BOOK REVIEWS

Meaning and Mental Representation, by Robert Cummins. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989. 180 pages. Reviewed by David Larson, Central Missouri State University.

Representations are semantic entities. This means that they, like propositions, carry truth values--or maybe it means that they, like predicates, enter into constructions which carry truth values. Cummins uses the term 'representation' both for entities which have truth-valued semantic contents such as the content *that Brutus had flat feet*, and for predicate-like entities having values such as *cat*. At any rate, the topic is that of mental entities with semantic value.

In spite of the title, the book is not about meaning. Cummins takes pains to avoid either relying on or attempting to explain folk psychological notions of meaning, intention, belief, desire, etc. He rejects Fodor's view that representations are ordinary meanings--the objects of intention, belief, and desire.

Cummins says that his topic is part of philosophy of science. It is a task in the philosophy of science to see whether good sense can be made of the notion of representation employed by the computational theory of cognition, an empirical scientific theory. (Actually, to speak of a scientific theory here is to be too generous, for no large cognitive tasks have yet been rendered computational, but we might fairly speak of an empirical research program.) Cummins relies heavily on assumptions peculiar to this theory in rejecting some accounts of the nature of representation and in defending his preferred account.

A successful computational theory of cognition would explain the activity of a cognitive system (whether human, canine, Martian, or whatever) by reductively describing it as computation on representations. What sort of sense, then, can be made of this notion of representation? Similarity between representation and thing represented, at this point in philosophic history, does not appear very attractive as an analysis of the nature of representation, and Cummins briefly recounts the huge difficulties for this analysis posed by mis-representation and by representation of abstractions. Another analysis of the nature of representation, one version of which is attributable to Ruth Millikan, is that of evolutionary, or adaptational role semantics. This account has it roughly that representational content is determined by the survival value of the representation, but the explicitly historical nature of this account renders it incompatible with the computational theory of cognition.

Mis-representation, or error, is a problem not only for the unattractive similarity account of representation, but also for causal accounts, such as those offered by Fodor and Dretske. The basic difficulty is widely

appreciated, but Cummins argues a) that there is really only one dodge possible, b) that the dodge is unsuccessful, and c) that even sophisticated causal accounts therefore fall on the difficulty.

Mis-representation is a difficulty for naive causal accounts of the nature of representation because these accounts explain the content of a representation by citing the cause of the representation. Thus, the catty content of one representation might be explained by the fact that occurrences of that representation are caused by cats, while the doggy content of another representation is explained by its occurrences being caused by dogs. If mis-representation is possible, however, as it obviously is, then the naive account cannot be right. In cases of mis-representation, a representation with, for instance, a catty content is caused by a non-cat. If representation were only causality, then there could be no mis-representation.

Sophisticated causal accounts, Cummins argues, have no choice but to go ideal to dodge the difficulty. They must try to explain representational content by saying what would, *given ideal cognitive operation and/or ideal epistemic conditions*, cause the representation. The idea is that a theory might spell out constraints under which a cognitive system would be infallible, not because of an interest in infallibility as such, but because of the need to get representation established.

Idealized causal accounts do not explain the nature of representation unless they manage to spell out the idealizing constraints without circularity and without the use of semantic concepts. Cummins considers the project hopeless. His account of Dretske's attempts finds Dretske circularly presupposing the very semantic concepts which representation should eventually help explain.

Fodor's solution, or one of them, grants that the necessary constraints (describing the conditions which set content) are epistemic and hence presuppose semantic concepts, but denies that these constraints need to be spelled out. Satisfaction of these constraints is all that is needed to set content, and pointing out (without spelling them out, even in outline) that these constraints must be satisfied is all that is needed to explain representation. Cummins reasonably objects that this amounts to an admission of defeat. If the constraints necessarily satisfied for representation presuppose epistemic notions, then representation cannot help explain semantic notions.

As an alternative, Cummins finds in standard descriptions of calculating devices (computational theories of non-cognitive machines) an innocuous (naturalistic or non-intentional) notion of representation which doesn't need to be explained, yet is adequate for the computational theory of cognition. What is it, Cummins asks, that makes a certain display state of a calculator representative of the number four? It is simply that that display state has a certain role in the functioning of the calculator. Were it not for the other states and processes of the calculator, this state would

not represent the number four or anything else. Because the button pressings and displays of the calculator, suitably interpreted, perfectly "track" arithmetic functions, those buttons and displays actually represent the numbers and operators which are their interpretations.

Cummins calls his account of representation "interpretational semantics". An interpretation, of course, is just a mapping of one set (symbols) into another (content). As such, the notion of an interpretation is unproblematic. But Cummins does not simply identify representation with interpretation--not all interpretation yields representation. On Cummins' account, it is only when a computation successfully tracks (is isomorphic to) the target function that symbols represent anything. Instead of "interpretational semantics", this might better be called "successful tracking semantics".

The reason Cummins finds no problem with mis-representation, it seems to me, is that he is not bothered by radical ambiguity. By way of contrast, Fodor considers mis-representation a problem because he would give representations unique contents. Fodor is forced to worry about mis-representation of cats turning into representation of the disjunctive cats or dogs because he cannot allow one representation to have both catty and disjunctive contents. It takes work to keep a causal theory from selecting the disjunctive content, and this is work which Fodor undertakes. Cummins contends that interpretational semantics does not need to do this work--disambiguation is not necessary. Interpretational semantics needs only to be able to talk about more or less successful tracking, and can remain untroubled by the fact that what is fairly successful tracking of one function is inevitably more successful tracking of another. Representation occurs with respect to both functions.

It seems to me that there is more to the "unproblematic" notion of representation employed in talking about calculators and adding machines than Cummins recognizes. Calculator displays represent numbers and not assorted shingles on my roof, regardless of the possibility of assigning the second interpretation. We should distinguish not only between what is represented and what was intended to be represented, as Cummins does, but also between what is represented and what could have been represented. Calculator displays do represent numbers, though they are doubtless suited to the representation of many other things as well. If Cummins' account stays naturalistic it will offer, it seems to me, only an explanation of suitability for representation, not an explanation of representation. In other words, it will offer, at most, a necessary condition on representation. Furthermore, since there are degrees of success, and representation can occur even without perfect success, it would appear that this necessary condition can only be vaguely stated in terms of more or less successful tracking.

