

HUSSERL AND NEO-KANTIANISM

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The suggestion of thematic and methodological affinities between the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl and the philosophies of Descartes and Kant appears repeatedly within the expansive secondary literature on the origins of transcendental phenomenology, as well as in the actual publications of Husserl himself. Husserl's indebtedness to Cartesian thought reveals itself throughout these writings, attaining its most explicit formulation in a series of lectures given in 1929, published under the title of Cartesian Meditations. Within this work, Husserl refers to his own phenomenology as a type of neo-Cartesianism, pointing to Descartes' Meditationes as the impetus generating the movement from a developing phenomenology to a genuine transcendental philosophy. Descartes' conception of philosophy and science, as well as his insistence upon absolute certainty with respect to fundamental principles, strongly parallels Husserl's own sense of the nature and task of philosophy. But despite the importance of such similarities, which do indeed animate the subsequent lines of advance within transcendental phenomenology, the bond between these two thinkers remains largely a spiritual one. The Husserlian divergence from the Cartesian enterprise occurs early along the path to phenomenology; a transition necessitated ". . . precisely by (phenomenology's) radical development of Cartesian motifs--to reject nearly all the well-known doctrinal content of the Cartesian philosophy."¹

So while it might be claimed that Cartesianism--with its view of philosophy as an all-inclusive science, upon the basis of, and within which, particular sciences can be grounded--and the attendant turn to subjectivity as source of apodicticity, affords the point of departure for Husserl's phenomenology, an even stronger affinity surfaces between Kant and Husserl within the concrete development of the idea of transcendental phenomenology itself. Both Kant and Husserl characterize their philosophical positions as "transcendental idealism." The phenomenological reduction or epoche, which finds its initial meaning within the horizon of a Cartesian methodological doubt, can be interpreted in light of the subsequent development of phenomenology as a kind of "critical" turn. With the introduction of the epoche in

1907, Husserl was no longer immersed within a naive, pre-critical problem set oriented exclusively in a positive manner toward beings, but saw the need for a radical critique of cognition which would uncover the conditions for the possibility of objectivity. In addition, there are extensive terminological parallels between Kantianism and transcendental phenomenology. Notions such as the transcendental ego as active in world constitution, synthesis as the ground of objectivity, a development of formal and transcendental logics, a doctrine of categories, and a pre-eminent concern with the a priori are just a few of the multiple points of apparent conversion between the critical and phenomenological transcendental philosophies.

However, there are severe dangers in attempting to explicate and gain access to an understanding of Husserl's thought by clinging too closely to either the Cartesian or Kantian positions. These dangers may be more acute with respect to Kant, for the similarities in language may prove, upon closer inspection, to be no more than linguistic forms of agreement. Such equivocations could only serve to distort the genuine phenomenological sense of Husserl's transcendental philosophy, barring access to the entire problematic from the outset. With this in mind, we shall attempt an exposition of some of the central concepts developed in the Cartesian Meditations, and then attempt a study of the sense of transcendental idealism as phenomenology in contrast to a critical transcendental idealism.

The movement of thought within the Cartesian Meditations reflects in a general fashion the fundamental structures which dominate all of Husserlian phenomenology. On the most universal level, it might be said that two concepts delineate the entire field and format of study: viz., the transcendental reduction and the problem of constitution. The transcendental reduction serves as the only avenue of approach to the realm of transcendental subjectivity, within which the transcendental ego is disclosed in its constituting activities as foundation of the world. Both of these dimensions of phenomenology must continually be kept in view, for the meaning of the epoche and the meaning of constitution are fundamentally inseparable. The concrete constitutional analyses disclose the richness of the epoche, firmly distinguishing it from a reversion to psychical immanence or a subjectivizing of the sense of the objective world. Insofar as the Cartesian Meditations, like Ideas I, is intended to serve as an "introduction to phenomenology," the reflections are oriented along a developmental line, from the posing of the problem of philosophy as science, to the reduction as methodological point of entry, to an

expository laying open of the field of transcendental experience, a laying open which elicits certain universal structures while probing to ever deepening levels of investigation.

In the opening paragraphs of Cartesian Meditations, Husserl expends considerable labor in attempting to arrive at a guiding idea for philosophical reflection; one which will give determinate direction to the somewhat amorphous sense of philosophy as "rigorous science." This guiding Idea is uncovered in the implicit telos governing all "de facto" sciences, as well as the original Cartesian enterprise itself. What serves as this ideal is a hierarchy of cognitions, of mediate and immediate judgments, ultimately grounded in apodictic evidence, with a correspondent apodicticity vis-a-vis the primacy of these original cognitions. The possibility of realizing such a demand, however, is held in abeyance, bestowing upon the investigations a certain hypothetical tone analogous to that characterizing the Kantian "Copernican Revolution." But this hypothetical spirit is not one which infiltrates each level of inquiry considered in itself, but envelops the phenomenological enterprise with respect to its final aim, the aim that animated Descartes' own investigations: a reforming of philosophy into a science grounded upon an absolute foundation, a science which in turn grounds the multiplicity of positive sciences, whether they be material or formal, natural or social.

