

A Response to Buber on Heidegger and Kierkegaard

ROY MARTINEZ

Martin Buber has alleged that "Heidegger secularizes the Single One of Kierkegaard" and that "Heidegger's man is a great and decisive step out from Kierkegaard in the direction of the edge where nothing begins."¹ By the Single One is meant Kierkegaard's term, den Enkelte. Now, in his attempt at self-determination, Dasein (Heidegger's man), recognizes only finitude, for Being discloses itself through Dasein as time. Den Enkelte, however, acknowledges the eternal both in himself as demonstrated by Anti-Climacus in The Sickness unto Death, and outside of himself as illustrated by Vigilius Haufniensis in The Concept of Dread. Where Dasein is compelled to turn only to himself when conscience calls for authenticity or existential wholeness, den Enkelte is sustained by faith in eternity for his personal integrity or salvation.

Actually, what accounts for the determinative difference between Dasein and den Enkelte is the voluntary, more specifically, resolution. Moreover, it is suggested that due to the primacy of its office, resolution can even be termed the personal center of both modes of existence. Resolution is the determinative factor in that it is through this phenomenon that Dasein and den Enkelte can attest the truth of their being, that is, authentic existence.

However, the authenticity of their existence cannot be homogeneous because in the case of Dasein existence is capable of being understood by itself, whereas in the case of den Enkelte it cannot. The upshot is that an existence which finds its measure of truth in itself and one which does not are heterogeneous. Consequently, this radical dissimilarity renders it impossible for the one to be derived from the other. Hence, Buber's allegation that "Heidegger secularizes the Single One of Kierkegaard, that is, he severs the relation to the absolute for which Kierkegaard's man becomes a Single One,"² makes sense only if it is understood that by virtue of this very secularization, the one cannot be derived from the other. In this paper I shall argue that Heidegger's Dasein can neither derive from, nor be a secularization of, Kierkegaard's den Enkelte.

It is obvious that the locutions "derives from" and "is a secularization of" or "secularizes" are key terms in this essay and as such deserve closer consideration. First of all, "derives from" implies the category of substance and answers to the question, "Derives from what?". "To be a secularization of" or "to secularize" implies that there is a religious prototype or model. Such a prototype, in the act of self-determination, acknowledges a transcendent absolute by virtue of which it assumes its particular identity. Without this transcendent factor, it would logically and ontologically be otherwise. If we approach the issue from the point of view of a model, that is, regard it isomorphically, then in fact we are pointing to the possibility of a duplication. It goes without saying, however, that a model thus configured, if at all duplicated, cannot yield a secular version, that is, a being whose act of self-determination excludes the transcendence in question. Nevertheless, Buber, when carefully analyzed, tends to impress upon us the idea that Heidegger conceptually abused Kierkegaard's model. Buber leaves us with the impression that Dasein is a deficient version of a substantial form: as if den Enkelte has all the attributes and Dasein only some; as if den Enkelte, mutatis mutandis, has the right relations and Dasein not.

It is true that the allegation notwithstanding, Buber did not attempt to demonstrate the process of secularization whereby Heidegger's man came into being. At best he contends that by nature and in virtue of his situation, man has a three-fold living relation: a relation to the world and to things, a relation to men--both to individuals and to the many--a relation to the mystery of being. Then Buber points out that the relation to things is virtually lacking in Kierkegaard whereas in Heidegger there is such a relation albeit only a technical, purposive one.

But considering a thing merely in its applicability to a definite aim, i.e., its technical suitability, does not allow for an "essential" relation with it. For the technical aspect of the thing does not exhaust its "essential life." For example, a man may gaze without purpose on a tree, and another may look at it with a view to making a stick from the best branch. If man relates to things only technically he shortchanges himself for the simple reason that the whole reality of the thing has escaped him.

Concerning the relation to individual men, Buber charges that to Kierkegaard it is a doubtful thing because of the exclusivity required by a God-relationship. But while he admits the presence of such a relation in Heidegger, because it is one of solicitude only, it cannot be essential. On the other hand, the connexion with the faceless, formless, nameless many, with the "crowd," with the "one," is acknowledged in

both Kierkegaard and Heidegger. They rightly urge the overcoming of the tendency to assimilate with "that nameless human all and nothing" in order to attain selfhood.' Nonetheless, otherness cannot be peremptorily decried because it is required for a genuine and adequate self.

Finally, man's third relation is to God or to the Absolute or to the mystery. This, according to Buber, is the sole essential relation for Kierkegaard, while in Heidegger it is completely lacking. Perhaps it is because of the paramountcy of God in Kierkegaard and the absolute absence of God in Heidegger, that the latter is charged with secularizing the former? It must be admitted that Buber's construal of both Kierkegaard and Heidegger is, to say the least, unorthodox. His contention, for example, that Heidegger secularizes the Single One of Kierkegaard in that he severs the relations to the absolute for which Kierkegaard's man becomes a Single One is unfounded. But even if that were the case, because there is no absolute in the being of Dasein, and because of its inexpugnable presence in den Enkelte, it is otiose to derive the one from the other. Between them yawns a formidable gulf; in other words, they are worlds apart.

Entschlossenheit (in Heidegger) and Beslutning (in Kierkegaard) both involve decision. But more than mere decision, resolution is "the crucial beginning of action that anticipates and reaches through all action."⁴ At the inception of action a prior determination to ward off obstacles or minimize their import has been reached, thereby giving impetus and adding momentum to the action. Concurrently the increment in momentum "consolidates life and reassures the individual in his own mind."⁵ There is, therefore, a serenity about resolution. This lack of tension, this unruffled repose, this inviting contentment is witnessed as apparently characterizing the ethical achievements of Judge William. But however inviting the contentment, it does not induce the dolce far niente of a thoughtless existence. The tensions of existence are ever present but are masterfully held in check by the firmly-focused vision and the unswerving direction of resolution. Whether the Judge meets this standard is another matter. "A serious choice of himself would not automatically bring him to a lovely concord of freedom and nature, man and wife, individual and society. It would isolate him before God in the awareness of his inadequacy to render account of himself."⁶

Nevertheless, resolution or self-choice, as the ultimate act of freedom, is nothing other than the recognition of one's nothingness in relation to God--and in this a man's self acquires absolute worth. Resolution is therefore edifying, and, as the Jutland priest expresses it in his "Ultimatum": "It proves its edifying power in a double way: partly by the fact that it

checks doubt and allays the solicitude of doubt; partly by the fact that it animates to action." Unencumbered by the ankylosis of doubt, the ethical individual strives onward to action, anxious only of not being able to maintain the resolution, yet bent on its upkeeping. As a result, resolution "joyfully recruits its strength by repose," as the Judge puts it.⁹ It is this tendency to recharge itself that disqualifies resolution as faith, the Judge notwithstanding. But though resolution is not faith, the striving must go on, for the tensions do not cease. Short of self-choice (in "Equilibrium") and resolution (in "Aesthetic Validity of Marriage" and again in "Various Observations about Marriage in Reply to Objections"), the individual is in despair. And as Anti-Climacus observes, the cause of despair is the eternal, for "if there were nothing eternal in a man, he could not despair."⁹ Man is constitutionally in despair, "and every means we have of coping with this despair, short of religion, is either unsuccessful or demoniacal."¹⁰ As depicted in the two psychological works, The Concept of Dread and The Sickness unto Death, "a human life consists generally in a series of failed projects, each doomed from the outset by its own inherent contradiction or by the incapacity of creatures who are themselves bundles of contradictions to sustain them."¹¹

It is important to note, then, that in Kierkegaard despair is the necessary condition for self-choice or resolution, and that the cause of despair is the presence of the eternal, a prime factor in the tension of existence. It is only when the individual, in being himself and willing to be himself, acknowledges his relationship to God by heeding the eternal that he vanquishes despair with faith.

