toward the American model. Refusal to don the “Golden Straitjacket” (i.e., globalization) condemns a nation to marginality (2000, 104-11). Friedman organizes entire chapters around profound images of globalization, such as “the golden arches theory of conflict prevention” (countries with McDonald’s do not go to war with each other), the “Michael Jordan of geopolitics” (the United States—globalization’s brilliant architect), “microchip immune deficiency” (the disease of resisting globalization), and the “five gas stations theory of the world” (U.S. neoliberalism vs. inferior regimes).<sup>24</sup> Friedman’s argument rests on two critical assumptions; first, free markets work efficiently, enrich the majority, and open the way for myriad rational choices that advance economic growth and globalization; second, global free markets need U.S. military power to stem brushfire wars and terrorism and to insure property rights and social stability. Distancing himself from the right, however, he supports the nation’s social safety-net, its multicultural character, and international role (in the UN, NATO, WTO, IMF). Friedman’s self-described “rational exuberance” about

the stock-market boom, enriched professional middle-class, and revised neoliberalism (giving lip service to social issues) manifests a shift in the dominant ideology of U.S.-led neoliberal globalization from 1980s neoconservatism to the centrist politics of Clinton and Blair (2000, 367-88, 438-9, 463-7, 475).

Prior to Friedman, Benjamin R. Barber in *Jihad vs McWorld* (1996), held that globalization has a U.S. “template” (or “speaks American”), is driven by free market deregulation and innovation in information-communication technologies, and generates populist backlashes. Both authors employ metaphoric titles, alluding to inherent tensions between global commercial culture and local traditions. Barber also embraces cosmopolitan modernity, but in a much more qualified way than Friedman.<sup>25</sup> Barber criticizes the current pattern of globalization, especially the leading U.S.-dominated “new information sector.” Referring to Michael Jordan and “The Nike Image” to illustrate global trade in virtual realities, Barber holds that U.S. pop culture and life-style are inscribed in and sell the product. The image overtakes the product in this postmodern style of peddling goods. Barber contends that massive media concentration through takeovers, tie-ins, and licensing empower American purveyors of video goods and images; they flood global markets, undermine local media industries, and spread U.S. consumer culture to nations that cannot sustain it without destructive cultural and environmental consequences (1996, 58-72, 78-9, 293-300). However, Barber argues that McWorld is not monolithic, but is received differently throughout the world, producing local fusions, hybrid elements and resistance from local cultures. He does not oppose global markets and consumption *per se*, admitting that they have virtues and favoring them over the closed, insular traditional forces that arise in reaction. But he is highly critical of U.S. neoliberalism’s equation of free trade, free markets, and consumer-investor choice with democracy.

Recall that Friedman applauds the diminution of political regulation, identifying consumer- investors as the motor force of globalization and equating them with the demos. Acknowledging increased socio-economic inequality both within and between nations, he must be aware that the majority of the world’s people lack the resources to participate widely in consumption and, especially, in investment. Friedman views neoliberal globalization as a democratization process, but he is undaunted that poor people and people of modest means have no voice in the process. Globalization critics argue that the neoliberal celebration of the market and rollback of the political sphere limits genuine citizenship to the middle-class and above and reduces democracy to a “stockholders republic.” Neoliberalism liberates markets and their participants from regulation by representatives of the overall citizenry and by the institutional and socio-cultural worlds in which they are embedded. Although recognizing that nurturance of responsible citizenship and effective political mediation is no easy matter, critics, such as Barber, contend that genuine democratization requires much wider participation than consumers and investors and much broader purview than the individual self-interest that rules in market choices. Overall, critics contend that market-driven globalization has two basic problems: the erosion of democracy

within nation-states and the absence of an international civil society and political sphere to mediate transnational finance, commerce, and organizations. According to the critics, if Fukuyama is correct that political options are restricted to either neoliberal globalization or fundamentalist ethnic or religious republics that spring up in backlash, then we are condemned to a “terminally postdemocratic” future (Barber 1996, 20).

By the late-1990s, thinkers across the political spectrum concurred that neoliberal policy is a globally hegemonic American idea, but they disagreed over its origins and how it is perpetuated. Advocates of the so-called “Washington consensus,” such as Friedman, usually see it as a natural product of diffuse, individual, rational choices, while critics argue that it is forged by U.S. economic and military power, achieved not as a result of conspiracy or direct force, but rather as a consequence of the United States’ “enormous structural power,” which is “deeply inscribed into the nature and functioning of the present world order” (Held et al., 1999, 425). In his incisively critical *False Dawn*, Englishman and former libertarian John Gray declares that neoliberal globalization is an “American project” fashioned with a great deal of help from the U.S. state. “Free markets are creatures of state power,” he contends, “and persist only so long as the state is able to prevent human needs for security and the control of economic risk from finding political expression” (1998, 17, 100). Scathingly rejecting claims about universal “truths” of the market, Gray argues that neoliberalism reflects an Enlightenment rationalism and universalism retrofitted to distinctly American conditions and then exported worldwide, without regard for local cultures or contexts and blind to the diversity of capitalisms. He holds that the practical failures of orthodox Marxism arise from similar universalizing Enlightenment ways (i.e., one economic model works in every setting). However, he contends that neoliberal globalization generates such uneven development, glaring inequalities, and intense political instability that it undermines the very socio-cultural foundations of its markets. Seeing the “new world order” as an American hallucination, Gray attacks the Washington consensus’ assumption “that the Hobbesian problem of maintaining order has been solved”—i.e., that societies require only minimal political governance. Gray contends that this position is a fatal error in a world where, outside the richest countries, the vast majority of people live on the margins and suffer intense socio-economic privation and insecurity and where rampant nationalism and religious-ethnic conflict prevail. In his view, neoliberalism and the new communication and information technologies free markets from socio-political regulation, institutionally disembedding the economy, enriching elites and professional middle-classes, and undercutting the prospect of freedom and well-being for the vast majority of people. He asserts that genuine “democracy and the free market are competitors rather than partners” (1998, 7, 201-2, 205, 208, 213).

Advocates of the Washington consensus hold that globalization is the work of almost divine universal rationality. Friedman says that if a “visionary

geoarchitect” was asked a century ago to design the model society for a globalized world, he or she could have hardly done better than the current U.S. system (2000, 368). Yet his effusion about the wonders of neoliberalism pales beside the revolutionary rapture found in the manifestos of several dot-com entrepreneurs (e.g., Schwartz et al., 1999). By contrast, Gray charges that attribution of a magical rationality to global markets is a fiction that lends neoliberal globalization an air of inevitability and averts thought about options or contestation (Friedman’s “Golden Straightjacket”). Preliminary results of an ongoing ten-nation study indicate that chief executives of U.S. transnational firms (TNCs and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) share a “market idiom” that equates neoliberal deregulation with “human progress and enlightenment” and resistance to the process as brazen irrationality.<sup>26</sup> The researchers state that “the most striking feature of globalization’s vanguard is the sense of moral innocence that they [CEOs] maintain about the world they are helping create.” They report that the executives claim to be totally objective and neutral about their views of globalization, and seem oblivious that their American background might obscure their vision. It is not at all surprising, therefore, that the executives seldom speak any language other than English, “inhabit a socio-cultural bubble” (e.g., U.S.-style hotels, health clubs, restaurants) when they visit other nations, and associate almost exclusively with like-minded, western-educated professionals. Gray asserts sarcastically that the neoliberal creed “implies that all humans are born American, and become anything else by accident—error [and that] American values are, or will soon be shared by all humankind.” He stresses that this fervent ethnocentrism and neoliberal faith foreclose discussion of today’s most pressing policy question: “how to reconcile the imperatives of deregulated markets with enduring human needs” (1998, 132).

At the turn of the twentieth century, Max Weber declared that the “spirit of capitalism” had been severed completely from its original religious roots. In his view, capitalists’ insatiable drive for acquisition had become “pure utilitarianism,” and, in the United States, the locus of this ethic’s “highest development,” it had come to be identified with “purely mundane passions” or “sport.” He held that the direction of capitalism was now inexorably determined by its “mechanical foundations” ([1904-5] 1958, 181-3). Today few thinkers deny that structural mechanisms of capital and power play an enormous role in globalization. As the discussion above implies, however, many thinkers also hold that cultural beliefs with American roots greatly facilitate the process. We are hardly at the end of ideology. Globalization advocates re-enchant the spirit of capitalism, treating neoliberal globalization as a messianic mission and making it the religion of business and state.<sup>27</sup> As theologian Harvey Cox (1999) argues, they ascribe to the “The Market” powers of omniscience, omnipotence, and omnipresence and, ultimately, treat it as if it were “God.” This religious fervor pervades Friedman’s book right up to his closing meditation about the compatibility of religion and electronically-mediated global capitalism (i.e., “fast capitalism”) and the ques-

tion of—"Is God in cyberspace?" (2000, 468-70). Similarly Micklethwait and Wooldridge end their work with a panegyric about the imminent rise of neoliberal utopia. Employing quasireligious imagery ("The Individual's Prayer" and "An Empire without End"), they praise global capitalism for making liberal individualism the top priority and creating near perfect markets. Quoting Sir Robert Peel's points about individual freedom fulfilling "the beneficent designs of an all-seeing Creator" and "Christian Duty," the authors suggest that the IMF ought to find more spiritual and streetwise ways of spreading the word about the benefits of globalization (2000, 332-43).

