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Druze Studies Journal

DSJ

مجلة الدراسات الدّرزية

Druze Studies Journal (DSJ) is a peer-reviewed open-access interdisciplinary journal that aims to advance scholarly understanding of the Druze communities, including their history, society, and faith.

Founding Editor-in-Chief: Dr. Rami Zeedan

The University of Kansas

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The journal is published in English. Scholars can also choose to publish an Arabic version of their accepted articles.

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Druze Studies Journal

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Introduction- Druze Studies Journal, Issue 1. *Rami Zeedan*

Articles

The Status of Druze Studies and Launching the Druze Studies Journal (DSJ). *Yusri Hazran, Marianne A. Reed, Birgit Schäbler, Hussam S. Timani, and Rami Zeedan.*

سلوك الدّروز الدّيني في استعمال العنف: دراسة تستند إلى المصادر الشّفهيّة. **سعيد أبو زكي.**

The Religious Attitude of the Druze Towards Violence: A Study Based on Oral Sources. *Said Abou Zaki.* (English version of the above Arabic article)

The Druze Sub-Governor Nasib Beik Jumblatt and the Ottoman Policy in Mount Lebanon. *Tuba Yildiz.*

Religious Unification, Regional Divergence: Exploring Multifaceted Linguistic Practices and Identities among the Israeli Druze and the Druze Community in the Golan Heights. *Afifa Eve Kheir.*

Druze Reincarnation Narratives - Book Forum: Druze Reincarnation Narratives: Previous Life Memories, Discourses, and the Construction of Identities, by Fartacek, Gebhard. *Maha Natoor, Dmitry Sevruk, Jens Kreinath, and Gebhard Fartacek.*

The Office of Sheikh al-'Aql of the Druzes in Lebanon", book forum of: Mashyakhat 'Aql al-Durūz fī Lubnān: Baḥth fī Usūlihā wa-Ma 'nāhā wa-Tatawwurihā [The Office of Sheikh al-'Aql of the Druzes in Lebanon: An Investigation into its Origins, Meaning and Development], by Abou Zaki, Said. *Abdul Rahman M. Chamseddine, Yusri Hazran, Akram Khater, Tuba Yildiz, and Said Abou Zaki.*

Bibliography of Periodical Literature on the Druze in 2023. *Charles Johnson and Rami Zeedan.*

Book reviews

Kamal Jumblatt and the Soul of Socialism in Lebanon", review of The Druze community and the Lebanese state: between confrontation and reconciliation, by Yusri Hazran. *Eduardo Wassim Aboultaif.*

Code-Switching and Sociopolitical Identity among the Druze in Israel," review of Codeswitching as an Index and Construct of Sociopolitical Identity: The Case of the Druze and Arabs in Israel, by Eve Afifa Kheir. *Muhammad Zammad Aslam and Sami Hussein Hakeem Barzani.*

An Ethnographic Exploration of the Druze in Syria." review of Power, Sect, and State in Syria: The Politics of Marriage and Identity amongst the Druze, by A. Maria A. Kastrinou. *Mael Baummar*

Call for Papers- 2025

With the publication of the 2024 issue of the Druze Studies Journal, we would like to invite scholars to submit their contributions for consideration in our next issue.

The journal will now shift to publishing upon acceptance. After concluding the peer review with an acceptance decision, we aim to finish production, copyediting, and formatting as soon as possible thereafter.

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We seek submissions that focus on the Druze as a whole, or on specific Druze communities, or include a comparison between the Druze and others or a comparison between several Druze communities. We encourage submissions from discipline-specific or those who employ an interdisciplinary approach, including, for example, History, Political Science, Theology, Religious Studies, Sociology, Anthropology, Linguistics, Literature, Economics, Medicine and Health, Psychology, Philosophy, Geography, Art (Performing and Visual), Law, Education, Journalism, Media Studies and Communication.

To submit your manuscript for consideration by the Druze Studies journal, please visit https://journals.ku.edu/druze.

If you have any inquiries, please contact the editorial office at druze-studies@ku.edu.

Call for Papers for the 2025 Hybrid Bilingual Interdisciplinary Conference: "Druze in the Levant and the Diaspora - Discourses of Tradition and Modernity"

16-17 October 2025
The University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas (USA) and over Zoom webinar.

With its rich historical heritage and unique religious identity, the Druze community has maintained a distinct presence in the Levant and across various diaspora communities. As the world rapidly 'transforms', the Druze have navigated the delicate balance between preserving traditional values and embracing change. This conference seeks to explore the diverse experiences of the Druze in both the Levant and the diaspora, focusing on the interplay between tradition and (late) modernity.

For this purpose, the Druze Studies Journal (https://journals.ku.edu/druze) and the Druze Studies Project at the University of Kansas (https://druze.ku.edu/) will be holding a hybrid bi-lingual event: "2025 Interdisciplinary Conference: Druze in the Levant and the Diaspora - Discourses of Tradition and Modernity," on 16-17 October 2025. The conference will include online and in-person panels of original research on the Druze. It will also feature roundtables of experts in the Druze Studies. Arab Art and cultural offerings will be available in person.

Active participants and the audience will be invited to attend in person in Lawrence, Kansas, or over the conference Zoom webinar.

We invite scholars from various disciplines to submit original and unpublished papers that focus on the Druze as a whole, a specific Druze community or communities, or a comparison between the Druze and others. Presentations can be from a discipline-specific approach or those who employ an interdisciplinary approach.

Papers will explore various topics, including but not limited to the following topics:

- Druze History and Historiography: Studies that delve into landmark events, developments, and figures in Druze history and interpret Druze history in various periods and regions, analyzing how historiographical methods have influenced our understanding of their past.
- Historical Evolution and Identity: Examine the Druze community's historical development in the Levant, uncovering change and continuity in defining and practicing their identity and focusing on how their unique history has shaped their identity in their homeland and the diaspora.

- Society and Ethos: An exploration of Druze customs, collective behaviors, and social norms, including religious practices that define the community's ethos.
- Cultural Adaptation in the Diaspora: Research on how Arab Druze communities adapt to new environments while maintaining their cultural and religious identity, both in their home countries and abroad.
- Education and Knowledge Transmission: Insights into the coexistence of traditional knowledge systems within the family and modern education within Druze communities, highlighting the ways in which knowledge is preserved and passed on to future generations.
- Political Participation and Integration: Analyses of the political engagement and integration of Druze communities in Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, and the diaspora, exploring their roles in various political systems, international relations, geopolitics, and impact on broader societal dynamics.
- Comparative Studies: Comparative analyses of the Druze experience across different countries or regions, examining similarities and differences in cultural, social, and political contexts.
- Literature, Art, and Performing Arts: Investigations into how literature, visual arts, or performing arts reflect and shape Arab Druze cultural identity, emphasizing the community's creative expressions.
- Family, Social Change, and Intergenerational Dynamics: Studies exploring the tensions and synergies within Druze families, the impact of social change, and the relationships between older and younger generations in preserving traditions in a modern context.

Submission Guidelines:

- Abstract Submission: Interested participants should submit an abstract of no more than 350 words by 28 February 2025. The abstract should clearly outline the research question, methodology, and anticipated findings.
- Papers must be original and unpublished (recently published articles in 2025 will be accepted)

- We encourage submissions from established scholars in the field, with institutional affiliation or independent scholars, and emerging scholars (including doctoral students). An exceptional master's thesis can be considered with a letter of recommendation from the student's advisor.
- Panels and papers can be in English or Arabic. Live interpretation will be provided for some panels: English to Arabic / Arabic to English.
- Full Paper Submission: Authors of accepted abstracts will be invited to submit a complete draft by 31 August 2025.
- Presentation Format: Accepted papers will be presented in panel sessions, followed by a Q&A discussion. Each presentation should not exceed 20 minutes.

Important Dates:

- Abstract Submission Deadline: 28 February 2025
- Notification of Acceptance: 30 April 2025
- Full Paper Submission Deadline: 31 August 2025
- Conference Date: 16-17 October 2025

Submission Process:

- Please submit your abstracts here https://kusurvey.ca1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_6r0AWPSBvezCSkS .
- Organized panels can be submitted here https://kusurvey.ca1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_26lZARvgQieHnQG . They must include 3 or 4 presenters.
- For any inquiries regarding the conference, please get in touch with Prof. Rami Zeedan at rzeedan@ku.edu or the DSJ editorial office at druzestudies@ku.edu

We look forward to your contributions to this critical dialogue on Druze Studies.

The conference website can be accessed here:
https://druze.ku.edu/2025druzeconference.

Thanks to the support of our co-sponsors at the University of Kansas, participation in the conference is free of charge for presenters and the audience.

Druze Studies Journal

Editor Note:
Introduction- Druze Studies Journal, Issue 1, 2024

Rami Zeedan[a]
University of Kansas

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[a]An Arabic version will follow the English version, starting on page 5.
ستتبع النسخة العربية النسخة الإنكليزية، بدءًا من الصفحة 5.

Contact: Dr. Rami Zeedan, Founding Editor-in-Chief: rzeedan@ku.edu

On behalf of the editorial board, it is with great pleasure that I present the inaugural issue of the *Druze Studies Journal* (DSJ). This new journal marks a significant milestone for scholars and researchers across various disciplines who have long appreciated the unique and complex history, culture, and religious identity of Druze communities. While the Druze have captured scholarly interest for many years, there has been a notable absence of a dedicated, peer-reviewed journal solely focused on the Druze, their communities, and their challenges in modern times.

Previous efforts laid important groundwork, but no sustained academic journal has emerged to provide a consistent platform for Druze Studies. Over the past two decades, interest in the Druze has grown. Yet, much of the English-language scholarship has been scattered across a wide range of discipline-specific journals, including History, Religious Studies, Sociology, Medicine, and Political Science. Unfortunately, these studies have often overlooked the Druze in Syria, Jordan, and the diaspora communities, and there remains a gap in comparative research across national boundaries. This fragmented approach underscores the need for a dedicated platform to advance research on Druze communities.

In response to this gap, the *Druze Studies Journal* was officially launched during the virtual interdisciplinary symposium, "Druze Studies: Past, Present, and Future," held on November 15-16, 2023. The symposium at the University of Kansas gathered scholars from various disciplines and regions and highlighted new research on the Druze. It featured expert roundtables addressing the state of Druze Studies and the particular challenges non-native English speakers face when publishing in academic journals. This symposium set the foundation for the journal's mission: to foster an interdisciplinary and global scholarly community centered on Druze Studies.

Since then, we have been diligently curating the first issue and are already preparing the second issue, which is scheduled for publication in 2025. Following a rigorous peer-review process, accepted manuscripts will be made available through our fully open-access platform. We encourage scholars to submit their manuscripts via our website: https://journals.ku.edu/druze.

The first issue of the *Druze Studies Journal* features a diverse collection of articles and discussions that reflect the interdisciplinary and global scope of Druze Studies. Geographically, the issue covers Druze communities in Lebanon, Israel, Syria, and the Golan Heights while thematically spanning topics related to history, religion, politics, identity, and language. While not exhaustive, this issue reflects a broad range of disciplines engaging with Druze Studies, including political science, sociology, anthropology, religious studies, history, linguistics, and ethnog-

raphy. It highlights the richness and complexity of Druze communities across different regions and contexts.

The issue opens with an article on the status of Druze Studies and the launching of the *Druze Studies Journal* written by a team of scholars who discussed the status of Druze Studies and open-access publishing during the 2023 symposium. These scholars include **Yusri Hazran**, **Marianne A. Reed**, **Birgit Schäbler**, **Hussam S. Timani**, and myself, **Rami Zeedan**. This piece sets the stage for the journal's mission and explores the field's current state.

The second article, by **Said Abou Zaki**, is titled *The Religious Attitude of the Druze Towards Violence.* It offers an insightful analysis based on oral sources, delving into the complex relationship between religious beliefs and social practices among the Druze. An Arabic version of this article is also included.

Historically, this first issue covers the late Ottoman period with **Tuba Yildiz's** article on *The Druze Sub-Governor Nasib Beik Jumblatt and the Ottoman Policy in Mount Lebanon*, examining political dynamics in Lebanon.

Linguistics and identity are explored in **Afifa Eve Kheir's** piece, *Religious Unification, Regional Divergence: Exploring Multifaceted Linguistic Practices and Identities among the Israeli Druze and the Druze Community in the Golan Heights*. This study emphasizes the variations in identity formation through linguistic practices within these geographically close yet distinct communities.

The first issue also includes two significant book forums. The first discusses **Gebhard Fartacek's** work *Druze Reincarnation Narratives: Previous Life Memories, Discourses, and the Construction of Identities*, featuring contributions by **Maha Natoor**, **Dmitry Sevruk**, **Jens Kreinath**, and a repose by the book author **Gebhard Fartacek**. The second forum focuses on **Said Abou Zaki's** study, *The Office of Sheikh al-'Aql of the Druzes in Lebanon: An Investigation into Its Origins, Meaning, and Development*, with scholarly insights from **Abdul Rahman M. Chamseddine**, **Yusri Hazran**, **Akram Khater**, and **Tuba Yildiz**, a repose by the book author **Said Abou Zaki.**

The journal concludes with a *Bibliography of Periodical Literature on the Druze in 2023*, compiled by **Charles Johnson** and **Rami Zeedan**. It also includes three book reviews covering works on the role of socialism within the Druze community in Lebanon by **Eduardo Wassim Aboultaif**, on Druze sociopolitical identity in Israel by **Muhammad Zammad Aslam and Sami Hussein Hakeem Barzani,** and on marriage practices among Druze in Syria by **Mael Baummar.**

In addition to launching the journal and expecting the second issue to be published next year, we are also planning the *2025 Interdisciplinary Conference: Druze in the*

Levant and the Diaspora—Discourses of Tradition and Modernity. This hybrid bilingual event will be held at the University of Kansas and over Zoom from October 16th to 18th, 2025. The conference will provide a platform for scholars to present disciplinary-specific, comparative, or cross-disciplinary research on Druze communities and to explore the intersections of tradition and modernity. The call for papers and submission details are available here: https://druze.ku.edu/2025druzeconference.

One of the core principles of the *Druze Studies Journal* is to create a collaborative, accessible space for scholars from all over the world. The fully open-access format ensures that research on the Druze is freely available to anyone interested in the subject, supporting the broad dissemination of knowledge. This journal and the entire initiative would not have been possible without the generous support of the University of Kansas Libraries and the KU College of Liberal Arts & Sciences.

I want to express my heartfelt gratitude to the many who made this journal's first issue and the 2023 symposium successful. Special thanks go to our esteemed reviewers, whose insightful feedback has been invaluable in shaping the quality of this issue. We are immensely grateful for their time and expertise, even those whose reviews led to article rejections, as their efforts contributed to the scholarly rigor of this journal.

I would also like to extend my thanks to our editorial board members for their continuous service to the field and the journal: **Eduardo Wassim Aboultaif, Gebhard Fartacek, Rabah Halabi, Yusri Hazran, William F.S. Miles, Makram Rabah, Birgit Schäbler, Hussam Timani, and Samer Traboulsi.** Many thanks to our support team at the University of Kansas, **Marianne Reed and Eric Bader**, whose support has been instrumental. Additionally, we thank all the 19 authors published in this issue and the presenters at the 2023 symposium whose contributions have enriched the field of Druze Studies.

Our editorial team looks forward to receiving submissions of scholarly articles and reviews of books, films, and other media related to Druze communities. We aim to use our reviews section as a platform for critical debate and scholarly engagement and welcome ideas for book forums. Authors will have the opportunity to respond to reviews of their work, and we invite letters to the editor regarding recently published articles, book forums, and book reviews in the *Druze Studies Journal*.

Once again, I thank everyone who has made this journal a reality. I invite you to join us in this exciting journey as we build a vibrant, interdisciplinary community dedicated to advancing the field of Druze Studies.

Note: This is the Arabic version of the English version above.

ملاحظة: هذه هي النسخة العربية للنسخة الإنكليزية أعلاه.

ملاحظة المحرر

"مقدمة- مجلة الدراسات الدرزية، العدد 1، 2024"

رامي زيدان
جامعة كانساس

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This Arabic version follows the above English version.
هذه النسخة العربية تتبع النسخة الإنكليزية أعلاه.

بالنيابة عن هيئة التحرير، يسرني أن أقدم العدد الأول من مجلة الدراسات الدرزية (DSJ). تمثل هذه المجلة الجديدة مرحلة مهمة للعلماء والباحثين في مختلف التخصصات الذين طالما قدّروا التاريخ الفريد والثقافة والهوية الدينية للمجتمعات الدرزية. ورغم أن الدروز كانوا موضع اهتمام العلماء لسنوات عديدة، فقد كان هناك غياب ملحوظ لمجلة مخصصة فقط للدروز ولمجتمعاتهم والتحديات التي يواجهونها في العصر الحديث.

لقد وضعت الجهود السابقة أساساً مهماً للدراسات الدرزية، ولكن لم تظهر مجلة أكاديمية مستدامة توفر منصة دائمة للدراسات الدرزية. وخلال العقدين الماضيين، زاد الاهتمام الأكاديمي بالدروز. ومع ذلك، فإن الكثير من الدراسات المكتوبة باللغة الإنجليزية كانت متناثرة عبر مجموعة واسعة من المجلات المتخصصة في عدّة مجالات مثل التاريخ والدراسات الدينية وعلم الاجتماع والطب والعلوم السياسية. ولكن، للأسف، غالباً ما أهملت هذه الدراسات الدروز في سوريا والأردن والمجتمعات المغتربة. ولا يزال هناك فجوة وفراغ في مجال البحث المقارن عبر الحدود الدولية. لذلك فهناك ا حاجة ملحة إلى منصة مخصصة لتطوير البحث حول المجتمعات الدرزية.

استجابة لهذه الفجوة، تم إطلاق مجلة الدراسات الدرزية رسمياً خلال الندوة الافتراضية متعددة التخصصات بعنوان "الدراسات الدرزية: الماضي والحاضر والمستقبل" التي عقدت في 15-16 تشرين الثاني 2023. وجمعت الندوة في جامعة كانساس علماء من مختلف التخصصات والمناطق، وسلطت الضوء على أبحاث جديدة حول الدروز. وشملت الجلسات طاولات مستديرة تناولت حالة الدراسات الدرزية والتحديات الخاصة التي يواجهها غير الناطقين باللغة الإنجليزية عند النشر في المجلات الأكاديمية والعلمية. ساهمت هذه الندوة في تعزيز مجتمع علمي عالمي متعدد التخصصات يتمحور حول الدراسات الدرزية.

منذ ذلك الحين، عملنا بجد على إعداد العدد الأول ونحن بالفعل بصدد التحضير للعدد الثاني المقرر نشره في عام 2025. وبعد عملية التحكيم العلمي ومراجعة علمية دقيقة، المقالات المقبولة ستكون متوفرة عبر منصتنا المفتوحة بالكامل. ونشجع الباحثين على تقديم مقالاتهم عبر موقعنا الإلكتروني: https://journals.ku.edu/druze.

العدد الأول من مجلة الدراسات الدرزية يتضمن مجموعة متنوعة من المقالات والمناقشات التي تعكس النطاق العالمي والمتعدد التخصصات للدراسات الدرزية. جغرافياً، يغطي العدد مجتمعات الدروز في لبنان وإسرائيل وسوريا وهضبة الجولان، بينما يتناول مواضيع متعددة مثل التاريخ والسياسة والهوية واللغة. وعلى الرغم من أن هذا العدد ليس شاملا ولا يغطي كل المواضيع ي المتعلقة بالدروز، إلا أنه يعكس مجموعة واسعة من التخصصات التي تتعامل مع الدراسات الدرزية، بما في ذلك العلوم السياسية وعلم الاجتماع والأنثروبولوجيا والدراسات الدينية والتاريخ واللغويات والاثنوجرافية. يبرز العدد غنى المجتمعات الدرزية في مختلف المناطق والسياقات.

يفتتح العدد بمقالة حول وضع الدراسات الدرزية وإطلاق مجلة الدراسات الدرزية، المقالة كتبها فريق من العلماء الذين ناقشوا الموضوع خلال ندوة 2023، ومنهم **يسري خيزران وماريان رييد وبرجيت شيبلر وحُسام تيماني ورامي زيدان**. هذه المقالة تمهد الطريق لمهمة

المجلة وتتناول الوضع الحالي لهذا المجال.
المقالة الثانية، التي كتبها **سعيد أبوزكي**، تحمل عنوان "موقف الدروز الديني تجاه العنف". تقدم تحليلاً عميقا يستند إلى المصادر الشفوية، وتتعمّق المقالة في العلاقة المعقّدة بين المعتقدات الدينية والممارسات الاجتماعية بين الدروز. يتضمن العدد أيضاً نسخة عربية ونسخة انكليزية من هذه المقالة.
يغطي هذا العدد من الناحية التاريخية الفترة العثمانية المتأخرة من خلال مقالة **توبا يلديز** حول" نائب حاكم الدروز نسيب بيك جنبلاط والسياسة العثمانية في جبل لبنان"، حيث يتم فيه فحص الديناميات السياسية في لبنان.
يتم استكشاف علم اللغويات والهوية في مقال **عفيفة إيف خير** بعنوان "التوحيد الديني والتباعد الإقليمي: استكشاف الممارسات اللغوية المتعددة الأوجه والهويات بين الدروز الإسرائيليين ومجتمع الدروز في هضبة الجولان". تركز هذه الدراسة على التباينات في تشكيل الهوية من خلال الممارسات اللغوية داخل هذه المجتمعات القريبة جغرافياً لكنها تبقى متميزة ومختلفة.
يتضمن العدد الأول أيضاً منتديين مهمين لمناقشة الكتب. المنتدى الأول يناقش عمل **جيبهارد فارتاتشيك** بعنوان "روايات التقمص عند الدروز"، ويضم مساهمات من **مها ناطور وديمتري سيفروك وجينز كريناث،** ورد من مؤلف الكتاب **جيبهارد فارتاتشيك**. المنتدى الثاني يتمحور حول كتاب **سعيد أبوزكي** بعنوان "مشيخة عقل الدروز في لبنان"، ويشمل أيضا رؤى نقدية وعلمية من **عبد الرحمن شمس الدين ويسري خيزران وأكرم خاطر، وتوبا يلديز،** ورد من مؤلف الكتاب **سعيد أبوزكي**.
تختتم المجلة بقائمة المراجع للأبحاث حول الدروز لعام 2023، أعدها **تشارلز جونسون ورامي زيدان**. كما تتضمن ثلاث مراجعات لكتب تغطي أعمالاً حول دور الاشتراكية داخل المجتمع الدرزي في لبنان بقلم **إدواردو وسيم أبو الطيف،** والهوية الاجتماعية والسياسية للدروز في إسرائيل بقلم **مُحمد زماد إسلام وسامي حُسين حكيم برزاني،** وحول ممارسات الزواج بين الدروز في سوريا بقلم **مائل أبو عمر**.
بالإضافة إلى إطلاق المجلة وتوقع نشر العدد الثاني العام المقبل، نحن أيضاً نخطط لعقد مؤتمر متعدد التخصصات في عام 2025 بعنوان "الدروز في المشرق والمهجر: بين التقليد والحداثة". سيعقد هذا المؤتمر الثنائي اللغة في جامعة كانساس وعبر منصة زوم من 16 إلى 18 أكتوبر 2025. سيوفر المؤتمر منصة للباحثين لتقديم أبحاث متخصصة أو مقارنة أو متعددة التخصصات حول المجتمعات الدرزية، واستكشاف التقاطعات بين التقليد والحداثة. يمكن الاطلاع على تفاصيل الدعوة لتقديم الأوراق والمشاركة في هذا الرابط: https://druze.ku.edu/2025druzeconference.
أحد المبادئ الأساسية لمجلة الدراسات الدرزية هو توفير مساحة تعاونية للباحثين من جميع أنحاء العالم. يضمن النموذج ذات الوصول المفتوح بالكامل أن تكون الأبحاث حول الدروز متاحة بحرية لأي شخص مهتم بالموضوع، مما يدعم نشر المعرفة على نطاق واسع. لم يكن من الممكن إطلاق هذه المجلة والمبادرة بأكملها دون الدعم السخي من مكتبات جامعة كانساس وكلية الآداب والعلوم فيها.

أود أن أعبر عن خالص امتناني لكل من ساهم في إنجاح العدد الأول لهذه المجلة والندوة التي عقدت عام 2023. شكر خاص للمحكمين، الذين كانت ملاحظاتهم ذات قيمة كبيرة في تشكيل جودة هذا العدد. نحن ممتنون للغاية لوقتهم وخبراتهم، حتى أولئك الذين أدت مراجعاتهم إلى رفض المقالات، حيث ساهمت جهودهم في الصرامة العلمية لهذه المجلة.
كما أود أن أوجه شكري إلى أعضاء هيئة التحرير على خدمتهم المستمرة في هذا المجال والمجلة: **إدواردو وسيم أبو الطيف، وجيبهارد فارتاتشيك ورباح حلبي ويُسري خيزران وويليام (بيل) مايلز ومكرم رباح وبرجيت شيبلر وحُسام تيماني وسامر طرابلسي**. الشكر الجزيل لفريق الدعم لدينا في جامعة كانساس، **ماريان رييد وإريك بادر**، فقد كان دعمهم أساسياً. بالإضافة إلى ذلك، نشكر جميع المؤلفين التسعة عشر الذين نُشرت أعمالهم في هذا العدد والمشاركين في ندوة 2023 الذين ساهموا في إثراء مجال الدراسات الدرزية.
يتطلع فريق التحرير إلى استقبال مقالات علمية ومراجعات الكتب والأفلام وغيرهامن وسائل الإعلام الأخرى المتعلقة بالمجتمعات الدرزية. نهدف إلى استخدام قسم المراجعات لدينا كمنصة للنقاش النقدي والمشاركة العلمية ونرحب بالأفكار حول منتديات الكتب. ستتاح للمؤلفين الفرصة للرد على مراجعات أعمالهم، وندعو إلى إرسال رسائل إلى المحرر حول المقالات المنشورة مؤخراً، ومنتديات الكتب، ومراجعات الكتب في مجلة الدراسات الدرزية.
مرة أخرى، أشكر كل من ساهم في جعل هذا العدد الأول من مجلة الدراسات الدرزية حقيقة.

Druze Studies Journal

Article

The Status of Druze Studies and Launching the Druze Studies Journal (DSJ)

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Abstract

This essay discusses the evolution of Druze Studies and the inauguration of the *Druze Studies Journal* (DSJ), as well as encapsulates discussions from the "2023 Bilingual Interdisciplinary Virtual Symposium: Druze Studies: Past, Present, and Future." Initiated at the University of Kansas, this event marks a pivotal moment in researching the Druze, addressing the field's expansion over the last two decades, and creating platforms like DSJ and the Druze Studies Project for scholarly exchange. Contributions range from digital publishing innovations to critical reevaluations of Druze Studies' scope and methodologies. Key discussions revolve around enhancing research continuity, overcoming interdisciplinary challenges, and navigating ethical considerations surrounding sacred community beliefs. This collective effort underscores the importance of DSJ as a medium for fostering academic dialogue, broadening Druze Studies' reach, and promoting a deeper, more inclusive understanding of the Druze community's historical and contemporary contexts.

Keywords: *Druze Studies, Digital Publishing, Academic Symposium, Open-Access Journal, Interdisciplinary Research.*

This essay is based partly on the roundtable discussion on "The Status of Druze Studies and Launching the *Druze Studies Journal* (DSJ)." The roundtable was part of the event "2023 Bilingual Interdisciplinary Virtual Symposium: "Druze Studies: Past, Present, and Future," which took place at the University of Kansas on November 15-16, 2023. The essay is divided into six parts. First, an "Introduction to the Status of the Druze Studies" by Rami Zeedan. Second, Marianne Reed discusses "Launching the *Druze Studies Journal* (DSJ) in the Age of Digital Publishing and Open-Access." Third, Hussam Timani discusses "Rethinking Druze Studies." Fourth, Yusri Hazran discusses "The Druze of Lebanon and the Sectarian System in the Lebanese State." Fifth, Birgit Schäbler discusses "The Druzes in Syria." The sixth and final part of the essay consists of a discussion between participants.

Introduction to the Status of the Druze Studies by Rami Zeedan

The "2023 Bilingual Interdisciplinary Virtual Symposium: "Druze Studies: Past, Present, and Future" comes at a time of transition in Druze Studies, following about two decades of increased academic publications on the Druze. The event's purpose was to unite scholars researching various aspects of the Druze communities and fostering a community of Druze Studies scholars. This event was organized by two initiatives that started at the University of Kansas: the *Druze Studies Journal* and the Druze Studies Project.

The *Druze Studies Journal* (DSJ) is an open-access interdisciplinary journal that aims to advance scholarly understanding of the Druze communities, including their history and contemporary affairs (*Druze Studies Journal*, n.d.). The journal provides a platform for scholars who produce scholarship focusing on the Druze to exchange their knowledge, scholarship, and ideas. The journal aims to increase scholarly publications on the Druze, specifically through comparative projects involving communities in various countries, including diasporic communities. The journal will publish discipline-specific research projects and encourage interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary research on the Druze in a way that analyzes and synthesizes links between disciplines into a coordinated and coherent whole to explain the Druze's history, present, and future.

The Druze Studies Project is a multi-year project with two major components: the *Druze Studies Journal* and the Druze Studies Reference Portal. In the initial stages of development and pending major external grants, the Druze Stud-

ies Reference Portal will host a digital humanities project to study Druze culture, literature, and history. The project will delve into the rich and diverse aspects of the Druze communities in the Middle East and global diaspora. In this project, we systematically review all existing research conducted on the Druze and identify major gaps in the literature. The content published on the website is freely accessible to students, scholars, and the general public (Druze Studies Project n.d.). The team is also writing a series of systematic literature reviews to be published in an open-access format (Zeedan and Luce, 2021).

The example below showcases the increase in scholarship on Druze Studies. It is based on the progress made as part of the Druze Studies Project until the end of 2023.

Example of the increase in scholarship on Druze Studies

The ongoing research project delves into various facets of the Druze community, spanning history, society, culture, politics, gender, religion, and genetics (Zeedan and Pullum Lindsey, 2024). While the project encompasses a comprehensive examination across Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, and the diaspora, a notable trend has emerged over the last two decades. This trend reveals a surplus of published research in English on the Druze in Israel compared to other countries, as illustrated in Figures 1-4 below.

As systematic reviews on specific topics unfold, an analysis of the identified studies is crucial for understanding the overarching trends. The dataset comprises 160 articles and book chapters, primarily focusing on women, genetics, and religion within the Druze community.

Figure 1 showcases the increasing number of articles and book chapters related to the Druze, specifically concentrating on women, genetics, and religion. Notably, the surge in publications has been prominent since the onset of the 21st century. As of 2023, the data indicates a substantial increase, with 42 publications in the 2000-2009 decade, followed by a remarkable 73% increase in the last decade.



Figure 1. The number of articles and book chapters focusing on the Druze (on topics related to women, genetics, and religion) (N = 160). Data as of 2023.

Examining the regional distribution of publications in Figure 2 reveals a significant concentration on the Druze in Israel. Since 1990, over 63% of the publications have focused on the Druze in Israel. This suggests that the overall increase reported in Figure 1 predominantly pertains to research on the Druze within Israel.



Figure 2. The percentage of articles and book chapters focusing on the Druze (related to women, genetics, and religion, by country of focus of the study) (N = 160). Data as of 2023.

Figure 3 delves into the country of affiliation of the lead authors of articles and book chapters. The data indicates a notable increase in publications from authors affiliated with Israeli institutions. Since 1990, over half of these publications have originated from authors affiliated with Israeli institutions, aligning with the geographic focus highlighted in Figure 2.



Figure 3. The percentage of articles and book chapters focusing on the Druze (related to women, genetics, and religion, by country of affiliation of the lead author) (N = 160). Data as of 2023.

Figure 4 explores the role of Druze authors in publications, revealing a growing engagement over the years. The data highlights a significant increase in publications authored by Druze individuals, particularly since the early 21st century. Notably, since 2020, Druze authors have surpassed non-Druze authors, constituting 67% of the publications, signaling a shift towards community-driven research.



Figure 4. The percentage of articles and book chapters focusing on the Druze (related to women, genetics, and religion, with at least one Druze author) (N = 160). Data as of 2023.

Although incomplete, the data presented above could serve as a basis for further exploration. We suggest these topics: 1) The status of the Druze Studies and research gaps; 2) Identity Dynamics and Research Focus; 3) Impact of Sociopolitical Factors; 4) Collaborative Research Initiatives; 5) Comparative Analysis of Druze Communities; 6) Longitudinal Analysis of Authorship Trends; 7) Exploration of Methodological Approaches; 8) Community Engagement and Knowledge Dissemination.

First, while the study highlights a surge in publications, it would be worthwhile to identify potential research gaps. Examining topics or aspects of Druze society that have received limited attention in academic literature could guide future research endeavors and contribute to a more holistic understanding of the community.

Second, the observed disparity in publications between Israel and other countries is postulated to stem from a nuanced understanding of Druze's identity. The concept of "Druze particularism" in Israel encapsulates this in the context of their distinctiveness within Islamic traditions and Arab culture. In essence, the centrality of the concept of Druzeness itself, elucidating a unique perspective that warrants further exploration, accounts for the surplus of research on the Israeli Druze. This could also be understood within the framework of increased access to education among the Druze in Israel, especially Druze women.

Third, the geographical concentration of research on the Israeli Druze prompts consideration of sociopolitical factors. Exploring the impact of regional political dynamics, policies, and cultural nuances on research trends could provide a deeper understanding of the contextual factors driving the surplus of publications.

Fourth, given the increasing involvement of Druze authors in researching their own communities, there is an opportunity to investigate collaborative research initiatives. Understanding how collaborations between Druze scholars and researchers from other backgrounds contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of Druze-related topics could be a valuable avenue for exploration.

Fifth, conducting a comparative analysis of Druze communities across different countries could unveil intriguing variations and commonalities. Exploring how contextual differences shape research priorities and themes within each community might offer valuable insights into the multifaceted nature of Druze identity and society, including in the diaspora.

Sixth, a longitudinal analysis tracking authorship trends over an extended period could provide a comprehensive perspective on the evolving landscape of

Druze-related research. Understanding how authorship patterns change over time may reveal underlying shifts in academic engagement and community involvement.

Seventh, investigating the methodological approaches used in Druze-related research could shed light on the diversity of research methods utilized. Analyzing whether there are predominant methodologies and their implications for the depth and breadth of research findings would contribute to methodological discussions in the broader academic community.

Eight, evaluating the mechanisms that disseminate research findings within the Druze community can be crucial. This is especially relevant in relation to the language of publication other than English. Assessing the extent of community engagement, the accessibility of academic knowledge, and the potential impact of research on the community's well-being can provide valuable insights into the broader societal implications of academic endeavors.

By delving into these additional aspects, researchers can enrich the current understanding of the relationship between identity, research focus, and the dynamics of academic contributions within the Druze community.

"Launching the *Druze Studies Journal* (DSJ) in the Age of Digital Publishing and Open-Access" by Marianne Reed

Over the years, the realm of academic publishing has undergone significant transformations, and one noteworthy development is the rise of library publishing programs. I will explore the motivations, advantages, and practical implications of such programs, focusing on the recent establishment of the *Druze Studies Journal* by the University of Kansas Libraries.

The journey begins with examining the historical context that led to the emergence of library publishing in response to rapidly escalating journal prices in the 1990s. Library publishing programs were conceived as a response to the challenges faced by libraries and scholars, especially due to the limited budgets in libraries and the increasing costs of journal subscriptions. The necessity to cancel journals due to financial constraints impeded scholars' access to valuable research, prompting the inception of library publishing programs and software that prioritized open access to research and affordability.

The University of Kansas Libraries' Digital Publishing Services program currently hosts 56 journals, with two more expected to come online in 2024 (University of Kansas Library n.d.). Our journals publish high-quality scholarship in the disciplines of herpetology and other biological sciences, philosophy, Montessori

education, intercollegiate and amateur sport, medicine, paleontology, geology, and German, French, African, Spanish, and Russian language and culture. We are supported by the University of Kansas Libraries, with some staffing support from the College of Liberal Arts & Sciences. In 2023, readers worldwide downloaded our journal content over 1 million times.

One primary benefit of open-access library publishing highlighted in the roundtable discussion is that their institutions support library publishing programs and, unlike commercial publishers, do not have a profit motive. Our survival does not depend on generating revenue, so we can go where the research and the editor's expertise take us. Library publishing programs welcome journals that explore diverse subjects, feature marginalized voices, and include interdisciplinary, multi-lingual, and international research that might not have a large audience.

Our nonprofit publishing model allows us to host journals free of charge. Authors submitting to our journals also do not pay publishing fees. This removes barriers to journals and authors without the funds to participate in scholarly publishing under different models and allows editors to concentrate on producing high-quality research instead of fundraising. Journals publishing research in an open-access model can also save money by publishing online rather than printing and shipping paper copies. Since our focus is on the quality of the research, not the quantity, we do not require that our journals publish a minimum number of articles each year, as some commercial publishers do. Our journals can publish articles based on their capacity without minimum requirements.

We enhance the discoverability of the published content in our journals by following best publishing practices and using publishing software that follows technology standards, enabling search engines like Google to find and increase the impact and reach of the research. Our publishing program at KU is unusual in that we format the articles for publication, saving our journals time and money and allowing us to ensure that the articles are accessible to all readers, including those with visual disabilities. To ensure the long-term availability of the research we publish, we contract with preservation services such as Portico to ensure scholars can find the content in the future.

Another critical theme in library publishing is our emphasis on inclusivity. The absence of financial barriers ensures that scholars can participate in disseminating their research regardless of their financial capacity. Marginalized voices can finally be heard, and interdisciplinary and multilingual research can flourish and find new audiences.

For example, in the summer of 2023, we worked with Dr. Rami Zeedan to initiate the *Druze Studies Journal*. This journal is interdisciplinary, open access, and licensed so that people can reuse the scholarship for non-commercial purposes. Yesterday, at this conference, Dr. MJ Curry's keynote focused on multilingual scholars. She talked about the importance of scholarly networks. Research that is open access and easily discovered increases the collaborative potential of these programs, fostering networks across disciplines and languages for increased reach and impact. This journal will help scholars of the Druze expand their networks since publications are open to the public without obstacles and will be seen by new audiences. The *Druze Studies Journal* is ready to accept submissions on the journal's website for authors who are ready to explore this publication model (*Druze Studies Journal* n.d.).

In conclusion, the essay underscores the evolving landscape of academic publishing through the lens of library publishing programs. Library publishing is uniquely positioned to help interdisciplinary journals succeed. The establishment of the *Druze Studies Journal* serves as a testament to the adaptability and inclusivity of this approach. As the journey continues, it is hoped that the positive outcomes from this journal will encourage scholars to explore the possibilities offered by open-access library publishing, fostering collaboration and expanding the horizons of academic discourse.

"Rethinking Druze Studies" by Hussam S. Timani

The Druze Studies field faces many challenges that hinder its growth and recognition within academia. I will delve into the existing limitations and propose potential avenues for progress. The narrative revolves around the experiences and insights of an individual deeply engaged in Druze Studies, shedding light on issues such as inconsistent research output, inadequate representation in major conferences, and the need for interdisciplinary exploration. We should acknowledge the current status of Druze Studies:

- No consistency in Druze Studies;
- Little to no representation in major academic conferences;
- Translation of scriptures is inadequate;
- Absence of Druze publishing houses;
- Absence of college courses, at least at the graduate level;
- Research and publications focus primarily on the history and politics of the Druze;

- Philosophical and theological studies are lacking;
- Isolation of Druze Studies from Islamic Studies and Religious Studies;
- Absence of major venues to organize conferences and seminars;
- Little to no funding and grants for research and the development of college courses.

One prominent issue within Druze Studies is the lack of consistency in research publications. Unlike other academic fields, there is a noticeable dearth of regular research publications, hampering the discipline's development. This inconsistency poses a significant hurdle to advancing Druze Studies and diminishes its impact within the broader academic community.

Another issue is the underrepresentation in major conferences. The absence of a substantial presence in major academic conferences, such as the American Academy of Religion and the Middle East Studies Association, further compounds the challenges faced by Druze Studies. This lack of visibility restricts opportunities for scholars to disseminate their research, hindering potential collaboration and exchange of ideas. Here are a few examples. In the American Academy of Religion (AAR), the world's largest academic institution for studying religion, there has been no single paper on Druze in the last ten years. In the Middle East Studies Association of North America (MESA), the world's largest academic institution for the study of the Middle East and North Africa, there were only ten papers in the last ten years: One in 2023 (anthropological); Two in 2022 (anthropological; literary); One in 2021 (literary); one in 2020 (textual); Two in 2018 (anthropological); One in 2017 (biographical); One in 2015 (historical); One in 2013 (historical).

The third issue is language barriers and limited access to primary sources. An additional impediment is the absence of translated primary sources, limiting the ability to conduct comprehensive research. The unavailability of reputable international Druze publishing houses exacerbates this challenge, hindering the promotion and dissemination of Druze research. Without access to these essential resources, scholars face obstacles in advancing the depth and breadth of their studies.

The fourth issue is the educational gaps. There is a noticeable gap in formal courses dedicated to Druze Studies, particularly at the graduate level. This deficiency highlights the need for academic institutions to recognize and integrate Druze Studies into their curricula, providing students with a structured and in-depth understanding of this field.

Next, I will discuss misconceptions and Orientalism. The misrepresentation of the Druze as an independent religion rather than a school of thought within Islam reflects Orientalist biases. It is essential to dispel such misinterpretations and promote an accurate understanding of the Druze identity and beliefs.

As for future directions and recommendations, I suggest setting three goals: to explore areas that are primarily understudied within the Druze tradition; to reach out in conversation with the AAR and MESA and promote the annual meetings of the AAR and MESA as international venues for sharing research on the Druze; and to initiate an International Symposium on the Druze: Discuss the application of theories and methodologies in the humanities and social sciences to the field of Druze Studies. Here are some suggestions to consider. First and foremost, there is a need for increased research output and conference participation to establish a more consistent presence in the academic sphere. Furthermore, fostering interdisciplinary exploration and collaboration can open new avenues for understanding the Druze from multiple perspectives, including philosophy, theology, and sociology. We need to encourage significant comparative studies and interdisciplinary cross-fertilization, and we hope to explore intersections between Druzism and ethics, theology, philosophy, spirituality, arts, literature, gender studies, sociology, scripture, literary criticism, and liberation studies.

In conclusion, the challenges faced by Druze Studies are multifaceted, ranging from limited research output and underrepresentation to language barriers and educational gaps. By acknowledging these obstacles and implementing the suggested recommendations, the field can embark on a journey toward greater recognition, understanding, and collaboration within the broader academic community.

The Druze of Lebanon and the Confessional System in the Lebanese State by Yusri Hazran

While aiming to contribute to the discussion on the status of the Druze Studies, primarily through the lens of the Lebanese Druze, this section will focus on the history of the Druze in Lebanon vis-à-vis their position within the sectarian system in Lebanon.

Over centuries, the history of Lebanon has been characterized by its association with the history of the Druze, who were the founders of the Emirate of Mount Lebanon. The drastic developments witnessed in Mount Lebanon in the nineteenth century were pivotal in terms of their implications, leading to the fall of the feudal system, the Emirate system, and the establishment of a politi-

cal-administrative entity based on the politicization of sects and the principle of the confessional system. This transformation coincided with the demise of the political role of the Druze, as the establishment of the confessional system was considered by the Druze to be an antithesis to the original heritage of the Emirate. This vision, along with historical awareness and collective memory, which considered the Druze as the founders of the project, formed the fundamental basis for shaping the relationship of the Druze with the Lebanese state and creating a state of alienation towards the political system of their homeland.

The Druze and the Founding Discourse

The history of the Druze in Lebanon is linked to the establishment of a political entity in Mount Lebanon, which gained autonomy under Islamic rule and was based on the combination of doctrinal particularism under the Islamic State and the social-feudal system that continued to dictate the social structure of Mount Lebanon until the mid-nineteenth century. From this standpoint, the Druze consider themselves the project's owners to establish the autonomous political entity in Lebanon based on their historical consciousness and social memory. The beginnings date back to the period of the introduction of the Druze faith, when Lebanon, with its mountain and the Wadi al-Taym region, was an essential center. The emergence of the Druze community in the region was a precursor to the project of establishing an emirate that enjoyed autonomy and gained legitimacy by gaining recognition from the sovereign Islamic state in the region. The Tanukhi Emirate, which played a prominent role religiously and politically, marked the beginning of autonomous rule for the Emirate of Mount Lebanon. This rule continued from the twelfth century until its fall amidst the bloody wars that Mount Lebanon witnessed in the nineteenth century. The Emirate's rule in Lebanon started with the Tanukhis, followed by the Ma'nis (both dynasties were Druze), who expanded it and ended with the Sunni Shihabs (Makarem and Abu Saleh 1984, 133-140).