Dread, too, is integral to Dasein. "L'angoisse," writes Jean Wahl, "est le fond permanent de nos sentiments, et chez Kierkegaard, et chez Heidegger."¹² (In both Kierkegaard and Heidegger dread is the basis of our feelings). But in Heidegger dread or anxiety (Angst) is basically a phenomenon of finitude. The ways in which this finitude is manifested are Dasein's dependence on things, his facticity (thrownness), and death. But granted this "need" to dwell in the midst of things other than himself, "by which he is sustained, on which he is dependent," he can never, try as he may with all his cultural apparatus and advanced technology, be master of them. Furthermore, dependent on things that he is not, "man is, at bottom, not even master of himself."¹³ Werner Marx has recalled that if Dasein could not project things in their sense of Being, that is, if he had no understanding of Being, he would not be able to relate to them and to himself. "It is in this sense that the 'privilege of existing' contains the 'need of the understanding of Being'

within itself. Understanding of Being is 'the most finite in the finite'."¹⁴

Facticity as a structural moment of care also discloses Dasein's finitude. It should be remembered that facticity depicts Dasein as already abandoned and compelled to cope with the fact, wherefore his being an issue for himself. Finding himself in being, he discovers that he exists in spite of himself. James Clark, displaying very little tolerance for Heidegger, comments: "But here we may observe that in association with the employment of the rather aggressive words 'throw' and 'abandon' the uncanniness of the pristine dimension takes on the aspect of the chamber of horrors with which 'anxiety' is so apt."¹⁵ Existence may well be a chamber of horrors, nevertheless it must be perpetuated.

This "nullity" in his being over which he can never become master, i.e., that his having been thrown is not his doing (he is not his own source) also indicates that as a process his is a Being still-to-be-achieved. That is what Heidegger means by the statement: "Existenzialitat ist wesenhaft durch Faktizitat bestimmt."¹⁶ (Existentiality is always determined by facticity). So, then, there is a not to his origin and a not to his Being. Dasein's existence is permeated by nullity. It is nullity with which Dasein is compelled to cope; it is the nullity disclosed by Angst.

Therefore, dread, as the comprehensive disposition of Dasein, occasions the decisive moment for the recollection of self.¹⁷ There is, then, a double movement in the experience of dread: negatively, it discloses the nullity of Dasein's basis; positively, it indicates self-choice or resolution (Entschlossenheit). Accordingly, if in Kierkegaard the necessary condition for resolution (Beslutning) is despair (Fortvivlelse), then in Heidegger the necessary condition for Entschlossenheit is dread or anxiety (Angst). But where in Kierkegaard despair is engendered by the urgency of the eternal, in Heidegger Angst is grounded in Zeitlichkeit (temporality) which, after all, accounts for the structural unity of care. And what is Zeitlichkeit if not "das ursprungliche 'Ausser-sich' an und fur sich selbst"? (The primordial "outside-of-itself" in and for itself, SZ 329). In other words, Dasein's essential grief is that while he is compelled to carry out the process of existence, permeated though it be by nullity, he is nevertheless constrained to endure his Sisyphus-situation, considering that he exists in and for himself. Here lies the main gravamen of Wyschogrod's charge against Heidegger's version of Being, and, mutatis mutandis, the reason that Dasein cannot emerge out of den Enkelte.

Referring to the hopelessness of Dasein's anxiety-ridden existence, Wyschogrod writes: "But Heidegger's dread is a dread on behalf of a Self that is not some-

thing other than dread but dread itself. Dread on behalf of something that itself is dread would seem to be somewhat self-defeating because that which is at stake in dread can be provided only by something other than the dread itself."¹⁸ And the desperation of this situation or the untenability of such a position is attributable, Wyschogrod argues, to the very essence of Zeitlichkeit itself as construed by Heidegger. But first, let us consider a Heideggerian expatiating on time.

Henri Birault, a faithful exponent of Heidegger, whose projected book for which the article "Existence et verite d'apres Heidegger" was a first sketch and which would have pre-empted Richardson's massive Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought,¹⁹ writes apropos of Zeitlichkeit:

Le temps, ou plutot la temporalization du temps, est la transcendence elle-meme, 'le transcendant pur et simple'. Le temps est en soi hors de soi. Cela ne signifie pas qu'il est tout ensemble a l'interieur et a l'exterieur de lui-meme. Cela veut dire-que, dans son etre le plus intime, il est l'exteriorite comme telle.²⁰

(Time, or rather the temporalization of time, is transcendence itself, "the transcendent pure and simple." In itself time is outside of itself. This does not mean that it is altogether inside and outside of itself. It means rather that in essence time is externality as such). Time generating itself without any other reference, time flowing from itself back into itself, issuing from nothing other than itself and forth into nothing other than itself because there is nothing else! Hence when Birault indicates that "dans son etre le plus intime, il est l'exteriorite comme telle," I take this to mean that apart from the process of self-generation, whose movement, as transcendence, is outside of itself but also in and for itself, as was earlier observed, nothing is left. Temporality is thus the process inclined to depart from itself: it is the ekstatikon. The term used by Wyschogrod to characterize this "outward" tendency of time is "extendedness."

In his totality Dasein is to be grasped as "Sich-vorweg-schon-sein-in (der-Welt-) als Sein-bei (innerweltlich begehendem Seienden)" (SZ 192), that is, "ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in-(the world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered within-the-world)."²¹

To Wyschogrod the plethora of hyphens is significant, for it bespeaks extension; indeed, the intention is "to spread out the essence of Dasein into a field that understands Dasein as possibility in an existentialistic sense."²² He charges Heidegger with attempting

to "dissolve any entity into extended componentiality."²³ And this, to the very eternity of God.

