One of the fundamental phenomena of Modernity is the erosion of meaning. In recent years, the discussion around the “come back of religion” and the “post-secular society” seems to affirm the problem of a deficit of meaning in (post-)modern society and to invalidate the conviction — firmly held by many — that secularization is inevitable and irreversible and that it is accompanied by an increase in possibilities the individual can freely choose from to construct an existence that is experienced as meaningful and fulfilled. If it would probably be an overinterpretation of the extent of the phenomenon if one was to talk unambiguously about a change of paradigm with regards to secularization, it seems at least possible, at present, to revisit the role transcendence can play for human beings as a constiuens of meaning at the beginning of the 21st century and to argue in favor of approaches that allow for perspectives that go beyond mere immanence but without falling short of the state of the art of the knowledge attained in philosophy and the natural sciences over the last 250 years. In the present paper, I will take up this problem of a crisis of meaning and argue that there is an intrinsic link between the possibility to relate existence to a perspective of transcendence and the possibility to “recharge” our being in the world with meaning.

The starting point of my reflections shall be a philosophy that might at first sight seem little appropriate for the endeavor of defending perspectives of transcendence in complete respect of the body of knowledge at the beginning of the early 21st century but which will, as I hope, reveal itself — at least in some, and in my opinion essential, aspects — as a very useful and instructive approach. The approach in question is the highly polemical defense of faith formulated by Søren Kierkegaard, who posits unambiguously that an existence without anchorage in transcendence is inevitably to be considered as an existence in despair and boredom. Kierkegaard’s argument will uncover the problematic structure of the modern attempt of self-creation...
through free choice among a number of equivalent possibilities. In a second step, I will illustrate that a crucial aspect of the argumentative structure of the highly intransigent, demanding, and provocative— and certainly in some aspects at least philosophically contestable—Kierkegaardian apology of faith can indeed be identified also in a contemporary “state of the art” approach to transcendence which, even though it explicitly takes its distances from Kierkegaard’s conception, remains intimately linked to the latter when it comes to the importance of faith for relating in a meaningful manner to the things of the world (understood broadly and thus including human relationships as well). This second approach is developed by the contemporary German philosopher Thomas Rentsch.

Beyond immanent possibilities: Kierkegaard’s claim for transcendence

To understand the Kierkegaardian claim of the insurmountability of a transcendent perspective for a meaningful existence, I will take as a starting point his definition of Man, which is crucial for his argument. In *Sickness unto Death*[^8] Kierkegaard defines very concisely: “Man is Spirit” (SuD). Shortly thereafter, he specifies that one of the fundamental characteristics of the human being is its synthetic structure: “Man is a synthesis of the infinite and the finite, of the temporal and the eternal […].” (ibid.). Kierkegaard stresses that it is the human spirit— which he equates with the Self— that posits this synthesis of the infinite and the finite, of the temporal and the eternal. Insofar as the human being is essentially characterized through its being spirit, Man is—in an essential sense—Man only if and insofar as he transcends immanence and relates himself to the infinite, to eternity. If he remains within pure immanence, he falls short of being a human and of being an authentic Self. As Man is thus incapable of fully realizing himself within immanence, this falling short of having adopted an authentic Self manifests itself in boredom and despair. The only option that remains to avoid conscious despair is, according to Kierkegaard, the drowning out of boredom and despair through *divertissement* in the Pascalian sense or, alternatively, through poeticizing a reality experienced as unsatisfying[^9].

[^7]: See Hüsch 2016.

[^8]: *Sickness unto Death* 1941 [1849]; in the following quoted as “SuD” in the main text.