The emirate reached its peak during the reign of the Ma'nis, especially under Emir Fakhr al-Din Ma'n II, who succeeded in establishing a Druze-Christian partnership, enhancing the stature of the emirate, expanding its borders, building its army, and bringing European modernity to develop his emirate agriculturally and economically. The Ottoman state viewed Emir Fakhr al-Din's project with suspicion, correctly interpreting his relations with the Duchy of Tuscany as a precursor to a separatist project that Christian Europe supported against the Ottoman state. This attempt, which was ahead of its time, ended with the invasion of the emirate,

the overthrow of Emir al-Din's rule, and his and his sons' executions. Despite the tragic end of Emir Fakhr al-Din and his family, the historical writing in Lebanon (except for the Shia case) theorized that Emir Fakhr al-Din is the actual founder of the modern Lebanese political entity. From the writings of Issa Abou Ma'alouf, Aziz el-Ahdab, Sami Makarem, and Abbas Abou Saleh, there is a consensus that Emir Fakhr al-Din Ma'n II is the actual and true founder of the modern Lebanese political entity (Makarem and Abu Saleh 1984, 140-146). The difference in historical theorizing about the political tendencies of Emir Fakhr al-Din Ma'n II does not negate the consensus on considering him a national symbol of Lebanon, whose political project was based on institutionalizing the independence of the Lebanese entity, expanding its borders, developing its economy, and establishing its existence on the harmony between the Druze and Christians in Mount Lebanon. With the fall of the Ma'nid emirate, the leadership passed to the Shihabis, who, although they were Sunni Muslims, their tribal and political affiliation, as part of the Qayssi tribal federation, prevailed from the Druze Qaysi- feudal families, over the religious difference of the Shihabi family. The Druze elite, known as the Maqatta'jiyya, retained their elite and leadership position in the emirate despite the handing over of the emirate itself to the Shihab family. The Shihabis period was characterized by a decline in the status of the Druze, particularly after the battle of Ain Dara in 1711, which led to a Druze migration from Lebanon to Hauran. The Egyptian occupation of the Levant between 1831 and 1840 altered the relationship between the Druze and the Maronites due to the policies of the Egyptian occupation and against the backdrop of the rise of the Maronite Church as a religious, and political player with its religious, economic, status, and international relations.

The Fall of the Emirate and the Demise of Druze Leadership

With the end of the Egyptian occupation era and the return of Ottoman sovereignty to the Levant, civil wars broke out between the Druze and Maronites. These wars, which continued intermittently between 1841 and 1860, ended in a military victory for the Druze, but this military success did not translate into any political achievement. On the contrary, The Druze experienced a setback in political forums, as the political agreements that ended the era of military conflict established a confessional political system in Lebanon, clearly favoring Maronites over the Druze. In 1864, the Ottoman state underwent reform, including establishing the Mutasarifiyya system. In three main aspects, the Mutasarifiyya is rightly

considered the foundation of a new era in Lebanese history. First, it established the confessional system in Lebanon, which is still in place today. Second, it embodied a decline in the political role of the Druze in Lebanon against the backdrop of political settlements, economic transformations, the abolition of the feudal system, and the introduction of the new Land Law. Third, since that period, the Mutasarifiyya system, an external solution to an internal dilemma, has been the model for solving political crises in Lebanon. This model of foreign intervention ending internal conflict has become the mechanism for resolving internal political conflicts in Lebanon (Harik 1968, 35-36).

The Mutasarifiyya ensured a civil peace that lasted for more than half a century and ended with the outbreak of World War I, which led to the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the beginning of the French Mandate era. This era embraced the political project of the Lebanese national movement, which was based on the idea of a national homeland for Christians in the Arab Middle East. The mandate further marginalized the Druze's political role in Lebanon. This role was reversed with the establishment of the National Pact, which founded the Maronite-Sunni duality as the basis of the political system in Lebanon in the independence era. The Druze played a prominent role in the short battle for independence in November 1943, but their embrace of the independent government did not help them. Hence, their integration into the politics of the independent state came through traditional leadership based on the principles established by the National Pact in independent Lebanon.

Kamal Jumblatt and the Revolutionary Project to Abolish Sectarianism

The relationship between the Druze and the Lebanese state and their stance towards its confessional system changed after the rise of Kamal Jumblatt, who entered the political arena through the traditional channels of Jumblattist partisanship. However, he soon challenged the confessional political system in Lebanon by establishing the Progressive Socialist Party and demanding its abolishment as the focus of his political work and activity. From the founding of the Progressive Socialist Party in 1949 until his assassination by the intelligence affiliated with the Ba'ath regime in Syria in 1977, Jumblatt dedicated his political struggle to abolishing the political, confessional system and replacing it with a secular system based on the principles of equal citizenship and social justice. The first Lebanese Civil War of 1958, which Kamal Jumblatt called the Lebanese Revolution, was an opportunity, a shock, and a significant leap in his political activity.

With the end of the war and the restoration of the confessional system, which was based on the principles of "no victor, no vanquished" and improving performance and achieving justice through the existing confessional system, Jumblatt realized that peaceful political system mechanisms were no longer effective. Having missed the golden opportunity provided by the 1958 Civil War, it became necessary to develop methods of political struggle by undermining the confessional system rather than betting on its reform. Thus, Jumblatt developed three axes for political struggle: an alliance with the Nasserist-revolutionary regime on the Arab level, establishing an ideological-political partnership with the Palestinian resistance organizations, and striving to rally all leftist, nationalist, Marxist, and communist forces and organizations within a united front challenging the confessional-political system. Jumblatt's new convictions were based on the belief that the system was irreplaceable and had to be removed rather than reformed, leading to its collapse and undermining. Indeed, with Kamal Jumblatt's appointment as Interior Minister in 1969 at the insistence of the Palestinian organizations, he provided his allies from the resistance organizations with official cover and a haven that gave them complete control over the Palestinian camps and freedom for guerrilla operations against Israel (Hazran 2010, 157-176).

With its ideological and revolutionary momentum, the Palestinian organizations' military presence gave the Lebanese left a substantial boost of courage, which now relied on its popular legitimacy and political ability to mobilize a grassroots movement, in addition to the Palestinian military presence on Lebanese soil. Jumblatt, caught off guard by the sudden outbreak of the civil war, saw it as the last golden opportunity to eliminate the confessional system and rise to a secular Lebanon. Based on this vision, Jumblatt quickly proposed a political project to reform the sectarian system by abolishing confessionalism, reorganizing the army, and establishing administrative decentralization. This project clashed with the opposition from the Phalangist right and the Maronites in general, which the Ba'ath regime in Syria saw as a golden opportunity to intervene in Lebanon and Arabize Maronite politics. The contradiction in visions between the Ba'ath regime and Jumblatt led the right-wing forces to exploit Syrian intervention to strike the left and bring down its project.

The clash between Jumblatt and the Syrian Ba'ath regime dealt a fatal blow, leading to the abandonment of Jumblatt by the Palestinian resistance organizations, the Syrian regime's dominance over the Lebanese left, and the eventual downfall of its project. Subsequently, Jumblatt's assassination in March 1977 was

the culmination of this clash. The Syrian intervention and Jumblatt's assassination were a devastating blow to the political project of the Lebanese anti-establishment left, leading to a retreat in the Druze's political role, who, since the assassination and the collapse of the leftist political project, have aspired to maintain their role instead of seeking to change the entire political equation in Lebanon. Walid Jumblatt, son of Kamal Jumblatt, clearly reflected this orientation in his political activity. His vision, based on an alliance with the Syrian Ba'ath regime to preserve the Druze's status and consolidate their role in the Lebanese political arena, explains the Druze's support for the Taif Agreement despite its re-establishment of the confessional system in Lebanon (Hazran 2010, 157-176).

Returning to the Square of Confessionalism and Merely Preventing Sedition

Walid Jumblatt's policy was based on three pillars: preserving the Druze's political status within the existing political system and the Druze's gains after the Mountain War 1983-1984, adhering to the alliance and coordination with the Ba'ath regime in Syria, and framing the Socialist Party as the political front for the Druze in the Lebanese political scene. After the unconditional Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000, these pillars began to crumble, particularly with the continued military presence of Syria and the growing military power of Hezbollah.

The assassination of Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in February 2005 was the starting signal for a widespread protest movement against the continued Syrian military presence in Lebanon, which indeed led to the "Cedar Revolution" and the withdrawal of Syrian forces after a three-decade military presence. Tensions escalated between the Druze and Hezbollah due to the demographic expansion of the Shia at the expense of the Druze on the one hand and Hezbollah's adherence to its resistance project in Lebanon on the other, reaching a boiling point in 2008 after the Lebanese government decided to dismiss the director of security at Beirut International Airport and dismantle Hezbollah's private communication network. Following these decisions backed by Walid Jumblatt, Hezbollah launched an attack on Mountain Lebanon and, in return, took control of Beirut, the capital. This control resulted in the Doha Agreement of 2008, which granted Hezbollah dominance over the political decision-making in Lebanon (Abisaab and Abisaab 2014; Hajjar 2009, 261-276).

After the Doha Agreement, the Druze's political role receded, mainly as Yazbaki factionalism re-emerged. The Doha Agreement created a new political reality

in Lebanon. Through it, the Druze realized that all they could aspire to was to preserve their existence and position in the Lebanese political scene in the face of dominance. Walid Jumblatt summarized the shifting and the dramatic decline in ambitions with the phrase that the Druze and Maronites had become "Red Indians" in Lebanon, meaning their political role had ended despite their long history in the founding project of Lebanese statehood (al-Akhbar 2010). The Druze in Lebanon still consider themselves the owners of the founding project through their role over hundreds of years in the Emirate (Zahreddine 1994, 91-108). Kamal Jumblatt used this profoundly ingrained awareness in the Druze collective memory as the starting point to re-sort the political system in Lebanon through secularization. However, this project ended with the fall of the anti-establishment left and the assassination of Jumblatt. The policy of those who followed him recognized an inflexible reality: the Druze had lost their political role in Lebanon despite their foundational role in Lebanon's history, and this role no longer advocated for them, and their political aspirations were now limited to drawing strength from their awareness and memory to preserve their existence, rather than changing the reality in Lebanon.

"The Druzes in Syria" by Birgit Schäbler

Thank you for your kind invitation to this important conference and roundtable.

I am contributing here as a Middle East Historian trained in historical anthropology, Islamic studies, and political sciences, with an academic background in Germany and the US. In the early 1990s, I had the opportunity to be the first Westerner to undertake extended fieldwork in the province of al-Suwayda, formerly known as 'Jabal Druze' or, more politically correct in Syria, 'Jabal al-'Arab' - the 'mountain' being more of a highlands, bordering on a sizeable rugged lava field, which served as a hideout throughout history. I am still very grateful for this experience.

I discussed the Druze sociologically as an ethnic group and wanted to concentrate historically on the 20th century, especially the Great Syrian Revolt of 1925. However, it soon became apparent that one cannot understand the workings of politics and society in Syrian Druze society without going back much further in time. Looking at the way this frontier region was settled by Druze peasants who wrestled it from Arab nomadic tribes with whom they then lived and interacted for centuries is essential to explain the unique political and social traits of the frontier society of Druze warrior-peasants, including the local form of communal land

tenure, a variety of *musha'* (Schäbler 2001, 241–311).

The political system they established was a *mashyakha* system, which differed from the *imara* system of Mount Lebanon in that it was internally more dynamic, with several first-rank families vying for power and several secondary and third-rank families vying to move up in rank. This contrasts with the *imara* system, which, throughout centuries, featured only one and then two families, whose control was consequently tighter on their fellow Druzes. The "compact minority" (a term that implies that Druzes were the majority in their highlands but also hints at their cohesiveness) was only socially "compact" in times of external threat. During periods of peace, it showed significant social dynamics: a peasant movement known as *al-'ammiyya* emerged in 1889/90, and in 1949, a popular movement called al-*sha'biyya* called for full integration into the state of Syria and fought against the unionism of the family in power, the Atrash.

My research was ultimately about the specificity of the Syrian Druze as a group and their dealings with the Ottoman, French mandate, and early independent states around them, especially through their well-documented Intifadas. Hardly any other group in Bilad al-Sham put up as much resistance against centralizing states and endured as many punitive campaigns as the Druze in Syria. My sources were oral history, locally written sources, and colonial archives, primarily in France, the UK, the US, and Germany.

This dynamic social structure was also reflected in the religious sphere, where there developed over time three *mashaykh al-'aql* (established to deal with Ottoman authorities), distinct from the large group of "initiated," *ajaweed*, whose authority rests on their spirituality or knowledge of the scriptures, who keep aloof of worldly powers, have an inner hierarchy of rank expressed in their headgear, and are responsible for safeguarding the Druzes and their faith., as well as fighters in the war. The three families who each brought forth a *shaykh al-'aql*, especially the oldest one, al-Hajari, were more independent of the worldly, powerful *mashaykh* than was the case in Lebanon, where the *shuyukh al-'aql* depended mainly on the ruling families. In Israel, only one family provided the *shaykh al-'aql,* as there were not many powerful families to speak of. From the Ottomans onward, the ruling powers preferred the *shuyukh al-'aql* as interlocutors and spokespersons for the group, as they were the most conservative force in Druze society.

However, in Syria, rulers had to contend with the powerful chiefs of a society of warrior-peasants, and the Syrian Druzes developed a tradition of rebellion and a reputation of resistance to what they deemed unjust demands from the state.

Their military prowess occupied rulers from Ibrahim Pasha to Sultan Abdülhamid, French high commissioners, and Syrian presidents after independence.

This tradition of rebellion, transmitted orally in heroic songs and poems from generation to generation in the families, culminated in the person of Sultan Pasha al-Atrash, who managed to broaden what had started as another Druze revolt into a national Syria-wide uprising against the French Mandate in 1925, together with his close urban ally Dr. Shahbandar. It was given the name "Great Syrian Revolt," differentiating it from the previous "Great Arab Revolt," in which the Druzes had also played an important role when they turned their mountain into a refuge for activists of the Arab secret societies of the time, who were planning the Arab revolt against the Ottomans in 1916. This was when an old *imaginaire* of the noble warrior from the steppe was impregnated with the politics of the time, and these early contacts between urban nationalists and Druze, who had lost a number of their shaykhs at the gallows in 1911 in Damascus, laid the foundations for the rural-urban alliance of 1925. This is a little-known and fascinating story of the Syrian Druzes, which I explored in some detail in an article called "From Urban Notables to 'Noble Arabs': Shifting Discourses in the Emergence of Nationalism in the Arab East, 1910-1916," which brought forth new questions, apart from the take on Arab nationalism, which was the ruling paradigm back then (Schäbler 2004, 174-198).

It is equally fascinating how the status of Sultan Pasha al-Atrash as a nationalist symbol, both patriotic and Druze, has been upheld until this very day. Sultan never took any political office and avoided embroiling in the political game. He remained above it, in his village of al-Qurayya, leaving politics to the Suwayda branch of the family, as was explained to me by his youngest brother Zayd, entertaining a significant number of guests in his *madafa* – the most illustrious probably being Egyptian president Gamal Abdelnasir.

The Druzes in Bathist Syria lost their historical position in military prowess to the Alawites under Hafez al-Asad. However, they skillfully used their political capital invested in the heroic persona of Sultan al-Atrash to hold their ground and negotiate with the regime until this very day. Sultan stands for armed rebellion, often expressed as 'revolution,' but also for Arab political values that the Ba'th, whatever is left of it, and the Syrian Arab Republic wish to project. It appears that the Syrian Druzes are still the least studied group among the Druze, despite essential contributions to this conference.

My anthropological research in the Jabal Druze took place in the early 1990s.

Back then, the old discourses and discussions about the separation of the spheres in Druzedom, the religious and the worldly, were still alive with the older men, as was the secular outlook of the young. When I returned at the end of the 1990s and in the early 2000s, large numbers of the young men were clad in religious beginners' gear, with *shirwal* and knitted white wool caps, and historical photos of initiated shaykhs, the *ajaweed* were put up publicly and could even be bought at shops and petrol stations - which would have been deemed deeply inappropriate ten years before. The political discussions that I could witness earlier had stopped. People said, "We cannot talk like this anymore."

These overall shifts need to be researched, it seems, making use of all the disciplines we have at our disposal: anthropology, history, sociology, political science, Islamic studies, religious studies, and gender studies should all be made use of.

Discussion

The section below includes a discussion between the participants in the November 16, 2023, roundtable and answers to questions. We used the original text as captured by the Zoom Webinar automated annotation. After the event, contributors to this roundtable manually edited their responses for better clarity and continued their scholarly exchange, editing the discussion below to maintain clarity and adding additional content.

Rami Zeedan: My first question is for Mrs. Marianne Reed. From your extensive experience helping new journals at the University of Kansas (Reed, 2018), what suggestions do you have for this new *Druze Studies Journal*?

Marianne Reed: My main suggestion is to get high-quality submissions. Then, conduct a thorough peer review process. Whenever anything is published, make sure it is disseminated within your academic networks, whether it is disciplinary or linguistic, in order to ensure its visibility. You can encourage people at this conference to sign up for publication in the journal. Signing up for publication in the journal would be a good start, as it would notify them of upcoming publications. Other than that, I think you are already on the right track. It is just what you do after things are published. You notify people, other associations, and other disciplinary networks, and you encourage others to do the same.

Rami Zeedan: My next question is for Dr. Hussam Timani. In 2000, you published a review of the famous 1999 book by the late Professor KAIS FIRRO on "*The Druzes in the Jewish State: A Brief History.*" You wrote: "*This well-researched book is a welcome contribution to the study of the Druzes, one of the most under-studied religious groups in the Middle East*" (Timani 2000, 432-434). Now that we are meeting 22 years later, do you still think the Druze are "*one of the most under-studied religious groups in the Middle East"?* How would you assess this field today, given that we are launching a unique journal dedicated to studying the Druze?

Hussam Timani: I am pointing out a lack of continuity and follow-up in research and publications. Often, we see isolated studies without connections to other relevant work. Publications emerge, but there is no subsequent exploration or development of the ideas presented. For instance, if a scholar publishes a book, I expect other scholars to engage in dialogue, building on that work. The problem lies in the absence of sustained conversation and consistency. In academia, a publication should mark the beginning of a discussion, not the end. However, in Druze Studies, while questions are posed in publications, there is a noticeable gap in further research addressing them. This hinders the progress of these studies, leading to misconceptions that could quickly be clarified through continued exploration and follow-up research. The key is encouraging ongoing dialogue and exploration rather than letting the discussion end abruptly after a major publication. For example, we can use the platform of the *Druze Studies Journal* we are initiating today.

Rami Zeedan: My next question is for Dr. Yusri Hazran: you are a published scholar on the Druze in Lebanon, with a book and many excellent articles (Hazran 2014). Recently, you published an article on the "*Unrealized Potential: Druze Women in Israel vs. Lebanese-Druze Women*." In this article, you write that "[…] *via comparison with the Druze in Lebanon, the article traces the structural elements that impede Druze women in Israel from taking center stage in internal politics*" (Hazran 2023, 90–105). I think this is a valuable contribution since yesterday, at least one speaker mentioned during the discussion that the situation of the Druze in Israel is much better than that in other countries. Without getting into all the details of this project, could you please tell us more about the challenges and opportunities of conducting comparative research on the Druze? Do you have any recommendations for those interested in expanding comparative approaches?

Yusri Hazran: Thank you for the question. The main idea behind the article is that Druze in Israel are leading the revolutions inside society when it comes to birth rates, education, and employment. Druze women are the most important social force driving this change. Despite that, until our days, we still do not see them employing this potential to get into politics, which Druze men still control.

Rami Zeedan: Could you elaborate on the question of comparative research? What about the Druze in Lebanon versus the Druze in Israel and Syria? Do you have any suggestions for doing comparative research?

Yusri Hazran: Yes. We have the data regarding women in Israel. Unfortunately, I do not have access to data about women in Syria or Lebanon. However, it is crucial to indicate that Druze women in Lebanon play a prominent role in education, the social sphere, and politics. Unfortunately, I do not have the complete data about the education, employment, and birth rate relevant to the Druze in Syria and Lebanon. We urgently need to initiate such projects.

Rami Zeedan: My next question is for Dr. Birgit Schäbler. In 2013, you published an interesting article titled "*Constructing an Identity between Arabism and Islam: The Druzes in Syria*" (Schäbler 2013, 62-79). In that article, you talked about the Druze wanting to prove "their true Arabness," which was brought to full bloom in 1925 with the Great Revolt. You brought a quote from Khayr al-Dı¯n al-Zirikli, who said:

> "*Lineages got entangled, origins got lost and blood got mixed in most places of Bilad al-Sham; but there remained in Bilad Hawran and some places in Lebanon a group (ta'ifa) who guarded its 'Arabiyya, the classical Arabic, adhering to its party spirit ('asabiyya), and in whom is living the Qaysiyya and the Yamaniyya to the very day of these people (. ..) and that is the Arab and Islamic group of the Druzes who are hoisting the first flag streaming in the present Syrian revolution*".

My question is: how would you situate this discourse within the current scholarship on the Druze in Syria?

Birgit Schäbler: Thank you for this question. The 1925 quote from the famous intellectual, activist, journalist, and founder of numerous newspapers and journals, al-Zirikli, is the culmination of a certain discourse on the part of early urban na-

tionalist intellectuals, who in their political shift from Ottomanism to Arabism, reinterpreted the tribal people of the Syrian steppe, *ahl-al-badiya*, including the Druzes, turning them from robbers of caravans and general lawless malefactors into honorable people, who upheld the ancient virtues of the Arabs in their tongue, in their sense of freedom and honor. They were transformed into modern-day Antars, whose warrior spirit would liberate the current Arabs from the Ottoman yoke. This is an ancient *imaginaire*, also evoking Ibn Khaldun, which was infused with the political climate of the time, as evidenced in the writings of al-Kawakibi. The shift in discourse concerning the Druze emerged in the Damascene press, which had slammed the Druzes for decades. With the public hangings of Druze shaykhs in 1911 by Ottoman authorities, editor Muhammad Kurd Ali, who was in a *halqa*, an intellectual circle with Abd-al-Rahman al-Shahbandar and others, slowly changed the tone in the coverage of al-Muqtabas. A few years later, the Druzes would supply these intellectuals and officers with an escape route when they prepared for the Arab revolt in 1916. And they would again partner up in the Great Revolt of 1925. The quote you are asking about thus shows the amount of cultural and political capital invested in the Druzes as Arab heroes and even good Muslims, culminating in the persona of Sultan Pasha al-Atrash.

Rami Zeedan: This question is from the audience. How do we balance the visibility of Druze Studies and the need to respect secrecy about some aspects of their sacred beliefs and community?

Hussam Timani: As academics, we engage in controversy, maintain objectivity, present the facts, analyze them, and present our findings. Secrecy can challenge religion and faith, monopolizing who can speak or what they can say. This is a very sensitive issue, and I am unsure we can present a solution. However, I see that some followers are calling to end the secrecy, and they say, well, this is something that helped in the past and does not fit our days. In class, we have to learn from each other's interfaith dialogue. Understanding the other allows us to communicate with them. If we do not know about the other, we will assume things, and someone else will fill the gaps with false information.

Rami Zeedan: As the editor-in-chief of the *Druze Studies Journal*, I will also respond. Other communities worldwide have this kind of issue with their sacred texts. It is not a matter of the Druze only. This issue extends to other indigenous

communities, for example, here in the USA, who do not like researchers to get their hands on their sacred text or their sacred beliefs and want to keep away from the public eye and research. Therefore, this is a broader topic, focusing more than just the Druze and their specificities. I suggest framing this question in that context, drawing from the experiences of other scholars and other fields. Most importantly, this initiative is a service to academia and the Druze themselves, so we must be sensitive to the community.

Marianne Reed: If you recall, Rami, when you first came to me with the idea for this *Druze Studies Journal*, this was something I asked about. I asked this question about religion and what the community will accept because we run into this. We must acknowledge the ethical concerns about sharing information the community does not approve of. We had a very productive talk. I saw that you were aware of this and that awareness is what will prevent the journal from making mistakes. Knowing the editorial staff of this journal, I do not see that as a problem, but I can understand how it could be viewed from an external perspective. Moreover, we have had these conversations, and fortunately, I think that everyone involved is aware of the situation.

Rami Zeedan: It will surely be challenging, and we will be facing decisions that need to be made at the level of the Editorial Board. Another question from the audience. To Dr. Hazran: What do you make of Kamal Jumblatt's connection on a spiritual level with India? Does that have any influence on the Druze community?

Yusri Hazran: I am not sure there was a connection between Kamal Jumblatt and India. For the Druze, Kamal Jumblatt called for integration within their immediate public sphere. In Lebanon, he wanted the Druze to integrate into and lead the Lebanese state.

Rami Zeedan: My final question is for Dr. Birgit Schäbler. How have the Druze in al-Suwayda invoked the legacy of Sultan Pasha al-Atrash in their struggles, particularly during the Syrian civil war and recent demonstrations in 2023?

Birgit Schäbler: This question relates to what I said before. Druzes in al-Suwayda continue to invoke Sultan in their struggles. During the bloody civil war, the Druzes sought to keep neutrality. In 2013, Druze militias were established to

protect the community, and Druze men were also serving in the Syrian army. Both evoked Sultan Pasha al-Atrash as a protector of the community and as a protector of Syria. Ten years later, in September/October 2023, Druze in al-Suwayda came out openly in large demonstrations with the blessing of *shaykh al-'aql* al-Hajari, calling even for an end to Bashar al-Asad's rule. They did this once again, tapping into the symbolic capital of Sultan Pasha's double role as protector of the Syrian fatherland and the Druzes.

Rami Zeedan: Another question from the audience. Why do the Druze see themselves as the founders of the state of Lebanon?

Yusri Hazran: I say that the Druze are the real founders of the Lebanese entity. I added before that while Christians may agree, the Shiite community does not share this view. Christians and Druze historians genuinely consider Fakhreddine II the actual founder, while Shiites do not share this view.

Rami Zeedan: This is another question from the audience that captures two questions at once. Druze Studies is a growing field, but it remains a relatively small field. Is there a need for separate Druze Studies?

Hussam Timani: I think this is a fascinating question. That is my argument: we must take Druze Studies within the larger Islamic studies. Druze Studies should be studied like Sufism and Shi'ism. That is where books, interested people, and classes can be found. So that is the problem. Druze Studies- some say they are a tiny minority- but who cares about them? No, these Druze communities, like other communities, deserve to be researched within Islamic Studies. Even if the community is small, it does not matter.

Yusri Hazran: I will also add it within Middle Eastern Studies as an obvious connection. In my presentation, I said that we can focus on Druze particularism. At the same time, you need to keep the balance that the Druze are not playing their historical role within the religion.

Rami Zeedan: Thank you for this discussion.

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Article

"The Religious Attitude of the Druze Towards Violence: A Study Based on Oral Sources"

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Druze Studies Journal

مقال

"سلوك الدّروز الدّيني في استعمال العنف: دراسة تستند إلى المصادر الشّفهيّة."

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مستخلص

منذ نشأتها في القرن الحادي عشر للميلاد، تميّزت طائفة الدّروز عن محيطها بهويّتها الدّينيّة الخاصة. نشأ من تلك الهويّة الدّينيّة سلوكيّات اجتماعيّة وسياسيّة شكّلت بمرور الزمن شخصيّة الدّروز الجماعيّة. أطلق على المتمسّكين من الدّروز بهويّتهم الدّينيّة اسم «العُقّال»، وعلى الآخرين اسم «الجهّال». أدّى عُقّال الدّروز عبر العصور وظائف سياسيّة واجتماعيّة مُهمّة في طائفتهم، كان أبرزها الحفاظ على هويّة الدّروز الخاصّة والسلوكيّات الاجتماعيّة والسياسيّة الناشئة عنها. من ناحية أخرى، حفل تاريخ الدّروز في بلاد الشّام، ولا سيّما في لبنان، بالحروب والثّورات المسلّحة. وَسَمَتْ تلك الحروب والثورات طائفة الدّروز بشخصيّة حربيّة، غالبًا ما طغت على سماتها الجماعيّة الأخرى، رغم التزامها بمبادئ غير عنفيّة. لذلك كلّه، ثمّة فائدة تاريخيّة واضحة لفهم موقف عقّال الدّروز الدّينيّ من استعمال العنف وسلوكهم فيه. غرض هذا البحث تقصّي روايات شفهيّة عن عُقّال الدّروز في لبنان خلال القرن الماضي، عبر منهجيّة مُنضبطة تكشف عن سلوك شامل ومتّسِق لديهم يرتكز إلى مبادئ دينيّة أساسيّة وثابتة. يقوم هذا السّلوك على رفض أعمال العنف والتعدّي، والاجتهاد في منع وقوعها والنّهي عن التعرّض لها وذمّ مرتكبيها والاقتصاص منهم. من منظور أوسع، فإنّ موقِف المتديّنين الأخلاقيّ من العنف هو اليوم موضوع مثير للجدل ويحظى باهتمام شديد من المؤسّسات البحثيّة والمنظّمات الحكوميّة وغير الحكوميّة بسبب تأثير العنف المرتبط بالدّين الخطير في العالم. بناءً عليه، يكتسب هذا البحث أهميّة تتجاوز حدود الوجود الدّيموغرافي للدّروز في بلاد الشام، بما يُقدّمه من مبادئ وأنماط سلوكيّة يمكن أن تساهم في تعزيز القيادة الدّينيّة السلميّة على المستوى الدّولي.

كلمات مفاتيح: تاريخ لبنان، تاريخ الدّروز، الدّروز، عُقّال الدّروز، مبادئ استعمال العنف، أخلاقيّات العنف، المصادر الشفهيّة، التاريخ الشفهي.

"هذه نظرتكم للسلوك القويم: منع أنفسكم عن أذيّة الآخرين، ومنع الأذيّة عن أنفسكم"[1]

مقدِّمة

يُخيّل للباحث في تاريخ الدّروز أنَّهم طائفة تميل إلى القتال والأعمال العنفيّة لكثرة ما ارتبط تاريخها بالحروب والنّزاعات المسلَّحة. فقد اشتهر عنهم قتال الصليبيّين الذين حكموا أجزاءً من بلاد الشّام بين عامي 1098 و1291،[2] ثمَّ ثورتهم ضدّ السّلطنة العثمانيّة بعد احتلالها بلاد الشّام في العام 1516 والتي استمرت لأكثر من قرنين من الزّمن؛[3] وثورتهم المسلّحة على جيوش محمّد علي باشا، والي مصر، في جبل لبنان ووادي التّيم وبلاد حوران أثناء احتلاله بلاد الشّام بين عامي 1931 و1840.[4] بعد ذلك بمدّة قصيرة، خاض الدّروز ثلاث حروب أهليَّة بينهم وبين الموارنة في جبل لبنان بين عامي 1841 و1860.[5] في القرن العشرين، ثار دروز حوران ضدّ سلطة الانتداب الفرنسي بين عامي 1925 و1927، وشارك دروز لبنان في حربين أهليّتين في الجمهوريّة اللبنانيّة؛ الأولى في العام 1958، والثانية بين عامي 1975 و1990. ومؤخّرًا، شارك دروز جبل لبنان بأحداث أيار من العام 2008.[6] سِجلٌ حربيٌّ كهذا يُظهر أهميَّةَ فَهْمِ موقِفِ الدّروز من استعمال العنف والمبادئ التي تحكم سلوكهم فيه.

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[1] المؤرّخ اليوناني ثوسيديديس عن مبدأ الإسبرطيّين في الحرب؛ انظر Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, Transl. by Rex Warner (London: Penguin Books, 1972), 71. الترجمة عن الإنكليزيّة لي.

[2] ذكر الرحّالة اليهودي بينيامين التوديلي أن الدّروز "كانوا في حالة حرب مع رجال صيدا"، وقصد بهم الصليبيين لأنّ رحلته كانت بين عامَي 1159 و1173 م، أي أثناء سيطرة الصليبيّين على أجزاء عدّة من فلسطين ولبنان. Marcus Nathan Adler, *The itinerary of Benjamin of Tudela: Critical text, translation and commentary*, vol. 1 (New York: Philipp Feldheim Incorporated, 1907), 29.

[3] عن ثورة الدّروز ضدّ العثمانيين خلال القرن السّادس عشر، انظر Abdul Rahim Abu Husayn, *The View from Istanbul: Ottoman Lebanon and the Druze Emirate* (London: The Centre of Lebanese Studies with the association of I.B. Tauris, 2002).

[4] عن ثورة الدّروز ضدّ حكم محمّد علي باشا في سوريا، انظر سليمان أبو عز الدين، **إبراهيم باشا في سوريا** (بيروت: المطبعة العلميّة ليوسف صادر، 1929).

[5] أفضل مرجع أكاديمي عن حروب الدّروز والموارنة في القرن التاسع هو Caesar E. Farah, *The Politics of Interventionism in Ottoman Lebanon 1830 – 1861* (London: Centre for Lebanese Studies in association with I.B. Tauris, 2000).

[6] نزاع داخلي مسلّح وقع في لبنان بين 7 و15 أيار من العام 2008. تسلسل الأحداث بدأ في 5 أيار باتخاذ حكومة الرئيس فؤاد السنيورة المدعومة من قوى الموالاة، والتي عرفت آنذاك بقوى 14 آذار، قرارًا باعتبار شبكة اتصالات تنظيم حزب الله المسلّح غير شرعيّة واتخاذ إجراءات قانونيّة لتفكيكها، وقرارًا آخر بعزل رئيس جهاز أمن المطار المحسوب على المعارضة، المعروفة بقوى 8 آذار. اعتبر التنظيم المذكور أنّ قرار الحكومة هو إعلان حرب عليه، وانطلقت في 7 أيار أعمال عسكريّة تمكّن مقاتلو حزب الله وحلفاؤهم على أثرها من احتلال العاصمة بيروت. وفي 11 أيار، بدأ تنظيم حزب الله بهجوم متعدّد الجهات على قرى درزيّة في جبل لبنان الجنوبي. على عكس نجاحهم في بيروت، واجه مقاتلو التنظيم مقاومة شرسة في القرى الدرزيّة قادها عُقّال الدّروز بمعزل عن الأحزاب الدرزيّة السياسيّة، ونجحوا في صدّ الهجوم. توقّفت الأعمال العسكريّة في 15 أيار.

وبما أنَّ الدّروز طائفة تميّزت عن محيطها أوّلًا بهويّتها الدينيّة الخاصّة، تَظهر أهميّة فهم موقف عُقَّالها[7] ـــ أي المتديّنين فيها ـــ الدّينيّ من استعمال العنف؛ كونهم الأشدّ ارتباطًا بمنظومة القيم الخاصّة بطائفتهم. كما أنّ عُقّال الدّروز أدّوا عبر العصور وظائف سياسيّة واجتماعيّة مهمّة في طائفتهم. لذلك، ثمّة فائدة تاريخيّة واضحة لفَهْم موقِفِهم من هذه القضيّة المهمّة. غرَضُ هذا البحث تقصّي روايات شفهيّة منقولة عن عقّال الدّروز في لبنان خلال القرن العشرين ودراستها بطريقة منهجيّة منضبطة للكشف عن سلوك شامل ومتَّسِق لدى عقال الدّروز حصرًا يرتكز على مبادئ دينيّة أساسيّة، ويقوم على رفض أعمال العنف والتعدّي، والاجتهاد في منع وقوعها، والنّهي عن التعرّض لها، وذمّ مرتكبيها والاقتصاص منهم. ومن شأن فهم معالم سلوكهم هذا وأسسه الدّينيّة الثّابتة أن يجعل من تعميمه على مراحل تاريخيَّة سابقة أمرًا منطقيًّا وواقعيًّا.

سأستهلّ بحثي هذا بتقديم بعض الملاحظات المنهجيّة التي تتعلّق بالمسائل التطبيقيّة لهذا النّوع من المصادر؛ وأعرض بإيجاز بعض الخصائص والإشكالات المشتركة التي تتميّز بها الرّوايات الشفهيّة المرتبطة بتاريخ عقّال الدّروز عمومًا وبموضوع البحث خصوصًا. ثمَّ أُفْرِد قسمًا خاصًا لشرح المبادئ الدّينيّة التي تحكم سلوك عُقّال الدّروز تجاه العنف من خلال الآيات القرآنيّة والأدبيّات الوعظيّة ذات الصّلة لأبرز عالِمَيْ دِيْنٍ مرّا على طائفة الدّروز في بلاد الشام منذ اكتسابهم هويّة مذهبيّة خاصّة بهم قبل حوالي ألف عام، وهما الأمير السّيّد عبد الله التّنوخي (توفي 1479م) والشّيخ الفاضل محمّد أبي هلال (ت. 1641م). أنتقل بعدها لعرض الرّوايات الشفهيّة التي جمعتها خلال العقدين الماضيين عن سلوك عقّال الدّروز في الحروب وموقفهم من أعمال العنف والقتل في يوميّاتهم العاديّة على مدى المئة سنة الماضية، واستخلاص ما تحتويه من فوائد وحقائق تتعلّق بموضوع البحث وتساعد في تحقيق غرضه. ثمَّ أكشف أخيرًا عن العمق التاريخيّ لهذا السلوك من خلال الإضاءة على أبرز ما ورد في المصادر التاريخيّة الأساسيّة عن الموضوع.

ملاحظة: قُمت بتسويد بعض العبارات في الاقتباسات بغرض لفت انتباه القارئ إليها. وبالتّالي، التّسويد ليس من الأصل المأخوذ منه.

أوّلًا: المصادر الشفهيّة

تُعتبر المؤلّفات التاريخية المكتوبة المصدر المفضّل لدى المؤرّخين والأساس في بحوثهم، كونها الأقرب إلى طبيعة صنعتهم. فهذه المصادر لا تقتصر على سرد الأحداث بترتيب زمني يُحاكي الماضي وحسب، بل تشير أيضًا إلى أسباب وقوعها ونتائجها كما خبرها المؤرّخ وفهمها. وينشأ تقليد الكتابة التّاريخيّة في الغالب في المدن الرّئيسة والمراكز الإداريّة والسياسيّة للدّول والممالك الحاكمة. فمن جهة، هناك أشخاص مُتعلّمون قادرون على تأليف مثل هذه الكتب، وتقليد تأريخيّ متراكم يمكنهم البناء عليه. ومن جهة أخرى، توجد مُحفّزات كثيرة من تعاقب ملوك وتبدُّل أسر حاكمة واندلاع نزاعات وحروب ووقوع فتن وثورات وأحداث كبرى تُنتج تغيُّرات جذريّة في حياة تلك المدن ومجتمعاتها تدفع بأفراد متعلّمين لتأليف الكتب التّاريخيّة وتقصّي أخبار الماضي. في المقابل، تغيب معظم هذه المحفّزات في الأرياف والمناطق النائية

[7] سأستعمل مصطلح "العَاقل" وجمعه "عُقّال" للدلالة على المتديّنين من الدّروز، أفرادًا وجماعةً، كونه المصطلح الأكثر شيوعًا في مصادر تاريخ لبنان الحديث الأساسيّة. كما أنَّ هذا المصطلح يلحظ الطابع الرّوحيّ والمسلكيّ الخاصّ للالتزام الدّيني لدى طائفة الدّروز. وانسجامًا مع هذا الاختيار، سأستعمل عبارة "منتسب إلى مسلك العقّال" أو ما يشاكلها للدّلالة على التزام الشّخص المذكور المسلك الدّينيّ.

لبُعدها عن محور الأحداث الرّئيسة وضعف المعارف والمؤهّلات العلميَّة بين أهلها ممّا يجعل نمو مِثل هذا التَّقليد أمرًا نادرًا.

وينطبق هذا الحال على تاريخ طائفة الدّروز في القرون الماضيّة كونها استقرّت في الجبال والأرياف بعيدًا عن المدن الرّئيسة والمراكز الإداريّة للدّول الحاكمة. لذلك، لم تشهد طائفة الدّروز، منذ نشأتها قبل عشرة قرون، بروز تقليد مستمر وشامل للكتابة التّاريخيّة. بل على العكس، يمكن القول أنّ كتابة المؤلّفات التّاريخيّة عندهم كانت طوال تلك المدّة حالات فرديّة ظرفيّة ونادرة. فباستثناء تاريخ الأمير صالح بن يحيى البُحتريّ التنوخيّ الذي كتب في النّصف الأوّل من القرن الخامس عشر للميلاد،[8] وبعض السِّيَر القصيرة عن عالم الدّين الأبرز لديهم الأمير السّيد عبد الله التنوخيّ، والتي كتبها بعض تلاميذه في النّصف الثاني من القرن نفسه؛[9] ومن ثمَّ تاريخ "صدق الأخبار" لحمزة ابن سباط الذي كتب مطلع القرن السّادس عشر،[10] ليس هناك أي مؤلّف تاريخيّ آخر معروف قبل مطلع القرن العشرين، حيث دوَّن يوسف خطّار أبو شقرا (ت. 1904) روايةَ حسين غضبان أبو شقرا (ت. 1903) الشفهيّة عن حوادث جبل لبنان في القرن التاسع عشر.[11] لذلك، فإنَّ الباحث في تاريخ الدّروز غالبًا ما يضطّر إلى اللّجوء إلى المصادر التّاريخيّة الأخرى، ومنها الشّفهيّة، لتعويض النّقص في المؤلّفات التّاريخيّة المكتوبة.

غير أنّي لن أستعمل الرّوايات الشفهيّة في هذا البحث بغرض التّأريخ لأحداث أو شخصيّات معيّنة، بل لاستنباط مبادئ وقِيَم عامة تحكُم سلوك عُقّال الدّروز المشترك في استعمال العنف والقتال. تتمتّع الرّوايات الشفهيّة في هذا النوع من البحوث بميزةٍ خاصة تتفرَّد بها عن غيرها من المصادر التاريخيّة، إذ تمثّل الرّاوي القريب من الناس؛ وكما يقول عُقّال الدّروز: "يرى القريبُ ما لا يراه البعيد".[12] فالرّوايات الشّفهيّة تنقل مواقف شخصيّة وأحداثًا جانبيّة من حياة الناس اليوميّة نادرًا ما تجد طريقها إلى كتب التاريخ والسّجلّات الرسميّة. غير أنَّ أحداثًا كهذه تعبّر بعفويَّة عن قِيم جماعة متميّزة من النّاس، وطباعهم وسلوكيّاتهم، وهي بذلك أشدّ قدرة على الإخبار عنها من كتب التّاريخ العامّة. لذلك، فإنَّ الرّوايات الشّفهيّة يمكنها أن تنقل للمؤرّخ صورة أكثر قُربًا عن طريقة عيش عقّال الدّروز ومبادئهم وتطبيقهم تلك المبادئ في حياتهم الخاصّة، ومن ضمنها ما يتعلّق بالعنف والقتال.

[8] صالح بن يحيى، **تاريخ بيروت: وهو أخبار السّلف من ذريّة بحتر بن علي أمير الغرب ببيروت**، حقّقها الأب فرنسيس هورس اليسوعي وكمال سليمان الصليبي وآخرون (بيروت: دار المشرق، 1969).

[9] اثنان منها من تأليف علماء دين كبار عاصروا الأمير السيّد ورافقوه لأكثر من أربعة عقود، وهما الشيخان علم الدين سليمان بن حسين بن نصر والشيخ أبو علي مرعي. أمّا الثالثة، فهي من تأليف حمزة ابن سباط وتندرج ضمن كتاب التاريخ الذي ألّفه.

[10] حمزة ابن سباط، **كتاب صدق الأخبار**، نشرته وحقّقته نائلة تقي الدّين قيدبيه تحت عنوان **تاريخ الدّروز في آخر عهد المماليك** (بيروت: المجلس الدرزي للبحوث والإنماء ودار العودة، 1999).

[11] يوسف أبو شقرا، **الحركات في لبنان إلى عهد المتصرفيّة**، حقّقه ونشره عارف أبو شقرا (بيروت: لا د، [1952]).

[12] الشيخ عبد الملك الحلبي، **آداب الشيخ الفاضل**، مخطوط، محفوظات المؤلّف الخاصة، 43.

أ. أنواع الرّوايات الشفهيّة

تَحْكُمُ استعمالَ الرّوايات الشفهيّة مصدرًا للكتابة التاريخيّة شروطٌ وضوابط خاصّة يفترض توفُّرها لكي تُصبح مقبولة من حيث المنهج. لذلك، من الأهميّة بمكان توضيح بعض النقاط المنهجيّة الخاصّة بالمصادر الشفهيّة قبل البدء بعرض الرّوايات التي تتعلّق بموضوع البحث ودراستها.

بدايةً، تُصنَّف المصادر الشّفهيّة من حيث النّظريّة التاريخيّة الحديثة إلى صنفَيْن:

1. التاريخ الشّفهيّ (oral history)
2. المأثور الشّفهيّ (oral tradition)

الصنف الأوّل هو ممارسة أو أسلوب خاصّ للتّأريخ ينتج عنه مصدر يحمل الاسم نفسه؛ بينما الثاني هو نوع من المصادر التّاريخيّة فقط.[13] انطلاقًا من هذا التّصنيف، يُستعمل مصطلح التّاريخ الشّفهيّ للتّعبير عن "دراسة التّاريخ القريب أو المعاصر من خلال تاريخ أشخاص أو ذكريات شخصيّة، حيث يتحدّث الرّاوي أو المُخبر عن تجاربه الخاصّة".[14] كذلك، تُصنَّف الرّواية الشّفهيّة تاريخًا شفهيًّا إذا كانت تنقل أخبارًا عن أحداث شهدها (أو خبرها) أشخاص عرفهم الرّاوي خلال مدّة حياته؛ فيكون الرّاوي هو مصدر الرّواية المباشر.[15]

يختلف المأثور الشّفهيّ عن التّاريخ الشفهيّ من حيث الطّبيعة، كونه ليس منهجًا لدراسة التّاريخ، بل هو مصدر فقط. من جهة أخرى، يختلف المأثور الشّفهيّ عن التّاريخ الشفهيّ أيضًا من حيث هو رواية أو أخبار تاريخيّة شفهيّة عن أحداث سابقة غير معاصرة للرّاوي، انتقلت إليه عبْرَ عِدَّة أجيال سابقة من الرُّواة أو ناقلي الأخبار.[16] غير أن فانسينا (Vansina) يرى أن مرور جيل واحد فقط على الأحداث المنقولة في الرّواية الشفهيّة يكفي ليُصنِّفها مأثورًا شفهيًّا.[17] ومع ذلك، فإنَّ المأثور الشّفهيّ هو في الغالب إخبار عن أحداث أو أشخاص من الماضي البعيد.