He considers a footnote in *Sein und Zeit* where Heidegger criticizes the traditional conception of eternity as signifying a "standing now" (*nunc stans*), which is allegedly derived from the vulgar understanding of world-time. According to Heidegger, if God's eternity can be philosophically construed, then it should be as "ursprunglichere und 'unendliche' Zeitlichkeit" (SZ 427 n.), that is, "a more primordial temporality which is infinite" (BT 499 n.). Wyschogrod interprets this consideration by Heidegger to mean that not only is eternity intussuscepted by temporality, but is so transformed as "to extend the field of Being unendingly thereby making it something that is ahead of itself in an unending way."²⁴ Since eternity, or pure Being, as Wyschogrod prefers to call it, is thus annulled and removed from "the catalogue of ontological structures," the result is a bleak ontology:

There is no One that is not dissolved at its root into an extended relationship with itself that gives it direction and componentiality. Not only is there not in man or Dasein a measure of pure Being to which, as in Kierkegaard, he must relate himself, but there is no pure Being in any place because timeliness, as the root of Dasein's Care, engulfs everything in its ecstatic structure.²⁵

Hence *Zeitlichkeit*, rendered by Wyschogrod as timeliness, is indeed the transcendent pure and simple to which Henri Birault referred above. "Time, or rather the temporalization of time," i.e., *Zeitlichkeit*, is essentially "outside of itself," to boot, is "externality as such." Temporality engulfs everything in its ecstatic structure, leaving nothing outside of itself, for it is its own externality in the form of extendedness. Therefore, Wyschogrod observes, the dissolution of Being into timeliness, where the latter is a field of extendedness (Dasein), directly relates to the basic experience of dread. As he puts it, "Heidegger's dread is a dread on behalf of a Self that is not something other than dread but dread itself." And if there is nothing besides temporality, then Dasein is verily trapped; for the necessary condition for *Entschlossenheit* is *Angst*, and the call of conscience, however benevolent in its salvific office, functions in terms of Dasein's guilt, which is grounded in nullity or finitude.

But if the basic feature of Dasein is his Being-in-the-world, then with death this same "Being-in-the-world is at stake."²⁶ For temporality, which is the transcendental structure of Dasein, is also the "meaning," i.e., the "whereto" (*Woraufhin*) of the primary project, which consists of a "being-in and a being-

toward, always a caring-for, worrying about, trying to avoid, striving for, being afraid of, hoping for, etc." Temporalities is the "inner possibility" of care, Dasein's structural unity. Hence, since temporality accounts for the perpetuation of existence in that it is the ground of possibilities, it likewise accounts for the utmost possibility of impossibility, namely, death. In this way, the totality of Dasein is articulated as finite, having an origin and an end imposed on him as his distinctive mode of being.

But the totality of Dasein and his authenticity are correlative concepts in Heidegger. And since this paper has undertaken to demonstrate how Dasein cannot derive from den Enkelte, it behooves us to disclose them both in their very authenticity, that is, when they are maximally themselves. Heidegger is deliberate about the interdependence of totality and authenticity, for if Dasein's Being is to be interpreted primordially, as a basis for the question of ontology, "dann muss sie das Sein des Daseins zuvor in seiner möglichen Eigentlichkeit und Ganzheit existenzial ans Licht gebracht haben" (then it must first have brought to light existentially the Being of Dasein in its possibilities of authenticity and totality, SZ 233). The possibilities of authenticity and totality; then, encompass death as Dasein's utmost possibility.

Now in the everyday immersion in the world of his care, Dasein is unable to achieve totality because "die Alltaglichkeit ist doch gerade das Sein 'zwischen' Geburt und Tod" (Everydayness is precisely that Being which is "between" birth and death, SZ 233). Nevertheless, the totality of Dasein must include his death, and since everydayness (which is between birth and death) obviates its attainment, then obviously death has to be construed not so much as a ceasing-to-be, not an ending in the sense of fulfillment, but as something quite different. Heidegger writes: "Das mit dem Tod gemeinte Enden bedeutet kein Zu-Ende-sein des Daseins, sonder ein Sein zum Ende dieses Seienden. Der Tod ist eine Weise zu sein, die das Dasein ubernimmt sobald es ist" (The "ending" which we have in view when we speak of death, does not signify Dasein's Being-at-an-end, but a Being-towards-the-end of this entity. Death is a way to be, which Dasein takes over as soon as it is, SZ 245, BT 289).

To illustrate what he means by ending as fulfillment, Heidegger adduces as an example the ripeness of a fruit. In the process of ripening, the unripeness (that which the fruit is not yet) is not something that will be added subsequently to the fruit. As a matter of fact, contribute to it what you will, the unripeness of the fruit would not thereby be eliminated, if it did not come to ripeness of its own accord (vom ihm selbst her zur Reife, SZ 243). It is clear, then, that "The 'not-yet' has already been included in the very Being

of the fruit, not as some random characteristic, but as something constitutive. Correspondingly, as long as any Dasein is, it too is already its 'not-yet' (BT 288).

Hence death, regarded not as an ending in the sense of fulfillment, but as a Being-towards-the-end, signifies a relation that Dasein has to himself. As a self-relation, therefore, death can manifest itself either authentically or inauthentically.

In Being and Time Dasein in his everydayness is delineated as existing under the dictatorship of the "they" (das Man), considering himself as one among many. When the "they" speaks of death, "death is understood as an indefinite something which, above all, must duly arrive from somewhere or other, but which is proximally not yet present-at-hand for oneself, and is therefore no threat" (BT 297). Although the certainty of death is not thereby denied, it is nonetheless merely "the empirical certainty of demise, and evades the authentic Being-certain of Dasein's own death."²⁸ In this way the "when" of death is so distant that it is virtually irrelevant. Hence the possibility of its occurrence at any moment is covered up.

In everydayness, then, death is inauthentic. And Heidegger, despite his claim not to be engaged in a moralising critique of everyday Dasein (einer moralisierenden Kritik des alltäglichen Daseins, SZ 167) does not conceal his condemnation of inauthentic everydayness. He refers to this mode of being, that is, the process of "getting entangled" (verfangt) in inauthentic everydayness as a "downward plunge" (Absturz) as "die Bodenlosigkeit und Nichtigkeit der uneigentlichen Alltäglichkeit" (the groundlessness and nullity of inauthentic everydayness, SZ 178).

Since relating himself to death inauthentically is not the desideratum of Dasein's essence, then death not as demise (Ableben) but as dying (Sterben) is to be considered, because this is the way of Being in which Dasein qua Dasein is towards his death. In this mode death is regarded not so much as an empirical certainty but as a possibility. As such, it concerns Dasein directly, in his first-personal immediacy.

If the emphasis is on death as possibility, the point, then, is not to brood over it in the hope of knowing the exact moment of its actualization, thereby taking away its character as a possibility, but rather, "it must be understood as a possibility, it must be cultivated as a possibility, and we must put up with it as a possibility, in the way we comport ourselves towards it" (BT 306). So, actualizing his possibility is out of the question, since that would only bring about his own demise. Brooding over it is also out of the question, as this tends to be a calculation of how to have death at his disposal, thereby turning it into something ready-to-hand and present-at-hand, in brief,

"what is attainable, controllable, practicable" (BT 305). The alternative is to conduct himself towards his death by "expecting it" (im Erwarten). It is within the internal dialectic of expecting that what is expected (the possible) has its raison d'etre in the actual. "By the very nature of expecting, the possible is drawn into the actual, arising out of the actual and returning to it" BT 306).

