

BOOK REVIEWS

Wise Choices, Apt Feelings, by Allan Gibbard. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990. pp. xi + 346. Reviewed by Ann E. Cudd, University of Kansas.

The puzzle that Allan Gibbard sets for himself is: what do we mean when we call something "rational", or more broadly, what are we doing when we engage in normative discussion, and why do we do it? Gibbard's response is to provide what he calls a "norm-expressivistic analysis" of norms, and to explain human preoccupation with normative discussion in Darwinian terms. To call something rational is to express one's acceptance of norms that permit it. Normative discussions consist in expressing norms, that is, in talking about what it makes sense to do or feel or believe. Humans engage in normative discussion for vast portions of our lives because it is biologically adaptive for us.

Gibbard defends a non-cognitivist view of norms: when expressing norms, he claims, we are not stating facts (or putative facts) about the world. Facts play one biological role in our lives while norms and normative discussion play another, namely to help us to coordinate actions. Gibbard is concerned to give an account of norms that allows for everyday uses of the term "rational", and that accounts for the endorsement aspect of norms. For these reasons he rejects purely descriptive accounts of norms, and the "Hume-Ramsey" substantive account of rationality as instrumental rationality, which cannot make sense of claims that preferences are irrational.

One of the main goals of his analysis is to provide a *naturalistic* account of norms and their role in human life. In Gibbard's terms this means a Darwinian natural selection story of how norms, and the kind of psychology that we need to create them, are evolutionarily adaptive for humans. Since human normative systems and emotional responses differ widely, the story has to be about very plastic psychic devices. "In applying Darwinian theory to the human psyche, we should look not for rigid patterns of behavior, but for capacities to respond differently to different environments" (p.64). If the story is persuasive, then this gives us reason to agree with Gibbard's non-cognitivism, and he will have solved an important puzzle about how norms could have emerged without tacitly appealing to prior norms.

In his Darwinian story norms and judgments about our physical surroundings play very different roles. While the ability to make judgments about our physical surroundings is necessary for most animal functions, the abilities to create norms and engage in normative discussions are uniquely human adaptations that allow us to coordinate our actions, to cooperate for survival and for mutual advantage, and to do so in infinitely flexible ways. Humans typically face bargaining situations

with each other, situations where we stand to gain through cooperation but where there is a conflict of interest over the division of the gains. The solutions that humans take often involve norms (rather than fighting, which would destroy future cooperation), either in the form of rigid rules for splitting the cooperative effort or a framework for discussion of how norms of fairness or desert can be applied in a particular instance. Thus the ability to express norms linguistically is as essential to the story as the ability to be motivated to action by expressions of norms.

Gibbard applies his analysis explicitly to norms for action (though he claims that only the intentions and preferences guiding actions can be judged), norms for appropriate emotions, epistemic norms governing belief formation, and, especially moral norms. His focus is not so much on the norms themselves, (indeed one ought not read this book looking for any practical normative advice), but rather on how discussions of norms can go at all: what moves them toward consensus. Given his non-cognitivist approach there are some especially pressing concerns: Can his account be given a formal analysis? Can normative discussions be objective? Can we ever resolve normative disagreements? Can we make sense of the (typically cognitivist) question: why be moral? Gibbard argues for an affirmative answer to each of these.

Perhaps the most important part of the book is Gibbard's account of morality and moral emotion. Gibbard's account of morality resembles, self-consciously, that of Adam Smith, with the important exception that Gibbard rejects (partly) that role of the impartial spectator. In particular, morality consists in judgments about the appropriateness of moral feelings. Anger and guilt are especially important on Gibbard's view as the primary moral emotions; societies in which persons do not feel guilt do not have morality on what he calls the "narrow construal". Moral norms are adaptive because they help us to share feelings, which in turn helps foster coordination and cooperation. Shared feelings of anger and guilt, and the ability to employ normative authority about attributions of anger and guilt, are especially effective in motivating cooperation. Emotions are cognitive on Gibbard's account, that is, we feel anger at someone, or we feel guilty, for something we have done or omitted. Anger and guilt properly come about when someone has failed to do his part. In moral inquiry we need not feel these emotions, rather we need to take a special standpoint: moral norms are norms for how to feel given full engagement. Full engagement is "vivid awareness of everything generic that would affect one's feelings toward a situation" (p.127). One's feelings are not often fully engaged, but the norms governing the emotions are to be discussed from this standpoint because taking such a stance ensures the best hope for sharing feelings, and so for cooperation. Gibbard takes from Smith the idea that moral emotions have a pragmatic role, but rejects the idea that the appropriate moral emotions are those which an impartial spectator would feel, since on Gibbard's view it is sometimes better for coordination if we

are not so impartial. I find this last point somewhat confusing in the text, however (Compare p. 127 and pp. 279-282).

