BOOK REVIEWS

Ludwig Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus: A Transcendental Critique of Ethics, Robert J. Cavalier. Washington, D. C.: University Press of America, 1980. Pps. xii, 238.

The task of this carefully constructed work is nothing less than the comprehensive reinterpretation of Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus along lines first suggested by Paul Engelmann's Letters from Ludwig Wittgenstein with a Memoir and subsequently developed in fuller detail by Janik and Toulmin in Wittgenstein's Vienna. A basic understanding of these corroborative texts is therefore instructive for realizing the distinctiveness of Cavalier's own contribution.

Engelmann, writing in 1965, insisted that the key to understanding the Tractatus lay with the author's philosophical intention, not with the work's more generally noted logical considerations. This intention was similar to the journalistic intention of Karl Kraus and the architectural intention of Adolph Loos, Viennese intellectuals and contemporaries of Wittgenstein. All three were in Engelmann's words "creative separators" who sought to raise a distinction between fact and value within a cultural tradition whose obsolescence was marked by their coalescence. This tradition, known alternately as 'late Habsburg' or 'fin-de-siecle' Vienna, did not outlast its intellectual debacle (produced, the historican Carl Schorske tells us, by the inability of its liberal tradition to detect which way was up and which way down). Yet it was precisely this tradition that was not understood by those Anglo-Saxon philosophers upon whom Wittgenstein, at a later date and in a foreign setting, exerted his greatest influence. Hence the Tractatus made an impact as a refined logical novelty rather than as the reflective shock-wave of a culture on its way to neutralizing itself. It was taken to be representative of the direction of Cambridge philosophy of the day, which for Engelmann meant that it was mistaken to be chiefly a logical work and chiefly valuable for its apparent anti-metaphysical bias, anti-Kantianism, and positivistic temper.

In Wittgenstein's Vienna, which appeared in 1973, Janik and Toulmin followed up on Engelmann's suggestion that the Tractatus had fallen victim to a rather large cultural misunderstanding. Emphasizing that it was Wittgenstein who went to Frege, and from Frege to Russell, and that he appeared to have approached them with a clear set of questions of his own, these authors set about to determine the motives behind Wittgenstein's quest. They applied a cross-disciplinary analysis to Viennese culture, giving prominence to the telling themes of Robert Musil's Man Without Qualities, Kraus' literary criticisms, Loos' functionalism, Schonberg's innovations in musical style, turmoil in politics, and so on. As a result, they were able to identify a cultural imperative so fully general as to be shared by most Viennese intellectuals of the day. The imperative, voiced by Kraus, was for a thorough-going critique of language, one that could restore the power of subjective expression, of moral quality, to all fields of human endeavor, whether they be literary, artistic, or scientific; to enable what was sayable in all these fields to be said well and thereby to overcome the crippling effects of convention and sentimentality. Such a critique had its antecedents in the philosophies of Kant and Schopenhauer; the need for it was demonstrably apparent in the writings of Kierkegaard and Tolstoy; indeed, the failure of one such critique, that of Fritz Mauthner's, could be traced back to its Machian empiricist presuppositions and was counterable, at least in principle, by Heinrich Hertz's successful application of Kantian transcendentalism to models for the language of mechanics. According to Janik and Toulmin, precisely this quest for a critique of language along Hertz's lines led Wittgenstein first to Frege, then to Russell, and finally to the writing of the Tractatus. Moreover, the Kraus-like use to which it was to be put meant that the work's point could only be described (as Engelmann maintained and as Wittgenstein himself described it in a letter to Ludwig von Ficker) as an ethical one.

Although both Engelmann and Janik and Toulmin ventured into interpreting the Tractatus itself, in both cases the primary point was to show how understanding the man, Wittgenstein, is essential to understanding his work. This left the impression that the work itself has less to say on its own behalf than do the circumstances leading to its composition--an impression that is undoubtedly wrong, but bolstered by the knowledge that so many previous interpretations of the Tractatus were misguided. Thus, rather than agonize over Wittgenstein's elaborate numbering system, as Stenius, for one, did, or reconcile propositions that speak of mysticism, the transcendental and the ethical with propositions that treat of logic, as Cavalier sets out to do, there is a tendency to go behind the work to its sources in Karl Kraus' crusade against the journalistic 'feuilleton' of the day, to the 'actual' thoughts

Wittgenstein recorded in notebooks of the period, or even to sources that lie further afield.

Indeed, in the intervening years since Wittgenstein's Vienna was published, this tendency has amplified. Various articles have linked Wittgenstein to a number of different sources; to Schopenhauer and Heinrich Hertz (which are justifiable links), F. H. Bradley, William James, great mystics of the West, and others. Accompanying them have been interpretations of the Tractatus that defend such unorthodox positions as that the work is expressive of a new type of metaphysics and, in contrast, that it is or should be reducible to its 'biographical sources'. Although occasionally insightful, these accounts taken in combination mainly reflect the futility of coming to terms with the work on the work's own terms--a futility wryly noted by Wittgenstein himself when he said in his Preface that perhaps only those who think the same thoughts will understand his work.