When Dasein regards death as a genuine possibility, his mode of being is termed by Heidegger Vorlaufen, i.e., anticipation. Instead of trying to calculate "when" death will occur, the aim being to be so prepared for it (as if thus one could strike up a deal with death), one must rather cultivate the indefiniteness of the certainty. The point is to be always on the qui vive, whereby "Dasein opens itself to a constant threat arising out of its own 'there'." No doubt, since being vigilant for death is tantamount to peering into the abyss of Being in the form of nothingness, a courageous state of mind is required for the task, namely, anxiety. "In this state-of-mind, Dasein finds itself face to face with the 'nothing' of the possible impossibility of existence." Being face to face with "nothing" leaves one quite alone, extremely alone, and that is why Heidegger avers that "anticipation utterly individualizes Dasein." And the full implication of this individuation is emphasized in Being and Time:

Anticipation reveals to Dasein its lostness in the they-self, and brings it face to face with the possibility of being itself, primarily unsupported by concerned solicitude, but of being itself, rather, in an impassioned freedom towards-death--a freedom which has been released from the illusions of the "they", and which is factual, certain of itself, and anxious. (BT 311)

Anxiety sustains anticipation, anticipation individualizes Dasein, and since the process of individuation is one in which Dasein is released from the grand illusions of anonymity, Dasein is left in the purity of his solus ipse. In this pristine mode of being he is authentically himself. Wherefore the corollary to the above quotation:

Anticipation turns out to be the possibility of understanding one's ownmost potentiality-for-Being--that is to say, the possibility of authentic existence.

Authenticity is a thorny problem in the early Heidegger because of the unresolved tension between the authenticity-inauthenticity correlation (hence the denial that it is "some concrete possible idea of exis-

tence") and the admission that "a factual ideal of Dasein," i.e., authentic existence, underlies the ontological interpretation of Dasein's existence. This tension has induced Douglas Kellner to remark that "Heidegger's contrast between inauthenticity and authenticity indicates he is maintaining an axiological dualism which he dialectically develops, spelling out oppositions and differences between authentic and inauthentic ways of being." Consequently, "this interpretation would suggest that Heidegger's analysis of an inauthentic existence contains a negative evaluation of everyday behaviour, whereas the concept of authenticity contains an ideal of being human."²⁵ But Heidegger's friend from the Marburg years, the theologian Rudolf Bultmann, finds it inadmissible to view Heidegger's concept of authenticity as the expression of an ideal for existence:

For what is characterized by the concept of 'authenticity'--at least by intention--is the historicity of man, whose being is a possibility of being, a being that can be authentic and inauthentic--whereby 'authenticity' can be defined formally as taking place in resolution and whereby it remains completely open what particular thing is resolved upon. Therefore, the historicity of man is not an ideal that emerges out of the real factuality of man's experiences of life, but, since it characterizes man as such, is what first makes possible such experiences as human experiences and thus also the emergence of 'ideals for existence.'²⁶

But Bultmann, in equating authenticity with historicity, and making of the latter a generic characterization of being human, does not alleviate the tension but virtually glosses over it. On the other hand, Kellner's ascription of an axiological dualism to the general tenor of Being and Time is cogent, a dualism that might have eventuated in spite of Heidegger himself. For it is unlikely that a philosopher can undertake a formal description of human existence without his own evaluative perspective being operative therein.

We have dwelt enough on Heideggerian authenticity to be able now to contrast adequately Dasein and den Enkelte. The tension just referred to between the authenticity--inauthenticity correlation and authenticity as an ideal makes only minimal difference. For in either form of authenticity, Dasein maintains his ontological structure as constituted by temporality, and it is with the self-constitution of temporality that the principle of den Enkelte is fundamentally at variance.

It should be recalled that Kierkegaard, in "A First and Last Declaration" at the conclusion of the Con-

cluding Unscientific Postscript, entreated his readers not to identify him with the pseudonyms. Exponents of Kierkegaard do not hesitate in underscoring the significance of construction and style in the works, and the pseudonymity is part and parcel of it. Thus Billeskov Jansen: "Each feature of his writing is calculated and premeditated, even the violent outbursts which played so subtle and complicated a game with the pseudonyms also controlled the variations in form within each work."¹¹ And Louis Mackey writes: "When Kierkegaard signed his books with impossible names like Johannes de Silentio . . . and Vigilius Haufniensis . . . , no one in the gossipy little world of Danish letters had any doubt about their origin. Nor did he mean they should; his purpose was not mystification but distance."¹² So that when Kierkegaard is accused of irrationalism, as so often happens, it is because little heed had been paid to this factor of his art. Thus Alastair McKinnon: "At least most of the problem disappears when we recognize that the doctrine of the stages was an intellectual framework specifically designed to achieve and promote a particular effect and that it is not taken seriously by Kierkegaard in his private person."¹³ And McKinnon also notes that the terms "paradox" and "absurd" (which usually catalyze the charge of irrationalism) are restricted by Kierkegaard to the aesthetic works:

The fact that words such as Absurde and Paradoks are confined to the pseudonymous literature surely means that his "irrationalism" (if that is what it is) is itself confined thereto. But, again, those works are not his works, nor are its views his view. Instead, as he insisted, it was a deliberately contrived artifice addressed to an aesthetic generation and calculated to point them in the direction of faith.¹⁴

Both the pseudonymous and edifying works, then, were aimed by Kierkegaard at provoking the reader into spiritual awakening, to crimp the waters of his soul, as it were. His was a maieutic art, hence he withdrew from it, the focus being not on himself but on the reader. Nevertheless, if purity of heart is to will one thing,¹⁵ then as a religious author employing a maieutic art, Kierkegaard never deviated from the course he took. "Once and for all I must earnestly beg the kind reader always to bear in mente that the thought behind the whole work is: what it means to become a Christian."¹⁶

Provoking the reader into becoming the single individual (den Enkelte) was more or less the gist of the works; and Kierkegaard employed several personae as agents provocateurs. For this reason, in contrasting Dasein with den Enkelte, I consider it circumspect to

do so via the pseudonymous personae themselves. Of course, insofar as the personae are means to an end, there is a continuity between them and the author. This continuity is the author's message. In the case of Kierkegaard this message emerges from the Christian context, and the Christian context is centered on the doctrine of creation. Behind the "poetic expressions" that are the pseudonymous personae, then, there is the unity of the doctrine of creation as presupposition. But if the formidable Karl Barth can confess that "in taking up the doctrine of creation I have entered a sphere in which I feel less confident and sure,"¹⁷ imagine my trepidation in even mentioning the subject itself! Then let us quickly move on.

Dasein, it was said, is constituted by temporality, where temporality was viewed by Wyschogrod as the dissolution of Being into sheer extendedness. In the mellifluous prose of Birault, temporality "est la transcendence elle-meme, 'le transcendant pur et simple;" it is "sans autre reference," and "cela veut dire que, dans son etre le plus intime, il est l'exterieurite comme telle." It was also pointed out that Angst is grounded in temporality, and that this latter exists "in and for itself." It is for this reason that Wyschogrod laments Dasein's Sisyphus-situation, maintaining that Heidegger's position is self-defeating because, according to him, that which is at stake in dread can be provided only by something other than the dread itself. In the world of Kierkegaard, it was said, despair is engendered by the urgency of the eternal. What does this mean?