It may seem that objectivity would pose a special problem for norm-expressivistic analysis. Gibbard spends the largest portion of the book (100 pages) in giving an account of normative objectivity: how and to what extent it is possible on his analysis of norms. He divides the topic of objectivity into three issues to discuss: (1) what it means to say that a norm applies independent of one's acceptance of it; (2) the distinction between accepting something as demand of rationality and making idiosyncratic existential commitment to it; and (3) the nature of claim to authority about moral norm. The first issue is easily settled when one distinguishes between accepting a norm and expressing acceptance. Since his account is about when it is appropriate to *express* acceptance, he claims that normative discussions can be as interpersonal as talk about trees. The second issue is settled by appeal to higher order norms for rationality. Then "to accept a norm as a requirement of rationality is to accept it along with higher order norms that require its acceptance" (p.169). The third issue arises when we see that every normative discussion involves claims to normative authority, often conflicting ones. The question then is, how can normative discussions reach resolution? If the answer is that someone's normative expressions must be taken as authoritative, when does it make sense to take someone else as normative authority?

I found the most interesting and illuminating parts of this book to be Gibbard's account of normative disagreement and its resolution. Normative discussions involve persons expressing norms, applying pressure on one another to accept their views of how norms govern the situations at hand. One way that a person can be persuaded to change her view is by pointing out an inconsistency in the norms that she accepts. The resulting emotion is embarrassment, and this normally causes one to reevaluate one's normative position. But Gibbard holds that consistency is only one meta-norm among several competitors, and even persons with coherent norms and beliefs can disagree. Given such deep seated disagreement, how can we agree to disagree? Gibbard outlines two general strategies for accepting disagreement: parochialism and relativism. Parochialism involves accepting some norms as, arbitrarily, beyond challenge, and then holding that those who do not accept those norms as outside one's normative community. This strategy may seem both theoretically unsatisfying and practically dangerous if the wrong combination of norms conflict. The alternative is relativism, which involves accepting higher order norms that allow (or even require) disagreement at lower orders, depending on the circumstances of everyday life. Again, this is unsatisfactory if the higher order norms conflict. Gibbard gives a sort of practical account of the results of disagreement. We choose between tolerance and (when we are in a position to do so) repression. Repression is costly because we desire

respect and repression makes that impossible. Tolerance assures mutual respect in the face of disagreement, but can be costly too when one has to tolerate serious breaches of one's norms. These are the costs that are weighed in deciding on a course of tolerance or of repression of conflicting norms.

This book is an interesting attempt to understand norms by an important contemporary philosopher. It is a clear statement of a non-cognitivist, naturalist account of norms, and a thoughtful examination of the complexities involved in trying to give a Darwinian grounding to ethical theory. It is very rich and suggestive, and leaves one wanting more. However, I have some doubts about the adequacy of the Darwinian analysis as a complete account of the origin norms. I wonder about the fact that legal, aesthetic, and etiquette norms were excluded, and how well they would fit into the analysis. My guess is that while they could each be given a coordination rationale, the latter two would fit only awkwardly. Epistemic norms, moral norms, and norms for other feelings are all pushed by facts or naturally based intuitions: the external world rules out certain kinds of epistemic judgments, as does the need for cooperation and our emotional capacities for the case of moral and emotional norms. And this may be true for the possible legal systems of norms that we could invent: some conceivable systems would not be adequate to the task of political survival and would result in their own demise. But for aesthetic and etiquette norms there are no such survival pressures at work; they seem to be completely arbitrary on this analysis.

My biggest concern is with the adequacy of an analysis of morality that is centered on the emotions of guilt and anger. First of all it is not clear why Gibbard wants to so center the analysis, except that it conveniently fits his Darwinian story. But morality seems to me to involve other emotions, such as concern, love, a sense of fairness or justice, pride, sympathy, benevolence, sadness, and shame, to name a few standard examples. Now Gibbard might respond that though these are emotions guided by norms, all *moral* judgments can be understood as judgments about the appropriateness of feeling anger or guilt over some action, which might also have inspired these other emotions. To suggest a counterexample, imagine the following scenario. Recently a man plowed under a part of his land that was one of the last pieces of virgin prairie in eastern Kansas. I believe that what he did was morally wrong, that the predominant moral emotion was a sense of sadness or loss, and that anger at him is unjustifiable. I would argue that we cannot be angry because he had a right to do what he did since he owned the land, but we can be disappointed and sad because what he did diminishes us and lessens our community feelings. The actions of various members of the community lend evidence to my interpretation. Some people were angry and tried to protest by laying their bodies in the path of the tractor, but these people were removed by the sheriff, and many people considered their actions

fanatical. It was thought by the wider community that they had gone too far. Another group held a ritualistic ceremony of mourning. Others tried to buy the land before it was destroyed. These seemed to most people to be appropriate reactions. Surely his action was selfish, stubborn, and stupid. If I am right that this was immoral and yet anger was unjustified, then it seems that this would constitute a counterexample to Gibbard's construal of morality. However, it also seems that his analysis could be broadened and still preserve the Darwinian story; it seems clearly adaptive for us to want not to make each other sad, and to be perceived as generous and wise, for this preserves community and our individual place in it. Since Gibbard notes that there are many societies that do not have guilt, his construal of morality implies that they do not have morality. This is, given my suggestion, unnecessarily ethnocentric.