Numerous internet gurus attach a New Age religiosity to fast capitalism. *The Cluetrain Manifesto* (Levine et al. 2000, 39, 82-3, 90-1, 102) claims that "networked markets" are "conversations" and replace High Fordism's manipulative management and marketing strategies with a discursively democratic new economy of "human voices" that speak a truth-telling "word of web" language. Implying that web-based markets are sacred, they hold that "This fervid desire for the web bespeaks a longing [for a "return to voice"] so intense that it can only be understood as spiritual." Believers in this re-enchanted spirit of capitalism often embrace culturally progressive causes, sing praises to change, flattened hierarchy, open discourse, broader participation, multicultural workplaces, and saving the planet from ecological disaster (Schwartz et al. 1999). But this perspective consecrates technocratic infrastructure and reduces the social world to rational actors, preferences, and choices.<sup>28</sup> Called by some the "Californian ideology," this libertarianism with a muted social conscience rules among the new economy's information and communication technology elites.<sup>29</sup> These globalization advocates assume that the stock market investments that have enriched themselves assure rational allocation of resources and revolutionary socio-economic progress on a global scale. Critics charge that this theology lacks theoretical and empirical support—that the soaring stock market gains explain sky-high CEO compensation packages and the hefty accumulations of some middle class investors, but provide little insight into actual global corporate governance or overall socio-economic development (O'Sullivan 2000). Carriers of the new spirit of capitalism do not treat the economy and democracy as social things, and see global capitalism's blemishes to be largely technical or individual imperfections. They claim to be fomenting a revolution that will free the engine of progress from its postwar manacles; the liberated holy trinity of the all-powerful, all-knowing market, magical web, and hyper-rational investor-consumer will enrich us all or, at least, greatly improve the lot of humanity. This new civil religion or ideology, which re-enchants the economy—the most worldly, rationalized domain of modernity—produces a stunningly good conscience and is the fabric of the blinders described by Gray and other globalization critics. It surely has pervaded the 1990s climate summarized by Perry Anderson (2000, 10): "What is the principal aspect of the past decade? Put briefly, it can be defined as the virtually uncontested consolidation, and universal diffusion of neo-liberalism."<sup>30</sup>

*The Interregnum After High Fordism: Mapping Neoliberal Globalization*

We concur with (post)-Fordist arguments that neoliberal globalization represents a significant break with postwar capitalism, but it retains too many High Fordist elements to represent a complete rupture. The new regime is not yet on the horizon. In the discussion to follow, we outline schematically a multidimensional and contested process of *neoliberal* globalization. The emphasis on “neoliberal” is to remind readers that we focus on a part of a broader process. We explore a *regime of capitalism in motion* not globalization as a whole. In other words we are not trying to reduce globalization to an “economic” complex. We believe that capitalism has enormous—indeed fateful—consequences for life on a planet that has never before been so commodified, but we want to avoid sterile debates about the relative importance of different factors (e.g., economic versus cultural) in a broader, complexly intertwined, and indeterminate globalization process.

### **Flexible Accumulation: Commodification/Recommodification**

Neoliberals’ self-declared aim is maximal “flexibility” and minimal “rigidity.” Put simply, flexibility refers to the pursuit of profits with as few restrictions as possible under the most favorable conditions and in the widest possible arena. The consequent diminution of social, political, and geographical constraints on capital accumulation and the vastly expanded scope of market exchange have been the engine of globalization. Even some cultural theorists who criticize economism of both the right and the left concede that globalization has intensified and extended commodification (e.g., Tomlinson 1999, 81-8). Deregulation, privatization, reduced public subsidies, and increased user fees, argued under a rubric of small government, tax cuts, and local control, have been the core of the U.S. neoliberal agenda. These strategies have often operated in concert with a racial politics, urging, *sotto voce*, for reduced support for “undeserving,” “free-riding” minorities. Regardless of the level of actual participation in international markets, managers argue that international competition and their very survival compels them to intensify and extend work-time; use sliding shifts or beepers; minimize wages and benefits; employ part-time, temporary, or contract labor; and fight union and government “interference.” Re-engineered organizational structure, new communication and information technology, and restructured financial operations serve the similar ends. Enhanced “efficiency” translates into increased return on invested capital.

On a global scale, neoliberals pit free trade, private initiative, market-led growth, and outward-oriented development against postwar demand stimulation, import-substitution, state intervention, and central planning. Their policies increase capital mobility and diminish its social burdens (e.g., Harrison and Bluestone 1988; Rifkin 1996; 2000; Brohman 1996; Brenner 1998; Gray 1998,

1-54) Globalization has also accelerated the global shift from independent production and in-kind exchange to wage labor and provision of needs through market exchange. The numbers of wage workers have doubled during the past three decades of globalization (Coates 2000: 256). An important part of this growth—commodification of peasant life creates a labor force for Third World industrialization and consumers for the home market. The process also facilitates a new international division of labor that accelerates a shift in rich nations from manufacturing to information and service production. Further, it provides a flexible pool of immigrant labor often employed in the First World as domestics for the “busy” professional middle-class and as disposable, low-cost casual workers in very low pay, hazardous jobs. This ongoing proletarianization process is reminiscent of early capitalism rather than of a postindustrial economy (Sassen 1998). Commodification is also advanced by other strategies, such as creation of new markets (e.g., web advertising and dot.com business), deregulation (e.g., opening areas formally closed to advertising to commercial messages), and recommodification of public goods (e.g., raising tuition at public colleges). Laissez-faire policy disembeds markets from socio-cultural and political institutions, reducing capital’s costs, increasing its mobility, and advancing its power vis-à-vis labor and the state. As Gray says, the neoliberal dream “of a single global market assumes that economic life of every nation can be refashioned in the image of the American free market” (1998, 4).

### **The Digital Revolution: Re-Engineering and Network Organizations**

Most globalization writers stress the vital role of new technologies, which accelerate, diversify, improve, and cut the costs of communication and information (e.g., Giddens 2000, 24-37; Tomlinson 1999, 1-31). Friedman, for example, asserts that: “Globalization has its own defining technologies: computerization, miniaturization, digitalization, satellite communications, fiber optics, and the Internet . . .” (2000, 9). Globalization advocates and critics alike hold that the new technologies give rise to *network organizations*, which are communicatively-based, process-oriented, dispersed, horizontal, ad hoc, complex, and dynamic. The web is the prototypical network. Network organizations invert the rigid, top-down bureaucratic command structures described by Weber and advocated by Taylor and Ford. Many commentators portray the new communication and information technologies as producing a great leap forward in a “Third Industrial Revolution” that began with postwar mainframe computers. Besides improving communication, they hold, the new technologies are “thinking machines,” and are able to perform “conceptual, managerial, and administrative functions and [to coordinate] production, from extraction of raw materials to marketing and distribution of final goods and services” (Rifkin 1996, 60; Castells 1996, 29-65).

However, thinkers sharply disagree about the new technologies’ impacts. Celebrants claim that the technologies forge a democratic revolution, while

critics contend that they polarize already sharp inequalities. The new technologies (e.g., money-machines, cell phones, Amazon.com, bulletin boards) have improved substantially the lives of many people, saving time, energy, and money, creating fresh opportunities, opening access, providing convenience and cultural enrichment, and democratizing certain activities and spaces. For example, they are indispensable even to organizations that resist neoliberal globalization (e.g., anti-WTO protesters in Seattle made wide use of the web to publicize, mobilize support for, and organize their cause). Still the democratic revolution trumpeted by Friedman and other globalization advocates gives only lip service to the “digital divide” or “cyber-segmentation.” Celebrating the creation of vast new democratic spaces, open to everyone, they simply fail to acknowledge that these domains are private or accessible primarily to people who can afford the equipment costs or user fees, especially high cost electronic services. Although efforts are being made to provide free computer access in public spaces such as schools and libraries, it is still significant that, in the year 2000, 73 percent of American children live in households without Internet access and 49 percent lack a computer. For the most part, poor people live a nonwired existence; 84 percent of the households in low income urban areas have no computer and 20 percent have no phone. The gap is far greater in poor countries, where the vast majority lack access to the basic technologies of the “new economy.”

Regardless of their positive features and untapped potential, the new technologies have been deployed in the United States and certain other countries precisely at the moment when neoliberal policies have reduced public investment, increased privatization, and blocked strategies to provide both wider public access to spaces “gated”<sup>31</sup> by money and to reduce socio-economic inequalities. Even technological investments in U.S. public schools, which vary widely with communities’ taxable wealth, manifest the divide between rich and poor districts. Globalization advocates declare the dawn of a new informational democracy, but they appear oblivious that the new technologies empower some strata and nations, but fail to provide full “citizenship” in the new cyberspaces to those who lack adequate financial resources (Rifkin 1996, 165-217; 2000; Sassen 1998, 178-80; Bradley 2000).

