

Review Essay

A Global Challenge: Reframing Democracy and Education

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As several of the articles in this issue have emphasized, the far-reaching consequences of globalization have elicited widespread concern—about the large disparities in the wealth of nations, the environmental despoilation ensuing from transnationally unregulated disease and pollution, and the social problems created by global flows of capital and people. Most prominent among these concerns, however, is whether transnational institutions can be constructed or reconstructed to ensure that such borderless problems can be addressed and controlled democratically.¹

Reflection upon appropriate models of global democracy requires rethinking basic issues of citizenship and its education. Such discourse is charged with controversy because globalization and democracy are contested concepts whose meanings vary with the moral and political orientations of the participants.² So too, reflection on the implications of globalization for education, as the two collections of essays under review here make clear, is rooted in conflicting orientations and varies with the operative conceptions of globalization and democracy.

Whether positioned on the political right or the political left, a global consciousness and sensitivity have transformed discourse on educational policy in the advanced capitalist nations of the West. There is a general recognition that

intensified global interdependence requires a rethinking of purpose, curricula, pedagogy, governance, and professional development at all levels of education.

Such recognition has emerged in the last decade as part of a burgeoning literature on globalization. As late as the mid-1980s, the purpose of education was bounded by preparation for life and work in the nation-state.³ For example, despite explicit recognition of intensified global economic competition, the most influential educational policy statement of the 1980s, *A Nation At Risk: The Imperative For Educational Reform*, recommended changes motivated more by national economic imperatives than by global concerns.⁴

Even progressive statements of the 1980s reflected a nation-centered focus. In their history of public education in the United States, David Tyack and Elisabeth Hansot argued that the kind of education we want for our children reflects the kind of society we want to live in. “A commitment to a common school starts with . . . beliefs about what sort of society America should become,” they wrote. “That is really what most discourse on purpose is about in education: a preferred future expressed as a particular kind of training for the young.”⁵ Tyack and Hansot echoed John Dewey’s maxim in *Democracy and Education* that “the conception of education as a social process and function has no definite meaning until we define the kind of society we have in mind.”⁶ They also share with Dewey a common recognition of connections between education and political purpose broadly construed.

As a social process and function,” Dewey views education as a pivotal site for the reproduction of any regime or society. Education serves to cultivate skills and capacities, qualities of character, and habits of mind that enable members of a society to live and work in a manner that maintains its definitive economic, political, and cultural features. Nevertheless, education is not exclusively a conservative force. Latent within education as a socially reproductive process is a progressive possibility. For Dewey, taking this possibility seriously requires a move from the sociology of education to sociologically informed political theory. Tyack and Hansot agree.

In the seventh chapter of *Democracy and Education* Dewey constructs a substantive ideal of strong democracy, characterizing it as “a mode of associated living”—a way of life as opposed to merely “a form of government”—juxtaposing it to the weak and increasingly elitist democracy in the class-divided society of his day. Existing educational institutions, Dewey argued, must cultivate the competencies of citizenship, communication, and “associated living” that strong democracy requires.⁷ This is a tall order because while the schools must equip people to flourish in the existing society, they must also cultivate capacities that will enable them to create a more authentically democratic one.

It is important to recognize that global processes and recent discourse about their meaning do not make local and nation-centered educational policy obsolete. More to the point, they do not make the normative concerns of Dewey, Tyack, and Hansot irrelevant. As Tyack and Larry Cuban argue in their book, *Tinkering With Utopia: A Century of Public School Reform*, “a vision of a just democracy . . . has

marked the best discourse about educational purpose [in America] over the past century” and it should continue to do so.⁸ What globalization and the attending discourse about it have done, however, is stimulate a restructuring of educational institutions and a reframing of educational policy—at least among university educators, think tanks, and national policy makers. Just as these impacts have elicited a reformulation of conservative discourse on education, so too they require a reframing of progressive and more radical educational objectives, including a rethinking of the scope and essential conditions of “a just democracy.” The notion of “reframing” is appropriate here because it connotes not only the incorporation of something new, but also significant continuity with older forms of theory and practice.

Public education, Michael Apple asserts in his contribution to *Globalization and Education*, serves “as a proxy for larger battles over what our institutions should do, whom they should serve, and who should make the decision.”⁹ Apple builds on David Labaree’s periodization of educational reform in American high schools that identifies a tension between two general political orientations in each era. One of these “elevates liberty and promotes free markets,” while the other, Labaree writes, “elevates equality and promotes participatory politics.”¹⁰ Labaree’s analysis can be broadened by subsuming these orientations into contending models of democracy in which liberty, equality, and justice have different meanings: “weak democracy,” which is elitist, market-friendly, government-centered and characterized by a relatively passive citizenry, and “strong democracy,” a model envisioning a broad democratization of society that requires a more substantive and active form of citizenship, and regulates economic activity to ensure greater equality among citizens.¹¹ Each period of educational reform has involved reframing these contested models in response to a changing economic and political environment. Coincident with this theoretical and rhetorical refinement is a political struggle—with public schools in the middle—to determine which vision will be hegemonic.

In recent years heightened sensitivity to globalization and cultural diversity have set in motion yet another round of reframing—not only with respect to education, as the two books under review make clear, but also with respect to democracy. Weak and elitist models of global democracy contend with more substantive and participatory models in the globalization literature. In line with Dewey, Tyack, and Hansot—but now on a grander scale—the ideal of global democracy, however construed, requires a reframing of educational purpose.