I want to add a final critical note about Gibbard's choice of norms governing the gender of pronouns, and about the images of women generally in his book. He continually uses the pronoun 'he' and the term 'man' as if they were gender neutral. Since it is now a widespread practice, at least a competing linguistic norm, in analytic moral philosophy to use 's/he', or 'she' and 'he' interchangeably, one can only read this as an unfortunate deliberate choice. Worse, women appear in five examples in the book, at least three of which are extremely negative stereotypic images: Cleopatra who is irrationally angry at the bearer of bad tidings, Delilah (and we all know what she did to Samson), and the coherent anorexic. In a book about what it makes sense to do and to feel, these images are rather insensitive. Perhaps this was less intentional, but I find it no less unfortunate.

True and False Ideas, New Objections to Descartes' "Meditations" and Descartes' Replies, Antoine Arnauld, translated, with an Introduction by Elmar J. Kremer, (Lewiston/Queenston/Lampeter: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1990), pp. xxxiv + 198. Reviewed by Roy Martinez, Spelman College.

Among his Cartesian contemporaries of seventeenth-century France, Arnauld was unquestionably a key intellectual figure. Singularly combative of spirit and prolific to boot, he managed to generate during his long life more than forty volumes of rigorously argued works dealing with various theological and philosophical concerns. Although known to most English-speaking readers as the author of the Fourth Objections to Descartes *Meditations*, Arnauld was a philosopher in his own right. If no where else, this assessment is especially vindicated in the book under review.

What motivated Arnauld to write *Des vraies et fausses idées* (*hereafter: Idées*) was his conviction that Malebranche, particularly in his

Recherche de la verite, not only misread Descartes but confounded matters by wittingly perpetuating ambiguities that might have been merely accidental in Descartes' texts. Amidst the complex of issues attended to by the Port-Royal logician in this book, those featuring the cognate concepts of perception and ideas serve as the foundation of the rigorous examination to which Malebranche's work is subjected. In accordance with a practice prevalent in his age, Arnauld proceeds *more geometrico* to demonstrate the inevitable contradictions involved in his adversary's arguments. As early as the fifth chapter, i.e., on p. 19, he fortifies his position by constructing a list of definitions, axioms, and postulates to refute the Malebranchean thesis that between the act of perceiving and its object, there is a *tertium quid* known as a "representative entity." This is not to suggest that Arnauld denies that perceptions represent. Like Malebranche, he grants that this is undoubtedly the case. Indeed, implied in this concession is the Cartesian principle according to which every act of cognition *eo ipso* correlates with an object.

It is not surprising, therefore, that Arnauld, in the first and second definitions respectively, accepts that the mind or soul is a substance that thinks, and then equates "to think," "to know," and "to perceive." Significantly, however, in the third definition he states unequivocally that he takes "the 'idea' of an object and the perception of an object to be the same thing." This move, on his part, is a crucial step in rejecting Malebranche's analysis of cognitive experience into the threefold division of (1) the act of perceiving, (2) its direct correlate: the idea, and (3) the thing itself, i.e., the indirect object. Since the thought of Descartes is at the backdrop of these deliberations, or rather, since it provides the stimulus for the issue at hand, I'd like to revert to him for the nonce.

In Descartes' scheme of concepts, "idea" means whatever can be in our thought, and there are, as he illustrates in the third meditation, three kinds: "*Ex his autem ideis aliae innatae, aliae adventitiae, aliae a me ipso factae mihi videntur*" (Among these ideas, some seem to be born with me, others to be alien to me and to come from without, and the rest to be made and invented by myself.) An example of an innate idea is one I have of God, triangle, or any eternal essence; of one that is adventitious, it would be my idea of the sun; and the example adduced for a constructed or factitious idea is the astronomer's version of the sun. Although all three kinds of ideas are epistemically different in that they are grasped with varying degrees of certainty, one cannot help wondering how, qua ideas, i.e., entities contained in or present to thought, they differ ontologically.