The Politics of Being: The Political Thought of Martin Heidegger, by Richard Wolin. New York: Columbia University Press, 1990. 221 pp. Reviewed by Patricia J. Huntington, Fordham University

Lucidly written and rigorously argued, Wolin's *The Politics of Being*[1] examines the manner in which Heidegger's political convictions were embedded in and prepared for by his philosophy. Employing a Kantian methodology to explore Heidegger's thought for the conditions of possibility of his political engagement, Wolin attempts to compensate for two deficiencies in the existing literature on the subject. On the one hand, historical accounts of Heidegger's empirical commitment to National Socialism lack the moment of "philosophical specificity" requisite to exemplify the theoretical basis of this commitment (xv). On the other hand, most conceptual analyses of Heidegger's political thought, in proceeding ahistorically, fail to challenge the "self-evidence" and supposed ideological neutrality of his basic philosophical categories (xiv). Situating the conceptual development of Heidegger's philosophy in its historical context, Wolin undertakes an immanent analysis aimed at exposing the inherently flawed character of Heidegger's political thought.[2]

Despite the hopeful formulation of and careful research underlying this project, it fails to fully achieve this aim. Certainly successful in revealing that Heidegger's philosophy does not rule out a priori a totalitarian political agenda, Wolin does not succeed in 'philosophically specifying' the exact nature of the theoretical deficiencies at root of Heidegger's political action. Wolin's usage of Kantian method, unbalanced by a study of the conceptual heritage influencing Heidegger, generates an overdetermined reading of historiography back into thought.

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[1] Richard Wolin, *The Politics of Being: The Political Thought of Martin Heidegger* (NY: Columbia University Press, 1990). All pagination in the main body of this paper refers to this book.

[2] Wolin envisions his work as "the philosophical pendant to Pierre Bourdieu's sociological study," *L'ontologie politique de Martin Heidegger* (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1988) [xv], introducing the philosophical moment into this work as well as two other works, largely biographical in import: Victor Farias, *Heidegger und der Nationalsozialismus*, with a foreword by Jürgen Habermas (Frankfurt: S. Fischer, 1989) [This is an expanded version of *Heidegger et le Nazisme*. Trans. Myriam Benarroch and Jean-Baptiste Grasset (Lagrasse: Editions Verdier, 1987)]; and Hugo Ott, *Martin Heidegger: Unterwegs zu seiner Biographie* (Frankfurt: Campus, 1988). On the other end of the spectrum, most Heidegger scholars in France, Germany and the USA have given apolitical readings of Heidegger's work for several decades. Wolin will focus on Jacques Derrida and Phillipe Lacoue-Labarthe, cf. n 5 below.

Instead of examining the manner in which the conceptual framework of Heideggerian thought critically transcends Heidegger's political action, Wolin simply reads his philosophy as part and parcel of his politics. This conceptual lack not only proves, in my opinion, a serious omission in a work that promises an immanent critique, but renders his analysis inconclusive. Tainted by his own political interests, Wolin's interpretation of Heidegger places his work too close to those historical analyses he claims offer unfounded speculative explications of Heidegger's empirical action.[3]

In what follows I will focus on how Wolin's serious misreading of key aspects of the Heideggerian texts problematizes the conclusions he draws. The thesis that Heidegger's political thought is flawed can be substantiated by demonstrating that the 1933 decision for National Socialism flowed from the "innermost tendencies" of *Being and Time* (66).[4] Toward this end, Wolin undertakes a two-stringed analysis of *Being and Time*, focusing on methodology and the concept of *Mitsein* (Being-with), in order to expose the manner in which ideology and philosophy fuse into a viewpoint theoretically consistent with the conservative-authoritarianism of Heidegger's day.

First, despite the attempt to break with subjectivism, *Being and Time* advances a theory of decisionism that, in turn, issues in a collectivist view of practical life. According to Wolin, *Dasein* can only achieve authenticity by "repudiating the public" realm of everydayness (36). Rejecting traditional normative criteria for action--criteria both Heidegger and the conservative revolutionaries deemed bankrupt inasmuch as modernity stands under the sway of nihilism--Heidegger valorizes the mere act of resolute decision. Yet this valorization leads to the aporia of decisionism, viz. that *Dasein*, because the act of decision is empty in itself, can only find meaning in bearing up under the collective destiny of the *Volk*. Heidegger's analysis of *Mitsein* amounts at most to a self-canceling social ontology. Situated in the ethical vacuum of modernity, *Dasein* must find the content of the "authentic destiny of the people" among those political options historically available (65).

Second, that Heidegger regarded National Socialism as the most viable "filling" of the empty vessel of decision available in his day was not, Wolin argues, incidental to his philosophy (66). The flawed methodology of *Being and Time* prevents Heidegger's thought from the

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[3] It should be noted that Wolin's project reflects the strong influence of Jürgen Habermas, under whom Wolin studied in Germany, both in its general conceptual formulation and in terms of interpretation. Yet Habermas' interpretation of Heidegger is tendentious due to his polemic with all who participated in fascist Germany. Wolin proves too good a student of Habermas in that he inherits the biases of his mentor.

[4] Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (NY: Harper & Row, 1962).

attainment of ontological purity. Due to the impossibility of undertaking an existential version of Kant's transcendental turn, the categories of *Being and Time* (e.g. authenticity, everydayness, fallenness, angst, resolve, destiny), reflect the cultural and historical biases that Heidegger shared with the conservative intelligentsia of his day (21). These included minimally the valorization of decisionism, denigration of the life-world, the antimodernist rejection of all inherited moral conventions, and the belief in the special destiny of the German *Volk*--all of which find theoretical cogency with the treatment of *Mitsein*. Fusing ideology with philosophy, Heidegger's thought devolves into a conservative-authoritarian world-view, one which, because devoid of the liberal democratic inheritance of modernity, lacked an "ethico-political bulwark against the enticement of fascism" (65).