[^9]: See in particular Søren Kierkegaard’s *Seducer’s Diary* as an attempt to fully poeticize reality (Kierkegaard 1987, 301-445). See also Konrad Paul Liessmann (1991). In fact, Kierkegaard unfolds a very detailed analysis of all possible ways of missing one’s authentic Self, possibilities that are derived from the synthetic structure through which he identifies this Self. The different kinds of despair that result from the wrong positing of the synthesis that constitutes the Self are developed in SuD, 28ff.
In the context of the present paper, the most important analysis Kierkegaard proposes concerns his interpretation of what he calls the *aesthetic existence*. This analysis is first developed in *Either/Or*, his earliest writing, which provides the preliminary Kierkegaardian reflections on this topic which he subsequently unfolds in more detail in *Sickness unto Death*. It is in *Either/Or* that he abundantly and eloquently illustrates the seductive power and yet existential vacuity of aesthetic existence. His methodological proceeding is very particular as he develops his strongly ambivalent interpretation through a double — and perspectivist — approach. In a sort of literary fiction, he first lets an “aestheticist” express his world view and life style, which, in a reply to this aesthetic way of existing, is criticized and put into perspective by an “ethicist”.

Through this double perspective, Kierkegaard makes very clear that the aesthetic existence appears to be appealing at first; however, such an existence cannot but inescapably fail and in the end leads inevitably into despair. In this sense, the ethicist explains in the second part of the work that, “nothing finite, not the entire world can satisfy the soul of a man who feels the longing for eternity within him” (Kierkegaard 1987, 758).

Given that the aesthetic existence anticipates a certain number of fundamental features of the way of life in contemporary western society (or, to put it the other way round, as the modern western way of living could appear to be a trivialized form of the Kierkegaardian aesthetic existence), it is worth insisting on the fact that Kierkegaard has the aesthetic existence inevitably shipwreck in boredom and despair. His explanation for this inevitable failure of aesthetic existence is related to the problem of a reduction of modern orientation to merely immanent perspectives. In focusing exclusively on immanent possibilities, the human spirit experiences the limitedness inherent to them. The immanent possibilities from which we can choose lack distinction and appear to be — in the literal sense — equivalent and thus exchangeable and random. According to Kierkegaard, as long as we remain within the realm of immanent possibilities, we lack a valid criterion of discrimination which would allow us to prefer one possibility rather than another. In the framework of Kierkegaardian thought this is inevitable insofar as human
spirit, by essence, needs to be linked to transcendence and the question is, at this point, to what extent the link to transcendence helps overcome the problem of boredom and despair.

This interconnection of transcendence and meaning is very comprehensively developed and illustrated in Kierkegaard’s analysis of one of his core concepts, the instant (or the moment according to other translations for the Danish Øjeblikket) in The Concept of Dread, where he posits that all possibility of a real presence is annihilated without its relatedness to eternity: “The instance,” explains Kierkegaard, “is this ambivalent moment in which time and eternity touch one another, thereby positing the temporal, where time is constantly intersecting eternity and eternity constantly permeating time. Only now does the division we talked about acquire significance: the present, the past, and the future.” (CD 79).

The crucial element in Kierkegaard’s reflection concerning the problem of transcendence is in fact a double postulate: (1) that human existence, when limited to immanence, is an existence without presence; and (2) that it is thus a requirement for Man to complement and to complete the immanent perspective of the world by a transcendent perspective. Only through the relatedness to transcendence does immanence obtain a reality in an authentic sense. This is illustrated in Either/Or where the ethicist describes how, through the choice to relate oneself to the eternal, the possibilities of the immanent world become literally charged with meaning. Kierkegaard illustrates this by using the metaphor of “metamorphosis” (Kierkegaard 1987, 271): “Everything,” the ethicist explains, “comes back again, but transfigured” (ibid.). Only through the relationship that is established with transcendence, life gains “beauty, truth, meaning, continuance” (ibid.). The meaninglessness and despair, the nothingness and groundlessness of aesthetic existence are transfigured into meaningfulness and hope through the absolute choice of the Self now grounded in eternity. In other words, the equivalent and meaningless immanent possibilities can only become meaningful and our possibilities in an authentic sense, if they gain reality through their being permeated by the eternal. In the instant in the Kierkegaardian understanding, transcendence is intruding on immanence and
thus charges the latter with meaning; on the other hand, the “intersecting” of eternity by the temporal guarantees that the synthesis incarnated by Man does not fail to take the temporal into account, as — Kierkegaard insists on this point — this is precisely Man’s mission: to succeed in integrating both, the temporal and the eternal, in this synthesis (which, evidently, would otherwise not be a synthesis). Man thus remains inevitably and deliberately attached to immanence, but the embeddedness of the immanent — represented through immanent possibilities — in transcendence makes these very same possibilities come back transformed into authentic possibilities.