Nevertheless, it remains the case that the Tractatus needs to be interpreted on its own terms, as earlier commentators had naively sought to do. Its terms, however, are not only the terms of language analysis or mathematical logic. They are also the terms of a European philosophical tradition that gave Viennese cultural criticism its grounding through the thought of Kant, Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, Tolstoy, and their Viennese interlocutors (Hertz, Theodor Haecker, Kraus, etc.). These terms fall within the purvue of transcendental philosophy, philosophy that seeks out the conditions for the possibility of meaningful experience only from within that experience, and of existential philosophy, philosophy that places the locus of ethical existence in individual subjective inwardness, will, decision, and concrete praxis. In a word, they are trans-empirical terms and they are combined with empirical terms in a new way in the Tractatus. Hence a return to the text itself, to understand what it is really telling us, is what is called for most by the revelation that the Tractatus has divergent historical and cultural sources. It is to Cavalier's credit that he fulfills this need, thereby affirming the primacy of Wittgenstein's philosophical intentions over whatever personal, cultural, or logical designs the Tractatus may also possess.

"It will be the purpose of this book," Cavalier writes, "to attempt an interpretation of the Tractatus along the lines that I believe Wittgenstein himself would have wished" (p. 5). To analytical philosophy, this route led to logic. To the authors of Wittgenstein's Vienna, the route leads to a psychobiography informed by Karl Kraus' aphorism that many a man writes because 'he does not possess enough character not to write' (Wittgenstein's talk--and life--of silence pays homage to this insight). But to Cavalier, if too easy of a dichotomy between Wittgenstein's philosophical text and his 'idiosyncratic' character has laid at the basis of "an utterly misguided interpretation" (p. 5) and if, moreover, the past fifty years of such interpretation "have focussed upon the seemingly central part of the text dealing with the 'limits of language', failing to see the double task--indeed, the real task--of performing a '_Sprachkritik_' _in order to_ 'draw limits to the sphere of the ethical from within'" (p. 185), then the alternative is to regard the _Tractatus_ as a work of synthetical philosophy, philosophy that incorporates tensions and resolutions and struggles to achieve a final unity not through logic but _within_ it, in its own self-limitation of sense and its consequent calls for a praxis of silence. "Within these noisy surroundings and countering it, the expression of utter silence must be deepened until this babbling world is finally at a loss of words," wrote Ludwig von Ficker, editor of one of Vienna's influential journals, _Der Brenner_ (quoted by Cavalier on p. 26). In the same year Wittgenstein wrote to von Ficker that the point of the _Tractatus_ was an ethical one and that his work consisted of two parts: "the one presented here plus all that I have _not_ written. And it is precisely this second part that is the important one. My book draws limits to the ethical from the inside as it were, and I am convinced that this is the ONLY _rigorous_ way of drawing those limits" (Cavalier, p. 12). Having so drawn them, Cavalier reminds us, Wittgenstein chose to live the life of silence the _Tractatus_ succeeded in deepening (p. 1).

For the interpreter, the work's 'two parts' means exegesis must not be restricted to the text alone. Both the text and the life of the mind that wrote it are essential moments in the work as a whole. Yet the text is not the 'important' part of the work, Wittgenstein says, so it is not there that one can discover the 'first principles' of the philosophy that give it its character. The _Tractatus_ opens with a series of propositions about world, states-of-affairs, objects, but the _character_ of these ontological commitments is not transparent to the text itself. If, indeed, the "fundamental purpose of the _Tractatus_, viz., the disclosure of the ethical sphere, is already present in the first propositions" as Cavalier maintains (p. 67), it nevertheless remains true that the theme of the work as a whole operates on a broader philosophical plane that the text discloses. Exactly how broad this plane is can be seen from Cavalier's prefatorial statement that the task of his interpretation is to "investigate the nature and kind of conflict obtaining between the spheres of objectivity and subjectivity" as they relate to the work's ethical problem (p. ix). Subject and object, Kierkegaard and Tolstoy on the one hand and Russell and Hertz on the other, are being brought face to face in the pages of the Tractatus. By interpreting the character of the work as ethical, the Tractatus emerges as nothing less than a "synthesis of both European and Anglo-Saxon thought" (p. ix).

Cavalier's work is informally divided into two parts, each having two chapters. The second part is the more substantial, since it contains the textual exegesis and interpretation proper, but the importance of the first part should not be underestimated. Chapter One contains a worthwhile biographical sketch of Wittgenstein's life (pp. 5-15), designed to counteract the 'false image' of Wittgenstein as a mysterious, driven man and an odd-ball genius that other accounts (perhaps most notably Norman Malcolm's Ludwig Wittgenstein; A Memoir) seemed to promote.