Similar points hold for network organizations. Globalization advocates speak of a “shift from hierarchies to networks”; employees of “all types” are seen to be “active subjects” participating freely in “active communication” on the debureaucratized web (Leinberger and Tucker 1991, 332-51). Undergirding the meteoric rise of the NASDAQ and so-called “new economy,” the new technologies have been used to restructure and re-engineer organizations. These technologies have had many laudable effects and are used in horizontal networks such as internet bulletin boards. However, most high wage information and financial workers, who personify the net revolution, operate in much more hospitable workplaces and organizational environments than the far more numerous non-professionals, especially low wage service workers. The differences are even

more pronounced for immigrant casual workers or for workers in the often authoritarian and nineteenth century-like labor processes of Third World U.S. affiliates (e.g., Greider 1998). As we have previously noted, core facets of Fordist organizational structure persist in most parts of large U.S. firms; the new technologies are employed largely to implement “downsizing,” “lean production,” “just in-time production,” “outsourcing,” and other types of neoliberal rationalization in order to improve control, regimentation, and surveillance and, thus, to decrease costs and increase return on invested capital (Rifkin 1996, 90-106; 2000; Castells 1996, 151-259; Dyer-Witheford 1999; Prechel 1994; 1997; 2000, 175-279; Prechel and Bois 1998; Staples 2000).

### **Deterritorialization/Postmodernization: U.S.-Accented Cultural Hybridity**

The current phase of globalization has been characterized by dramatically increased transnational movement of material goods, images, and people (Sassen 1998; 2000). This increased mobility leads to new mixtures of culture or hybridization. Local cultures have long been affected—even shaped—by outside forces, and, historically, under capitalism, they have been torn from their local moorings (Harvey 1988, 199-352; Giddens 1990, 21-9).<sup>32</sup> Thus, deterritorialization is not a new process. But neoliberal globalization’s transnational division of labor and free trade stir multisided fusions, blurred borders, and cultural homelessness. Its worldwide infrastructure of airports, malls, computer terminals, chain restaurants, and other “nonplaces” erase distinct space and history, and its core means of communication, such as the web, is even more radically deterritorialized (Tomlinson 1999, 108-20).

As Seago shows clearly in his article in this issue, cultural goods with indefinite origins abound; what appears to be traditional is invented; and what seems to be homogenous is hybrid. “American made” products often incorporate design and engineering ideas, parts, and labor from many nations, and a piece of “Caribbean” music likely blends traditions that have circulated back and forth between the United States and Africa as well as between the Islands. Friedman describes the label on a computer component: “This part was made in Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, China, Mexico, Germany, the U.S., Thailand, Canada, and Japan. It was made in so many different places that we cannot specify a country of origin” (2000: 40). In America’s pervasively malled, theme-parked, mediatized pop culture, “real things” turn out to be “simulated,” and the postmodern “cultural dominant” is a mixture of fragmentation, rampant commercialization, spectacle, playfulness, and hype. Especially, in the First World, however, globalized markets deliver a wider variety of products than ever before and often at good prices.

If Jameson (1984) was correct that postmodernism was the “cultural logic of late capitalism,” then what post-post term describes “fast capitalism’s” far more dizzying pace and diversity? The accelerated movement and mixture of people

nearly matches that of goods and images. Global proletarianization uproots peasants formerly fixed to local spaces. In a radically unequal world, the push and pull of economic forces motivates the privileged as well as the poor to migrate. To compete for Indian computer engineers, Oracle of Silicon Valley installs an executive Indian cafeteria, with a tandoori oven, alongside ones for other groups (Cass 2000, 67). In global cities, divergent immigrant populations forge multiple identities, hybrid offspring, and cultural fusions. Globalization's standardized goods "are locally consumed, read, and transformed," and its cultural flows move in divergent directions (Cox 1997; Hall 1997a; 1997b; Hall et al. 1999, 283-326; Sassen 1998, xxx, 41-5; Held et al. 1999, 373; Giddens 2000, 34; Thurow 2000, 27-8; Barber 1996).

Yet globalization's nonplaces and hybridized pop culture bears a clear American imprint. American tourists often feel at home in these spaces, while locals experience, at least, a tinge of unease or displacement, even when they enjoy the consumption. The ironies of global pop culture's hybridized American accent are apparent in the tendency of both globalization advocates and critics (e.g., Friedman and Barber) to treat McDonald's as the prime symbol of "Americanization-Globalization."<sup>33</sup> McDonald's of France has been a very contested terrain. Its web-site stresses that it customizes its operations for regional tastes. Averting total domestication of the corporate image or food, McDonald's managers are aware that their success derives from marketing Americana with the burgers and fries.<sup>34</sup> However, its American identity makes the company a prime target for globalization critics. French outlets have been bombed, trashed, and protested; the latest dispute drew support not only from the French but worldwide from antiglobalization activists of diverse political persuasions.<sup>35</sup>

### **Transnationalization: TNCs and the Globalization System**

Neoliberal globalization has been marked by waves of mergers and new types of corporate linkages and modes of concentration, which have increased the already substantial concentrations of private organizational power (Barber 1996, 137-51; Prechel 1997). A major feature of this trend has been the expansion of transnational corporations (TNCs), the private sector's engine of globalization.<sup>36</sup> Multinational acquisitions and mergers between major corporations from different nations (e.g., Chrysler and Mercedes-Benz) are an easily visible aspect of the process. But corporations have also expanded foreign direct investment (FDI), and created networks of global subsidiaries; FDI grew yearly at about 30 percent in the second half of the 1980s and more than doubled in the 1990s. Most FDI was in the United States and Europe, but it also increased sharply in developing countries. Consequently, a major part of world trade (e.g., 40 percent of U.S. imports) is between parent firms and subsidiaries (Gilpin 2000, 169-70).

Transnational, corporate collaborative arrangements are complex and varied, going beyond ownership relations. For example, besides subsidiaries, TNCs often have flexible networks of separately owned, but dependent regular suppliers. As Deane Neubauer points out in his article in this issue, development of new communication and information technologies, internationalization of key business services, and major innovations in transportation facilitated TNC's expansion and more diverse organizational arrangements.<sup>37</sup> The major shift in investment patterns and corporate alliances has changed qualitatively the connections between national economies (Dicken 1998; Harrison 1994). The impacts of TNCs on host nations are varied and a matter of intense debate, but it appears to us indisputable that they have substantially increased capital's leverage with the state and labor (Ross 2000; Mittelman 2000, 31-89; Held et al. 1999, 280; Dicken 1998, 243-77; Bonanno and Constance 1996).

Some globalization advocates hold that the TNC-led fusion of new technologies and free markets have transformed nationally-based High Fordist, oligopoly capitalism into a "centerless" global capitalism—the world as web. In their view, the new economy is a fluid, seamlessly integrated space of free flowing information, capital, and commodities, orchestrated by a global invisible hand. Yet TNCs are not "placeless" or "deterritorialized" entities. Their parent firms are almost always embedded in a national and institutional home base, where their socio-political connections and knowledge of local business, political, and cultural environments provide them comparative advantages (Dicken 1998, 193-200). Moreover, business infrastructure is unevenly distributed. Parent firms, home offices, and major subsidiaries usually have spatial roots in global cities, which are rich in information, communication, and financial resources; built environments; and pools of highly skilled workers, services, and other infrastructure that major businesses need to operate efficiently. These centers of corporate power restrict access to information, which is often their most valuable resource and commodity. Their "fire-walled" intranets hardly constitute an open web. Also, most TNCs are in the richest countries, where their owners and managers reside and which usually provide the best overall socio-economic, political, and legal bases for their operations. It is no surprise that the United States is the number one TNC host economy and home economy, that New York is the world's largest center of fiber-optic cable services, and that English is the globalization system's international language. For similar reasons, TNC subsidiaries and suppliers are also spread very unevenly (Gilpin 2000, 165; Dicken 1998, 177-200 Sassen 1998, 184-94; 211).

Globalization has reconfigured corporate geography into a new system of worldwide connections, but they are hardly decentered and fully integrated, and they remain hierarchical and unevenly distributed. Some critics see the transnational economy as an "empire" ruled by the United States, with strong support from its rich "G8" partners and assistance from segments of local elites and publics in other parts of the world (Hardt and Negri 2000, 308-14; Harvey 2000, 53-72). The imperial metaphor aside, the transnational system is, at least, partially a creation

of the U.S. state's neoliberal policies, its use of economic and military power, and the support given by U.S. allies. In a dispersed way and in the name of "economic development," TNCs and the globalization system benefit from state power and public resources. The neoliberal "free market" does not rule out copious state business assistance.

### **Winner Take All Culture: Economic Inequality and Polarization**

Globalization advocates often admit that the process has increased economic inequality (e.g. Gilpin 1999, 306-15). But they treat the problem as a footnote to an inevitable and generally fruitful process. Friedman acknowledges the extreme inequality by discussing the huge income gap between super-rich Michael Jordan and semi-rich, Joe Kleine, a marginal National Basketball Association (NBA) player, who benefits from and does not begrudge Jordan's well-earned success (which helped market the NBA globally) (2000, 306-24). Although expressing concern about the exceptional inequalities and emiseration in poor countries, Friedman brushes the matter aside with the argument that the only other option, a Cuban-style managed economy, impoverishes everyone.<sup>38</sup> Avid cheerleaders of globalization hold that poor countries have no choice but to go global, and imply that consequent technological progress and an enlarged global middle-class will eventually make "all boats rise." Comfortable pundits claim that the roaring 1990s U.S. stock boom is the "best economy ever" and that the strange mix of high growth and low unemployment with low inflation defies neoclassical theory's laws of motion (the demand for labor should cause wages to rise and inflation to increase).