It should have become clear that Kierkegaard’s proposal to escape from the erosion of meaning brought forth by Modernity through the sole focus on our immanent possibilities requires us to concede our dependence upon something that transcends us and the world. However, it is important to emphasize that Kierkegaard’s approach is not to be understood as ‘reactionary’ or the expression of ‘backwardness’. On the contrary, he makes a clear effort not to fall back into the traditional attempts to provide metaphysical ultimate justifications. Rather he contents himself with delivering the proof that a transcendent perspective is existentially necessary and at the same time possible. In other words, Kierkegaard does not overstretch the reach of human reason by succumbing to the attempt to give proof of the existence of God, but he claims that we existentially need the possibility of a perspective of transcendence all the while insisting on the fact that reason cannot deny this possibility. Reason, in fact, is not able to prove, nor to refute, the existence of God, transcendence is placed beyond the possibility of rational accessibility. In a certain way, to abandon the attempt to provide ultimate justifications is a major argumentative advantage, but his claim is at the same time an inconvenience: By placing transcendence beyond what is positively knowable, Kierkegaard’s claim can certainly not be refuted scientifically; on the other hand, from a philosophical perspective, this claim of existential necessity remains a mere claim. However, his approach helps to carry the possibility of transcendence through the breakdown of traditional metaphysics with the advent of Modernity, as it is not concerned by the delimitations of
knowledge brought about by science. If and to what extent this approach may be updated for present times will be discussed later in this paper. At present, I would like to go over to Thomas Rentsch’s approach to transcendence which, in some relevant aspects, will reveal similarities with Kierkegaard, even though it takes explicitly its distance from the latter, as previously stated.

**The rationality of transcendence: Th. Rentsch’s phenomenological hermeneutics of transcendence**

Rentsch develops his reflections on transcendence in the context of the question of the possibility of meaningfully talking about God. Rentsch aims to show that phenomena of transcendence can or even have to be considered as accessible by reason, and he thus explicitly refuses to place faith beyond reason as was done by Kierkegaard. If the focus of his argumentation seems at first to be quite different form Kierkegaard’s, I will try to show that in fact his intention is to ultimately promote a perspective on the world that is embedded in transcendence; and I will argue that it is precisely in this more implicit but finally central intention that we find common ground between the two approaches, where the existential relevance of both concepts unfolds.

In a study published in 2005, concisely and unambiguously in its focus called *God*, Rentsch first emphasizes that his primary aim is what he calls a “Standortbestimmung” of philosophy as a discipline, that is, to determine the “self-understanding of philosophy today” (Rentsch 2005, VIII). One of his basic assumptions is that the question of God is still topical in the early 21st century. According to Rentsch, even under the conditions of post-Modernity, the question of God remains “inextricably linked to the question of an authentic meaning of our existence” (ibid., IX). However, what is particularly important for Rentsch is to show that if we want to establish a meaningful discourse on God we cannot fall back into traditional ways of dealing with the question. Philosophizing on God and transcendence must respect the philosophical state of the art: “A critical philosophizing cannot fall short of Kant’s critique of ontology and metaphysics, Heidegger’s critique of ontology, Wittgenstein’s critique of language, as
well as Adorno’s critique of society, ideology, and culture” (ibid.)\textsuperscript{16}. It is thus for Rentsch crucial to reflect on the conditions of the possibility of a meaningful discourse on God from the highest level of philosophical knowledge. Departing from the philosophy of language of the later Wittgenstein, Rentsch specifies that a statement about God is not to be confused with a statement on an object in the world. However, as he argues with Wittgenstein, if the discourse on God is not referring to an “object” in this empirical sense, this does not mean that taking about God becomes necessarily and inevitably meaningless or irrational. Rentsch illustrates this as follows:

The status of the discourse on God cannot be understood as if, beyond our familiar and everyday world I, there would be some world II that could be related to the former empirically, temporally, and spatially, a sort of parallel universe. With our language, our acts, our thinking and our understanding, we cannot leave our human and finite world. Through the question of God and the question of the status of statements on God, we are confronted with the most fundamental questions of the critique of knowledge in the sense of Kant, which ask about our own constitutively finite essence. [...] In articulating statements on God, we indicate that these statements have this eminent status, that they are precisely not to be understood as empirical statements on facts. (ibid. 12)\textsuperscript{17}

To legitimate the talking about God as a discourse on something that is not to be confused with the naming of facts within the empirical world, Rentsch claims that there is nothing extraordinary in talking about something which is not in this sense to be considered as ‘facts’. In fact, as he states, we do that every day insofar as not only God, but reality as such cannot be reduced to a simple statement of facts on objects. Reality is not an agglomerate of ‘objects’ but reality, as our reality, is already a non-empirical phenomenon. With a certain proximity to Heidegger’s concept of being-in-the-world, he notes:

\textsuperscript{16} “Ein kritisches Philosophieren [...] kann heute nicht mehr hinter die Ontologie- und Metaphysikkritik Kants, die Ontologiekritik Heideggers, die Sprachkritik Wittgensteins, sowie die Gesellschafts- und Ideologie- bzw. Kulturkritik Adornos zurückfallen.”

\textsuperscript{17} “Der Status der Rede von Gott kann nicht so bestimmt werden, dass einer uns bekannten, alltäglichen Welt I eine jenseitige Welt II räumlich-zeitlich-empirisch angestückt wird, eine Art Paralleluniversum. Wir können mit unserer Sprache, mit unserem Handel, mit unserem Denken und Erkennen die menschliche, endliche Welt nicht verlassen. Die Frage nach Gott und nach dem Status von Gott-Sätzen konfrontiert uns mit Grundfragen der Erkenntniskritik im Sinne Kants, die nach unserem eigenen, konstitutiv endlichen Wesen fragen. [...] Indem die Sätze von Gott reden, indizieren sie, dass sie diesen eminenten Status haben, dass sie gerade nicht als empirische Tatsachenbehauptungen verstanden werden können.”
Reality is the entire reality of the world in its irreducibility. It is within the horizon of its being and of its meaning that we discover and develop our understanding of ourselves and our possibilities of action to lead a good and successful life in awareness and liberty. (p. 49)\(^\text{18}\)

Building upon this backdrop, Rentsch specifies:

If we consider as reality not just crude objectivity (Gegenständlichkeit): stones, atoms, things, scientifically reduced quantities, but rather the real within the concrete reality of life in which Men evolve in a highly rational way, as free beings open to and creating meaningfulness, then there is nothing in which God could be closer than in authentic existential and interexistential practice: If we transcend ourselves in the direction of authentic claims of meaning and validity in our common quest for truth, in the direction of truthfulness, justice, and solidarity also with weak human beings in need of help. The concrete reality of living revealed this way can, with good reasons, be called true and authentic reality, and thus God as ens realissimum. (ibid., 91)\(^\text{19}\)

Rentsch thus introduces a postulate of transcendence which, in the initial analysis, relies simply and essentially on our being-in-the-world as such. Consequently, his argumentation starts with the evocation of three undeniable phenomena of transcendence which do not immediately make a claim for a ‘beyond’ in the vertical sense of the word, but remain ‘horizontally’ transcendent. These three phenomena of transcendence are only accessible for us insofar as we dispose of reason. Or, to put it differently: Rentsch claims that transcendence does not require us to go beyond reason, but, on the contrary, that its manifestations cannot be grasped except through reason. The three phenomena he is talking about are (1) the transcendence of being; (2) the transcendence of the Self; and (3) the transcendence of language.