وقد أضاف هنيج (Henige) شرطًا آخر لتصنيف رواية مأثورًا شفهيًّا، حيث اشترط أن تكون معلومة على نطاق واسع، أي أنَّها تنتمي إلى الذّاكرة أو الوعيّ التاريخيّ المشترك لجماعة متميّزة من النّاس.[18] وبالتّالي، حتى لو توفَّر الشّرط الأوّل في رواية شفهيّة معيَّنة — أي أنَّها تنقل أخبارًا عن أحداث أو أشخاص من ماضٍ بعيد — ولكنَّها معلومة على نطاق فرديّ أو محصور، يجب اعتبار هذه الرّواية شهادة شخصيَّة لا مأثورًا شفهيًّا. ويرى فانسينا أنَّ هذا الشّرط الإضافيّ 'ضروريّ بالنّسبة للتّحليل الاجتماعيّ (sociological analysis) للمأثور الشفهيّ'، وهو ما أقوم به في هذا البحث ولكنّه 'ليس كذلك

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[13] David Henige, *Oral Historiography* (London: Longman, 1982), 2.

[14] المصدر نفسه.

[15] تتّفق سومر وكوينلان مع هنيج في تعريف التاريخ الشفهي، حيث أوردتا في كتابهما "دليل التاريخ الشفهي" التعريف التالي: "التاريخ الشفهي هو مادة مصدر أساسي يتمّ إنشاؤها في إطار مقابلة مع شاهد أو مُشارك في حدث أو أسلوب حياة، وذلك بغرض حفظ المعلومات وإتاحتها للآخرين. ويُشير المصطلح إلى العملية والمقابلة ذاتها [التي يتمّ من خلالها جمع المعلومات]". Sommer, Barbara W., and Mary Kay Quinlan, *The Oral History Manual*. 2nd ed. (Lanham, MD: Altamira Press, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009), 1.

[16] Henige, *Oral Historiography*, 2.

[17] Jan Vansina, *Oral Tradition as History* (Wisconsin: The University Press of Wisconsin, 1985), 27-28.

[18] Henige, *Oral Historiography*, 2.

عندما يتعلّق الأمر بالاستعمال التاريخيّ لهذا المأثور'.[19] ملاحظةُ فانسينا هذه صائبة في بعض الحالات، إذ تبيَّن لي خلال إعداد دراسة تاريخيّة سابقة أنَّ بعض الرّوايات الشّفهيّة المتناقلة في نطاق محدود ضمن عائلة أو قرية معيّنة، وغير معروفة على نطاق واسع في المجتمع، تتقاطع مع روايات تاريخيّة مكتوبة؛ وبالتّالي تحتفظ بصدقيّة عالية رغم عدم شيوعها على صعيد المجتمع عامّةً.

ب. ملاحظات منهجيّة على روايات عقّال الدّروز الشّفهيّة

إنَّ غرض هذا البحث، كما سبق وذكر، هو استعمال الرّوايات الشّفهيّة للكشف عن ظاهرة فريدة في سلوك عقّال الدّروز تجاه العنف والقتال وليس تقديم دراسة نظريَّة عامة عن استعمال المصادر الشّفهيّة مصدرًا للتّأريخ أو عن شروط استعمال كلّ من التّاريخ الشّفهيّ أو المأثور الشّفهيّ دليلًا تاريخيًّا (historical evidence) والإشكالات التي تعترض ذلك.[20] لذا، سأقتصر في ما يلي على عرض بعض الخصائص والإشكالات المشتركة التي تتميَّز بها الرّوايات الشّفهيّة المرتبطة بتاريخ عقّال الدّروز عمومًا، وبموضوع البحث خصوصًا؛ وذلك من خلال ثلاثة محاور رئيسة هي:

1. الرّاوي في حال استعمال التّاريخ الشّفهيّ، أو سلسلة االرُّواة في حال استعمال المأثور الشّفهيّ.
2. المضمون أو المحتوى التّاريخيّ.
3. القالب الأدبي الذي يحمل المضمون، مثل الشعر الموزون، والنثر المسَجّع، والقصص، وغيرها، ويختصّ بالمأثور الشفهي حصريًّا.

1. الرّاوي

تنتمي معظم الرّوايات الشّفهيّة المرتبطة بموضوع هذا البحث إلى مخزون الدّروز الدّينيّ، ومحفوظة بالتّالي لدى العقَّال أنفسهم. ولهذا الواقع نتائج مُهمَّة على بُنية هذه الرّوايات ومحتواها، أي على المحورين الأوَّلَيْن بالتّحديد. تعترض الباحث عند تقصّي روايات من تاريخ العقّال الشّفهيّ عقبةٌ رئيسة تتمثَّل بأنّ أشدّ الرُّواة صدقيّة وأكثرهم اطّلاعًا على الأحداث المتعلّقة بشؤون العقّال وتاريخهم القريب والمعاصر هم كبار العُقّال سنًّا، وخصوصًا المرجِعيَّات الدّينيّة منهم، وذلك لمعايشتهم الكثير من الأحداث المهمّة على مدى فترة زمنيّة طويلة نسبيًّا، ومعرفتهم بمجرياتها عن كثب. غير أنَّ منظومة الأخلاق التي تحكم سلوكيّات هؤلاء العقّال تجعلهم يرفضون أن يُذكر اسمهم مصدرًا للرّوايات الشفهيّة التي ينقلونها؛ إذ يعتبرون أن ذِكْرَهم مرجعًا لتلك الرّوايات تلك ضربٌ من ضروب الشّهرة، الَّتي تتحرّك لها شهوة نفس الإنسان حبًّا بالذّكر والجاه المذمومين عندهم وطلبًا لهما.

ولا يقتصر هذا السّلوك المتحفّظ تجاه التّاريخ الشّفهيّ على كبار العقّال، بل يتعدّاه إلى كثير من العقّال الّذين يقتدون بهم. وبالتّالي، يصعب في كثير من الأحيان اقناع الرُّواة من العقّال بالسّماح باستعمال إفاداتهم مصدرًا للرّوايات الشّفهيّة. لذلك، سأقتصر في بحثي هذا على اثبات أسماء الرُّواة الذين أذنوا لي باستعمال إفاداتهم. ولكن، سأشير عند سماعي الرّوايات من أكثر من عاقل، بعضهم لم يأذنوا لي باستعمال إفاداتهم مصدرًا في بحثي، إلى أنّي سمعتها من عقّال آخرين دون تحديد أسمائهم لاثبات شيوع الرّوايات تلك. في الواقع، ساعد موضوع البحث هذا، على عكس مواضيع أخرى عن عقّال الدّروز سبق لي جمع الرّوايات الشفهيّة عنها، في تخطّي هذه المشكلة. فقد شاعت معظم هذه الرّوايات مع الوقت، وباتت معلومة

[19] Vansina, *Oral Tradition as History*, 28.

[20] كتابا هنيج (Henige) وفانسينا (Vansina) المذكوران في الحواشي السابقة مفيدان في هذا المجال.

لدى الكثير من العقّال وغيرهم من الدّروز؛ ما قلّل من تأثير مشكلة عدم ذكر اسم الرّاوي على صدقيّة الرّوايات الّتي سأستعملها.

تصير مشكلة الرّاوي أشدّ تعقيدًا عند البحث عن روايات من المأثور الشّفهيّ، إذ ثمّة سببٌ إضافيّ يجعل العاقل يرفض نسبة رواية شفهيّة إليه. فقد برَّر لي أحد العقَّال من قرية خربة الشّوف رفضه استعمال إفادته في بحثي، أنّه علاوةً على رغبته في عدم ذكر اسمه مصدرًا لتلك الرّوايات الشّفهيّة، هو يخاف أيضًا على ذمّته من أن يكون قد دخل عليها قبل أن تَصِلَه تحريف يجعلها زائفة إمّا كليًّا أو جزئيًّا، الأمر الذي يُوقعه في خطر المشاركة في نقل أخبار خاطئة أو غير دقيقة، وهي مخاطرة لا يرغب الوقوع فيها.

كذلك، يواجه الباحث في مأثور العقّال الشفهيّ مشكلة غياب سلسلة النَّقل الكاملة، التي تعود في تسلسلها إلى الرّاوي الأوّل المعاصر للأحداث التي تتحدّث الرّواية الشّفهيّة عنها. ولا يمكن في حالة عقّال الدّروز أن يمتدّ تسلسل الرُّواة أبعد من جيل أو جيلَيْن سابقَيْن على الأكثر. فالعاقل عندما يسمع خبرًا، يكتفي لتقييم صدقيّته بالنَّظر إلى مدى ثقته بصدقيّة الرّاوي الأخير الذي سمع منه الرّواية، ولا يسأل غالبًا عن المصدر الذي أخذ عنه الرّاوي الثِّقة. وقد حاولتُ جاهدًا خلال السنوات التي عملت فيها على جمع الرّوايات الشّفهيّة الحصول على حلقات أكثر من سلاسل الرُّواة التي تستند إليها الرّوايات التي جمعتها، ولكن دون جدوى.

لذلك، تعترض استعمال روايات عقّال الدّروز الشفهيّة إشكالات حقيقيّة تتعلّق بالمحور الأوّل من المحاور الثلاثة التي ذكرت آنفًا، أي الرّاوي. ومع ذلك، لا يمكن رفض المأثور الشّفهيّ كلّه على أساس عدم اكتمال سلسلة الرُّواة؛ فكثير من الرّوايات المُكوِّنة لهذا المأثور واسعة الانتشار، ويمكن القول بأنّها تنتمي إلى الوعيّ الجماعيّ لفئة العقّال، ممّا يُعطيها أهميّة كبيرة بالرّغم من الإشكالات المذكورة. وقد لجأت إلى طريقة خاصّة في تقييم صدقيّة ما جمعت من مأثور شفهيّ، حيث اكتفيت باستعمال الرّوايات التي صنَّفها كبار العُقَّال، وخصوصًا المرجِعيّات العليا منهم، باعتبارها ذات صدقيّة عالية؛ وطرحت جانبًا تلك التي أُبدي شكوكًا فيها.

وقد دفعني إلى اعتماد الطريقة هذه خبرٌ سمعته من المرجع الدّيني الشيخ أبو محمّد جواد وليّ الدّين (1916 – 2012) عن رواية مشهورة كان قد سمعها في شبابه تتعلّق بالشيخ أبو محمّد سعيد العقيلي (ت. 1915؟) من بلدة السّمقانيّة[21] والشيخ أبو حسين محمود فرج من بلدة عبيه (ت. 1953)،[22] وكانا من كبار عقّال الدّروز في وقتهما، وتتحدّث عن آداب العقّال بزيارة بعضهم لبعض. يبدو أنَّ الشيخ أبو محمّد جواد لم يستسغ صيغة الرّواية كما سمعها في الأوّل، فاستبان أمرها من الشيخ أبو حسين محمود فرج نفسه عندما التقاه في أحد الاجتماعات الدّينيّة؛ وتبيّن له أنَّ الزيارة حصلت فعلًا، ولكن على صورة تختلف عمّا سمع سابقًا.[23] استوقفني آنذاك ردّ الشيخ أبو حسين محمود بعد سماعه الصيغة الخاطئة لخبر الزيارة، حيث قال متعجّبًا: "كيف بليق (أي يليق) هيك؟" ويعني أنَّ الخبر كما سمعه لا يختلف عن الواقع وحسب، بل لا يتوافق وآداب العُقّال؛ وهو ما تنبّه له بالفعل الشيخ أبو محمّد جواد ودفعه إلى التثبّت من

[21] كان الشيخ سعيد العقيلي من كبار المرجعيّات الدينيّة الدرزيّة في جبل لبنان مطلع القرن العشرين. ولم أقف بَعْد على تاريخ محقّق لسنة وفاته، إلّا أنّه توفيّ خلال الحرب العالميّة الأولى وقبل ولادة الشيخ أبو محمّد جواد وليّ الدّين في نهاية العام 1916.

[22] السّمقانيّة بلدة في قضاء الشوف من محافظة جبل لبنان، وعبيه بلدة في قضاء عاليه من المحافظة نفسها.

[23] الشيخ أبو محمّد جواد وليّ الدّين، مقابلة أجراها المؤلّف، 10 آب 2003. ثمَّ طلبت منه أن يرويها لي ثانيةً في 22 شباط 2010. ولم أذكر تفاصيل الرّواية اختصارًا، كونها لا تتعلّق بموضوع البحث. لم يكن بإمكاني استعمال إفادة الشيخ وليّ الدّين وهو حيّ.

صحّته من الشّخص المعني بالحادثة مباشرةً، أي الشيخ أبو حسين محمود فرج. يُظهر هذا الخبر أمرين مُهمَّيْن: الأوّل أنَّ المأثور الدّيني الشفهي لعقّال الدّروز قد يدخل عليه الخطأ؛ الثاني والأهم، أنَّ لكبار عقّال الدّروز من أمثال الشيخ أبو محمّد جواد وليّ الدّين قدرة أشدّ من بقيّة العقّال على تقييم صدقيّة الرّوايات الشفهيّة، وبخاصّةٍ المأثور منها، وتمييز ما يتوافق منها مع تعاليم مذهبهم وآدابه الدّينيّة – أو ما "يليق" – وما لا يتوافق معها، وذلك لتعمّقهم بمعرفة التعاليم والآداب تلك. وروايات كهذه تعبّر بالتأكيد عن سلوكيّات العقّال وآدابهم؛ وهي بالتالي، تفيد بحثي هذا.

2. المضمون

تتّصف معظم روايات عقّال الدّروز الشّفهيّة من حيث مضمونها بخصيصة مُشتركة؛ إذ تتميّز بإهمالها — وفي كثير من الأحيان عمدًا — التفاصيل التاريخيّة مثل أسماء الأشخاص والتواريخ المحدّدة إلخ؛ وتركّز بالمقابل على المضمون الحكميّ أو الوعظيّ المتضمّن فيها، أي العبرة. وتجدر الإشارة إلى أنّ المؤرّخ الدّرزي حمزة ابن سباط (ت. 1520 أو بعدها)، وكان من العقّال، قد اتبع الأسلوب نفسه في سرد أحداث مهمّة جرت في حياة الأمير السيّد وأظهرت فضائله الكثيرة، فلم يذكر تاريخ الأحداث ولا أسماء الأشخاص المعنيّين بها أو بلداتهم، بل اقتصر على إيراد صفاتهم الاجتماعيّة أو الوظيفيّة الّتي تساعد في إيضاح العِبْرَة من الحادثة المذكورة.[24] وقد ذكر لي الرُّواة في أحيان كثيرة أسماء الأشخاص الذين ورد ذكرهم في الرّوايات، إلّا أنّهم طلبوا عدم الافصاح عن الأسماء تلك.

بالطّبع، تَفقد الرّوايات الشفهيّة كثيرًا من مضمونها التّاريخيّ عندما تغيب أسماء الأشخاص والأماكن وتضيع التّواريخ. ومع ذلك، يمكن الوثوق بأنَّ بعض الرّوايات تحتفظ بنواةٍ من الحقيقة كونها متناقلة بنطاق واسع وتحظى بقبول عامّ لدى العُقّال. ويمكن الوصول إلى هذه النّواة عبر إخضاع تلك الرّوايات التي تحظى بصدقيّة عالية، وفق الشّروط التي ذكرتها سابقًا، للتّحليل المنطقيّ والنّقد السّياقي، ومن خلال مقابلتها بمصادر تاريخيّة أخرى ذات صلة مباشرة بالموضوع أو تنتمي إلى الحقبة الزمنيّة نفسها لمعرفة ما تحمله من حقيقة وما قد يكون دخل عليها من خطأ، أو تبديل، أو تحريف مُتعمّد، أو غير مُتعمّد.

3. القالب الأدبيّ

تأخذ معظم الرّوايات الشّفهيّة التي يتناقلها عقّال الدّروز الطابع القَصصيّ، بحيث تُروى قصة قصيرة أو طويلة عن شخص أو حدث معيّن. لا تتّخذ هذه القصص قالبًا أدبيًّا ثابتًا، بل تُروى بلغة الرّاوي الأخير، وهي ممارسة يمكن أن تُفقر مضمون الرّواية التاريخيّ. فالقالب الثّابت — سواءً أكان شعرًا أم نثرًا مُسجّعًا الخ — يساعد بقوّة في احتفاظ الرّواية بمضمونها الأصليّ.

وكي لا يبقى الحديث عن هذه الرّوايات مُبهمًا أو محصورًا في المجال النظريّ، ربّما من المفيد عرض رواية شفهيّة تتعلّق مباشرة بموضوع البحث، وغالبًا ما كنت أسمعها من كبار العُقّال في منطقة الشّوف الأعلى عندما كنت أسأل عن روايات شفهيّة تعبّر عن قِيم عُقّال الدّروز وسلوكيّاتهم.

[24] مثال على ذلك: "شخص من ذوي الايسار"، و"شخص من الأكابر ببعض النواحي وكان ذي (ذا) سطوة وقوة والناس اليه منقادين وله هيبة ووقار وكان زعيم قومه ... وكان من التلاميذ الكبار"، و"سكن بعض القرايا"، و"رجل كبير ... ريس (أي رئيس) قومه من ذوي الايسار والثروة والسّطوة"، و"رجل يخاف (أي يُخيف) السبيل". انظر ابن سباط، **كتاب صدق الأخبار**، 74-75 و77-78.

ج. قصّة العاقل المظلوم

تعود أحداث قصة "العاقل المظلوم" على الأرجح إلى القرن التاسع عشر،[25] وقد سمعت هذه الرّواية من عدد من عُقّال الشّوف الأعلى أبرزهم الشّيخ أبو سليمان حسيب الحلبيّ (ت. 2016) من بلدة بطمة، والّذي كان أحد المرجعيّات الدّينيّة في منطقته.[26] تقول الرّواية الشّفهيّة أنَّ أحد عقّال الدّروز من أبناء المنطقة المذكورة – ويدعى قاسم بحسب عدّة رواة – كان يمرّ يومًا على طريق تصل بلدة عمّاطور ببلدة بعذران وينتعل حذاءً جديدًا؛ فصادف مرور جنديّ عثمانيّ على الطّريق نفسه، فغدر به وطعنه بخنجر طمعًا في سرقة حذائه الجديد! غير أنَّ العاقل كان رجلًا صلبًا، قويّ البُنية؛ فتمالك نفسه وتمكّن من الجنديّ وطرحه أرضًا، ثمَّ جرّده من سلاحه وهمَّ بقتله. ولكن، انتبه العاقل أنَّ الطّعنة التي أصابته قد تكون قاتلة، فقال للجنديّ: "لولا خوفي من ربّي لقتلتك"؛ ثمَّ تركه يذهب في سبيله! اعتلَّ العاقل بعد الحادثة أيامًا قبل أن تُدركه الوفاة بسبب جُرحه.[27]

يُوضح الرُّواة أنّ وراء تصرّفه هذا قاعدة دينيّة أساسيّة عند عقّال الدّروز: القتل من كبائر الذّنوب التي تقطع صلة المؤمن بربّه وتحرمه ثواب الآخرة، فلا يجوز اللّجوء إليه إلَّا دفاعًا عن النّفس (أي الحياة) والعِرض[28] والأرض. وإذا كان جرح العاقل مُهلكًا، ينتفي بذلك مبرّرُ قتل الجنديّ دفاعًا عن الحياة، إذ هو هالكٌ بسببه لا محالة. والقتل في هذه الحالة يصير انتقامًا؛ وهو محُرّمٌ عندهم. عندما روى الشيخ أبو سليمان حسيب الحلبي القصّة لي، وصف فعله بإعجاب واضح، مُعلّقًا: "العفو عند المقدرة". فقد كان بمقدور العاقل أن يقتل الجنديّ المعتدي، لكنَّه اكتفى بنزع سلاحه ليرفع أذاه عنه، ثمَّ أخلى سبيله خوفًا من الوقوع في قتل لا يجوّزه الشّرع الدّينيّ؛ واختار أن يموت مظلومًا على أن يموت ظالمًا.[29] فعلٌ كهذا يُعبّر عن أمرَيْن: قدرة على ضبط مشاعر الغضب وترجيح العقل عليها، وخوف شديد من الوقوع في القتل ظلمًا.

يُلاحظ افتقار الرّواية إلى تحديد الاسم الكامل للعاقل الّذي تتمحور حوله الحادثة وزمان وقوعها؛ وهو أمر غير مُستغرب، إذ ما يَهُمُّ العقّال منها هو العِبرة الدّينيّة: العاقل عفا عن قاتله خوفًا على دينه. يحتفظ العقّال بهذه الرّواية ويتناقلونها جيلًا بعد جيل ويتحدّثون بها مادة للتّربية الرّوحيّة لأنّها تُجسّد المبادئ

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[25] أو إلى العقدين الأوّلَيْن من القرن العشرين؛ إذ لم يعد يتواجد عسكر عثمانيّ في سوريا وجبل لبنان بعد العام 1918. وليس للقصّة عنوانٌ محدّد، بل أسميتها قصّة "العاقل المظلوم" اصطلاحًا.

[26] الشيخ أبو سليمان حسيب الحلبي، مقابلة أجراها المؤلّف، 13 تشرين الأوّل 2004. تجدر الإشارة إلى أنّي لم أكن لأذكر اسم الشيخ الحلبي لو كان ما زال حيًّا. وقد أفادني سلمان ماهر أنَّ الشّيخ أبو سلمان محمود الشّمعة (ت. 1999)، وكان من وجهاء الدّين في بلدته عين قني ومنطقة الشوف الأعلى ومُشرفًا عامًّا على خلوات القطالب في بلدة بعذران لعدّة عقود، كان أيضًا يروي هذه القصّة؛ وأنَّه سمعها منه مباشرةً. سلمان ماهر، مقابلة أجراها المؤلّف، 9 نيسان 2019؛ وهو من عقّال بلدة عين قني الشوف. بطمة، وبعذران، وعمّاطور، وعين قني جميعها بلدات في قضاء الشوف.

[27] يُشير الرُّواة إلى أنَّ العاقل مدفون في المكان المعروف باسمه إلى يومنا هذا على الجانب الأيمن للطريق التي تصل بلدة عمّاطور ببلدة بعذران.

[28] يُشير "العِرض" في الثقافة العربيّة إلى شرف العائلة وكرامتها، وخصوصًا فيما يتعلق بسمعة الإناث من أفرادها.

[29] قارن بسلوك مشابه ورد في القرآن في رفض القتل وكرهه: ﴿قَالَ لَأَقْتُلَنَّكَ قَالَ إِنَّمَا يَتَقَبَّلُ اللهُ مِنَ الْمُتَّقِينَ * لَئِن بَسَطتَ إِلَيَّ يَدَكَ لِتَقْتُلَنِي مَا أَنَا بِبَاسِطٍ يَدِيَ إِلَيْكَ لِأَقْتُلَكَ إِنِّي أَخَافُ اللهَ رَبَّ الْعَالَمِينَ * إِنِّي أُرِيدُ أَن تَبُوءَ بِإِثْمِي وَإِثْمِكَ فَتَكُونَ مِنْ أَصْحَابِ النَّارِ وَذَلِكَ جَزَاء الظَّالِمِينَ * فَطَوَّعَتْ لَهُ نَفْسُهُ قَتْلَ أَخِيهِ فَقَتَلَهُ فَأَصْبَحَ مِنَ الْخَاسِرِينَ﴾؛ **سورة المائدة** 5: 27-30. قارن أيضًا مع ما قاله الحكيم اليوناني أفلاطون عن صفات النفس العادلة (أو الإنسان الفاضل)، من أنّها ترفض بطبعها الظّلم والتّعدّي؛ وأنّها متى فُرِضَ عليها أن تختار بين أن تَظْلِم أو تُظلم، تفضّل أن تُظلم على أن تَظْلِم؛ انظر على سبيل المثال Plato, *Gorgias* 469c; *Crito* 49c–d.

والقِيَم التي يحملونها. فروايات كهذه تُربّي العقّال على بُغض العنف والقتل، والخوف من الوقوع فيهما من دون مجوّز شرعيّ؛ وتُرسِّخ عندهم تحريم القتل في الدّين. ولهذا السّبب بالتّحديد تكتسب هذه الرّواية ومثيلاتها، بالرّغم من افتقارها إلى التّفاصيل التّاريخيّة، أهميّة كبيرة للباحث في سلوكيّات عُقّال الدّروز عمومًا وموقفهم الدينيّ من أعمال العنف والقتل خصوصًا. من ناحية أخرى، تصل روايات كهذه، في كثير من الأحيان، إلى الدّروز غير المتديّنين، فتنشر بينهم أخلاق العُقّال ومبادئهم، وتؤثّر في سلوكهم، وتساهم في بناء السلوكيّات الجماعيّة التي سجّلها مؤرّخون أجانب في فترات مختلفة، كما سيظهر في القسم الخامس أدناه.

ثانيًا: مسلك العقّال

من الأهميّة بمكان التّشديد بأنّ نطاق بحثي هذا ينحصر في سلوك عقّال الدّروز دون غيرهم. لذلك، من المفيد تقديم تعريف مختصر بالعقّال وسلوكهم. ينقسم الدّروز، من حيث الممارسة الدينيّة، إلى مجموعتين: الملتزمين دينيًّا من جهة، وغير الملتزمين من جهة أخرى. كان يُطلق على الملتزمين دينيًّا في المصادر التاريخيّة اللبنانيّة التي تعود إلى ما قبل القرن العشرين، عُقّال، ويُطلق على غير الملتزمين جُهّال.[30] كما استعمل المؤرّخ الدّرزي العاقل حمزة ابن سباط لفظة "أجواد" (صيغة الجمع من جيّد) للدّلالة على الدّروز الملتزمين دينيًّا.[31] أمّا في مجتمع الدّروز المعاصر، فلا يستعمل أي من تلك المصطلحات، ويكتفي الدّروز الملتزمون دينيًّا باستعمال لفظة "جويّد" (وهي صيغة تصغير من جيّد، وجمعها أجاويد)، تواضعًا، في الإشارة إلى من هم من طبقتهم.

ينتظم العقّال في أماكن دينيّة تنتشر في قراهم، تُعرف بمجالس الذّكر أو الخلوات، ويرأسها أحدهم، ويعرف بين الدّروز في وقتنا الحاضر بالسائس (من سياسة). تُعنى هذه المجالس بالتنشئة الدّينيّة بكافة مجالاتها، أي المعرفيّة، والإيمانيّة (العقيدة)، والأخلاقيّة والمسلكيّة.[32] من واجب السائس القيام بهذه الوظائف في مجلسه، وله الحقّ بمراقبة حياة جميع العقّال المنتظمين فيه وسلوكيّاتهم، ومحاسبتهم على أي مخالفة للقوانين الدينيّة أو خطأ يقترفونه. غير أنّ السائس وعقّال مجلسه هم جميعًا تحت رعاية ورقابة شيوخ المناطق، أو المرجعيّات الدينيّة فيها؛ والجميع تحت رعاية شيخ البلاد ورقابته، والذي هو برتبة الرئيس الرّوحيّ لدروز بلاده.[33]

التزام تلك المجالس يُقيّد سلوك العقّال الدّروز ويفرض عليهم اتّباع سلوكيّات حياتيّة مُقتصدة ومنضبطة وفقًا لتعاليمهم الدينيّة ونظام أخلاقيّ شامل. ولا يمكن للعقّال الدّروز، بموجب التزامهم تلك المجالس، مخالفة أيّ من شروطها الدينيّة أو السلوكيّة دون التعرّض للمطالبة والمحاسبة.[34] يكتسب سلوك العقّال في استعمال العنف أهميّة كبيرة عندهم لأنّه يرتبط بإحدى الذنوب الكبيرة في مسلكهم، أي القتل.

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[30] للاطّلاع على دلالات مصطلحي العقّال والجهّال الدينيّة لدى الدّروز، راجع الفصل الثالث من كتاب سعيد أبو زكي، **مشيخة عقل الدّروز في لبنان: بحث في أصولها ومعناها وتطوّرها** (بيروت: دار المشرق، 2021).

[31] انظر ابن سباط، **كتاب صدق الأخبار**، 70، و103.

[32] عن مجالس الذكر، انظر المصدر نفسه، 72-73. وعن شروط مسلك العقّال الدينيّة وأغراضه، انظر الفصل الثالث من كتاب سعيد أبو زكي، **مشيخة عقل الدّروز في لبنان**.

[33] عن طبقات العقّال، انظر المصدر نفسه.

[34] انظر ابن سباط، **كتاب صدق الأخبار**، 73.

لذلك، يجب على العُقّال التقيّد بشروط مُحدّدة تضبط استعمالهم العنف؛ والتي هي موضوع بحثي هذا. سأعمد في ما يلي إلى عرض نظرة عُقّال الدّروز الدّينيّة إلى العنف والقتل والتّعدّي مُستندًا إلى بعض الآيات القرآنيّة وبعض الاقتباسات من أدبيّات وعظيّة مهمّة للأمير السّيّد عبد الله التّنّوخي والشّيخ الفاضل محمّد أبي هلال، واللذين يُعتبران من أبرز علماء الدّين عندهم.

يحتوي الخطاب القرآني على نهي واضح عن التّعدّي بدليل قوله: ﴿وَلَا تَعْتَدُواْ إِنَّ اللهَ لَا يُحِبُّ الْمُعْتَدِينَ﴾.[35] كما كشف عن تأثير روحيّ كبير لارتكاب العنف حين أشار إلى أنّ الـمُعتدين محجوبون عن إدراك حقائق الإيمان والتّوحيد، بدليل قوله: ﴿كَذَلِكَ نَطْبَعُ عَلَى قُلوبِ الْمُعْتَدِينَ﴾.[36] هذا يعني أنَّ التّعدّي، بحسب الخطاب القرآني، يحجب البصيرة القلبيّة عن معرفة الحقائق الإلهيّة ويمنع قلب الإنسان من الإيمان بها؛ وهو بالتّالي يُفسد ديانة مرتكبه، ويحرمه الفوز بالآخرة ونعيمها بدليل قوله: ﴿وَيْلٌ يَوْمَئِذٍ لِّلْمُكَذِّبِينَ * الَّذِينَ يُكَذِّبُونَ بِيَوْمِ الدِّينِ * **وَمَا يُكَذِّبُ بِهِ إِلَّا كُلُّ مُعْتَدٍ أَثِيمٍ * إِذَا تُتْلَى عَلَيْهِ آيَاتُنَا قَالَ أَسَاطِيرُ الْأَوَّلِينَ * كَلَّا بَلْ رَانَ عَلَى قُلُوبِهِم مَّا كَانُوا يَكْسِبُونَ * كَلَّا إِنَّهُمْ عَن رَّبِّهِمْ يَوْمَئِذٍ لَمَحْجُوبُونَ** * ثُمَّ إِنَّهُمْ لَصَالُو الْجَحِيمِ﴾.[37]

أمام هذا التّأثير الرّوحيّ الخطير لارتكاب التّعدّي، لا بدَّ أن يحترز المؤمنون من الوقوع فيه ويجتهدوا في ذلك. غير أنَّ الخطاب القرآني أقام توازنًا دقيقًا بين دعوته إلى اجتناب التّعدّي من جهة وبين حفظ حقّ النّاس بالدّفاع عن أنفسهم رفعًا لتعدّي الغير عليهم من جهة أخرى، حيث قال: ﴿وَقَاتِلُواْ فِي سَبِيلِ اللهِ **الَّذِينَ يُقَاتِلُونَكُمْ وَلَا تَعْتَدُواْ** إِنَّ اللهَ لَا يُحِبِّ الْمُعْتَدِينَ﴾.[38] كما أوجب على المؤمنين حُسن معاملة الّذين لا يتعدّون عليهم، حيث قال: ﴿**لا يَنْهَاكُمُ اللهُ عَنِ الَّذِينَ لَمْ يُقَاتِلُوكُمْ فِي الدِّينِ وَلَمْ يُخْرِجُوكُم مِّن دِيَارِكُمْ أَن تَبَرُّوهُمْ وَتُقْسِطُوا إِلَيْهِمْ** إِنَّ اللهَ يُحِبُّ الْمُقْسِطِينَ، إِنَّمَا يَنْهَاكُمُ اللهُ عَنِ الَّذِينَ قَاتَلُوكُمْ فِي الدِّينِ وَأَخْرَجُوكُم مِّن دِيَارِكُمْ وَظَاهَرُوا عَلَى إِخْرَاجِكُمْ أَن تَوَلَّوْهُمْ﴾.[39]

كذلك، جعل الخطاب القرآنيّ الحلم والعفو من الفضائل الإنسانيّة الواجبة على المؤمنين ومن معالم الإحسان المحبَّبة إلى الله، بدليل ذكرهما ضمن صفات المؤمنين الحسنة بقوله: ﴿وَالْكَاظِمِينَ الْغَيْظَ وَالْعَافِينَ عَنِ النَّاسِ﴾.[40] والحلم والعفو هما فضيلتان ضروريّتان لاجتناب العنف ومنع التّعدّي. وسنرى أنَّ موقف عقّال الدّروز الدينيّ الـمُعبَّر عنه في الرّوايات الواردة أدناه ينسجم مع القواعد القرآنيّة هذه، فهم يحرّمون ما حُرّم من التّعدّي ويحرصون على اجتنابه، ويحتفظون بالمقابل بحقّ الدّفاع عن النفس بوجه من يتعدّى عليهم.

وقسّم الأميرُ السّيّد البشرَ في رسالة بعث بها إلى عموم عقّال الدّروز في جبل لبنان تعرف بـ "كتاب إلى جماعة البلدان" إلى أربع طبقات: نباتيّة، وحيوانيّة، وإنسانيّة، وملكيّة؛ وأضاف الشّرس والتّعدّي والقهر والعنف إلى الطبقة الحيوانيّة التي هي دون الطبقة الإنسانيّة، حيث قال:

ومن تجاوز هذه المنزلة (أي النباتيّة)، فقد صار إلى رتبة الحيوان الذي هو أيضًا عاملٌ بما ذكرناه من المبالغة في الرّاحةِ والأكلِ والشّربِ وغيره، **الموجب له الطّيش وغيره**، مثل البطر **والغَضَب**

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[35] **سورة المائدة** 5: 87.

[36] **سورة يونس** 10: 74.

[37] **سورة المطفّفين** 83: 10-16.

[38] **سورة البقرة** 2: 190.

[39] **سورة الـمُمتَحِنة** 60: 8-9.

[40] **سورة آل عمران** 3: 134.

والشَّرَس والقَهْر والمَنْع والاستِكْبار وحُبّ الرّياسة، فهذه ثمرة عموم كلّ حيوان في البرّ والبحر والهواء، كلٌّ يَقْهَرُ بعضهُ بَعْضًا، ويأكلُ بعضهُ بعضًا. فمن توصّل إلى هذه الدَّرجة، فهو في سبيل البهائمِ ما زال، غير أنَّ الحيوان يُنتفعُ بلبنها ولحومها، والنَّوعُ البشري المنقطع عندَ هذا الحدِّ لم يحصلْ إلَّا على الإضرار، وغَضَبِ الجبَّار، والوصول إلى حريق النار، **في جملة الأشرار الفجّار.**[41]

تُظهر هذه العبارات بشكل واضح نظرة الأمير السّيّد إلى العنف والتّعدّي والقتل؛ فهي جميعًا من طباع الحيوان اللّاعقلانيّ ولا تليق بالإنسان العاقل. وأعمال كهذه تهبط بفاعليها من البشر إلى رتبة أدنى من رتبة الإنسان، فتضرب شرفهم الإنسانيّ. وشرح الأمير السيّد طباع الإنسان العاقل، فقال:

ومن منحه الله القبول والتّرقّي والعروج إلى **حدِّ الإنسانيّة**، كان من **ثمرةِ أفعاله العقل والحلم والسُّكون والرّزانة والرّجحان**، والعفاف ... والطهارة ومكارم الأخلاق ... **والصّبر والاحتمال، والغضّ عن بلوغ الأغراض** ... فهذه درجة الإنسان التي تبعها السَّلف الصَّالح من أهل الفضل والإخوان.[42]

إذًا، فمن طِباع الإنسان العاقل، بحسب الأمير السيّد، الحلم والسّكون، وهما قائمان على ضبط الغضب. ومن طباعه أيضًا الصّبر والاحتمال اللّذان يعتمدان على رياضة القوّة الغضبيَّة على الانقياد للعقل واتّباع إرشاده. ثمَّ أوضح في موضع لاحق من الرّسالة أهميّة الحلم ورَبَطَ بين الميل إلى العنف واستحسانه وبين الجهل، وَجَعَلَ الجهل من نتائج الكفر. ثمَّ رَبَطَ بين الامتناع عن التّعدّي والكفّ عن الأذى وبين الحلم، وجعل الحلم ثمرة العقل، وجعل العقل مركز العبادة التي هي غرض الربّ، حيث قال:

واعلموا أنَّ المكافاة على القبائح والمناظرةِ في الشرور والمكائد هي مولود الجهل، والجهل مولود الكبر، والكبر مولود الظّلمة، **والظّلمة بدعة إبليس. والغضو عن المكائد والكَفُّ عَنِ الأذَى والاحتمال للمَكارِه مولود الحِلم**، والحلم مولود العلم، والعلم نتيجة العقل، **والعقل خزانة العبادة، والعبادة غرض الرب.**[43]

إذًا، بحسب الأمير السّيّد، ثمّة صلة وثيقة بين الإيمان وبين عدم التّعدّي وكره العنف واجتنابه، وكذلك بين الكفر وبين الميل إلى ارتكاب العنف والتّعدّي. وقد حذَّر الأمير السيّد المؤمنين العُقَّال من أن يُستفَزُّوا للتسبّب في بدء الشُّرور وافتعال النّزاعات واندلاع العنف، حيث قال: **"وَإِيّاكُمْ أَنْ تَكُونُوا شُعْلَةَ النَّارِ**، وَسَبَبًا لِبُلُوغِ غَرَضِ الأَشْرارِ"، وذلك لأنَّ **"لَيْسَ يَلْزَمُ الجاهِلَ ما يَلْزَمُ العاقِلَ**، فَثَمَرَةُ الجاهِلِ الجَهْلُ، وَثَمَرةُ العاقِلِ العَقْلُ".[44] يُشير كلامه إلى أنّ من واجب العُقَّال الحرص الشّديد على صيانة إنسانيّتهم وطباعها العاقلة؛ ويجب أن تُعبّر أعمالهم عن حرصهم هذا وتجسّد إنسانيّتهم؛ لأنَّ ثمرة الإنسان عملُه، وصحيح عمله يعبّرُ عن حقيقة إيمانه وتحقُّقه الدّيني. لذا، وبحسب الأمير السّيّد، فإنَّ الحلم ونَبْذَ العنف واجتنابَ الظّلم والتّعدّي هي من طباع الإنسان التي يجب على العاقل التخلّق بها ولا يمكنه إغفالها أو إهمالها، لأنَّها جزءٌ لا يتجزأ من طباعه الإنسانيّة الشّريفة التي تميّزه عن بقيّة الكائنات الحيّة من نبات وحيوان، وشرط ضروريّ لصيانة طبيعته العاقلة التي هي مركز العبادة. وذكر ابن سباط أن الأمير السيّد كان يمنع من وقع

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[41] الأمير السيّد، **كتاب إلى جماعة البلدان**، مخطوط، محفوظات المؤلّف الخاصّة، 18-19.

[42] المصدر نفسه، 19-20.

[43] المصدر نفسه، 25.

[44] المصدر نفسه، 39. يُفسِّر كلام الأمير السيّد هذا عبارة الشيخ أبو محمّد جواد التي سترد لاحقًا: "لا يُسيء إلى المرء إلَّا ما يخرج منه".

في إحدى الذنوب الكبيرة، وأهمّها القتل والزنى، مِن حضور مجالس التّذكار؛[45] ويستعمل العُقّال هذا القصاص على مرتكبي الكبائر إلى يومنا هذا.

وعدّد الشيخ الفاضل في إحدى مواعظه الدّينيّة القصيرة أربعًا وثمانين خَصلة وَاجبة على كلّ مؤمن عاقل، ذكر في جملتها: **"أَنْ يَكُونَ ... قَلِيلَ**[46] **الـمُنَافَرَة، قَلِيلَ الـمُنَازَعَةِ ... كَثِيرَ الاحْتِمَالِ ... قَلِيلَ الخِلافِ ... وَشَرُّهُ مَأْمُونٌ ... وَإِنْ أَغْضَبُوهُ صَبَرَ وَاحْتَمَلَ"**.[47] بالطبع، تُساعد كلُّ هذه الخصال على اجتناب الوقوع في العنف والتّعدّي. جعل الشّيخ الفاضل اكتساب هذه الخصال واجبًا دينيًّا أصيلًا كما فعل قبله الأمير السّيّد. وسيتّضح بعد هذا العَرْض المختصر أنَّ مُعظم ما سيرد في ما يلي عن مواقف عقّال الدّروز من العنف وسلوكهم في استعماله يرتكز إلى مبادئ دينيّة أساسيّة وثابتة ممّا يجعل تعميمها على حقبات زمنيّة سابقة أمرًا مُبرَّرًا ومنطقيًّا. وبالطّبع، فإنَّ أمرًا كهذا يمكّن الباحث من درس المصادر التّاريخيّة الأساسيّة عن تاريخ الدّروز بعمق أكبر وكفاءة أشدّ.

ثالثًا: سلوك عُقّال الدّروز في الحرب الأهليّة اللبنانيّة (1975 - 1990)

تُعتبر الحروب أحد أهمّ ميادين اختبار مبادئ الناس في استعمال العنف وسلوكهم في استعماله. ويحتفظ عُقّال الدّروز بكثيرٍ من الرّوايات الشّفهيّة التي تنقل أقوالًا وتوصياتٍ ومواقف وأفعالًا لمرجِعيّاتهم الدّينيّة العُليا أثناء الحرب الأهليّة تعبّر عن المبادئ التي تحدّد موقفهم الدّينيّ مِن العنف والقتال والشروط التي تقيّد استعمالهما. مِن أبرز هؤلاء المرجِعيّات الشيخ أبو حسن عارف حلاوي من الباروك، وكان يُعتَبرُ المرجِع الرّوحيّ الأعلى في لبنان منذ مطلع ثمانينيّات القرن العشرين إلى حين وفاته في العام 2003؛ والشيخ أبو محمّد جواد وليّ الدّين من بعقلين،[48] والّذي بَرَزَ في المدّة نفسها عالمَ دِيْنٍ ثقةً وأحد المرجِعيّات الدّينيّة العليا في طائفة الدّروز؛ ثمّ انفرد بالرّئاسة الرّوحيّة بعد وفاة الشيخ أبو حسن عارف وحتى وفاته في العام 2012. تُعدّ أقوالُ الشيخَيْن المذكورَيْن وتوجيهاتهما مُلزمة لغيرهما من العقّال لكونهما من أصحاب الولاية الدينيّة عليهم، كما يَعتبر عُقّال الدّروز الشيخين الأعلم بينهم بمبادئ مسلكهم وقِيَمِهم وأشدّهم تحقيقًا لها.

أدّت المرجعيّات الدّينيّة الدّرزيّة دورًا رئيسًا بتثبيت دروز جبل لبنان في قراهم طوال الحرب الأهليّة. فقد كان الشيخان أبو حسن عارف وأبو محمّد جواد وبقيّة المرجعيّات الدّينيّة، باتفاق الرُّواة جميعًا، يحثّون الدّروز بلسان القال والحال على الصّمود في أرضهم والدّفاع عنها. فبعد وصول الحرب إلى قراهم، كان الشيخ أبو حسن عارف يدعو الدّروز كافّة إلى الدّفاع عن وجودهم وأرضهم وعِرضهم. وقد نقل لي أكثر من راوٍ تكراره في مجالسه العامة والخاصة موقف عُقّال الدّروز المبدئيّ من العنف والتعدّي: "نحن

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[45] ابن سباط، **كتاب صدق الأخبار**، 73، حيث قال: "ثمّ جعل من ثبت عليه ذنب من **الذنوب العظيمة** أمر بنفيه [من تلك المجالس]"، أي بابعاده عنها مدّة حياته. ثمّة تفسير للمعاني الروحيّة لهذا القصاص في نظر العقّال في كتاب أبو زكي، **مشيخة عقل الدّروز في لبنان**، 214 – 216. وقد ميّز القرآن كبائر الذنوب عن غيرها في عدّة آيات، أذكر منها على سبيل المثال: ﴿إِن تَجْتَنِبُواْ **كَبَآئِرَ** مَا تُنْهَوْنَ عَنْهُ﴾، **سورة النساء** 4: 31، و ﴿وَالَّذِينَ يَجْتَنِبُونَ **كَبَائِرَ** الْإِثْمِ وَالْفَوَاحِشَ وَإِذَا مَا غَضِبُوا هُمْ يَغْفِرُونَ﴾؛ **سورة الشورى** 42: 37. وقد أجمع المفسّرون المسلمون على أنّ القتل، موضوع البحث، هو من كبائر الذنوب.