Thus, globalization advocates pronounce the emergence of a "new economy," "long boom," or "permanently high plateau" (e.g., Schwartz et al. 1999, 47). However, retaining neoclassical theory's libertarian presuppositions, they reject the idea that accelerated accumulation on top and stagnating or falling wages below might somehow be related and have something to do with a shift in power between capital and labor.<sup>39</sup> By contrast, critics argue that capital's enhanced leverage over labor is the secret of the so-called new economy. In the heartlands of neoliberalism—the United States and United Kingdom—inequality grew sharply from the 1980s to the late-1990s (Mishel et al., 1999, 12). In the United States, most wage earners had either stagnating or falling wages and family income stagnated, even though the numbers of hours worked increased substantially. Regardless of increases in the federal minimum wage, its purchasing power has eroded by \$2.00 per hour since 1968.<sup>40</sup> By contrast, the richest 1 percent of families have good reason to concur with "best ever" assessments of the so-called new economy; their net worth increased on average from about \$1 million to about \$10 million between 1989 and 1997. The rest of the upper 20 percent also made substantial gains, and have good reason for their exuberant optimism.<sup>41</sup> However, the nearly one-third (32 percent) of American families that had a net

worth of \$10,000 or less in 1997 had reason to disagree. The United States has the highest level of economic inequality, the least upward mobility for low wage workers, and the highest poverty rates of the leading economies. (Mishel et al. 1999, 9, 12, 23). These are the fruits of “the longest peacetime expansion without a recession in the nation’s history” (Schwartz et al. 1999, 47).

Polarized economic conditions are plainly visible in the built environments of American cities, where their rundown ghetto areas are separated from downtown business, financial, and shopping complexes, elegant restaurants, and gentrified neighborhoods. Surveillance and security systems in privatized “public” spaces, in gated neighborhoods, in upscale suburban malls, and in urban border zones exemplify applications of the new technologies that contradict the radically democratic uses described by New Age “webheads” (Davis 1992). The polarization is also visible in “winner-take-all-culture” that suffuses schools and workplaces, emphasizing ranks, embracing the stars, and nurturing status seeking and personal ambition (Frank and Cook 1995). Neoliberalism’s self-congratulatory rhetoric about fostering “personal responsibility” among the poor absolves the well off from public responsibility.

Economic inequality between the rich and poor nations is even more extreme than the sharp divides in American society. From 1989-1998, the poorest fifth of nations’ share of global income fell from 2.3 percent to 1.4 percent. Poor nations suffer from enormous crises in health care, environment, food, and infrastructure (Giddens 2000, 33-4). Globalization critics argue that the process has substantially enriched the world-wide upper strata and eroded wages, benefits, and working conditions for the rest of the majority of the world’s people.<sup>42</sup> They contend that class inequalities are hardened by status inequalities in a global workforce that added many women and racial minorities and employs much immigrant and informal labor. Emphasizing the abject poverty and misery of the poorest nations and poorest people, these critics charge that neoliberal policies hasten the famine, epidemics, and environmental disaster that loom on the horizon.<sup>43</sup>

We do not, however, blame globalization for all the world’s ills. Poverty and inequality arise from plural and complex causes, and measurement of the precise role of globalization in the growing economic polarization would be a daunting task. Rather, our point is that existing and growing intra- and international inequality is a reason to doubt globalization advocates’ claims that neoliberal globalization represents the only way to a brighter future. Major U.S. political parties have dropped the postwar projects of reducing economic inequality and fighting poverty, holding that past efforts failed and that market-based growth is the only way to alleviate such problems. Twenty years of neoliberal policy suggests that the opposite is true, but the United States still exports theology to the rest of the world.

## **End of the Nation-State, or The Social State versus the Carceral, Eco-Devo State**

“Hyperglobalist” thinkers, from left and right, contend that transnational capitalism, international governance, and hybrid global culture have effectively ended the modern nation-state. They claim that while the nation-state may retain its bureaucratic shell and many of its functions, globalization so greatly diminishes its regulatory capacities that it has lost any semblance of genuine autonomy (Held et al. 1999, 3-5). In the globalization system, nation-states have numerous transnational connections and, thus, experience many external impacts that provide novel challenges to national sovereignty. However, nation-states still control legitimate forms of coercive force and law, govern much of the institutional matrix for the global economy, and institute policies that can facilitate or resist globalization. Moreover, international governance is still very limited and uneven and is frequently strenuously resisted. Great powers, such the United States and the G8 nations, are hardly passive bystanders; they set the direction of globalization.<sup>44</sup>

Yet the nation-state’s regulatory and welfare arms, or social state, are a contested terrain under globalization. Neoliberals see the post-World War II social state as the cause of the worst rigidities, waste, and social problems (e.g., welfare dependency). They oppose social regulation, which holds the private sector accountable for its “externalities” (e.g., pollution), and progressive taxation, which redistributes resources downward and supports the social state. The 1970s arguments about the “overloaded” state and its contribution to a “revolution of rising expectations” foreshadowed a right turn that culminated in the politics of Thatcher and Reagan. American neoliberals fell short of their goals to radically roll back the social state, but they made much sharper reductions than were instituted in the European social democracies, which had larger social states. The United States was the only rich nation to reduce substantially the increasing rate of social spending from the 1970s through the 1990s. Entitlements benefiting the middle-class (e.g., Social Security) fared much better than means-tested programs for the poor, which were often cut to the bone or had their eligibility requirements stiffened. As Alejandra Marchevsky and Jeanne Theoharis point out in their article in this issue, the harsh treatment of the poor was animated, in part, by white middle-class resentment against increased tax burdens and by a racial politics that exploited the prejudicial stereotype of African Americans as “undeserving poor” who cause higher taxes and urban decline. Verging on Social Darwinism, the 1996 welfare reform legislation supported by Democratic President Clinton exemplified the radical break from the postwar “war on poverty” and “Great Society.” (Bowles and Gintis: 1986; Harrison and Bluestone: 1988; Katz 1989; Quadagno 1994; Wilson 1997; Noble 1997, 104-34).<sup>45</sup> Racial politics also built popular support for strengthening the internal security arm of the U.S. state; police forces and prison systems were expanded, prosecutors were favored, prison terms were lengthened, and the death penalty was used more widely. At the

millennium, the high U.S. rates of imprisonment and execution are unparalleled among rich nations. They also affect primarily poor people and disadvantaged minorities, especially African Americans. The increasingly “lean and mean” U.S. social state is also manifested in its health care system, which is the most expensive in the world, but leaves about 46 million citizens uninsured and many more with inadequate coverage.<sup>46</sup> While the social state was slashed, corporations and the rich received major tax cuts, and developers and companies on the move benefited from economic development (Eco Devo) policies that provided generous public subsidies for private sector development. Such “public-private partnerships” subsidize upscale postmodern business-consumer-recreation-stadium complexes for the rich and professional middle-class and relegate to the poor what Foucault called “carceral” cities-centers of surveillance and detention (Davis 1992; Harvey 2000).

By the mid-1980s, neoliberal globalization had also helped exhaust the postwar model of social democracy (Esping-Anderson 1985, 289-92). Beliefs that the social state is ineffective and cannot be sustained under globalization favors the “ratcheting down” of postwar era “social settlements” (Coates 2000, 259).<sup>47</sup> Yet neither markets nor nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have picked up the slack left by the diminished social state. Besides mounting misery and unmet needs among increasing numbers of very poor people, paralysis of the social state affects other areas. For example, extending and intensifying capitalist production and consumption has exacerbated environmental problems. As Black points out in his review of global environmental literature in this volume, the globalization system is itself threatened by potential environmental crises, such as resource depletion, toxic waste, global warming, pollution of air and ground water, and destruction of rainforests (Held et al. 1999, 376-413). Neoliberal theology’s certainty about the virtues of a shrunken “Nanny State” and about the virtues of global free markets parallels the nascent Fordist “iron cage” that Weber feared would “determine” social life “until the last ton of fossilized coal is burnt” (1958:181).

### **End of the Political: Neoliberal Hegemony and Convergence of Left and Right**

Post-World War II political discourse in advanced industrial democracies was characterized by a left-right continuum. Generally, major political parties ranged from those embracing market-centered Keynesianism and a semi-welfare state to those advocating social democracy and robust welfare state. Both models retained capitalism, but they posed substantially different alternatives. The Keynesian model stressed extending the social state to correct market imperfections, reduce insecurity, and avert economic and political crises. From this vantage, preservation of market-centered capitalism required modest social regulation, income and wealth redistribution, and decommmodification. By contrast, the social democratic model called for more sweeping versions of these

measures, aiming to reduce class differences, increase capital's responsibilities, and move toward a mixed regime or market socialism (Esping-Anderson 1985, 145-78).<sup>48</sup> The critical point is that the postwar left-right continuum posed alternative policy frameworks for managing capitalist development and employing the social state democratically to regulate the market.