Unlike Dasein, from whose ontological structure the eternal is exempt, den Enkelte is determined by his relation to the eternal. But how is eternity to be understood? Is it really the "nunc stans" implied by the "'constant' presence-at-hand imputed by Heidegger to tradition's conception of it? And is eternity as understood by the Greeks the same as that of Christian tradition? Hans-Georg Gadamer, a disciple of Heidegger, explains:

What we call eternity is . . . , as is claimed by the theological tradition of Christianity, a concept which has as background the ontological distinction between creator and creature. This concept does not exist in Greek thought, not even in Platonic thought, which divided the "invisible" world of ideal Being in the sense of aidion, from the visible world of Becoming, which lacks Being To be sure it was precisely Plato, who in giving the first definition of time, called it the "moving image of eternity." But the word which he used here is gion. Aion itself means a temporal phenomenon. The word is

used above all for "lifetime" and then this meaning is transformed to "unlimited duration."³⁹

Since in Greek thought time and change were inseparable correlates, eternity was conceived as qualitatively different from time, for the distinction had to be such that change was exempt from eternity. Hence, whereas everything in time changes, nothing in eternity does. Wherefore the Platonic definition of time as "the moving image of eternity." Or, as the theologian Oscar Cullmann puts it, "Time in Plato's view is only the copy of eternity." Eternity so viewed is timelessness. Cullmann continues: "How much the thinking of our days roots in Hellenism, and how little in Biblical Christianity, becomes clear to us when we confirm the fact that far and wide the Christian Church and Christian theology distinguish time and eternity in the Platonic-Greek manner."⁴⁰ Cullmann's studies of primitive Christianity have resulted in the conviction that eternity then was understood as endless duration:

Eternity, which is possible only as an attribute of God, is time, or, to put it better, what we call "time" is nothing but a part, defined and delimited by God, of this same unending duration of God's time. Nowhere does this come so clearly to expression as in the already established fact that the word used to express eternity, aion ("age"), is the same word that is also applied to a limited division of time; otherwise expressed, between what we call eternity and what we call time, that is, between everlastingly continuing time and limited time, the New Testament makes absolutely no difference in terminology. Eternity is the endless succession of the ages (aiones).⁴⁰

It is obvious that we cannot go on to eternity on this subject, not so much because of its nature as such, as that it can easily lure us to be unwilling custodians of a kettle of fish. What the above citations have done is to connect unequivocally eternity with the New Testament and the doctrine of creation, thus paving the way for den Enkelte.

Now it is an understatement to say that Kierkegaard knew both Greek philosophy and the New Testament very well. He was rather au fait with them. The interesting thing now is to observe what he can do with the conceptual categories of both worlds. And if eternity as understood by the Greeks is unlike eternity within the Christian context, then the dissimilarity becomes evident with the personae themselves.

The first thing to notice is that in the world of Soren Kierkegaard "the eternal" is applied to both God and man. But "it will become evident that he means

different things when he uses 'eternal' of man and God. There is, however, a formal consistency in his use of 'eternal'. 'Eternal' always refers to unchangeability and to possibility."⁴¹ In the hands of the personae this characteristic of unchangeability and possibility, when applied to man, is consistently attributed to the self, which both is and becomes. Thus, Judge William:

But what, then, is this self of mine: If I were required to define this, my first answer would be: It is the most abstract of all things, and yet at the same time it is the most concrete--it is freedom.⁴²

Johannes Climacus:

The goal of movement for an existing individual is to arrive at a decision, and to renew it. The eternal is extraneous to the movement of life, and a concrete eternity within the existing individual is the maximum degree of his passion.⁴³

Vigilius Haufniensis:

Man is a synthesis of the soulish and the bodily. But a synthesis is unthinkable if the two are not united in a third factor. This third factor is spirit.⁴⁴

The synthesis of the soulish and the bodily is to be posited by spirit, but the spirit is eternal. (CD 81)

Anti-Climacus:

Man is spirit. But what is spirit? Spirit is the self. (SD 146)

The self is composed of infinity and finiteness. But the synthesis is a relationship, and it is a relationship which, though it is derived, relates itself to itself, which means freedom. The self is freedom. (SD 162)

The self is the factor of continuity throughout the changes of becoming. The self is that which changes, yet it is not the case "that the self is comprised of self-identical (unchanging) substratum (substance) in which constantly changing experiences (accidents) inhere."⁴⁵ What constitutes the structure of the self in Judge William and Anti-Climacus, of man in Haufniensis, and of the existing individual in Johannes Climacus, is freedom. Properly speaking, then, the self is freedom. Therefore, the pseudonyms concur that what is eternal in the self is freedom.

In time the self actualizes its possibilities, and these possibilities-become-actualities in turn engender their own possibilities. What is not subject to change, because it is outside the realm of time, is freedom. Freedom here is not an attribute inherent in some substance. It is the very being of the self. And since the actualization of possibilities (which is a process of becoming) presupposes freedom as a constant factor, the self and man and the existing individual are characterized as temporal and eternal, each becoming what he is. Such is "eternal" when applied to man: it is the presupposition of his very self-actualization.

But if self-actualization occurs through the eternal in time, and these two factors are held to be qualitatively different, then how account for the contingency presupposed by their co-presence in man? Haufniensis' answer: "The instant is that ambiguous moment in which time and eternity touch one another, thereby positing the temporal, where time is constantly intersecting eternity and eternity constantly permeating time" (CD 80). To Climacus, "the Eternal, which hitherto did not exist, came into existence in this moment," and "in the Moment man becomes conscious that he is born; for his antecedent state, to which he may not cling, was one of non-being."⁴⁴ And Climacus gives to the moment the distinctive name: the Fullness of Time, by which he means Christ as the absolute paradox. Following the same line of thought, Jean Wahl writes: "L'eternel a un commencement et un achievement temporel. Ce qui est eternel, un instant auparavant n'etait pas"⁴⁷ (The eternal has a beginning and a temporal conclusion. That which is eternal a moment ago was not). These are expressions for the entrance of the eternal into the temporal "at the opportune moment for decision": "man, not being born eternal, becomes eternal;" and "man becomes conscious of himself as being born anew."⁴⁸ Haufniensis, making reference to the concept of Kairos in Christianity, writes: "The concept around which everything turns in Christianity, the concept which makes all things new, is the fullness of time, is the instant as eternity, and yet this eternity is at once the future and the past" (CD 81). The past here is not a concatenation of objectified nows which have congealed in the flux of time and are now irrevocably "out there" in the objective order of things. The past is retained in memory as present possibilities, for they serve as condition for present action. Schrag, with characteristic lucidity, elaborates: "The cardinal significance of the Christ-event is that it is a contemporaneous reality in the Christian's personal decision. Christ's coming is not to be identified with an objectivized and fixed historical incident. Rather it expresses a repeatable

possibility. Christ 'comes again' in each responsible decision."⁴⁹

Now what of "eternal" when applied to God? How is God eternal? If the will of God is the well-being of man, God must, as far as man is concerned, be worthy of his confidence. And if God has revealed Himself to man through the human agency of His Son, then the Word of the Son, too, must deserve man's absolute trust. This means that whatever the Son said had to be irrevocable. In other words, God is unchangeable.