Globalization and Education

The essays in *Globalization and Education* and *Universities and Globalization* take up the issue of educational purpose. The subtitle for both books, *Critical Perspectives*, is appropriate because both reject neoliberal (free-market) interpretations of globalization, the discourse of educational purpose and policy rooted in these interpretations, and the restructuring of educational institutions occurring

around the world as a result. Several of the essays are constructive insofar as they identify sites of resistance to neoliberalism. Some of these sites—human rights, environmental protection, gender, and labor issues—have inspired substantive conceptions of global democracy and citizenship. For the most part, however, the essays in these two collections do not flesh out a preferred model of global democracy or a conception of educational purpose commensurate with it.

In *Global Transformations* David Held and his colleagues have surveyed a huge quantity of literature on globalization and distinguish “three broad schools of thought” that they have labeled “hyperglobalists,” “sceptics,” and “transformationists.” Each school differs with respect to its “conceptualization” of globalization and its conclusions regarding the “causal dynamics,” “implications for state power and governance,” “socio-economic consequences,” and “historical trajectory” of contemporary global process.¹² Analysis of each school is unnecessary, but the depiction of the transformationists is relevant because the interpretations of globalization in both books under review fall within this camp:

At the heart of the transformationist thesis is a conviction that, at the dawn of a new millennium, globalization is a central driving force behind the rapid social, political, and economic changes that are reshaping modern societies and world order. . . . According to [its] proponents . . . contemporary processes of globalization are historically unprecedented such that governments and societies across the globe are having to adjust to a world in which there is no longer a clear distinction between international and domestic, external and internal affairs. . . .¹³

The five criteria used to differentiate the schools of globalization theory are also useful for understanding the critical perspective that informs both collections.

Conceptualization

Both *Globalization and Education* and *Universities and Globalization* view globalization as a set of socio-economic, political, cultural, and environmental processes.¹⁴ For the most part, however, they focus on the economic and cultural aspects of globalization and their impact upon educational institutions and policy. Both books recognize a distinction between global processes and their current impact, on the one hand, and discourse about them, on the other.¹⁵ This is important because many of the authors attack not only the neoliberal version of globalization, but also the proposed and existing restructuring of education around the world defended on neoliberal grounds.¹⁶ Equally important is the conviction that the future of globalization is an open, politically mediated process. So far as economic globalization is concerned, what David Coates calls “market-led capitalism”—celebrated by neoliberalism—may currently be ascen-

dant. But the future of globalization is a political project “and not just a spontaneous cascade of natural market flows” to which all national governments must conform.¹⁷ To the contrary, there are international organizations, social movements, and progressive possibilities in an emerging global civil society whose potential for shaping the trajectory of globalization in more humane and democratic directions has not, as yet, been sufficiently recognized or realized.¹⁸

Causal Dynamics

Unlike the discussion in *Global Transformations*, there is no extended treatment of causation in the two collections under review. Nevertheless, critical analyses contained in these books suggest conclusions regarding the most important factors shaping globalization today. When global processes—as distinct from global discourse—are the focus, the assumption is that global capitalism is the principle force driving other global social and cultural processes. In the language of *Global Transformations*, global capitalism is the “site of power [that] becomes to a degree the source of power” in other domains.¹⁹ When the focus is upon theoretical, policy-oriented, and popular global discourse, essays in both collections recognize the dominance of neoliberalism.²⁰ These structural and discursive phenomena are linked insofar as neoliberalism is the well-financed, ideological arm of global capitalism.²¹ It is important to outline the substance of this ideology because it both drives and justifies current retrenchment of welfare states, privatization of public services (including education), and the restructuring of educational institutions and practices.

Janice Dudley in *Universities and Globalization* and Michael Apple in *Globalization and Education* provide similar analyses of neoliberal discourse. In her essay “Globalization and Education Policy in Australia,” Dudley constructs a synopsis of a neoliberal “grand narrative of economic globalization” that she characterizes as a “master discourse of uncontrollable global market forces that valorizes the economic rationality of neo-classical economics and the minimalist politics of neoliberalism.” This narrative embraces

a form of economic fundamentalism, an absolutist closed discourse that valorizes “the market”—an international capitalist marketplace of free trade, unfettered by national regulation. It is this neutral global market that becomes the paramount organizing principle to which all societies must become subject.²²

In an argument that presupposes the distinction between empirical phenomena and the contested interpretations to which they give rise, Dudley contends that this narrative mediated the response of the Australian government to economic globalization during the 1980s and 1990s. Depending upon the politics of the administration in power, two strategies were fol-

lowed. One strategy “emphasize[d] . . . markets, labor market flexibility (through lower labor costs), efficiency, . . . deregulation, privatization, and managerialism,” Dudley writes, “while [the other emphasized] a high-skill/high wage route to national prosperity . . . characterized by . . . value-added innovative production and market flexibility through multiskilling.”²³ For both strategies, however, “education was but an element of the micro-economy, with the role of providing skilled workers . . .”²⁴ At its core, education was to be vocational training; the rest was fluff. A key difference between the strategies was in the role of the state, with the first pushing for retrenchment of social services and reduced spending for education, and the second combining welfare retrenchment with the recognition of public education and skills-training as a national investment.²⁵

In his essay Michael Apple identifies two variations of American neoliberalism that are virtually identical to the Australian strategies Dudley describes. Apple has studied the “right turn” in American politics—now more than two decades in the making.²⁶ Calling it the “conservative restoration,” he identifies four factions of this “broad-based alliance”: neoliberalism, neoconservatism, authoritarian populism, and a faction composed of the “upwardly mobile new middle class.” However, neoliberalism and neoconservatism are his principal concerns, and he places them at the forefront of public school reform in America. Neoliberalism is the more powerful voice.²⁷ The essential difference between its two variants consists of one being more insistent on advocating the commodification of education; that is to say, “placing schools themselves into the market” so that they are subject to the alleged beneficial effects of market competition.²⁸ By contrast, the other variation is willing to spend more on public education so long as it addresses the needs of business.²⁹