According to Rentsch, these three phenomena of transcendence are nothing less than the “principal conditions of the possibility and reality of our human world” (ibid., 67)\(^\text{20}\). He
thus emphasizes the fact that, on the one hand, these phenomena are not empirical facts, but that, on the other hand, they are something fundamentally different from mere opinions, ways of perception, or perspectives. They are concrete without being material, and they are of the utmost importance for us as human beings insofar as “without the absolute transcendence” represented by these phenomena, “immanence is not even possible, real, or simply conceivable” (ibid., 78).

One of the main aspects in his claim that these phenomena of transcendence not only are not irrational but even depend on reason is to stress the limitedness of the concept of reason forwarded by scientific-functionalist ways of thinking. His critique of the reductionist scientific conceptualization of reason allows Rentsch to refute the argument according to which the discourse on phenomena of transcendence is per se irrational.

It is important to emphasize, says Rentsch, that transcendence, as a phenomenon, is “knowable, rational, and universal”, criticizing all variations of “reductionist objectivistic-scientistic world views which cut off reason and transcendence” (ibid., 108).

It is clear, then, that Rentsch distances himself from Kierkegaard, who stressed the necessity to go beyond reason, that one finds God only via the absurd, and it might be useful to take a closer look at this difference. First, we can state that each thinker takes a distinct and diverging point of departure: If Kierkegaard is very clearly immediately interested in the existential question of how to live a meaningful life, Rentsch starts from a more theoretical standpoint, grounding his position in reflections on philosophy of language by starting with the argument that the discourse on God does not necessarily have to be irrational(ist). He backs up this claim by showing both that and how transcendence can be made accessible to reason. He even goes further, showing that we need reason to become aware of transcendence. In Rentsch’s argumentation, the name “God” is not assimilated to a Kierkegaardian credo quia absurdum, but on the contrary plays the role of a stand-in for what he calls, with Heidegger, an “ek-static reason”, even if it is accessible only ex negativo as that which, precisely, is transcendent with regards to us human beings. However, in linking meaning and transcendence intrinsically, he remains, in this respect,
very close to Kierkegaard, a proximity that becomes even more striking in another – and crucial – context, as he attributes the highest existential significance to the relationship that we entertain with transcendence. Thus he states:

This is why authentic processes of conversion are this profound and earthquake-like: When we enter into a relationship with ourselves that is based upon God, absolute meaning, and the miracle of creation, the whole understanding that we had until then of the world and of ourselves is transformed. In a certain sense, nothing remains as it was before.” (ibid., 113)

There is a striking parallel in this description of religious awakening and the passage from Kierkegaard's Either/Or we examined earlier, where the ethicist talks about the "metamorphosis" the things in the world undergo as a result of this opening up to transcendence; and it is certainly not by accident that there is another element in Rentsch's analysis which seems to respond to the Kierkegaardian concept of the instant as the category par excellence of our relatedness to the eternal. Rentsch proposes a conceptualization that is quite similar to Kierkegaard's. In this sense, Rentsch notes:

We get partially beyond an understanding based upon finitude and transience and become open to potentials of meaning of transcendence and adopt thus the perspective of a meaning that cannot be eradicated by the transience of time: Eternity, not understood as infinite temporality and iteration, but as an irruption of transcendence into immanence [...]. (ibid., 113/114)