[46] قليل هنا وفي بقيّة الاقتباس بمعنى عديم.

[47] الشيخ الفاضل، **أربعٌ وثمانون خَصلةٌ**، مخطوط، محفوظات المؤلّف الخاصّة، 4-5.

[48] الباروك وبعقلين بلدتان في قضاء الشوف.

نُحرّم التّعدّي منّا ونُحرّم التّعدّي علينا"،[49] و"من يتعدّى ليس مِنّا، **ومَن لا يردّ التّعدّي ليس منّا**".[50] وبقي الشيخ أبو حسن عارف حلاوي طوال مدّة الحرب الأهليّة مقيمًا في بلدة معصريتي بالرّغم من المخاطر التي أحاطت بها،[51] وبخاصة بعد تعرّضها في العام 1982 للقصف المدفعيّ والحصار من ميليشيا القوّات اللبنانيّة وجيش الاحتلال الإسرائيلي. وبحسب أحد الرُّواة، "كان النّاس يقصدونه في المنزل للسؤال عن مجرى الحرب، وعمّا إذا كان الأمر يوجب إجلاء النساء والأطفال عن البلدة ونقلهم إلى أمكنة أكثر أمانًا، **فيجدونه بلباس البيت** – أي غير مستعد لمغادرة البلدة، فيشعرون بالطمأنينة ويدركون أنّه لا يرى ضرورة لأمرٍ كهذا".[52] بدوره، كان الشيخ أبو محمّد جواد وليّ الدّين، بحسب عقّال بلدته، يجول في مناطق الدّروز وقراهم – وأحيانًا في أثناء القصف، مخاطرًا بحياته – داعيًا الأهلين إلى التشبّث بأرضهم والدّفاع عنها.[53]

كذلك، أضاء بعض الرُّواة على حرص الشيخ أبو محمّد جواد وليّ الدّين على حماية قرى الشوف من المخاطر التي ترافقت مع احتلال الجيش الإسرائيلي جبل لبنان في صيف العام 1982؛ وذلك برفضه الرّضوخ لأوامر ضباطهم بتسليم أهالي الشوف أسلحتهم الحربيّة لجيش الاحتلال. فبعد مدّة من الاجتياح، دخلت فرقة من جيش الاحتلال بلدة بعقلين بغرض تجريد سكّانها من السّلاح؛ فرفض الأهالي الانصياع لهم قبل أخذ موافقة شيخ البلدة، أي الشيخ أبو محمّد جواد وليّ الدّين. قصد الضابط الإسرائيلي منزل الشيخ وليّ الدّين وركن دبّابته على مدخل حوشه الأمامي موجّهًا المدفع صوبه ترهيبًا. ثمّ قابل الشيخ وأبلغه بضرورة تسليم أهالي البلدة جميع ما بحوزتهم من الأسلحة فورًا؛ فرفض الشيخ طلبه، قائلًا: "عندنا سلاح ولن نسلّمه، **سلاحنا لندافع عن كرامتنا**، سلاحنا ليس ضدّ أحد إلّا الذي يعتدي علينا". فتهدّد الضّابط الإسرائيلي الشيخ مستعرضًا عظيم قوة الجيش الإسرائيلي ومتوعّدًا بتدمير البلدة بقصف جوّي، فأجابه الشيخ متحدّيًا: "ما من أحد يموت قبل وقته (أي ساعة أجله)؛[54] نحن عمّرنا البيوت، إذا هدّمتوها، منعمّر غيرها". غير أنّ الضابط ألحّ على ضرورة الانصياع لأوامر الجيش الإسرائيلي وتسليم السلاح؛ فردّ الشيخ غاضبًا: "أنتم أقويا بسلاحكم، ولكن ضعاف مع الله تعالى؛ لن نسلّم سلاحنا". ثمّ تحدّث الضابط الإسرائيلي مع قيادته، فطُلب منه ترك بعقلين من دون جمع السّلاح؛ فغادر بعدها منزل الشيخ أبو محمّد جواد متوجّهًا إلى بلدة أخرى مجاورة للغرض نفسه. أُبلغ الشيخ وليّ الدّين بالأمر، فأوعز إلى عقّال حاضرين بالتوجّه سريعًا إلى القرى المجاورة وتبليغ أهلها بضرورة عدم تسليم السّلاح للجيش الإسرائيلي؛ فتمّ ذلك، ولم ينجح

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[49] سمعت هذا الخبر من عدّة عقّال في الجرد، أذكر منهم: معين الصّايغ، مقابلة أجراها المؤلّف، 25 أيار 2017. وهو من بلدة شارون في قضاء عاليه.

[50] سمعت هذا الخبر من عدّة عقّال؛ أذكر منهم: معين الصّايغ. وقد ورد هذا الخبر في: رمزي مشرفيّة، "وليّ من لبنان أضاء التماسك والوحدة"، **جريدة النهار** (بيروت)، 28 تشرين الثاني 2003، 6. واندرج هذا المقال ضمن تغطية جريدة النهار الصحفيّة لمأتم الشيخ أبو حسن عارف حلاوي. شارون بلدة في قضاء عاليه.

[51] معصريتي بلدة في قضاء عاليه.

[52] سمعت هذا الخبر من عدّة عقّال، أذكر منهم: معين الصّايغ.

[53] سمعت هذا الخبر من عدّة عقّال، أذكر منهم: حاتم أبو ضرغم، مقابلة أجراها المؤلّف، 31 آذار 2019؛ وعلي سعد الدّين، مقابلة أجراها المؤلّف، 7 نيسان 2019؛ ومحمّد صفا، مقابلة أجراها المؤلّف، 6 نيسان 2019. والثلاثة المذكورون: حاتم أبو ضرغم وعلي سعد الدّين ومحمّد صفا هم من بعقلين.

[54] في الإشارة إلى: **﴿قُل لَا أَمْلِكُ لِنَفْسِي ضَرًّا وَلَا نَفْعًا إِلَّا مَا شَاءَ اللَّهُ لِكُلِّ أُمَّةٍ أَجَلٌ إِذَا جَاءَ أَجَلُهُمْ فَلَا يَسْتَأْخِرُونَ سَاعَةً وَلَا يَسْتَقْدِمُونَ﴾. سورة يونس** 10: 49.

الجيش الإسرائيلي بجمع السّلاح من أهالي الشوف الدّروز، إلّا القليل.[55] تُظهر هذه الرّواية، في نظر الرُّواة، أحد أهم معالم علاقة عقّال الدّروز بالسّلاح، هو الوسيلة الّتي يدافعون بها عن كرامتهم في وجه التّعدّي والظلم؛ وتنبع أهميّته عندهم من حرصهم على العيش في أرضهم بكرامة. فلو سلّم الدّروز حينذاك أسلحتهم للجيش الإسرائيلي لربما تعرّضوا لمجازر وتهجير قصريّ.

كان الشيخ أبو محمّد جواد وليّ الدّين أوّل مَنْ شرّع للعقّال في بداية الحرب الأهليّة اقتناء السلاح الحربي والتدرّب على استعماله لأغراض دفاعيّة حصرًا.[56] وقد تحدّث غالب الرُّواة عن حثّ الشيخَيْن وبقيّة المرجعيّات الدّينيّة الدّروز عامّةً والعقّال خاصّةً على الدّفاع عن أرضهم وعِرضهم بوجه التّعدّي، واقتناء السّلاح الحربيّ لتحقيق هذا الغرض بالتّحديد؛ وشدّدوا على تقييدهم استعمال السّلاح واللّجوء إلى العنف بضوابط دينيّة صارمة. انتظم غالب العقّال الذين اشتركوا في الأعمال القتاليّة خلال الحرب الأهلية في فِرق خاصة بهم، تخضع سلوكياتها لرقابة المرجعيّات الدينيّة العليا وتوجيهاتهم. وسأذكر فيما يلي بعض ما نقل الرُّواة من توصيات الشيخَيْن عن الشّروط التي تُجيز استعمال العنف في الحرب دفاعًا. حرّم الشيخان، بحسب الرُّواة، التّعدّي بأشكاله كافّة، وطلبا من جميع العقّال الذين حملوا السّلاح دفاعًا عن أهلهم وأرضهم "ألّا يبتدئوا بإطلاق النّار، وينتظروا أنْ يبدأ الطّرف الآخر بذلك"، كي يكونوا بموقع الدّفاع، ويكون عدوّهم، لابتدائه بالهجوم، في موقع التّعدّي.[57] وكان الشيخ أبو حسن عارف يُضيف على ذلك، تشدّدًا، طالبًا منهم أن "لا يردّوا سريعًا على نيرانهم إلّا بعد التأكُّد من استمرارها"، ليتحقّقوا من وقوع اعتداء عليهم. وفي المقابل، كان يرغّبهم في ضرورة التزام مبدأ عدم التّعدّي، قائلًا: "اضمنوا لي عدم التّعدّي، أضمن لكم النّصر".[58]

من جهة أخرى، أفاد الرُّواة أنّ الشّيخين، حلاوي ووليّ الدّين، والمرجِعيّات الدينيّة الأخرى كانوا "يرفضون أن يُقاتل العُقّال خارج حدود مناطق الدّروز وبلداتهم كي لا يقعوا في التّعدّي".[59] ومع أنّ بلاد الدّروز، كما سيتّضح لاحقًا في القسم الخامس، شملت تاريخيًّا مناطق جبل لبنان الجنوبي كافة؛ إلّا أنّ مرجعيّاتهم الدّينيّة حصروا، بحسب عُقّال قابلتهم، شرعيّة القتال أثناء الحرب الأهليّة بحماية القرى الدّرزيّة.[60] وقد ذكر بعض هؤلاء الرُّواة، دعمًا لمقولتهم هذه، أنّ الشيخ أبو محمّد جواد كان يُعدِّد على مسامع العقّال أسماء ثلاث معارك خسرها الدّروز في الحرب الأهليّة، وسقط لهم فيها العديد من القتلى، ويعزو خسارتهم فيها إلى قتالهم خارج مناطقهم، وبالتّالي وقوعهم في التّعدّي. جميع تلك المعارك وقعت في مناطق جبل لبنان الجنوبي، وفي قرى مُتاخمة لقرى درزيّة.[61]

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[55] سمعت هذا الخبر من عدّة عقّال في بعقلين، أذكر منهم: حاتم أبو ضرغم، وعلي سعد الدين، ومحمّد صفا.

[56] محمّد صفا.

[57] سمعت هذا الخبر من عدّة عقّال، أذكر منهم: معين الصّايغ، وسلمان ماهر، ومحمّد صفا.

[58] المصدر نفسه.

[59] سمعت هذا الخبر من عدّة عقّال في الشوف والجرد، أذكر منهم: حاتم أبو ضرغم، وسلمان ماهر، ومعين الصّايغ.

[60] المصدر نفسه.

[61] سمعت هذا الخبر من عدّة عقّال، أذكر منهم: حاتم أبو ضرغم، ويحيى جمّول، مقابلة أجراها المؤلّف، 12 حزيران 2017. لم يتمكّن الرُّواة من تذكّر أسماء المعارك تلك بثقة؛ ولكن، أفادني خالد الحلواني، وهو من عقّال بلدة مرسته في قضاء الشوف ولديه معرفة مباشرة بالحرب الأهلية، أنّ المعارك الثلاث التي خاضها الدّروز خارج أرضهم وخسروها كانت: عاريّا (قضاء بعبدا، 1976)، والمطلّة (قضاء الشوف، 1983)، وسوق الغرب (قضاء عاليه، 1989)؛ ووافقه على ذلك عقّال آخرون. خالد الحلواني، مقابلة أجراها المؤلّف، 9 نيسان 2019. وأشار يحيى جمّول إلى أن الشيخ وليّ الدين كان يذكر، إلى جانب المعارك

كذلك، تكرّر حديث الرُّواة عن تشديد الشّيخ وليّ الدّين في الطلب من العقّال الذّاهبين إلى جَبَهات القتال "ألّا يطلقوا النار على النساء والأطفال،[62] وألّا يستمرّوا بإطلاق النّار على العدوّ متى رمى سلاحه"[63] أو أدار ظهره هاربًا،[64] إذ لا يعود حينذاك في موقع التّعدّي. وكان يوصيهم أيضًا "ألّا يتعرّضوا للأسرى بأذيّة أو قتل[65] ولا يحتفظوا بهم".[66] من جهة أخرى، نقل بعض الرُّواة عن الشيخ وليّ الدّين "تحريمه على العقّال المرابطين في الجبهات استعمال المدافع، كي لا يتسبَّبوا في قتل المدنيّين على سبيل الخطأ".[67] وعندما سَمِعَ عن تدرّب بعض العُقّال على استعمال مدفع الهاون، غضب وأمر العقّال الحاضرين قائلًا: "على المدفعيّة ما بدّي ولا جويّد (أي عاقل)؛ المدفع أعمى يصيب أبريا".[68] ثمَّ سمع باستقدام أحد عقّال البلدة مدفع رشّاش من عيار 23 مم، فتوجّه إلى مكانه مستنكرًا وعاتبًا. غير أنّ العاقل شرح للشيخ وليّ الدّين أنّ المدفع الرشّاش، مثله مثل البندقيّة الرشّاشة، يطلق الرّصاص بشكل مباشر، ولكن يختلف عنها بأنَّ حجم رصاصه أكبر ومدى رمايته أطول؛ وهو بالتّالي يختلف عن مدفع الهاون ومدافع الميدان ذات الرميّات المنحنية وغير الدّقيقة، وراجمات الصواريخ ذات الرميّات العشوائيّة. فسمح له باستعماله شرط ألّا يوجّهه إلى الأحياء السكنيّة ويقتصر على المواقع العسكريّة.[69] تُظهر قواعد الاشتباك هذه حِرْصَ الشّيخَيْن على تَقْييدِ استعمال العُنْفِ بنطاقِ الدِّفاع عن النَّفس والأرض والعِرض.

كذلك، أشار الكثير من الرُّواة إلى تشديد الشيخين، حلاوي ووليّ الدين، كما بقيّة المرجعيَّات الدّينيّة في المناطق في تحريم أذيّة النّساء والأطفال والشّيوخ وقنص المدنيّين العُزّل، والتعرّض لأرزاق الأهالي من الطّوائف الأخرى الّذين نزحوا عن قراهم هربًا من الحرب والاغتنام منها.[70] وعندما هجّر مسيحيّو الشّوف قراهم بعد اشتداد الحرب، استغلّ بعض الدّروز أراضٍ زراعيّة في تلك القرى من دون

الثلاث، معركة المسيفرة (حوران)، وهي معركة هجوميّة خاضها الثوار الدّروز ضد الجيش الفرنسي خارج مناطقهم في عام 1925؛ وقد خسروها وسقط لهم فيها قتلى كثيرون.

[62] سمعت هذا الخبر من عدّة عقّال في بعقلين، أذكر منهم: حاتم أبو ضرغم، وأمين البلّاني، مقابلة أجراها المؤلّف، 31 آذار 2019؛ وعماد أبو دهن، مقابلة أجراها المؤلّف، 31 آذار 2019، ويحيى جمّول، ومحمّد صفا. أمين البلاني وعماد أبو دهن ويحيى جمّول هم جميعًا من أبناء بعقلين.

[63] سمعت هذا الخبر من عدّة عقّال في بعقلين، أذكر منهم: أمين البلّاني، وحاتم أبو ضرغم، وعماد أبو دهن، ومحمّد صفا.

[64] سمعت هذا الخبر من عدّة عقّال في الشوف، أذكر منهم: أمين البلّاني، وحاتم أبو ضرغم، وعماد أبو دهن، ومحمّد صفا ويحيى جمّول. وينقل محمّد صفا كلام الشيخ أبو محمّد جواد للعقّال المتوجّهين إلى الجبهة على النحو التّالي: "القواص على النسوان والولاد ممنوع، وعلّي بسلّم سلاحه (أي يستسلم) ممنوع، وعلّي بدير ضهره ممنوع".

[65] سمعت هذا الخبر من عدّة عقّال في الشوف، أذكر منهم: محمّد صفا، وحاتم أبو ضرغم، وعماد أبو دهن، ومنير ذبيان، مقابلة أجراها المؤلّف، 28 أيار 2017؛ وهو من بلدة نيحا الشوف.

[66] سمعت هذا الخبر من عدّة عقّال في بعقلين، أذكر منهم: محمّد صفا، وحاتم أبو ضرغم.

[67] سمعت هذا الخبر من عدّة عقّال، أذكر منهم: محمّد صفا، وحاتم أبو ضرغم، وعماد أبو دهن، ومنير ذبيان.

[68] محمّد صفا.

[69] حاتم أبو ضرغم ويحيى جمّول.

[70] سمعت هذا الخبر من عدّة عقّال، أذكر منهم: حاتم أبو ضرغم، وسلمان ماهر، ومحمّد صفا، ومعين الصّايغ، وأمين البلّاني. ونقل محمّد صفا كلام الشيخ أبو محمّد جواد وليّ الدّين للعقّال المتوجّهين إلى الجبهة على النحو التالي: "انتبهوا، ممنوع الغنايم، ما حدا يجيب معه شي"؛ ولكنّه كان يستثني من حُرمه هذا السّلاح الحربيّ لأنّه قد يُستعمل بالتّعدّي. كما أخبرني أنّ إثنين من عقّال بعقلين جلبا معهما من جبهة القتال أسلحة صيد غنيمة، ووصل خبرهما إلى الشيخ أبو محمّد جواد، فقاصصهما ولم يسمح لهما باستعمالها أو الاحتفاظ بها؛ وأوضح أنَّ القصد بالسّلاح، هو السّلاح الحربي فقط.

إذن أصحابها؛ فأعلن الشّيخان، بحسب الرُّواة، تحريم شراء المنتجات الزّراعيّة الواردة منها.[71] وقد سمعت هذه الإفادات جميعها من عُقّال دروز حملوا السّلاح دفاعًا عن أرضهم وأهلهم أثناء الحرب الأهليّة الأخيرة. وهي تُظهر، بحسب الرُّواة، مُرتكزات موقفهم من العنف والقتل: هم لا يجوّزونه إلّا عن ضرورة قاهرة، وهي الدّفاع عن النفس والأرض والعِرض؛ ويحرصون على عدم الوقوع في التّعدّي بأشكاله كافةً حتى في خضمّ الحروب التي تهدّد وجودهم وبقاءهم في أرضهم.

وثمّة رواية مشهورة بين عقّال الشوف تعود إلى المراحل الأولى من الحرب الأهليّة في أواخر سبعينيّات القرن العشرين تُظهر من جهة التزام العقّال توصيات المرجعيّات الدّينيّة بتحريم التّعدّي وقَنْص المدنيّين، ومن جهة أخرى حِرْص المرجعيّات الدّينيّة على تثبيت هذه الوصايا بين الناس وترغيبهم بها، وذلك بالثّناء على من يلتزمها ليتشجّع الآخرون على الاقتداء بهم. فذات صباح في العام 1977، سُمع في كفرنبرخ صوت إطلاق رصاص كثيف مصدره بلدة بريح المختلطة، فأدركوا أن ثمّة قتالًا قد بدأ فيها. تجمّع نفر من دروز كفرنبرخ وقرّروا النزول للدّفاع عن أهلهم في بريح.[72] غير أنَّ الشيخ أبو محمّد علي البتدّيني (ت. 1990)، وهو من عقّال البلدة، لم يشأ انتظار تجمُّع الأهالي، فحمل بندقيّته الرّشّاشة وقصد التوجّه إلى بريح وحيدًا. التقى الشيخَ البتدّيني في الطريق شابٌّ حدث السنّ من أقربائه وطلب مرافقته، فأذن له الشيخ بذلك، ونزلا معًا نحو بريح حتى وصلا إلى مكان قريب من أرزاق له يعلو بلدة المطَيْلة الملاصقة لبريح. هناك، انتبها إلى تحصينات عسكريّة على مسافة قريبة منهم، فيها مسلّحون مسيحيّون مجهّزون بأسلحة ثقيلة كانوا يستعملونها في قنص أهالي بريح من الدّروز؛ وكان الشيخ يعرف المكان جيدًا حيث له أرزاق فيه. فتمركز وقريبه خلفهم وبدآ بإطلاق الرّصاص على المسلّحين المتحصّنين. وقد أدّى عنصر المفاجأة إلى إحداث هلع وارتباك في صفوف هؤلاء المسلّحين، ممّا دفعهم إلى ترك تحصيناتهم والتّراجع إلى قراهم بعد أن كان سقط لدروز بريح عدد من الضّحايا المدنيّين بسبب قنصهم المفاجئ. أراح دحرُ الشيخ البتّديني وقريبه الشاب المسلّحين المسيحيّين المتحصّنين في أعالي المطَيْلة دروزَ بريح من قنصهم القاتل، ومكّنهم من استعادة المبادرة العسكريّة والسّيطرة على البلدة.

بعد أن تأكّد من هزيمة المسلّحين في المطَيلة، قَفَل الشيخ عائدًا إلى بلدته كفرنبرخ. وفي طريق العودة، استراح الشيخ والشاب المرافق له بعض الوقت في أرض له تُطِلّ على كنيسة في بلدة الفوّارة (فوّارة جعفر)؛[73] فانتَبها إلى جمعٍ غفيرٍ من الأهالي المسيحيّين يتجمّعون في باحة الكنيسة خائفين. كانت الكنيسة ومن في باحتها في مرمى نيرانهما، فهمَّ الشاب أكثر من مرّة بإطلاق النّار؛ غير أنَّ الشيخ البتدّيني منعه بعدما لاحظ أنّهم مدنيّون عُزَّل، مُنبّهًا إياه: "هذا يصير تعدّي". ثمّ باشرا مجدّدًا الصعود في الجبل باتجاه بلدتهما، فانتبه إليهما عناصر الجيش السوري المتمركزين في أعالي كفرنبرخ، وكانوا قد دخلوا حديثًا إليها، فأطلق السوريّون النّار صوبهما ثمَّ أرسلوا فرقة للقبض عليهما؛ فتمكّنوا من أسر الشاب، بينما استطاع الشيخ البتدّيني الفرار بعد اشتباك معهم. غير أنّ الجيش السوري ظلّ يتعقّب الشيخ البتدّيني مدّة ممّا اضطره إلى الابتعاد عن بلدته والتخفّي عن نظرهم. لاحقًا، روى الشيخ البتدّيني الحادثة للمرجع الدّينيّ الشيخ أبو محمّد جواد وليّ الدّين، موضّحًا أنّه لو أطلقا النّار حينذاك على جمع المسيحيّين في باحة كنيسة الفوّارة، "لانطفأ الرّصاص جميعه باللّحم" لكثافة الناس؛ ولكنّهما امتنعا عن ذلك لأنّهم كانوا مدنيّين. ففرح

[71] سمعت هذا الخبر من عدّة عقّال، أذكر منهم: أمين البلّاني وسلمان ماهر، ومعين الصّايغ، ويحيى جمول. وهو خبر شائع بين دروز جبل لبنان.

[72] كفرنبرخ وبريح بلدتان في قضاء الشوف.

[73] الفوّارة والمطيلة بلدتان في قضاء الشوف.

الشيخ وليّ الدّين بما سمع وأثنى عليه، وقال له على مسمع الحاضرين: "إن شاء الله بنيتك، **ستتوفّق الطائفة"** في الحرب، أي بنيّة عدم التّعدّي.[74] وشاع هذا الحديث بين العُقّال.

وقد عبّر الشيخ محمّد أبو شقرا (ت. 1991)، شيخ عقل الدّروز بين عامي 1949 و1991، عن مبدأ العقّال بعدم التعدّي منهم وعدم القبول بالتعدّي عليهم بشكل رسميّ خلال الحرب الأهليّة. فعلى سبيل المثال، صرّح الشيخ أبو شقرا خلال مقابلة صحفيّة في العام 1983 أنَّ: "الدّروز في هذا الوطن كانوا هنا منذ القدم **وسيبقون هنا مهما كلف الأمر** وما داموا أحياء فيسبقون هنا. الدّرزي اليوم مُستعد أن يموت في بيته، ولن يغادره ... **فمن يتعدّى عليهم فإنّهم سيردّون عدوانه. والدّروز معروف عنهم أنّهم يردّون العدوان ولا يعتدون على أحد. وهذا كلام كنت قد أعلنته** [سابقًا]".[75] في العام 2008، بعد مرور ثمانية عشر عامًا على انتهاء الحرب الأهليّة، أكّد الشيخ نعيم حسن، شيخ عقل الدّروز وقتذاك،المبدأ نفسه ثانية وبشكل رسميّ في اجتماع عامّ واستثنائيّ عُقد في خلوات القطالب في بعذران الشوف بعد يومين من أحداث 11 أيّار في جبل لبنان؛ حيث قال في خطابٍ علنيّ: "إنّ التّطاول على حرمات منازلنا وقُرانا يمثّل انتهاكًا صارخًا **لعقيدة الأرض والعِرض** الّذي يأبى الموحّد الدّرزي العيش من دون الذّود عنها، التزامًا منه **بحُرم الطائفة التّعدّي منها والتّعدّي عليها".**[76]

في مطلع ثمانينيّات القرن الماضي، حدث قَصْفٌ مدفعيّ عنيف من جهة قرى المسيحيّين على معصريتي، البلدة التي كان يقطنها الشّيخ أبو حسن عارف حلاوي وقتذاك. فردّ الدّروز بدورهم على مصدر النيران بقصف مدفعيّ. وبعد انتهاء جولة العنف هذه وعودة الهدوء، سارع بعض المقاتلين الدّروز إلى بيت الشيخ أبو حسن عارف ليطمئنّوا على سلامته وأهالي البلدة؛ فسألوه إن كان القصف العنيف قد تسبَّب في ضحايا، فأجابهم: "الحمد لله لا، وإن شاء الله ما يكون في ضحايا في الطرف الآخر"![77] ويُشير الرُّواة إلى أنّ كلام الشيخ في ظرفٍ كهذا – ولم يمض وقتٌ طويلٌ على انتهاء القصف – دليل على بُغضه العنف. فالنار لا تُطفئ النار، بل تُغذّيها، وكذلك العنف يجرّ العنف؛ وإذا تسبَّب قصف الدّروز في ضحايا عند المسيحيّين، فسيؤدّي ذلك إلى المزيد من العنف والقتل، وهو يرغب في انتهاء ذلك كلّه وعودة السّلم والاستقرار.

من جهة أخرى، أخبرني الشّيخ أبو سلمان أمين عامر من بعقلين (ت. أيلول 2012) قبل مدّة قصيرة من وفاته عن حادثة مشهورة جرت مع الشّيخ أبو محمّد جواد وليّ الدين أثناء الحرب الأهليّة وكان هو حاضرًا عليها.[78] فقد أُخِبر الشيخ أبو محمّد جواد أنَّ أهالي بلدة غريفة بدأوا بالنزوح عنها بعد ورود أنباء عن هجومٍ كان يُعدّ في المقلب الآخر على الشوف من الجبهة الجنوبيّة،[79] وأن البلدة مُهدّدة بالسقوط سريعًا ما لم تُرسل تعزيزات عسكريَّة للدّفاع عنها. فأرسل الشيخ بعض عقّال البلدة إلى مدخل بعقلين

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[74] حمزة البتدّيني، مقابلة أجراها المؤلّف، 22 نيسان 2019. وهو من عقّال كفرنبرخ وابن الشيخ علي المذكور في الرّواية. والحادثة كما ذكرت مشهورة، وقد سمعت خبرها من عدّة عقّال في منطقة الشوف، أذكر منهم: حاتم أبو ضرغم، وعلي سعد الدّين. كما سمعت عدّة روايات أخرى تُظهر التزام العقّال توصيات الشيخ هذه في خضمّ المعارك.

[75] سمير صبرا وضاهر شحادة، "شيخ عقل الطّائفة الدّرزيّة محمّد أبو شقرا لـ «الشراع»: إنّهم يدفعونا للطّريق الصّعبة وسنواجه الانتحار بعمل انتحاري"، مقابلة مع شيخ عقل الدّروز محمّد أبو شقرا، **الشراع**، رقم 49 (21 شباط 1983): 17.

[76] "اجتماع درزي روحي في الشوف يرفض 'التّطاول على حرمات المنازل'"، **جريدة الحياة** (بيروت)، 14 أيّار 2008، 8.

[77] سمعت هذا الخبر من عدّة عقّال في منطقة الجرد، أذكر منهم: معين الصّايغ. هذا الخبر شائع بين الدّروز.

[78] الشيخ أبو سلمان أمين عامر، مقابلة أجراها المؤلّف، 1 تموز 2012. وكان من وجهاء عقّال بعقلين.

[79] غريفة بلدة في قضاء الشوف.

الجنوبي وأمرهم بمنع أهالي غريفة من النّزوح وحثّهم على العودة إلى منازلهم. ثمّ حمل بندقيّته، وكان قد قارب السّبعين من العمر، ونادى الشيخ أبا سلمان أمين (أي الرّاوي)، وكان قد تجاوز السّبعين أيضًا، وسارعا مع عاقل آخر من البلدة مشيًا على الأقدام قاصدين غريفة قبل أن تلحق بهم سيارة لنقلهم. كان بعض أهالي البلدة قد بدأوا بالنّزوح عنها حين وصل الشّيخ ورفاقه، فصار يقابلهم ويستنهض معنويّاتهم، ويحثّهم على العودة إلى منازلهم والصّمود في قريتهم، ويُطمْئن النّساء الخائفات قائلًا لبعضهنّ: "لا تخافوا ... لن يصلوا إليكم إلّا على جثثنا". ثمّ أراد الشّيخ وليّ الدين استنهاض شجاعة المقاتلين الذين يتولّون الدّفاع عن البلدة، فطلب أن يضعوه في "أنحس" موقع فيها، وقصَدَ بذلك النقطة الأكثر خطرًا ومواجهة. فهيَّأوا له على عَجَل موقعًا مُتقدّمًا في جبهة البلدة الأماميّة؛ ورابط الشيخ فيه مع فرقة قليلة العدد والعتاد طوال اللّيل. غير أنّه عاد في اليوم التّالي إلى بيته بعد أن توافدت فرق المدافعين من العقّال وغيرهم من الدّروز وحصّنوا جبهات البلدة. فلمّا دخل المنزل كان يحمد الله أنّه لم يُضطر إلى استعمال بندقيّته، قائلًا: "الحمد لله ما قَوَّصْنا ولا ضَرَب"، أي أنّه لم يطلق رصاصة واحدة. وكان يردّد هذه الجملة نفسها عندما يسأله العقّال عن تلك الحادثة.[80] يُخبر الرُّواة هذه الحادثة باعتبارها دليلًا واضحًا على كرهه استعمال السلاح والقتل، وأنّه ذهب إلى جبهة القتال مُكرهًا من باب القيام بواجب الدّفاع عن الأرض والعِرض.

وقد تعرّفتُ على الشّيخ أبو محمّد جواد وليّ الدّين عن قرب في زيارات مُتكرّرة قمت بها خلال العقد الأخير من حياته؛[81] فسمعت منه مباشرةً وفي أكثر من مناسبة تكرار مواقفه المذكورة في ما يلي من حمل السّلاح وشروط استعمال العنف والقتل. اقتضت موجة الاغتيالات السياسيّة والاضطرابات الأمنيّة التي عصفت بلبنان بعد العام 2004، ثمَّ أحداث أيّار من العام 2008 وما جرى من هجمات مُسلّحة على مناطق آمنة في بيروت وجبل لبنان، أن يوضح الشيخ أبو محمّد جواد، بصفته رئيس الدّروز الرّوحيّ حينذاك، موقف طائفة الدّروز من الأحداث تلك. وقد سمعته يُكرّر في مجالسه العامّة والخاصّة: "نحن نحرّم التّعدّي، ولكن إذا تعدّى علينا أحد فسندافع عن أنفسنا". كما سمعته مرارًا يوصي العُقَّال الذين يزورونه قائلًا: "المؤمن الديّان لا يقتني السّلاح ولا يحمله إلّا لغرض شريف"، أي ما سبق وذكر من الدّفاع عن النّفس والأرض والعِرض. ويحذّرهم من التّعدّي، قائلًا: "من يتعدّى ليس منا"، أي أنّه ليس بمؤمن حقيقيّ؛ و"نحن لا نرضى بالتّعدّي، ولن نحمي فاعله"؛ أي أنَّ العقّال لن يحموا مُرتكب التعدّي أيًّا كان، كي لا يشاركوه المسؤوليّة الأخلاقيّة عن فعله، أو يشجعوا الآخرين على التّعدّي. وكان يدعوهم إلى التّعقّل والحلم وكظم الغيظ وضبط الانفعالات كي لا يستفزّهم أحد إلى الوقوع في التّعدّي، ويذكّرهم بمبدأ دينيّ ثابت عندهم: "نحن لا نحبّ الأذيّة لأحد". وكان يقول عند سماعه بأخبار العنف الذي يتعرّض له المدنيّون في الدّول العربيّة والأجنبيّة التي شهدت حروبًا أو قيام ثورات شعبيّة: "نحن لا نستحسن القتل، ولا نرضى به".[82]

تعمّدت سرد أقوال الشّيخ وليّ الدّين جميعًا، وغالبها مشهورة بين النّاس، وسمعها منه العديد من زواره، لأظهر من جهة حِرصه على منع العقّال الّذين يتّبعون أمره ويسترشدون بوصاياه من الإقدام على التّعدّي أو تبريره لأنفسهم؛ ولأبيّن من جهة أخرى حرصه في الوقت عينه على حثّهم على عدم قبول الظّلم واستعدادهم الدّائم للدّفاع عن أنفسهم وعِرضهم وأرضهم متى قرَّر الآخرون التّعدّي عليهم. وكما ذكرت سابقًا، سمعت هذه الأقوال جميعها مباشرةً وعلى مراحل عدّة خلال عقد من الزّمن من شيخٍ كان قد

[80] سمعت هذا الخبر من عدّة عقّال في بعقلين، أذكر منهم: محمّد صفا وعماد أبو دهن.

[81] بالتّحديد بين العامين 1999 و2012.

[82] سمعت هذه الأقوال مباشرة من الشيخ وليّ الدّين في أثناء زياراتي المتكرّرة له في المدّة المذكورة.

أصبح المرجع الدينيّ الأعلى في طائفته. توضح أقواله هذه أبعادًا مُهمَّة لموقف عقّال الدّروز الدّينيّ من العنف والتّعدّي، وقد شدّد عليها جميع الرُّواة: هُم لا يقتنون السّلاح رغبةً فيه أو حبًّا للعنف، بل لضرورته في رفع الظّلم والتّعدّي عنهم. وأمَّا تشديده على حقّ الدّروز في الدّفاع عن النّفس إذا ما قرّر الآخرون التّعدّي عليهم، فهو حقٌّ أقرّته جميع الشّرائع الدّينيّة والوضعيّة من دون استثناء.

قبل الانتقال إلى المحور التالي، تجدر الإشارة ثانيةً، إلى أنّ القصد من هذا العرض ليس التّأريخ لوقائع الحرب الأهليّة اللبنانيّة، بل الكشف عن المبادئ التي حكمت سلوك العقّال في القتال التي شهدته وقيّدت مشاركتهم فيها. بالتأكيد، شهدت الحرب اللبنانيّة قتل مُسلّحين دروز مدنيّين مسيحيّين كما شهدت قتل مُسلّحين مسيحيّين مدنيّين دروزًا. غير أنّ انتظام حياة العُقّال الدّروز الروحيّة في مجالس الذكر يُقيّد استعمالهم العنف والقتل بشروط محدّدة لا تجيز قتل الأبرياء، وتُعرّضهم للقصاص الدّينيّ الشديد في حال عدم الالتزام بها؛[83] ما حصر مشاركتهم في الحرب بمهام دفاعيّة في مناطقهم وفي إطار معارك حربيّة مع جهات مسلّحة. أذكر على سبيل المثال، حادثة اغتيال الزعيم الدّرزي كمال جنبلاط في آذار من العام 1977، والتي تبعتها ردود فعل عُنفيّة من قبل بعض الدّروز من غير العُقّال، ذهب ضحيّتها عشرات المدنيّين المسيحيّين في ثلاث قرى شوفيّة. صادف مرور العميد عصام أبو زكي (ت. 2018)، وهو ضابط أمن درزي من الشوف، بالقرب من مسرح الجريمة فكتب في مذكراته عمّا حدث مباشرةً بعد اكتشاف جريمة الاغتيال إذ كان من أوائل الواصلين إلى مكان وقوعها. بدايةً، وصف مشاعر الغضب العارمة التي كانت تظهر على الدّروز الذين صادف مرورهم في المكان بُعيد الاغتيال، وكيف تحوّلت سريعًا إلى "عاصفة من الغضب" وسط إرباك شديد بين المتواجدين في مسرح الجريمة؛ ما دفعهم إلى طلب الاستعانة بالمرجع الروحيّ الشيخ أبو محمّد جواد وليّ الدّين ليساعدهم على "ضبط المشاعر وتهدئة النّفوس الغاضبة". وأورد العميد أبو زكي ما قال الشيخ وليّ الدّين له مباشرةً بعد اطلاعه على حيثيّات الجريمة: "كثّر خير الله، منيح إنّها مش أعظم"؛ وهو كلام غرضه تهدئة النّفوس وتحكيم العقل منعًا لتطرّف الغضب وتحوّله إلى عُنف أعمى.[84] ذكرتُ هذه الحادثة هنا لشهرتها أوّلًا، ولأنّها شهدت إقدام دروز من غير العقّال على قتل مدنيّين مسيحيّين في قراهم ظُلمًا، وهو فعل تعدٍّ. ولكن، ذكرتها أيضًا لأنّها تُظهر فعّاليّة مساهمة عقّال الدّروز، وبخاصة مرجعيّاتهم العليا، في ضبط النّزعات العُنفيّة الانفعاليّة التي غالبًا ما تُولّدها الحروب الأهليّة بسبب ما تشهده من قتل وتدمير متبادل بين أطراف النزاع.

رابعًا: مواقف عُقّال الدّروز من العنف والتّعدّي في يوميّاتهم العاديّة

يظْهَرُ موقف عقّال الدّروز الرّافض للعنف والتعدّي وعُمق التزامهم به بشكل أوضح من خلال تجلّياته العفويّة في يوميّاتهم العاديّة. وسأنقل فيما يلي روايات شفهيّة تبيّن هذا الأمر. كان الشّيخ أبو حسن عارف حلاوي في زيارة خارج معصريتي، فجاء خبر موت جار له من عقّال البلدة. فلاذ الشّيخ بالصّمت ولم يبادر إلى الشّهادة للرجل الميت بالخير والصّلاح! وبحسب ما أوضح الرّاوي، يدلّ تصرّف الشيخ، بِعُرفِ العُقّال، على أنّه لا يعتقد الخير وحسن الدّيانة في الرّجل الميت بالرّغم من نسبته إلى العقّال. وكان الرّجل

[83] أي منعهم من حضور مجالس التّذكار. راجع الصفحتين 14-15 أعلاه.

[84] عصام أبو زكي، **محطّات في ذاكرة وطن: مذكّرات العميد عصام أبو زكي** (بيروت: الدار العربية للعلوم ناشرون: 2015)، 189 – 191. يرتبط كلام الشيخ وليّ الدّين بحادثة اغتيال كمال بك جنبلاط حصرًا؛ إذ لم يكن قد انتشر بعد خبر مقتله أو حَدَث ما تلاه من ردّات فعل انتقاميّة ضدّ المسيحيّين في بعض قرى الشوف.

المذكور يتحلّى ببعض الفضائل الأخلاقيّة مثل النّخوة والكرم، إلّا أنَّه أقدم على الانتحار بشرب مادّة سامّة. وحُكم المُنتَحِر عندهم أنَّه خرج عن الإيمان إلى الكفر، فلا تجوز له شهادة بالخير والصّلاح.

لَفَت تصرُّف الشّيخ هذا انتباه العاقل الذي أبلغه الخبر، فسأله لاحقًا عن سبب امتناعه عن الشّهادة للرجل بالخير حتى قبل أن يَعلَم بانتحاره، فأجاب الشّيخ أبو حسن عارف أنَّ الرّجل "كان يستَهْون الشرّ"؛ أي أنَّه لا يتورَّع عن افتعال المشاكل والتسبّب في العنف! وأوضح الرّاوي، وكان حَاضِرًا على الحادثة المذكورة، أنَّ الشيخ كان يعرف عن ذلك الرجل أنَّ "فتوح الشرّ عنده هيّن (أي سهل)، وهذه علامة خُبث". فقد حدث قديمًا أنَّ الشّيخ أبو حسيب أسعد الصّايغ (ت. 1979)، وهو والد زوجة الشيخ حلاوي، كان راجعًا يومًا إلى منزله ورأى الرّجل المذكور يتعارك مع شقيقه بشراسة حتى كاد أحدهما يقتل الآخر. وبما أنَّ الرجلين كانا منتسبَيْن إلى مسلك العُقَّال، أدرك الشّيخ أبو حسيب أسعد أنَّ ديانة أحدهما غير صحيحة.[85] غير أنَّ شقيق ذلك الرجل توفي قبله وشهد له العقّال بالخير والصّلاح، فترجَّح عند الشيخَيْن، الصّايغ وحلاوي، أنَّ إيمان الرّجل المذكور غير صادق.[86] وتتَّفِق الرّواية هذه مع ما سبق وذكر من رَبْط الشّيخَيْن أبو حسن عارف حلاوي وأبو محمّد جواد وليّ الدّين صحّة الإيمان بكره العنف واجتناب الوقوع فيه بقولهما أنَّ "مَنْ يتعدَّى ليس منّا"؛ فالشّيخان أبو حسيب أسعد وأبو حسن عارف حكما بفساد ديانة الرّجل المذكور لتحقّقهما من شراسة طبعه واستحسانه العنف وعدم تورُّعه عن فعله؛ فثبَّت انتحاره لهما صحة حكمهما فيه.

وبما أنَّ الأشياء تُعرف بأضدّادها، يمكن الاستفادة من رواية أخرى من المأثور الشفهيّ عن الشّيخ أبو فارس حسن الفطايري (ت. 1940)، الذي كان من وجهاء الدّين في بلدته جديدة الشّوف،[87] تُظهر بُغضَ العقّال العنف وحرصهم على منع وقوعه.[88] سمعت هذه الرّواية عدّة مرّات من حفيده الّذي يحمل نفس الاسم والكنية، أي أبو فارس حسن، وقد سمعها هو من الشّيخ أبو سليم سلامة سريّ الدّين (ت. 1973) من عقّال بلدة بعقلين، الذي كان معاصرًا لجدّه. كان الشّيخ أبو فارس حسن يعتمد على الزراعة في معيشته، فقرَّرَ يومًا أن يذهب مع ولدَيْه للعمل في قطعة أرض يملكها. وحَدَثَ أنّ الشّيخ سبَقَ ولديه إلى تلك الأرض، فوجد عند وصوله رجلًا يقطع شجرة من أرضه. اقترب الشّيخ منه وسأله إن كانت الشجرة ملكه ليقطعها، آملًا أن يدفعه السؤالُ إلى التوقّف عن فعله؛ إلّا أنّ الرجل أصرّ على قطع الشّجرة وتهدَّد الشّيخ أبا فارس بالأذيّة إذا حاول منعه. تلقّى الشّيخ كلام هذا الرجل وفعله بحلمٍ واسع وقفل عائدًا إلى منزله؛ وعندما التقى بولدَيْه في الطريق، أخبرهما بأنَّه بَدَّلَ فكره وقرَّر العمل في قطعة أرض أخرى.[89]

يُظهر تصرّف الشّيخ أبو فارس حسن هذا، بحسب الرّاوي، بُغضه العنف وخوفه من التسبّب في وقوعه. فقد أدرك أنَّه إذا وصل ولداه إلى قطعة الأرض تلك واكتشفا أمر الرّجل الذي يسرق الحطب من رزقهم، سينتج عن ذلك عِراكٌ وشرٌّ، وقد تسيل دماءٌ بسببه؛ فقرَّر أن يمنع نار الشّرّ من الاشتعال خوفًا

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[85] قارن مع الآيتَيْن القرآنيّتَيْن: ﴿**وَمَا كَانَ لِمُؤْمِنٍ أَن يَقْتُلَ مُؤْمِنًا إِلَّا خَطَئًا** ... * **وَمَن يَقْتُلْ مُؤْمِنًا مُّتَعَمِّدًا فَجَزَآؤُهُ جَهَنَّمُ** خَالِدًا فِيهَا وَغَضِبَ اللهُ عَلَيْهِ وَلَعَنَهُ وَأَعَدَّ لَهُ عَذَابًا عَظِيمًا﴾؛ **سورة النّساء** 4: 93-94.

[86] سمعت هذه الرّواية من عدّة عقّال في الجرد، أذكر منهم: الشيخ أبو عارف ناصيف الصّايغ، مقابلة أجراها المؤلّف، 25 أيار 2017. وهو من بلدة شارون وكان حاضرًا على الحديث المذكور.

[87] وهو معروف بين كبار العُقَّال الذين قابلتهم بحسن ديانته وفضائله الأخلاقيّة. وقد جَمَعَت في العقدين الأخيرين رواياتٍ تُظهر تحلّيه بحسن المعاملة، والكرم، والحلم.

[88] جديدة الشوف بلدة في قضاء الشوف.

[89] الشّيخ أبو فارس حسن الفطايري، مقابلة أجراها المؤلّف، كانون الثاني 2002. وهو من عقّال بلدة الجديدة الشوف.

على ديانته، وفضّل التّضحية ببعض الحطب على المخاطرة بالتّسبّب في اندلاع إشكال عنفيّ لا تُعرف عاقبته.