Cartesian metaphysics posits God as its first truth (its *fundamentum inconcussum*) and the notion of truth in this system of thought is inherently deductive. This means, among other things, that reason is endowed with the ability to discern every logical turn that the mind makes in establishing commerce between God and the world he has caused or

created. On this accounting, by the natural light of reason, the mind can affirm the validity of a true judgment and accept confidently the reality of any object given to it in perception. To put it another way, present in any act of awareness is the internal testimony of truth itself: the ultimate guarantor of our sense of what is real and true. Since the principal agent here is the thinking substance, which constitutes the human interface between God and the world, what needs to be determined is how the term "perception" should be understood.

According to Arnauld's fifth definition in *Idées*, "a thing is *objectively* in my mind when I conceive of it. When I conceive of the sun, of a square or a sound, then the sun, the square or that sound is objectively in my mind whether or not it exists outside of my mind." Arnauld implies that while there is a difference between the idea (object of perception) and a thing in the world, the idea is a representation of the thing merely in the sense that the former contains objectively what is formally in the latter. "Objectively" can be here used interchangeably with "cognitively;" and the "formal" characteristic of a thing refers to the limited and imperfect manner in which it exists in itself. In contrast to these two modes of being, creatures exist in God *eminently*, i.e., in a way which is more noble than the way they are in themselves and which is separated from all the imperfections which are inseparably attached to their condition as creatures, in comparison to the infinite perfection of the Sovereign Being" (p. 77). In dispensing with Malebranche's "representative entity" as a distinct third term, Arnauld avoids the possibility of falling into an infinite regress of a *coqitationis coqitationis*....

Having identified the perception with the idea in the third definition, Arnauld elaborates on it in the sixth: "I have said that I take the *Perception* and the *idea* to be the same thing. Nevertheless it must be noted that this thing, although only one, has two relations: one to the soul which it modifies, the other to the thing perceived insofar as it is objectively in the soul; and that the word *Perception* indicates more directly the first relation and the word *idea* the second" (p.20). The difference here, then, is not ontological: there's only a single entity. Rather, Arnauld's distinction is one of emphasis: when the focus is on the noetic pole or mental aspect of the perceptual situation, the term used is "perception;" when the focus is on its noematic aspect or external reference, the term employed is "idea."

There is, as earlier stated, much more in this book than space allows us to cover. Suffice it to say that in it Arnauld, faithful to Descartes' principles and writing with Gallic clarity, proves himself to be not only a major contributor to the understanding of Cartesian thought but a thinker *modo suo*. The realization of his significance is reflected in the growing scholarship that the English-speaking world is currently devoting to his work. This new translation of the *Idées* clearly confirms this fact. Kremer provides the reader with an ample introduction comprised of adequate biographical information and a lucid, albeit brief, exposition of the content

of *Idées*. In his notes reference is made to three recent books that somehow deal with Arnauld: John Yolton's *Perceptual Acquaintance From Descartes to Reid* (University of Minnesota Press, 1984); John Kilcullen's *Sincerity and Truth, Essays on Arnauld, Bayle and Toleration* (Oxford, 1988); and Stephen Nadler's *Arnauld and the Cartesian Philosophy of Ideas* (Princeton University Press, 1989). Another appropriate title that may be added to this list, although not included in Kremer's notes, is Patrick Riley's *The General Will Before Rousseau: The Transformation of the Divine into the Civic* (Princeton University Press, 1986).

Apart from the value that this book can provide as an introduction to the thought of Arnauld for those who have limited acquaintance with seventeenth-century Cartesianism, by virtue of its critical thrust this study can be useful to readers and instructors of Descartes. Elmar Kremer is to be commended for the inestimable service he has rendered the philosophic community.

The Authority of Language: Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and The Threat of Philosophical Nihilism, James C. Edwards, (Tampa: University of South Florida Press, 1990), Pp. xi + 249, \$ 25.00. Reviewed by Michael J. Quirk, Bellerose, New York.

Many readers of Heidegger and Wittgenstein have sensed that they share considerable common ground, despite the monumental differences between the style and substance of their respective philosophical traditions. In this new book, James C. Edwards makes the compelling suggestion that the source of their similarity is a response to the threat of philosophical nihilism--the idea that since all our epistemic and moral practices can be objectified, or formalized as systems of precise rules, they thereby come to seem arbitrary, and thus lose their *authority* over us and fade into meaninglessness.