Chapter Two consists of an exposition of the influences operating upon the Tractatus. Much of the material here is essentially the same as can be found in Wittgenstein's Vienna and Engelmann's Memoir (and essentially based on them). The function of Chapter Two, however, is to organize these influences into distinct groupings, to identify the dominant themes forthcoming from each, and by so doing, to set the stage for a distinctively philosophical treatment of the text.

According to Cavalier, six major influences operated on the Tractatus. Foremost among them were the influences associated with Karl Kraus (including Adolph Loos and Der Brenner) and Heinrich Hertz, whose Principles of Mechanics sought in Kantian fashion to show 'from within' what both the nature and the limits of mechanical models were. Kierkegaard's influence was probably indirect but hardly incidental to the Tractatus, since it derived primarily from Theodor Haecker's translations and interpretations in Der Brenner. Cavalier explicates Kierkegaard's ethics using The Concept of Irony, Volume II of Either/Or and Concluding Unscientific Postscript, taking Wittgenstein's references to choice, will and action in Propositions 6.422 and 6.43 as his lead. He is therefore able to produce an unmistakable similarity between Wittgenstein's and Kierkegaard's views. "For Kierkegaard ethics is a matter of personal appropriation, the individual's willing to realize 'the Good' within his own most particular existence . . . . For Wittgenstein, too, ethics is essentially a matter of personal appropriation and willing in decisive praxis. Thus with our presentation of Kierkegaard's view of ethics we have simultaneously anticipated Wittgenstein's view of ethics" (pp. 41-2).

The three remaining influences are Schopenhauer, Tolstoy, and Russell and Frege. Although Wittgenstein rejected Schopenhauer's idealism ("In the Tractatus, objects (Gegenstande) are the ontological structure of the world itself, radically distinct from any 'faculties of the mind'", p. 42), Schopenhauer's bifurcation of the world into representation and will remained influential, primarily through its forceful presentation of the inability of reason to guide conduct, and so too did Schopenhauer's identification of compassion as the ground of ethical action. Both Schopenhauer and Tolstoy regarded ethics and art as related (with Schopenhauer looking to art for a 'better knowledge' for ethical action and Tolstoy seeing the role of art as the language of feeling), and both influences were formative for Wittgenstein's view that ethics and aesthetics are one (Tractatus Proposition 6.421). These influences together with Wittgenstein's expanded definition of ethics in his Lecture on Ethics leads Cavalier to conclude that ethics for Wittgenstein "includes all that which appropriately belongs to the sphere of 'life problems,' . . . . It is involved in those problems that comprise the conclusion of the Tractatus (6.4ff) and which constitute the main point of the work" (p. 53). Thus both the sense of the ethical and the existential sphere in which it operates are discernible in the influences operating on the Tractatus.

The occurence of both Hertz and Schopenhauer in this listing of major influences as well as the close association struck between Tolstoian and Schopenhauerian themes, raises a question concerning the general nature of the Kantian influence on the Tractatus. In a footnote Cavalier describes Wittgenstein's relation to Kant as "subtle and complex" (p. 211, n. 21). Through Hertz, Wittgenstein apparently understood the value of a transcendental critique that drew limits from within rather than imposing them from without, but he disallowed any subjective activity involved in our comprehension of the world. Thus Wittgenstein's Sprachkritik utilizes the transcendental approach to create a distinction between object (world) and subject (will) but distances itself from Schopenhauer's developments beyond Kant by treating representational form as itself objective. "While the work can be seen as two-fold division into representation and will", Cavalier writes when discussing the differences between Wittgenstein's and Schopenhauer's senses of solipsism, "the representation is not grounded in a 'representing subject,' but rather in the world itself" (p. 151).

The appeal of the transcendental approach, so characteristic of Wittgenstein's unorthodox approach to philosophy, apparently rests not with its conclusions but with the way in which it enables questions to be raised. It is a way of putting first things first. Simples precede complexes, and representational possibility precedes models (including propositions) that do the representing. "This peculiar way of unfolding the treatise," Cavalier notes concerning the movement from representation as such to language "has parallels with Kant's transcendental task which was, in the Critique of Pure Reason, to uncover the conditions for the possibility of judging and knowing" (pp. 103-4).

Thus, if we seek to know the influences that most led Wittgenstein to actually separate object and subject along the manner of world and will, we need to turn more towards Russell and Frege than to transcendentalism and its themes, more to the technical requirements of the answer (to which most of the Tractatus is devoted) than to the question.