Under neoliberal globalization, by contrast, policy regimes blur, parties converge, and left-right alternatives vanish. The authors of *The Long Boom* declare: "It's not about left and right; it's about what works" (Schwartz et al. 1999, 74); Louis Rossetto, editor and publisher of *Wired*, praises "the Digital Revolution's crucial left-right fusion of free minds and free markets" (2000, 1); and Friedman asserts that the golden straightjacket forces everyone "toward America's gas station" and reduces their political choice to "Pepsi and Coke" (2000, 105-6, 380). Liberal Ulrich Beck describes a "paralysis" of right-left party politics; it is a "silent movie," he says—people "move their lips and pound the keyboards, but nothing comes out!" (Beck 1997, 149). Neo-Marxist Claus Offe (1996, 3-30) speaks of "zero options," and postmodernist Zygmunt Bauman (1992, 175-86) refers to "living without an alternative." Leading radical conservative Alain de Benoist (1995) holds that the postwar right and left are exhausted. In his view, neoconservatives and social democrats alike now serve global neoliberalism, handling affairs in nearly identical ways and offering no genuine alternatives. His New Right critique of the free market and globalization is ambiguous, sounding at critical points almost identical to left-leaning Barber's critique of McWorld (see Benoist 1996; 1998).

Arguments about the "end of left and right" and similar "endings discourses" have been a major thread of interdisciplinary social theory since the late 1970s, multiplying in the wake of Fukuyama's "end of history" thesis and the centrist fusion politics of Clinton and Blair.<sup>49</sup> These positions often speak of an end of modernity or history, but they expose a perceived exhaustion of the postwar-Keynsian and social democratic visions of modernization and their related political ideologies, policy regimes, and reforms. Although some of these commentators see creative and fresh political forces emerging from the erosion of postwar politics, most portray depoliticization and gridlock, contending that neoliberal globalization gives so much power to markets and capital that social states are forced into full-fledged and even irreversible retreat and, as a consequence, major social problems are left to fester.<sup>50</sup>

### *Return of the Political: Resistance to Neoliberal Globalization*

Globalization critics argue that a market crisis would have almost instantaneous impact on today's wired and closely intertwined worldwide financial markets. Fast moving ripple effects occurred at the peak of the recent Asian crisis, but they did not generate a major crisis of the globalization system. A substantial erosion of U.S. markets, however, would likely have more serious consequences,

because of the nation's central role in global capitalism.<sup>51</sup> If the new technologies are not the basis of a new economy, but are, instead, a high tech version of earlier technical revolutions that generated similar initial surges of profit and optimism and later ran their course, then we can expect a cyclical erosion of profits and eventual economic, political, and social crises. In the absence of such an erosion, however, festering social problems, weakening political legitimacy, and growing dissatisfaction (felt by the people being squeezed economically and socially) could still generate major political opposition to continued neoliberal hegemony. In the United States, neoliberal policy has dominated since the early 1980s, and, in some circles, its promises have begun to fade. Finally, Barber (1996, 155-300) and others argue that globalization's destabilizing impacts have already generated opposition from local cultures and led to "retribalization"—a centrifugal wave of populist struggles for regional or group identity, autonomy, and power that range from democratic efforts to preserve a community or secure group recognition (e.g., saving a dialect or defending an indigenous people's corporate rights) to bloody and even genocidal warfare (conflicts in Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, and Northern Ireland or European neo-Nazis and U.S. white supremacists). At the millennium, such resistance grows ever more self-conscious and the very idea of globalization is contested by a new populist politics of right and left.

Manifesting broader retribalization, right-wing populism (e.g., French National Front, the Italian Northern League, and U.S. Neoconfederate groups) occurs worldwide. Finishing second in the 1999 Austrian elections and forming a center-right government with a more conventional conservative party, Jörg Haider's Freedom Party brought ascendent radical right politics to world's attention. The European "New Right," which borrows heavily from Weimar-era radical conservatism, poses sharp critiques of neoliberal globalization.<sup>52</sup> Similarly, U.S. "paleoconservatives" charge that neoconservatives, neoliberals, and liberals are all lackeys of the new world order.<sup>53</sup> New Right intellectuals attack economism, rationalism, multiculturalism, and human rights. Many embrace Weimar era, radical conservative Carl Schmitt's view that Anglo-American economics, equal rights, liberal institutions, and individualism annihilate the cultural bases for coherent identity, community, and political unity and allow global capitalism to evaporate cultural difference. Schmitt saw Marxism's economic egalitarianism as a more collectivist and regimented version of the same utilitarian ethos.<sup>54</sup> Martin Heidegger also warned that liberalism and Marxism were "metaphysically the same," causing a "darkening of the world" or total cultural homogenization ([1953] 1961, 37). The New Right revives these views in a postmodern racial identity politics that claims to defend the "the right to difference" and resist cultural hegemony. Their so-called "ethnopluralism" holds that sending immigrants home resists globalization and saves indigenous cultures.<sup>55</sup> They contend that cultural survival depends on returning politics to its rightful dominance over markets and empowering ethnic particularity as the

bulwark against homogenizing neoliberal globalization. European radical conservatives call for federated ethnic states, with ethnically-based citizenship, while U.S. paleoconservatives call for a white Christian republic to “take back the nation.” These thinkers want to forge an authoritarian communitarian order that scuttles liberal rights and excludes ethnic others. Although unlikely to attain power under current conditions, the radical right strengthens the broader nationalist, nativist, racist, and antidemocratic tendencies that block efforts to cope with inequality and the harmful consequences of neoliberal globalization.

On the left, during the 1970s, “new social movements” (NSMs) shifted the focus of critique from capitalism and redistribution to culture and the state.<sup>56</sup> Environmental groups opened new dialogues about top-down planning and unsustainable, harmful development policies, while identity politics mobilized racial and ethnic groups, lesbians and gays, women, and other minorities against cultural exclusion and disparagement. NSM advocates held that the postwar left’s one-sided class politics and reliance on the state and planning ignored or exacerbated environmental and cultural problems. However, opposing thinkers countered that the NSMs’ diverse agendas were too fragmented to forge a common politics or to address economic inequality and, especially, the problems of the poorest people and nations.<sup>57</sup> But signs of a new left alliance politics emerged suddenly in 1999 and 2000, in the Seattle, Davos (Switzerland), and Washington DC protests against the WTO, IMF, World Bank, and other U.S.-dominated governance organs of the global economy.<sup>58</sup> The trial of the group that trashed the French McDonald’s (to protest globalized industrial food) drew similar left groups together in June 2000 (Truehart 2000; Associated Press 2000). These collective actions fused cultural politics with critiques of capitalism and focused attention of diverse groups on the impacts of neoliberal globalization. Globalization advocates hold that the groups are too ragtag and diverse to be effective, but their sarcastic rejections of the protests betray a fear of the new alliance politics (e.g., Friedman 2000, 334-6).

It is possible that these protests were one-time actions, cultural happenings, and media events, and it is too soon to tell if they are the start of a new political realignment or reconstitution of the left. However, they represent a step toward the broad alliance politics that NSM theorists have praised abstractly but have seldom, if ever, executed in practice. Globalization’s diffuse and varied impacts touch most NSM groups in some way and provide natural bridges for alliance politics. The protests brought together a multinational assortment of cultural movements and labor unions that for a moment overcame the divides of recent left-leaning politics. Communicating, acting in common, confronting police forces, and responding to media coverage builds bonds that could lead to future actions and more permanent organization. Unions have more female and minority members and officers today, and are more able, than in the postwar era, to bridge the cultural and political differences with NSMs. Moreover, neoliberal globalization has proletarianized large numbers of women and minorities. Leading women’s groups are already highly organized and have international

connections, and could emerge as a crucial site of resistance and links to other groups.<sup>59</sup> Major environmental groups and certain minority group organizations have similar potential. Information and communications technologies, which are the infrastructure for implementation of (post)-Fordist rationalization, also serve as transnational links for groups that resist globalization. The collective actions, media coverage, web-links, and new discourses may be the start of the “global civil society” that Barber holds must precede the creation of democratic governance structures to socially and culturally mediate globalization (1996, 276-88).

The media were bemused by the presence of Pat Buchanan at the April 2000 Washington, D.C., demonstrations against the WTO, World Bank, and Clinton China policy, especially that he attacked neoliberal globalization along with socialist congressman Bernard Sanders (I-VT), Amnesty International, and other representatives of the left (Montgomery 2000). The emergent poles of paleoconservative economic nationalism and left alliance politics have not yet registered fully in a media still attuned to the postwar political order. Regardless of the fate of these polar groups, they both treat “neoliberal democracy” as a “Stockholders’ Republic” and call for it to be replaced by a “Stakeholders’ Republic.”<sup>60</sup> Globalization critics of both the left and the right (e.g., Barber and Benoist) discussed in this essay both argue that effective power is monopolized by the richest institutions and strata and that ordinary citizenship and participation are separated by high economic gates. Both groups want a revived state to address economic exclusion, re-embed the economy politically, and regulate it in accord with noneconomic interests. Thus, they both break with the ahistorical economism (stressing timeless, abstract economic laws in isolation from socio-cultural affairs) and the libertarian individualism of neoclassical theory and neoliberalism. Once again they raise the question of *regime*, which goes back to Gramsci and before. However, radical conservatives’ virulently antiliberal views of citizenship, individual rights, and political institutions promise to erect new and higher cultural and racial gates and a harsher monocultural regime.