Aside from this difference, Apple argues, neoliberals are united on a number of ideas. With distant intellectual roots in classical utilitarianism, and recent ties to theories of mainstream economics and rational choice, neoliberals see human beings as self-interested, acquisitive, and bent on maximizing benefits to themselves. This view of agency is coupled with a belief in the fairness and efficiency of politically unregulated markets as the quintessential institution for allocating and distributing income, goods, and services. They rigidly bifurcate “public” and “private,” with the former being the sphere of government and the latter being the sphere of the family, the economy, and the exercise of constitutionally protected rights. The purpose of government is to protect the autonomy of the private sphere with a minimum of interference in the lives of families, the management of business enterprises, the operation of markets, and the exercise of rights.³⁰

Drawing upon the work of feminist philosopher Nancy Fraser, Apple views neoliberalism as both a “reprivatizing” and “depoliticizing” discourse. In dismantling the welfare state, neoliberals desire to shrink a

public sphere that has expanded since the Progressive Era while reclaiming (reprivatizing) and expanding the private sphere of individual choice and free markets. Reprivatizing discourse is also depoliticizing because it shrinks the scope of public policy. For example, by commodifying education and allowing market competition among providers to be the arbiter of social utility, the “irrationality” of politics is removed from decisions about education.³¹

These features of neoliberalism—acquisitive individualism, valorization of the private sphere at the expense of the public, and distaste for politics—are incorporated into a weak and elitist model of nation-centered democracy. Of all the essays in *Globalization and Education* and *Universities and Globalization*, Apple’s piece is most sensitive to this neoliberal model. It is a market model of democracy in which the practice of citizenship is subsumed under the metaphor of consumption and “‘consumer choice’ [in both the political and economic marketplace] is the guarantor of democracy.” Political parties and politicians are “entrepreneurs” who periodically advertise menus of policies and compete for power. Citizens as consumers—“deraced, declassed, and degendered”—choose which set of elites and policies best serve their interests.³² After voting in the political marketplace, citizens are expected to resume a stance of political passivity as they pursue their private lives and allow elected officials to do their jobs.

There is both continuity and discontinuity between this neoliberal, market model of democracy and elitist models that prevailed among progressive liberals (including educational administrators) before the turn to the right in American politics in the 1970s.³³ Progressive elitists disparaged the political competence and rationality of ordinary citizens; they believed in the insulation of policy formation from the hurly-burly of mass politics; and they reduced democracy to the election and accountability of public officials. The contrast with neoliberalism lies in the belief of progressive elitists in a more substantial array of public goods and services, including education, modest macromanagement of the economy, and greater faith in policy experts than in unregulated markets. Of course there is also a strain of progressive liberalism in the United States that embraces a more substantive and social democratic model.³⁴ Both strains of progressive liberalism, however, have been pushed by the “conservative restoration” to the margins in recent American political life.

Neoliberalism confines democracy to the nation-state.³⁵ It considers the global economy a vast private sector inhospitable and off-bounds to political interference. If any regulation or economic coordination is required, it should be conducted by international organizations dedicated to the expansion of global capitalism, insulated from democratic publics, and committed to the economic and political principles of neoliberalism.³⁶

Implications For State Power and Governance

Recent literature on contemporary globalization has raised serious questions about the autonomy of national governments in a global environment of unregulated capital mobility and financial markets.³⁷ With respect to advanced capitalist nations, these questions focus on the capacity of their governments to shape the quality of life in their own societies. At stake is the future of the welfare state in which education as a public good is a definitive component. The future of public education in these societies, therefore, depends upon the continuing capacity of their governments to distribute public goods and services and to regulate economic activity in the interest of the common welfare. As their titles indicate, the purpose of the collections of essays under review is to reflect upon the implications of globalization for education. Both books recognize, however, that global impacts upon educational policy and institutions are mediated through the state and through the political struggles to control its policies.

Is the welfare state in serious trouble because of globalization? The response in these books is a qualified yes. Qualifications are in order, they argue, because it is necessary to differentiate between the structural impacts of economic globalization, on the one hand, and policy initiatives of global and domestic, neoliberal economic and political elites, on the other. Equally important, the response of a welfare state to economic globalization depends upon the type of welfare state it is, its place in the economic and political pecking order in the community of nations, and the political salience of neoliberalism in its own internal politics.³⁸

So what has been the actual impact of economic globalization upon welfare states? First, as many commentators have argued, international capital mobility, intensified global competition, unpredictable exchange rates, and the agendas of private and quasi-public international trade and financial institutions have severely diminished, if not destroyed, the prospects of Keynesian demand management either as a catalyst of national economic growth or as the redistributive foundation of the welfare state.³⁹ Second, corporate restructuring, a significant increase in female employment during the last thirty years, and the phenomenon of “deindustrialization” have transformed not only labor markets but also the structure of needs toward which services and public goods delivered by welfare states are directed.⁴⁰ Neoliberal global economic policies and multinational business practices since the early-1970s have created a world order in which the “Keynesian Welfare State,” as it was constructed during the postwar years of unprecedented economic growth, is (or is fast becoming) obsolete.⁴¹