From Frege, Wittgenstein appears to have inherited the notion of a 'general project' to uncover the formal, logical relations that lay beneath grammar and that contain the key for understanding language (pp. 55-6). From Russell, principally Russell's Theory of Descriptions contained in his essay "On Denoting", Wittgenstein discovered, in his own words, how to show "that the apparent logical form of a proposition need not be its real one" (Tractatus Proposition 4.0031). Comments Cavalier: "Wittgenstein had sought to help the reader 'see the world rightly' (6.54), and it was the work of Frege and Russell that allowed him to accomplish this task . . . . But this 'seeing,' as the study of the other influences has indicated, is a double seeing . . . . a simultaneous grasping of the subjective and objective moments of existence" (p. 60).

The second informal part of Cavalier's work contains a detailed exegetical analysis of the Sprachkritik cf the Tractatus (Chapter Three) and a reconstruction of its ethical disclosures for the subject, the will and the nature of the ethical (Chapter Four). Because the Tractatus is an ethical work, the unfolding of the Sprachkritik in Chapter Three reflects the negative movement, while the discussion of ethics in Chapter Four reflects the postive movement of the work as a whole.

Concerning Chapter Three, the first four sets of propositions in the Tractatus are regarded as comprising the Sprachkritik proper. Their essential themes are: the nature of the world (the first set but extending to Proposition 2.063), ontology and representation (the second set), the nature of the proposition (the third set), and language and the Sprachkritik (the fourth set). Consistent with the negative movement of these propositions, the mood of the Tractatus by the time of their completion is "one of doubt and suspicion; ordinary language is not what it seems to be. Language is capable of disguising itself; it is a kind of self-concealing which must be uncovered from 'beneath'" (p. 134).

Crucial to the understanding of the Sprachkritik is the displacement of the so-called 'picture theory of language' which Wittgenstein appears to be giving us, and which previous commentators assumed he was giving us, when he wrote that "We picture facts to ourselves" (Tractatus Proposition 2.1). As its name implies, the sented at all. "A world must have form if a language is to represent it, it must have form and content if a language is to have determinate sense" (p. 94). "What gets passed over" in the picture theory "is the necessity for an inner similarity (form) between language and the world, a condition which makes possible the possibility of a thought's projecting language on to the world" (p. 100). Overlooking the significance of inner similarity, the picture theory emphasizes projection as 'something we do' (Anscombe), and the whole project of the Sprachkritik cascades into the subjective sphere, precisely that sphere that is not in the world.

In place of the picture theory, Cavalier argues, Wittgenstein actually represents a theory of models drawn from his ontology (not from language) and in compliance with Hertz's a priori requirement that there be a fundamental conformity between the world and our representations of it (cf. p. 101, 111). Logical form, that is, the "structural possibilities of objects with respect to their possibilities of combination" (p. 114), fulfills this requirement. Just as things are related in a determinate manner, so too models are 'out there', facts by virtue of the way their elements are related to one another (i.e., by their structure), rather than because of their objective markings (p. 108). Structure is form but not yet logical form; to establish that, Wittgenstein also establishes that a model essentially is its representational form.

Now, a model "can model any reality whose form is identical with it . . . but it cannot model the relationship itself" (p. 113). It is peculiarly self-limited, or limited from within its own representational relation. Hence, homogeneity of form between model and modelled (the Hertzian fundamental requirement) is alone what establishes the difference between facts that are models and 'mere' facts. Homogeniety of form, representational form, is the ground for the sense of the model (p. 121), including models of things (objects in combination) that are not actual. If a presumed model lacks sense, it lacks it because it lacks representational possibility. To complete the Sprachkritik, it remains to show how propositions and by extension language, are, unlike 'life problems', species of models.

"Language disguises thought", Wittgenstein says in Tractatus Proposition 4.002; "So much so, that from the outward form of the clothing it is impossible to infer the form of the thought beneath it . . ." This "Fregean insight" (p. 132) is the reason why Wittgenstein looks for the nature of language only from within language; because "the outward form of the clothing is not designed to reveal the form of the body" (Proposition 4.002), the conditions for the possibility of language first need to be established.

picture theory states that language is a picture which we hold up to the world to determine its truth or falsity (p. 94); it depends heavily on the translation of 'Bild' as 'picture' rather than as 'model' and on the mental act of projection by means of which statements are supposedly compared with real situations (p. 101). Cavalier's criticisms of it are four-fold: (a) it overlooks the importance of Wittgenstein's distinction between thing and object; (b) hence it does not accord ontological status to form as the 'third thing' by means of which language and world come together; (c) it unduly emphasizes the notion of projection, and as a consequence of all three, (d) it fails to grasp the proper task of the Sprachkritik being constructed through the theory of the model (pp. 97-8).