Aspects of Wolin's analysis are incisive and deserve close attention. He accurately questions the problematic methodology of *Being and Time* as well as the personal and historical biases influencing this work. And, despite inaccuracies of interpretation, Wolin's general analysis often returns the reader to the text with an enriched, more critical eye. This holds especially true of his treatment of historicity and destiny. Yet the keystone in Wolin's argument, viz. that the crucially flawed rejection of liberal democratic values was grounded in the aporia of decisionism, rests on a serious misinterpretation of the concepts of authenticity and *Mitsein*.

Wolin mistakenly reads Heidegger's critique of everydayness as a total denigration of the life-world because he omits an examination of the Augustinian-Kierkegaardian spiritualist tradition that so heavily influences this discussion. The concern with collapse into everydayness is not a denigration of the life-world per se, but rather a concern to live in a qualitatively transformed relation to the world. Heidegger is well aware that there is no getting out of the existentiell world of the everyday--this is the context of human existence. He simply recognizes that there are minimally two ways to inhabit the life-world: (i) either one can unconsciously drift along with the gravitational momentum of inherited traditions, perpetuating them, yes, but only dogmatically; (ii) or, by questioning this inheritance, one can relate critically to tradition.

Analogously, Heidegger's concept of authenticity does not 'repudiate the public' world of everydayness, thereby retreating into the 'empty' interiority of individual *Dasein* and its arbitrary will. Authenticity constitutes a transformed mode of *Mitsein*. The entire analysis of Being-with already moves beyond the dialectic 'individual-collective.' Authenticity can't leave off the intersubjective character of *Dasein* or the contextual character of life; it marks a transformed mode of Being-with, not a departure therefrom.

Now, it cannot be denied that Heidegger did personally reject liberal values and did accept the conservative political ideology of his time. My critique of Wolin neither undermines the claim that Heidegger's

philosophy provided support for his empirical convictions nor denies the questionable nature of key Heideggerian concepts from a political perspective. Yet, Wolin can't locate the theoretical flaw in Heidegger's viewpoint specifically in 'decisionism' and 'denigration of the life-world' on the basis of misconstruing the text. Without accurately identifying the 'decisionistic' nature of authenticity, Wolin does not provide a definitive account of the actual link between thought and empirical conviction. He thus deprives us of the possibility of introducing a corrective into Heidegger's thought and leaves the reader with the fallacious sense that Heidegger's thought could only give birth to a fascistic politics, despite Wolin's occasional comment that he intends no such implication.

Nonetheless, Wolin advances a broader thesis throughout most of his work, viz. that the fundamental lack of material concretion in Heidegger's thought leads to a politically flawed rejection of modernity. Thus extending his thesis beyond the analysis of *Mitsein*, Wolin argues that Heidegger's conservative ideology solidifies into a *Seinspolitik* (politics of Being) between 1929 and 1933 (12). Analyzing the political situation from the historico-metaphysical perspective of his doctrine of *Seinsgeschichte* (History of Being), Heidegger diagnoses the loss of values rampant in modernity as rooted in the forgetfulness of Being. This diagnosis leads him to reject all historical-material solutions to political issues (for such accounts, premised upon the perspective of individual agents and not Being, stand under the sway of nihilism) and to embrace a totalitarian view of the state. Only the state, operating under a higher ontological perspective, can function as the veritable midwife of Being, thereby restoring values to the west (112).

Against this background, the main thrust of Wolin's study centers on exhibiting the manner in which Heidegger's politics becomes increasingly inadequate the more his thought shifts away from the practical philosophy of resolute (albeit decisionistic) action in *Being and Time* to an historico-metaphysical perspective of reality. Without addressing the middle period, I will focus on Wolin's concluding chapter, devoted to a critique of the late works. Here Wolin wishes to repudiate those who, while admitting the political defects in the early works, attempt to vindicate the philosophy of later Heidegger.[5] According to Wolin's interpretation, the pseudo-concrete historico-metaphysical interpretive framework yields a twofold outcome in the late works: (i) it functions as a strategy of denial, an attempt at political cover-up and (ii), by rendering Heidegger's philosophy devoid of all resources for practical philosophy,

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[5] Although applicable to a wide range of studies, Wolin's critique focuses on: Jacques Derrida, "Heidegger: l'enfer des philosophes." *Le Nouvel Obsevateur*, November 6-12 (1987) 170-74; Phillipe Lacoue-Labarthe, *La fiction du politique*. (Strasbourg: Associations des Universites de Strasbourg, 1987).

it results in a thoroughly heteronomous, antimodernist, counter-enlightenment and antihumanistic theory (147-160).

Wolin regards Heidegger's development of the notion of *Gelassenheit* as a disavowal of the concepts of agency and freedom. Under such a disavowal, Heidegger did not have to apologize for his moral ineptitude in 1933 since Being, not a human agent, was responsible for the events that transpired. In addition, since the concepts of agency and freedom are essential to moral theory, *Gelassenheit* issues in the total eclipse of practical philosophy. Without freedom, claims Wolin, humans are not agents and can have no moral responsibility. The quietistic, passive character of *Gelassenheit*, in which Being and the gods dominate human existence, leaves no room for responsible agents finding humanly possible solutions to their circumstance. Failing to broaden the rational basis of moral agency, Heidegger opts for poetical dwelling instead of rational solutions to material concerns; he mis-diagnoses modernity as having an excess as opposed to "dearth of reason" (167). His turn to *Gelassenheit* covers over and evades the fact of his moral failure, such that Heidegger never once in public denounced or apologized for his involvement with National Socialism.

I cannot emphasize sufficiently my complete agreement with Wolin that Heidegger's philosophy on the whole, and not simply his political thought, stands in need of a corrective on the side of material concretion. Yet I disagree that Heidegger's critique of modernity constitutes per se an 'inherently flawed' political perspective. While Heidegger's *Seinspolitk* proves a deficient perspective from which to analyze socio-political circumstance, large-scale analyses are not, in principle, deficient on this account. In fact, it is crucial for many marginalized to understand the large-scale level at which systems of thought underlie particular forms of material injustices. Nor is Heidegger's rejection of liberal values in principle problematic. Granted a material analysis would help prevent an uniformed digression behind the lessons of modernity. Yet Wolin's tacit assumption that a concrete material analysis of the life-world would of necessity accept the inheritance of liberal modernity does not hold, e.g. for the material oppression of women thematized by feminist critics of liberalism.[6]

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[6] E.g. the French feminists perform such large-scale analyses when they explore the level at which discourse is constituted, i.e. when they uncover the *arche* underlying the sexualization of discourse across gender lines as embedded in the entire history of western (european) philosophy. Working at a meta-level, so to speak, does not render their analyses impertinent to material oppression let alone conservative or reactionary. For feminist rejections of the liberal inheritance of modernity, see Rosemarie Tong, *Feminist Thought: A Comprehensive Introduction* (Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1989) passim, esp. chap. 1.