Soci-economic Consequences

Essays in *Globalization and Education* and *Universities and Education* indicate a keen awareness of globalization-induced inequalities of wealth and power within and among the nations of the world, of new forms of social

exclusion, of corporate restructuring and shifts in the structure of global labor markets, and of the cultural impact of dramatic changes in satellite and computer technologies. Some of the essays recognize resistance to globalization and differentiate between “tribalist” and xenophobic forms and those that reject neoliberal globalization while embracing a cosmopolitan point of view (e. g., human rights and environmental organizations).⁴²

As their titles indicate, however, their main focus is upon the impact of globalization on education. Some of the essays analyze impacts in technologically advanced nations; others look at developing countries. For the most part, these writers acknowledge that national responses to global pressures of one kind or another are not uniform. Responses with respect to education are shaped by indigenous cultural traditions, institutional inertia, and the politics of policy elites.⁴³

Most of the essays in these books are concerned with neoliberal policy initiatives and the resulting institutional changes. Some speak briefly to the normative issue of what kind of education is appropriate in this increasingly global society. These normative considerations will be considered in the concluding part of the essay. For now the implications of neoliberalism will be the focus, and it is therefore imperative to distinguish between neoliberal proposals for reform and the actual institutional restructuring that may result; “policy statements, position papers, and . . . the pronouncements of . . . economically and politically powerful lobby groups do not leap from the page directly into material reality.”⁴⁴

Both books focus on “the economic effects of globalization which tend to force national educational policies into a neoliberal framework that emphasizes lower taxes, shrinking the state sector, . . . promoting market approaches to school choice,” installing corporate models of management, and instituting closer ties between the schools and business.⁴⁵ Within this framework, both books, but primarily *Universities and Globalization*, document the rise of “academic capitalism” and the shift in funding toward the natural sciences and applied research in higher education.⁴⁶ This framework, as they both document, affects not only technologically advanced nations but also developing countries. Neoliberal “structural adjustment programs” introduced into Third World countries by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have constricted the funding of education and narrowed educational objectives. Adoption of educational initiatives promoted by the Organization For Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the World Bank have had similar effects in Mexico, Australia, New Zealand, and other countries.⁴⁷

Trajectories

As discussed previously, the authors in *Globalization and Education* and *Universities and Globalization* reject the notion of historical inevitability. Globalization, they argue, is a political project whose future is unpredictable.

Neoliberalism to the contrary notwithstanding, there is no singular trajectory immanent within contemporary globalization. Various paths of development are possible. Janice Dudley concludes her contribution to *Universities and Globalization* by asserting:

There are alternative visions of the future [sustained by transnational social movements] . . . where capital is social, rather than solely financial or economic, and where community and human priorities take precedence over those of the market . . .—vision[s] concerned with human, social, and ecological sustainability, rather than competitive international capitalism.⁴⁸

While the editors of *Globalization and Education* reject the neoliberal vision of the future, they are more somber than Dudley about progressive possibilities. They raise two questions. The first is

whether, given the decreasing role and influence of the nation-state in unilaterally determining domestic policies, and given the fiscal crisis of public revenues in most societies, there will be a corresponding decline in the state's commitment to educational opportunity and equality, or whether there will simply be a greater turn toward the market, privatization, and choice models that regard the public as consumers who will only obtain the education they can afford.

The second question revolves around

governability in the face of increasing diversity (and increased awareness of diversity), permeable borders and an explosion of worldwide mobility, and media and technology that create wholly new conditions shaping affiliation and identification.

“Nothing less is at stake,” they conclude, “than the survival of . . . democratic . . . governance and the role of public education in that enterprise.”⁴⁹

Possible trajectories of globalization are an important concern of Held and his co-authors in *Global Transformations*. And, like the editors of *Globalization and Education*, they are troubled by the prospects of weakened national democratic governance in a context of international global pressures. Unlike these editors, however, Held and his colleagues broach the subject of global democracy as a nurturing environment for a revitalization of democracy within the nation-state. The Asian economic crisis of

the late-1990s, they argue, has had the effect of making neoliberal globalization problematic. Several possible trajectories are reasonable:

from a shift to a more highly regulated form of globalization, through a form of thin globalization (as protectionism, exclusionary regionalism, and nationalism gain the upper hand), to a more predatory form of neoliberal economic globalization. . . .⁵⁰

These authors link the project of creating a global democracy to the first of these trajectories

Reframing Democracy and Education

The editors and the authors in both *Globalization and Education* and *Universities and Globalization* recognize, with considerable trepidation, that unregulated globalization has led to a retrenchment and, in some cases, dismantling of the welfare state—developments celebrated by neoliberalism. Their principle concern is for the future of public education and for a conception of educational purpose that is broader than that envisioned in neoliberal educational policy. As strong democrats, they desire an education that coheres with a more substantive democracy than currently exists; and the social democrats among them recognize that strong democracy requires that citizens enjoy a variety of social protections and services (including education) that only a welfare state can provide. The challenge for this moral and political orientation, however, goes beyond current welfare state retrenchment to a restructuring of the welfare state itself, including a restructuring of educational institutions and practices.⁵¹ The essays in the books under review only hint at what a restructured education might look like.

As a host of scholars recognize, however, reconstruction of the welfare state requires a global environment that will return some autonomy to the nation-state. Clearly, unregulated neoliberal globalization does not provide such an environment. But, as Held and his co-authors argue, “globalization is not, nor has it ever been, beyond regulation and control.”⁵² The political project for progressive liberals, social democrats, environmentalists, and cultural pluralists is to bring global processes under some form of democratic control.