وقد حدث أيضًا أنَّه كان بين أحد عُقَّال بلدة إغميد[90] وقريب له "خلافٌ على قطعة أرض". وفي أحد الأيام، بينما كان العاقل يعمل في أرضه، حاول قريبه استفزازه بالكلام، فلم يفلح، فهجم عليه "ببلطة" (أي فأس) موجّهًا ضربته إلى رأسه. غير أنَّ العاقل كان مُتنبّهًا فحمى نفسه بعصا مجرفة[91] كانت معه، تلقَّتْ ضربة البلطة بدلًا من رأسه. تمكَّن العاقل بعدها من المعتدي عليه، وضربه بأحجار على يدَيْه "وبالكُرَيك"[92] على رجلَيْه ضربًا قاسيًا حتّى تلاشت قواه وفقَد القدرة على أذيّته أو اللّحاق به. ثمّ همَّ بمغادرة المكان تجنُّبًا لوقوع المزيد من العنف. غير أنَّ قريبه تمالك نفسه واستفزّه بالكلام ثانيةً، فعاد العاقل إليه وضربه مرّة أخرى، ثمَّ غادر.

ذهب العاقل بعدها إلى الشيخَيْن أبو حسن عارف حلاوي وأبو حسيب أسعد الصّايغ وأخبرهما بالحادثة، وسألهما إذا كان قد ارتكب ذنبًا يوجب القِصاص. فأجاب الشّيخان بأنَّهما يجدان له عذرًا في ضرب قريبه المرّة الأولى لأنَّه كان دفاعًا عن النفس في وجه اعتداء قريبه؛ ولكنَّهما لا يجدان عذرًا لعودته وضربه ثانيةً استرسالًا مع غضبه، خاصّة أنَّ قريبه كان قد بات عاجزًا عن إيذائه بسبب الضرب المبرّح الّذي تلقّاه منه. فحكم الشّيخان عليه بالقِصاص لأنَّهما اعتبرا عودته غير مبرّرة بعد أن انتفى شرط الدّفاع عن النّفس؛ إذ لا يجوز للعاقل في شرعهم اللّجوء إلى العنف لمجرد سماعه كلامًا سفيهًا استفزّه، بل من واجبه كظم غيظه واجتناب التسبّب في الشرّ.[93]

تُظهر هذه الرّواية شيخَيْن من كِبار المرجِعيّات الدّينيَّة لعقّال الدّروز في النّصف الثّاني من القرن العشرين يحكمان بالقِصاص على عاقلٍ مزارع تعارك مع قريب له في حقل خاص بسبب خلاف على قطعة أرض. لا تتحدّث الرّواية عن مشاركة في حروب أو نزاع بين طائفتَيْن أو غيره، بل عن خلاف شخصيّ محصور بين رجلَيْن لا يعلم به إلّا قلّة من أقاربهم وأهل بلدهم، وقد لا يصل خبره إلى القرى المجاورة، وربّما يُنسى مع الوقت. ومع ذلك، نرى الشيخَيْن يُطبّقان المبدأ ذاته ويتصرّفان تجاه الأمر بالحزم نفسه الذي يتعاملان به مع أحداث كبرى مثل الحروب والنّزاعات: التّعدّي محرّم، والوقوع فيه خطيئة يُقاصص المؤمن عليها بقدر حجمها. وجاء قصاص الشيخَيْن للعاقل تذكيرًا له بواجبه في بُغض العنف واجتنابه، وعدم اللّجوء إليه إلّا مكرهًا، أي دفاعًا عن النفس والعِرض والأرض.

من جهة أخرى، يُبيّن خوف العاقل من النتائج الدّينيّة المترتّبة عن فعله، ومبادرته من تلقاء نفسه إلى إعلام المرجِعيّات الدّينيّة في منطقته بما حدث، وسؤاله عن حكم الدّين بالمسألة، أنّ العُقّال عامّة يعلمون من خلال تربيتِهم الرّوحيّة أنَّ الشّرع الدّيني[94] يُحرّم التّعدّي ولا يُجيز استعمال العنف إلّا دفاعًا عن النفس، وأنَّ من واجبهم اجتناب الوقوع فيه. وتَظهر هنا ثانيةً الميزة التي تنفرد بها المصادر الشّفهيّة عن غيرها من المصادر، والتي أشرت إليها في المقدّمة، وهي قدرة الرّوايات الشفهيّة على نقل أخبار مفيدة

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[90] إغميد بلدة في قضاء عاليه.

[91] المجرفة: أداة الجَرْف.

[92] الكُرَيْك: أدَاةٌ ذات يدٍ من خشَب طويلة تنتهي بصفحة من الحديد مُنبسطة مُفلطَحة عريضة، يُحفر بها، ويُنقل بها التّرابُ ونحوه. **المعجم الوجيز** (1989)، مادة "كريك".

[93] سمعت هذه الرّواية من عدّة عقّال في الجرد، أذكر منهم: معين الصّايغ. كما قابلت ابن أحد الرجلين قبل وفاته، لكنّه لم يأذن لي بنقل الأخبار عنه.

[94] الشرّع الدّينيّ هو مجموع الأوامر والنواهي الدينيّة المفترضة على المؤمنين.

عن أحداث جانبيّة من يوميّات النّاس العاديّين، لا تشملها أنواع المصادر التاريخيّة الأخرى، ممّا يساعد الباحث في فهم قِيَمهم وعاداتهم وسلوكيّاتهم بشكل أعمق وأدقّ.

ويفسّر حُكمَ الشيخَيْن أمرٌ سمعته يومًا من الشيخ أبو محمّد جواد وليّ الدّين عند حديثه عن مسألة مشابهة تتعلّق بمحاولة مؤسّسة إعلاميّة لبنانيّة الإساءة إلى سُمعة مجتمع الدّروز الدّينيّ. فقد أخبرني أنَّه يحاول جاهدًا، وبالتّعاون مع سياسيّي الطّائفة، تدارك الأمر ومنع حدوثه بالوسائل السلميّة المتاحة. ولكن إذا أصّرت المؤسّسة تلك وأقدمت على الفعل المسيء، فهو 'يدعو من يتّبع أمره من العقّال إلى لجم الغضب وضبط الانفعالات والصّبر على الضّيم، وعدم السّماح لأحد باستدراجهم إلى فخّ العنف والتّعدّي'، إذ "لا يُسيء إلى المرء إلّا ما يخرج منه"، أي من أقوال وأفعال؛ و'أنّ الإنسان مسؤول عن عمله'.[95] يشير الشّيخ بكلامه هذا إلى الإساءة المعنويّة؛ فهو يحذّر من أنَّ تعدّي المؤسّسة الإعلاميّة على سُمعة عقّال الدّروز وكرامتهم ظلمًا لن يسيء إلى العقّال أكثر ممّا سيُسيء سماحهم بأن يستفزّهم ذلك التّعدّي إلى الرّدّ عليه بتعدٍّ من قِبَلهم، فيسِمون أنفسهم بالجهل والظلم![96] ثمَّ خَتَمَ حديثه قائلًا: "انقلوا عنّي أنّي ضدّ العنف والاستقواء بالسّلاح، ولا أرضى بهما، وأحرّم التّعدّي ولا أجيزه".[97] وقد شَهَرَ موقفه من تلك القضيّة بين العقّال منعًا لأي ردّ فعل عنيف تُجاه المؤسّسة الإعلاميّة المعنيّة.

كما أنّ عقّال الدّروز لا يستحلّون جرائم الشرف. ثمّة حادثة ذات صلة مشهورة بين عقّال الدّروز في جبل لبنان عن شيخ من وجهاء الدّين في بلدته بيصور،[98] توفي في الثمانينيّات من القرن العشرين. يُخبر أحد الرُّواة من بلدته أنّه كان في عائلة ذلك الشيخ امرأة نزلت إلى المدينة للعمل، وبعد فترة علم أقاربها أنّها سلكت مسلكًا أخلاقيًّا مُشينًا. حرّكت أخبار تلك الإمرأة حميّة أبناء عائلتها فاجتمعوا للتّشاور بشأنها، وكان الشيخ المذكور حاضرًا معهم كونه فردًا من العائلة. صرّح بعض الشبان من أقاربها، وكانوا من غير العقّال، بأنّهم يعتزمون النزول إلى المدينة وقتلها صونًا لشرفهم وعرضهم. سمع الشيخ كلامهم، ولكنّه لم يعترض عليه. بعد فترة، قَتَلَ هؤلاء تلك الامرأة. عندما وصل الخبر إلى الشيخ، تنبّه إلى خطئه، واعتبر نفسه شريكًا في الجريمة لعدم اعتراضه خلال اجتماع العائلة ومحاولة منعهم من قتلها؛ فأقام على نفسه الحدّ الدّينيّ المرتبط بكبائر الذنوب وبقي عليه مدّة حياته.[99] وفي تراث العقّال المكتوب ما يدعم حكم الشيخ على نفسه. فقد ورد في آداب الشيخ الفاضل محمّد أبي هلال حادثة ذات صلة، فقد أخبر تلميذه وكاتب سيرته:

أَنَّ رَجُلًا نَزَلَ فِيْ القَرْيَةِ الَّتِيْ كَانَ المرحوم [الشيخ الفاضل] فِيْهَا **وَمَعَهُ حُرْمَتَانِ فِيْهِمَا كَلَامٌ غَيْرُ جَمِيْلٍ**، فَعَلِمَ [رفيقه] الشَّيْخُ الصَّافِيْ بِهِمَا، فَعَزَمَ عَلَى تَطْيِيْرِ هِمَا مِنَ البَلَدِ **عَنْفًا وَصَمَّمَ عَلَى ذَلِكَ**. فَأَوْصَلْنَا

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[95] الشّيخ أبو محمّد جواد وليّ الدّين، مقابلة أجراها المؤلّف، 5 نيسان 2010.

[96] قارن مع: ﴿**قُلْ كُلٌّ يَعْمَلُ عَلَى شَاكِلَتِهِ** فَرَبُّكُمْ أَعْلَمُ بِمَنْ هُوَ أَهْدَى سَبِيلاً﴾؛ **سورة الإسراء** 17: 84. ومعنى الآية أنَّ أقوال الإنسان وأفعاله إنّما تُعبّر عمّا حقّقه في نفسه من هدى أو ضلال، وما اكتسبه من أخلاق، أمحمودةً كانت أم مذمومة. لذلك، وبحسب القرآن، فإنَّ الوقوع في التّعدّي يُسيء إلى كرامة المؤمن أوّلًا إذ يكشف عن جهل فاعله وفساد نفسه، وهي مذمّة في ذاتها كما جاء في الآية: ﴿بِئْسَ الِاسْمُ الْفُسُوقُ بَعْدَ الْإِيمَانِ﴾؛ **سورة الحجرات** 49: 11. ويرد المعنى نفسه في مثل الشّجرة وثمارها في **إنجيل لوقا** 6: 43-45.

[97] الشّيخ أبو محمّد جواد وليّ الدّين، مقابلة أجراها المؤلّف، 5 نيسان 2010.

[98] بيصور بلدة في قضاء عاليه.

[99] سمعت هذه الرّواية من عدّة عقال أذكر منهم: نبيل أنيس ملاعب، مقابلة أجراها المؤلّف، 15 نيسان 2024. وهو من عقّال بلدة الشيخ المذكور ويعرفه شخصيًّا؛ وأمجد حمزة، مقابلة أجراها المؤلّف، 15 نيسان 2024؛ وهو من عقّال بلدة بعقلين ومتزوّج من قرية الشيخ المذكور، وقد سمع قصته من أقاربه مباشرةً. عن الحدّ الدّيني للقتل والكبائر من الذنوب، راجع الصفحتين 14-15 أعلاه.

خَبَرَهُمَا إِلَى الشَّيْخِ [الفاضل] **فَاغْتَبَنَ مِنْ سِيَاسَةِ أَخِيْهِ** ثُمَّ قَالَ: ... قولوا لَهُ يُدَبِّرُ هَذِهِ القَضِيَّةَ **بِالسُّتْرَةِ وَاللُّطْفِ وإِلَّا إِنْ غَفَلَ عَنْ ذَلِكَ وَشَاعَ الخَبَرُ يُعْدِمُوْهُمَا وَيَقَعُ** (أي الشيخ الصّافي) **تَحْتَ الخَطَرِ"**.

فَأَعْلَمْنَاهُ بِمَا قَالَهُ المرحُومُ، فَتَلَطَّفَ في الظَّاهِرِ وَلَمْ يَحْلُ عَنْ ذَلِكَ حَتَّى طَيَّرَهُمَا مِنَ البَلَدِ.[100]

وأختم عرض الرّوايات الشفهيّة المرتبطة بالموضوع برواية تُظهرُ حرص كبار عقّال الدّروز على وأد الخلافات والنّزاعات العنفيّة في مهدها. قصد أحد العُقَّال يومًا زيارة الشّيخ أبو فارس محمود عبد الخالق (ت. 1937) من مجدل بعنا،[101] الّذي كان من كبار مرجِعيّات الدّروز الدّينيّة في وقته. وفي الطريق، سمع رجلًا يعرفه ينطق بكلام سفيه تجاه ربّه، فثار غضبه لما سمع، لكنّه كظم غيظه وأكمل طريقه إلى بيت الشّيخ أبو فارس. عندما دخل عليه، وجده يقرأ في كتاب دينيّ، فحيّاه وشكا له ما سمع من سفاهة ذلك الرّجل. أصغى الشّيخ أبو فارس لكلام ضيفه ثمَّ أكمل القراءة في كتابه من دون أن يعلّق على ما سمع. فأعاد الضّيف الخبر مرةً ثانيةً وثالثة، فوجد الشيخ على الحال نفسه؛ فظنَّ أنَّه ربّما لم يصدّقه، فقال له مُنفعلًا: "أعطني الكتاب لأحلف لك أنّ هذا ما حدث فعلًا"! فردَّ الشيخ أبو فارس عندها: "دَعْك منه، هذا ربُّه إبليس".[102]

مِيزة هذه الرّواية أنَّها تتناول حادثة لها بُعدٌ دينيٌّ واضح وترتبط بموضوع البحث. فالكلام السّفيه لم يكن موجهًّا إلى شخص العاقل أو لأهله أو أصحابه، بل إلى ربّه. وتحرُّك غضبه في هذه الحالة كان من باب الحميّة الدّينيّة الطّبيعيّة، حيث استعظم وقوع شخص يعرفه في ذنب كبير كهذا. غير أنَّ العبرة منها تكمن في كيفيّة احتواء الشّيخ أبو فارس محمود هذا الغضب ومنعه من التّحوّل إلى شرارة شرّ وعنف.[103] فقد أوضح له أن أقوال الإنسان إنّما تعبّر عن علمه ومعتقده،[104] وأنَّ الرّجل إنّما عبّر بسفاهته عن كفره وجهله بالإله الحقّ؛ وأنَّه في حقيقة الأمر يَعبُد إلهًا باطلًا، وكلامه موجّه إلى الإله الّذي يعتقد ويعبد؛ وليس إلى الإله الذي يعرفه المؤمنون ويعبدونه. بالطبع، مقاربة دينيّة عقلانيّة كهذه تتطلَّب رُجحان العقل على القوّة الغضبيّة، كي يتمكّن الإنسان من تأمُّل الفعل وفهم حقيقته، ومن ثمّ استخلاص حكم الشّرع فيه. وتتطلّب أيضًا معرفة صحيحة بأحكام الشّرع؛ فجواب الشّيخ أبو فارس يحاكي ما جاء في القرآن عن أنَّ الكافرين يعبدون إلهًا غير الإله الذي يعبده المؤمنون، حيث قال: ﴿**قُلْ يَا أَيُّهَا الْكَافِرُونَ * لَا أَعْبُدُ مَا تَعْبُدُونَ * وَلَا أَنْتُمْ عَابِدُونَ مَا أَعْبُدُ** * وَلَا أَنَا عَابِدٌ مَّا عَبَدتُّمْ * وَلَا أَنتُمْ عَابِدُونَ مَا أَعْبُدُ * **لَكُمْ دِينُكُمْ وَلِيَ دِينِ**﴾.[105]

تُظهر الرّوايات السّابقة سلوكًا مشتركًا لعُقَّال الدّروز يقوم على تغليب العقل على القوّة الغضبيّة الّتي هي مركز الشّراسة والعنف في النّفس البشريّة، وذلك استنادًا إلى التّعاليم الدّينيّة التي تحدّد متى يجب أن يُسمح للغضب بالفعل، ومتى يجب لجم فعله أو ضبطه. وسلوك كهذا يُزيل الكثير من الأسباب التي عادةً

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[100] الشيخ عبد الملك الحلبي، **آداب الشيخ الفاضل**، 106 – 107.

[101] مجدل بعنا بلدة في قضاء عاليه.

[102] سمعت هذه الرّواية من عدّة عقّال في الجرد، أذكر منهم: معين الصّايغ.

[103] من المفيد ها هنا ذكر حادثة قتل وقعت في شمال لبنان في صيف العام 2018 تثبت أنَّ أمرًا كهذا قد يتسبّب في شرّ كبير إذا ما ترك النّاس العنان لغضبهم. فقد قُتل رجلٌ يدعى محمّد الذّهيبي بطريقة وحشيّة بعد أن اتّهمه قاتلوه بشتم العزّة الإلهيّة. "قتلوه طعنًا وأخرجوا قلبه من جسده وقطّعوه «أكعابًا»"، **جريدة الأنوار** (بيروت)، 28 آب 2018، 4.

[104] راجع الحاشيّة 96.

[105] **سورة الكافرون** 109: 1-6. كذلك، يُحاكي طلب الشيخ أبي فارس من العاقل الذي زاره أن يدع الرجل السفيه وشأنه قوله في القرآن: ﴿أَرَأَيْتَ مَنِ اتَّخَذَ إِلَهَهُ هَوَاهُ أَفَأَنتَ تَكُونُ عَلَيْهِ وَكِيلًا﴾؛ **سورة الفرقان** 25: 43.

ما تُولّد الشّرور وتؤدّي إلى النّزاعات العنفيّة والقتل بين النّاس. كذلك، تثبت هذه الرّوايات ما ذكر بالقسم الثاني أعلاه، بأنّ تحريم عقّال الدّروز استعمال العنف والتعدّي ينبع أساسًا من اعتبارات دينيّة بحتة ترتبط بشروط مسلك العقّال وأغراضه الروحيّة، وليس من اعتبارات سياسيّة تتعلّق بكون الدّروز أقليّة مذهبيّة تعيش بين جماعات أخرى أكثر عددًا وأعظم قوّة.

خامسًا: العمق التّاريخيّ لسلوك عقّال الدّروز في العنف

تحوي مصادر تاريخ لبنان الحديث الأساسيّة أدلّة كثيرة تثبت من جهة العمق التّاريخيّ لسلوك العقّال الذي تمّ شرحه أعلاه؛ وتشير من جهة أخرى إلى أنّ هذا السلوك لم يقتصر عليهم، بل تطوّر في كثير من الأوقات ليصبح سلوكًا درزيًّا جماعيًّا. فعلى سبيل المثال، ذكَر المؤرّخ اللبناني إبراهيم بك الأسود، وهو قريب العهد من أحداث العام 1860، في كتابه «ذخائر لبنان» عن سلوك الدّروز في الحرب، وبالتّحديد عن عدم تعرّضهم للنّساء والأطفال بالأذى، فقال:

> ومما ينبغي أن يذكر لهم **أنّهم** (أي الدّروز) **في حروبهم لا يتعرّضون أصلًا لِما يمسّ الآداب وما سُمع أنّهم سطوا على العِرض ولا قتلوا النّساء ولا الأطفال.** وربما احتمى نساء أعدائهم ببيوتهم بعد قتل بعولتهنّ ورائين منهم غاية الرّفق والإنسانيّة؛ وذلك لأنّ الدّروز شديدو التّمسك بالنّاموس الأدبي **فلا يسطون على أعراض غيرهم وعندهم احترام للحريم.**[106]

وذكر اللورد دوفرين (Lord Dufferin)، قُنصل بريطانيا العظمى في بيروت (1860-1861)، الأمر نفسه في رسالة بعثها إلى وزير خارجيّتها، حيث قال: "بيد أنَّ الدُّروز هم من هذا القبيل أكثر شفقة منهم فلا يقتتلون مع بعضهم **ويحترمون النساء** [في الحروب]".[107] كما أدرج المؤرّخ اللبناني شاهين مكاريوس (ت. 1910) في ملحق لكتابه رسالة أرسلها إليه شخص لم يذكر اسمه، لكنّه عرّفه بأنّه "فاضل من الذين لهم إلمام تام" بالحوادث التي جرت في جبل لبنان خلال الحروب الأهليّة في القرن التاسع عشر، صحّح فيها بعض ما أورده مكاريوس من أخطاء. وذكر كاتب الملحق من جملة تلك الأخطاء ما أورده مكاريوس مِن تعدّي الدّروز على نساء دير القمر وأطفالهم،[108] وصوّب قوله في موضعَيْن؛ الأوّل بقوله: "ولم يذكر العرض (أي النساء) لعدم الخوف عليه من جهة الدّروز **لأنَّ حفظه من قواعد الدّين عندهم**"، والثاني: "ولم يتعرّض أحد الدّروز للحريم كليًّا وهذه من جملة عوائدهم الحميدة".[109]

كذلك، ورد في مذكرات الإرساليّين الأمريكيّين لونزا بنتون (Loanza Goulding Benton) ووليام بنتون (William Austin Benton) خبرٌ في غاية الأهميّة عن إرساليٍّ كان يُقيم في بلدة بحمدون

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[106] إبراهيم بك الأسود، **كتاب ذخائر لبنان** (بعبدا: لا ن، 1896)، 126-127.

[107] فريد وفيليب الخازن (محرّران ومترجمان)، **مجموعة المحرّرات السّياسيّة والمفاوضات الدّوليّة عن سوريا ولبنان**، ط 2 (بيروت: دار الرائد اللبناني، 1983)، 3: 137.

[108] شاهين مكاريوس، **حسر اللثام عن نكبات الشام**، (باريس: دار أسمار 2014)، 84.

[109] المصدر نفسه، ملحق، 11-12. مؤلّف الملحق هو لبنانيّ مسيحيّ اختبر مباشرة الحرب الأهليّة في العام 1860، ومن المحتمل أنّه كان من مصادر مكاريوس الرئيسيّين.

الواقعة في قائمقاميّة الدّروز خلال أحداث العام 1860،[110] نقل فيه الموقف المبدئيّ للشيخ حمدان بللمني، أحد كبار مشايخ الدّين الدّروز آنذاك، من الحرب التي كانت تبدو وشيكة قبل حوالي شهرين من وقوعها في أيّار من العام 1860م. أخبرنا بنتون أنّه:

> في مطلع ربيع العام 1860، بعث أبو ناصيف[111] حمدان بللمني، كبير مشايخ الدّروز العجوز، خادِمَه إلى الإرساليّ في بحمدون، يطلب منه أن يأتي برفقة وجهاء رجال المسيحيّين [في البلدة] للاجتماع به ... بجانب النّبع القريب من [بلدته] شانيه.[112] ذهب ستّة رجال مع الإرساليّ واجتمعوا تحت شجرة الجوز. وبعد أن جلسوا، نبّه الرّجل العجوز إلى أنّ حربًا ستقع قريبًا؛ [ثم قال:] الحال، **أنّ نحن الدّروز لا نريد حربًا**. هل أنتم تريدون حربًا مع الدّروز يا رجال بحمدون"؟ كان مقابله الإرساليّ الأمريكي وإثنان بروتستانت من أهالي بحمدون المسيحيّين، إثنان موارنة، وإثنان من كنيسة الرّوم [الأرثوذكس]؛ فأجابوا: "لا، نحن رجال بحمدون لا نريد الحرب. **ليس هناك عداوة بيننا وبين الدّروز**." [ثمّ] قال الرّجل العجوز: "أكرّر، **نحن [الدّروز] لا نتمنّى [وقوع] الحرب ولن نبدأها، ولكن إذا بدأ الموارنة الأعمال الحربيّة ضدّنا، فمن واجبنا الدّفاع عن أنفسنا** لأنّنا أبناء السّيف".[113]

يُفيد هذا الخبر بأنّ الشّيخ حمدان بللمني كان وقتذاك من المرجعيّات الدينيّة العليا لدروز جبل لبنان، وربما كبيرهم. وقد كان من موقعه المسؤول يتابع تطوّر الأحداث ويستشعر قرب اندلاع حرب أهليّة. يوضح كلام الشيخ بللمني الموقف المبدئيّ للدّروز عمومًا وعقّالهم خصوصًا، وهو أنّهم لا يريدون الحرب مع الموارنة ولن يبدؤوا بها؛ غير أنّهم سيحملون السّلاح دفاعًا عن أنفسهم إذا ما بدأ الموارنة بالأعمال الحربيّة ضدّهم. وتُظهر رسالة تظلّم أرسلها بالنيابة عن طائفته الشيخ حمدان بللمنى نفسه[114] إلى ملكة إنكلترا بعد انتهاء الحرب تركيزه على نقطة محوريّة، وهي أنّ الدّروز لم يبتدئوا في أيٍّ من الحروب الأهليّة الثلاث بالأعمال الحربيّة؛ بل كان الموارنة دائمًا هم البادئين، وكان الدّروز في موقع المدافعين عن أنفسهم في وجه اعتداءاتهم.[115]

يتّفق مكاريوس مع قول الشيخ بللمنى في تحميل الموارنة، وتحديدًا البطريرك يوسف حبيش وبعض مطارنته، ولاحقًا البطريرك بولس مسعد، ومن خلفهم حليفتهم فرنسا، مسؤوليّة افتعال الحروب الأهليّة الثلاث وبدء الأعمال الحربيّة ضدّ الدّروز.[116] كذلك، حمّل المستشرق البريطاني الكولونيل تشارلز

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[110] على أثر الحرب الأهليّة الأولى بين الدّروز والموارنة في خريف العام 1841، قسّم العثمانيّون – بالاتفاق مع الدّول الأوروبيّة الكبرى – جبل لبنان بين عامي 1843 و 1861 على أساس طائفيّ إلى قسمين، شمالي وجنوبي، يفصل بينهما طريق بيروت-دمشق. أطلق على القسم الشمالي "قائمقاميّة النصارى"، وعلى القسم الجنوبي "قائمقاميّة الدّروز"، وعُرف ذلك بنظام القائمقامتين.

[111] كذا في الأصل، والصحيح أبو يوسف.

[112] بحمدون وشانيه بلدتان في قضاء عاليه.

[113] Goulding L. Benton & William A. Benton, *The Diaries, Reminiscences and Letters of Loanza Goulding Benton (Mrs. William Austin Benton) and William Austin Benton, D.D., missionaries to Syria 1847-1869* (St Reynolds SWC, 1900), 111-112. التّرجمة من الإنكليزيّة لي.

[114] ما يدعم القول بأنّه كان كبير مشايخ الدّين الدّروز في العام 1860.

[115] الخازن، **مجموعة المحرّرات السّياسيّة**، 2: 305-318.

[116] مكاريوس، **حسر اللثام عن نكبات الشام**، 74-76، و78، و100، و116، و119، و130.

تشرتشل (Charles Churchill) الموارنة، وبخاصة البطريرك حبيش والمطارنة، مسؤوليّة افتعال الحربين الأهليّتين الأولى والثانية، إلّا أنّه حمّل العثمانيّين وزعماء الاقطاع الدّروز مسؤوليّة أكبر في التسبّب في الحرب الثالثة؛ مع أنّ الموارنة، بحسب إفادته، كانوا هم من قاموا بالاعتداءات العسكريّة الأولى على القرى الدرزيّة، بدءًا بحادثة بيت مري في العام 1859.[117] أمّا قيصر فرح (Caesar Farah)، فقد أثبت في كتابه الموسوعي والمرجعي عن حقبة الحروب الأهليّة في جبل لبنان في القرن التاسع عشر، مستندًا إلى بحث طويل وشامل استغرق سنوات عديدة في دراسة المصادر التاريخيّة الأساسيّة وأرشيف الدول الكبرى الضالعة في المسألة الشرقيّة وقتذاك، دور الكنسية المارونيّة الرئيسي في التسبّب في اندلاع الحروب الأهليّة الثلاث في جبل لبنان بين عامي 1841 و1860.[118]

وليس من الصعب ملاحظة التّشابه الكبير بين كلام الشيخ أبو يوسف حمدان بللمني في العام 1860 وبين كلام الشّيخين أبو حسن عارف حلاوي وأبو محمّد جواد وليّ الدّين في الرّبع الأخير من القرن العشرين، حيث أكّدوا أنّ الدّروز لا يقبلون بالتّعدّي منهم ولا يبدؤون بالحروب، ولكنّ متى تعدَّى عليهم أحد سيحملون السّلاح ويدافعون عن أنفسهم. وقد تحدّث كولونيل تشرشل، الذي أقام عشر سنوات في جبل لبنان بين عامي 1842 و1852، عن مشاركة عُقّال الدّروز في الحربَين الأهليّتين اللّتين وقعتا في جبل لبنان عامي 1841 و1845، فشدّد أنّ مشاركتهم تلك كانت دفاعًا عن وجود الدّروز في جبل لبنان، حيث قال:

> العاقل الدرزي هو في الأساس صانع سلام؛ **حتى الحرب بغيضة لمعتقداته الأخلاقيّة**. صحيح أنّه خلال الأزمة الأخيرة (أي الحرب الأهليّة)، **عندما كان وجود الدّروز بذاته في خطر، شارك العُقّال بالنضال من أجل الدفاع** [عن وجودهم]؛ ولكن، كانت هذه الممارسة انحرافًا عن مبدأ معترف به [عندهم].[119]

ولا بدّ من التنبيه إلى أنّ الحروب الأهليّة الثلاث التي وقعت بين الدّروز والموارنة في جبل لبنان في القرن التاسع عشر كانت في جبل لبنان الجنوبي، الذي كان يُعرف منذ بداية حكم العثمانيّين لبلاد الشام إلى العام 1861 باسم "جبل الدّروز" أو "بلاد الدّروز"،[120] ويحكمه أمير منهم.[121] هذا يعني أنّ

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[117] كولونيل تشارلز تشرتشل، **الدّروز والموارنة من سنة 1840 إلى 1860**، أصول ومراجع تاريخيّة 5، (بيروت: دار لحد خاطر، 1986)، 26-27، و30-31، و52، و54-55، و74، و80. وتجدر الإشارة إلى أنّ تشرتشل أقام في جبل لبنان بين عامي 1842 و1852؛ أي أنّه حصل على معلوماته عن الحربين الأولى والثانية بطريقة مباشرة من منطقة النزاع، بينما استقى أخبار الحرب الثالثة بطريقة غير مباشرة، من خلال أشخاص أو عبر الاطلاع على الأوراق الدبلوماسية وغيرها من المصادر المتوفّرة له.

[118] Farah, *The Politics*, 91 – 97, 376 – 377, 380 – 381, 392, 103, 557, and 716.

[119] Charles Henry Churchill, *Mount Lebanon: a Ten Years' Residence from 1842 to 1852*, vol.2 (London: Saunders and Otley, 1853), 252. الترجمة عن الانكليزيّة لي.

[120] انظر على سبيل المثال: أحمد البديري الحلّاق، **حوادث دمشق اليوميّة 1154-1175 هـ – 1741 – 1762 م**، ط 3 (دمشق: دار سعد الدين للطباعة والنشر والتوزيع، 2008)، 85، و114، و137. ومؤلف مجهول ، **وقائع الدّروز مع أحمد باشا الجزّار 1697 – 1809م حوليّات مجهولة**، تحقيق منذر الحايك (دمشق: صفحات للدراسات والنشر والتوزيع، 2018)، 40. والأمير حيدر أحمد الشّهابي، **كتاب الغرر الحسان في أخبار أبناء الزّمان**، نَشَر الجزأين الثاني والثالث وحقّقهما أسد رستم وفؤاد افرام البستاني تحت عنوان: **لبنان في عهد الأمراء الشهابيّين**، قسم الدّراسات التاريخيّة 17 (بيروت: منشورات الجامعة اللبنانية، 1969)، و3: 552، و556، و572، 62 Farah, *The Politics*.

[121] انظر على سبيل المثال نص مراسلة من دفتر المهمّة العثماني رقم 800/115، مؤرّخة بكانون الثاني 1707م والمنشورة في Abu Husayn, *The View from Istanbul,* 66.

الدّروز كانوا، جُغرافيًّا وسياسيًّا، يقاتلون في بلادهم، وهو ما يبرّر نظرتهم إلى تلك الحروب بأنّها كانت حروبًا دفاعيّة. أمّا الموارنة فقد هاجروا من موطنهم الأصلي في نواحي جبل لبنان الشمالي واستوطنوا النواحي الجنوبيّة منه بتشجيع من أمراء الدّروز وحمايتهم بدءًا من القرن السّابع عشر.[122] كما يدعم نظرتهم تلك ما نقله عدّة مؤرخين بأنّ غرض الكنيسة المارونيّة المعلن من الحروب الأهليّة في القرن التاسع عشر كان القضاء على حكم الدّروز ووجودهم في جبل لبنان، إمّا قتلًا أو تهجيرًا إلى مناطق أخرى، وبالتّحديد، جبل حوران.[123]

كما نجد دلائل تاريخيّة واضحة على سلوك العقّال هذا في المصادر التي تعود إلى القرن الثامن عشر. فقد تحدّث المستشرق الفرنسي جان-ميشال دي فونتور دي براديز (de Paradis)، الذي عمل مُترجمًا دبلوماسيًّا في قنصليّات فرنسا وبعثاتها في بلاد الشام خلال القرن الثامن عشر، عن موقف عُقّال الدّروز من استعمال العنف، فقال إنّ على الدّروز الراغبين في الانضمام إلى مسلك العُقّال أن يتركوا "عادة حمل السّلاح، **الذي لا يجب عليهم استعماله** [بعد ذلك] **في التعدّي** [على الغير]، بل [يُستعمل] **فقط للدّفاع عن إخوانهم**".[124] ونجد الملاحظة نفسها لدى المستشرق الفرنسي دي باجس (De Pagés)، الذي كان ضابطًا في البحريّة الفرنسيّة، حيث قَصَر هذا السلوك على العُقّال ، وذكر عند حديثه عنهم أنّه "لا يُسْمح لهم، **وفق قواعد مسلكهم**، بحمل السّلاح، إلّا عندما يذهب جميع الشيوخ (الاقطاعيّون الدّروز) إلى ميدان [الحرب]، أو في حالات الطوارئ الكبرى".[125] من الواضح أنّ دي باجس قصد من ملاحظته عن شيوخ الاقطاع وطبيعة المخاطر، الإشارة إلى حربٍ دفاعيّة في مواجهة مخاطر وجوديّة تهدّد الدّروز، حيث يتّحد شيوخ الاقطاع جميعًا للدّفاع عن طائفتهم، وليس إلى حربٍ ناتجة عن نزاعات فئويّة بين هؤلاء الشيوخ طلبًا للسُّلطة أو المناصب. يثبت هذان الاقتباسان ما ذكر سابقًا عن اقتصار استعمال عُقّال الدّروز السّلاح على الدّفاع عن الأرض والعِرض. وكما تبيّن أعلاه، فإنّ هذا السّلوك هو نفسه الذي اتّبعته المرجِعيّات الدّينيّة الدّرزيّة خلال الحرب الأهليّة في الرّبع الأخير من القرن العشرين.

أمّا الرّحالة الفرنسي فولني (Volney)، الذي زار جبل لبنان في الرّبع الأخير من القرن الثامن عشر، فقد عمّم سلوك العقّال هذا على مجتمع دروز جبل لبنان كافةً، حيث قال إنّ "لديهم **نفور طبيعيّ**،

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[122] William W. Harris, *Lebanon: A History 600 – 2011* (New York. Oxford University Press, 2012), 94. تظهر السجلّات العثمانيّة في القرن السّادس عشر أنّ الغالبيّة الساحقة من سكان نواحي بلاد الدّروز، أي شوف ابن معن، الغرب، الجرد، المتن، كانوا من الدّروز، بينما كان المسيحيّون يتركّزون في كسروان والنواحي الشماليّة من جبل لبنان. انظر عصام خليفة، **نواحي لبنان في القرن السّادس عشر: التقسيمات الإداريّة، الدّيموغرافيا، الأديان والمذاهب** (بيروت: لا ناشر، 2004)، 88، و92، و100-101، و104-105، و108، و154-155، و158، و162، و166-167.

[123] انظر مكاريوس، **حسر اللثام عن نكبات الشام**، 73-75، و119، و131، وتشرتشل، **الدّروز والموارنة**، 26-27، وسليمان أبو عز الدين، **مصادر التاريخ اللبناني**، تحرير نجلاء أبو عزّ الدين، الجزء الثالث: وثائق سياسيّة وإجتماعيّة (بيروت: دار أمواج للطباعة والنشر والتوزيع، 2002)، 285، و289-290، 92. Farah, *The Politics*.

[124] Jean Michel de Venture de Paradis, "*A Historical Memoir concerning the Druses, A People Inhabiting Mount Lebanon*," in *Travels in Various Countries of the East*, ed. by Rev. Robert Walpole (London: G. G. J. and J. Robinsons, 1786, Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme, and Brown, 1820), 98.

[125] Monsieur De Pagés, *Travels round the World in the years 1767, 1768, 1770, 1771,* vol. 2 (London: J. Murray, 1791), 239.

وفي سائر الأوقات، من المشاركة في حروبٍ **خارج بلادهم**".[126] الحروب التي تقع خارج بلادهم هي ذات طبيعة هجوميّة، وتُصنَّف أعمالًا عدائيّة؛ فيما الحروب التي تقع داخل بلادهم هي ذات طبيعة دفاعيّة. وبحسب فولني، فإنَّ نفور الدّروز هو من الحروب الهجوميّة، أي من تلك التي تأخذ طابع التّعدّي. لذلك، تُشير ملاحظته هذه إلى وجود سلوك عام لدى دروز جبل لبنان، كان مشهورًا عنهم في القرن الثّامن عشر، قائم على بُغض التّعدّي واجتناب الوقوع فيه. كما تُظهر بأنَّ هذا السّلوك هو من طباعهم الأصيلة، وحاضرٌ في سائر الأوقات، مّما يُعطيه امتدادًا تاريخيًّا أقدم من الحقبة الزمنيّة التي تحدَّث عنها فولني. وكان بيجيه دي سان بيير (Puget de Saint Pierre) قد سبقه إلى ذكر الأمر نفسه في كتابه عن دروز لبنان، حيث قال أنّ من طباع الدّروز 'حرصهم على ألَّا يكونوا في موقع التعدّي أبدًا، ولكنّهم يقابلون أقلّ تَعَدٍّ عليهم بكل ما يلزم من الغضب'.[127]

كذلك، ذكَرَ المؤرّخ الأب روفايل كرامة في بداية أحداث العام 1758 أنَّ الأمير بشير أبي اللّمع من برمانا،[128] أحد زعماء الاقطاع الدّروز، أراد أن يدخل في مسلك العقّال.[129] علم رئيس دير النبي أشعيا بأمره، فزار الشّيخ أبا علي مقصد، شيخ العُقّال في البلدة، وطلب منه أن يتحدّث إلى الأمير بشير ليُعوّض على الدّير دراهم كان قد أخذها غصبًا. استجاب الأمير بشير لطلب شيخ العقّال، فأعطى الدّير قطعة أرض في أنطلياس تعويضًا عن الدراهم المذكورة.[130] يُثبت هذا الخبر أمرين مُهمَّيْن: الأوّل، أنَّه كان مشهورًا وقتذاك بين سكّان جبل لبنان عمومًا عن عقّال الدّروز عدم قبول انتساب شخص إلى مسلكهم ارتكب في أيام جهله ظلمًا وتعدّيًا قبل أن يرجع عن تعدّيه ويُصلح ما أفسد بظلمه؛ بدليل معرفة رئيس دير بالأمر، وهو بالطّبع من غير الدّروز. أمّا الأمر الثّاني، فهو أنَّ العقّال هُمْ مَصدر قِيَم العدل والسّلم وعدم التّعدّي هذه وحَفَظَتُها في مجتمع الدّروز؛ بدليل أنَّ الأمير بشير أقدمَ على التّعدّي أيام الجهل، فعندما أراد الانتساب إلى مسلك العقّال، فَرَضَ عليه رئيسُ الدّين في بلدته، وهو دونه بالمرتبة الزّمنيّة (أو الاجتماعيّة)، أن يعود عن ظلمه ويعوّض على الدّير الدّراهم التي أخذها غصبًا، كي يُقبل بين العقّال.[131]

وذكر حمزة ابن سباط خبرًا مهمًّا يصف فيه عدل الأمير السّيّد عبد الله التّنّوخي في أحكامه وجرأته بإظهار الحقّ، يُبيّن شدّة حرص العُقّال على رفض التّعدّي وتبريره. فقد تحدّث عن شيخ كان "من الأكابر ببعض النواحي، وكان ذى (ذا) سطوة وقوّة، والناس إليه منقادين، وله هيبة ووقار، وكان زعيم قومه ... [و]من التلاميذ الكبار ومن أكبر المشايخ بالنّاحية"، ظَلَمَ جارًا له "رديء السيرة فاسد الخصال" تسبّب في تخريب نظام كَرْمٍ للشيخ بعد أن نقل إليه أغصانًا كان قد رماها في أرضه عاملون أوكلهم الشيخ بتشحيل دواليه. شكا الشيخُ الرّجل إلى حاكم الناحية – والذي كان بحسب الأمير السيّد، "لا يحسن طرايق العدالة"، أي ظالم — "فقبض عليه وضربه ضربًا مبرّحًا، وأخذ منه خمسماية درهمًا"، وهو مبلغ كبير،

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[126] Constantin-François Volney, *Travel Through Syria and Egypt, in the years 1783, 1784, and 1785*, vol. 2 (London: G. G. J. and J. Robinson, Pater-Noster-Row, 1787), 51. الترجمة الإنكليزيّة لي.

[127] Puget de Saint Pierre, *Histoire des Druses, Peuple du Liban* (Paris: Cailleau, 1763), 132.

[128] برمانا بلدة في قضاء المتن الشمالي من محافظة جبل لبنان.

[129] كان الأمراء آل أبي اللّمع ما زالوا دروزًا.

[130] روفائيل كرامه، **حوادث لبنان وسورية: من سنة 1745 إلى سنة 1800**، تحقيق المطران باسيليوس قطّان، مصادر التّاريخ اللبناني 2 (طرابلس: جروس برس، لا ت)، 21.

[131] المصدر نفسه.

قبل أن يطلق سراحه. صار الرّجل يشكو إلى النّاس مصابه ويتعرّض للشيخ بالإساءة؛ فغضب الأخير وأقسم بأنّه لا يسكن وذلك الرّجل في بلدة واحدة؛ ممّا اضطرّ الرّجل أن يرحل هو وعائلته عن بلدته.

ثمَّ أشار على الرّجل بعضُ من سمع قصته بالتظلّم إلى الأمير السيّد، ففعل. أرسل الأمير بطلب الشّيخ مُستوضحًا؛ وبعد سماع الخصمَيْن، تبيّن له أنَّ الأخير ظَلَمَ الرّجل وجار عليه. فوبّخ الأميرُ الشيخَ الكبير، والذي كان، بحسب ابن سباط، "عين أعيان البلاد" و"له نفوذ يضاهي ما عند الأمير السيّد"، واصفًا ما قام به تجاه الرّجل بـ "فعل الجبابرة"، وسائلًا إياه عتبًا: "أين شروط الدّيانة؟ أين حفظ الأمانة؟" كما حَكَمَ عليه أن يُعوّض على الرّجل ما خسر من مال بسببه، وأن يسمح له بالعودة إلى بيته وبلدته، حتى ولو تسبّب ذلك في رحيل الشّيخ عنها برًّا لقسمه. ثمَّ حذّره من مخالفة حكمه، قائلًا: "فإن أحببت مفارقتنا واخترت مرافقة غيرنا فمانِعٌ فيما رسمنا لك به وخالف". يعني كلام الأمير السيّد أنّه سيقطع صلته بالشّيخ وينفيه من مجالسه الدّينيّة إذا لم يُنصف ذلك الرّجل كما أمره. قَبِلَ الشّيخ العين حُكم الأمير بعد أن بيّن له خطأه، وعوَّضَ على الرّجل المال الذي خسره بسببه، وسمح له أن يعود إلى بلدته. وفي المقابل، رَحَلَ هو عن البلدة وسكن بلدةً أخرى برًا ليمينه![132] يُظهر حكم الأمير السيّد على الشيخ المذكور أنّ عدم التّعدّي هو شرط من شروط الدّيانة لدى عقّال الدّروز؛ وأنّه لا مكان بينهم لمن يقع به مهما علا شأنه في الدّين أو الدّنيا، إلّا أن يتوب ويُصلح ما تسبّب فيه من ظلم.[133]

أكتفي لضيق المكان بعرض هذه الأخبار والتي تشير بوضوح إلى العمق التّاريخيّ لسلوك العقّال الذي كشفت عنه في هذا البحث بالاعتماد على روايات شفهيّة عن أحداث تعود إلى القرن العشرين والعقد الأول من القرن الواحد والعشرين. الغرضُ من هذا العرض المختصر هو من جهة إظهار إمكانيّة دراسة المصادر التّاريخيّة المكتوبة للتحقّق من وجود هذا السّلوك عندهم في حقبات سابقة؛ ومن جهة أخرى، إظهار فائدة معرفة الباحث في تاريخ الدّروز خصوصًا وتاريخ لبنان عمومًا بسلوكهم هذا عند تحليل المصادر التاريخيّة الأساسيّة، لما يساعد ذلك في فهم مضمونها بشكل أعمق وأشمل.