The first and second failures result from a misreading of the first and second sets of Tractatus propositions. Arguing that the first set of propositions attempts to "portray the world as it presents itself 'in itself,' i.e., prior to any descriptions of the world as representable" (p. 66), and that, consequent upon their success, the second set deals not with language but with representation as such (cf. p. 116), Cavalier interprets Wittgenstein as having first established the world (the totality of what can be represented) as radically contingent (the world 'breaks down' into facts and facts are both contingent and independent, cf. p. 72-3), therefore requiring, if representation is to be possible at all, a non-empirical criterion of 'determinate sense' (cf. p. 84). The ontology of the Tractatus is essentially simple, and only on the condition that it remains simple can elementary propositions, propositions which can not be analyzed further, be possible. By postulating that an 'aporia' develops early in the second set of propositions concerning Wittgenstein's "somewhat equivocal" use of the terms 'thing' and 'object' (p. 74), Cavalier carries out a "clusteral reading" (p. 76) of propositions from the Tractatus and the Notebooks that ends by establishing that objects are trans-empirical structural forms conforming to the transcendental demands for simplicity (p. 88) and permanence (p. 114), while things are complex, sensible or empirical entities. Objects ". . . represent the simplicity (non-diversity) of form and structure . . . written into the manifest particularity of diverse things" (pp. 91-2). They do so through the "referentially equivocal nature of substance, i.e., substance qua 'form' as referring to objects (2.021), substance qua 'form and content' as referring to things (2.025)" (Ibid).

These conclusions suffice to discredit the picture theory, for they locate the possibility of representation outside language and outside the speaker's mental projections, in the ontological presuppositions mandated by the possibility that the world can be repre-

Thus Wittgenstein places 'severe limitations' on thought, limiting it to the world and logic (p. 124). Thoughts are logical models; propositions are their sensible expressions and are composed of signs in projective relation to the world (p. 126). Propositions meet world, language meets ontology, precisely through their structure, not through their objective markings. Expressed in more poignant fashion, propositions meet world through their signs or names meaning or depicting objects, alone or in combination, not through the relations that symbolize them. Relations, Cavalier writes, ". . . do not play a role in the ontology of the Tractatus" (p. 127). "Propositions, as logical models, are bound to the requirements of sense, ultimately to a certain homogeneity of form between the form of the model and the form of the reality it is representing" (p. 129). Language is the totality of propositions; it shares with propositions the same condition for the possibility of being meaningful, namely, that it adheres to the formal requirements of representation (p. 131).

With this, the Sprachkritik is completed. Its 'master stroke' was to show that "the very nature of representation as such is a self-limiting sphere which is bound by its own formal requirements to a homogeneity of form between the model (language) and that which is being modelled (reality)" (p. 134). Its consequences, which Chapter Four seeks to bring out, have to do with nothing less than "the problem of human existence (viewed ethically) with regard to the problem of happiness" (p. 184).

The severe limitations Wittgenstein placed upon thought, propositions and language mean that language can only have a descriptive function; its propositions can say nothing more than "this is how things stand" (p. 162). Propositions that purport to say more pass beyond the essential neutrality of the world and are therefore classifiable as pseudo-propositions. On these grounds, many an interpreter has regarded the 'ethical' assertions of the Tractatus as the negative accomplishment, and the propositions concerning language and logic as the positive accomplishment. But for Cavalier, the truth of the matter is exactly the reverse. The Sprachkritik serves as prolegommenon to ethics; its restrictiveness is alone what calls for a 'creative separation' of (subjective) value from (objective) fact, and it does so once again in Kantian fashion by examining the 'conditions for the possibility' of genuine subjectivity, now that objectivity has been given a clearly determinate character. The uniqueness of Cavalier's approach comes from its ability to detect the subtle shifts between Kantian and Russellian problematics and to recognize the character of the synthesis thus being brought about in the Tractatus. This uniqueness is most apparent in Chapter Four.

Chapter Four begins with an analysis of Wittgenstein's references to solipsism (Proposition 5.6ff), from which the nature of subjectivity will be determined, and ends with an enlightening discussion of the concluding propositions of the Tractatus (6.4ff). The inquiry into subjectivity establishes the sphere of existence in which it operates while the concluding propositions shed light on the sense of the ethical as it operates within that sphere.

There are, Cavalier tells us, three discernible senses of self or subject in the Tractatus: psychological, metaphysical and ethical. The psychological self is the will as phenomenon; it falls within the causal nexus (p. 139), therefore within the world; therefore it does not survive either Hume's skeptical rejection of it or Wittgenstein's own statement that belief in the causal nexus is superstition (Proposition 5.1361). But both the metaphysical self (the knowing self that shrinks to a mere perspectival point) and the ethical self (the willing self that serves to change the limits of the world) are transcendental, and by the disclosure of them as two different deployments of the same self (p. 157), the possibility of a subjectivity falling outside the sphere of representation has also been effectively disclosed. They are disclosed through the 'truth of solipsism'.