The justification for global democracy does not rest solely on its being a condition for strengthening national democracies or reconstructing the welfare state. It also rests in the increasing extent to which “socio-economic processes, and outcomes of decisions about them, stretch beyond national frontiers.”⁵³ Some form of global democracy is justified because the locus of economic and political power, and the global consequences of its exercise, transcend institutions of public accountability within national boundaries. Finally, some form of global democratic regulation and control is justified because national polities confront

problems—communicable diseases, global warming, crime, nuclear waste, migration, to name a few—that transcend territorial boundaries. For all of these reasons, “the nature of political community . . . [and] how . . . the proper boundaries of a political community [should] be drawn in a more regional and global order [is at stake].”⁵⁴ What would it mean to speak of the world as a political community? What would global democracy look like?

In parallel accounts, Andrew McGrew in *The Transformation of Democracy* and the co-authors (including McGrew) of *Global Transformations* outline three schools of thought that address these questions. They label these schools “liberal-internationalist,” “radical communitarian,” and “cosmopolitan democracy.” The project of each of these schools is normative and theoretical. Their purpose is to construct viable models of global democracy. None of these schools is wildly utopian because each believes that it grounds its model in existing institutions, political traditions, and possibilities immanent within existing political and social trends. Each model entails a compatible conception of citizenship. None of these schools recommends the creation of a world government.⁵⁵

There is a fault line, however, between the liberal-internationalists and the other two schools. With minimal regulation of the global economy, liberal-internationalists seek “to transpose a weak form of liberal democracy into a model of democratic world order.” Like their classical liberal forbears, they “separate the economic from the political and restrict democracy to the political sphere.”⁵⁶ There is a model of global democracy that expects little from ordinary citizens. Indeed, it represents a reframing of the progressive elitist model of democracy outlined above.

By contrast, radical communitarians and cosmopolitan democrats draw upon traditions of participatory democracy, civic republicanism, and democratic socialism. Both schools are committed to substantive democratization of the private as well as the public spheres. The difference between them is that the cosmopolitans make a more explicit case for the global rule of “democratic law.” The core of cosmopolitan democracy

involves reconceiving legitimate political authority in a manner which disconnects it from its traditional anchor in fixed borders and delimited territories and, instead, articulates it as an attribute of basic democratic arrangements or basic democratic law which can, in principle, be entrenched and drawn on in diverse self-regulating associations—from cities and subnational regions, to nation-states, regions and wider global networks.⁵⁷

In this global reframing of strong democracy, both radical communitarians and cosmopolitan democrats recognize a kind of “world citizenship” in which individuals “can fall within the jurisdiction of several authorities; they can have

multiple identities and they need not be united by [national] social bonds which make them indifferent to, or enemies of, the rest of the human race."⁵⁸

Neither collection of essays under review speaks to the issue of global democracy. *Universities and Globalization* strays little from showing how neoliberal policy initiatives have shaped the restructuring of higher education around the world. The agenda of *Globalization and Education* is broader and the essays are more diverse. The introductory essay by Nicholas Burbules and Carlos Torres and the following essay by Raymon Morrow and Torres acknowledge the need to develop a conception of "world," or "cosmopolitan," or "multicultural democratic" citizenship.⁵⁹ Burbules and Torres ask how multicultural education designed to teach people to respect differences within diverse societies might be extended to "a global order in which the gulf of differences becomes wider, the sense of interdependence and common interest more attenuated, and the grounding of affiliation more abstract and indirect (if it exists at all)."⁶⁰ In addition to these explicit references to a global form of citizenship, *Globalization and Education* includes an excellent piece by Burbules entitled "Does the Internet Constitute a Global Educational Community?" that could be helpful in developing the educational implications of the radical communitarian and cosmopolitan models of global democracy.⁶¹

Such a project would reframe the connections that Dewey, Tyack, and Hansot see between visions of a good society and educational purpose. It is a project that is currently at a very initial stage. Strong democrats can begin their reflections on the educational implications of a preferred model of global democracy, such as those proposed by David Held or Richard Falk, by reading Carlos Torres's *Democracy, Education, and Multiculturalism*; Martha Nussbaum's *Cultivating Humanity*; and, for professional education, William Sullivan's *Work and Integrity*.⁶²

Notes

1. The two books under review are Nicholas C. Burbules and Carlos Alberto Torres, eds., *Globalization and Education: Critical Perspectives* (New York, 2000) and Jan Currie and Janice Newson, eds., *Universities and Globalization: Critical Perspectives* (Thousand Oaks, Calif., 1998). David Held et al., *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics, and Culture* (Stanford, Calif., 1999) and Don Kalb et al., *The Ends of Globalization: Bringing Society Back In* (Lanham, M.D., 2000) provide excellent introductions to globalization and guides to the literature. David Held, *Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance* (Cambridge, 1995); Andrew Linklater, *The Transformation of Political Community: Ethical Foundations of the Post-Westphalian Era* (Cambridge, 1998); Anthony McGrew, ed., *The Transformation of Democracy: Globalization and Territorial Democracy* (Cambridge, 1998); and Daniel Achibugi, David Held, and Martin Kohler, eds., *Reimagining Political Community: Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy* (Stanford, Calif., 1998) introduce issues of globalization and democracy.

2. It is not only that free-market liberals, progressive liberals, and socialists see the nature and meaning of globalization differently. It is that with respect to economic globalization, there is an affinity between free-market (or neo) liberalism and neo-classical economic theory on one hand, and between progressive and more radical views and the economic theories of Karl Polanyi, Marx, and several strains of institutional economics on the other. For a breakdown of globalization theory into contending schools of thought, see Held et al., *Global Transformations*, 2-10, and a shorter version in McGrew, ed., *The Transformation of Democracy*, 9-12. For the connections between political orientations and various types of economic theory, see Kalb et al., *The Ends of Globalization*, 8, 13-14, 21; David Coates,

Models of Capitalism: Growth and Stagnation in the Modern Era (Cambridge, 2000), 6-7; Dean Baker, Gerald Epstein, and Robert Pollin, eds., *Globalization and Progressive Economic Policy* (Cambridge, 1998), 1-4, 17-20; and John Gray, *False Dawn: The Delusions of Global Capitalism* (New York, 1998), 1-21.