من جهة أخرى، أبرز العرض التاريخيّ مسألة مهمّة، وهي تأثير العُقّال الأخلاقي في سلوكيّات مجتمع الدّروز العام وقِيَمه، والتي دفعت ببعض المؤرخين والمراقبين في القرنين الثامن عشر والتاسع عشر إلى تعميم مبادئ العُقّال بعدم التعدّي وتقييد استعمال السلاح والعنف بالدّفاع عن النفس والعِرض والأرض على الدّروز عامةً. وقد أشار جورج واشنطن شاسود (George Washington Chasseaud)، ابن قنصل أمريكا في بيروت في النصف الأوّل من القرن التاسع عشر، في كتابه عن دروز لبنان إلى أنّ العقّال يؤدّون وظيفة سياسيّة محوريّة في مجتمعهم، ويشكّلون عنصر قوّة الدّروز الحقيقي، لأنّهم مصدر مبادئهم وسلوكياتهم وحفظتها، ولأنّ هذه المبادئ والسلوكيّات هي، برأيه، السبب الأساس لتفوّقهم، حيث قال عن العقّال:

> إنّهم يمارسون... تأثيرًا كبيرًا جدًا في الأمور الزمنيّة، لأن لا أحد يُفكّر بالدخول إلى أي مكان، أو الإقدام على أيّ مسألة من دون استشارة العُقّال؛ لن يتم محاولة أي شيء ذي أهميّة، حتى من قبل

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[132] ابن سباط، **كتاب صدق الأخبار**، 75-76.

[133] إنَّ اشتراط الأمير السّيّد على الشّيخ العين إصلاح ما أفسد بتعويض الرّجل عن الضرّر الّذي لحقه بسببه يستند إلى قاعدة قرآنيّة تتعلّق بتحديد شروط التّوبة الصحيحة وتحقيق العدالة، حيث جعل القرآن التّوبة شرطًا ضروريًّا لنيل المغفرة عن ارتكاب الظلم، وإصلاح ما أفسد شرطًا متمّمًا لها، لما في ذلك من إقامة العدل، كما جاء في الآية: ﴿فَمَن **تَابَ مِن بَعْدِ ظُلْمِهِ وَأَصْلَحَ** فَإِنَّ اللهَ يَتُوبُ عَلَيْهِ إِنَّ اللهَ غَفُورٌ رَّحِيمٌ﴾، **سورة المائدة** 5: 39؛ و**سورة الأنعام** 6: 48 و54. وقد سمعت عدّة روايات شبيهة عن مشايخ معاصرين.

الشيخ (أي الإقطاعي)، دون مشورتهم وموافقتهم؛ **ويمارسون جميعًا رقابة عامة وإشرافًا على سلوك وأخلاق وسَمْت شعب الدّروز، والتي لها تأثير مفيد للغاية**. بالتأكيد، لأنّ العقّال هم خير الدّروز، فالدّروز خير أهل لبنان.[134]

كما دعم شاسود ما أشار إليه بعض المؤرّخين اللبنانيّين وكولونيل تشرتشل عن مساهمة العقّال الفعّالة في حلّ النزاعات وترسيخ الوحدة والوئام بين أبناء مجتمعهم، بقوله أنّ: "عقّال الدّروز هم وزراء سلام في مجتمعهم".[135]

يتولّد تأثير العُقّال القوي في مجتمع الدروز، الذي تحدّث عنه شاسود، من عدة عوامل، منها: التربيّة والمعاشرة والتوجيه الدّيني العام. فالعقّال وبقيّة الدّروز يعيشون في القرى نفسها، وفي كثير من الأحيان، في المنزل نفسه، ممّا يسهّل على غيرهم من الدّروز تَعلُّم مبادئ العُقّال واكتساب سلوكيّاتهم. كما أنَّ مبدأ عدم التعدّي بذاته يؤدّي وظيفة مهمّة، حيث يعلم معظم الدّروز، من خلال التربية والمعاشرة والتوجيه الدّيني، أنّ ارتكاب كبائر الذنوب مثل القتل ظُلمًا أو الزنا (وهو عندهم تعدّ على العرض) يحرمهم، متى أرادوا الالتزام بمسلك العُقّال، من حضور مجالس التذكار.[136] وبالتالي، يصير هذا القصاص الروحيّ رادعًا لكثير من الدّروز غير الملتزمين دينيًا لعدم التعدّي والقتل.

سادسًا: الخاتمة

أظهر هذا البحث فعاليَّة الرّوايات التاريخيّة الشفهيّة في تقديم مادة أساسيّة مفيدة للمؤرّخ الذي يرغب في دراسة مبادئ جماعة معيّنة من الناس وسلوكيّاتهم العامّة؛ خاصةً إذا ما جمع المؤرّخ بين المأثور الشّفهيّ المتوارث والتّاريخ الشّفهيّ المباشر، وعرف كيفيّة مقاربة كلّ منهما وفق خصائصه، والاستفادة منه بمنهج علمي واضح ومنضبط. فغالبًا ما تكون الرّوايات الشّفهيّة المتعلّقة بالمبادئ والسلوكيّات العامّة أكثر وفرة في الأرياف والمناطق النائية من الرّوايات التاريخيّة التي تتعلّق بالأحداث والحروب، لأنّها لا تتطلّب بالضرورة ثقافة عالية من ناقلها، كما أنّها أقرب إلى اهتمامات النّاس العاديّين وتشكّل جزءًا أساسيًّا من الأدوات التي تعتمدها الجماعات التي تسكن تلك المناطق للحفاظ على قِيَمِها ومبادئها ونقلها عبر الأجيال.

من جهة أخرى، كشف البحث، بالاعتماد على روايات من التّاريخ الشّفهيّ والمأثور الشّفهيّ ذات الصّلة، عن المبادئ الدّينيّة العامّة التي تحكم موقف العقّال الدّروز من العنف والتّعدّي، والسلوكيّات المشتركة النّابعة من هذه المبادئ. كما أظهر تجذّرها في حياتهم اليوميّة الخاصّة ومواقفهم العامّة على حدٍّ سواء. فقد بيّنت الرّوايات تحريم عُقّال الدّروز التّعدّي بأشكاله كافّة، وبُغضهم العنف والقتل، وحرصهم على عدم استعمالهما إلّا كَرْهًا في حالة الدّفاع عن أنفسهم في وجه تعدّي الآخرين عليهم. كما أظهر أنَّ علاقتهم بالسّلاح تنحصر في هذا الغرض الدّفاعي "الشريف" فقط؛ إذ لا يقتنونه حبًا به، بل لحاجته في رفع الظّلم والتّعدّي عنهم.

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[134] George Washington Chasseaud, *The Druses of the Lebanon: their Manners, Customs and History with a Translation of Their Religious Code* (London: R. Bentley, 1855), 379.

[135] المصدر نفسه .

[136] راجع الصفحتين 14-15 أعلاه.

كذلك، أظهر البحث الأسس الدّينيّة الثّابتة لسلوك العُقَّال هذا وعمق ارتباطه بتحقُّقهم الرّوحيّ ومسلكهم الدّينيّ. فالتّعدّي يُفسد طبيعة الإنسان العاقلة، التي هي مركز العبادة عندهم، ويحجب بصيرته القلبيّة عن إدراك الحقائق الإلهيّة، ويمنعه من التّصديق بها والإيمان بعدل الله ووعد الآخرة، ممّا يحرمه من النّجاة والفوز بالسّعادة الأبديّة في القيامة. لذلك، يجب على المؤمن عندهم بُغض العنف والابتعاد عن التّعدّي ورياضة القوّة الغضبيّة وتهذيب أخلاقه لاكتساب الخصال الحسنة التي تساعده على ضبط مشاعر الغضب التي تدفع الإنسان إلى ارتكاب الأعمال العُنفيّة والتّعدّي على الآخرين وظلمهم، مثل الحلم والصّبر والاحتمال والعفو. فالإنسان الذي يغلب على سيرته وسلوكيّاته العنف والشّراسة والميل إلى النّزاعات والاستهانة بالتّعدّي لا يمكن، في نظرهم، أن يكون من المؤمنين الأخيار؛ لأنَّ المؤمن العاقل بطبعته ينفرُ من جميع هذه الأمور ويجتهد في اجتنابها، ولا يلجأ إليها إلّا مكرهًا عند اضطراره للدّفاع عن النّفس والأرض والعِرض. كذلك، بيّن البحث إمكانات تتبّع سلوكهم هذا في مصادر تاريخ لبنان الحديث الأساسيّة، وقدّم نماذج واضحة تُثبت وجود هذا السلوك عند العقّال خصوصًا والدّروز عمومًا منذ القرن الخامس عشر على أقل تقدير. وأظهر أيضًا أنَّ موقفهم هذا من العنف والتّعدّي يستند إلى قواعد قرآنيّة محكمة وصريحة تُثبت أصالته الدّينيّة. من جهة أخرى، أظهر البحث مدى فاعليّة طريقة العبادة الروحيّة، كما في مسلك العُقَّال، في إبعاد المؤمنين عن العنف مقارنةً بالطريقة الشعائريّة.

وغنيّ عن الذكر أنَّه لم يسبق معالجة هذا الموضوع من قبل غرضًا لبحث أكاديميٍّ مستقل ووفْق أطر منهجيّة واضحة. وبالتالي، هذه هي المرّة الأولى التي يتمّ فيها الكشف عن معالم هذا السّلوك المتميّز لعقّال الدّروز في استعمال العنف والقتال من خلال أخبار تاريخيّة تتّعلق في الغالب بحياتهم اليوميّة العاديّة، علاوة على مواقفهم في الحوادث الكبرى مثل الحروب وغيرها. وتُقدِّم نتائجُ هذا البحث معاييرَ قِيميّة وسلوكيّة واضحة وثابتة يمكن المؤرّخ المتخصّص في تاريخ الدّروز خاصّةً وتاريخ لبنان عامّةً الاستعانة بها في فهم سلوك عقّال الدّروز خلال الحروب والنّزاعات المسلّحة التي شاركوا فيها عبر التّاريخ؛ وتقييم ما ورد في المصادر التّاريخيّة الأساسيّة عنها، وتمييز الصحيح منها من الزائف. وإذا ما أخذنا بالاعتبار ندرة المصادر الدرزيّة عن تاريخ لبنان الحديث، وبالتالي غياب روايتهم لأحداثه، وطغيان رواية الآخرين عليها، تظهر بوضوح فائدة معرفة كهذه، إذ تساعد المؤرّخين في تقديم رواية متوازنة لتاريخ لبنان الحديث.

فعلى سبيل المثال ، يذكر الأمير حيدر أحمد الشّهابي عند حديثه عن النّزاع المسلّح بين دروز جبل لبنان بقيادة الشّيخ بشير جنبلاط والشّيخ علي عماد من جهة، والأمير بشير الشّهابي الثّاني من الجهة الأخرى حضور الرئيس الرّوحيّ لدروز جبل لبنان شيخ العقل الكبير في ذلك الوقت، الشيخ أبو علي شرف الدّين بو زين الدّين (ت. 1826) من بلدة الهلاليّة في المتن، وعدد من كبار مشايخ العقّال مثل الشيخ يوسف الحلبي، بين جموع الدّروز المتجمهرين في المختارة.[137] وأشار إلى أنَّ هؤلاء المشايخ كانوا يحضّون الدّروز على قتال الأمير بشير الشّهابي الثّاني.[138] شكّل هذا النّزاع المسلّح نقطة تحوّل مفصليّة في تاريخ جبل لبنان في القرن التّاسع عشر، ومع ذلك، لم يُعطَ بعد حقَّه من الدّراسة المنهجيّة والبحث العلميّ المعمّق للكشف عن الأسباب الحقيقيّة وراء اندلاعه. غير أنَّ من شأن نتائج هذا البحث أن تنبّه المؤرّخ الذي يريد دراسة هذا النّزاع إلى أهميّة الوقوف عند مشاركة عُقَّال الدّروز فيه ومحاولة فهم أسبابها في ضوء المعايير القِيميّة والسّلوكيّة التي تظهَّرت في هذا البحث. وأقصد بذلك الإشارة إلى ضرورة تقصّي

[137] الهلاليّة بلدة في قضاء بعبدا من محافظة جبل لبنان. والمختارة بلدة في قضاء الشوف.

[138] الشّهابي، **كتاب الغرر الحسان**، 3: 762، و766، و768.

الأسباب التي جعلت هؤلاء العقّال يعتبرون أن الأمير بشير الشهابيّ الثّاني كان في حالة تعدٍّ عليهم، والكشف على طبيعة هذا التّعدّي وأبعاده؛ وهذا ما لم يُبحث بعد.

كذلك، يمكن الاستفادة من نتائج هذا البحث في الدّراسات السياسيّة والاجتماعيّة التي تتناول علاقة الطوائف الدينيّة في الشرق الأوسط عمومًا، والدّروز خصوصًا، بالمؤسّسات العسكريّة في دولهم، مثل الجيش والأمن العام وغيرها. وهي مسألة مهمّة برزت مؤخّرًا بعد اندلاع الحرب الأهلية السوريّة في العام 2011 ورفض آلاف الدّروز الالتحاق بالجيش السوري والمشاركة في الاقتتال الداخلي. يمكن أن يُفيد البحث أيضًا في دراسة مسألة خضوع دروز فلسطين للتجنيد الاجباري في الجيش الإسرائيلي.[139] ويوفّر أيضًا مادة مهمّة للأبحاث التاريخيّة التي تدرس سلوك الدّروز في مواجهة نزع السّلاح والتّجنيد الإجباري. فقد اشتهر دروز لبنان وسوريا برفض التّجنيد الإجباري ونزع سلاحهم خلال حكم العثمانيّين لبلاد الشام.[140] كما كان رفض التجنيد ونزع السلاح من أبرز أسباب ثورة دروز لبنان وسوريا ضدّ حكم محمّد علي باشا.[141]

ومن شأن نتائج هذا البحث أن تفتح الباب لدراسة أوسع وأشمل لمبادئ عقّال الدّروز وسلوكيّاتهم في مجالات أخرى من الحياة، وخاصةً سلوكهم السياسيّ، ممّا يساهم في فهم المعالم الحقيقيّة لمسلكهم الدّينيّ الفريد وغاياته الرّوحيّة والاجتماعيّة الخاصّة. ويساعد ذلك في فهم أبعاد نسيجهم الاجتماعيّ وأسسه، التي كانت من أهم العوامل التي أعطت هذه الطّائفة القليلة العدد قدرةً على الصّمود طوال عشرة قرون، حافظت فيها على هامش كبير من الحريّة في إدراة شؤونها الدّاخليّة، في منطقة شهدت باستمرار حروبًا ونزاعات مدمّرة. من جهة أخرى، يمكن الاستفادة من نتائج هذا البحث على الصّعيدين الاجتماعيّ والسّياسيّ العامّ، إذ يُقدّم صورةً عمليّة وواقعيّة عن نهجٍ أخلاقيٍّ ثابت ومُتّسق ينسجمُ مع مبادئ العدل الأساسيّة، ويُشكّل نقيضًا واضحًا لكثير من الممارسات العنفيّة التي تُمارس تحت شعارات دينيّة، وسياسيّة، وأيديولوجيّة مُختلفة، وتنشر القتل والدّمار في أرجاء العالم كافة. كذلك، قد تساهم المبادئ وأنماط السلوك التي تمّ عرضها في هذه الدراسة في تعزيز القيادة الدينيّة السلميّة بما يتجاوز السياقات المحليّة والإقليميّة، وتفتح آفاقًا جديدة للبحث الأكاديمي في الدراسات الدينيّة عن أخلاقيّات اللّاعنف.

أختم هذا البحث بروايةٍ تُظْهِرُ ثبات المرْجَعِيات الدّينيّة الحاليّة على سُلوكهم هذا. زارَ مسؤولٌ أمنيٌّ لبنانيّ كبير الشيخَ أمين الصّايغ، رئيس الدّروز الرّوحِيَّ في وقتنا الحاضر، للتّعارف. أثناء الزيارة، سأله المسؤول عن سرّ الدُّروز في الحرب، فأجاب الشّيخُ بإيجازٍ أنَّ: "الآخريْنَ اقْتَتَوا السِّلاحَ ليحموا

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[139] أورد رامي زيدان ملاحظة مُفيدة عن حيثيّات إقرار التّجنيد الإجباري للدروز في الجيش الإسرائيلي في العام 1955. فقد أشار إلى أنّ الأرشيف الإسرائيلي لا يحتوي على رسالة ذات صلة من رئيس الدّروز الروحي، الشيخ أمين طريف، مع أنّ رئيس الوزراء آنذاك، ديفيد بن غوريون، كان قد اشترط تلقّي مراسلة خطيّة تفيد بموافقته وقادة الدّروز الآخرين على قرار التجنيد.
Rami Zeedan, "The Role of Military Service in the Integration/Segregation of Muslims, Christians, and Druze within Israel," *Societies* 9, 2019 (1), 9.

[140] راجع Abu Husayn, *The View from Istanbul*، 23، حيث ذكر المؤلّف رفض الأمير أحمد معن الذهاب مع مجندين دروز للقتال مع العثمانيّين ضدّ الامبراطوريّة النّمساويّة في أواخر القرن السّابع عشر. عن رفض الدّروز أوامر نزع السّلاح، راجع عبد الرحيم أبو حسين، **صناعة الأسطورة: حكايّة 'التمرد الطويل' في جبل لبنان**، (بيروت: دار الساقي 2019)، 31 – 32.

[141] عن رفض دروز حوران التجنيد الاجباري ونزع سلاحهم، انظر على سبيل المثال: سليمان أبو عز الدين، **إبراهيم باشا في سوريا**، 197 – 202، و219، وبرجيت شيبلر، **انتفاضات جبل الدّروز – حوران من العهد العثماني إلى دولة الاستقلال 1850 – 1949** (بيروت: دار النهار بالتعاون مع المعهد الألماني للأبحاث الشرقيّة في بيروت 2004)، 78.

إيمانَهم، أمَّا نحن، إيمانُنا يحمي سلاحنا".[142] رسالة الشيخ الصّايغ إلى المسؤول الأمنيّ ومن خلاله إلى عموم الناس، وبضوء ما بيّنه البحث، هي أنّه في زمنٍ يزداد فيه يومًا بعد يوم، وبوتيرةٍ متسارعة وأشكالٍ بشعة، استعمالُ العنفِ وسفك الدماءِ في أنحاء الأرض كافةً، وباسم الدّين خاصّةً؛ لدى عقّال الدّروز سلوكٌ قيّمٌ يُقَدّمونه إلى تراث الإنسانيّة: "إيمانٌ يحمي السّلاح" مِنَ الظُّلْمِ والتّعدّي.

[142] معين الصّايغ.

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Article:

"The Religious Attitude of the Druze Towards Violence: A Study Based on Oral Sources"

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This is the English version which follows the Arabic version above (pages 3-41);

هذه النسخة الإنكليزيّة للنسخة العربية أعلاه (صفحة 3-41).

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Abstract

Since its rise in the 11th century AD, the Druze community has distinguished itself from its surroundings by its unique religious identity. This religious identity has given rise to social and political behaviors that have, over time, formed the collective character of the Druze. The Druze who upheld their religious identity were known as the *ʿuqqāl*, while others were called *juhhāl*. Historically, the *ʿuqqāl* have played vital social and political roles within their community, the most prominent of which has been preserving the Druze identity and the social and political behaviors arising from it. On the other hand, Druze history in the Levant—particularly in Lebanon—is marked by wars and armed uprisings, which have imparted a warlike character on the Druze that often overshadowed their other collective traits, despite their commitment to nonviolent principles. For these reasons, understanding the *ʿuqqāl*'s religious stance on the use of violence and their conduct in conflicts is of clear historical importance. This study investigates oral narratives about notable Druze *ʿuqqāl* in Lebanon during the past century, employing a rigorous methodology to reveal a consistent, comprehensive behavioral pattern grounded in fundamental religious principles. This behavior is characterized by a rejection of violence and aggression, an effort to prevent such acts, a condemnation of those who engage in them, and retribution where necessary. From a broader perspective, the ethical stance of religious adherents on violence is a contentious issue today and is receiving intense attention from research institutions and both governmental and non-governmental organizations, particularly given the global impact of religiously motivated violence. Consequently, this research carries significance beyond the Druze demographic presence in the Levant, as it offers principles and behavioral patterns that may contribute to fostering peaceful religious leadership on an international level.

Keywords*: the history of Lebanon, the history of the Druze, the Druze ʿUqqāl, principles of using violence, ethics of violence, oral sources, oral narratives*.

"Your idea of proper behavior is, firstly, to avoid harming others, and then to avoid being harmed yourself."[143]

Introduction

A researcher studying the history of the Druze might be led to believe that they are a sect inclined toward combat and violent acts, given how often their history has been intertwined with wars and armed conflicts. They are renowned for fighting the Crusaders, who occupied parts of the Levant between 1098 and 1291,[144] and for their revolt against the Ottoman Empire after its occupation of the Levant in 1516, a rebellion that lasted more than two centuries.[145] They also mounted an armed uprising against the armies of Muhammad Ali Pasha—the governor of Egypt—in Mount Lebanon, Wādī al-Taym, and the Ḥawrān region during his occupation of the Levant between 1831 and 1840.[146] Shortly thereafter, the Druze fought three civil wars against the Maronites in Mount Lebanon between 1841 and 1860.[147] In the twentieth century, the Druze of Ḥawrān revolted against the French Mandate authority between 1925 and 1927, and the Druze of Lebanon took part in two civil wars in the Lebanese Republic—the first in 1958 and the second between 1975 and 1990. More recently, the Druze of Mount Lebanon took part in the events of May 2008.[148] Such a war-torn history highlights

[143] The Greek historian Thucydides on the Spartan principle in war, see Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, Transl. by Rex Warner (London: Penguin Books, 1972), 71.

[144] The Jewish traveler Benjamin of Tudela reported that the Druze "were at war with the men of Sidon"; by whom he meant the Crusaders, as his trip took place between the years 1159 and 1173 AD during the Crusaders' control over parts of Palestine and Lebanon. Marcus Nathan Adler, *The itinerary of Benjamin of Tudela: Critical text, translation and commentary*, vol. 1 (New York: Philipp Feldheim Incorporated, 1907), 29.

[145] On the Druze revolt against the Ottomans during the 16th century, see Abdul Rahim Abu Husayn. *The View from Istanbul: Ottoman Lebanon and the Druze Emirate* (London: The Centre of Lebanese Studies with the association of I.B. Tauris, 2002).

[146] On the Druze revolt against the rule of Muhammad Ali Pasha in Syria, see Abū ʿIzz al-Dīn Sulaymān, *Ibrāhīm Bāshā fī Sūriyā* (Beirut: al-Maṭbaʿah al-ʿIlmīyah li-Yūsuf Ṣādir, 1929), 197-202.

[147] The best academic reference on the wars between the Druze and the Maronites in the 19th century is Caesar E. Farah, *The Politics of Interventionism in Ottoman Lebanon 1830 – 1861* (London: Centre for Lebanese Studies in association with I.B. Tauris, 2000).

[148] An internal armed conflict that occurred in Lebanon from May 7 to May 15, 2008. Tensions escalated on May 5 when Prime Minister Fouad Siniora's government, backed by the pro-government March 14 Forces, declared Hezbollah's independent communication network illegal and initiated legal actions to dismantle it. Additionally, the government decided to dismiss the head of airport security, a figure aligned with the opposition March 8 Forces. Hezbollah viewed these moves

the importance of understanding the Druze stance on the use of violence and the principles that govern their behavior in this regard.

Since the Druze are a community distinguished primarily through their unique religious identity, it is crucial to understand the stance of the ʿuqqāl[149]—the religiously observant members—on these issues, as they are the ones most closely tied to the value system of their community. Moreover, the ʿuqqāl have historically played significant political and social roles within the Druze community. Therefore, there is a clear historical benefit in understanding their stance on using violence and resorting to fighting, in addition to the principles governing their behavior towards these significant issues. This study investigates oral accounts transmitted about notable Druze ʿUqqāl during the past century, employing a transparent, rigorous methodology to uncover a consistent and comprehensive behavior grounded in fundamental and constant religious principles. This behavior is marked by the rejection of violence, killing, and aggression, as well as a commitment to preventing such acts, condemning those involved, and seeking retribution against them.

I will begin by presenting some methodological observations related to the practical issues of oral sources, briefly discussing some common characteristics and problems associated with oral accounts of the history of the Druze ʿUqqāl in general and the subject of this research in particular. Then, I will dedicate a section to explaining the religious principles that govern the behavior of the Druze ʿUqqāl towards the use of violence through Quranic verses and related religious literature composed by the two most prominent Druze religious scholars, namely al-Amīr al-Sayyid Jamāl al-Dīn ʿAbd Allāh al-Tannūkhī (died 1479) and al-Shaykh al-Fāḍil Muḥammad Abū Hilāl (d. 1641). After that, I will present the oral accounts I have collected over the past two decades about the behavior of the Druze ʿUqqāl in wars and their stance on violence and killing in their everyday lives over the past century and extract the insights and facts that relate to my research topic and

as an act of war, and on May 7, its fighters launched military operations, subsequently seizing control of Beirut. By May 11, Hezbollah extended its offensive to several Druze villages in southern Mount Lebanon. However, unlike in Beirut, they faced strong resistance from Druze fighters—primarily religiously committed individuals acting independently of political factions—who successfully repelled the attack. Hostilities eventually ceased on May 15.

[149] I chose to use the term "al-ʿĀqil" and its plural "ʿUqqāl" to refer to Druze religiously observant men, individually and collectively, as it is the most commonly used term in the primary sources of modern Lebanese history. This term also captures the spiritual and behavioral characteristics of religious commitment among the Druze community. In line with this choice, I will use the phrase "affiliated with the Order of the ʿUqqāl" or similar phrases to indicate a person's religious commitment.

help in achieving its purpose. Finally, I will present a focused historical survey of this behavior by shedding light on the primary historical sources that contain revealing insights on the subject.

Note: Some phrases in the quotes are emphasized in bold letters to draw the reader's attention. Therefore, the emphasis is not part of the original texts.

1. Oral Sources

Written historical works are the preferred sources for historians and the foundation of their research, as they align closely with the nature of their craft. These sources often go beyond merely recounting events in a chronological order that mirrors the past; they also seek to explain causes and consequences as interpreted and understood by their authors. The tradition of historical writing often originates in major cities and administrative and political centers of ruling states and kingdoms. On the one hand, there are educated people who can write such books, supported by a longstanding tradition of historical writing to build on. On the other hand, there are many incentives, including the succession of rulers, the change of ruling families, the outbreak of conflicts and wars, and the occurrence of strife, revolutions, and major events that produce radical changes in the lives of these cities and their societies, prompting educated individuals to write historical books and investigate news of the past. In contrast, these incentives are largely absent in rural and remote areas, where distance from major events and limited access to knowledge and education make the development of this tradition rare.

Such a situation applies to the history of the Druze community in the past centuries, as they settled in the mountains and countryside far from the main cities and administrative centers of the ruling states. Consequently, the Druze community did not witness the emergence of a continuous and comprehensive tradition of historical writing until nine centuries after its inception. Instead, it can be said that historical writing among them during that period comprised of sporadic individual cases. Apart from the history written by Emir Ṣāliḥ ibn Yaḥyā al-Buḥturī al-Tannūkhī in the first half of the 15th century AD,[150] two short biographies of their most famous religious scholar, al-Amīr al-Sayyid ʿAbd Allāh al-Tannūkhī, written in the second half of the same century by two of his leading

[150] Ṣāliḥ ibn Yaḥyā, *Tārīkh Bayrūt: wa-huwa Akhbār al-Salaf min Dhurriyat Buḥtur ibn ʿAlī Amīr al-Gharb bi-Bayrūt*, a critical edition by Fr. Francis Hors the Jesuit, Kamal S. Salibi, and others (Beirut: Dar al-Machreq, 1969).

companions and disciples;[151] and "Tārīkh Ṣidq al-Akhbār" by Ḥamzah ibn Ṣbāṭ (d. 1520 or later), written at the beginning of the 16th century,[152] there are no known historical works before the early 20th century. This is when Yūsuf Khaṭṭār Abū Shaqrā (d. 1904) documented the oral narrative of Ḥusayn Ghaḍbān Abū Shaqrā (d. 1903) about the civil wars in Mount Lebanon in the 19th century.[153] Therefore, researchers of Druze history often have to resort to other historical sources, including oral ones, to compensate for the lack of written historical works.

However, I will not use oral accounts in this research to chronicle specific events or historical figures but rather to derive general principles and values that govern the collective behavior of the Druze ʿUqqāl towards the use of violence. Oral accounts have a unique advantage in this type of research, as they offer a source close to the people; in the words of the Druze ʿUqqāl, "Those who are close by see what the distant ones do not."[154] Oral accounts convey personal stances and marginal events from ordinary people's daily lives that rarely find their way into history books and official records. Yet, such events spontaneously express the values, collective traits, and behaviors of a distinct group of people, thus having a greater capacity to inform researchers about the people than general history books. Therefore, oral accounts can give historians a closer look at how the Druze ʿUqqāl lived and applied their principles, including those related to violence and fighting.

A. Types of Oral Accounts

The use of oral accounts as a source for historical writing is governed by specific requirements and regulations that must be observed. Therefore, it is essential to clarify some methodological points specific to oral sources before

[151] The two authors were senior religious scholars contemporary to the Al-Amīr Al-Sayyid and accompanied him for more than four decades, they are Shaykh ʿAlam al-Dīn Sulaymān ibn Ḥusayn ibn Naṣr and Shaykh Abū ʿAlī Mirʿī. The History book of Ḥamzah ibn Sbāṭ contained a third biography of al-Amīr Al-Sayyid.

[152] Ḥamzah ibn Sbāṭ, *Kitāb Ṣidq al-Akhbār*, a critical edition published by Nāʾilah Taqī al-Dīn Qaydbay under the title *Tārīkh al-Durūz fī Ākhir ʻAhd al-Mamālīk* (Beirut: The Druze Council for Research and Development and Dar al-ʿAwdah, 1999).

[153] Yūsuf Abū Shaqra, *Al-Ḥarakāt fī Lubnān ilā ʻAhd al-Muṭaṣarifiyyat*, ed. and published by ʿĀrif Abū Shuqra (Beirut: no publisher, [1952]).

[154] Shaykh ʿAbd al-Malik b. al-Ḥājj Yūsuf al-Ḥalabī, unpublished manuscript, *Ādāb al-Shaykh al-Fāḍil,* author's private archives, 43.

presenting the accounts related to the research topic and studying them. To begin with, oral sources are classified by modern historical theory into two categories:[155]

Oral History: A practice or a unique method of historiography that produces a source bearing the same name.

Oral Tradition: A type of historical source only.

Based on this classification, "'oral history' refers to the study of the recent past by means of life histories or personal recollections, where informants speak about their own experiences."[156] Additionally, an oral account is classified as oral history if it conveys firsthand knowledge about events witnessed (or experienced) by people known to the narrator during his lifetime; hence, the narrator is the direct source of the account.[157]

Oral tradition differs from oral history in that it is not a method for studying history but instead is only a source. Moreover, oral tradition also differs from oral history in that it consists of oral historical accounts about earlier events not contemporary to the narrator, passed down through several previous generations of narrators or transmitters.[158] However, Vansina states that the passage of only one generation from the events conveyed in the oral account is sufficient to classify it as an oral tradition.[159] Nevertheless, oral tradition is, for the most part, a recounting of events or people from the distant past.

Henige added a condition for classifying an account as an oral tradition: it must be widely known, meaning that it belongs to the collective memory or historical consciousness of a distinct group of people.[160] Therefore, even if the first condition is met in a particular oral account by means of conveying knowledge about events or people belonging to a distant past if it is known individually or in a limited scope, it must instead be considered a personal testimony rather than an oral tradition. Vansina sees this additional condition as

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[155] David Henige, *Oral Historiography* (London: Longman, 1982), 2.

[156] Ibid.

[157] Sommer and Quinlan agree with Henige in defining oral history. In their book The Oral History Manual, they provide the following definition: "Oral history is primary-source material created in an interview setting with a witness to or a participant in an event or a way of life for the purpose of preserving the information and making it available to others. The term refers both to the process and the interview itself." Barbara W. Sommer and Mary Kay Quinlan, The Oral History Manual, 2nd ed. (Lanham, MD: Altamira Press, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009), 1.

[158] Henige, *Oral Historiography,* 2.

[159] Jan Vansina, *Oral Tradition as History* (Wisconsin: The University Press of Wisconsin, 1985), 27-28.

[160] Henige, *Oral Historiography*, 2.

"a crucial criterion for any sociological analysis of [oral] tradition," – which I am applying in this research – but "not for [its] use as a source for history."[161] Vansina's note is correct in some cases. While preparing another research project, I found that some oral accounts, that are transmitted within a narrow range, e.g., a particular family or village, and are not widely known in the community, intersect with written historical accounts. Thus, they retain high credibility despite not being widely known at the community level.

B. Methodological Notes on the Oral Accounts of Druze ʿUqqāl

As mentioned previously, the purpose of this research is to use oral accounts to reveal a unique phenomenon in the behavior of Druze ʿUqqāl the use of violence rather than presenting a general theoretical study on the use of oral sources as a means of historiography or on the conditions for using both oral history and oral tradition as historical evidence and the problems that arise from that.[162] Therefore, I will present some common characteristics and problems associated with oral accounts related to the history of Druze ʿUqqāl in general and to the research topic in particular through three main axes: the narrator, in the case of oral history, or the chain of narrators (or transmitters) in the case of oral tradition, the content or historical substance, and the literary form that carries the content, such as metered poetry, rhymed prose, stories, etc., as it relates to oral tradition.

1) The Narrator

Most of the oral accounts related to the subject of this research belong to the Druze religious reservoir and are preserved by the ʿuqqāl themselves. This reality has significant implications for these accounts' structure and content, particularly concerning the first two axes. Researchers investigating oral accounts about the history of the ʿuqqāl encounter a significant obstacle, as the most credible narrators and those most knowledgeable about events related to the affairs of the ʿuqqāl and their contemporary history are the elder ʿuqqāl, especially the religious authorities among them, due to their experience of many significant events over a relatively long period and their intimate firsthand knowledge of these events. However, the strict ethical code that governs the behaviors of these elder ʿuqqāl

[161] Vansina, *Oral Tradition as History*, 28.

[162] The books by Henige and Vansina mentioned in the previous notes are useful in this field.

makes them refuse to include their names mentioned as sources for the oral accounts they convey. They consider being cited as a source for those accounts to be a form of fame that stirs human desire for recognition and status—qualities they deem objectionable and strive to avoid.

This reserved behavior towards oral history is not limited to the senior ʿuqqāl but extends to many ʿuqqāl who follow their example. Consequently, it is often difficult to persuade ʿuqqāl narrators to allow the use of their testaments or statements as sources for oral accounts. Therefore, in this research, I will limit myself to stating the names of the narrators who have authorized me to use their accounts. However, when I use accounts I heard from more than one ʿāqil (singular of ʿuqqal), some of whom did not give authorization to use their statements as sources in my research, I will indicate in the footnotes that I have heard them from other ʿuqqāl without specifying their names in order to prove that those accounts are widespread. The topic of this research, unlike other topics about Druze ʿUqqāl I have worked on collecting oral accounts about, helped overcome this problem, as most of these accounts have become widespread over time and are known to many ʿuqqāl and other Druze. This reduced the impact of not mentioning the names of all narrators on the credibility of the accounts used.

The problem of the narrator becomes more complicated when searching for accounts from oral tradition, as there is an additional reason for an ʿāqil to refuse attribution. One of the ʿuqqāl from Khraybit al-Shūf village justified his refusal to use his testimony as a source in my research, stating that he is afraid of compromising his religious integrity due to any alteration that the transmitted account might have suffered before it reached him. Such an alteration may make it either entirely or partially false, which is a risk he does not want to take.

Moreover, another problem lies in the absence of a complete chain of transmitters, which goes back in the chain of narrators to the first narrator, who was contemporary to the events depicted in the oral account and thus has firsthand knowledge of it. In the case of Druze ʿUqqāl, the sequence of narrators cannot extend beyond one or two previous generations at most. When an ʿāqil hears a story, he evaluates its credibility by considering how much he trusts the last narrator he heard it from. He does not usually inquire about the source from which that trustworthy narrator learned it. I have tried hard over the years to obtain more layers of the chains of narrators upon which the accounts I collected rely but to no avail.

Therefore, when using oral accounts of Druze ʿUqqāl, real issues arise related to the first axis, the narrator. However, it is not possible to dismiss all oral

traditions based on the incompleteness of the chain of narrators. Many of the accounts forming this oral tradition are widely spread, and it can be confidently said that they belong to the collective consciousness of the ʿuqqāl, which gives them significant importance despite the mentioned issues. I have resorted to a unique method in evaluating the credibility of the oral tradition I have collected. I have relied on using accounts classified by senior ʿuqqāl, especially the higher religious authorities among them, as highly credible and set aside those they doubted.

This method was inspired by a story I heard from the senior religious authority Shaykh Abū Muḥammad Jawād Walī al-Dīn (1916 – 2012) about a famous account he heard in his youth related to Shaykh Abū Muḥammad Saʿīd al-ʿUqaylī (d. 1915?) from the town of al-Samaqānīyya,[163] and Shaykh Abū Ḥusayn Maḥmūd Faraj from the town of ʿBayh (d. 1953),[164] both of whom were among the most senior ʿuqqāl of the Druze in their time. The account depicts the manners of ʿuqqāl in visiting each other. Apparently, Shaykh Abū Muḥammad Jawād Walī al-Dīn was initially skeptical of the story as he heard it, so he clarified the matter from Shaykh Abū Ḥusayn Maḥmūd Faraj himself when he met him at one of the religious gatherings. It turned out that the visit did indeed occur but in a form different from what he had previously heard.[165] I was struck at that time by the response of Shaykh Abū Ḥusayn Maḥmūd after hearing the incorrect version of the visit story, where he exclaimed in surprise: "How is that appropriate?" indicating that the story as he heard it not only differs from reality but also does not conform to the manners of the ʿuqqāl. This, indeed, is what likely alerted the young Shaykh Abū Muḥammad Jawād and prompted him to verify its accuracy directly from the person involved, i.e., Shaykh Abū Ḥusayn Maḥmūd Faraj. This account shows two important things: first, the oral religious tradition of Druze ʿUqqāl can be erroneous, and second, senior Druze ʿUqqāl like Shaykh Abū Muḥammad Jawād Walī al-Dīn have a greater ability than other ʿuqqāl to

[163] Shaykh Abū Muḥammad Sa'īd al-'Uqaylī was a leading religious authority among the Druze in Mount Lebanon at the beginning of the 20th century. I have not yet come across a verified date of his death, but he died during World War I and before the birth of Shaykh Abū Muḥammad Jawād Walī al-Dīn towards the end of 1916.

[164] Al-Samaqānīyyah is a town in the Shūf district of Mount Lebanon Governorate, and ʿBayh is in the ʿĀlayh district of the same governorate.

[165] Shaykh Abū Muḥammad Jawād Walī al-Dīn, interview by author, August 10, 2003. I later asked him to recount it again on 22 February 2010. I did not mention the details of the story for brevity, as it was not related to the research topic. I could not have used Shaykh Walī al-Dīn 's account while he was alive.

assess the credibility of oral accounts, especially oral tradition, and to distinguish which of them conform to their religious teachings and manners – or what "is appropriate" – and which do not, due to their deep knowledge of those teachings and manners. Such accounts undoubtedly express the behaviors and manners of the ʿuqqāl and, as a result, benefit this research.

2) Content

Most of the oral accounts of the Druze ʿUqqāl are characterized by a common feature in terms of content; they often intentionally omit historical details such as names of people, specific dates, etc., and instead focus on the moral or admonitory content they carry–that is, the lesson. It is worth noting that the Druze historian Ḥamzah ibn Ṣbāṭ, who was an ʿāqil, used the same method in narrating significant events that occurred in the life of al-Amīr al-Sayyid and demonstrated his many virtues without mentioning dates of events or names of people or towns. He instead limited himself to mentioning people's social or functional attributes that help to elucidate the lesson from the story.[166] The narrators often mentioned to me the names of the people referred to in the accounts, but they requested that those names not be disclosed.

Indeed, such a practice causes these oral accounts to lose much of their historical content. However, one can be confident that some accounts retain a core of truth, as they are widely circulated and generally accepted among the ʿuqqāl. This truth can be reached by subjecting highly creditable accounts, defined by earlier conditions, to logical analysis and contextual criticism and by comparing them with other historical sources directly related to the topic or belonging to the same historical period. This determines what truth they contain and what errors or alterations, whether intentional or unintentional, they may have suffered.

3) Literary Form

Most oral accounts transmitted by the Druze ʿUqqāl take a narrative form, telling a short or long story about a person or a specific event. Most of these stories do not take a fixed literary form but are narrated in the language of the latest narrator, a practice that can also impoverish the historical content of the account. A fixed form—whether it be poetry or rhymed prose, etc.—enormously helps

[166] An example of this is: "a person of wealth", "a person among the notables in some districts, who had power and influence, and whom people obeyed, having dignity and respect, and was a leader of his people ... and was among the major scholars," and "lived in some villages", "a prominent man ... a leader (chief) of his people, wealthy and influential," and "a man who inspires fear (i.e., frightening) on the road." See Ibn Ṣbāṭ, *Kitāb Ṣidq al-Akhbār,* 74-75 and 77-78.

preserve the account's original content and integrity, especially in the case of oral tradition.

To avoid leaving the discussion of these narratives vague or confined to the theoretical realm, it may be helpful to present an oral account that directly relates to the research topic, which I often heard from senior ʿuqqāl in the Upper Shūf region when I inquired about oral accounts that reflect the values and behaviors of the Druze ʿUqqāl.

C. Case of the Wronged ʿĀqil

The "Case of the Wronged ʿĀqil" most likely dates back to the 19th century.[167] I heard this story from several ʿuqqāl of the Upper Shūf, notably Shaykh Abū Sulaymān Ḥasīb al-Ḥalabī (d. 2016) from the town of Buṭmah, who was one of the religious authorities in his region.[168] The oral account states that one of the Druze ʿUqqāl from the mentioned region—named Qasim, according to several narrators—was walking one day on a road connecting the towns of ʿAmmāṭūr and Baʿdharān, wearing new shoes. He encountered an Ottoman soldier on the same road who, coveting his new shoes, treacherously stabbed him with a dagger! However, the ʿāqil was a robust man, strong in build. He regained his composure, overpowered the soldier, threw him to the ground, and disarmed him. He was about to kill him when the ʿāqil realized that the stab he received had caused a fatal wound, so he said to the soldier, "Were it not for fear of my Lord, I would kill you"; then he let him go on his way! The ʿāqil fell ill for a few days before death overtook him due to his wound.[169]

The narrators explain that behind his behavior was a fundamental religious rule among the Druze ʿUqqāl: killing is one of the capital sins that severs a believer's bond with his Lord and deprives him of the reward of the Hereafter. It

[167] Or to the first two decades of the 20th century; since there were no longer Ottoman troops in Syria and Mount Lebanon after 1918. The story has no specific title, but I called it "The Story of the Wronged ʻĀqil" conventionally.

[168] Shaykh Abū Sulaymān Ḥasīb al-Ḥalabī, interview by author, October 13, 2004. I would not have mentioned Shaykh al-Ḥalabī's name had he still been alive. Salmān Māhir informed me that Shaykh Abū Salmān Maḥmūd al-Shamʿah (d. 1999) also narrated it. He was a religious dignitary in his town of ʿAyn Qinī and the Upper Shūf area and a general supervisor of Khalwāt al-Qaṭālib, a religious retreat in the town of Baʿdharān, for several decades. Salmān Māhir had heard it directly from him. Salmān Māhir, interview by author, April 9, 2019. He is a ʿāqil from the town of ʿAyn Qinī in Shūf. Buṭmah, Baʿdharān, ʻAmmāṭūr, and ʿAyn Qinī are all towns in the Shūf district.

[169] The narrators indicated that the wronged ʿāqil is buried in a place known to this day by his name on the right side of the road connecting the town of ʿAmmāṭūr to Baʿdharān.

is only permissible in defense of life, honor,[170] and property. Since the ʿāqil's wound was fatal, the justification for killing the soldier in defense of life was not applicable, as he was doomed to die anyway. In this case, killing becomes an act of vengeance, which is forbidden among them. When he related the story to me, Shaykh Abū Sulaymān Ḥasīb al-Ḥalabī described the ʿāqil's act with clear admiration, commenting that it was an act of "forgiveness when capable." The ʿāqil could have killed the attacking soldier but instead merely disarmed him to prevent him from harming others and let him go, fearing that he would commit an unlawful killing. He chose to die wronged rather than die as a murderer.[171] Such an act expresses two things: the ability to restrain feelings of anger and prioritize reason over them, and a profound fear of committing unjust killing.