The distinction is drawn between adequacy and apodicticity with respect to evidence. Adequacy implies a certain wholistic orientation, an absolute fulfilling of the unfulfilled, a harmonious synthesis which may lie at infinity, reminiscent of a Kantian Idea. Apodicticity, however, must serve as a measure at each step. Apodicticity is a further grounding of what is already evident, by going back and grounding at a higher level in principles. The issue is not one of grasping with certainty, nor even with full certainty which actually excludes doubt. On the contrary, apodictic evidence

. . . discloses itself to a critical reflection as having the single peculiarity of being at the same time the absolute unimagineableness of . . . non-being, and thus excluding in advance every doubt as objectless, empty.²

It is this sense of apodicticity as criterion of rigorous philosophical science that forms the spiritual bond between Husserl and Descartes, and further, introduces the Cartesian methodological doubt and the turn to the ego cogito as functional within the Husserlian framework as well. But Husserl's claim is that his own thought is

concretely differentiated from the Cartesian course in that the latter failed to understand the true significance of the "I am," as a turn to transcendental subjectivity.

The demand for apodicticity functions in a twofold manner which in turn gives the transcendental epoche a dual nature, and correlatively bifurcates the Husserlian sense of the Absolute qua transcendental subjectivity. On the one hand, what are sought are evidences which are in themselves apodictic. The criterion of the absolute inconceivability of the non-being of the objects of such experience is satisfied only by the immanent acts of consciousness itself. This is not to suggest that the being of the world is doubtful, but only that it is not apodictic; i.e., it is, in principle, dubitable. Not only do particular objects within the world at times show themselves as images, concretizing the possibility of non-being, but also entire experiential frameworks suffer the same devaluation, such as in dreams. Therefore, the entire world, the one, objective, spatio-temporal fact world, within which we dwell as men, labors under the shadow of the possibility of non-being. Not that it is rational to doubt the world, but that it is not fully rational to remain immersed within a naive, positive orientation. But the ego cogito, in the full sense of the multiplicity of possible acts of consciousness, is indubitable on grounds of principle, is apodictically evident.

Yet this constitutes only one of the dimensions to apodicticity as it appears in the Cartesian Meditations, and consequently only one of the senses of the epoche and of the Absolute being of transcendental subjectivity. Apodictic insight must also be attained into the primacy of these original cognitions. The initial philosophical formulation is,

. . . the question whether it is possible for us to bring out evidences that, on the one hand, carry with them--as we now must say apodictically--the insight that as 'first in themselves' they precede all other imagineable evidences, and on the other hand, can be seen to be themselves apodictic.³

The latter demand is satisfied by the recognition of the indubitability of the cogitationes, of the lived experiences themselves, regardless of the objective status of the transcendent claims inherent in such processes. But the former dimension of priority is grasped only with the realization that the entire sense of the being of the objective world is derived exclusively from such conscious life. Here the move is from the epistemological to the ontological insofar as the mode of being of the objective

world, its existential status, is shown to be relative and secondary to the Absolute being of transcendental subjectivity. It is from this aspect of apodicticity and of Absolute being that the concrete constitutive analyses of phenomenology blossom, for constitution, in general, refers to just such a relation between primary and secondary, absolute and relative being.

The preceding brief treatment of the background of the reduction was intended solely to trace the correlation between the methodological onset of phenomenology and the notions of philosophy, science, and apodicticity which animate the whole course of the Cartesian Meditations. We can now attempt a presentation of the phenomenological reduction itself. One way of illuminating the significance of the epoche is by contrasting it with the Cartesian turn to the cogito. For Descartes, once the apodicticity of the "I am" was encountered, the problem immediately became that of reintroducing the transcendent world. The basic epistemological problem was, as it always has been, that of the relation between subjectivity and objectivity conceived in terms of immanence and transcendence. "The problem of traditional epistemology is that of transcendence."⁴ How is it that that which is given with apodicticity, yet seemingly has only subjective significance, can relate to that which is beyond my "island of consciousness?" How is the "for us," even when given with clarity and distinctness, related to the "in itself?" It was precisely at this juncture that Descartes was forced to appeal to divine veracity as the epistemological guarantee of the objective significance of purely immanent conscious life.

The phenomenological response to this difficulty is not a positive attempt to solve the problem. The introduction of the methodological techniques characteristic of Husserl's thought is not oriented toward a radical re-examination of the problem; rather the epoche dismisses this entire problem formulation as erroneous, as a Cartesian motif which must be transcended in the spirit of neo-Cartesianism. But this form of the problem could be considered as far more pervasive than merely a Cartesian dilemma, for it really serves as that framework within which the basic epistemological question need necessarily be posed, insofar as it is asked by natural men. Thus, Husserl claims,

To the extent that I apprehend myself as a natural human being, I presuppose having apprehended a spatial reality; I have conceived of myself as being in space, in which I consequently have an outside of myself.⁵

The problem of transcendence which is raised by traditional epistemology, Descartes' formulation serving as a paradigmatic instance, arises within a setting which presupposes as antecedent that which should be established as a result of the critique of cognition.

The phenomenological epoche, however, places the entire objective spatio-temporal world in brackets. The "spatiality" of space likewise is reduced, insofar as it serves as the horizon within which beings in the world show themselves. It is just at this point that natural reflective consciousness must be radically differentiated from transcendental reflective consciousness. The turn to the act of cognition, the cogito as that which is given absolutely, can be undertaken within the context of two horizons. From a world-immanent perspective, the object of a reflective consciousness appears within the horizon of consciousness and object such that the cogito makes up a part of the totality of the world. Reality is the conjunction of matter and spirit, one extended, the other not extended. The problem then is to discover a lawful relationship between the two parts. The bracketing of the world developed by the reduction, however, develops along completely different lines. The epoche reduces not only individual objects within the world to their appearing as such in consciousness, but also the "worldly" character of the world, as universal horizon within which such phenomena give themselves. It is this move that uncovers Absolute subjectivity as the universe of possible meanings, bearing within itself both the immanence and the transcendence of the natural world view. Thus being-in-itself and being-for-us are moments within the whole of transcendental subjectivity. The reduction is not, and could not, be carried out by running through the multiplicity of acts of cognition and reducing each in turn, but is realized by a single stroke in which the entire world, including conscious activity and the horizon within which this activity gains determinate significance, comes to be seen as "universal acceptance phenomenon," as the meant as such. Insofar as to be human is to exist within a constant belief-in-the-world, transcendental phenomenology makes a demand upon the philosopher which stands outside of his human possibilities. With this in mind, one can understand Ricoeur's description of the epoche as a spiritual discipline rather than simply a methodological device.