3. Raymon A. Morrow and Carlos Alberto Torres, "The State, Globalization, and Educational Policy," in Burbules and Torres, eds., *Globalization and Education*, 35-36, and Bob Lingard, "It Is and It Isn't: Vernacular Globalization, Educational Policy, and Restructuring," in *ibid.*, 83.

4. The importance of "A Nation At Risk" is recognized by David Tyack and Larry Cuban in their book, *Tinkering With Utopia: A Century of Public School Reform* (Cambridge, Mass., 1995), 13, 53.

5. David Tyack and Elisabeth Hansot, *Managers of Virtue: Public School Leadership in America, 1820-1980* (New York, 1982), 260-61.

6. John Dewey, *Democracy and Education* (1916) in *The Middle Works, 1899-1924*, Jo Ann Boydson, ed. (Carbondale, Ill., 1985), IX, 103. For the linkage of democracy and character, see his "Creative Democracy" in *The Later Works, 1939-41*, Jo Ann Boydson, ed. (Carbondale, Ill., 1988), XIV, 226.

7. Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, 93.

8. Tyack and Cuban, *Tinkering With Utopia*, 10-11.

9. Michael Apple, "Between Neoliberalism and Neoconservatism: Education in a Global Context," in *Globalization and Education*, 58.

10. David F. Labaree, "Politics, Markets, and the Compromised Curriculum," *Harvard Educational Review* 57 (November, 1987), 489 quoted in *ibid.*, 54.

11. As Tyack and Hansot demonstrate in *Managers of Virtue*, the struggle in the 1910s and 1920s between the new profession of educational administration and John Dewey and other progressive educators epitomizes a struggle between "weak" and "strong" models of democracy. The debate between Walter Lippmann and Dewey is another flash point for these contending models. See the discussions of this debate in Robert H. Wiebe, *Self-Rule: A Cultural History of American Democracy* (Chicago, 1995), 173-77; Terrence Ball, "An Ambivalent Alliance: Political Science and American Democracy," in *Political Science in History: Research Programs and Political Traditions*, James Farr, John S. Dryzek, and Stephen T. Leonard eds. (Cambridge, 1995), 41-65; and Leon Fink, *Progressive Intellectuals in the Dilemmas of Democratic Commitment* (Cambridge, Mass., 1997), 13-51. For an introduction to "weak" and "strong" models of democracy, see Alan Ryan, "Two Concepts of Politics and Democracy: James Mill & John Stuart Mill," in *Machiavelli and the Nature of Political Thought*, Martin Fleisher ed. (New York, 1972); C. B. Macpherson, *The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy* (Oxford, 1977); and David Held, *Models of Democracy*, 2nd ed. (Stanford, Calif., 1996). The concept "strong democracy" comes from Benjamin R. Barber, *Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics For a New Age* (Berkeley, Calif., 1984).

12. Held et al. *Global Transformations*, 2-14. In my view this is the single best introduction to the phenomenon of globalization and to the discourse about it. The weakness of the book lies in not emphasizing sufficiently the extent to which neoliberal discourse—reinforced by powerful political and financial interests—dominates the literature, both academic and popular. For a splendid assessments of neoliberal intellectual hegemony in this regard, see in this issue Robert J. Antonio and Alessandro Bonanno, "A New Global Capitalism?: From 'Americanism and Fordism' to 'Americanization-Globalization'"; see also Kalb et al., *The Ends of Globalization*; Baker, Epstein, and Pollin, *Globalization and Progressive Economic Policy*; Gray, *False Dawn*; Coates, *Models of Capitalism*; and Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, *Globalization in Question: The International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, 1999).

13. Held et al. *Global Transformations*, 7. The analysis of "contemporary globalization" by Held and the other authors is clearly transformationist. See *ibid.*, 21-27, 424-44.

14. In *Global Transformations*, Held and his co-authors argue that globalization is not a singular process, but rather a set of processes linked to various domains of social action. They analyze political, military, economic, and cultural domains as well as those of labor, migration, and the environment. "It is the particular conjuncture of developments [in these domains] . . . and the complex interactions among these which reproduce the distinctive form and dynamics of contemporary globalization." See *ibid.*, 11-12, 23-26; the quotation is from 437. Don Kalb in *The Ends of Globalization* views the latter as differentiated into multiple, "transnational flows of capital/goods, information/ideas, and people" (see 1, 15). In their introduction to *Globalization and Education* (14; cf., 29) Burbules and Torres differentiate globalization into economic, political, and cultural processes. In *Universities and Globalization* Janice Dudley rejects the "economistic," neoliberal version of these three dimensions as well as its feeble response to environmental globalization (41).

15. Of course this distinction is not unique. The authors of *Global Transformations* make this distinction too when they argue that their theory of "contemporary globalization,"

building upon the “transformationist” strain of global discourse, captures the reality of global process more adequately than the “hyperglobalists” or the “sceptics”. Kalb, in his introduction to *The Ends of Globalization* (4), differentiates globalization as an “empirical phenomenon” from globalization “as a set of propositions, a meaningful framework of concepts and symbols, to interpret and give order to this new form of social organization.”