The prophet of philosophical nihilism was Nietzsche, who maintained that the rejection of a Platonic "higher world" (and its Christian, Kantian, and Positivistic variants) would usher in a situation where values would devalue themselves. Without a transcendental guarantee, "higher" values (such as "truth") would turn out to be nothing other than specific manifestations of an impersonal Will-to-Power, which would shatter the dominant Western attitude toward their origins and authority. Nietzsche believed that the resulting nihilism, where *none* of our systematic beliefs and practices would be adequate from the standpoint of philosophical rationality, might be a moment of opportunity for humankind. Freed from the illusions of Platonism, "the noble" can joyously and wholeheartedly affirm their lives as expressions of Will-to-Power without need of philosophical legitimation. But Edwards, following Heidegger, notes the

dangers as well as the charms of the Nietzschean "yes": the exemplary Nietzschean life is bent on the utter control and *domination* of all beings. Behind the stirring rhetoric of the *Übermensch* lies the uglier realities of technocracy and institutionalized brutality.

The later Heidegger, as Edwards portrays him, was determined to undermine the basis for the nihilism of which Nietzsche warned us, as well as his supposed transcendence of it in the affirmation of Will-to-power. Heidegger complained that both Nietzsche and his metaphysical rivals viewed language, and the articulation of being in language, as a *human* possession and achievement, a capacity to either "find" or "make" the world. This elevates the human self to the exalted status of a transcendental ego; even Nietzsche, who rejected the metaphysical attitude only to reaffirm it in an inverted form, insisted upon the primacy of the (super)human. And because of this, nihilism is inevitable. The godlike subject of metaphysical reflection cannot consistently objectify its own representational or expressive activity. If *that* were accomplished, the ground of representation or expression will have been successfully represented or turned into an object and thus lost as a *ground*. And were this metaphysical quest to fail, the "ground of our lives as rational beings [would be left] utterly mysterious, and therefore insecure." Either alternative is nihilistic.

For Heidegger, "*Die Sprache spricht*": not humankind, but "*language speaks*." Representationalist philosophers of language (Locke, Condillac) and their expressivist counterparts (Herder, Humboldt, Nietzsche) epitomize the humanistic blindness to the ways in which the practices whereby we grasp things, and the language wherein they are disclosed, constitute and shape us, rather than the other way around. Heidegger claims that poetry, rather than metaphysics, shows how and why this is so. His interpretation of Trakl's poem "A Winter Evening" highlights the way in which the difference between thing and world cannot be accommodated to representationalism and expressivism. Just as words *are* the words they are only in the context of a language, so things are things only in the context of the referential totality of a world. The poet's words *show* the world which "grants things" by naming the things which "bear a world": they do *not* represent a "found" totality of objects which only incidentally comprise a world, nor do they "make" a world by imposing order on a void. Poetry, for Heidegger, puts the lie to metaphysics by alerting humans to the context of things-in-the-world they are "always already" in, and shows the dichotomy between subject and object to be derivative and misleading.

Thus, for Heidegger, the primordial articulation of whole into part, of world into things, of language into words and sentences, cannot be a matter of mere human activity, for the ability to differentiate and identify anything demands a *prior* articulation. Ontological difference (*Unterscheid*), the ultimate difference between beings and Being, is

presupposed by all human distinguishing and relating, and thus cannot itself be formalized into one more distinction or relation. Rather, it constitutes the "open dimension" in which Being reveals and conceals itself to human beings, outside the scope of human will. Heidegger harks back to the Heraclitean doctrine of being-as-*logos*, toward which we must listen and submit as it historically "sends" itself to different epochs and cultures.

Edwards comments that Heidegger's archaism has the power both to charm and to chill: while it dissolves the threat of philosophical nihilism, it does so by investing language with an authoritarian mystique, where our duty is to obey in silence the biddings of the *logos*. One can question whether Heidegger's retrieval and "destruction" of the Western philosophical tradition supports this "linguistic fascism"--if the "sendings" of Being are historically mutable and diverse, does it make sense to allude to the unitary, determinate *logos* of Heraclitus at all?--but Edwards is certainly correct to claim that the rhetoric of Heidegger's later writings uniformly leads in this direction, which in turn renders Heidegger's reprehensible political convictions all too intelligible.

Edwards worries whether Heidegger's rejection of "moral rationality"--the ideal of the autonomous agent who legislates her behavior in accord with the dictates of practical reason--carries too high a price: the devaluation of democratic political institutions. He contends that Wittgenstein manages to preserve that which is best in Heidegger's philosophical achievement without capitulating to an authoritarianism that threatens our moral and political identities.

To measure Wittgenstein's achievement in the *Philosophical Investigations* and other later writings, one must first appreciate the genre into which they fall. While they address serious defects and omissions in the *Tractatus*, they do not offer an alternative account of the canonical features of language: rather, they call the whole effort of providing such accounts into question. When the *Tractatus* accuses metaphysical propositions of being disguised "nonsense," it does so from the vantage of a philosophical *theory* of the necessary logical structure of language itself. In contrast, the *Investigations'* similar charges emanate from the perspective of a very different sort of philosophical *practice*, that of assembling "reminders for a particular purpose" which render the doings of language "perspicuous," and therefore in no need of any theoretical legitimation. Edwards thus sides with those commentators who emphasize the rupture between the early and the later Wittgenstein, but goes further than most in claiming that, at bottom, Wittgenstein's rejection of the *Tractatus* was rooted in a severe *moral* judgement against the outlook which it epitomized.