The domain of phenomenological inquiry opened by the reduction is a realm of transcendental experience, characterized by its epistemological apodicticity and ontological priority. Husserl insists that the transcendental is a realm of genuine being, of individual being, with a mode of existence proper to it. This mode of being,

however, is a unique and singular one, as is the experience which lays hold of it, the transcendental experience. While it is characteristic of worldly, transcendent objects to give themselves only perspectively, in an ongoing process of synthesis which is essentially open-ended, those objects of transcendental reflection (lived experiences) do not present themselves perspectively. The ever present possibility of non-being which belongs to worldly objects is excluded essentially from lived experiences taken eidetically. The distinction between perspective variation, which is an experience, and perspected variable, which is spatial, is an absolute one. Thus, Husserl claims in Ideas I that,

Between the meanings of consciousness and reality yawns a veritable abyss. Here a Being which manifests itself perspectively, never giving itself absolutely, merely contingent and relative; there a necessary and absolute Being, fundamentally incapable of being given through appearance and perspective patterns.⁶

Here, therefore, is the inversion of the meaning of Being at the core of Husserl's transcendental idealism.

The scientifically oriented necessity for apodicticity has led back to the ego cogito. The genuine sense of the epoche, as we have seen, is not grasped so long as it is understood in terms of psychological immanence and transcendence. But the radical philosophical meaning of this phenomenological "discipline" can be understood concretely only to the extent that the unique nature of transcendental being is uncovered. The movement in Meditations II-IV is precisely a laying open of the field of transcendental experience in its universal structures. Hence, it is not simply the bare ego cogito which is given with apodicticity. And correlatively, the phenomenological onset is not that of the relation between the "I think" and transcendent objectivities; a problematic which led Descartes to the proofs of God's existence and veracity, and ultimately yielded what Husserl labels an "absurd transcendental realism." Transcendental phenomenology undertakes the task of the exploration and systematic description of the realm of transcendental subjectivity. And furthermore, insofar as this is to be a new science, a study of the universal, the phenomenological and eidetic reductions are both necessary methodological moments. Husserl insists that,

The bare identity of the 'I am' is not the only thing given as indubitable in transcendental self-experience. Rather there extends through all the

particular data of actual and possible self-experience . . . a universal, apodictically experienceable structure of the Ego.⁷

Universal transcendental structures constitute the subject matter for phenomenology as science, and with the elucidation of these structures the sense, origin, and meaning of the transcendent world are uncovered. On this most general of levels, certain parallels can be seen between the Kantian and Husserlian problematics. It is transcendental ideality which furnishes the conditions for the possibility of objectivity. No longer does philosophy remain locked within a positive orientation toward objectivities in which the self is "forgotten," but rather subjectivity itself is submitted to critical reflection in a search for a ground of the world. Despite radical divergences between critical and transcendental idealism, both recognize the necessity for probing the constitutive activity of consciousness in attempting to come to an understanding of the human world and its very possibility.

In the development of thought up to the fifth meditation, three eidetic structures of transcendental subjectivity emerge as central to all phenomenological considerations. The first is that of the ego-cogitatum, which reflects the general form of intentionality. This singularity is not exhausted with the way in which conscious acts give themselves to reflection, but is further refracted in the "ontic" predicates which are discovered as applicable. Whether that act be perceiving, valuing, willing, desiring, imagining, remembering, or caring, it is an achieving act of an ego towards an objectivity in the broadest possible sense. Thus the structure ego-cognito-cogitatum is an ordering of all conscious life, discovered by eidetic intuition carried out within the limits of the epoche. One need not run through all types of conscious activities in order to recognize this structure as universal, but rather via imaginative variation one comes to intuit, to see in an apodictic fashion which excludes all possible doubt in advance, that a conscious act without such a structure would not be a conscious act.

It should be further noted that this intentional structure is a relational structure, but one of a unique kind. The relational structure cannot be captured in spatial "metaphors," viewing the terms to be related in an ontic fashion as essentially independent parts which are capable of being thought in relation to one another. The unity of the ego-cognito-cogitatum is not an external-

ly imposed one, holding between fundamentally self-in-closed factors. Instead, the unity of act, of cogitatio, of think-ing, perceive-ing, with ego and with cogitatum, (that it is I-am-perceiving-a-house-perception), is an internally articulated unity of moments which stand in an essential structural inter-connectedness. As Husserl says concerning the object oriented dimension of the relation, "Each cogito, each conscious process, . . . means something or other, and bears in itself, in this manner peculiar to the meant, its particular cogitatum."⁸ When the problem of the relation between the subject and the object is taken up in this transcendental fashion, and the temptation to impose a world-immanent conceptual framework upon consciousness is resisted, attending merely to what shows itself in itself within the limits in which it shows itself, then the ground of the natural attitude's subject-object dichotomy is discovered within a primal unity of intentionality. Husserl's adamant opposition to constructivistic philosophy which emerges most clearly here, as the imposition of a conceptual schema which takes the moments of the whole of consciousness as parts of an all, is the prejudice which precludes the possibility of bridging such a dichotomy. Eidetic insight grasps the necessary structural inter-connectedness in its universal form, and brings to intuitive givenness the essentially dependent nature of moments which can be only abstractly conceived as independent parts.