16. As Morrow and Torres recognize, this rejection of neoliberal “globalization” and neoliberal educational policy rests on a differentiation of “neoliberal globalization as an ideology, from the globalization of the economy, politics, and eventually culture as a historical and structural process”—a process that invites alternatives in theory and practice with more affinities to strong democracy and social justice (*Globalization and Education*, 40).

17. Kalb in *The Ends of Globalization*, 15; see also *ibid.*, 7, 16, 21. In *Globalization and Education* see 2, 3, 11, 40, 45, 48, 64-65; in *Universities and Globalization* see 2, 23, 26-27, 29-30, 141-42, 303. Arguments along these lines occur in Held et al. *Global Transformations*; Held, *Democracy and the Global Order*; McGrew, *The Transformation of Democracy*; Gray, *False Dawn*; and Hirst and Thompson, *Globalization in Question*; and Jurgen Habermas, “The European Nation-State and the Pressures of Globalization,” *New Left Review* 235 (May/June 1999), 46-59.

18. In *Globalization and Education* see Burbules and Torres, 10 and the essay by Douglas Kellner, “Globalization and New Social Movements: Lessons for Critical Theory and Pedagogy,” 299-321. In *Universities and Globalization* (at 41) Janice Dudley notes the international environmental movement’s vision of “ecological citizenship [and] sustainability” as a counterweight to the neoliberal vision of unfettered global capitalism.

19. Held et al., *Global Transformations*, 24. Defending a multicausal account, however, Held and his co-authors argue that “contemporary globalization is not reducible to a single causal process [such as capitalism] but involves a complex configuration of causal logics” (436; cf., 12, 23-26).

20. The authors of the essays in these collections are not alone in this judgment. See Kalb in *The Ends of Globalization*, 13-14, 26; Ute Pieper and Lance Taylor, “The Revival of the Liberal Creed: the IMF, the World Bank, and Inequality in a Globalized Economy,” in *Globalization and Progressive Economic Policy*, 37-63; Hirst and Thompson, *Globalization in Question*, 261-62; and Coates, *Models of Capitalism*, 6-7.

21. In *Models of Capitalism* David Coates argues that global capitalism should be differentiated into three distinct models. “Market-led” or “liberal” capitalism exemplified most purely by the United States should be differentiated from two types of “trust-based” capitalism: a European model of “negotiated or consensual” capitalism and an Asian model of “state-led” capitalism. Neoliberalism is a defense of market-led capitalism. For both moral and economic reasons it is opposed to both trust-based types. It only makes sense to say that neoliberalism is the ideological arm of global capitalism if market-led capitalism represents the current vanguard of the global economy. In fact, this is the argument of Coates as well as John Gray in *False Dawn*. See Coates, *Models of Capitalism*, 6-11, and Gray, *False Dawn*, 78-132.

22. Janice Dudley, “Globalization and Education Policy in Australia” in *Universities and Globalization*, 30, 23. Likewise, Don Kalb writes of a neo-liberal “grand narrative” that can be reconstructed not only from academic discourse, but also from more popular trade books like *New York Times* foreign affairs columnist Thomas Friedman’s recent *The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization* (New York, 2000). Kalb writes: “The last quarter of the twentieth century . . . has come under the sign of neoliberal policies that have successfully coined and disseminated an idea of globalization as a grand narrative of rootless flows in a borderless world, explaining and advocating the demise of state-based politics and social redistribution in favor of self-regulating global markets.” Kalb in *The Ends of Globalization*, 26; cf., 3-5.

23. Dudley in *Universities and Globalization*, 31; see also 23-24, 32-39.

24. *Ibid.*, 22.

25. These two strategies correspond to what David Coates calls the “old” and “new” faces of neoliberalism. The second strategy, or neoliberalism’s new face, has been appropriated by the Democratic Leadership Council and by Tony Blair’s so-called “third way.” Coates, *Models of Capitalism*, 6-8; cf., Habermas, “The European Nation-State and the Pressures of Globalization,” 52-54.

26. A short introduction to the emergence of the “new right” is constructed in David Noble, *Welfare As We Knew It: A Political History of the American Welfare State* (New York, 1997), 105-34.

27. Apple in *Globalization and Education*, 59. A full-blown analysis of the “conservative restoration” appears in Michael W. Apple, *Cultural Politics and Education* (New York, 1996).

28. *Ibid.*, 61.

29. *Ibid.*, 62.