That outlook is an attempt to see the world and ourselves *sub specie aeternitatis*, as objects to be beheld by a detached knowing subject, as riddles rather than as mysteries, as cause for curiosity rather than awe.

But this view—precisely that which Nietzsche and Heidegger cited as the source of nihilism—cannot be accommodated to certain very basic facets of our human existence, of which it is the (Wittgensteinian) philosopher's job to "remind" us.

Wittgenstein's critique of nihilism is an oblique one, centering around the conception of language as a system of rules advanced in the *Philosophical Remarks*. The *Remarks* took stock of the problems posed by the logical atomism of the *Tractatus*, where elementary propositions were axiomatically assumed to be truth-functionally independent. Color predicates show this to be untenable: e.g., The truth of "X is blue at T₁" entails the falsity of "X is red at T₁." But Wittgenstein thought at that time that the theory of language as an exact calculus could be salvaged if it was not individual propositions which "pictured" the world but systems of propositions—language as a whole pictures the world as a whole by way of its essential rule-governed order. The *Investigations* do not seek to refute the *Remarks* on this point: rather they wish to show that its attempt to formalize language—or, in a Continental idiom, to objectify human linguistic and epistemic practices—does not provide the sort of explanation that it claims to provide. It does not answer to "our real need" in posing the question about how we come to mean what we say.

How is it that we can judge whether or not a rule has been understood? Given the hypothesis that language is a calculus of fixed rules, it is tempting to suppose that our understanding of rules is a uniquely mental state or process: our introspective reports establish whether or not we have understood what they require. But the process of learning any rule-governed system involves imitating the exemplary actions of others and submitting oneself to the public judgement of one's tutors. Hence whether or not one "understands" is not exclusively a mental matter, since it involves the "physical" facticity of appropriate and inappropriate responses. It therefore is not justified by any form of introspection. Mentalistic, solipsistic philosophies of language do not square with what is "perspicuous" in our actual use of rules.

Rules must be applied, and understanding a rule is not something ontologically discrete and separable from knowing how to apply it. Just as Heidegger maintained that every attribution of difference presupposes a prior differentiation, Wittgenstein similarly insists that the mastery of a rule-governed system requires a prior assimilation of skills, abilities which enable us to project our concepts into new contexts yet still maintain enough regularity to render our linguistic innovations plausible. To insist that the application of language is "always and everywhere bounded by rules" is thus to risk a nonsensical regress: somewhere our reason-giving, our rule-following, must come to an end, and our trust in human practices take its stead—"this is what we do."

It would be a mistake, however, to interpret Wittgenstein's insouciance about rules as a form of conventionalism (the analytic

equivalent of "expressivism"). To view conventional stipulation as the singular source of meaning is to overlook the fact that human members of a linguistic community share not simply "agreement in opinions" but also "agreement in judgement" —they share a "form-of-life." We can not shrug these off as mere conventions; they cannot be willed into or out of our lives. Conventionalists, like their essentialist counterparts, try to detach themselves from human practice and human life, in order to gaze upon it as if from above and pronounce them "mere conventions": they too are infected by the disease of traditional philosophy, the willful, narcissistic aspiration to the transparency of a transcendent, omnipotent god.

Like Heidegger, Wittgenstein concludes that our deepest moral, epistemic, and ontological commitments flow from certain "very general facts" rooted in our biology, society, and culture, which open up the world to discourse and discourse to the world, and which in some sense make up the weft and warp of our selves. Like Heidegger, he is consumed by the desire to banish the contempt for human finitude epitomized by metaphysical and transcendental philosophy. But unlike Heidegger, Wittgenstein refuses to let this contempt resurface as *Gelassenheit*, the abject subservience to the voice of being-as-logos. The *Philosophical Investigations* does not posit any singular substitute for the loss of singular authority: it is the deepest aspect of philosophical pathology to insist upon a singular explanation for why our words carry weight. We are left with manifold, contingent practices, which manage to sustain our quests for meaning and truth, and provide us with the means for rationally extending and enriching our lives. They suffice. To expect a more solid ground for these efforts, a firm, self-authenticating foundation of necessities, is to be victimized by a spiritual pathology which substitutes a vain desire for theoretical mastery in place of rapt wonder in the face of the world and our grasp of it.