A second eidetic structure of transcendental subjectivity is temporality, or the continuous consciousness, specifically with reference to the 1905 lecture series,⁹ three levels of objects and temporality must be distinguished. The first level is that of the things of experience in objective time. This level is a pre-phenomenological, pre-reduction time, corresponding to our naive, naturalistic conception of time. Just as upon the universal level of the being of the world, the epoche effects an inversion of the meaning of being such that the sense of the world re-emerges within the phenomenological sphere as relative and constituted, objective time can be traced to its genetic origins via phenomenological methods.

The second level to be distinguished is described as, "the constituting appearance-manifolds of various levels, the immanent units in pre-empirical time." At this juncture, we encounter the immanent field of transcendental experience. The immanent-objective sense of world time is contained in this level of temporality. But Husserl's analysis of time is not exhausted with this dyadic schema, nor is the genuine sense of time in Husserl's phenomenology thereby uncovered. Instead,

phenomenology probes to a still deeper level, to that which in the Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness is called, "the absolute time constituting stream of consciousness." While transcendent objects exist in objective time, and the immanent components of transcendental consciousness have their being in immanent temporality, on the final level one discovers the "ultimate and absolute," viz., the consciousness of internal time itself, as that which makes possible transcendental experience. It is in these primal depths of transcendental subjectivity that phenomenological reflection reaches its very core.

The differentiation drawn in the Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness between the second and third levels, between "the constituting appearance manifolds in pre-empirical time" and "the absolute, time-constituting stream of consciousness," is also mentioned in the Cartesian Meditations. In this later work, Husserl formulates the problem in the following terms:

The distinction between internal time itself and the consciousness of internal time can be expressed also as that between the subjective process in internal time, or the temporal form of this process, and the modes of its temporal appearance, as the corresponding multiplicities.¹⁰

If we take as an example an inherently temporal object, one that is what it is only insofar as it is temporally extended (e.g., a musical tone), perhaps these distinctions can be brought into clearer relief. Once the transition is made beyond the objective, worldly tone, with its spatial point of origin and its occurrence within objective clock time, we discover the lived experience of the tone itself. This lived experience has its own temporal form. Using the terminology of Ideas I, the genuinely immanent components of the lived experience, the noeses and the hyletic data, possess a temporal form. The immanent object as unity, the tone as lived experience captured in a reflective glance, and philosophically significant as transcendental experience, has a multiplicity of phases against the background of a temporal continuum. Enveloping the now-phase are the just-elapsed phases and the coming phases. The phases belong to internal time as the form of immanent objects. And beyond this, we find the consciousness of internal time. With this dimension, Husserl's inquiry probes beyond the concern with intentionality as a relation between the transcendental and the transcendent, and brings to light the possibility of transcendental experience itself. The consciousness of immanent data, the consciousness of internal time, itself possess a

structure which grounds and makes possible transcendental, reflective experience, and thus in turn affords the condition for the possibility of objective experience.

The immanent object, the phenomenologically reduced lived experience, is found to be a cohesion of a multiplicity of temporal profiles, in contrast to a spatial continuum qua series of perspectives. To account for this unity, an even more radical reflective turn is effected, toward the noetic dimension of noeses and hyletic data themselves, insofar as they are objects of reflection. Here a phenomenology of phenomenology takes place, as a kind of quid juris in relation to the possibility of the entire phenomenological method. It is Husserl's position that, "The fundamental form of universal synthesis, the form that makes all other syntheses of consciousness possible, is the all-embracing consciousness of internal time."¹¹ The primary level of consciousness is identified with temporality, and the structure of this level is that of retention-primal impression-protection. The now moment is not simply an unextended point, and internal time consciousness is not merely a multiplicity of such points. Rather, the now moment emerges as extended, as a sort of species present, which contains within itself in an originary way retentional and protentional modifications. Memory, as a re-productive consciousness, and expectation, as an anticipative consciousness, are derivative modes in which the object is not given as originally present, "in person." So Husserl states, in the Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, with respect to retention,

. . . if we call perception the act in which all 'origination' lies, which constitutes originally, then primary remembrance (retention) is perception. For only in primary remembrance do we see what is passed; only in it is the past constituted, i.e., not in a re-presentative way but in a primitive way.¹²

The same holds for protention, or primary expectation, vis-a-vis the future.

It can be said, therefore, that the second eidetic structure of transcendental subjectivity is temporality, which possesses the form of retention-primal impression-protection. These are the fundamental "intentional components of conscious life," as act phases which in themselves are not constituted. The first eidetic structure was expressed in the universal and necessary proposition, "all consciousness is intentional, possessing the ego-cogito-cogitatum format." The second eidetic structure can be expressed as, "All consciousness is temporal, of

the form retention-primal impression-potention." Just as transcendent objects are found to be constituted in a multiplicity of appearances, immanent objects of transcendental experience are a synthetic unity of a manifold of temporal phases which themselves have their intensive, noetic components in the partial intentions of retention-primal impression-potention. Within a fully extended intentional act, such as hearing a tone, each partial intention is oriented toward the object, or rather toward one of its profiles; and simultaneously, the elapsed now points are retained such that I am conscious of inner duration. Here the critical dual relatedness of partial intentions is uncovered, a relatedness which makes self-consciousness possible as unmediated due to the unique nature of inner temporality.