Now, the 'truth of solipsism' Wittgenstein acknowledges in Proposition 5.62 arises directly from language's self-limitation to its descriptive function. The limits of language are the limits of what can be described or thought about which means, following Pitcher's interpretation of the 'principle of significant negation' (pp. 141-2), that the limits of language are the limits of the world. Language's self-limitation also limits the language-user (who can know only a limited part of the language). Due, then, to the human (as distinct from the logical) limitations on knowing, the limits of my language are the limits of my world, as Wittgenstein says in Proposition 5.5571. Self and world are equated, and the nature of the language-user or knowing subject serves as the condition for the possibility of 'my' world. Hence the knowing subject is transcendental, a metaphysical subject. By contrasting Wittgenstein to Hume and Schopenhauer (based on evidence available in Wittgenstein's Notebooks), Cavalier is able to conclude that "The solipsism of Wittgenstein is not the reduction of the world to something 'in' me . . . but rather the uniqueness of myself" (p. 155).

Uniqueness, then, is the primary predicate of the subject. Correspondingly, the nature of ethics that arises in the concluding propositions of the Tractatus reflects, given Cavalier's analysis, the conditions for the possibility of this uniqueness manifesting itself or, in other words, the conditions for the meaning of the self actually disclosed by the 'truth of solipsism'. They are conditions resulting from the subjective revelation of different possible worlds. They effect the transition from objectivity to subjectivity, from speech to silence, and yet remain within the power of the Sprachkritik.

Cavalier is careful to point out that the shift from the world and the langugae to my world and my language, while introducing the possibility of different worlds, does not signify a change in the ontology of the Tractatus. "People live differently, and Wittgenstein is here speaking of life in this deeper sense" (p. 167); "each person qua ethical subject dwells amongst . . . facts differently" (p. 174). For Wittgenstein, all propositions are of equal value (which is to say, value is irrelevant to them), so what one makes of them must come from outside the world. Since the ontology of the Tractatus is essentially simple, excluding as it does all relationships, the value that comes from outside the world comes from the relationship of the subject to the world. Willing is that relationship; it is expressible mainly as a 'non-accidental' (perhaps 'intentional') attitude towards the world (p. 160).

Thus from the 'explosion' (p. 166) of many worlds (or perspectival points) out of one world, the world of the ontology of facts, individuality erupts in the form of a willing, never abstract, that must take place within the inherently ambiguous "situations of life" (pp. 200-1). As a relationship to the world, such individuality expresses a fundamental unity of inwardness and praxis, an ethical unity culminating in a happy life when the will is to "do the good". A happy life is one in which ". . . individuals who live rightly find a harmony within themselves that is free from the radical contingency of the world" (p. 188) and the 'true mark' of it consists of the attitude one has towards death. Death does not appear fearful to one living timelessly in the present, as distinct from one who is caught up in the temporal (p. 192).

To reveal this profound and expansive sense of the ethical, Cavalier gave thoughtful consideration, first to Wittgenstein's statement that ethics and aesthetics are one (ethics is a matter of inwardness and the power of art gives expression to the innermost spheres of human existence, pp. 168-9), and second to an 'aporia' that develops in the Notebooks between 'willing' and 'wanting', reminiscent of the earlier aporia between 'object' and 'thing'. Distinguishing between willing and wanting is important, for both are expressive of how the individual, viewed ethically, relates to the world. Willing " . . . found expression in pure praxis", Cavalier explains in summary, whereas wanting

" . . . was able to incorporate the stoical attitude of one faced with a world outside their ultimate control". They are two moments of an individual's life that " . . . find a single home in the attitude of a subject who wills the good . . . without wanting a reward (or fearing a punishment)" (p. 184).

With Wittgenstein there is a similarity between the ethical and the religious way of life, suggestive of Kierkegaard but once again produced by the self-limitation of language to the objective sphere and by the arrival of subjectivity as the individual's relationship to the world. The religious, or mystical, relationship concerns how the world as whole is viewed; unlike the ethical attitude of doing, it is marked by contemplation (p. 196). Thus wanting, willing and contemplation comprise the three relationships of subject to world in the Tractatus. They come to the life of space and time from outside space and time, and the "solution to the problem of life", to the riddle of life in space and time, is grounded in the recognition of their difference. The problem, the riddle, is transcendental, not immanent; it concerns the 'willing subject' and is 'solved' only within the living of life itself (p. 199). With this, together with the recognition that the Tractatus as a whole speaks 'whereof one must be silent', that is, speaks transcendentally and therefore beyond propositional warrant, both Wittgenstein and Cavalier's analysis end.