The Authority of Language is a masterful explication of Heidegger and Wittgenstein, and also succeeds in showing how a reading of Wittgenstein can both illuminate and allow one to transcend a glaring inadequacy in Heidegger's later thought. It is also edifying in the best sense of the word, revealing the significance of two rather obscure philosophers for life in the (post-) modern era. One troubling question, however, remains. Both Heidegger and Wittgenstein doubted the value of philosophical theories: their work is a form of *therapia*, seeking to transform rather than inform their audience. But, once converted from the transcendental standpoint, that readership needs to find concrete moral guidance and support, support which was once provided by, among other things, moral theory and religious devotion. Edwards portrays Heidegger and Wittgenstein as ambivalent, at best, toward both. But neither of them offers an determinate alternative to philosophical theory or religion. Heidegger and Wittgenstein are valuable in showing us the limitations of the metaphysical-epistemological, or "onto-theological"

tradition and its capacity to stifle the sense of amazement that gave rise to it in the first place. In effect, they show us how *not* to think about thinking. But as to what might *follow* their reformed and refreshed philosophical practice, we are left without any clear options. It remains for us to consider what philosophy might be in their wake.

The Causes of Quarrel: Essays on Peace, War, and Thomas Hobbes, edited by Peter Caws, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1989), 224 pages. Reviewed by Ted Zenzinger, University of Kansas.

The project of *The Causes of Quarrel* is at once ambitious and valuable. Caws suggests in his introduction that we examine international relations from a hobbesian perspective, view the atomic bomb as our absolute sovereign, and attempt to find another, more acceptable means of achieving peace. The project is ambitious for it entails not only working through the complexities of Hobbes' social contract theory, predominately the causes of quarrel (competition, diffidence and glory) and their control by the sovereign, but it also entails evaluating the political response to Hobbes, the determination by the Federalists and others to secure peace without the sacrifice required by an absolute sovereign. If the project succeeds, we will not only have gained an understanding of how nation states interact, but we may also come to see how we might live in a peace not imposed by the fear of mutual destruction. In this we find great value.

Unfortunately, the project proves too much for one collection of essays. Caws makes a gallant attempt in his introduction to hold the project together, but the authors of the essays are not to be held in check. They embark on favorite topics which, while often interesting in themselves, contribute marginally if at all to the stated goal of the collection. While we are not, then, in a position to evaluate Caws' project (for it remains incomplete), there are connecting threads to be found in the essays which we might profitably examine.

The first thread takes up the value of the contribution Hobbes' analysis of the interaction of individuals makes to an understanding of the interaction of nation states. Were nation states to behave like hobbesian individuals, we would expect them to find it rational to escape the war of all against all by giving over their liberties (save self defense) to an absolute world sovereign. Martin and Farrell suggest a problem with this analysis.

Martin brings to the table the serious problem of obligation. Can an absolute hobbesian sovereign prevent rebellion and insure peace? The answer seems to be no, for Hobbes attempts to combine the liberty of self-defense with the alienation of all other liberties. In allowing each to determine what constitutes harm to self, Hobbes allows each individual to undermine the authority of the sovereign by disobeying it whenever the

individual so chooses. If nations, like individuals maintain the liberty of self-defense, then an absolute world sovereign may be no better able to secure peace than the absolute sovereign of a nation state. Knowing this, it is unlikely that nation states will agree to establish an absolute world government, nor, developing a point made by Farrell, are they likely to be willing to transfer their liberty of self-defense to the sovereign.

Farrell asks whether it is rational for a nation to place itself under the control of an absolute sovereign. Given the power of the national state today and the horrors inflicted by nation states on one another in the past century, is it rational to place one's nation at the mercy of an absolute sovereign? Moreover, is it rational for strong nations (those possessing nuclear weapons) to give up control of such weapons to the world state and thus the means of self-defense? Farrell suggests that it is not rational to do so because a nation will not know the likelihood that the sovereign will act despotically. Without any knowledge of this likelihood, Farrell suggests that the rational nation state will play it safe and choose to retain its nuclear weapons and thereby its means of self-defense. There is then a serious problem to be addressed even before we discover if the analogy between individual and nation state holds, namely the success of Hobbes' theory in bringing peace to individuals or nation states.

A second thread seeks to develop an understanding of glory. Hobbes writes of glory as one of the causes of war, but how does it cause war and how is it overcome by the sovereign? These are the questions Hampton, Sacksteder and Altman address in their essays. Hampton asks an important question. Will vain glory disrupt the rational pursuit of self-preservation? If vain glory is not in some way a rational response to the human condition, then there seems little hope of controlling it such that individuals can rely upon one another to comply with the social contract. If the vain glorious are simply mad, then there is no way to stop them short of elimination. And, if all humans are subject to vain glory, there seems little hope for peaceful life.