The final dimension of Husserl's concept of transcendental subjectivity that shall be developed prior to turning toward some general remarks on transcendental philosophy in Kant and Husserl, is synthesis. We have thus far uncovered two universal structures of transcendental experience claimed to be given with apodicticity, viz., intentionality and temporality. Husserl also asserts, in the second Meditation, that,

. . . the whole of conscious life is unified synthetically. Conscious life is therefore an all-embracing cogito, synthetically comprising all particular conscious processes that ever become prominent, and having its all-embracing cogitatum founded at different levels on the manifold particular cogitata.¹³

An understanding of Husserl's conception of synthesis is absolutely necessary for a positive appropriation of the inner dynamic of transcendental phenomenology; for insofar as phenomenology is a phenomenology of consciousness, viewed as absolute subjectivity, and synthesis is "the primal form belonging to consciousness," the movement of consciousness at all levels is a synthetic movement with respect to the constitution of both immanent and transcendent objects. Such an insight, however, cannot be attained so long as one remains within an "ontic" framework. Husserl sees synthesis as, ". . . a mode of combination exclusively peculiar to consciousness,"¹⁴ and hence analogical schemes functional for worldly sciences are entirely inappropriate for the phenomenological concept of synthesis. The unique mode of being of consciousness, attested to by the possibility of the epoche, and further concretized by the discovery of intentionality and the being-in of transcendencies which give us the "world," is also determinative for the concept of synthesis.

It is Husserl's position that only in the elucidation of the "facts of synthetic structure" can the genuine significance of Brentano's concept of intentionality be revealed. The activity of synthesis, however, is a multi-leveled one, bifurcated along the most general lines into active and passive syntheses. It can be said, on a very broad basis, that for Husserl synthesis is not an externally directed activity which imposes determinate forms upon a pure manifold, thereby generating a unitary relatedness. Instead, synthesis is an internal articulation such that any moment within the synthetic whole bears within itself, even if only in a potential, anticipatory way, the synthetic whole of which it is a moment. This can, perhaps, be exhibited more concretely if we turn to a particular form of passive synthesis as found in a developed ego; one in which an environment of objects is already given as material for possible higher synthetic acts. An intentional analysis of perception reveals a unitary object being meant or intended through a multiplicity of acts, in which the object as meant, the object of consciousness, shows itself in a variety of perspectival shadings. In any one act as cogitatio, only one feature or aspect of the object as meant shows itself. The chair that I now look to, which is given to me as an object for possible judgments, which could be submitted to analysis or put to some use via higher level active syntheses, at any moment shows only one feature. Another act, at another point in time and from another position in space, shows another feature, but another feature of the same identical chair. It is the synthetic unity of these acts which constitutes the one identical object as meant.

But to claim that to each act there corresponds a particular and distinct cogitatum, and to pose the problem of the synthesis of this disparate multiplicity is to recognize only the dimension of actuality belonging to conscious life. It is to conceive of consciousness as a bundle of sense data, and then to attempt to impose a unity on this multiplicity analogous to the construction of a complex spatially extended entity from simple parts. The recognition that consciousness is not a res extensa is of minimal positive value if one still demands that specifically "ontic," world-immanent predicates and conceptual frameworks be brought to bear on it. A descriptive, transcendental, eidetic science such as Husserl's has the positive value that it is guided by the phenomena themselves, and does not immediately reduce the manifold senses of being to either the physical or psychical level. The unique mode of being belonging to pure consciousness is separated by an abyss from the being of Nature, and synthetic consciousness as intentional being

is radically differentiated from ontic combination. The peculiarity of intentionality, the theme developed in Section 20 of Cartesian Meditations, ought to be taken as a concrete instance which lends substantive meaning to the phenomenological slogan, "to the things themselves." Such phrases remain empty and hollow unless they are rendered determinate through the working out of phenomenological analyses in light of the demands of the epoche and eidetic structures.

Thus, concerning intentional analysis, Husserl claims that, ". . . its peculiar attainment (as intentional) is an uncovering of the potentialities "implicit" in actualities of consciousness."¹⁵ The distinction between actuality and potentiality is fundamental in phenomenology, in that it supplies the basis for the central concept of "horizons," and simultaneously affords access to an understanding of synthesis as a mode of combination peculiar to consciousness. Each cogito is a meaning of something meant, and something more. This "something more" is contained in the cogito insofar as the latter is a constitutive moment of a synthetic whole. In perceiving the chair I have explicitly before my gaze only one aspect, yet I simultaneously mean the chair in its fullness. The multiplicity of other possible views is contained within the singular act, and is co-intended in the sense of the cogitatum. Intentional analysis uncovers and explicates this implicit dimension which makes up the horizon structure characteristic of all intentionality. The relation is an internal one between possibility and actuality. It is with this distinctive feature of the kind of being belonging to transcendental subjectivity in mind that we must understand Husserl's notion of the unity of synthesis as,

. . . not merely a continuous connectedness of cogitationes (as it were, a being stuck to one another externally), but a connectedness that makes the unity of one consciousness, in which the unity of an intentional objectivity, as 'the same' objectivity belonging to multiple modes of appearance, becomes constituted.¹⁶