Despite Heidegger's personal anti-modern political commitment, his theoretical critique of modernity stands in a complex relation to the Enlightenment. Late Heidegger's works do address an important dimension of concretion, viz. the systemic level at which conceptual frameworks oppress. Inherent in his thought are resources, albeit undeveloped by Heidegger, for a critique of the manner in which the liberal inheritance of modernity has systemically oppressed women and others who stand outside the dominant (white) patriarchal tradition.

Moreover, the non-material character of Heidegger's thought does not lead, as Wolin states, to deficient concepts of rationality and agency that result in political heteronomy. As with his analysis of *Being and Time* Wolin misconstrues the Heideggerian critiques of rationality and agency. Heidegger's philosophy broadens both what has been a masculinist concept of rationality--a point Wolin wholly misses in claiming that Heidegger rules out rationality altogether--and the concept of human agency underlying masculinist moral theory. Wolin glosses over this latter point by ignoring entirely the strong concept of freedom delineated in *The Question Concerning Technology*.[7] Finally, Wolin's apparent inability to read *Gelassenheit* as a positive concept of autonomy, understood in terms of receptivity and not passivity (quiescence, quietism, etc.), appears to reflect his own masculinist biases. Had Wolin explored the tension in Heidegger's thought between its anti- and post-modern strains--strains that simultaneously admit conservative empirical interests and avail us a political corrective to the biases of modernity--he couldn't have justified his strong thesis that Heidegger's thought is inherently deficient with respect to all dimensions of the political.[8]

Nonetheless, Wolin's intimation that the doctrine of *Seinsgeschichte* proves a dubious vantage point from which to interpret the socio-political realm is not without warrant. My suggestion is that there lies embedded in Heidegger's vision of history a deterministic undercurrent that, left uncorrected by a materialist analysis, lends itself to the disturbing political tendencies which rightly dismay Wolin. Because this deterministic strain literally operates against the potentially sound and liberating aspects of Heidegger's philosophy, one must be especially careful to properly comprehend the theoretical concerns of his thought before throwing out the baby with the bathwater. Wolin simply fails to

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[7] Martin Heidegger, *The Question Concerning Technology*, trans. William Lovitt (NY: Harper & Row, 1977), see the essay of the same title, pp. 1-35.

[8] To give Wolin his due, he does claim throughout that while Heidegger's thought does not preclude a fascistic politic it is not reducible to this political agenda. Yet Wolin never cashed this claim out conceptually. Since his analysis remains one-sided in establishing a strong link between totalitarianism and Heidegger's philosophy it is hard to imagine what this could mean for Wolin.

do this kind of conceptual work. Focusing exclusively on decisionism, rejection of liberal values, inadequate moral theory and such concerns, Wolin never examines explicitly Heidegger's theory of history.

All criticism notwithstanding, Wolin's work constitutes a highly instructive analysis in that it does not leave the reader naive about the political climate in which Heidegger's philosophy grew. In this sense alone, Wolin grants the American audience a truly needed study. Wolin's work brings one to recognize that any attempt to extract, toward political ends, the sound aspects of Heidegger's critique of modernity must introduce restraints into such a critique that would prevent a conservative backlash. Still, the beginning reader of Heidegger should be careful to avoid uncritical acceptance of Wolin's depiction of Heidegger's philosophy as essentially antihumanistic, latently authoritarian and devoid of a concept of rational autonomy. Toward this end, the reader needs to study works more sympathetic to the spirit of Heideggerian thought, including those Wolin believes he repudiates.

Critical Theory and Philosophy, by David Ingram. New York: Paragon House, 1990. 240 pages. Reviewed by George A. Trey, Loyola University of Chicago.

David Ingram is best known, in scholarly circles, for his *Habermas and the Dialectic of Reason*, as well as numerous articles on critical theory and contemporary French social philosophy. In his most recent book, *Critical Theory and Philosophy*, Ingram's work moves in a different direction. Rather than dealing with complex issues that are internal to debates in contemporary theory, this book attends to equally complex concerns that need to be understood in order for those debates to begin making sense. Anyone who has attempted to crack the codes of philosophers such as Herbet Marcuse, Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer and Juergen Habermas knows that a rather expansive knowledge of German thought, from Kant to the present, is presupposed. This creates a fundamental gap between reader and text which leads to confusion and often misunderstanding. The purpose of *Critical Theory and Philosophy* is to bridge that gap by providing relevant discussion of important historical figures and showing how they continue to influence contemporary critical social theory.

A number of books are now available on the genesis and development of the "Frankfurt School." They tend to address this topic in one of two way: either through an intellectual history that spans form the late 1920's to the most recent work of Habermas, or by critically assessing the socio-philosophical implications of the work of recent critical theorists. Ingram's task is quite different. He says about the book:

> *Critical Theory and Philosophy* is intended to provide an accessible introduction to some of the major figures and themes of the Frankfurt School. It is primarily directed toward undergraduate and graduate students who have little or no familiarity with the German philosophical tradition informing its heritage. At the same time it presents a coherent argument that will no doubt be of interest to those already conversant with this tradition (XV).

Ingram shows that Kant is the pivotal historical figure in the philosophical development that leads to the Frankfurt School. It is Kant's conception of critical philosophy, as well as his attachment to the ideals of the Enlightenment, that place him at the fulcrum of the critical turn which is traced through Hegel and Marx on the one hand, and Nietzsche and Freud on the other, up to Marcuse, Adorno and Horkheimer.