The perceived worth or value of an individual, Hobbes contends, plays a role in the ability of the individual to control resources in both the state of nature and in society. But, Hampton reminds us, individual worth is instrumental in Hobbes' account; the worth of an individual is determined by how much others are willing to "pay" for the services of that individual. Those who suffer from vain glory believe that they have a worth higher than their market worth. And, if someone assigns them a lesser worth than they would assign themselves, they react violently. For, in attacking one who assigns to them a lesser worth, the affected individual seeks to establish that the person who made the evaluation was not to be believed and that their worth is lower than that of the person they devalued, thus making the worth of the attacking individual seem greater by comparison. Although Hampton's major concern is with individual vain glory, she does note that nations can suffer from it as well. When, however, it comes to

solving this problem, she can offer no suggestion other than that she sometimes despairs of finding an answer. Sacksteder believes that he has a plausible answer to offer.

Sacksteder argues that glory is the most insidious and destruction cause of quarrel among nations, but argues that there is a rational response to it. The suggestion is that nations will find it rational to develop what Sacksteder calls "mutually acceptable glory." The idea here is that the glory which a nation or individual assigns to itself matches that assigned to it by other individuals or nations. In effect, all agree to assign each other a mutually acceptable level of glory. The suggestion is interesting, but left undeveloped by Sacksteder. For example, there is no detailed treatment of how the nations or individuals will determine what a mutually acceptable level of glory is. It cannot simply be what each nation would assign itself, for nations often determine their level of glory in reference to other nations. If nation A believes it has more worth and so deserves more glory than nation B, and B believes that it has more worth than nation A, what is the mutually acceptable level of glory?

Altman makes a similar point in his response to Hampton and Sacksteder. Contra Sacksteder he argues that what is required is not mutual recognition of glory, but mutual recognition of sovereignty. He notes that liberal democracies have been willing to recognize the sovereignty of other liberal democracies because of a shared sense of what actions are morally legitimate. Maybe, Altman suggests, the problem we face is not that we have nation states, but that we have nation states of the wrong type. Perhaps we need to promote the development of liberal democracies if we are to secure peace.

Contra Hampton, Altman suggests that humans, by nature, enjoy making others suffer and that we are not the rational egoists Hampton supposes. The point at issue here is important to our understanding of Hobbes. Hampton's reading of Hobbes seeks to emphasize the rational aspect of human nature. Humans must be rational if they are to recognize that to avoid the war of all against all they need to enter into a social contract which establishes an absolute sovereign. Humans, however, must not be so rational that the state of nature does not erupt into the state of war, for were this the case, there would be no need for a sovereign. In her analysis of glory, Hampton is seeking to show that while glory is a problem and a cause of war, it is not something which will preclude rational individuals from making the social contract. To make this argument she must develop an account of how the absolute sovereign can make individuals recognize the irrationality of being vain glorious, and how vain glorious individuals can find it rational to enter into the social contract.

Altman, by comparison, is seeking to emphasize the irrational aspect of human nature. Humans are so irrational, so wild, that nothing but an absolute sovereign will allow them to live in peace. Proponents of this reading of Hobbes face the task of demonstrating how such violent,

irrational individuals could make the decision to establish a social contract. Behind the scenes of the exchange between Altman and Hampton, then, lies a key debate among interpreters of Hobbes.

The third and final thread we will discuss concerns our understanding of peace. Hobbes defined peace as the absence of war; what if we attempted to provide a positive definition of peace? This is the question addressed by Cox, Caws and Lee.

Cox suggests that we view peace as a process, one whose goal is cooperation. We can make a beginning he argues, by recognizing that choosing to interpret events as conflictual is optional. That is, we do not have to see ourselves as engaged in conflict if we choose not to.

Caws endorses the idea that we view peace as a process, but he argues that we should focus our attention on the resolution of disputes without force. Unlike Cox, Caws recognizes that humans and nations will come into conflict with one another, but he argues that they have a choice when it comes to the manner in which the conflict will be settled. He, for example, suggests that we discuss the disbanding of our standing army because standing armies make it easier for us to avoid resolving our disputes without use of force.

Lee seeks to bring together the intuitions of Cox and Caws. He agrees that we need to develop a positive conception of peace, but argues that the belief that we can redescribe conflict so as to avoid it is simplistic. Further, the idea that all interactions are conflictual in nature is an exaggeration. We need to recognize that we will encounter situations where cooperation is called for and situations where peaceful resolution to conflict is indicated.

In an intriguing final section of his essay Lee argues that nuclear weapons have changed the world. They have forestalled cooperation by making us fearful and suspicious and they have made conflict without threat of force impossible. They have, in addition, made positive peace unnecessary for they secure a sort of peace without the need for cooperation and non-violent resolution of conflict. They have, as Caws remarks in his introduction become an unwanted, perilous absolute sovereign.