By contrast, today’s emergent left alliance politics aims at a more inclusive, egalitarian stakeholders’ society. Some of this group (e.g., Barber) hold that the fate of democracy depends on rethinking liberalism and reconstructing its conceptions of citizenship, human rights, and participation in light of the new global interdependence and in a manner that improves the provision for general human needs and better protects communities and the earth. Such critics do not oppose globalization, *per se*. This vision is not shared by all globalization critics and it hardly constitutes a concrete policy regime, but the aspirations to mesh economic globalization with social justice, environmental sanity, and reduced misery provide a welcome starting point for a new conversation about *democratizing globalization*. The first step of this project requires a methodological shift in public policy discourse to an approach that acknowledges the “economy” as a social domain embedded in a still larger socio-cultural complex. As in the early days of the republic and the debates over the question of Jeffersonian or Hamiltonian courses of development, the matter of capitalism must be treated as

part of the overall question of democracy. Today this issue requires an even broader and more difficult move beyond the early republic's noninclusive and partial democratization of political life to a wider and more inclusive democratization of politics, social life, and culture that rethinks the nation in a global context.

On the verge of the Great Depression, John Dewey ([1929] 1988: 49) asserted that: the "spiritual factor of our [American] tradition . . . is obscured and crowded out. . . . [and instead of the] individualities which it prophetically set forth, there is a perversion of the whole ideal of individualism to conform to . . . pecuniary culture." In his view, vaunted American individual liberty had come to justify "inequalities and oppressions." We close by suggesting that our current gridlock and incapacity to address mounting inequalities has serious implications for the legitimacy, meaning, and vibrancy of American democracy and, indeed, the prospect of it ever becoming realized according to its inclusive ideals of liberty and equality. Facing the bad economic times of the 1930s and ascendent Stalinism and Fascism, Dewey warned that a noninclusive, merely formally free, and unequal liberalism that equates democracy with formal rights and free markets might be unable sustain liberal democratic institutions in a world suffering from economic crisis and facing ascendent authoritarian regimes around the globe. Dewey contextualized the grave economic problems and new political threats of the Depression years within the broader question of a democratic socio-cultural regime. In his view, a strong economy and genuine democracy require a just, inclusive, and habitable *social* order and *free culture* rather than merely economic growth and individual rights. Consequently, he argued that the times required a rethinking of liberalism and refashioning of democracy to make them truer to their ideals and return it them to the status of a "fighting faith" (Dewey [1935] 1987).

Dewey's words may sound anachronistic, anomalous, or even naive in these blasé postmodern times. The issue of the meaning and reality of democracy is today seldom discussed because neoliberalism has so extended the private realm that the public sphere either disappears or is simply treated as a realm of waste and malfeasance. For much of the American middle-class, real individual freedom entails the abundant delivery of fine goods and images and the ecstatic joys and possibilities of communication on the web. But the downside of neoliberal globalization is easy to see when one steps out of such these restricted domains, in which most of us who read and write about such things are included. Dewey's words have a more felicitous tone for those who make this step and ask for something more.

## Notes

1. The authors are listed in alphabetic order. We wish to thank our colleague Norman Yetman for discussions of this topic over the years and for his work on several drafts of this paper, which has improved our argument and narrative. We are very grateful for insights we have received from

Professor Mohamed El Hodiri, expert on the “religious” factor in the neoclassical revival in American economics and on the problems of neoliberal restructuring in Russia and the Third World and to Dr. Duke Kent who has long persuasively articulated the merits of regime analysis.

2. For some sources, we will employ the original dates of writing or publication *in brackets*, at least once, to inform readers of the approximate historical sequence of important ideas.

3. Contemporary work in cultural theory and cultural studies varies widely. Some studies that employ Gramscian ideas converge theoretically with those described in this essay, but others deploy Gramsci in “post-Marxist” moves that displace capitalism as a core focus of analysis and criticism, or ignore it entirely. Gramsci posed his theory as part of an effort to promote working class solidarity and national unification and to create a socialist regime. The reappropriation of Gramscian thought and its relation to cultural theory and to the Marxian tradition has long been a contested terrain. Two qualifications are in order: first, by contrast to many recent Fordists and post-Fordists, Gramsci himself believed in Marxist politics; second, other thinkers, besides Gramsci and Marx have influenced the Fordists and post-Fordists discussed below. For example, Karl Polanyi ([1944] 1957) is especially important, and early twentieth century American institutionalists, such as Thorstein Veblen, Clarence E. Ayres, and John R. Commons, have also been influential.

4. Gramsci elaborated his notion of Fordism while imprisoned in Mussolini’s Fascist Italy (see Hoare and Smith 1971). Arrested for his political views in 1926, Gramsci was sentenced to twenty years. Released in 1935 because of his deteriorating health, he died in 1937 at age 46. See Marx ([1867] 1996, 341-508) for discussion of the shift from manufacture to modern industry.

5. Frederick Winslow Taylor’s ([1911] 1947) principles of rationalizing production through “scientific management” were never fully implemented. However, his name came to be associated with actual practices employed in the development of Fordism, which followed his call to employ rigorous, systematic, rational—“scientific”—procedures and methods of calculation to maximize efficiency. “Taylorist” methods separated mental and physical labor and shifted power to regulate and plan the work process from the shop floor to managers and technical personnel, who designed machinery and routines with the aim of gaining technical control over production and maximizing return on invested capital (Braverman 1974, 85-183; Clawson 1980, 202-53).

6. For more detailed argument and documentation about “High Fordism” and its decline, see Antonio and Bonanno (1996, 4-8).

7. For overviews of the expanded role of the High Fordist state see Heilbroner (1993, 149-65); Kolko (1976, 310-47); O’Connor (1973); Noble (1997, 79-134).

8. Neoconservatives claimed that they aimed to restore liberty and meritocracy, eliminate wasteful and inefficient social programs, reduce economic and environmental regulation, cut taxes, and scale down unreasonable expectations (i.e., of the lower classes, minorities, and women), revive traditional values and religion, and insure “law and order” (i.e., employ force to control the shiftless underclass. Compare Hodgson’s (1978, 67-98) summary of the High Fordism’s “liberal consensus” with Steinfels’ (1979, 25-69) description of the neoconservative views.

9. On the “end of consensus,” see the special issue of *Daedalus* (Summer 1980); Hodgson (1976, 263-499).

10. We will map today’s neoliberal capitalism below. See Brohman (1996, 9-34), for a concise summary that contrasts neoliberal development theory with postwar modernization theory; see the rest of his book for a detailed account and many examples of global neoliberal policy.

11. Bell argued that a media-based, “cultural class” of transmitters and vendors of mass culture (i.e., the leading segment of the dominant “new class” of knowledge and communication workers) made “everything permissible” (Bell 1980, 154-64).

12. *Regime of capitalism* is our term for the “economy” (i.e., the mode of production and exchange), which is itself a socio-cultural domain, *and* the larger socio-cultural complex of structures and processes (e.g., aspects of the state, family, media) upon which economic affairs depend and in which they are “embedded.” We do *not* suggest a deterministic base-superstructure model, but imply mutual interaction between the “economy” and its socio-cultural matrix. By contrast to neoclassical economic theory and neoliberalism, which stress universal principles and laws, regime analysis treats capitalism as a variable socio-cultural complex dependent on its specific historical context. For example, see Hollingsworth and Boyer (1997).

13. For American studies of capitalism popular at this time, see Baran and Sweezy (1966); Gutman ([1966] 1977); Chandler (1977); Edwards (1979); Montgomery (1979); Herman (1981); for detailed treatment of the U.S. context, see Attewell (1984); and for some important European works, see E. P. Thompson (1963); Braudel ([1966] 1973); Anderson (1974a; 1974b); Hobsbawm (1975).

14. On dependency theory, see Frank (1969) and Amin (1974). On world systems theory, see Wallerstein (1974; 1980; 1988). Dependency theory faded in the early 1980s, but world systems theory has flourished as a specialized area in sociology. Although related to themes discussed in this paper, world systems theory represents a different branch of thought. In particular, it stresses relations in the global system, and does not focus on the overall national regimes that compose it.

15. The Russian economist N.D. Kondratieff developed the idea of long waves in the 1920s. See (Attewell 1984, 190-92). On long waves and the history of capitalism, see Mandel (1978, 108-46).

16. For discussion of Fordism and post-Fordism, see e.g., Amin (1994a); Kumar (1995, 36-65); Allen (1996), and Bonanno and Constance (1996). Some thinkers argue that post-Fordism and the related concept of globalization are inadequate tools for analyzing changes in capitalism; e.g., Arrighi (1998); Gordon (1996); Hirst and Thompson (1996); Kiely (1998). Other critics maintain that distinctions between Fordism and post-Fordism have been greatly exaggerated; e.g., Friedland (1994a; 1994b); Prechel (1994). And others argue that the concepts are too broad or too totalizing; e.g. Arce (1997); Long and Long (1992); Goodman and Watts (1996).