The Kantian problematic, as it pertains to critical social theory, was to scrutinize the scope and limits of rationality. Kant was aware that many, basking in the aura of Enlightenment humanism, failed to consider the bounds of reason. His critique showed that rational philosophy must be careful not to fall into patterns that have been typical of the philosophical tradition—to theorize vainly and dogmatically about that which is beyond the human grasp. As such, he took a good deal of the wind out of metaphysical speculation. Hegel furthered this critique by developing the Kantian transcendental dialectic into an historicized epistemology. By evaluating knowledge in terms of both its internal coherence and its historical evolution, Hegal established a methodological model that became "one of the guiding principles of critical theory" (16). This appropriation was mediated by Marx, who developed the historical dialectic into a critique of political economy. In doing so, Ingram notes, Marx transformed philosophy into critical social science, or, "critical theory proper."

Having situated critical theory in terms of these key figures in the history of philosophy, Ingram turns to the influence of Sigmund Freud upon the first generation of Frankfurt School thinkers. While deeply influenced by Marx, they were likewise aware that the dialectic of history did not lead with necessity to a communist revolution. In order to account for this obvious fact, they turned to Freud's theory of repression. Ingram puts it as follows: "In this respect, Marx's analysis of capitalism was deemed to be necessary but not sufficient. What was needed was a psychological science explaining the natural and social dynamics of consciousness as such. Their discovery of Freudian psychoanalysis filled this gap by enabling them to appreciate the instinctual dynamics underlying ideological false consciousness" (31). This supplementation allowed first generation critical theorists to develop a sophisticated form of ideology critique that

clarified, in many ways, the conditions which circumvented revolutionary practice in the first half of the twentieth century. In contrast to orthodox marxists of their time, critical theorists focused less on economic patterns and more on state intervention and the "dissemination of ideology." Their conclusions tended to be rather bleak: post-liberal capitalism could continue indefinitely.

The introduction of Freud into their analysis, along with their perception that Soviet Communism was not communism at all, and the rise of fascism in western Europe, dealt a serious blow to first generation critical theorists belief in the primary tenet of the Enlightenment: rational emancipation. Reason, it would appear, is rather more malleable than Kant and company had thought; it can be turned against humankind in a manipulative and domineering manner. Ingram writes:

> The most disturbing feature of Freud's prognosis of humanity's fate was his belief that reason itself operates through mechanisms of repression and domination. As we shall see, this view struck a sympathetic chord with Adorno, Horkheimer, and Marcuse, regardless of their insistence that rational enlightenment was nonetheless desirable. This became the predominant them of the school from the forties on (49).

As rationality came to be viewed in questionable light, the influence of Nietzsche, and even more so Max Weber, began to play an increasingly important role in the work of the major Frankfurt School figures. Rationalization ultimately was equated with nihilism--a general loss of meaning and the forfeiture of freedom and dignity. On this score, Weber's theory of social action and his analysis of bureaucratic rationality proved most useful in fleshing out the critique of modern society. Modernity represented, for the Frankfurt school, both the possibility of human emancipation and a set of systemic imperatives that prohibit its realization. This paradox, which Weber called the "iron cage," and Horkheimer and Adorno referred to as the "dialectic of enlightenment," ultimately undercut the school's faith in interdisciplinary science and forced them to rethink the relationship of theory to practice.

These discussions of the relationship between critical theory and the sources from which it draws make up the first three chapters of *Critical Theory and Philosophy*. The next four chapters focus on particular figures in the Frankfurt School tradition, illuminating the importance of their contributions to contemporary theory. One of the highlights in this segment of the book is the account Ingram provides of the work of Herbet Marcuse--the member of the school to whom the book is dedicated as a memorial. This lucid analysis demonstrates the way in which Marcuse's work deviated from the pessimism that came to dominate that of Adorno

and Horkheimer. While certainly not a naive optimist, Marcuse maintained a utopian component in his thinking which recognized the possibility for emancipatory practice. This kept, in a sense, the question of Enlightenment open ended, while preserving and expandi g on the tradition of thinking theory and practice together. Another strong suit of this part of the book is the careful rendition that Ingram provides of the relations between Habermas and first generation critical theorist. He pursues this all the way through Habermas' recent work on discourse ethics and his interventions into the postmodernism debate. As was the case with his discussions of earlier critical theorist, these chapters provide accessible accounts of very complicated material without watering it down.

Ingram's text concludes with a chapter on the future of critical theory and a postscript on recent work in social philosophy. The former considers the limits of rational discourse and the possibilities afforded by aesthetic considerations in terms of generating meaning and sparking emancipatory action; the later examines the role of feminism and postmodernism in relationship to the projects and influences of critical theory. In addition to this, there are biographical profiles of the key figures discussed in the text, along with a bibliography of important terms.

Critical Theory and Philosophy is a book that could be put to good use in several contexts. As was indicated earlier, it is well suited as an introduction to critical social theory--both at the graduate and undergraduate level. It is designed to be used with a champion anthology, *Critical Theory: The Essential Readings*, edited by Ingram and Julia Simon-Ingram (Paragon, 1991, forthcoming). At the same time, however, a rather interesting philosophical problem is traced through the text that makes it of interest to specialists as well. An alternative to the chosen title might be "Kant and the Theory/Practice Problem." Ingram shows with precision and clarity the way in which Kant is constantly in the foreground of the critical enterprise and how this bears on the difficult talk of thematizing the relationship between theory and practice. His explication of this important facet of recent social theory is sufficiently detailed and sophisticated enough to make it important reading for anyone doing research in the fields of social theory and political philosophy. My criticisms of *Critical Theory and Philosophy* are minor. An exhaustive bibliography would be helpful as would be indexical references located within the glossary. These drawbacks, however don't inhibit the value of text. It is a clearly written, carefully organized introduction to critical theory that is equally stimulating to the already initiated reader. Ingram both readily accomplishes and exceeds in a theoretically stimulating fashion the objectives of this valuable book.

God, The Devil And The Perfect Pizza, by Trudy Govier. Ontario and New York: Broadview Press, 1989. 198 pages. Reviewed by Clarence Sholé Johnson, Spelman College.

In the preface to this book, Govier states her conviction that the apparently imponderable questions of philosophy can be presented in a way that can be "both enlightening and entertaining to think about them." I believe that the book upholds that conviction and, even despite some weaknesses, offers a resounding "Yes" to the question whether philosophic material can be presented to the beginner in a non-intimidating way. Accordingly, I will begin by saying that *God, The Devil And The Perfect Pizza* is a pedagogically sound book and as such I recommend it as a valuable non-technical, yet sophisticated, introduction to some of the main questions with which philosophy has been concerned throughout the ages.