A review of this length should be useful mainly as a guide to the text. There are two general points that can be made in this regard, both of which reflect the positive advance Cavalier has contributed to our understanding of Wittgenstein. The first is that the primary justification Cavalier makes for his interpretation is not fidelity to sources or to biographical detail (these are secondary justifications), but fidelity instead to the text itself. And he is surely right in his defense of this matter. What marks the superiority of his interpretation is that it can account for the text as a whole, even if ironically it must do so by de-emphasizing the vast majority of propositions treating of logic and the logic of our language. The latter fulfill the technical requirements of the Sprachkritik; they do not provide it with its 'categorical' requirement. For the latter, it is necessary to envision the project of the work as a whole, to see how language based upon an ontology of simples evinces an expansive sense of silence which can situate 'one's' language in relation to what is higher. (What is perhaps most creative about Wittgenstein's 'creative separation' has to do with the expanded definition of ethics which it produces. It is an error to treat this, as some do, as broadened for the sake of emptying it of content).

The second point is that Cavalier's fine ear for the thematic content of transcendental philosophy has enabled him to do what other interpreters fail to do: regulate the extent of influence that should be accorded to Wittgenstein's sources. Such regulation gives both more and less credit to these sources--more, because by carefully listening to the themes, Cavalier puts Wittgenstein in direct communication with the core ideas of previous philosophies, which surely Wittgenstein _heard_, even if not through reading them; and less, inasmuch as the _Tractatus_ on Cavalier's analysis does not dissolve into the influence of any of its sources. Wittgenstein took an idea from Kraus but did with it something the _Brenner Circle_ apparently did not understand; the same comment applies to Russell and Frege. He recognized the functional value of the Kantian approach, but drew conclusions of his own--not those of Kierkegaard, Schopenhauer and Tolstoy, but a synthesis of what in his view was essential to their views. By showing that Wittgenstein 'drew limits from within' the ethical by the _Sprachkritik_, that is, by the very same stroke that enabled him to draw limits from within to language, Cavalier has also drawn limits from within the text to the amount and type of biographical, cultural and historical commentary needed to understand it. He has, in other words, restored the text to its philosophical power.

What in the _Tractatus_ is philosophically provocative for our age, an age that has presumably passed beyond the dismantling influence of the _Tractatus_, much of it by Wittgenstein himself in his later work? Perhaps this more than anything, that although Western thought has struggled to arrive at an adequate concept of objectivity, Wittgenstein was seemingly the first to actually stop to look at a fact in utter neutrality. What he saw was decidedly not what Logical Positivism, for instance, took it to be, namely, a criterion for truth. Instead, he saw a _ground_ for truth in the neutrality of representational possibility. Such a ground is not _used_ (as, for example, in a verification procedure) but _acted_ upon. Now the consequences of acting so openly, upon truth so radically, utterly neutral, has been a theme of contemporary existentialist thought, and Wittgenstein's thought rightfully ranks alongside it as distinctively modern. It differs significantly from it, however, because it is sensitive to the _functional_ relationship between objectivity and subjectivity, world and self, by means of which the individual self stands 'counter to' the objective world, ethically grounding itself in act.

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The Human Dilemma: Finding a Meaning in Life, Herbert A. Tonne. Buffalo, New York: Prometheus Books, 1980.

In The Human Dilemma Herbert Tonne at once tries both too much and too little. As a result the trained philosopher and the lay reader will find Dr. Tonne's book dissatisfying.

The dilemma which concerns Tonne results from "the awareness that death is inevitable--a realization that is unique to humans while we share with other animals the insatiable desire to live." This dilemma, Tonne claims, tends to render vacuous all claims of value, purpose, or worth for life and its constituents. Tonne accepts as a starting point the absurdity of life, and his book is an attempt to show that while a certain frame of mind "does not make life worth living, it can make life livable." It is by resolving the human dilemma and discovering the livable life that we can become happy.

The Preface of The Human Dilemma states that the book is written for "(H)umanists, liberal thinkers, people who have discovered the futility of packaged answers to life's problems, philosophically minded persons who have been turned off by formal philosophy; those inclined to existentialism, those fed up with the emptiness of much of life, liberal ministers, humanistic counselors and social workers--in short those who are not impressed by facile answers based on trite generalizations . . . ." I fear the members of this pantheon of thinkers will not then be impressed by Dr. Tonne's book, as his tendency toward the trite, the facile, and the general often over-powers the significance of the questions and problems with which he is dealing.

Tonne does know what the big issues are, and that is what is so disconcerting and exasperating about The Human Dilemma. While Tonne recognizes that the problems of value, relativism, the existence of God, and so forth are crucial considerations in any discussion of the human dilemma, he fails to capture the subtleties of these problems. In his discussion of the mind and its relation to the body, Tonne mentions the importance of self-awareness in the concept of mind, but rather than explore this area, the discussion degenerates into some pseudo-scientific ramblings and ends with the following strange passage:

> Using the brain is like using the body. With a little training, we can walk forty or even fifty miles a day, but most of us don't. We can work for twelve or more hours a day, but we usually prefer not to. So why use our minds to the limit? Thinking is only one part of life and not always the most important part of a full, rewarding life.