In the edifying discourse entitled "The Unchangeableness of God," Kierkegaard turns to the Epistle of James for inspiration: "Every good thing bestowed and every perfect gift is from above, coming down from the Father of lights, with whom there is no variation, or shifting shadow" (James I:17). Whatever is good for man comes from God, and God, in giving His Word to man, does so with His own light: revelation. And what is revealed is not subject to change because the will of Him who is the source knows no variation. Nevertheless, man, who keeps changing his mind while calculating the best avenues to worldly success, is called to his either/or. "For with this immutable will you must nevertheless some time, sooner or later, come to collision--this immutable will, which desired that you should consider this because it desired your welfare; this immutable will, which cannot but crush you if you come into hostile collision with it."⁵⁰

So, it is up to man to decide whether his collision with the Eternal will be hostile or not. And, as Kierkegaard benevolently warns, hostile opposition will induce guaranteed annihilation. God's eternity is expressed in His unchangeableness, and His unchangeableness characterizes His will, which is the well-being of man.

Within the context of the existence-spheres or the stages, Christian faith is the telos of existence. With the consciousness of sin, that is, the acknowledgement that the measure of my being transcends my human powers, man is virtually alone before God, and in this mode of being he is maximally himself. By contrast, Dasein is maximally himself in the anticipation of death, when death is construed as possibility.

Now, since what renders den Enkelte authentic is his sin-consciousness and concomitantly the gift of faith, it is impossible that an existence whose structure is devoid of the necessary condition for sin or faith be derived from him. As has been remarked in various ways, in Heidegger, "the self emerges as 'primordial time', which manifests itself in terms of temporalization provided by imaginative synthesis."⁵¹ Constituting and directing himself temporally, Dasein does so as the very meaning of Being, where Being is construed as a horizon which is projected by Dasein.

This horizon is the world, the wherewithal of the self-disclosure of things.

Furthermore, the heterogeneity between Dasein and den Enkelte can be indicated thus: In virtue of Dasein's referential dependence on things and his existence as their meaning, he cannot commence to make the movement of infinite resignation, the prerequisite of faith, without his ontological structure dissipating. For how can he, as the structural unity of care, let go of what is presupposed by care? Not only is Dasein unable to approximate Silentio's knight of faith, he cannot even assimilate to the knight of infinite resignation. This is because infinite resignation, although presupposing the world, also means that man is not absolutely dependent on it. That is why Buber's version of den Enkelte in "The Question to the Single One" in his book Between Man and Man is a skewed rendition. The distortion consists in the allegation, and its implications, that "the relation to things is lacking in Kierkegaard . . . he knows things only as similes."⁵²

I suspect that Buber is referring to Climacus, especially to the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, where the propositions central to the argument of the book are that the ethical reality of the subject is the sole reality, and that every other reality encountered by him is in the mode of possibility, that is, by the subject thinking them. But if Buber's claim carries weight, then it would be quite impossible to make the movement of infinite resignation. Resignation, after all, must be understood as neither scorn nor indifference but as a strenuous effort on the part of the individual to maintain a "continued resistance to the absolute claims of the relative and immediate, and it is a calm, balanced valuation of the actual world."⁵³ We are mindful, however, that Silentio is not a philosopher, but writes poetice et eleganter, writing only for the luxury of writing (FT 24).

Furthermore, this calm, balanced valuation of the actual world results from the clear recognition of the duplex character of human existence, i.e., composed of the finite and the infinite, and the courage to abide their oppositional pull. This insight, then, obviates scorn, and since passion undergirds courage, then indifference, too, is peremptorily ruled out. But then, it may be pointed out, what of the following characterization by Climacus of someone who has made the movement of infinite resignation?

Let the world give him everything, it is possible that he will see fit to accept it. But he says: "Oh, well," and this "Oh, well" means the absolute respect for the absolute telos. If the world takes everything from him, he suffers no doubt; but he says again: "Oh, well"--and this

"Oh, well" means the absolute respect for the absolute telos. Men do not exist in this fashion when they live immediately in the finite. (CUP 368)

Could not this be suggested as a clear case of indifference, that an individual who receives everything or loses everything has the same attitude: a shrug with the seeming nonchalance of an "Oh, well"? Oh, well, viewed from without that is the logical interpretation; it is even the most natural impression to have. But Climacus is dealing with inwardness, a region of being inaccessible to logic.

Moreover, to charge that there is no relation to things in Kierkegaard is to miss the humor of Climacus, and to be heedless of the daedal contexture of Kierkegaard's art. For awakening is his aim, he means to wound from behind, and Climacus has the humor and dialectical skill to serve as agent provocateur par excellence.

To return to Buber, how can there be no relation to things in Kierkegaard, when things are expressions of finitude? Too; when Kierkegaard himself writes that "no one wants to be that strenuous being--the single individual,"⁵⁴ the implication is that it is not easy to let go of things, to see them simply as relative means to relative ends. Nonetheless, these things are there, ineradicably present in existence, serving as the presupposition of resignation and faith. Still, the single individual refuses to capitulate to the finite. But this, obviously, does not mean that he has no relation with the finite world of things.

Dasein, on the other hand, because of his lack of infinitude, is deprived of the privilege to put the world at arms length at his own behest. When, in the case of Dasein, there is a "retreat from," "this 'repelling from itself' is essentially an 'expelling into': a conscious gradual relegation to the vanishing what-is-in-totality."⁵⁵ This disclosure by dread is revealed, more specifically, "in the clear night of dread's Nothingness." Dasein is compelled to endure the occurrence of his withdrawal from the world. Again emphasizing Dasein's locked-in finitude, Heidegger writes:

So finite are we that we cannot, of our own resolution and will, bring ourselves originally face to face with Nothing. So bottomlessly does finalization dig into existence that our freedom's peculiar and profoundest finality fails.

Admittedly, "Being can only happen through the activity of men, but no activist, voluntaristic act of the will can force a revelation of being."⁵⁶ And yet, it is in the mode of inauthentic everydayness that

dread reveals being as nothing. Now, by "everydayness" Heidegger means "a definite 'how' of existence by which Dasein is dominated through and through 'for life' . . . the way in which Dasein is 'manifest' in the 'with-one-another' of publicness" (BT 422). Everydayness, in other words, is a way to be of Dasein.