The book is divided into eight segments. (There are no traditional chapter divisions, but more on this later.) Among the topics Govier presents are the following: whether computers can be said to think; the problem(s) of personal identity; the free-will/determinism debate; Anselm's version of the ontological argument; and conscience as a basis for morality. What makes Govier's presentation of some of these topics exciting, and therefore gives the book the distinctive attribute of being readable, is her adoption of an informal style. She employs the dialogue and narrative forms as well as some illustrative cartoons. In choosing the dialogue and narrative forms as the media through which to present the matters examined Govier, in the tradition of past masters like Plato and Berkeley, wishes to strip the discussions from the customary tension that hovers around philosophical arguments. In this connection, it is no accident that she uses language that is simple and straightforward and sometimes draws upon situations and experience with which the contemporary reader is familiar. Let me now attempt to illustrate some of these features of the book by commenting on a few of the issues discussed. I will begin with the segment from which the book derives its title.

This segment, spanning nineteen pages in all (pp. 46-65), deals with Anselm's version of the ontological argument. Govier's exposition of the argument, especially of Anselm's *reductio* against the Fool, its direct and to the point. Govier makes very palpable the contradiction that would follow, according to Anslem, upon denying the existence of God (pp. 47-49). This is the point that is sometimes articulated in the question "Why must something exist rather than nothing?" The reader cannot but grasp the necessity of God's existence.

Gaunilo's Perfect Island objection to the ontological argument is recast in terms of corresponding arguments for the most Perfect Pizza and for the Devil (pp. 52-54 and 56-60). If from my thinking of the Greatest Conceivable Being it follows that such an entity exists then it should follow from my conceiving of the most perfect pizza that such a pizza

exists. However, the most perfect pizza exists only in my mind. By parity of reasoning God, *qua* the Greatest Conceivable Being, exists only in the mind. To this argument the reply is given that "God is unique. The idea of God is special" (p. 54)--precisely what Anselm seeks to establish. This important characteristic of God, a central feature of the ontological argument, had been registered right at the beginning of the discussion (p. 46). We also have the thesis, although not developed, that a version of the ontological argument for the existence of the Devil seems consistent with religious belief. The argument here is given an unorthodox and provocative application.

Another important topic Govier examines is whether computers can be regarded as thinking entities (pp. 1-18). Here Govier articulately presents the common resistance to the idea that computers can think, wherein thinking entails being both conscious and self-conscious. Consciousness is manifested in such acts as breaking rules, trying to win games, pretending, cheating, and knowing that one does these things etc. We are told that conscious acts of the kind mentioned are distinctively human, and that only to humans, *qua* intelligent beings and hence legal entities, are civil, legal and moral rights ascribable. In the course of the discussion some major philosophical questions are raised, but only superficially treated. For example, questions about the role of language in formenting the mistake of ascribing cognitive states to machines; and questions about the intelligibility of the term 'artificial intelligence'. We also have a brief examination of Turing's Imitation Game (pp. 10-12).

Govier does present the issues in this segment with considerable clarity--although on some rare occasions it is very difficult to distinguish the respective positions of the disputants (pp. 14-15, for example). However, she seems too anxious to want to resolve the main problem in favor of the position that computers cannot by their very nature be thinking entities (pp. 17-18). Thus, the character Jan, having catalogued the rights that (she believes) computers ought to have if they were intelligent beings, revives the original question with which the discussion had commenced by asking "after all this *does* the computer cheat when it plays with Shelley?" To which Robin, the other disputant, peremptorily responds "Not really. Well, not the way people cheat anyway" (p. 17, emphasis in text). This sudden acquiescence of Robin who, incidentally, had been intransigent in defence of the position that computer behavior is cognitively-directed, transforms what had otherwise been a smooth and natural exchange of different points of views into a sudden straight-jacketed, forced and unnatural agreement. One cannot help thinking that, in this discussion, Govier tries to inject her own belief as the final word, a procedure that markedly contrasts with, for example, John Perry's treatment of the nature of the problem of personal identity in *A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality*. As personal identity is among the

topics Govier treats I will now consider her presentation of the nature of the problem.

Govier poses a problem of personal identity in the form of the question "What Makes Selves?" (pp. 79-104). Roughly, the discussion has a two-part structure. In the first part (pp. 80-92) a materialist version of the mind is presented and with it the bodily criterion of personal identity delineated. In the second part (pp. 92-104) *some* version of a non-materialist theory of a person is offered and, consequently, the memory criterion of personal identity outlined. The discussion is interspersed with problems about multiple personalities and the implications of brain-transplant experiments on the issue of personal identity.

But this is the worst segment of the book. Despite the semblance of a structure I have managed to read into the text, overall the discussion here lacks focus. There does not seem to be a clear logical progression of thought. Govier offers no detailed organised presentation of the competing positions, and the arguments advanced, to resolve the problem of personal identity. One also constantly hears of *a self* but, other than the materialist account proposed by the character Chris, there is no developed non-materialist conception of the self. Such a theory of the self ought all the more to have been given because of the tacit even if false supposition in the book that only a non-materialist can subscribe to the memory criterion of personal identity. (Would Govier want us to believe that Hume, for example, advances a memory criterion of personal identity *because* he subscribes to a non-materialist theory of the mind?)

Happily, Govier is able to redeem herself in the remainder of the book, especially in her crisp account of the free-will/determinism controversy (pp. 19-45) presented under the title of "The Sperm, The Worm, and Free-will", and of her concise and illuminating discussion of axiological issues under the title of "Conscience" (pp. 126-55) and in three captivating allegorical stories subsumed under the title "A Sequence of Events" (pp. 159-92). In her examination of theoretical issues about the nature of morality Govier reviews standard positions such as relativism, subjectivism and universalism. In addition, she gives a contemporary flavor to the question, first raised by Socrates in the *Euthyphro*, whether morality can be derived from religion. The contemporary appeal here is Govier's use of the event that the media dubbed the Salmon Rushdie Affair to illustrate Socrates' concern in the exchange with Euthyphro. Like Euthyphro, the late Ayatollah Khomeni may well be wrong in thinking that God will sanction as morally right his act of putting a price on Rushdie's head for, in his view, Rushdie's alleged denigration of Islam in the book *Satanic Verses*.