The Human Dilemma is filled with such homilies and platitudes, each dangling by itself, seemingly unrelated to any other thought in the book.

Yet such superficiality might be overlooked, if not forgiven. Dr. Tonne is after all writing for the general thinking public and not for the philosophically trained. Pressing the problems surrounding the human dilemma any further might confuse the reader rather than enlighten him or her. Indeed, only the philosopher might become annoyed at Tonne's lapses into hyperbole (i.e., "All of us are necessarily hypocrites in degree"), but any thinking person should be concerned by Tonne's constant lack of rigor, both in the explication of the views of others, and in the presentation of his own position.

The Human Dilemma is rife with misconceptions, misrepresentations, and misunderstandings. Consider a passage taken from his discussion of the mind/body problem:

> In the seventeenth century Descartes thought that the mind was quite different in form from the rest of matter and energy. Hume developed a bundle theory, arguing that everything is composed of two phenomena, mind stuff and substance stuff. A modification of Hume's approach argues that God constantly intervenes in the world. For example, when the mind decides to move the hand, God makes it happen. Then Berkeley argued solipsistically that the world is all mind, an approach that still does not tell us what mind is.

Such a representation of the history of philosophy makes one's skin crawl. If Tonne has not read Descartes, Berkeley and Hume, he should not write about them. If he has read them, and can still write a paragraph like the one above, then he should not write at all.

In the last four chapters of The Human Dilemma, Tonne offers his resolution of the human dilemma. His answers, while lacking all but the most ephemeral philosophical foundation are not without interest.

One way Tonne suggests to acheive happiness is to act as if certain things are so, even if we believe or know that they are not. Tonne accepts a wide ranging relativity, and his assertion that 'Truth is relative' is fundamental to his thought. Tonne of course offers only the most shadowy of arguments for this crucial premise, citing helter-skelter examples of the cultural relativity of belief, which tells us nothing about the existence of what Tonne terms absolute truth. If one is willing to grant Tonne the relativity of truth, which is best interpreted as the thesis that absolute, unchanging truths either do not exist or are inaccessible to humans, then Tonne thinks one will be comfortable with the moderate use of 'as-if-isms'. As-if-ism is the creation of fictions or, put more baldly, lies that allow us to live life more happily. Thus Tonne's call is to live a life of bad faith, denying logic and reason to live in blissful ignorance.

To his credit, Tonne advocates the use of as-if-isms only in moderation. Freud's work with neurosis has shown that excessive self-deception can adversely affect behavior, although Tonne seems mainly concerned with the social effects of as-if-isms. Yet the philosopher, as one committed to reason, should clearly reject Tonne's call to bad faith. Tonne calls Bertrand Russell's concern for humanity a 'sublime inconsistancy' given his philosophy, a charge that Russell would surely contest. Russell, who based much of his philosophy on his 'robust sense of reality' and the rules of logic, would wholeheartedly reject the use of as-if-isms as legitimate. Curiously, Tonne constantly appeals to the reader to be rational, to think. Thus this advocation of inconsistency is strange. Perhaps he feels that the only rational thing to do is to be irrational. Now that is a dilemma. Anyone who accepts consistency as fundamental to rationality must reject Tonne's call to as-if-ism.

The denouement of The Human Dilemma comes in its sixteenth chapter, wherein Tonne offers his decalogue for living:

1. Have awe for the unknown.
2. Respect the personalities of others.
3. To the extent to which it cannot be changed, accept the world as it is.
4. To what extent you can, change the world. Have a plan.
5. Avoid absolutism and dogmatism; everything is relative.
6. Lead not into temptation.
7. Abjure tradition for the sake of tradition.
8. Have faith in people and institutions, but not blind faith.
9. Be moderate in all things, including moderation itself.

10. Know yourself and live according to this knowledge.

Tonne, to his credit, recognizes the 'brashness' of offering such a set of principles. What he has failed to recognize is the vacuousness of a decalogue given only the most superficial argumentation. Indeed, some of these principles are totally unrelated to anything in the 180 pages preceding the decalogue. Further, Tonne's fondness for equivocation, as exemplified in principle eight, renders the principles nearly useless.

The philosopher's view of Tonne's work will be harsh. Tonne has read broadly, if not deeply, and surely his stint as a professor of business education at New York University did not prepare him for the rigours of philosophical investigation. Still, a hedonist might approve of Tonne's book, as some tormented soul may find comfort in its pages. But no one could find enlightenment or understanding in it. It is far to shallow a work for that. It is one thing to simplify a complex problem for the general public, and quite another to misrepresent it. Dr. Tonne is guilty of the latter.

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