But since Dasein is Being-with, it is impossible for him to bring about his own withdrawal from the world; everydayness prevents him. It is true that "in the moment of vision, indeed, and often just 'for that moment', existence can even gain the mastery over the 'everyday'; but it can never extinguish it" (BT 422). Existence is here being equated with authenticity and contrasted with inauthenticity in the form of the everyday. And what Heidegger is alluding to is Dasein's inability to exercise dominion over existence, that even in the moment of vision (a non-voluntary occurrence), the disclosure to him of his very authenticity is an event of Being, not an activist, voluntaristic act of the will. For, as was demonstrated earlier, although anticipation individualizes Dasein, thereby releasing him from the grand illusions of anonymity, anticipation itself is sustained by anxiety, and anxiety is not induced by any voluntary means. "So bottomlessly does finalization dig into existence that our freedom's peculiar and profoundest finality fails." A beautiful sentence, this. And the insight is a courageous one, but its courage is not undergirded by the healthy possibility of Anti-Climacus' personality, where "the condition of its survival is therefore analogous to breathing (respiration), which is an in- and an a-spiration" (SD 173).

God, regarded as "the one for whom all things are possible," is the source of the believer's "sound health of faith," that is, possibility (SD 175). Yet, although God is defined by Anti-Climacus as possibility, and man as a synthesis of possibility and necessity, there is a qualitative difference between them. Man's possibilities configure in his imagination, and God is "the power which makes possible the imagination of possibilities . . . God is the possibility which comes to man even when his imagination can no longer conjure up a possibility as his own possibility."⁵⁷ God, so considered, enables us to discern a similarity between Anti-Climacus' believer and Kierkegaard's den Enkelte. For in the Journals and Papers Kierkegaard writes: "The Single Individual (den Enkelte): this principle can be set forth only in a poetic way, for it would be presumptuous for anyone to pass himself off as being eminently 'The Single Individual'. Consequently it is a striving."⁵⁸ The condition for this striving is God, for whom all things are possible. In another entry Kierkegaard writes:

To Become a Christian, according to the New Testament, is to become "spirit." To become spirit, according to the New Testament, is to die, to die to the world, for according to the New Testament no man is born as spirit, and after the natural birth to be man is to be body and mind. Therefore dying to the world is the crisis in which one becomes spirit.⁵⁹

"The crisis in which one becomes spirit" and "striving" point to possibility as the sound health of faith. And the object, rather, the subject, of this faith is, for Anti-Climacus and Kierkegaard, Christ. Coming face to face with Christ or becoming a Christian, that is the goal. Characteristically expressing himself in terms of potentiation, Anti-Climacus aptly avers: ". . . the more conception of Christ, the more self. A self is qualitatively what its measure is" (SD 245).

Now, if in the luxury of Silentio's letters infinite resignation is the movement prior to faith, in Anti-Climacus faith is at its extreme. Recall that he is the author of The Sickness unto Death, the conclusion of which is a disquisition on "The Sin of Abandoning Christianity Modo Ponendo, of Declaring It Falsehood." And this, to him, is a sin against the Holy Ghost. It is also Anti-Climacus who wrote Training in Christianity, considered by Cornelio Fabro as "that jewel of Christological theology."⁶⁰ In this book Anti-Climacus reflects, with cogent exegetical penetration, on the invitation of Christ, "Come hither to me, all ye that labour and are heavy laden, I will give you rest," and also on Christ's promise to the multitude in Bethany, "And I, if I be lifted up from the Earth, will draw all unto Myself."

Once more, if Dasein could not approximate either of Silentio's knights, then the most that can be said of Dasein in comparison to Anti-Climacus is that he is worlds apart from the latter's believer. Aptly enough, what is written in The Sickness unto Death is applicable here: "The Christian motto . . . is: As thou believest, so it comes to pass; or, As thou believest, so art thou; to believe is to be" (SD 224).

Finally, when it is considered that the pseudonymous personae operate within the Christian context (accepting it or rejecting it), where the distinction between creator and creature presupposes eternity; to boot, since the principle of den Enkelte can be set forth only poetically, i.e., via the personae, then it is only reasonable to conclude that a concept such as Heidegger's Dasein cannot emerge from den Enkelte. For the absence of the eternal in Heidegger's conceptual scheme, and its omnipresence in the world of Kierkegaard, makes it impossible for Dasein to be derived from den Enkelte. And strictly speaking, what

renders the derivation unfeasible is that neither Dasein nor den Enkelte is intelligible as substance. If they were substances, then one could, perhaps, claim that while both beings were essentially the same, they nevertheless have certain accidental differences. And in this case it could be proffered that the one can derive from the other, in the way that a son derives from a father. But Dasein and den Enkelte are a "how" of being; and my point is that one way of existing cannot derive from another. Ways of existing are strictly disjunctive. Either you live one way or you live otherwise, and it is nonsensical to say, for example, that a reformed murderer derives from the murderer. Of course the murderer here is not referring to Heidegger's conceptual scheme and the reformed version to Kierkegaard's. The example simply wants to point out that the principles of Dasein and den Enkelte are heterogeneous ways of being. This difference carries with it immense implications, for an existence determined by its own temporalization, revering itself as sole authority, is qualitatively different from an existence constituted by eternity, where eternity is the source of man's possibility, and possibility his respiration, inspiration, and aspiration, that is, the ground of his faith. Therefore, at the cost of conceptual dissolution, we are better off keeping Dasein and den Enkelte in their respective ways of being.

NOTES

¹Martin Buber, Between Man and Man, trans. Ronald Gregor Smith (New York: MacMillan, 1971), 181.

²Buber, 174.

³Buber, 178.

⁴Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Ralph Manheim (New York: Doubleday, 1961), 17.

⁵Soren Kierkegaard, Stages on Life's Way, trans. Walter Lowrie (New York: Schocken Books, 1967), 113. Hereafter, Stages.

⁶Louis Mackey, Kierkegaard: A Kind of Poet (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), 93.

⁷Soren Kierkegaard, Either/Or, vol. 2, trans. Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), 353.

⁸Kierkegaard, Stages, 114.

⁹Soren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling and The Sickness unto Death, trans. Walter Lowrie (New York: Doubleday, 1954), 153. Hereafter SD when, as now, referring to The Sickness unto Death. FT when referring to Fear and Trembling.

¹⁰William Barrett, Irrational Man (New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1962), 169.

¹¹Stephen Crites, "Pseudonymous Authorship as Art and Act," in Kierkegaard: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Josiah Thompson (New York: 1972), 191. It may be added, however, that "despite the impossibility of realizing this synthesis . . . he continues to seek it, and this synthesis, in the religious stage, has several appellations. It is 'the absolute telos', 'the eternal happiness', 'the absolute good', and finally 'God'." Adi Shmueli, Kierkegaard and Consciousness, trans. Naomi Handelman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), 62.

¹²Jean Wahl, Les Philosophes de l'existence (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1954), 102.

¹³Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, trans. James Churchill (Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1962), 235.

¹⁴Werner Marx, Heidegger and the Tradition, trans. Theodore Kiesel and Murray Greene (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1971), 93. Relevant passages in Heidegger, for example, would be: "Wurde das Dasein im Grunde seines Wesens nicht transzendieren, d. h. jetzt, wurde es sich nicht im vorhinein in das Nichts hineinhalten, dann konnte es sich nie zu Seiendem verhalten, also auch nicht zu sich selbst." Wegmarken (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1976), 115.