In "A Sequence of Events," Govier uses allegories to illustrate the issues raised in and by the Prisoner's Dilemma, namely, that rational self-interested pursuit does not always in the long run leave one better off than if one cooperated with others, wherein a precondition of such cooperation is

communication. In reading these stories, one cannot but think of the mutual distrust that led to the Cold War and of the distrust that has always permeated arms negotiations. Govier also raises, from a moral point of view, serious environmental concerns about the destruction of the ozone layer and the proliferation of sulphur dioxide in the atmosphere that results in acid rain. And she concludes the book with a synopsis of the key concerns of each segment and of the persons and situations that influenced or inspired her in writing them.

The book deals with a wider range of issues than I have space to comment on. Because I have no doubt that students will find the material stimulating I have prescribed the book as one of two texts in my Introductory course. However, I must say that a revised edition of the book is in order if only to correct blemishes in the form of omissions, typos and grammatical errors. For example, the verb "are" is missing in the sentence "And there lots of other new things too" (pp. 13-14). The indefinite article is missing in the sentence "Even computers would have better chance of having free will than sperm, I think" (pp. 19-20). There is a grammatical error in the phrase "Along with twenty or so other people who also started to walked out" (p. 33). And there is one too many 'or'-expressions in the sentence "And it's hard to understand how William or Jimmy or can be selves because they can't connect ideas and conversations" (p. 95). We also have an inept punctuation in the sentence "The personality can't be just a matter of how the brain and body, are because there could be different personalities in the same brian" (p. 88). In correcting these mistakes Govier should seize the opportunity of providing conventional chapter divisions so that readers can make references more easily to *chapters* instead of to segments or discussions (as I have done).

Bergsonism, by Gilles Deleuze. Translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam. New York: Zone books, 1988. 131 pages. Reviewed by Justin J. Hernandez, Conception Seminary College, Conception, Missouri.

This book, first published in France in 1966 as *Le Bergsonisme*, is an admirable addition to the relatively few in-depth studies of Bergson to be seen in recent years. Readers should take note, however, that Deleuze presupposes some familiarity with *Time and Free Will* and *Matter and Memory*, the two Bergsonian works drawn upon most heavily. Only in the final chapter are the results of Deleuze's meticulous analysis of duration and memory brought to bear upon the doctrine of *Two Sources of Morality and Religion* and *Creative Evolution*, the two works by which students of philosophy have most likely been introduced to Bergson.

One of Deleuze's personal aims is to exonerate Bergson from the charge that he was not a rigorous thinker or that the coherence of Bergsonism is

only as strong as the cluster of images and analogies which are so prominent a feature of Bergson's philosophical method and style. Deleuze thoroughly examines how Bergson understood the notion of duration methodologically (intuition), epistemologically (memory), and ontologically (*elan vital*).

Chapter 1, "Intuition as Method," presents what Deleuze sees as three methodological rules of Bergsonian intuition: 1. distinguishing true from false problems and showing the false ones to be the result of bad analysis of a composite reality. 2. rediscover the qualitative differentiation in the real, and 3. state and solve problems in terms of time rather than space. This third rule seems to be a kind of corollary of the second, for time must be thought of in terms of duration and qualitative multiplicity ('heterogeneity' and 'differentiation' are sometimes used interchangeably for 'multiplicity'), rather than in terms of the quantitative multiplicity of space.

Chapter 2, "Duration as Immediate Datum," is the occasion for drawing the distinction between two kinds of multiplicity--discrete and virtual (continuous), and giving an account of their difference. Duration is of the latter sort and is exemplified in realities such as movement, time, and memory (hence, the past).

Chapter 3, "Memory as Virtual Co-Existence," is the heart of the book. Deleuze is convinced that *Matter and Memory* is Bergson's most important work, for it is here that Bergson began to work out the broader ontological implications of his work on the psychology of time and on mental disorders affecting memory. Bergson's analysis of memory of the past, with his notion of the preservation of co-existing but differently contracted levels of the *complete* past, leads him to view reality in its entirety as a kind of contraction and relaxation of duration.

Chapter 4, "One or Many Durations?", discusses how Bergson's theory of pure memory is at once a kind of pluralism, if not dualism, resulting in a novel monism. Deleuze wonders how consistent Bergson can be in this, but does not go into any critical detail.

The final chapter, "*Elan Vital* as Movement of Differentiation," ties in the preceding analysis to Bergson's position in *Two Sources* and *Creative Evolution*, elucidating the role of matter in the actualization of duration's virtual totality in divergent directions.

Even though Deleuze's superb exposition of memory-duration brings together several strands of Bergson's thought, this book is not a general introduction to Bergson's thought. I would only recommend it to one with some acquaintance with the primary sources. Deleuze writes from a perspective completely sympathetic to the foundations of Bergsonian philosophy, perhaps overly so. For, apart from a few questions periodically raised about the consistency of some of Bergson's conclusions with his presuppositions, Deleuze's account is devoid of critical assessment. The only other weakness worth mentioning is perhaps an

inadequate historical background against which to appreciate the contemporaneity of the specific problems upon which Bergson chose to focus. One exception to this lack is the historical context of Einsteinian theory of time which is provided when Deleuze discusses Bergson's doctrine of a single, identical time.

Kierkegaard's Critique of Reason and Society, by Merold Westphal. Mercer University Press, 1987, 129 pages. Reviewed by Roy Martinez, Spelman College.

It is part of Westphal's merit that in this book he succeeds in presenting Kierkegaard as a serious thinker who can, and should, be considered as being relevant to contemporary issues: philosophical, religious, and socio-political. There is a standard way of rendering Kierkegaard to the reading public, i.e., as the irrationalist architect of the three stages of existence: aesthetic, ethical, and religious; and as the advocate of the solitary self. The apolitical implications of an individual ensconced within its own self-imposed confines is usually offered as solid and compelling evidence that the thought of Kierkegaard is essentially antisocial in structure. Westphal's work vigorously vitiates such misrepresentation. In addition, he discloses Kierkegaard as a man who knows both the possibilities and the bounds of reason, and the relationship that obtains between reason and an existence lived under the auspices of faith.

