

***The New Husserl: A Critical Reader.* Edited by Donn Welton. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2003. xxv + 334pp. ISBN 0-253-21601-X. Hardback \$75.00, paper, \$29.95.**

The New Husserl: A Critical Reader will be of use primarily to graduate students and to professional philosophers. For those students and philosophers, *The New Husserl* is an excellent survey of a recent trend in Husserl scholarship. Non-specialists, on the other hand, will find the essays hard going but may learn quite a bit. Given the likely audience for *The New Husserl*, I will proceed to discuss some merits of the volume.

Phenomenology was first introduced to the philosophical world through Husserl's *Ideen I* (1913). It is there that one finds, for the first time, in print, the familiar Husserlian themes: epoché and reduction, consciousness as intentionality, noesis and noema, the transcendental ego. Perhaps because of the work's richness (both in its successes and failures) or the great delay between this first introduction and the next major work (*Formale und transzendente Logik*, 1929), *Ideen I* became the predominant lens through which Husserl's publications were interpreted. According to one reading, *Formale und transzendente Logik* is simply the pre-phenomenological *Logische Untersuchungen* updated. While both the *Meditations cartésiennes* and *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phänomenologie* are attempts to fix some of the egregious aspects of *Ideen I*. This approach, which Donn Welton calls 'the standard account,' insists that Husserl scholarship must begin and end with Husserl's first phenomenological work. The collection of twelve essays gathered together in *The New Husserl* provides a decidedly different picture of Husserl scholarship. The contributors present an account of Husserl's thought that is informed by the total consideration of his published work and by the numerous lectures and working manuscripts that Husserl wrote during his lifetime. This new reading, which focuses heavily upon Husserl's later Freiburg years (1916-1938), puts methodology at the fore, but this time the themes of static and genetic phenomenology, active and passive synthe-

sis, and transcendental intersubjectivity, are the principal topics. Contrary to the standard account, characterized above, the approach taken by the essays in *The New Husserl* sees these themes as being operative—albeit at times in an inchoate manner—throughout Husserl’s phenomenological philosophy. The volume begins with two essays by Klaus Held. Previously published in 1985-86, these essays appear for the first time in English and give an overview of Husserl’s thought. Beginning with the *Logical Investigations* and proceeding to the end of Husserl’s life, Held presents the development of Husserl’s philosophical view, setting the stage for the *New Husserl* essays. For the newcomer, or for those who struggle with the German in which the essays were originally written, the inclusion of Held’s essays is indeed welcome. Taken together, the essays present a concise, insightful, overview of Husserl’s philosophy. By themselves, Held’s essays fail to capture that which is distinctive about the alternative reading. *The New Husserl*, however, promises something more. Whereas Held remains largely within the purview of writings that Husserl chose to publish during his lifetime, the alternative to the standard account relies heavily upon lectures and working manuscripts. This is both informative and dangerous. For the years when Husserl withheld many of his manuscripts, it is only by turning to the archival material that one may get some sense of the actual development of Husserl’s thought. There is a risk associated with making interpretative use of ideas that Husserl never intended for publication. This danger is present even in the efforts of Dan Zahavi’s article on intersubjectivity.

In “Husserl’s Intersubjective Transformation of Transcendental Philosophy”, Dan Zahavi embodies the best that this new generation of scholars has to offer. The essay takes an underappreciated yet important theme within Husserl scholarship and presents it in a new light. The aim of Zahavi’s essay is to correct a long-standing misunderstanding of Husserl’s work, that Husserlian phenomenology is a solipsistic enterprise. In contrast to the standard account, which holds that intersubjectivity appears in Husserl as an attempt to salvage the solipsistic position of *Ideen I*, Zahavi shows that from “the winter of 1910/11 and until his death, [Husserl] worked thoroughly with different aspects of the problem of intersubjectivity” (233). Zahavi presents a reconstruction of Husserl’s thought, demonstrating the

centrality of intersubjectivity for Husserl. On the basis of the reconstruction, Zahavi argues for “an intersubjective transformation of transcendental philosophy” and presents “some of the more radical (and less well known) consequences of this transformation” (235). In other words, like many of the authors writing for *The New Husserl*, Zahavi’s aim is to get Husserl right. But, when one looks more closely at the collection, one sees that keeping a commentator’s exposition of Husserl’s writings distinct from Husserl’s original manuscripts is an ideal of a commentator rather than his attained goal. Take for example, Anthony J. Steinbock’s provocative essay “Generativity and Generative Phenomenology,” which presents and defends ideas originating from his 1995 book *Home and Beyond: Generative Phenomenology after Husserl* (Evanston, Ill: Northwestern UP, 1995) pp. 336. Steinbock begins by outlining an increasingly familiar distinction between static and genetic phenomenology. Static phenomenology is descriptive; genetic phenomenology is explanatory. The former looks to phenomena in their formal, eidetic dimensions; the latter details how phenomena come to be in the life of a subject. Steinbock’s concern is generative phenomenology. Generative phenomenology “treats phenomena that are geo-historical, cultural, intersubjective, and normative” (292). The focus of generative phenomenology is the cultural and historical phenomena that remain outside the static-genetic distinction. Steinbock’s construction of generative phenomenology relies heavily upon Husserl’s working manuscripts, which Husserl produced for reasons of self-clarification and personal edification. In the course of a career that penned around 45,000 pages in Gabelsberger shorthand, relying upon archival material to determine Husserl’s position risks being more of a production than an exposition. For themes that do not appear in Husserl’s published works, there is little way of knowing whether a particular line of thought is a brief conjecture or a sincere part of Husserl’s phenomenology. Consequently, a Husserl scholar’s admitted preference for non-published, archival material, over published material, is cause for caution. Such concerns notwithstanding, *The New Husserl* is an important collection of essays, presenting a prevalent trend in Husserl scholarship and demonstrating effectively that Husserl’s work remains a fruitful location for philosophical provocation.

Kem Crimmins
Fordham University

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