In English: "Were Dasein not, in its essential basis, transcendent, that is to say, were it not projected from the start into Nothing, it could never relate to what-is, hence could have no self-relationship." "What is Metaphysics?" in Existence and Being, ed. Werner Brock (Chicago: Regnery, 1949), 339.

¹⁵James Clark, The Problem of Fundamental Ontology, vol. 1 (Toronto: Limits Book Co., 1971), 107.

¹⁶Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (Tubingen: Niemeyer, 1972), 192. Hereafter, SZ.

¹⁷William Richardson, Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), 74.

¹⁸Michael Wyschogrod, Kierkegaard and Heidegger: The Ontology of Existence (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1954), 134.

¹⁹Richardson, 686.

²⁰Henri Birault, Heidegger et l'expérience de la pensée (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1978), 34.

²¹Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), 237. Hereafter, BT.

²²Wyschogrod, 61. The tendency to string out long hyphenated phrases might have been first noticed by Heidegger in studying Carl Braig's book Vom Sein. Caputo points out that Braig, in this book, uses phrases such as "das Ihr-was-in-sich-selber-haben . . . and das Zu-sich-selber-kommenkonnem." John D. Caputo, Heidegger and Aquinas: An Essay on Overcoming Metaphysics (New York: Fordham University Press, 1982), 54.

²³Wyschogrod, 64.

²⁴Wyschogrod, 65.

²⁵Wyschogrod, 65.

²⁶Werner Brock, "An Account of 'Being and Time'," in Existence and Being, 56.

²⁷Eugene T. Gendlin, "Analysis," in What is a Thing? by Martin Heidegger, trans. W. B. Barton, Jr. and Vera Deutsch (Chicago: Regnery, 1967), 282.

²⁸John Williams, Martin Heidegger's Philosophy of Religion (Canadian Corporation for Studies in Religion: 1977), 107.

²⁹Douglas Kellner, "Authenticity and Heidegger's Challenge to Ethical Theory," in Thinking about Being: Aspects of Heidegger's Thought, ed. Robert W. Shahan and J. N. Mohanty (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1984), 162.

³⁰Rudolf Bultmann, Existence and Faith: Shorter Writings of Rudolf Bultmann, ed. Schubert M. Ogden (Cleveland: World Publishing, 1960), 304 n.

¹¹F. J. Billeskov Jansen, "The Literary Art of Kierkegaard," in A Kierkegaard Critique, ed. Howard A. Johnson and Niels Thulstrup (Chicago: Regnery, 1962), 11.

¹²Louis Mackey, Kierkegaard: A Kind of Poet, 247.

¹³Alastair McKinnon, "Irrationalism Revisited," International Philosophical Quarterly, 9 (June, 1969): 170.

¹⁴McKinnon, 176.

¹⁵The allusion is to Kierkegaard's little book by the same name.

¹⁶Soren Kierkegaard, The Point of View for My Work as an Author: A Report to History, trans. Walter Lowrie (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), 22.

¹⁷Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, trans. J. W. Edwards, O. Bussey, Harold Knight; ed. G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance (Edinburg: Clark, 1958), 3.1, ix.

According to Louis Mackey, the doctrine of creation, in Kierkegaard's version, includes three inter-related elements: the omnipotence of God; the freedom of man; and a stress upon the ethical-practical aspects of life rather than the cognitive-theoretical. "God has made man free in order that his infinite creative will may be done in the finite created order. Man's task, therefore, is to do God's will in the world, a task he can only fulfill if he first 'becomes himself' by getting his relationship to God in proper focus. In Kierkegaard's language, the infinite qualitative difference between creator and creature is the 'possibility-relation' that links divine omnipotence and human freedom and stretches human life from here to eternity into a 'perpetual striving' after God." Kierkegaard: A Kind of Poet, 269.

¹⁸Hans-Georg Gadamer, "Concerning Empty and Fulfilled Time," in Martin Heidegger in Europe and America, ed. Edward G. Ballard and Charles E. Scott (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), 82.

Oscar Cullmann, Christ and Time, trans. Floyd V. Filson (London: SCM Press, 1962), 61.

¹⁹Cullman, 62.

²⁰Mark C. Taylor, Kierkegaard's Pseudonymous Authorship: A Study of Time and the Self (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 91.

¹Kierkegaard, Either/Or, vol. 2, 218.

²Soren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans. David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941), 277. Hereafter, CUP.

³Soren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Dread, trans. Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944), 39. Hereafter, CD.

⁴Taylor, 116.

⁵Soren Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, trans. David Swenson and Howard V. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), 25.

⁶Jean Wahl, Etudes kierkegaardienes (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1967), 326.

⁷Calvin O. Schrag, "Kierkegaard's Existential Reflections on Time," Personalist 42 (1961): 156.

⁸Schrag, 157.

⁹Soren Kierkegaard, Edifying Discourses: A Selection, trans. David F. and Lillian Marvin Swenson, Paul L. Holmer (New York: Harper and Row, 1958), 257.

¹⁰Charles M. Sherover, Heidegger, Kant and Time (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1971), 271.

¹¹Buber, 177. Robert L. Perkins has very effectively taken Buber to task on this issue in "Buber and Kierkegaard: A Philosophic Encounter," and Stephen Katz, sympathizing with Buber, explains, rather lamely, that the reason the essay "The Question to the Single One" was written "had nothing to do with Kierkegaard. The essay was written in 1936, if I am correct, and this was a time when German Jewry was under tremendous pressure. Buber himself was suspect and his life was in danger, as a leader of German Jewry . . . The essay was an appeal to German Christianity, not an academic essay for scholarly debate, but an appeal to German Christianity to arouse the conscience of Christians, who thought that their ethical responsibility could be avoided." Perkins' paper spans pages 275-296, and Katz' emotion-charged response is on p. 297, in Martin Buber: A Centenary Volume, edited by Haim Gordon and Jochanan Bloch (American Associates of Ben Gurion University: Ktav, 1984).

¹²Vincent A. McCarthy, "The Ethics of Irony in Kierkegaard," Kierkegaardiana 12 (1982): 62.

⁵Soren Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers, edited and trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1975), vol. 2, 422.

⁶Heidegger, "What is Metaphysics?," in Existence and Being, 338.

⁵Heidegger, "What is Metaphysics?," 344.

⁶Thomas Langan, "Heidegger: The Problem of the Thing," in Heidegger and the Path of Thinking, ed. John Sallis (Pittsburg: Duquesne University Press, 1970), 105.

⁷J. Preston Cole, "The Existential Reality of God: A Kierkegaard Study," in Kierkegaard's Presence in Contemporary American Life: Essays from Various Disciplines, ed. Lewis A. Lawson (Metuchen: Scarecrow Press, 1970), 101.

⁸Soren Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers, vol. 2, 414.

⁹Journals and Papers, vol. 2, 255.

⁶Cornelio Fabro, "Faith and Reason in Kierkegaard's Dialectic," in A Kierkegaard Critique, 168.