17. Also see Sabel (1982; 1994). Hirst and Zeitlin (1989; 1991; 1997) try to decouple flexible specialization from overall critiques of Fordism. They argue that the very idea of post-Fordism manifests a totalizing type of production-centered theory, rooted in Marxism. However, they still suggest that flexible specialization is displacing mass production as the “dominant paradigm” in production and imply an erosion of the larger social order in which the old system of production was embedded (including Marxism’s totalizing productivism). For critique of the Third Italy thesis and the Pire and Sable position, see Harrison (1994, 3-122), and Amin (1994b, 13-16).

18. For detailed analysis and critique of Aglietta and comparison to Mandel, see Davis (1978).

19. On the historical context, see the special issue of *The Annals Of the American Academy of the Political and Social Science* (475, September 1984) on “Deindustrialization and Restructuring the Economy.” On restructuring and erosion of the middle class during the 1980s and early 1990s, see, e.g., Thurow (1981; 1984); Bluestone and Harrison (1982); Bowles and Gintis (1986); Kennedy 1987; Harrison and Bluestone (1988); Newman (1989; 1993); Kuttner (1991); Reich (1991); Phillips (1991; 1994); Schor (1992); Harrison (1994); New York Times (1996); Rubin (1996).

20. See the former IMF chief economist, Joseph Stiglitz’s (2000) revealing account of his associates’ narrowness and unwillingness to entertain opposing perspectives. Also, see Moberg (2000) on the aftermath of Stiglitz’s public critique of the IMF and *Institute of Advanced Studies in Culture* (2000) for a report of research on globalization advocates that supports Stiglitz’s contentions.

21. Fukuyama feared a resurgent far right rebellion against prosaic market-centered culture. In later books, he warns about depleted “social capital” in the United States. He states that “neoclassical or free market economists” are “eighty percent correct” (i.e., about their “fundamental model of rational, self-interested human behavior”), but he argues that the gap in their vision causes them to overlook the economy’s socio-cultural foundations and vital social resources needed to regenerate U.S. community life as well as strengthen the economy (1996:13; 1999).

22. Leading cultural theorist Richard Rorty holds that globalization’s prime consequences are ethnic warfare and “Brazilianization” (rule by an international “overclass” that enriches the top 20 percent and immiserates everyone else), which have dimmed the left’s faith in “alternative scenarios.” Although he still urges the left to maintain hopes for a “global egalitarian utopia,” he implies that there are no practical means to resist the current pattern of globalization. Rorty advises concerned intellectuals to convince “educated publics” about the need to create a “global state” that can assert “countervailing power” against rule by the “super rich,” but he admits that the chances of such a strategy succeeding are “slim” (1999, 230-4).

23. For a parallel British perspective, see Micklethwait and Wooldridge (2000). For an extreme example of American optimism, see Schwartz, Leyden, and Hayatt (1999). For a critique, see Gimein (2000) and Henwood (1998; 2000).

24. Representative of the glowing media kudos appearing inside the front cover and on the book’s back: *The New York Times* praises its “vivid images and compelling analogies,” and “Breathtaking . . . exhilarating . . . spirited and imaginative exploration of our new order of globalization.”

25. The title of Barber’s book and its cover—a Muslim woman wearing a chadora and holding a Pepsi—have both been criticized. But the title is about the only cliché in his book. Friedman does not address Barber’s work, even though it was published earlier and was also written for a popular audience.

26. The report is on work by the University of Virginia’s James Davidson Hunter and Joshua Yates, leaders of the study’s U.S. component. See *Institute for Advanced Studies in Culture* (2000).

27. Our colleague Mohamed El-Hodiri has long argued that U.S. neoclassical economists treat their “first principles” as unimpeachable Truths and are the prime architects of the late twentieth-century American “state religion”—neoliberalism. See Pierre Bourdieu’s and Loïc Wacquant’s charges that neoliberalism is an imperialist U.S. “sociodicy.” (Bourdieu 1998, 34-6, 94-105; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1999). For the intense debate over their attack on Americanization-globalization, see *Theory, Culture and Society* (Volumes 16[1] 1999 and 17[1] 2000).

28. For an enchanted view of the fusion of markets and technology, see Schwartz et al. (1999); Levine et al. (2000); or *Fast Company* magazine, which can be accessed on-line (read its manifesto; *Founding Editors* 1995). For critical coverage of these sensibilities, see Stephenson (1997); Gray (1998, 100-32); Cox (1999); Gimein (1999); Stossel (2000). On U.S. technological utopianism, see Rifkin (1996, 3-56); (2000); and on the social views and life-style of new economy professionals, see Leinberger and Tucker (1991); Brooks (2000); Cass (2000).

29. Micklethwait and Wooldridge contend that the “broad church” of neoliberalism rests on two “fundamental principles”: the primacy of the individual over the group and state, on the one hand, and

individual choice as “the essence of freedom,” on the other (2000, 336). On high tech and web libertarianism, see Barbrook and Cameron (2000); Rossetto (2000); Borsook (2000); Ullman (2000); Kamiya (1997); Schwartz (1999: et al., 63-89).

30. Anderson states that: “The winning formula to seal the victory of the market is not to attack, but to preserve, the placebo of a compassionate public authority, extolling the compatibility of competition with solidarity. The hard core of government policies remain further pursuit of the Reagan-Thatcher legacy, on occasion with measures their predecessors did not dare enact: welfare reform in the United States, student fees in the United Kingdom. But it is now carefully surrounded with subsidiary concessions and softer rhetoric” (2000, 11).

31. We use “gated” to refer to privatized spaces that require money or other status-based characteristics (e.g., gender, race, ethnicity) for entry. Neoliberals generally support removing status-based “gates” but advocate monetary ones. They support commodification or privatization of public spaces (imposition of fees for entry), but they continue to speak of these private spaces (e.g., Internet) as if they were public and open to everyone. According to their libertarian view, monetary gates are a private matter and do not diminish democracy.

32. See Kern (1983) on the late nineteenth and early twentieth century time-space rupture and cultural impact of its major technical innovations, such as the wireless, telephone, cinema, automobile, and airplane. See Holton (2000) on global homogenization, polarization, and hybridization of culture.

33. See George Ritzer’s *McDonaldization of Society* (2000).

34. An Italian friend of the authors, replying to a very puzzled query about taking her 9-year-old daughter to Pizza Hut of Florence (a great center of regional Italian cuisine), explained that the child loved the experience of the American climate of the chain restaurant and that the food, although not pizza, was familiar enough to the child to be edible.

35. Twenty thousand people demonstrated at the June 30th, 2000, opening of the trial of Jose Bove and his associates, who destroyed a half-built McDonald’s outlet. A critic of U.S. industrial and genetically altered food and hero of globalization critics, Bove and his group acted in protest of the WTO’s ruling against France’s unwillingness to import U.S. hormone-laced beef and to sell it without an explanatory label and retaliatory U.S. economic sanctions. Polls showed wide support for Bove from the French people, including the conservative Prime Minister Chirac and socialist President Jospin. Other attacks on French McDonald’s outlets included a bombing that killed one person (Associated Press 2000; Trueheart 2000).

36. A TNC firm has “the power to coordinate and control operations in more than one country, even if it does not own them” (Dicken 1998, 177). TNCs often combine a nationally-based parent firm with a network of entirely or partially owned subsidiaries in two or more other countries and with other separately owned and globally dispersed suppliers (Gilpin 2000, 164).

37. TNCs’ global spread requires networks, but they often combine divergent organizational forms (e.g., flexible specialization, pre-Fordist manufacture, and Fordist bureaucracy) to utilize most (cost)effectively the diverse resources and opportunities of different national and regional settings. TNC operations can be decentralized to subsidiaries, subcontracted to different firms, globally sourced in open markets, or carried out in-house through production strategies, which may or may not resemble Fordist ones. Neoliberal globalization’s new organizational form—a “vertically disintegrated flexible network organization”—refers to a parent company with a network of mostly smaller and separately owned firms, which radically restructures and inverts High Fordism’s dominant vertically integrated firm (Harrison 1994; Dicken 1998, 201-42; Bonanno and Constance 2000).

38. Friedman does not mention that Cuba’s economic plight is in part a consequence of the U.S. trade embargo and American political efforts to undermine Cuba’s trade relations with other nations and to isolate it economically and politically. Moreover, he does not mention Cuba’s delivery of health care, education, and general subsistence to a wider range of people than many other poor countries. Nor does he consider the possibility that many of Cuba’s internal problems may derive from political dictatorship, rather than the managed economy *per se*.

39. George Ross argues that labor has been weakened across the globe and is the major loser under neoliberal globalization. He argues that transnational labor cooperation is very difficult (2000).

40. In 1999 a full-time minimum wage worker in the United States earned slightly less than \$11,000, compared to slightly less than \$15,000 (inflation adjusted) in 1968. In 1999, the official poverty line for a single parent family with two children was \$13,423 (Bernstein and Schmitt 2000, 2-3). By contrast, average compensation packages for CEO’s at major U.S. corporations have leaped from 44 times the average factory worker’s pay during 1965 to 419 times during 1998 (O’Sullivan 2000, 159).