The book is composed of seven essays, six of which have already appeared in print. Each essay corresponds to a chapter. The last composition, "Inwardness and Ideology Critique in Kierkegaard's *Fragments* and *Postscripts*," however, was presented to the conference on Kierkegaard and Contemporary Philosophy at St. Olaf College in October, 1985, and is being published in this volume for the first time. Note should be taken of the author's admission that although he has written more on Hegel, to whom his intellectual debts are enormous, it is Kierkegaard who has influenced Westphal's thinking more than any other writer (vii). This state of affairs led him to the discovery that "the concepts of ideology and the sociology of knowledge were first worked out in the 1840s, not just by Marx but also by Kierkegaard." He writes, furthermore:, that:

> since the terminology growing out of the Marxist tradition has become standard for talking about knowledged as social estimation and the resulting dimensions of false consciousness involved in this, the presence of essentially the same discoveries in Kierkegaard has not been fully appreciated.

That is why "Kierkegaard's critique of reason was all too frequently misinterpreted in 'existentialist' and 'irrationalist' terms." Also, "the Reason before which Kierkegaard refused to bow down in worship was in his eyes an historically specific form of human deviousness." In fact, "discovering the hermeneutics of suspicion and the critique of ideology in a thinker as passionately religious as Kierkegaard," persuaded Westphal "that the fundamental insights of Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud were not the monopoly of atheistic unbelief." It is thus that "the idea of the religious philosopher in a prophetic mold began to emerge" in the mind of our author (vii).

The first chapter, entitled "Prolegomena to Any Future Philosophy of Religion That Will Be Able to Come Forth as Prophecy" treats Kierkegaard as the philosopher of religion according to the model of the biblical prophet rather than as a scientist, in the sense that the latter functions in terms of *episteme* and *Wissenschaft*. In this essay, however, Kierkegaard makes only cameo appearances, as Westphal is so careful to indicate (viii). The second chapter battens on the theme of the first, and expatiates on it with the kind of perspicacity and scholarship characteristic of Westphal's style. He takes stock of Kierkegaard's discomfort with Christian apologetics. Moreover, he shows how this uneasiness on the part of Kierkegaard is merely indicative of the latter's dissatisfaction with the effort of apologists such as Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas to make Christianity reasonable. According to Westphal, Kierkegaard is skeptical about any endeavor that renders the teachings of Christ submissive to the rule of reason, especially when this reason proves to be an ahistorical one, as is implied in the thoughts of the three theologians mentioned above.

Thematically, chapter three differs from the first two in that it focuses on social criticism. Hence, it is appropriately entitled "Kierkegaard's Politics." The author introduces the essay with reference to Augustine's *The Soliloquies*, where the Church Father carries on the following dialogue with Reason.

> A. I desire to know God and the soul.
> R. Nothing more?
> A. Nothing whatever.

What Westphal wants to drag into the light of day is the intensity of the individual's direct relation to God not only in *The Soliloquies*, but also as this dimension of religiosity is manifested in *Confessions*. Given that Kierkegaard is traditionally associated with this kind of insularity, our author undertakes to combat any spiritual affinity with Augustine that fosters an asocial existence in the guise of a God-relationship. Here Westphal reverts to his Hegelian scholarship in order to present a

Kierkegaard who construes human existence in terms of dialectical individualism: "The first step toward understanding Kierkegaard's politics is to recognize that he shares with Hegel this conception of spirit and the dialectical individualism contained therein. Being dialectical, this individualism is a social theory of human experience, inherently political in a broad sense. Kierkegaard's task, as he sees it, is to rescue this theory of what it is to be human, and its corresponding practice, from a Hegelian philosophy that is insufficiently faithful to it and form a society of which Hegel's philosophy is an all too faithful expression" (32). At this junction, I must say that although this is not the place to explain why, I do not share the confidence with which the author associates Kierkegaard's thought with Hegel on this matter.

Chapter four is judiciously entitled "Kierkegaard's Sociology." What is meant by sociology, which is observable throughout his writings, is Kierkegaard's account of the massification of society, i.e., the emergence of mass society,the crowd, the public, the herd. In this sense, Westphal finds it apt to link Nietzsche and Kierkegaard together as spiritual contemporaries: "From Nietzsche's perspective, the herd is born of a passion for leveling, which has its own origin in a resentment and envy that religion masks as the ideals of justice and equality. . . . The 'herd' is Nietzsche's name for the disease that occurs when people only incompletely break free from Christianity, retaining its morality while repudiating its metaphysics" (43). Although Kierkegaard's diagnosis and prescription are equally spiritual, he differs radically from the preceding view. "The herd--this is a term he also uses to talk about mass society--is the offspring of a passionless age, committed only to self-interest. The envy that generates leveling betrays the increasingly total absence of ideals from social life, though a lot of talk about God remains" (44). This essay, together with "Inwardness and Ideology Critique in Kierkegaard's *Fragments* and *Postscript*," are by far my favorite pieces in this volume. In them, Westphal is at his best as a Kierkegaard scholar.

For purposes of space, I shall waive an exposition of, and comments on, chapters five and six, which are respectively entitled "Abraham and Hegel," and "Kierkegaard and the Logic of Insanity." This then brings me to the final chapter in this collection of superb compositions. "Inwardness and Ideology Critique in Kierkegaard's *Fragments* and *Postscript*" treats specifically of Kierkegaard's epistemology. In it, the author undertakes to combine a Lutheran understanding of Reason, i.e., "the noetic effects of sin, with essential insights of the sociology of knowledge to produce a theologically grounded critique of the society in which he lived" (105). Here Westphal manages to show how the concerns of Kierkegaard, as they were expressed about a hundred and fifty years ago, can be fruitfully associated with the interests and intellectual endeavors of major contemporary thinkers such as Habermas, Ricoeur, John Rawls, Hannah Arendt, Rudolf Otto, and MacIntyre. Were I to go on, I fear that there

would be no reason for the prospective reader to peruse *Kierkegaard's Critique of Reason and Society*, an original work on Kierkegaard in an area where more scholarship is wanting. For aught I know, this is a book that must be read by any serious student of Kierkegaard's works.