The story lacks the full name of the ʿāqil at the center of the incident and the timing of its occurrence. This is not surprising, as what matters most to the ʿuqqāl is the religious lesson: the ʿāqil freed his killer out of fear for his faith. The ʿuqqāl preserve this story, pass it down from one generation to another, and teach it as material for spiritual upbringing because it embodies their principles and values. Stories like this teach the ʿuqqāl to detest violence and killing and to fear falling into these acts without a legitimate religious justification. This reinforces, among them, the prohibition of killing in religion. For this specific reason, this story and similar ones, despite lacking historical details, offer researchers great insight into the behaviors of Druze ʿUqqāl in general, and their stance on violence and killing in particular. Similar accounts often reach uncommitted Druze, spreading among them the morals and principles of the ʿuqqāl, influencing their behavior, and transforming these morals and principles into a communal ethos that was recorded in different periods by foreign historians. This will appear later in the fifth section of the article.

[170] Translating the Arabic term «ʿirḍ» (عرض), which refers in Arabic culture to family honor, particularly the dignity and reputation of female members.

[171] Compare with similar behavior mentioned in the Qurʾān in the rejection and hatred of killing: "He said: 'I will surely kill you.' He replied: 'God only accepts from those who are righteous. If you do stretch your hand against me to kill me, I shall not stretch my hand against you to kill you, for I fear God, the Lord of the Worlds. I want you to bear my sin and your sin, so you will be among the companions of the fire. That is the recompense of the wrongdoers.' His soul permitted him to kill his brother, so he killed him and became one of the losers"; *Sūrat al- Māʾidah* 5: 27-30. Also compare with what the Greek philosopher Plato said about the characteristics of a just soul (or a virtuous man): it naturally rejects injustice and aggression and, when forced to choose between doing injustice or suffering, it prefers suffering injustice rather than committing injustice. See for example: Plato, *Gorgias* 469c; *Crito* 49c–d.

2. The Order of the ʿUqqāl

It is crucial to emphasize that the scope of this research is confined to the behavior of Druze ʿUqqāl alone. Therefore, briefly defining the ʿuqqāl and their behavior is useful. Regarding religious practice, the Druze are divided into two groups: the religiously committed and the uncommitted. In Lebanese historical sources dating to before the 20th century, the religiously committed were referred to as ʿuqqāl, while the uncommitted were referred to as Juhhāl.[172] The ʿāqil Druze historian Ḥamzah ibn Ṣbāṭ used the term "Ajwād" (plural of Jayyīd, Good) to denote the religiously committed Druze.[173] However, in contemporary Druze society, none of these terms are used, and the religiously committed Druze modestly use the term "Jwayyīd" (a diminutive form of Jayyīd, and its plural is Ājāwīd) to refer to members of their class.

The ʿuqqāl are organized in religious praying halls spread across their villages—called the Assemblies of Remembrance (Majālis al-Tadhkār)—and the one who heads those assemblies is known among the Druze in our present time as the *Sayis* (from the Arabic word for politics, *Siyasah*). These assemblies are concerned with religious upbringing in all its aspects, namely knowledge, faith (doctrine), morals, and behavior.[174] The *Sayis* must perform these functions in his assembly, and he has the right to monitor the lives and behavior of all the ʿuqqāl affiliated with it and to hold them accountable for any mistake or violation of religious laws they commit. However, the Sayis and the ʿuqqāl of his assembly are all under the care and monitoring of the Shaykhs of the Districts (the religious authorities within them), and all of them are under the care and supervision of the Chief Shaykh of the Country, who is considered as the spiritual leader of the Druze in his country.[175]

Commitment to these assemblies restricts the behavior of the Druze ʿUqqāl and imposes on them a frugal and disciplined life based on their religious teachings and its comprehensive moral system. The Druze ʿUqqāl cannot violate any of the religious and behavioral requirements of these assemblies without

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[172] To explore the religious significance of the terms "ʿāqil" and "jāhil" among the Druze, see chapter three of Said Abou Zaki, *Mashyakhat al-ʿAql fī Lubnān: Baḥthun fī Aṣūlihā wa Maʿnāhā wa-Taṭawwurihā* (Beirut: Dar al-Machreq, 2021).

[173] See Ibn Ṣbāṭ, *Kitāb Ṣidq al-Akhbār,* 70, 103.

[174] On the Assemblies of Remembrance, see ibid*,* 72-73. Regarding the religious conditions and purposes of the Order of the ʿUqqāl, see chapter Three of Abou Zaki, *Mashyakhat al-ʿAql fī Lubnān.*

[175] On the hierarchy of the ʿuqqāl, see ibid.

being subject to accountability and punishment.[176] The behavior of the ʿuqqāl towards the use of violence is of great importance to them because it relates to one of the capital sins in their religious principles, killing. Therefore, the ʿuqqāl must adhere to specific conditions that regulate their use of violence, which is the subject of this research. I will proceed to present the religious view of the Druze ʿUqqāl on violence, killing, and aggression based on Quranic verses and quotes from crucial admonitory literature by al-Amīr al-Sayyid Jamāl al-Dīn ʿAbd Allāh al-Tannūkhī and al-Shaykh al-Fāḍil Muḥammad Abū Hilāl, who are considered among the most prominent religious scholars.

The Quranic discourse contains an explicit prohibition against aggression, as evidenced by the verse: "And do not commit aggression. Indeed, God does not like the aggressors."[177] It also reveals the significant spiritual effect of committing violence by stating that the aggressors are blocked from realizing the truths of faith and monotheism (Tawhīd), as evidenced by the verse: "Thus do We seal the hearts of the transgressors."[178] Thus according to the Quranic discourse, aggression blocks the heart's inner eye from knowing divine truths and prevents the human heart from believing in them. As a result, it corrupts the religion of its perpetrator and deprives him of winning the Hereafter and its bliss, as evidenced by the verse:

> Woe that Day to the deniers, those who deny the Day of Recompense. **And none deny it except every transgressor, sinner**. When Our verses are recited to them, they say, 'Myths of the ancients.' **No! Rather, the stain has covered their hearts [due to] what they were earning. No, indeed, they will be screened from [seeing] their Lord that Day**. Then indeed, they will [enter and] burn in Hellfire.'[179]

In light of the grave spiritual impact of committing aggression, believers must make every effort to avoid it. However, the Quranic discourse established a precise balance between its call to avoid aggression on the one hand and preserving people's right to defend themselves from others' aggression on the other hand, saying: "And fight in the way of God **those who fight you but do not transgress**. Indeed, **God does not like transgressors**."[180] Additionally, the

[176] See Ibn Ṣbāṭ, *Kitāb Ṣidq al-Akhbār,* 73.
[177] *Sūrat al-Māʾidah* 5: 87.
[178] *Sūrat Yūnus* 10: 74.
[179] *Sūrat al-Muṭaffifīn* 83: 10-16.
[180] *Sūrat al-Baqarah* 2: 190.

Quranic discourse obliges believers to treat well those who do not transgress against them:

> **God does not forbid you from those who do not fight you because of religion and do not expel you from your homes – from being righteous toward them and acting justly toward them**. Indeed, God loves those who act justly. God only forbids you from those who fight you because of religion and expel you from your homes and aid in your expulsion – [forbids] that you make allies of them.[181]

Moreover, the Quranic discourse made even-temperedness (*ḥilm*) and forgiveness (*ʿafw*) human virtues obligatory for believers and among the traits of excellence (al-iḥsān) beloved to God, as mentioned among the good qualities of the believers in: "And those who restrain anger and pardon the people."[182] Even-temperedness and forgiveness are essential virtues for avoiding violence and preventing aggression and cycles of violence. The religious stance of the Druze ʿUqqāl, as expressed by the following oral accounts, is consistent with these Quranic rules. They forbid aggression and are keen to avoid it, and preserve in return people's right to defend themselves against those who aggress against them.

In a letter sent to all ʿUqqāl of the Druze in Mount Lebanon, known as "*Mukātabah ilā Jamāʿat al-Buldān*", al-Amīr al-Sayyid divided humanity into four classes: vegetative, animal, human, and angelic. He associated ferociousness, aggression, oppression, and violence with the animal class, which is below the human class, stating:

> Whoever surpasses this station (i.e., the vegetative) has moved to the rank of the animal, which is also active with what we have mentioned from the exaggeration in comfort, eating, drinking, and others, **which causes recklessness and others, like extravagance, anger, ferocity, oppression, prevention, arrogance, the desire to rule others; these are the fruit of the generality of every animal in the land, sea, and air, each oppressing one another, and eating one another**. Whoever reaches this degree is still on the path of the beasts, except that the animals are beneficial because of their milk and meat, and the human type who doesn't go beyond this limit has achieved nothing but harm,

[181] *Sūrat al-Mumtaḥinah* 60: 8-9.
[182] *Sūrat Āl ʿImrān* 3: 134.

> the anger of the Almighty, and reaching to the fire of Hell, **among the group of the wicked and corrupt**.[183]

These expressions clearly show al-Amīr al-Sayyid 's view of violence, aggression, and killing; they are all traits of the irrational animal and do not befit the rational human being. Actions like these degrade their perpetrators from the human rank to a lower one, consequently striking at their human honor. al-Amīr al-Sayyid explained the traits of the rational human being, saying:

> Whoever is granted by God's acceptance, advancement, and ascent to **the level of humanity**, will have from t**he fruit of his actions intellection, even-temperedness, tranquility, solemnity, judiciousness**, and chastity ... **and purity and noble morals ... and patience and endurance, and overlooking the fulfillment of [evil] purposes**... This is the rank of Man pursued by the righteous predecessors from the people of virtue and the brethren.[184]

Therefore, according to al-Amīr al-Sayyid, the traits of the rational human (*ʿāqil*) are even-temperedness (*ḥilm*) and tranquility, both of which require restraining one's anger. Crucial traits of a rational person also include patience and endurance, which depend on habituating anger to obey reason and to follow its guidance. In a later part of the letter, al-Amīr al-Sayyid clarified the importance of even-temperedness, linked the inclination towards violence and its approval to ignorance, and made ignorance one of the results of disbelief. Then, he linked abstaining from aggression and refraining from harm to even-temperedness and deemed even-temperedness the fruit of the [cultivated] mind (al-ʿAql), and made the mind the center of worship (or pivot, markaz), which is the purpose of the Lord, since he said:

> **Know that the recompense for evils [with evil] and contention in evils and plots are born of ignorance**, ignorance is born of pride, pride is born of darkness, **and darkness is an innovation of Satan. Overlooking plots, refraining from harm, and enduring adversities are born of even-temperedness.** Even-temperedness is born of knowledge, **and knowledge is the offspring of the mind, and the mind**

[183] Emir Jamāl al-Dīn ʿAbd Allāh b. Sulaymān al-Tannūkhī (al-Amīr al-Sayyid), unpublished manuscript, *Kitāb ilā Jamāʿat al-Buldān,* author's private archives, 18-19.
[184] Ibid*,* 19-20.

is the treasury (or chest, Khizānat) of worship, and worship is the purpose of the Lord.[185]

Therefore, according to al-Amīr al-Sayyid, there is an intrinsic causal relationship between faith and not committing aggression and avoiding violence on the one hand, and disbelief and the inclination to commit violence and aggression on the other. He warned the faithful ʿuqqāl not to be provoked to cause the beginning of evils or to incite conflicts and the outbreak of violence, by saying: "**And beware of being the spark of fire**, and a cause for achieving the purpose of the wicked," because "**what binds the ignorant is different from what binds the rational [person]**, for the fruit of the ignorant are [the acts of] ignorance, and the fruit of the rational are the rational [acts]."[186] His words indicate that the ʿuqqāl must take great care to preserve their humanity and its rational traits, and their actions must reflect this care and embody their humanity because the fruit of the human is his work, and the correctness of his work expresses the truthfulness of his faith and religious achievement.

Therefore, according to al-Amīr al-Sayyid, even-temperedness, renouncing violence, and avoiding injustice and aggression are among the human traits that the ʿuqqāl must acquire. They cannot ignore or neglect these traits because they are an integral part of the noble human traits that distinguish humans from other living beings, like plants and animals. Acquiring these traits is also a necessary condition for preserving their rational nature, which is the center of worship. Ḥamzah ibn Ṣbāṭ mentioned that al-Amīr al-Sayyid used to prohibit those who committed one of the capital sins, especially killing and adultery, from attending the Assemblies of Remembrance.[187] The Druze ʿUqqāl continue to apply this punishment to those who commit capital sins to this day.

Al-Shaykh al-Fāḍil listed in one of his short religious exhortations eighty-four traits obligatory on every faithful ʿāqil and mentions among them: "... To

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[185] Al-Amīr al-Sayyid, *Kitāb ilā Jamāʿat,* 25.

[186] Ibid*,* 39. This statement by al-Amīr al-Sayyid explains the phrase by Abū Muḥammad Jawād Walī l-Dīn that will be mentioned later: "Nothing harms a person except what comes out of him."

[187] Ibn Ṣbāṭ, *Kitāb Ṣidq al-Akhbār,* 73, said: "Then, whoever was proven to have committed one of the capital sins was, by his order, banished" [from the Assemblies of Remembrance]. That is, not allowed to attend them for the rest of his life. The spiritual significance of this punishment from the viewpoint of the ʿuqqāl is explained in Abou Zaki, *Mashyakhat al-ʿAql fī Lubnān*, 214-216. The Qurʾān distinguished capital sins from others in several verses. For example, "If you avoid the **capital sins** which you are forbidden to do", *Sūrat al-Nisāʾ* 4: 31, and "And those who avoid the **capital sins** and immoralities, and when they are angry, they forgive", *Sūrat al-Shūrā* 42: 37. Muslim commentators have unanimously agreed that killing, the subject of this study, is one of the capital sins.

have few contentions,[188] **few disputes** ... much endurance... **few disagreements, and [that people] are safe from his evil. If they anger him, he is patient and endures."**[189] Of course, all these traits help people avoid committing violence and aggression. As al-Amīr al-Sayyid did before him, al-Shaykh al-Fāḍil made acquiring these traits a cardinal religious duty. It will become apparent after this brief presentation that most of what follows about the stances of Druze ʿUqqāl on violence and aggression and their behavior in its use is based on fundamental and unchanging religious principles, which makes generalizing them across previous historical eras justified and logical. Of course, such a matter enables the researcher to study the primary historical sources of the history of the Druze more deeply and efficiently.

3. The Behavior of the Druze ʿUqqāl in the Lebanese Civil War (1975 - 1990)

Wars present the most significant tests of people's principles regarding the use of violence and killing. The Druze ʿUqqāl preserve many oral accounts that convey their highest religious authorities' sayings, recommendations, stances, and actions during the civil war. These accounts express principles defining their stance on violence and combat and the conditions restricting their engagement in it. Prominent among those authorities were Shaykh Abū Ḥasan ʿĀrif Ḥalāwī from al-Bārūk, who was considered the supreme spiritual authority in Lebanon from the early 1980s until he died in 2003, and Shaykh Abū Muḥammad Jawād Walī l-Dīn from Bʿaqlīn,[190] who was, during the same period, a trusted religious scholar and one of the highest religious authorities in the Druze community. He solely held the spiritual leadership after the death of Shaykh Ḥalāwī until he died in 2012. The sayings and directives of the two Shaykhs are binding for other ʿUqqāl as they hold religious authory over them. Moreover, the Druze ʿuqqāl consider these two Shaykhs the most knowledgeable among them about the principles of their conduct and values and the most stringent in achieving them.

The Druze religious authorities played a crucial role in keeping the Druze of Mount Lebanon in their villages throughout the civil war. According to all narrators, the Shaykhs encouraged the Druze through speech and actions to stand their ground and defend their land. After the war reached their villages, Shaykh

[188] "Few" here and in the rest of the quote means "no". Thus, it reads “to have no contentions”.

[189] Muḥammad Abū Hilāl (al-Shaykh al-Fāḍil), unpublished manuscript, *Arbaʿ wa-Thamānūn Khaṣlah,* author’s private archives, 4-5.

[190] Al-Bārūk and Bʿaqlīn are two towns in the Shūf district.

Abū Ḥasan ʿĀrif Ḥalāwī called on all Druze to defend their existence, land, and honor. More than one narrator recounted to me his repeated statements in public and private gatherings about the Druze ʿUqqāl's principled stance on violence and aggression: "We prohibit aggression from us, and we prohibit aggression against us,"[191] and "Those who transgress are not of us, **and those who do not repel aggression are not of us.**"[192] Shaykh Abū Ḥasan ʿĀrif Ḥalāwī remained in the town of Maʿṣrītī despite the dangers surrounding it,[193] especially in 1982 after it was subjected to artillery shelling and siege by the Lebanese Forces militia and the Israeli army. According to a narrator, "People would visit him at home to inquire about the course of the war and whether it necessitated evacuating the women and children from the town to safer places. **They would find him in home clothes**—not prepared to leave the town—reassuring them and making them realize he saw no need for such measures."[194] In turn, according to the ʿuqqāl of his town, Shaykh Abū Muḥammad Jawād Walī l-Dīn would tour the Druze regions and villages—sometimes under active shelling, risking his life—urging the inhabitants to cling to their land and defend it.[195]

Congruently, some narrators highlighted the crucial role of Shaykh Walī l-Dīn in protecting the villages of the Shūf from the dangers associated with the Israeli army's occupation of Mount Lebanon in the summer of 1982 when he refused to comply with the Israeli officers' orders to hand over the Shūf residents' war weapons to the occupying army. Soon after the Israeli invasion, a squad from the occupying army entered the town of Bʿaqlīn to disarm the inhabitants. However, the inhabitants refused to comply without the consent of the town's chief Shaykh, Shaykh Walī l-Dīn. The Israeli officer went to the Shaykh's home and parked his tank at the entrance of his courtyard, aiming its cannon at the house as a form of intimidation. He then met the Shaykh and informed him of the

[191] I heard this account from several ʿuqqāl in the Jurd, among them: Muʿīn al-Ṣāyigh, interview by author, May 25, 2017. He is from Shārūn, a town in the ʿĀlayh district.

[192] I heard this story from several ʿuqqāl; among them: Muʿīn al-Ṣāyigh. It also appeared in Ramzī Musharrafīyah, "Walīyy min Lubnān ʿaḍāʾ al-tamāsuk wa al-waḥda", *An-Nahar* newspaper (Beirut), November 28, 2003, 6. This article was part of *An-Nahar* newspaper's coverage of the funeral of Shaykh Abū Ḥasan ʿĀrif Ḥalāwī.

[193] Maʿṣrītī is a town in the ʿĀlayh district.

[194] I heard this account from several ʿuqqāl, among them: Muʿīn al-Ṣāyigh.

[195] I heard this account from several ʿuqqāl, among them: Ḥātim Abū Ḍargham, interview by author, March 31, 2019; and ʿAlī Saʿd al-Dīn, interview by author, April 7, 2019; and Muḥammad Ṣafā, interview by author, April 6, 2019. The three mentioned: Ḥātim Abū Ḍargham, ʿAlī Saʿd al-Dīn, and Muḥammad Ṣafā are from Bʿaqlīn.

immediate need for the town's inhabitants to surrender all their weapons. The Shaykh refused, saying: "We have weapons and will not surrender them. **Our weapons are to defend our dignity**, [they are] not against anyone unless they are aggressors." The Israeli officer then threatened the Shaykh by showing off the Israeli army's might and threatening to destroy the town with aerial bombardment. Shaykh Walī l-Dīn defiantly responded, "No one dies before their time (i.e., their destined hour);[196] we built the houses, and if you demolish them, we will build others." Yet, the officer insisted that they comply with the Israeli army's orders and hand over the weapons, and the Shaykh angrily retorted, "You are strong with your weapons but weak with God Almighty; we will not surrender our weapons."

The Israeli officer then spoke with his superiors and was instructed to leave Bʿaqlīn without collecting weapons. He subsequently left the Shaykh's home and headed to another nearby town for the same purpose. Shaykh Walī l-Dīn was informed of the matter, and he quickly ordered the ʿuqqāl present to head to the neighboring villages and tell the inhabitants not to surrender their weapons to the Israeli army, and so they did. The Israeli army did not succeed in collecting weapons from the Shūf's Druze inhabitants, except for a few.[197] According to the narrators, this account highlights one of the most critical aspects of the Druze ʿUqqāl's relationship with weapons: it is the instrument they use to defend their dignity against aggression and injustice. The importance of weapons stems not from a need to be aggressors, but rather, from their keenness to live on their land with dignity. Had they surrendered their weapons to the Israeli army, they might have faced massacres or forced displacement.

At the beginning of the civil war, Shaykh Abū Muḥammad Jawād Walī l-Dīn was the first to authorize the ʿuqqāl's acquisition of war weapons for strictly defensive purposes.[198] Most narrators spoke about how the Shaykh and other religious authorities encouraged the Druze in general—and the ʿuqqāl in particular—to defend their land and honor against aggression and to acquire war weapons exclusively for this purpose, emphasizing the restriction of their use of weapons and resort to violence with strict religious guidelines. Most of the ʿuqqāl who participated in combat activities during the civil war formed their own special

[196] In reference to: "Say, 'I do not possess for myself harm or benefit except what God wills. For every nation [there] is a term. When their term arrives, **they can neither delay it nor advance it an hour**.'" *Sūrat Yūnus* 10 :49.

[197] I heard this account from several ʿuqqāl in Bʿaqlīn, among them: Ḥātim Abū Ḍargham, ʿAlī Saʿd al-Dīn, and Muḥammad Ṣafā.

[198] Muḥammad Ṣafā.

squads, the conduct of which was subjected to the supervision of the highest religious authorities. I will mention below some of the recommendations which the narrators relayed from the Shaykhs about the conditions that justify the use of violence in a defensive war.

According to the narrators, the two Shaykhs prohibited aggression in all its forms. They asked all the ʿuqqāl who carried weapons in defense of their people and land "not to initiate firing and to wait for the other party to do so," ensuring that they would be in a defensive position, and, by initiating the attack, their enemy would be in a position of aggression.[199] Shaykh Abū Ḥasan ʿĀrif Ḥalāwī added strictness to this commandment by asking them not to "quickly fire back unless they are sure that the firing will continue," so they ascertained that it was an attack against them. In contrast, he encouraged them to adhere to the non-aggression principle, assuring: "Guarantee me non-aggression, and I guarantee you victory."[200]

Moreover, the narrators reported that the Shaykhs Ḥalāwī and Walī l-Dīn and other religious authorities "refused to allow the ʿuqqāl to fight outside the boundaries of Druze regions and towns so as not to fall into aggression."[201] Although the Druze Country, as will be shown later in the fifth section, historically included all districts of southern Mount Lebanon, some informed ʿuqqāl I interviewed asserted that their religious authorities limited the legitimacy of fighting during the civil war to protecting Druze villages only.[202] To support their statement, they mentioned that Shaykh Walī l-Dīn used to list to the ʿuqqāl the names of three battles the Druze lost in the civil war, in which many of them were killed, and then attributed their lack of success in those battles to their fighting outside their areas; therefore, falling into aggression. All three battles took place in the southern districts of Mount Lebanon and in villages adjacent to Druze villages.[203]

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[199] I heard this account from several ʿuqqāl, among them: Muʿīn al-Ṣāyigh, Salmān Māhir, and Muḥammad Ṣafā.

[200] Ibid.

[201] I heard this account from several ʿuqqāl in the Shūf and the Jurd, among them: Ḥātim Abū Ḍargham, Salmān Māhir, and Muʿīn al-Ṣāyigh.

[202] Ibid.

[203] I heard this account from several ʿuqqāl, among them: Ḥātim Abū Ḍargham and Yaḥyā Jammūl, interview by author, June 12, 2017. While not all narrators were confident in recalling the names of all the battles during the interviews, one narrator, Khālid Ḥalwānī—a ʿāqil from the town of Mristī in the Shūf district who had firsthand knowledge of the civil war—confirmed the names of three significant battles the Druze fought outside their lands and lost. According to him, these battles were

Also, the narrators repeatedly spoke about Shaykh Walī l-Dīn's strictness in requesting from the ʿuqqāl going to the battlefronts "not to shoot at women and children,[204] and not to continue shooting at the enemy once he throws his weapon"[205] or if he turns his back to flee,[206] as he would no longer be in a position of aggression. He also instructed them "not to harm prisoners-of-war or kill them,[207] nor to keep them."[208] Some narrators added that Shaykh Walī l-Dīn's prohibited the ʿuqqāl stationed on the fronts from using cannons, lest they inadvertently cause civilian casualties.[209] When he heard that some ʿuqqāl were trained to use a mortar, he was upset and ordered the ʿuqqāl present, saying: "I don't want any of the “ajāwīd” (i.e., ʿuqqāl) in the artillery; the artillery is blind and hits innocent [people]."[210] He then heard that one of the town's ʿuqqāl had brought in a 23 mm caliber machine gun, so he went to its location, expressing his disapproval and admonition. However, the ʿāqil explained to Shaykh Walī l-Dīn that the machine gun, like the submachine gun, fires bullets directly but differs as the size of its bullets is bigger and its shooting range is longer. Thus, it differs from the mortar and field guns with curved and inaccurate trajectories and rocket launchers with random trajectories. He allowed its use on the condition that

ʿĀrayyā (Bʿabdā district, 1976), al-Mṭullī (Shūf district, 1983), and Sūq al-Gharb (ʿĀlayh district, 1989). Khālid Ḥalwānī, interview by author, April 9, 2019. Yaḥyā Jammūl pointed out that Shaykh Walī l-Dīn used to mention, in addition to these three battles, the Battle of al-Msayfrih (Ḥawrān), an offensive battle fought by the Druze rebels against the French army outside their territories in 1925, which they lost, suffering many casualties.

[204] I heard this account from several ʿuqqāl in Bʿaqlīn, among them: Ḥātim Abū Ḍargham, Amīn al-Balānī, interview by author, March 31, 2019, and ʿImād Bū Dihn, interview by author, March 31, 2019; in addition to Yaḥyā Jammūl and Muḥammad Ṣafā. Amīn al-Balānī, ʿImād Bū Dihn, and Yaḥyā Jammūl are all from Bʿaqlīn.

[205] I heard this account from several ʿuqqāl in Bʿaqlīn, among them: Amīn al-Balānī, Ḥātim Abū Ḍargham, ʿImād Bū Dihn, and Muḥammad Ṣafā.

[206] I heard this account from several ʿuqqāl in the Shūf, among them: Amīn al-Balānī, Ḥātim Abū Ḍargham, ʿImād Bū Dihn, Muḥammad Ṣafā, and Yaḥyā Jammūl. Muḥammad Ṣafā recounts the commandments of Shaykh Walī l-Dīn to the ʿuqqāl heading to the front line as follows: "Shooting at women and children is forbidden, [at the ones] surrendering is forbidden, and [at the ones] turning their back is forbidden."

[207] I heard this account from several ʿuqqāl in the Shūf, among them: Muḥammad Ṣafā, Ḥātim Abū Ḍargham, ʿImād Bū Dihn, and Munīr Dhubyān, interview by author May 28, 2017. Munīr Dhubyān is from the town of Nīḥā in the Shūf district.

[208] I heard this account from several ʿuqqāl in Bʿaqlīn, among them: Muḥammad Ṣafā and Ḥātim Abū Ḍargham.

[209] I heard this account from several ʿuqqāl, among them: Muḥammad Ṣafā, Ḥātim Abū Ḍargham, ʿImād Bū Dihn, and Munīr Dhubyān.

[210] Muḥammad Ṣafā.

it would not be directed at residential areas and was limited to military targets.[211] These rules of engagement show the two Shaykhs' vigilant care about restricting violence to the scope of self-defense and protection of land and honor.

Also, many narrators mentioned that the two Shaykhs, Ḥalāwī and Walī l-Dīn, as well as other religious authorities in the regions, continuously emphasized "the prohibition of harming women, children, and the elderly, sniping at unarmed civilians, and trespassing the properties of the Christian inhabitants who had fled to escape the war and profiting from it."[212] When the Christians of the Shūf abandoned their villages after the war intensified, some Druze people exploited agricultural lands in those villages without getting their owners' permission. Consequently, the Shaykhs, according to the narrators, prohibited the buying of agricultural products coming from such land.[213] I heard all these statements from Druze ʿuqqāl who carried weapons in defense of their land and people during the 1975-90 Civil War. This demonstrates, according to the narrators, the foundations of their stance on violence and killing: they do not permit it except out of dire necessity—self-defense—and they are careful not to fall into aggression in all its forms, even amid wars that threaten their existence and continuity in their land.

There is a famous account among the ʿuqqāl of the Shūf that dates back to the early stages of the civil war in the late 1970s, showing the commitment of the ʿuqqāl to the directives of the religious authorities to prohibit aggression and sniping at civilians as well as the eagerness of the religious authorities to reinforce these commandments among the people and to encourage them by praising those who adhere to them. One morning in 1977, heavy gunfire was heard in Kfar-Nabrakh, originating from the mixed town of Brīḥ, indicating that a fight had started there. A group of Druze from Kfar-Nabrakh gathered and decided to go to defend their kin in Brīḥ.[214] However, Shaykh Abū Muḥammad ʿAlī al-Bṭaddīnī

[211] Ḥātim Abū Ḍargham and Yaḥyā Jammūl.

[212] I heard this account from several ʿuqqāl, among them: Ḥātim Abū Ḍargham, Salmān Māhir, Muḥammad Ṣafā, Muʿīn al-Ṣāyigh, and Amīn al-Balānī. Muḥammad Ṣafā relayed the words of Shaykh Walī l-Dīn, the religious authority, to the ʿuqqāl heading to the front as follows: "Pay attention, looting is forbidden, nobody should bring anything back". However, he made an exception for military weapons because they might be used for aggression. He also recalled that two ʿuqqāl from Bʿaqlīn brought back hunting rifles as spoils from the battlefield, which reached Shaykh Walī l-Dīn, who punished them and did not allow them to use or keep them. He clarified that the exemption holds for military weapons only.

[213] I heard this account from several ʿuqqāl, among them: Amīn al-Balānī, Salmān Māhir, Muʿīn al-Ṣāyigh, and Yaḥyā Jammūl. However, this is widely known among the Druze of Mount Lebanon.

[214] Kfar-Nabrakh and Brīḥ are towns in the Shūf district.

(d. 1990), an ʿāqil from the town, did not wait for the gathering of the people; he took his assault rifle and headed alone to Brīḥ. A young relative met the Shaykh on his way and asked to accompany him. The Shaykh permitted him, and they both descended towards Brīḥ until they reached a location near his land that overlooked the adjacent town of al-Mṭaylih.

There, they noticed military fortifications at a short distance from them, where armed Christians equipped with heavy weapons were sniping at the Druze inhabitants of Brīḥ. Shaykh al-Bṭaddīnī knew the place well since he owned land there. They positioned themselves behind the fortified militants and began shooting at them. The element of surprise was enough to cause panic and confusion among them, prompting them to leave their fortifications and retreat to their villages, only after several Druze civilians in Brīḥ had fallen victim to their unexpected sniping. Shaykh al-Bṭaddīnī and his young relative relieved the Druze of Brīḥ from the deadly sniping attack and enabled them to regain military initiative and control over the town. After confirming the defeat of the militants in al-Mṭaylih, Shaykh al-Bṭaddīnī returned to his hometown of Kfar-Nabrakh. On the way back, he rested for a while at his property, which overlooks a church in the town of al-Fuwwārah (Fawwārit Jaʿfar).[215] There, he noticed a large crowd of scared Christian residents in its courtyard, all were within their line of fire. The young man was tempted several times to open fire. However, Shaykh al-Bṭaddīnī prevented him, having noticed that they were unarmed civilians. He warned the young man: "This would be aggression." They then resumed climbing the mountain towards their town. Upon reaching it, they noticed soldiers from the Syrian army stationed at the heights of Kfar-Nabrakh, which they had recently controlled, who were firing at them and had sent a squad to arrest them. The squad captured the young man, while Shaykh al-Bṭaddīnī was able to escape after a skirmish with them. However, the Syrian army continued to chase Shaykh al-Bṭaddīnī for a while, forcing him to stay away from his town and hide from their sight.

Later, Shaykh al-Bṭaddīnī recounted the incident to the senior religious authority, Shaykh Abū Muḥammad Jawād Walī l-Dīn, explaining that if they had fired at the gathering of Christians in the church of al-Fuwwārah, "all the bullets would have been extinguished in the flesh" due to the density of the people, but they refrained from doing so because they were civilians. Shaykh Walī l-Dīn was pleased with what he heard and praised him, telling him in the presence of many

[215] Al-Fuwwārah and al-Mṭaylih are two towns in the Shūf district.

ʿuqqāl: "God willing, your intention **will bring success to the sect** [in the war]," meaning the intention of non-aggression.[216] This saying became well-known among the ʿuqqāl.

Shaykh Muḥammad Abū Shaqrā (d. 1991), who was Shaykh al-ʿAql of the Druze between 1949 and 1991, officially expressed the principle of non-aggression and not accepting others' aggression during the civil war. In a press interview in 1983, he stated: "The Druze in this country have been here since ancient times and will remain here no matter the cost as long as they are alive, they will stay here. **The Druze today are ready to die in their homes** and will not leave them... **whoever aggresses against them, they will fend off his aggression. The Druze are known to fend off aggression and not to aggress against anyone.** This is something I had declared [previously]."[217] In 2008, eighteen years after the end of the civil war, Shaykh Naʿīm Ḥasan, who was Shaykh al-ʿAql at that time, officially reiterated the same principle at an extraordinary general meeting held at the Khalwāt al-Qaṭālib in Baʿdharān Shūf, two days after the events of May 11 in Mount Lebanon, he said: "Trespassing against the sanctity of our homes and villages represents a blatant violation of **the creed of land and honor**, that the monotheistic Druze cannot live without defending (i.e. land and honor), **in adherence to the prohibition of the sect from aggression and being aggressed against**."[218]

In the early 1980s, Maʿṣrītī, the town that Shaykh Abū Ḥasan ʿĀrif Ḥalāwī lived in at the time, was subjected to heavy artillery shelling from Christian villages. The Druze retaliated against the source of the fire with artillery shelling. After this round of violence ended and the calm returned, some Druze fighters rushed to Shaykh Ḥalāwī 's house to check on his and the town's residents' safety. They asked if the heavy shelling had caused casualties, to which he replied: "Thank God, no; and God willing, there will be no casualties on the other side

[216] Ḥamzah al-Bṭāddīnī, interview by author, April 22, 2019. He is one of the ʿuqqāl from Kfar-Nabrakh and the son of Shaykh ʿAlī mentioned in the oral account. The incident, as described, is well-known, and I heard about it from several ʿuqqāl in the Shūf region, among them: Ḥātim Abū Ḍargham and ʿAlī Saʿd al-Dīn. I also heard several other accounts that show the ʿuqqāl adhering to these guidelines from the Shaykh during battles.

[217] Samīr Ṣabrā and Ẓāhir Shaḥāda, "Shaykh ʿAql al-Ṭāʾifa al-Durziyya Muḥammad Abū Shaqra li-«al-Shirāʿ»: Innahum yadfaʿūnā li-l-ṭarīq al-ṣaʿba wa-sa-nuwājih al-intihār bi-ʿamal intihārī", intreview with Shaykh al-ʿAql of the Druze Muḥammad Abū Shaqra, *al-Shirāʿ*, no. 49 (February 21, 1983): 17.

[218] "ʿIjtimāʿ Druzi Rūḥī fī l-Šūf Yarfuḍ al-Taṭāwul ʿalā Ḥurumāt al-Manāzil'", *Al-Hayat* newspaper (Beirut), May 14, 2008, 8.

either"![219] The narrators point out that such a statement by the Shaykh, made not long after the shelling had ended, demonstrates his aversion to violence. Fire does not extinguish fire, but feeds it; similarly, violence breeds violence. Had the Druze shelling caused casualties among the Christians, it would have led to further violence and killing—something the Shaykh wished to end entirely to restore peace and stability.

On the other hand, Shaykh Abū Salmān Amīn ʿĀmir (d. September 2012) told me shortly before he died about a famous incident during the civil war involving Shaykh Abū Muḥammad Jawād Walī l-Dīn, in which he also participated.[220] Shaykh Walī l-Dīn was informed that the residents of the town of Gharīfih had begun to flee after receiving news of an impending attack from the southern front on the Shūf;[221] the town was in danger of falling unless military reinforcements were sent to defend it. He sent some of the town's ʿuqqāl to the southern entrance of Bʿaqlīn and ordered them to prevent the inhabitants of Gharīfih from fleeing and to urge them to return to their homes. He carried his rifle at that time, although he was nearing seventy years old, and he called on Shaykh Abū Salmān Amīn, who had surpassed seventy years of age. The pair quickly walked with another ʿāqil from their town towards Gharīfih before a car arrived to transport them.

Some of the town's residents had begun to flee when the Shaykh and his companions were on their way there, so he met them and boosted their morale by urging them to return to their homes and to stand firm in their village, reassuring the frightened women by saying to some of them: "Do not be afraid... they will only reach you over our dead bodies." Then, Shaykh Walī l-Dīn wanted to boost the courage of the fighters defending the town, so he requested to be placed in "the worst" location, meaning the most dangerous and exposed point. They quickly prepared an advanced position for him at the town's front line, and the Shaykh stayed there with a small, poorly equipped squad all night. However, he returned home the next day once squads of defenders from the ʿuqqāl and other Druze arrived and fortified the town's fronts. Upon entering his home, he thanked God that he hadn't needed to use his rifle, saying, "Thank God, we didn't fire a single bullet"! Shaykh Walī l-Dīn would often repeat this same sentence whenever

[219] I heard this account from several ʿuqqāl in the Jurd, among them: Muʿīn al-Ṣāyigh. This story is well-known among the Druze.

[220] Shaykh Abū Salmān Amīn ʿĀmir, interview by author, July 1, 2012. He was one of the prominent ʿuqqāl of Bʿaqlīn.

[221] Gharīfah is a town in the Shūf district.

the ʿuqqāl asked him about that incident.[222] The narrators recount this incident as clear evidence of his aversion to using weapons and killing and that he was forced to go to the battlefront as part of his duty to defend land and honor.

I also got to know Shaykh Abū Muḥammad Jawād Walī l-Dīn well during repeated visits I made during the last decade of his life.[223] I heard from him directly, and on more than one occasion, the statements mentioned below regarding carrying weapons and the conditions for the use of violence. The wave of political assassinations and security disturbances that swept through Lebanon after 2004, and the armed attacks on safe areas in Beirut and Mount Lebanon during the events of May 2008, required Shaykh Walī l-Dīn, as the spiritual leader of the Druze at the time, to clarify the Druze sect's stance on the ongoing events. I heard Shaykh Walī l-Dīn repeat in his gatherings: "We prohibit aggression, but if someone aggresses against us, we will defend ourselves." He constantly instructed the ʿuqqāl who visited him that: "The faithful and pious believer does not acquire weapons nor carry them except for a noble purpose," which means defending oneself, land, and honor. He warned them against aggression, saying: "Whoever aggresses is not one of us," meaning that he is not a true believer, and "We do not accept aggression, and we will not protect its perpetrator," meaning that the ʿuqqāl will not protect anyone who commits aggression, so as not to share the moral responsibility for his act or to encourage others to commit aggression. He also urged them to be rational and patient and to restrain their anger and control their impulses, so that no one could provoke them into committing acts of aggression. He reminded them of a constant religious principle: "We do not like to harm anyone." And whenever he heard news of violence against civilians in Arab and foreign countries that had witnessed wars or popular revolutions, he would comment: "We do not condone killing, and we do not accept it."[224]

I intentionally recounted all of Shaykh Walī l-Dīn's sayings, most of which are well-known among the people and heard by many of his visitors, to show his keenness to prevent the ʿuqqāl who follow his orders and are guided by his instructions from committing aggression or justifying it to themselves. These sayings would also show his equal keenness to urge them not to accept injustice and to be prepared to defend themselves, their honor, and their land if others

[222] I heard this account from several ʿuqqāl in Bʿaqlīn, among them: Muḥammad Ṣafā and ʿImād Bū Dihn.

[223] Specifically, between the years 1999 and 2012.

[224] I heard these statements directly from Shaykh Walī l-Dīn during my repeated visits to him during the mentioned period.

decide to aggress against them. As previously mentioned, I heard all these stances directly and at various periods over the course of a decade from a Shaykh who had become the highest religious authority in his sect. His stances clarify essential dimensions of the Druze ʿUqqāl's attitude towards the use of violence emphasized by all narrators: they do not acquire weapons out of a desire for them or love of violence, but rather, out of necessity to lift oppression and aggression against them. As for his emphasis on the Druze's right to self-defense if others choose to aggress against them, it is a right acknowledged by all religious and secular laws without exception.

Before moving on to the next section, it should be noted again that the purpose of this presentation is not to chronicle the events of the Lebanese Civil War, but to reveal the principles that governed the conduct of the ʿuqqāl, regarding the fighting and violence that occurred, and restricted their role in it. Indeed, the Lebanese War saw the killing of unarmed Druze civilians by Christian militants as well as the killing of unarmed Christian civilians by Druze militants. However, the spiritual life of the Druze ʿUqqāl, as regularized in the Assemblies of Remembrance, restricts their use of violence and killing to specific conditions that do not justify the killing of innocents and exposes them to severe religious retribution if they do not comply with these conditions.[225] These binding conditions confined their participation in the war to defensive tasks in their areas and kept them within the framework of military battles with armed parties. I will mention as an example of this the assassination of Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt in March 1977, which was followed by violent reactions by some Druze—not from the ʿuqqāl—which resulted in the deaths of dozens of Christian civilians across three Shūf villages. Brigadier General ʿIṣām Abū Zaki (d. 2018), a Druze security officer from the Shūf, happened to pass near the crime scene and wrote in his memoirs about what happened immediately after the discovery of the assassination, as he was one of the first to arrive at the scene. Initially, he described the intense anger that was apparent among the Druze passing by the site of the assassination and how it quickly turned into "a storm of rage" amid severe confusion among those present at the crime scene. This confusion prompted them to seek the help of the spiritual authority, Shaykh Abū Muḥammad Jawād Walī l-Dīn, to "control the emotions and calm the angry souls." Brigadier General Abū Zaki quoted what Shaykh Walī l-Dīn said to him immediately after learning about the details of the crime: "Thank God it's not worse," a statement intended to calm

[225] That is, preventing them from attending the Assemblies of Remembrance. See page 59 above.

the spirits and enforce reason to prevent the anger from turning into blind violence.[226] I mentioned this incident here first because of its fame, and because it saw the killing of Christian civilians in their villages unjustly by Druze—not from the ʿuqqāl—which is considered an act of aggression. Also, I mentioned it because it shows the pivotal role of the Druze ʿUqqāl, especially their high authorities, in restraining the emotionally violent tendencies that civil wars often generate due to the frequent killing and mutual destruction between the warring parties.

4. The Attitudes of Druze ʿUqqāl Towards Violence and Aggression in Their Everyday Lives

The stance of the Druze ʿUqqāl against violence and aggression, and the depth of their commitment to it, is more clearly seen through spontaneous manifestations of this stance in their everyday lives. Below, I relay oral accounts that illustrate this matter. Shaykh Abū Ḥasan ʿĀrif Ḥalāwī was on a visit outside Maʿṣrītī when he received news of the death of a neighbor, who was a ʿāqil from the town. Shaykh Ḥalāwī remained silent and did not immediately testify for the goodness and righteousness of the deceased. According to the narrator, this behavior of the Shaykh, as per the customs of the ʿuqqāl, indicated that he did not believe in the goodness and righteousness of the deceased man despite his affiliation with the ʿuqqāl. The man in question possessed some moral virtues, such as bravery and generosity, yet he had committed suicide by drinking a poisonous substance. Among the Druze ʿUqqāl, the judgment for suicide is that he has changed from faith to disbelief, and thus, it is not permissible to testify to his goodness and righteousness.

This action by the Shaykh caught the attention of the ʿāqil who had informed him of the news. Later, the ʿāqil asked him about his reason for withholding good testimony about the man, even before knowing of his suicide. Shaykh Ḥalāwī replied that the man "took evil lightly," meaning he did not hesitate to cause trouble and provoke violence. The narrator, present during this incident, explained that the Shaykh knew that "committing evil was easy for that man, which is a sign of malice." It had happened before when Shaykh Abū Ḥasīb Asʿad al-Ṣāyigh (d. 1979), who was the father-in-law of Shaykh Ḥalāwī, was returning home one day

[226] Issam Abou Zaki, *Maḥaṭṭāt fī Dhākirat Waṭan: Mudhakkarāt al-ʿAmīd ʿIṣām Abū Zakī* (Beirut: Arab Scientific Publishers, 2018), 189-191. Shaykh Walī l-Dīn's statement is linked exclusively to the assassination of Kamal Jumblatt. At that time, the news of his killing or the subsequent retaliatory actions against the Christians in some villages of the Shūf had not yet spread.

and saw the man mentioned above fiercely fighting with his brother, nearly killing him. Since both men were affiliated with the ʿuqqāl, Shaykh Abū Ḥasīb Asʿad al-Ṣāyigh reckoned that the faith of one of them was untrue.[227] However, his brother died before the Shaykh's neighbor, and the ʿuqqāl testified to his goodness and righteousness. Consequently, the two Shaykhs, al-Ṣāyigh and Ḥalāwī, concluded that the neighbor's faith was insincere.[228] This account aligns with what was previously mentioned about the two shaykhs Abū Ḥasan ʿĀrif Ḥalāwī and Abū Muḥammad Jawād Walī l-Dīn, who linked the correctness of faith with the hatred of violence and avoiding involvement in it by stating: "Those who transgress are not of us." The two Shaykhs, Abū Ḥasīb Asʿad and Abū Ḥasan ʿĀrif, judged the man's faith as corrupt, having ascertained his violent nature, his approval of violence, and his lack of restraint in committing it. His suicide confirmed the correctness of their judgment about him.