This completes our treatment of some of the general structures of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology. This interpretation was intended to develop certain themes in such a way that the contrasts could subsequently be drawn between the meaning of philosophy as critical transcendental idealism versus a phenomenological transcendental idealism. Our comparative reflections shall begin with what I take to be a Husserlian criticism of

the entire structure of the Kantian problem set. From a Kantian or neo-Kantian position, the phenomenological method, with its attendant conception of philosophical knowing as intuition, might be termed dogmatic. Critical reflection presents philosophical knowing as a constructive arguing to the conditions for the possibility of objectivity. From such a perspective, Husserl's phenomenology might indeed seem both intuitionistic and ontologistic, insofar as (a) it fails to distinguish sensibility and understanding in an adequate fashion, and (b) reifies the a priori as object of intuitive reflection in opposition to a formal realm of meaning. On the other hand, from a phenomenological perspective, it can be said that the very sub-structure of Kantianism, the triadic schema of manifold-imaginative synthesis-unity of apperception, is a naive, pre-philosophical problem set. Beginning with this claim, we shall attempt to move systematically to a consideration of the meaning of "transcendental" for Kant and Husserl, to the resultant rejection of the thing-in-itself and the archetypus intellectus, to a comparison of the ideas of synthesis, and finally to a look at the ground of unity in critical and phenomenological thought, as transcendental unity of apperception and temporality respectively.

From the very outset of the Critique of Pure Reason, in the opening pages of the "Transcendental Aesthetic," Kant presents the structural framework within which transcendental philosophy as critical idealism shall unfold. There the stems of knowledge are delineated into sensibility and understanding, a distinction which in turn is grounded upon the radical opposition between receptivity and spontaneity. Also introduced in this first section is a matter-form dichotomy, in terms of the manifold that stands in need of ordering, and the ordering activity respectively.¹⁷ It is from within this framework that those structures which make possible experience emerge insofar as human cognition is finite: viz., (a) the pure manifold as given and which must be intuited under a certain form, (b) the forms of unity in light of which the transcendental power of imagination orders the manifold, and (c) the unity of apperception, as the condition for the possibility of bringing the manifold together in one consciousness.

For Husserl, however, this entire format reflects the inappropriate point of departure in Kantian thought. Transcendental philosophy is entirely subsequent to, and dependent upon, the phenomenological epoche. That which is known by critical transcendental knowledge is the pure forms of intuition and understanding to which any object must conform if it is to be an object of possible experience. The process of movement toward the realm of

the transcendental within Kantianism is an abstractive process. One argumentatively and constructively unpacks the concrete unity of any experience.

In the transcendental aesthetic we shall, therefore, first isolate sensibility, by taking away from it everything which the understanding thinks through its concepts, so that nothing may be left save empirical intuition. Secondly, we shall also separate off from it everything which belongs to sensation, so that nothing may remain save pure intuition and the mere form of appearances¹⁸

In opposition to this, the phenomenological epoche is not an abstraction in any sense, either critical or psychological. Rather, the Husserlian would claim that this method is concretion insofar as the limitedness of the sense of the world characteristic of the natural attitude is broken through by the reduction.

To argue to a concept of pure manifold and absolute unity founded upon the distinction between receptivity and spontaneity is, for Husserl, to remain immersed within a world-immanent outlook, and to have previously committed oneself to a view of the relationship between consciousness and object. Such notions are "constructions;" abstractions derived from a sense of the world which is within the world, and nowhere are they given with the kind of apodicticity requisite for philosophy to be science. Receptivity and spontaneity, despite their apparent "obviousness," cannot serve as pre-given poles about which one can develop a genuine transcendental philosophy, for such concepts are mundane. The reduction, in contrast, allows one to penetrate to the transcendental origins of these concepts themselves. The ego-cogito-cogitatum structure revealed within the domain of absolute subjectivity is a transcendental concept which can be seen to be a necessary structure belonging to any conscious experience. It is this concept, as intentionality, which Husserl poses in opposition to a manifold-form-unity schema.

In turn, one can say that for Kant "transcendental" is primarily an adjective, modifying knowledge. "The term 'transcendental,'" claims Kant, ". . . signifies such knowledge as concerns the a priori possibility of knowledge, or its a priori employment."¹⁸ That which is known by this kind of knowledge, however, is the a priori world forms in their relation to the unit of apperception. The figurative synthesis is a unifying activity in which the form of givenness of the manifold is brought to the unity of one consciousness in a determinate fashion, i.e., according to the functions of judgment.

This synthesis, as pure, is to be contrasted with the reproductive synthesis belonging to the domain of psychology. That which is known transcendently is formal, the matter being given as raw manifold capable of being ordered by a priori forms. The transcendental for Husserl, in contrast, designates a genuine realm of being accessible to a singular kind of experience. The transcendental reduction is not an abstractive movement, but a bracketing of the world through which the world re-emerges as intentional correlate of transcendental subjectivity. The phenomenological transcendental domain is non-worldly insofar as that is understood from a naive or natural point of view. So while for Kant, "transcendental" might be said to point out a formal a priori, understood as ordering the matter which allows of being ordered, the phenomenological sense of "transcendental" is that of a subjectivity which constitutes the meaning and being (Sinn und Sein) of the world. In phenomenology the opposition is between the transcendental as non-worldly and the transcendent as world-immanent, in contrast to the Kantian split between the world forms, which are a priori, and the world matter qua a posteriori.