There are thus interesting parallels between the description of transcendence as an experience, as an irruption into immanent life, as it is proposed by Rentsch on the one hand, and Kierkegaard's illustration of the instant on the other. However, the major gap remains that Rentsch insists on the rational accessibility of the phenomena of transcendence he identifies and that he thus refutes the necessity to concede the "leap of faith" Kierkegaard argues for.
The question is, then, how the above reflections can be linked more explicitly to the question brought up in the introduction: To what extent do Rentsch and Kierkegaard, with their respective approaches, respond to what can be called the ‘need for transcendence’ of the modern world? It is clear that both are most profoundly convinced that no immanent aims, circumstances, or objectives can fulfill Man’s need for meaning, meaning understood in its most eminent sense. Both, Kierkegaard and Rentsch claim that the configuration of the modern world is to some respect hostile to the generation of meaning in this sense, but the fundamental question that comes out of this claim is whether the link to transcendence as it is proposed by Kierkegaard and Rentsch, respectively, is convincing before the backdrop of the configuration of Modernity.

Here, both approaches have to be discussed separately in that their answers diverge in terms of their methodology, though they finally converge, in a certain sense, in their essence. It might seem that Kierkegaard’s “leap of faith” is more difficult to defend as a claim in the early 21st century. This is certainly true in the sense that Kierkegaard, in his writings, sticks to a personal relationship to a personal God. However, if one focuses more precisely on the structure of his argumentation, the judgment could be more nuanced. At no point does Kierkegaard go against scientific knowledge. Nor does his leap of faith necessitate the denial of scientific knowledge. Unlike some contemporary reactionary interpretations of Christianity, Kierkegaard places his conception of faith entirely beyond the reach of human reason and does not succumb to the problematic and today widespread temptation to defend as knowable what is not—which allows him to avoid bringing science and faith into a relationship of rivalry and claiming the superiority of faith within the realm of scientific reason and reasoning.

This battle cannot be convincingly fought by faith in the 21st century and Kierkegaard already saw that it could not reasonably be fought in the 19th century. Rather, Kierkegaard’s major claim is that reason cannot provide the meaning that Man needs from an existential point of view. Faith and reason do not enter into conflict for Kierkegaard as both have their specific relevance,
but this relevance is situated at different levels. If this means, on the one hand, as was said above, that he does not deny scientific knowledge, it means, on the other hand, that faith can never be proven, but it can never be refuted scientifically, either. His claim is thus not to deny reason as such, but to throw overboard reason in the act of believing. Reason preserves its domain of competence and of relevance, but there is a realm beyond reason, which remains open for faith. In this sense, Kierkegaard’s passionate Christendom remains as valid as it remains valuable. However, the main difficulty with Kierkegaard’s position is that his claim of the necessity of faith and transcendence is not based upon a logic necessity, but on what I have called an existential necessity. This preserves it from entering into conflict with science and scientific rationality, but it weakens his point from a purely philosophical standpoint; which leads to the position of Thomas Rentsch who, unlike Kierkegaard, tries to show, as we have seen, that the discourse on God can be philosophically justified and meaningful, and, in extension of this claim, that faith does not necessarily have to be irrational or irrationalistic. Thus, he approaches the problem by demonstrating that the currently prevailing understanding of reason is to be considered as highly reductive and can – and even needs to be – extended to phenomena that go beyond the mere understanding of reason as a capacity of grasping what is materially present. This is a first result to retain: The advancement of knowledge that characterizes the past centuries does not authorize us to simply evacuate issues of transcendence as irrational. On the contrary, there is an important need for non-reductive philosophical approaches that help us overcome the limitedness of the dominant, one-sidedly naturalistic and – to use a more polemical adjective – simplistic world views. As Rentsch shows, there are undeniable phenomena of transcendence that no scientific reason will ever be able to grasp because this kind of reductive reason does not look beyond the limits of immanence, even if transcendence undeniably breaks into and – transcends it.