41. Between 1989-1997, inflation adjusted hourly wages fell for about 60 percent of the U.S. workforce, and a median worker’s earnings fell about 3.1 percent. During the same period, the total number of hours worked per year for the typical married family with children increased 368 hours, making it the longest work year among the rich countries. In this period, the percentage of jobs paying wages below the poverty line remained static, but poverty increased from 12.8 percent to 13.3 percent (Mishel et al., 1999, 2-3, 5, 9, 382). From 1989-1997, the middle 20 percent of households lost 2.9

percent of their net worth. By contrast, the wealthiest 1 percent households increased their net worth by about 11.3 percent. In 1997, these families controlled 39.1 percent of the nation's total net wealth (increasing 5.3 points since 1983), and, between 1989 and 1997, the top 10 percent of households received about 86 percent of the increased stock market values. Corporate profits or returns on invested capital have been at historic highs, and are the primary basis of the increased accumulation among the upper strata. Mishel et al. estimate "conservatively" that 30 to 40 percent of the increased wage inequality derives from globalization and related shifts to low wage industry (1999, 20-3). For updates on some of the material mentioned above, go to the Economic Policy Institute's "quarterly wage and employment series" online at <http://www.epinet.org>. For comprehensive treatment of economic inequality in the United States, see Mishel et al. (1999), and on American and global inequality, see Carruthers and Babb (2000,101-41); Perrucci and Wysong (1999); Gray (1998, 100-32); Braun (1997).

42. For example, in 2000, AIDS infection rates in the United States were 0.61 percent of the population, while figures were more than 10 percent in 16 sub-Saharan African nations and 20 percent or above in six of them. The rates are still climbing, and little is being done to stem them. Differences in life expectancy between rich and poor countries are also exceptionally polarized. In the top nation, Japan, life expectancy is 74.5 years and in the lowest, Sierra Leone it is 25.9 years (Gelman 2000; Brown 2000). For an opposing optimistic view, see Easterlin (2000).

43. On these various matters related to global inequality, see Coates 2000, 251-9; Mittelman 2000, 74-89; Bauman 1998; Gray 1998, 78-165; Sassen 1998, 81-131; Wallimann 1998; Greider 1998.

44. Paraphrasing Marx, powerful countries make history, but not just as they please. Even the United States faces certain unintended, unwanted consequences of globalization. However, the scope and nature of external impacts and constraints on sovereignty still vary according to a state's place in the globalization system and its power, wealth, social movements, and institutional complex. For broader examination of the complex relation between the state and globalization, see Dicken (1998, 79-144); Held et al., (1999, 32-148).

45. The Clinton administration's welfare-to-work legislation made reference to "self-sufficiency," but made no attempt to define it except for movement from public support to a job. The legislation set up no mechanisms to track the actual adjustment of former welfare recipients. This "successful" legislation has, as intended, reduced welfare roles. Preliminary studies demonstrate that many of these workers go into low-wage poverty level employment (Tongier 2000).

46. A recent *World Health Organization* study ranked the United States 37th in the quality of its health system, even though it is the most costly (*World Health Organization* 2000; Star News Services 2000).

47. Other rich countries have not experienced the growth of inequality or reductions of the social state that have occurred in the core neoliberal states of the United States and the United Kingdom. Most European social democracies have traded off higher unemployment (maintaining postwar types of full-time employment) rather than to shift to the flexible types of labor that reduce wages. But many thinkers argue that erosion has begun in these states as well and that the remains of postwar institutions will not hold: Offe (1996); Gray (1998, 78-99); Coates (2000,191-264).

48. These caveats qualify our points about the left-right continuum; first, postwar Keynesianism and social democracy signify polar ideal types within mainstream discourse among the rich countries; second, politics of a single nation often shifted along the continuum; third, actual political poles varied in different countries (e.g., postwar U.S. politics was centered on the right side of the continuum); fourth, parties sometimes went beyond the continuum. On left-right battles in postwar Europe, see Esping-Anderson (1985); Przeworski (1986); Anderson and Camiller (1994); Sassoon (1996).

49. On endings discourses, see Antonio (1998; 2000); for divergent examples, see Baudrillard (1994); Giddens (1994); Feher (1995); Bobbio (1996); Rorty (1998); Jacoby (1999).

50. We agree with critics about the gaps of postwar politics, and about the substantial achievements of cultural politics (e.g., women's or gay and lesbian rights). We are not affirming postwar politics.

51. The U.S. dollar is central to the global economy, and its financial markets hold a great deal of the world's finance capital. Moreover, stock ownership is more widespread and important in the United States than in the other rich countries, and its significance has grown during the 1990s stock boom as wider segments of the middle-class invested directly in the stock market or indirectly through pension funds. Low interest rates and beliefs in a long boom have led many middle-class people to have low savings and to maximize their stock market investments. Gray argues that stock market crises have been a regular facet of U.S. history, and that a significant one today (similar in scale to Japan's 1989 crash and weak recovery) would impoverish segments of the U.S. middle-class and cause serious instability (1998, 218-26). Instability in the land of global hegemon could destabilize the entire globalization system.

52. Weimar era radical conservatives (e.g., Martin Heidegger, Carl Schmitt, Ernst Jünger) developed incisive cultural critiques of liberal democracy and capitalism, calling for a revolution from the right. They attacked bourgeois individualism, instrumental rationality, and liberal democratic

pluralism, urging a recovery of ethnic culture, mythology, and organic community and a militarization of life. Radical conservatives contributed to cultural currents that led to fascism and Nazism. The 1980s and 1990s brought a major revival of interest in their thought. On radical conservatism old and new, see Dahl (1999).

53. France's Alain de Benoist is the leading theorist of the New Right, and American Pat Buchanan is the most visible paleoconservative. On the worldwide revival of far right, populist-nationalist movements, see Betz and Immerfall (1998). For examples of New Right and paleoconservative thought, see Francis (1993); Benoist (1996; 1998); Buchanan (1998); Gottfried (1999), and for analyses of these approaches, see Sunic (1990); Holmes (1996); Dahl (1999); Antonio (2000).

54. Schmitt saw genuine politics to be based on a "friend-enemy" dichotomy anchored in deeply rooted shared culture and a common identity and in self-conscious opposition to divergent cultures. In his view, socially-constituted ethnic and racial differences provide the type of sharp cultural opposition that generates strong collective identity and great politics. Schmitt wanted a culturally and politically unified order that would end what he considered to be nihilistic, individualistic, fragmentary, liberal democratic pluralism and political competition. He supported the Nazi regime in its early years and was, for a time, the regime's "crown jurist" (Schmitt [1932] 1996).

55. Heidegger influenced key members of the Frankfurt School (e.g., Adorno) and almost all the French Poststructuralists (e.g., Foucault). Thus, their cultural criticism converges at key points with radical conservatism, but they diverge sharply over the matters of collective subjectivity and politics (i.e., radical conservatism's organic communitarianism and protofascism). But the borders between the cultural left and radical conservatism have been sometimes blurred and fluid. The far right and cultural left share an extreme antipathy to bourgeois culture, and constitute a horseshoe-shaped political continuum. As happened in the Weimar era, some thinkers make the short jump from one pole to the other. Today, Benoist claims to be beyond left and right, and recruits refugees from the cultural left to write for his journal *Elements*. He now writes regularly for the U.S. journal, *Telos*, which in the 1970s and early-1980s brought the Frankfurt School to the United States and published postmodernist Jean Baudrillard's first English translations. Starting in the mid-1980s, however, *Telos* embraced Schmitt, the New Right, and paleoconservatism. *Telos* is now allied with the paleoconservative Rockford Institute and the populist right, a prospect unthinkable in the 1970s.

56. NSMs refer to the left-leaning social movements (i.e., environmentalism and various forms of identity politics) that came into prominence in the 1970s and 1980s, after the decline of the labor-centered postwar left, Marxism, and the New Left.

57. NSMs are a debated topic. Supporters see them as new forms of radically democratic collective action (e.g., Giddens 1994; Beck 1997). Moderate critics argue that NSM's progressive aspects are countered by their tendency to split the left and underplay economic injustice (e.g., Gitlin 1995; Rorty 1998; Zizek 1997). Dismissive critics hold that NSM leaders and core members are a "New Class" of bureaucratically entrenched, "politically correct," and powerful pseudo-left professionals (e.g., Piccone 1990-1991; Lasch 1995). On the break from Marxism, see Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985); Ellen Meiksins Wood (1986); Anderson (1983; 1998); and Eagleton (1996).

58. On the protests in Seattle, see Klee (1999); in Davos, see Kettmann (2000); and in Washington, see McKibben (2000). For left views on the protests and protesters, see St. Clair (2000) and Faux (2000); for a mainstream source, see Elliot (1999); for neoconservative and libertarian critiques, see Montgomery, Lindsey, and Morgen (1999); Will (1999); Huffington (1999); Zakaria (1999); and *The Economist* (1999a; 1999b; 1999c). For excellent coverage and diverse points of view on the antiglobalization protests, search *Salon.com*'s archives on the topic (<http://www.salon.com>).

59. As part of a growing concern about globalization, the *UN Division for the Advancement of Women* (2000) has recently suggested the need to address the gender dimensions of the growing inequalities that have accompanied globalization.

60. In an afterword to the new edition of *Cultural Contradictions to Capitalism*, Daniel Bell (1996, 285) stated that the postwar "social relation" between capital and labor "has been shrinking and the 'naked' economic relation has been assuming priority, especially in the rights of the 'shareholder' . . . as against the 'stakeholder. . . .'"

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