We can see, therefore, that accompanying the rejection of the opposition between receptivity and spontaneity as foundational concepts, is the dismissal of the matter-form schema as it emerges in the Critique of Pure Reason. In turn the real differences between the senses of "transcendental" in Kantian idealism and Husserlian phenomenology appear. Another consequence of this original break is the denial of the Kantian thing-in-itself and the archetypus intellectus, even as limiting concepts within transcendental philosophy. Insofar as the theme of finitude is central to the Critique of Pure Reason, and finitude becomes manifest in terms of the receptivity functions as a limiting concept. The gap between phenomenon and noumenon on the side of the object is reflected in the differentiation between the archetypus intellectus and the finite human intellect on the side of the subject. For transcendental phenomenology, on the other hand, such distinctions are simply seen as consequences of the original receptivity-spontaneity problematic. Transcendental subjectivity, with its ego-cogitatum structure, is the whole. The fact that transcendent, spatial objects are given to consciousness only perspectively is not disclosive of an insufficiency or defect in our mode of knowing, but is representative of that kind of being which belongs to the region, Nature. The radical otherness of the Ding an sich which must be thought insofar as human knowledge is sensible and finite is grounded in the receptivity of the manifold. Husserl's rejection of the former follows from his rejection of the latter, insofar as receptivity and manifold are constructs rooted in pre-transcendental world views.

It should be noted that Husserl's intention is not to dismiss the distinction between the in-itself and the for-us as an illusory one. Instead, his aim is to trace this distinction to its genetic origins in transcendental subjectivity. In this respect, a certain affinity can be seen between Fichte and Husserl. Fichte posits the radical distinction between dogmatism and idealism, with the attendant claim that we are all born dogmatists. That we do, experientially, think the thing-in-itself is given; but the content of this concept differs according to whether we think it transcendently or transcendentally. The latter position is called for in life. "To think of something as a thing-in-itself, that is, as existing independently of myself, the empirical, I must think of myself from the point of view of life, where I am merely the empirical."²⁰ Naively, we think a receptivity, and consequently a thing-in-itself. But for neither Fichte nor Husserl can this function as a ground concept in transcendental philosophy. The necessity for thinking the Ding an sich must find its foundation in the intellectual intuition of the Absolute I and the accompanying positing of the I and non-I. For Husserl, the differentiation between being-for-us and being-in-itself must also find its ground in transcendental subjectivity. It is here that the sense of the in-itself emerges as a kind of Kantian Idea. The being of Nature is such that it shows itself only through perspectives. It is through the patterned synthesis of a multiplicity of acts that the object as unity is constituted. This process of synthesis is an open ended one, in that, ". . . a margin of determinable indeterminacy always remains over."²¹ Thus the being of a "Thing" takes on a nature analogous to that of a Kantian Idea in that the synthesis can ideally continue ad infinitum.

Up to this point, an attempt has been made to distinguish critical transcendental idealism from phenomenological transcendental idealism in light of Husserl's rejection of the initial problem setting within which Kantian thought develops. In this vein, there is another aspect of Kantianism which should be clearly separated from the phenomenological movement, viz., synthesis. As has been said previously, both Kant and Husserl develop philosophies of subjectivity within which the object of consciousness is the result of the synthetic activity of the self. It could be claimed that the intention of both of these thinkers is to give an account of objectivity via an analysis of the life of consciousness, with this life being essentially a synthetic life. Husserl's conception of synthesis has been discussed previously as one of the eidetic structures of transcendental subjectivity. If, however, we look to Kant's notion of synthesis, attending primarily to the way in which it is presented in the B deduction, it becomes recognizable

that the critical conception of synthesis differs radically from the phenomenological. Furthermore, this distinction too can be traced back to the starting points of their respective systems.

For Kant, synthesis is always externally imposed. That which is to be combined is a manifold given via sensibility. That manifold may be pure or empirical; in either case, the ordering activity is imposed from without.

. . . All combination--be we conscious of it or not, be it a combination of the manifold in intuition, empirical or non-empirical, or of various concepts--is an act of the understanding. To this act, the general title 'synthesis' may be assigned.²²

The previous account of Husserlian synthesis was limited to that of the passive, pre-predicative variety, such as that found in perception by a developed ego. Correspondingly, a treatment of the Kantian account of synthesis between concepts in judgment shall be omitted, focusing instead upon the synthesis of the manifold of intuition, and primarily upon the pure manifold.

All synthesis, as combination, is activity. This places synthesis on the side of the understanding as faculty of spontaneity. But synthesis, as a determinate mode of combination, takes place in light of a directive unity according to which that which lacks order acquires it. Insofar as the manifold is to be given to us, it must submit to the forms of space and time. Insofar as it is to be thought, however, it must be capable of being brought to the unity of one consciousness. All possible presentations must be capable of being mine. The different determinate ways in which the manifold is to be brought to this unity are found in the functions of judgment. The application of the pure notions to the pure form of time, which contains any manifold given to finite, human consciousness, results in the categories as ontological predicates in the sense of a priori determinations of the objectivity of objects. The extent to which the matter-form schema permeates this account of synthesis is evident. The matter is the given manifold to be combined by an act of the understanding, that act being the logical function of judgment. The externality of this idea of synthesis is due to the rigorous bifurcation of the stems of knowledge. With respect to the categories, Kant claims,

. . . they are merely rules for an understanding whose whole power consists in thought, consists,

that is, in the act whereby it brings the synthesis of a manifold, given to it from elsewhere in intuition, to the unity of apperception--a faculty, therefore, which by itself knows nothing whatsoever, but merely combines and arranges the material of knowledge.²³