28 Kierkegaard was perfectly conscious of this fact and it is not by accident that he never calls himself a philosopher but considers himself a religious author. See Søren Kierkegaard (1962 [1859]), 12.

29 In this point, Rentsch is as close to Wittgenstein as to Heidegger who both, in their respective manners, denounce the reductive character of the scientific and positivistic world view. Rentsch is actually one of the earliest researchers who in a detailed study stressed fundamental parallels in the thought of Wittgenstein and Heidegger (see his PhD thesis, Rentsch [1985]).

30 “Tendenz der westlichen wissenschaftlich-technischen Zivilisation zu naturalistischen, biologistischen, neurophilosophischen oder funktionalistischen Selbstdeutungen des Menschen.”

31 It is little surprising that he makes reference to the old tradition of negative theology which represents for him a model of orientation that still deserves our attention. See on negativity also Rentsch (2000).
Conclusion

To conclude, it seems possible to say that faith remains a possible—and important—cornerstone of the attempt of us humans to orient ourselves in the world, despite the current “trend of western scientific-technical civilization to have recourse to naturalistic, biologist, neurophilosophical, or functionalistic self-interpretations” (Rentsch 2005, 19). Faith does not enter necessarily into conflict with enlightened reason as it is incarnated by the advances of knowledge in the natural sciences. The question of faith and the question of God are not in contradiction with science, but it would be better to say that science cannot even ask these questions in a meaningful way because it would otherwise transgress its own boundaries and domains of competence. For Rentsch, transcendence represents a phenomenon that appears at the limits of reason and remains thus negatively accessible.

However, if Rentsch seems to make the claim that the famous “leap” is unnecessary, one might object that in his approach there is no immediate nor necessary transition from the proof that there are phenomena of transcendence and that these are accessible for human reason to what is commonly called “faith” in the same sense as it is certainly possible but not necessary either to use the name of “God” for the phenomena identified by Rentsch. So I would argue that what causes this transition from the knowledge about phenomena of absolute transcendence to faith, inevitably remains inaccessible for human reason. This would imply then that, in one sense, Kierkegaard was right to claim the there still is the necessity for a “leap”, for something inexplicable and beyond reason and reasoning that allows us to take the step from the reasonably accessible to what faith means in its most eminent sense.

Søren Kierkegaard very eloquently alludes to the (modern) gap separating philosophical reflection from philosophy as a praxis of living that enters into play here in his ironic comments on Schopenhauer (see Schwab 2011, 329-382), as, unlike for Schopenhauer, for Kierkegaard philosophizing is meaningless if it does not have any impact on the philosopher’s own life. Schopenhauer actually refers himself explicitly to this problem when he writes: “For here also is seen the great distinction between intuitive and abstract knowledge, a distinction of such importance and of general application in the whole of our discussion, and one which hitherto has received too little notice. Between the two is a wide gulf; and, in regard to knowledge of the inner nature of the world, this gulf can be crossed only by philosophy. Intuitively, or in concreto, every man is really conscious of all philosophical truths; but to bring them into his abstract knowledge, into reflection, is the business of the philosopher, who neither ought to nor can do more than this. [...] A saint may be full of the most absurd superstition, or, on the other hand, may be a philosopher; it is all the same. His conduct alone is evidence that he is a saint [...]. It is therefore just as little necessary for the saint to be a philosopher as for the philosopher to be a saint; just as it is not necessary for a perfectly beautiful person to be a great sculptor, or for a great sculptor to be himself a beautiful person. [...] To repeat abstractly, universally, and distinctly in concepts the whole inner nature of the world, and thus to deposit it as a reflected image in permanent concepts always ready for the faculty of reason, this and nothing else is philosophy” (Schopenhauer 1869 [1844], 383–384). It is clear that Kierkegaard would in no case subscribe to this point of view.
Bibliography:


Kierkegaard, Søren (1941 [1849]). *The Sickness unto Death*. Princeton.