30. *Ibid.*, 59-63.
31. *Ibid.*, 69.
32. *Ibid.*, 60.
33. In *Managers of Virtue*, Tyack and Hansot reconstruct the elitist conception of democracy within the field of educational administration during its formative years (see 105-114). An elitist model of democracy was also at the core of the profession of city management during its formative years. See Martin J. Shiesl, *The Politics of Efficiency: Municipal Administration and Reform in America: 1800-1920* (Berkeley, Calif., 1977).
34. Like progressive elitism, this more social democratic strain is rooted in the progressive era. See James T. Kloppenberg, *Uncertain Victory: Social Democracy and Progressivism in European and American Thought, 1870-1920* (New York, 1920); Eldon J. Eisenach, *The Lost Promise of Progressivism* (Lawrence, Kans., 1994); and Fink, "Progressive Intellectuals and the Dilemmas of Democratic Commitment," 1-51, 275-87.
35. See the neoliberal model of democracy constructed by David Held in *Models of Democracy*, 253-63.
36. Kalb in *The Ends of Globalization*, 17-18.
37. As Held and co-authors argue in *Global Transformations* (29), "one needs to distinguish the claim to sovereignty—the entitlement of rule over a bounded territory—from state autonomy—the actual power the nation-state possesses to articulate and achieve policy goals independently."
38. For recognition that unregulated global capitalism erodes the autonomy of the nation state, see *Globalization and Education*, 2, 7-8, 9-10, 13-15, 22, 35-37, 80, 80-84; and *Universities and Globalization*, 26-28. For recognition of the differential effects of globalization, see *Globalization and Education*, 11-12, 15-16, 79-83, 93, 100-03, 303, 309-310; and *Universities and Globalization*, 24-25.
39. Held et al., *Global Transformations*, 13, 182-88, 227-30, 232, 276-82, 426-27, 440-441, 445; Gray, *False Dawn*, 6, 16-17, 19, 66-71, 74-79, 87-92, 213-14, 218; Habermas, "The European Nation-State and the Pressures of Globalization," 48-50; Christopher Pierson, "Continuity and Discontinuity in the Emergence of the 'Post-Fordist Welfare State'" in *Towards a Post-Fordist Welfare State?* Roger Burrows and Brian Loader eds. (London, 1994), 95-102; idem., *Socialism After Communism: The New Market Socialism* (University Park, Penn., 1995), 25-52; idem., "Contemporary Challenges to Welfare State Development," *Political Studies* XLVI (1998), 785-87; and Peter Taylor-Gooby, "'Hollowing Out' versus the New Interventionism: Public Attitudes and Welfare Futures" in *The End of the Welfare State? Responses to State Retrenchment*, Stefan Syllfors and Peter Taylor-Gooby eds. (London, 1999), 1-13.
40. Gosta Esping-Andersen, "Welfare States and the Economy" in *The Handbook of Economic Sociology*, Neil J. Smelser and Richard Swedberg eds. (Princeton, N.J., 1994), 711-32; and idem., *Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economics* (Oxford, 1999), 1-10; 170-84.
41. Following the lead of Esping-Andersen, it is important to recognize that there are different types of welfare state regimes whose distinctive features are based upon different social, political, and cultural histories. Western societies and governments will redesign their welfare institutions and practices differently in response to global processes. How they do so will reflect the type of regime they have been as well as their internal balance of power. Obsolescence of the Keynesian Welfare State does not mean disappearance. It means restructuring under newer and different internal and global conditions. For Esping-Andersen's typology of welfare state regimes, see his *Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* (Princeton, NJ, 1990), 1-34; and the updated version in *Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economics*, 73-94. See also the discussion in Pierson, "Contemporary Challenges to Welfare State Development," 778-82, 87; Held et al., *Global Transformations*, 13, 427, 440-41; and Kalb et al., *The Ends of Globalization*, 7-8, 11-16.
42. *Globalization and Education*, 18, 48, 73, 94, 307-08.
43. Bob Lingard's essay "It is and It Isn't: Vernacular Globalization, Educational Policy, and Restructuring" in *Globalization and Education*, 79-108 is especially good on the point. See also *ibid.*, 11-12, 303, 309-10; and *Universities and Education*, 24-25, 303.
44. *Universities and Globalization*, 142.
45. *Ibid.*, 2-5, 22, 24, 142, 216-17, 297; *Globalization and Education*, 11-12, 39-45, 59-62, 84, 109-12.
46. See Sheila Slaughter's essay, "National Higher Education Policies in a Global Economy" in *Universities and Globalization*, 45-70; *Globalization and Education*, 44-46.
47. *Ibid.*, 43-44, 87-100; *Universities and Globalization*, 6-7, 10, 143, 149, 235, 238, 262-65.
48. *Ibid.*, 40, 41.
49. *Globalization and Education*, 22, 23.
50. *Global Transformations*, 431.
51. See the references in notes 42 and 43.

52. *Global Transformations*, 444.

53. *Ibid.*, 446.

54. *Ibid.*

55. McGrew in *The Transformation of Democracy*, 241-42.

56. *Ibid.*, 245; *Global Transformations*, 447.

57. *Ibid.*, 450; see also 447-50; McGrew in *The Transformation of Democracy*, 245-54; and fuller discussions of cosmopolitan democracy in Held, *Models of Democracy*, 335-60 and *Democracy and the Global Order*, 221-286. For a radical communitarian view of global democracy, see Richard Falk, *On Humane Governance: Towards A New Global Politics* (University Park, Penn., 1995). Both models of global democracy require a critical rethinking of liberal democratic political theory. For an insightful example, see Richard Bellamy, *Liberalism and Pluralism: Towards A Politics of Compromise* (London, 1999).

58. Andrew Linklater, "Citizenship and Sovereignty in the Post-Westphalian State," *European Journal of International Relations* 2 (1996) quoted by McGrew in *The Transformation of Democracy*, 251. See also Janna Thompson, "Community Identity and World Citizenship" in *Reimagining Political Community*, Archibugi, Held, and Kohler eds., 179-97 and Richard Falk, "The Making Of Global Citizenship" in *Global Visions: Beyond the New World Order*, Jeremy Brecher, John Brown Childs, and Jill Cutler, eds. (Boston, 1993), 39-50.

59. *Globalization and Education*, 21-23, 36, 42.

60. *Ibid.*, 21.

61. *Ibid.*, 323-55.

62. Carlos Alberto Torres, *Democracy, Education, and Multiculturalism: Dilemmas of Citizenship in a Global World* (Lanham, M.D., 1998); Martha C. Nussbaum, *Cultivating Humanity: A Classical Defense of Reform in Liberal Education* (Cambridge, Mass., 1997); and William M. Sullivan, *Work and Integrity: The Crisis of Professionalism in America* (New York, 1995).