This kind of synthetic activity is antithetical to that found in transcendental phenomenology. In Kant's imaginative synthesis, the matter to be ordered is either a pure or empirical manifold. From a phenomenological viewpoint, such a manifold is an abstraction rooted in a pre-philosophical starting point. On the empirical level this would seemingly be a bundle, or rather a chaos, of sense data. Despite the advance made by the Kantian onset over a Humean empirical conception of consciousness, strains of such atomism still structure the critical problematic. Husserlian synthesis, on the other hand, unfolds within the framework of intentional analysis. The parts to be combined are not atomic elements, but moments of a whole which bear within themselves, in the unique sense of being-in which intentionality has uncovered, possibilities into which they may flow in actuality to constitute the synthetic whole. The Kantian emphasis upon the activity of consciousness in the bestowal of objectivity is surely correct from a Husserlian perspective, yet this conception of activity is not a genuinely transcendental one, for it emerges in terms which are applicable to the ontic. Despite the radical difference within critical philosophy between philosophical and natural (or empirical) knowing, the former still contains the seeds of the natural attitude due to its enigmatic starting point.

If, finally, we look to the ground of all synthesis, of all unity, in the phenomenological and critical philosophies, the same type of opposition manifests itself. For Kant, the transcendental unity of apperception serves as epistemological guarantee of the objective unity of the object as well as of the identity of consciousness throughout these presentations. This highest principle of unity is a pure form, a pure self-identical act which must necessarily be thought, but is in principle outside the domain of experience. In order for this highest principle to be transcendental, an abstraction must be made from the matter to the form, and insofar as it is to be on the side of the understanding, the abstraction is effected from the forms of givenness to form of spontaneity as universal self-consciousness. The particular synthetic activities which constitute the life of consciousness are possible only to the extent that the elements stand under the unity of one consciousness.

Husserl, on the other hand, claims, "The fundamental form of universal synthesis, the form that makes all other forms of synthesis possible, is the all-embracing consciousness of internal time."²⁴ The problem of the highest principle of unity, of the condition for the possibility of any experience whatsoever, is not, for Husserl, that of the unity of a multiplicity of atomic parts which admit of being related to one another throughout the vehicle of the spontaneity of consciousness. While transcendent objects manifest themselves through perspectival shadings oriented along the lines of spatiality, those immanent acts which constitute objectivity are themselves extended along a temporal continuum. And insofar as immanent acts are viewed from within the framework of the transcendental reduction, all consciousness, as synthetic unity, is subject to internal temporality. The absolute unity of consciousness, therefore, is grounded in the structure of temporality itself. Each now moment, as a primitive intentional act, bears within itself in an internally articulated fashion, the past and the future in retention and protention. Time is not simply a one-dimensional flowing of a multiplicity of disparate nows, but is a primordially overlapping continuum whose elements are moments of an all-enveloping whole. Thus, Husserl states, ". . . any imagineable particular subjective process is only a prominence within a total consciousness always presupposed as unitary."²⁵ This presupposition finds its warranted validity in the retention-primal impression-protention structure of the consciousness of internal time.

It is at this level that Husserl hopes to have overcome the enigmatic issue of the possibility of transcendental knowledge itself. Time is no longer a form of intuition which serves as a mediating agent, as ". . . some third thing which is homogeneous on the one hand with the category, and on the other hand with the appearance, and which thus makes the application of the former to the latter possible."²⁶ For in this employment it is also that which stands between consciousness and the in-itself, barring knowledge of noumenal reality. Instead, in the lectures on internal time-consciousness, Husserl identifies the intensive components of a temporally extended conscious act with partial intentions, each of these bearing within itself a consciousness of past and future in an original fashion. This holding of the just-past founds the possibility of an unmediated reflective glance. "It is thanks to retention that consciousness can be made an object."²⁷ And when this consciousness is absolute consciousness, is transcendental consciousness as effected by the *epoche*, then it is retention as a moment in the structure of the consciousness of internal time which affords the possibility of

transcendental experience. Thus transcendental phenomenology claims to do justice to the unique mode of being of consciousness, striking out interpretive horizons which reduce the manifold senses of being to that which is physical, psychical, or a formal offshoot of such notions. And simultaneously, by exploring consciousness at the primary level of temporality itself, it claims to offer a kind of self-critique, a phenomenology of phenomenology, which deals directly with the problem of the possibility of transcendental knowledge.

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NOTES

¹Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, trans. Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970), p. 43.

²Ibid., p. 56.

³Ibid.

⁴Edmund Husserl, The Paris Lectures, trans. Peter Koestenbaum (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1967), p. 30.

⁵Ibid., p. 32.

⁶Edmund Husserl, Ideas I trans. W. R. Boyce Gibson (New York: The Humanities Press, 1967), Sec. 49.

⁷Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 67.

⁸Ibid., p. 71.

⁹Edmund Husserl, Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness trans. James Churchill (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1971).

¹⁰Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 81.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Husserl, Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, Sect. 17.

¹³Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 80.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 77.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 83.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 80.

¹⁷Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman K. Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), (A20, B34).

¹⁸Ibid., (A22, B36).

¹⁹Ibid., (A56, B81).

²⁰Fichte, Science of Knowledge trans. P. Heath and J. Lachs (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1970), (I,483).

²¹Husserl, Ideas I, p. 125.

²²Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B130.

²³Ibid., B145.

²⁴Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 81.

²⁵Ibid., p. 80.

²⁶Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, (A138, B177).

²⁷Husserl, Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, p. 162.