Since things are known by their opposites, another account from the oral tradition about Shaykh Abū Fāris Ḥasan al-Faṭāyirī (d. 1940) from Jdaydat al-Shūf can be helpful, because it shows the ʿuqqal's abhorrence of violence and their keenness to prevent its occurrence.[229] I have heard this oral account several times from his grandson, Abū Fāris Ḥasan, who bears the same name. He heard it from a contemporary of his grandfather, Shaykh Abū Salīm Salāmah Sarrī al-Dīn (d. 1973) from the ʿuqqāl of Bʿaqlīn. Shaykh Abū Fāris Ḥasan al-Faṭāyirī was among the religious notables in his town and known among the ʿuqqāl for his good faith and numerous virtues.[230] He was a peasant who relied on agriculture for his livelihood. One day, he decided to go with his sons to work on a piece of land he owned. The Shaykh went ahead of his sons to the land, where he found a man cutting down a tree. The Shaykh approached him and asked if the tree was his to cut, hoping that his question would make the man stop. However, the man insisted on cutting the tree and threatened Shaykh Abū Fāris Ḥasan with harm if he tried to stop him. The Shaykh patiently received the man's words and actions and left.

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[227] Compare with the Quranic verses: "It is not for a believer to kill a believer except by mistake... * **And whoever kills a believer intentionally, his recompense is Hell to abide therein**, and the wrath and the curse of God are upon him, and a great punishment is prepared for him"; *Sūrat al-Nisāʾ* 4: 93-94.

[228] I heard this account from several ʿuqqāl in the Jurd, among them: Shaykh Abū ʿĀrif Nāṣīf al-Ṣāyigh, interview by author, May 25, 2017. He is from Shārūn and was present during the mentioned conversation.

[229] Jdaydat al-Shūf is a town in the Shūf district.

[230] Over the past two decades, I have collected several accounts about him that speak of his good manners, generosity, and even-temperedness.

When he met his sons on the way, he told them he had changed his mind and decided to work on another piece of land instead.[231]

According to the narrator, Shaykh Abū Fāris Ḥasan's action shows his hatred of violence and his fear of causing it. He realized that if his sons reached the piece of land and discovered the man stealing wood from their property, it would lead to a fight and potential bloodshed. Therefore, he decided to prevent the fire of evil from igniting out of fear for his faith, preferring to sacrifice some wood over risking causing a violent incident with unknown consequences.

There was also an incident between an ʿāqil from the town of ʾIghmīd[232] and a relative of his involving a "dispute over a piece of land". One day, the ʿāqil was working on his property when his relative tried to provoke him with his words but failed. His relative then attacked him with an axe, aiming a blow at his head. However, the ʿāqil was alert and protected himself with a shovel handle[233] that took the axe's blow instead of his head. Then, he overpowered his attacker and struck his hand hard with stones and his legs with a shovel[234] until he was incapacitated and lost the ability to harm him further, and he was about to leave the place to avoid more violence. However, his relative pulled himself together and provoked him again with words, so he returned and struck him, then left.

Afterward, the ʿāqil went to the two Shaykhs, Shaykh Abū Ḥasan ʿĀrif Ḥalāwī and Shaykh Abū Ḥasīb Asʿad al-Ṣāyigh, and informed them of the incident. He asked them if he had committed a sin that warranted retribution. The Shaykhs replied that they found an excuse for him to strike his relative the first time because it was in self-defense against his attack. However, they found no excuse for his return and striking a second time, as he succumbed to his anger. This was especially true since his relative had become incapable of harming him due to the severe beating he had received. Therefore, the Shaykhs sentenced him to retribution because they considered his return unjustified after the condition of self-defense had ceased, as it is not permissible for an ʿāqil in their law to resort

[231] Shaykh Abū Fāris Ḥasan al-Faṭāyirī, interview by author, January 2002. He is an ʿāqil from Jdaydat Al-Shūf.

[232] ʾIghmīd is a town in the ʿĀlayh district.

[233] Al-Mijrafah: a tool for shoveling.

[234] Al-Krayk (shovel): a tool with a long wooden handle ending in a flat, broad iron blade used for digging and transporting soil and similar materials. *Al-Muʿjam al-Wajīz* (1989), entry "Krayk".

to violence simply because he heard foolish words that provoked him. Instead, he must suppress his anger and avoid causing harm.[235]

This account depicts two notable Druze ʿUqqāl from the second half of the 20th century sentencing a fellow ʿāqil to retribution after he engaged in a fight with a relative over a property dispute. The account does not speak of participation in wars or conflicts between two sects but rather, of a personal dispute between two peasants. Only their relatives and fellow townsmen may have known about this conflict, and it may have not reached the neighboring villages. Due to this, it may have been quickly forgotten over time. Nonetheless, we see the Shaykhs applying the same principle here and acting with the same firmness and seriousness as they do when they deal with significant events like wars and conflicts: aggression is forbidden, and falling into it is a sin for which the believer is retributed in due measure. The Shaykhs' retribution for the ʿāqil reminded him that he must detest violence, avoid it, and not resort to it except when coerced, i.e., in self-defense of self, honor, and land.

The ʿāqil's fear of the religious consequences of his actions led to a voluntary confession to the local religious authorities, seeking their judgment on the matter. This highlights that the ʿuqqāl, shaped by their spiritual upbringing, are well aware that the religious law[236] forbids aggression and only permits the use of violence in self-defense. They are also conscious that it is necessary to avoid falling into acts of violence. This brings to light, once again, the distinctive advantage of oral sources over other historical records. Oral accounts can convey valuable insights into everyday events and marginal incidents that may not be covered by other types of historical sources, offering researchers a deeper and more accurate understanding of people's values, customs, and behaviors.

The ruling of the two Shaykhs is explained by a story I heard one day from Shaykh Abū Muḥammad Jawād Walī l-Dīn when he spoke about a similar issue related to an attempt by a Lebanese media entity to harm the reputation of the religious body of the Druze sect. He informed me that he is trying hard, in collaboration with the politicians of the sect, to resolve the matter and prevent it from happening by using available peaceful means. However, suppose that the media entity insisted and proceeded with the offensive act. In that case, he "calls on those who follow his orders from the ʿuqqāl to restrain their anger, control their

[235] I heard this oral account from several ʿuqqāl in the Jurd, among them: Muʿīn al-Ṣāyigh. I met the son of one of the two men involved in the dispute, but he did not permit me to share his report in my research.

[236] Religious law is the sum of religious commands and prohibitions imposed on believers.

emotions and to endure the harm and not to allow anyone to lure them into the trap of violence and aggression," because "nothing harms a person except what comes out of him," i.e., except his own words and actions; and "that a person is responsible for his own action"![237] With his words, the Shaykh refers to moral harm. He warns that the media entity's unjust aggression against the reputation and dignity of the Druze ʿUqqāl will not harm the ʿuqqāl more than allowing that aggression to provoke them, causing them to respond with aggression on their part, thus branding themselves with ignorance and injustice![238] Then he concluded his talk, saying: "Transmit my words, I am against violence and power by arms, and I do not approve of them, and I forbid aggression and do not permit it."[239] He made his stance known on that issue among the ʿuqqāl to prevent them from any violent reactions toward the concerned media entity.

Moreover, the Druze ʿUqqāl do not justify honor crimes. There is a relevant incident that is well-known among many of the Druze ʿUqqāl in Mount Lebanon about a notable Shaykh from Bayṣūr[240] who died in the 1980s. According to a narrator from his town, a woman from the Shaykh's family had gone to the city to work and, over time, her relatives discovered that she had taken a disgraceful moral path. The news stirred her family's zeal, leading them to convene and discuss her situation. The Shaykh, being part of the family, attended the gathering. During the meeting, some younger male relatives, who were not ʿuqqāl, expressed their intention to go to the city and kill the woman to restore their honor. The Shaykh heard their statements but did not oppose them. Eventually, the men carried out the killing. When the Shaykh learned of the murder, he realized his error in not speaking out against their plan and considered himself complicit in the crime. He subsequently imposed upon himself the religious penalty for capital sins, which he adhered to for the rest of his life. The written tradition of the ʿuqqāl

[237] Shaykh Abū Muḥammad Jawād Walī l-Dīn, interview by author, April 5, 2010.

[238] Compare with: "Say, '**Everyone acts according to his manner**, but your Lord knows best who it is that is best guided on the Way'"; *Sūrat al-Isrā* 17: 84. The meaning of the verse is that a person's words and deeds express what he has achieved in himself of guidance or misguidance and what morals he has acquired, whether praiseworthy or blameworthy. Therefore, according to the Qurʾan, committing transgressions harms the dignity of the believer first, as it reveals the ignorance of the doer and the corruption of his soul. This is blameworthy in itself as mentioned in the verse: "Evil is the name of disobedience after [one's] faith"; *Sūrat al-Ḥujurāt* 49: 11. The same meaning is communicated in the example of the tree and its fruits in the *Gospel of Luke* 6: 43-45.

[239] Shaykh Abū Muḥammad Jawād Walī l-Dīn, interview by author, April 5, 2010.

[240] Bayṣūr is a town in the ʿĀlayh district.

validates the Shaykh's judgment against himself.[241] The following relevant incident was reported in Ādāb al-Shaykh al-Fāḍil Muḥammad Abī Hilāl:

> That a man came to the village where the late [al-Shaykh al-Fāḍil] was, **and with him were two women about whom there was unpleasant talk**, so [his companion] Shaykh al-Ṣāfī learned about them and decided to expel them from the town by force and was determined on that. So, we conveyed their news to al-Shaykh [al-Fāḍil], who was **displeased with his brother's policy** and then said: ... Tell him to handle this issue **discreetly and kindly, or else if he neglects that and the news spreads, they will execute them, and he** (i.e., Shaykh al-Ṣāfī) **will be at risk** [of retribution]." So we informed him of what the late [Shaykh] had said, and he softened in appearance and did not relent until he expelled them from the town.[242]

I conclude the presentation of these oral accounts with a story that highlights the determination of senior Druze ʿUqqāl to nip violent disputes and conflicts in the bud. An ʿāqil was on his way to visit Shaykh Abū Fāris Maḥmūd ʿAbd al-Khāliq (d. 1937) of Majdil Baʿnā,[243] who was one of the highest Druze religious authorities of the time. On his journey, the ʿāqil overheard a man he knew uttering profane words against God, which deeply angered him. Despite his anger, he kept calm and proceeded to Shaykh Abū Fāris Maḥmūd's house. Upon arriving, he found the Shaykh reading a religious book. After greeting him, the ʿāqil shared what he had heard, hoping for a reaction. Shaykh Abū Fāris Maḥmūd listened silently, then continued reading without commenting. The guest repeated his account two more times, still receiving no response. Frustrated and suspecting the Shaykh doubted him, the ʿāqil finally exclaimed, "Give me the book so I can swear to you that this really happened"! Shaykh Abū Fāris Maḥmūd then calmly responded, "Do not trouble yourself over him. His lord is Satan."[244]

The merit of this account is that it speaks about an incident related to the research topic with a clear religious dimension. The profane words were not

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[241] I heard this oral account from several ʿuqqāl, among them: Nabīl Anīs Mulāʿib, interview by author, April 15, 2024. He is an ʿāqil from the mentioned Shaykh's town and knew him in person. ʿAmjad Ḥamzah, interview by author, April 15, 2024. He is an ʿāqil from Bʿaqlīn who is married to a relative of the mentioned Shaykh and heard this story directly from his relatives. Regarding the religious ruling on killing and capital sins, refer to page 59 above.

[242] Al-Ḥalabī, *Ādāb al-Shaykh al-Fāḍil,* 106-107.

[243] Majdil Baʿnā is a town in the ʿĀlayh district.

[244] I heard this oral account from several ʿuqqāl in the Jurd, among them: Muʿīn al-Ṣāyigh.

directed at the ʿāqil himself nor his family or friends, but towards God, and his anger, in this case, was from a natural religious zeal, as he was appalled that someone he knew would commit such a great sin. However, the lesson from it, according to the narrators, lies in how Shaykh Abū Fāris Maḥmūd contained this anger and prevented it from turning into a spark of evil and violence.[245] He clarified to his visitor that a person's words express his knowledge and belief,[246] and that the man merely expressed his disbelief and ignorance of the true God with his blasphemy. The man, the Shaykh explained, worships a false god, and his words are directed towards the god he believes in and worships, not towards the god that believers know and worship. A rational religious approach like this, of course, requires that reason triumphs over the force of anger, allowing one to reflect on the situation and discern the true nature of the action before deriving a religious judgment. It also demands a sound understanding of religious teachings. Shaykh Abū Fāris Maḥmūd's response mirrors what is stated in the Qurʾān about the disbelievers worshiping a god other than the one worshiped by the believers, where it says: "Say, O disbelievers, I **do not worship what you worship. Nor are you worshippers of what I worship**. Nor will I be a worshiper of what you worship. Nor will you be worshippers of what I worship. **To you, your religion, and to me, my religion**."[247]

The previous accounts reveal a common behavior among the Druze ʿUqqāl characterized by prioritizing reason over the impulse of anger, which is the seat of ferocity and violence in the human soul. This behavior is based on religious teachings that clarify when one should be allowed to act from anger and when anger should be restrained or controlled. By adhering to these teachings, many potential sources of conflict and violence are mitigated, thus preventing disputes and violence among people. Furthermore, these narratives support the earlier discussion in section two, demonstrating that the Druze ʿUqqāl's prohibition of violence and aggression is grounded in purely religious considerations. This prohibition reflects the principles and spiritual objectives of the Order of the

[245] It is useful here to mention a killing incident that occurred in northern Lebanon in the summer of 2018, which proves that such an act can cause great harm if people give free rein to their anger. A man named Muḥammad al-Duhaybī was brutally killed after his killers accused him of insulting divine honor. "They killed him by stabbing, and removed his heart from his body and cut it into pieces," *Al-Anwar* newspaper (Beirut), August 28, 2018, 4.

[246] Refer to footnote 238.

[247] *Sūrat al-Kāfirūn* 109: 1-6. Similarly, Shaykh Abū Fāris's request for the ʿāqil who visited him to leave the foolish man alone mirrors the Quranic verse: "'Have you seen him who takes his god to be his own passion? Then would you take responsibility for him?'" *Sūrat al-Furqān* 25: 43.

ʿUqqāl rather than political motivations. Their stance on violence is therefore not influenced by their status as a religious minority surrounded by more numerous and powerful groups.

5. A Historical Survey of the Druze ʿUqqāl's Behavior Towards Violence

Modern sources on Lebanese history provide substantial evidence of the historical depth of behaviors exhibited by the ʿuqqāl, as previously described. These sources reveal that this behavior extended beyond the ʿuqqāl and evolved into a collective Druze practice. For instance, the Lebanese historian Ibrāhīm Bayk al-Aswad, writing not long after the events of 1860, documented the conduct of the Druze during wartime in his book *Dhakhāʾir Lubnān*. He specifically highlighted their commitment to avoiding harm to women and children, stating:

> It should be noted that in **their wars, the Druze do not commit what goes against morality, and it is unheard of for them to violate honor or kill women or children**. Sometimes, the wives of their slain enemies sought refuge in their homes, experiencing the utmost compassion and humanity because the **Druze are firmly committed to moral law and do not violate the honor of others, respecting women**.[248]

Lord Dufferin, British Consul General in Beirut (1860-1861), mentioned the same thing in a letter to his Foreign Minister, saying, "However, the Druze are more compassionate in this regard … they do not fight among themselves **and respect women** [in wars]."[249] Moreover, the Lebanese historian Shāhīn Mākāriyūs (d. 1910) included an appendix to his book sent to him by a person whom he did not name, but identified as "a distinguished person who has complete knowledge" of the events that took place in Mount Lebanon during the civil wars in the 19th century. In this appendix, he corrected some of the errors in Makarios' account. Among those errors, the author of the appendix noted that Mākāriyūs had mistakenly stated that Druze men assaulted Christian women of Dayr al-Qamar and their children,[250] which he corrected in two places. He explained in the first that: "He did not mention the honor (i.e., women) because there is no fear for it on the part of the Druze, **for preserving it is one of the rules of their religion**." In the second he confirmed that: "None of the Druze violated

[248] Ibrahim Bayk al-Aswad, *Kitāb Dhakhāʾir Lubnān* (Bāʿabdā: no publisher, 1896), 126–127.

[249] Farid and Philipe Khazin, eds. and trans., *Majmūʿat al-Muḥarrarāt al-Siyāsīyah wa-l-Mufāwaḍāt al-Dawlīyah ʿan Sūriyā wa-Lubnān*. 2nd ed., vol. 3 (Hazmieh: Dar al-Rāʾid al-Lubnānī, 1983), 137.

[250] Shāhīn Mākāriyūs, *Ḥasr al-Lithām ʿan Nakabāt al-Shām* (Paris: Manshūrāt Asmār, 2014), 84

in any way the honor of women (al-ḥarīm), and this **is among their good customs**."[251]

Additionally, the memoirs of the American missionaries Loanza Goulding Benton (d. 1899) and William Austin Benton (d. 1874) preserved an account of great importance about a missionary residing in the town of Bḥamdūn, located in the Druze Qāʾimmaqāmiyyat,[252] during the events of 1860. The account conveys the principled stance of Shaykh Ḥamdān Billmunā, a prominent Druze religious leader, on the war that seemed imminent approximately two months before it broke out in May of 1860. Benton informs us that:

> In the early spring of 1860, the old **leading Sheikh of Druzes**, Abu Nasif Hamdan B'l Minni,[253] sent his servant to the missionary at B'Hamdoun (Bḥamdūn), entreating him to come with the leading men of the Christians to [meet] him … near [the town of] Shaneh (Shānay),[254] as he wished to talk with them. Six men went over with the missionary and gathered under the walnut tree. When all were seated, the old Sheikh remarked that a war was coming on. "**Now, we Druzes don't want a war. Do you men of B'Hamdoun want a war with the Druzes?**" There were before him the American missionary, two protestant native Christians, two Maronites and two of the Greek Church. They replied, "No, we men of B'Hamdoun don't want war. There is no enmity between us and the Druzes." "I repeat," said the old Druze, "**We do not wish the war and will not begin it, but if the Maronites begin warring upon us, we must defend ourselves for we are sons of sword**."[255]

This account shows that Shaykh Abū Yūsuf Ḥamdān Billmunā was at the time one of the highest religious authorities among the Druze of Mount Lebanon, likely serving as their spiritual leader. From this position of responsibility, he

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[251] Shāhīn Mākāriyūs ,*Ḥasr al-Lithām ʿan Nakabāt al-Shām,* Appendix, 11-12. The author of the appendix is a Christian Lebanese who had direct experience of the 1860 Civil War and was likely among the principal informants of Mākāriyūs.

[252] In the aftermath of the first civil war between the Druze and the Maronites in the fall of 1841, the Ottomans, in agreement with the major European powers, divided Mount Lebanon along sectarian lines between 1843 and 1861 into two parts: northern and southern, separated by the Beirut-Damascus road. The northern part was called the "Christian Qāʾimmaqāmiyyat," and the southern part the "Druze Qāʾimmaqāmiyyat". This division became known as the Qāʾimmaqāmatayn System.

[253] Thus in the original; the correct name is Shaykh **Abū Yūsuf** Ḥamdān Billmunā.

[254] Bḥamdūn and Shānay are two towns in the ʿĀlayh district.

[255] Goulding L. Benton & William A. Benton, *The Diaries, Reminiscences and Letters of Loanza Goulding Benton (Mrs. William Austin Benton) and William Austin Benton, D.D., missionaries to Syria 1847-1869* (St Reynolds SWC, 1900), 111-112.

closely monitored the unfolding events and sensed the imminent outbreak of a civil war. Shaykh Billmunā's words clarify the moral stance of the Druze in general, and their ʿuqqāl in particular: they do not seek war with the Maronites and would not initiate it. However, they would take up arms in defense if the Maronites launch an attack. After the war, a letter of grievance he sent on behalf of his community[256] to the Queen of England emphasized a crucial point: the Druze had not initiated hostilities in any of the three civil wars; instead, it was the Maronites who had always been the aggressors, while the Druze merely acted in self-defense.[257]

Mākāriyūs supported Shaykh Billmunā's assertion that the Maronites—specifically Patriarch Yūsif Ḥbayš, some of his bishops, and later Patriarch Būlus Masʿad, backed by their ally France—were responsible for instigating the three civil wars in Mount Lebanon between 1841 and 1860 and initiating military attacks against the Druze. [258] Similarly, British orientalist Colonel Charles Churchill, who lived in Mount Lebanon for ten years between 1842 and 1852, also held the Maronites, particularly Patriarch Ḥbayš and his bishops, responsible for stirring up the first and second civil wars. However, Churchill attributed more responsibility for causing the third civil war to the Ottomans and Druze feudal lords despite noting that the Maronites were the ones who initiated the military offences on Druze villages, starting with the Bayt Mirī incident in 1859. [259] Additionally, Caesar Farah, in his comprehensive reference work on the Lebanese civil wars of the 19th century—based on extensive, years-long research into primary historical sources and the archives of the major powers involved in the Eastern Question—affirmed the pivotal role of the Maronite Church in causing the three civil wars. [260]

It is not difficult to notice the striking similarity between the words of Shaykh Abū Yūsuf Ḥamdān Billmunā in 1860 and those of Shaykhs Abū Ḥasan ʿĀrif

[256] This letter supports the conjuncture that he was the spiritual leader of the Druze in the year 1860.

[257] Khazin**,** *Majmūʿat al-Muḥarrarāt al-Siyāsīyah,* 2: 305 - 308.

[258] Mākāriyūs, *Ḥasr al-Lithām ʿan Nakabāt al-Shām*, 74-76, 78, 100, 116, 119, and 130.

[259] Colonel Charles Churchill, *Al-Durūz wa-l-Mawārina min Sanat 1840 ilā 1860,* Uṣūl wa-Marājiʿ Tārīkhīyah 5 (Beirut: Dar Lahd Khatir,1986), 26-27, 30-31, 52, 54-55, 74, and 80. It should be noted that Churchill obtained his information about the First and Second Civil Wars directly from the conflict zone. However, he obtained his information about the Third Civil War indirectly through people, or by reading diplomatic papers and other sources available to him as he had left Lebanon by that time.

[260] Farah, *The Politics,* 91-97, 376-377, 380-381, 392, 103, and 716.

Ḥalāwī and Abū Muḥammad Jawād Walī l-Dīn in the last quarter of the 20th century. All expressed a consistent Druze principle: they neither accept aggression from themselves nor initiate wars, but if attacked, they will take up arms to defend themselves. Colonel Churchill also highlighted the participation of Druze ʿUqqāl in the civil wars of 1841 and 1845 in Mount Lebanon, emphasizing that their involvement was solely in defense of the Druze community's existence, since he remarked:

> A Druse Ockal (ʿāqil) is essentially a peace-maker: **even war is repugnant to his moral convictions**. During the recent crisis (i.e., the civil war), it is true, when the very existence of the Druses was at stake, the Ockals joined in the struggle for defence; but the practice was a deviation from an acknowledged principle.[261]

It must be noted that all three civil wars that took place between the Druze and Maronites in Mount Lebanon in the 19th century were fought in southern Mount Lebanon, which was known from the beginning of the Ottoman rule of the Levant until the year 1861 as The Druze Mountain or the Druze Country[262] and was ruled by a prince from among them.[263] The Druze, thus, were geographically and politically fighting in their own country, which justifies their view of those wars as defensive wars. As for the Maronites, they immigrated from their original homeland in the northern districts of Mount Lebanon and settled in its southern districts with the encouragement and protection of the Druze rulers at the beginning of the 17th century.[264] The Druze view is also supported by the reports

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[261] Charles Henry Churchill, *Mount Lebanon: a Ten Years' Residence from 1842 to 1852*, vol. 2 (London: Saunders and Otley, 1853), 252.

[262] See, for example, Aḥmad al-Badīrī al-Ḥallāq, *Ḥawādith Dimashq al-Yawmīyah 1154-1175 H – 1741-1762 M,* 3rd ed. (Damascus: Dār Saʿd al-Dīn lil-Ṭibāʿah wa-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzīʿ, 2008), 85, 114 and 137; Ḥaydar Aḥmad al-Shihābī, *Lubnān fī ʿAhd al-Umārāʾ al-Shihābīyīn: wa-Huwa al-Juzʾ al-Thānī wa-l-Thālith min Kitāb al-Ghurrar al-Ḥisān fī Akhbār Abnāʾ al-Zamān,* 3rd part, ed. by Assad Rustum and Fuad Efram al-Bustany (Beirut: Lebanese University Publications,1969), 3 :552, 556 ,and 557; Munthir al-Ḥāyik, ed., *Waqāʾiʿ al-Durūz maʿ Aḥmad Bāshā al-Jazzār 1697-1809: Ḥawliyāt Majhūlah* (Damascus: Ṣafḥāt lil-Dirāsāt wa-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzīʿ, 2018), 40; Farah, *The Politics,* 62.

[263] See, for example, the text of a correspondence from the Ottoman Archives No. M.D. 115/800, dated January 1707 AD and published in Abu Husayn, *The View from Istanbul,* 66.

[264] William Harris, *Lebanon: A History 600–2011* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 94. Ottoman records from the 16th century show that the vast majority of inhabitants in the Druze regions, i.e., Shūf ibn Maʿan, al-Gharb, al-Jurd, and al-Matn, were Druze, while Christians were concentrated in Kisirwān and the northern regions of Mount Lebanon. ʿIṣām Khalīfah, *Nawāḥī Lubnān fī al-Qarn al-Sādis ʿAshar: al-Taqsīmāt al-Idārīyah, al-Dīmūghrāfīyā, al-Adyān wa-l-Madhāhib* (Beirut: No Publisher mentioned, 2004), 88, 92, 100–101, 104–105, 108, 154–155, 158, 162, and 166–167.

from several historians who noted that the Maronite Church's stated purpose for the 19th century civil wars was to eliminate Druze rule and presence in Mount Lebanon, either by killing or displacing them to other Druze areas outside Mount Lebanon—specifically the Hawrān region.[265]

Clear historical evidence of the Druze ʿuqqāl's stance on violence can also be found in 18th-century sources. The French orientalist Jean-Michel de Venture de Paradis, who served as a diplomatic translator in French consulates and missions across the Levant, commented on the behavior of the ʿuqqāl. He noted that those aspiring to join their ranks must "leave the custom of carrying arms, which **they must no more make use of as aggressors**, **but only for [the] defence of their brethren**."[266] A similar observation was made by the French orientalist and naval officer De Pages, who attributed this non-violent conduct to the ʿuqqāl in particular. He stated that they "are not allowed, **by the rules of their order**, to carry arms, except when all the cheikhs (feudal lords) take the field, or in cases of greatest emergency."[267] De Pages' observation indicates that the ʿuqqāl are allowed to use arms only in a defensive war, where all the Druze chiefs would unite and "take the field" to protect the Druze community from existential threats. These two quotes confirm what was previously mentioned about the Druze ʿUqqāl limiting their use of weapons to the defense of life, land, and honor. As previously noted, this behavior parallels that of Druze religious authorities during the civil war in the last quarter of the 20th century.

On the other hand, the French traveler Volney, who visited Mount Lebanon in the last quarter of the 18th century, generalized the ʿuqqāl behavior towards the use of violence and aggression to the broader Druze community. He noted "their **natural repugnance, at all times**, **to make war out of their country**"![268] Wars that occur outside their own country are considered offensive and are generally

[265] See Makāriūs, *Ḥasr al-Lithām ʿan Nakabāt al-Shām*, 73-75, 119, and 131; Colonel Charles Churchill, *Al-Durūz wa-l-Mawārina*, 26-27; Farah, *The Politics*, 92; and Sulaymān Abū ʿIzz al-Dīn, *Maṣādir al-Tārīkh al-Lubnānī, part 3: Wathāʾiq Siyāsīyah wa-Ijtimāʿīyah,* Edited by Najlāʾ Abū ʿIzz al-Dīn. (Beirut: Dar Amwaj, 2002), 285, and 289-290.

[266] Jean Michel de Venture de Paradis, "*A Historical Memoir concerning the Druses, A People Inhabiting Mount Lebanon*," in *Travels in Various Countries of the East*, ed. by Rev. Robert Walpole (London: G. G. J. and J. Robinsons, 1786, Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme, and Brown, 1820), 98.

[267] Monsieur De Pagés, *Travels round the World in the years 1767, 1768, 1770, 1771*, vol. 2 (London: J. Murray, 1791), 239.

[268] Constantin-François Volney, *Travel Through Syria and Egypt, in the years 1783, 1784, and 1785*, vol. 2 (London: G. G. J. and J. Robinson, Pater-Noster-Row, 1787), 51.

classified as hostile actions. In contrast, wars within their own territory are defensive. According to Volney, the Druze's aversion is to offensive wars characterized by aggression. His observation indicates that there was a well-known collective behavior among the Druze in the 18th century that reflected a deep-seated dislike of aggression and a tendency to avoid it. Volney also indicated that this behavior is an inherent trait of the Druze, present at all times. This gives his remark a historical continuity that extends beyond the 18th century. Puget de Saint Pierre had recorded the same attitude in his book about the Druze more than two decades before Volney. He mentioned that 'they are keen never to be in a position of aggression but will respond with all necessary anger to even the slightest aggression against them.'[269]

Similarly, Father Rufā ʾīl Karāmah, a local Christian historian, recorded under the events of the year 1758 that Emir Bashīr Abī al-Lamaʿ from Brummānā, [270] a Druze feudal lord sought to join the Order of the ʿUqqāl.[271] Upon learning of this, the head of Dayr al-Nabī Ishaʿyā, a Christian monastery, visited Shaykh Abū ʿAlī Maqṣad, the Shaykh of the ʿUqqāl in the town, to request that he speak with Emir Bashīr about compensating the monastery for dirhams he had previously taken by force.[272] Shaykh Abū ʿAlī agreed and intervened on behalf of the monastery. Emir Bashīr complied by giving the monastery a piece of land in Anṭiliyās as compensation. This account from Father Rufā ʾīl demonstrates two important points. First, it was well-known among the inhabitants of Mount Lebanon at that time that the Druze ʿUqqāl did not accept individuals into their Order if they had previously committed injustice or aggression. Instead, they first must repent and make amends. This principle was so well-established that even a non-Druze, the head of a monastery, was aware of it. Second, the ʿuqqāl are the custodians of values such as justice, peace, and non-aggression within the Druze community. Emir Bashīr, having committed past aggression, was required by the religious authority of his town—who was of lower social rank—to rectify his wrongs and compensate the monastery before being admitted into the Order of the ʿUqqāl.[273]

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[269] Puget de Saint Pierre, *Histoire des Druses, Peuple du Liban* (Paris: Cailleau, 1763), 132.

[270] Brummānā is a town in the Matn District of Mount Lebanon Governorate.

[271] The Abī al-Lamaʿ Emirs were still Druze at the time.

[272] Rufāʾīl Karamah, *Ḥawādith Lubnān wa-Sūriyā: min Sanat 1745 ilā Sanat 1800,* edited by Archbishop Bāsīlīūs Quṭṭān, Maṣādir al-Tārīkh al-Lubnānī 2 (Tripoli: Jarrūs Press, n.d), 21.

[273] Ibid.

Hamzah ibn Sbāt reported an important account that illustrates the justice of al-Amīr al-Sayyid ʿAbd Allāh al-Tannūkhī in his judgments and his courage in upholding the truth. This account emphasizes the strict stance of the ʿuqqāl against transgression and its justification. Ibn Sbāt described a "prominent person in certain districts who was influential and powerful, to whom people were submissive. He had prestige and respect, and was the leader of his people ... [and] one of the senior disciples [of al-Amīr al-Sayyid] and among the most esteemed scholars in the area." This prominent Shaykh wronged a neighbor, known for his "evil comportment and depraved manners," after the neighbor threw back branches that workers—whom the Shaykh had entrusted with pruning his vines—had tossed into his land, causing damage to the Shaykh's vineyard. The Shaykh complained to the local governor, who, according to al-Amīr al-Sayyid, "was not well-versed in the ways of justice." The governor "arrested the man, beat him severely, and forced him to pay five hundred dirhams"—a significant sum—before releasing him. The man, resentful, complained to the public about his punishment and insulted the Shaykh. Enraged, the Shaykh swore that he and the man could not live in the same town. Consequently, the man and his family were forced to leave the town.

Then, some of those who had heard the man's story suggested that he seek redress from al-Amīr al-Sayyid, so he did. Al-Amīr sent for the Shaykh in order to clarify the matter. After hearing both sides, he found that the Shaykh had indeed wronged the man and treated him unjustly. Al-Amīr rebuked the senior Shaykh, who was, according to Ibn Sbāt, "the most prominent Shaykh in the country" and "his influence matches that of al-Amīr al-Sayyid," and described his actions towards the man as "the deeds of tyrants." He asked him reproachfully: "Where are the principles of religion? Where is the preservation of trust?" Al-Amīr then ruled that the Shaykh should compensate the man for the financial losses he had caused and allow him to return to his home and village, even if this meant the Shaykh himself would have to leave the town to honor his oath! He also warned the Shaykh against defying the ruling, saying: "If you wish to part ways with us and prefer the company of others, then disobey what I have decreed and oppose it." This statement from al-Amīr al-Sayyid implies that he would sever his ties with the Shaykh and banish him from his religious assemblies if he did not redress the wrongs done to the man as commanded! The Shaykh accepted al-Amīr's judgment after realizing his error, compensated the man for his losses, and allowed him to return to his village. In turn, the Shaykh left the village and settled

in another town to honor his oath.[274] This incident shows that refraining from transgression is one of the conditions of good faith for the Druze ʿUqqāl. There is no place among them for anyone who commits it, no matter how high his religious or worldly status, unless he repents and rectifies the wrongs he has caused.[275]

I limited myself to the aforementioned accounts to demonstrate the historical continuity of the behavior revealed in this research, based on oral accounts of events from the 20th century and the early 21st century. The purpose of this concise historical survey is twofold. First, to illustrate the potential for studying written historical sources to verify the existence of this behavior in earlier periods. Second, to highlight the benefit for researchers of Druze history in particular and Lebanese history in general of being aware of such behaviors when analyzing primary historical sources, as this awareness allows for a deeper and more comprehensive understanding of their content.

This historical survey highlights another important issue: the moral influence of the ʿuqqāl on the overall behavior of the Druze. This influence led some historians and observers in the 18th and 19th centuries to generalize the principles of the ʿuqqāl to the entire Druze community, particularly their commitment to non-aggression and their restriction of the use of weapons and violence solely to defending one's life, honor, and land. George Washington Chasseaud, the son of the American consul in Beirut during the first half of the 19th century, noted in his book on the Druze of Lebanon that the ʿuqqāl played pivotal political and social roles within the Druze community. He regarded them as the true source of the community's strength, as they were the custodians of its principles and behaviors. In his view, these principles were the main reason for the Druze's superiority. He noted that the ʿuqqāl:

> exercise… a very considerable influence in temporal matters, for nobody would think of entering upon any place, or conducting an affair without consulting the Akals (ʿUqqāl); nothing of importance would be attempted, even by a sheik, without their advice and approval; **and**

[274] Ibn Sbāt, *Kitāb Ṣidq al-Akhbār,* 75-76.

[275] The terms that al-Amīr al-Sayyid imposed on the prominent Shaykh to rectify the harm by compensating the man for the damage he caused is based on a Quranic principle related to the proper conditions of repentance and the establishment of justice. The Qurʾān makes repentance a necessary condition for attaining forgiveness for wrongdoing, and rectifying the harm is an essential complement to it, so as to uphold justice, as stated in *Sūrat al-Māʾidah* 5: 39: "But whoever repents after his wrongdoing **and amends**, indeed, God will turn to him in forgiveness. Indeed, God is forgiving and merciful". See also *Sūrat al-Anʿām* 6: 48, and 54. I have heard similar accounts about contemporary Shaykhs.

> **altogether they exercise a general control and supervision over the manners, morals, and proceedings of the Druse people, which has a most beneficial effect**, for certainly, as the Akals are the best of the Druses, so the Druses are the best of the inhabitants of the Lebanon.[276]

Chauseaud also supported what some Lebanese historians and Colonel Churchill have referred to as the role of the ʿuqqāl in resolving disputes and establishing unity and harmony among the people of their community, stating that the Druze ʿUqqāl "are ministers of peace in their society."[277]

Several factors grant the ʿuqqāl a strong influence in Druze society, as mentioned by Chasseaud. Chief among these are upbringing, social intercourse, and religious guidance. The ʿuqqāl and the rest of the Druze live in the same villages and often in the same house, which makes it easier for the rest of the Druze to learn the principles of the ʿuqqāl and adopt their behaviors. There is also the principle of non-aggression itself. Most Druze know through upbringing, social interaction, and general religious guidance that committing capital sins like unjust killing or adultery—which is, to them, considered an assault on honor—would bar them from attending the Assemblies of Remembrance, should they wish to join the Order of the ʿUqqāl.[278] This spiritual punishment acts as a deterrent for many religiously uncommitted Druze, preventing them from committing aggression or murder.

6. Conclusion

This research demonstrates the effectiveness of oral historical accounts in providing valuable primary source materials for historians interested in studying the principles and general behaviors of a specific group of people, especially when the historian combines inherited oral tradition and direct oral history and knows how to approach each according to its characteristics and utilize them according to a disciplined methodology. Oral accounts related to general principles and behaviors are often more abundant in rural and remote areas than historical accounts related to events and wars. This is partly because they do not require the narrator to have a high level of education and because they are more closely aligned with the interests of ordinary people. They constitute an essential tool that

[276] George Washington Chasseaud, *The Druses of the Lebanon: their Manners, Customs and History with a Translation of Their Religious Code* (London: R. Bentley, 1855), 379.
[277] Ibid.
[278] C.f. page 59.

those communities use to preserve their principles, values, and customs to pass them down across generations.

The research, drawing on relevant oral history and inherited traditions, reveals the general religious principles that guide the Druze ʿUqqāl's stance on violence and aggression, as well as the collective behaviors that arise from these principles. It elucidates how these principles are deeply rooted in both their private daily lives and their public stances and directives. The oral accounts illustrate that the Druze ʿUqqāl strictly prohibit all forms of aggression, hate violence and killing, and only resort to such measures when compelled to defend themselves against others' aggression. Their use of weapons is strictly limited to defensive purposes: the Druze ʿUqqāl do not carry weapons out of preference, but rather out of necessity to protect themselves from oppression and aggression.

Moreover, the research demonstrates the firm religious foundations underpinning the behavior of the ʿuqqāl and its strong connection with their spiritual realization and religious conduct. To the ʿuqqāl, aggression corrupts the rational nature of human beings, which is the core of worship. It obscures their heart's insight from perceiving divine truths, preventing them from believing in God's justice and the promise of Judgement Day. Thus, it deprives them of salvation and the attainment of eternal happiness in the Hereafter. Therefore, a believer must detest violence, stay away from aggression, and refine the spirited part of his character. He must habituate his character to moral virtues such as even-temperedness, patience, endurance, and forgiveness to be able to control the feelings of anger that drive a person to commit violent acts and aggression against others and to wrong them. A person characterized by violence, ferocity, inclination to disputes, and trivializing aggression cannot, in their view, be among the righteous believers, because a rational person by nature hates all these things, strives to avoid them, and only resorts to violence unwillingly when forced to defend himself, his land, and his honor.

Additionally, the research showed the possibility of tracing this behavior in primary sources of modern Lebanese history, providing clear examples that prove the existence of this behavior among the ʿUqqāl in particular and the Druze in general since at least the 15th century. It also showed that their stance on violence and aggression is based on firm and explicit Quranic principles that prove their religious authenticity. The research highlights the effectiveness of the spiritual approach to worship, as in the Order of the ʿUqqāl, in keeping believers away from violence compared to the ritualistic approach.

This topic has not been previously addressed as an independent academic study within clear methodological frameworks. As a result, this research marks

the first time that the distinctive behavior of the Druze ʿUqqāl toward violence, killing, and aggression has been examined through historical accounts. These accounts mostly relate to their daily lives, as well as their stances on significant events such as wars and other major incidents. The findings of this research provide clear and consistent ethical and behavioral standards that can help historians specializing in Druze and Lebanese history to better understand the behavior of the Druze ʿUqqāl during the wars and armed conflicts they participated in throughout history. These standards also offer a means to evaluate the correctness of primary historical sources regarding the Druze ʿUqqāl, distinguishing between what is true and what is false. Given the scarcity of Druze sources on modern Lebanese history, and thus the absence of their narrative in historical accounts—often dominated by the narratives of others—the importance of this knowledge becomes evident as it enables historians to provide a more balanced portrayal of modern Lebanese history.

For example, Emir Ḥaydar Aḥmad al-Shihābī mentioned, in his account of the armed conflict between the Druze of Mount Lebanon led by Shaykh Bashīr Junblāṭ and Shaykh ʿAlī ʿImād on one side and Emir Bashīr al-Shihābī II on the other, the presence of the spiritual leader of the Druze of Mount Lebanon. This leader was the Grand Shaykh al-ʿAql of the time, Shaykh Abū ʿAlī Sharaf al-Dīn Bū Zayn al-Dīn (d. 1826) from the village of al-Hilāliyya in the Matn. The account also mentioned that several other prominent Shaykhs of the ʿUqqāl, such as Shaykh Yūsuf al-Ḥalabī, were among the Druze gathered in al-Mukhtārah.[279] These Shaykhs were reportedly urging the Druze to fight Emir Bashīr al-Shihābī II.[280] Despite the significance of this armed conflict and its role as a pivotal turning point in the history of Mount Lebanon in the 19th century, it has yet to receive adequate systematic study and in-depth scholarly research to uncover the true reasons behind its outbreak. However, the findings of this research can alert historians who seek to study this conflict to the importance of examining the involvement of the Druze ʿUqqāl and understanding the reasons behind their participation, based on the ethical and behavioral standards revealed in this research. By this, I mean drawing attention to the necessity of investigating the reasons that led these ʿUqqāl to consider Emir Bashīr al-Shihābī II to be in a state of aggression against them and uncovering the nature and dimensions of this aggression—something that has yet to be done.

[279] Al-Hilāliyyah is a village in the Bʿabdā District of Mount Lebanon Governorate. Al-Mukhtārah is a village in the Shūf District.

[280] Al-Shihābī, *Lubnān fī ʿAhd al-Umārāʾ al-Shihābīyīn,* 3: 762, 766, and 768.

This research also aids political and social studies examining the relationship between religious sects in the Middle East, particularly the Druze, and military institutions in their countries, such as the army and general security services. This issue gained importance following the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011, when thousands of Druze refused to join the Syrian army and participate in the internal conflict. The findings can also contribute to understanding the experience of the Druze of Palestine with compulsory service in the Israeli army.[281] Additionally, this research provides valuable material for historical studies on Druze attitudes toward disarmament and compulsory military service. Historically, Druze in Lebanon and Syria are noted for their resistance to compulsory military service and disarmament during the Ottoman rule over the Levant.[282] Moreover, their refusal to enlist and disarm was a significant factor in the Druze revolt in Lebanon and Syria against the rule of Muḥammad ʿAlī Pasha.[283]

Moreover, the results of this research will pave the way for a broader and more comprehensive study of the principles and conduct of the Druze ʿUqqāl in other areas of life, particularly their political conduct. This would contribute to understanding the true features of their unique religious order and its distinctive spiritual and social objectives. Such understanding helps explain the fabric and foundations of their social structure, which has been among the most important factors enabling this relatively small community to persist for ten centuries, during which they maintained a considerable margin of autonomy in a region continuously plagued by destructive wars and conflicts. On another level, the findings can also be of benefit in broader social and political contexts, as they offer a practical and realistic portrayal of a consistent moral approach that aligns

[281] Rami Zeedan provides a useful note on the context of the Druze compulsory military service in the Israeli army in 1955. He pointed out that the Israeli archives do not contain any relevant letter from the Druze spiritual leader Shaykh Amīn Ṭarīf, despite the requirement by then-Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion to receive a written correspondence indicating his and other Druze leaders' approval of the conscription decision. See Rami Zeedan, "The Role of Military Service in the Integration/Segregation of Muslims, Christians, and Druze within Israel," *Societies* 9, no. 1 (2019): 9.

[282] See Abu Husayn, *The View from Istanbul,* 23, where the author mentions Emir Aḥmad Maʿan's refusal to go with Druze conscripts to fight alongside the Ottomans against the Austrian Empire in the late 17th century. On the Druze refusal to disarm, see Abdul Rahim Abu Husayn, *Ṣināʿat al-Usṭūrah: Ḥikāyat al-Tamarrud al-Ṭawīl fī Jabal Lubnān* (Beirut: Dar al-Saqi, 2019), 31-32.

[283] On the Druze of Ḥawrān's refusal of conscription and disarmament, see for example Abū ʿIzz al-Dīn, *Ibrāhīm Bāshā fī Sūriyā,* 197-202, and 219; and Brigit Schäbler, *Intifāḍāt Jabal al-Durūz – Ḥawrān min al-ʿAhd al-ʿUthmānī ilā Dawlat al-Istiqlāl 1850–1949* (Beirut: Dār al-Nahār in collaboration with the German Oriental Institute in Beirut, 2004), 78.

with fundamental principles of justice. This stands in stark contrast to many acts of violence committed under various religious, political, and ideological banners, spreading death and destruction across the globe. Additionally, the principles and behavioral patterns identified in this study offer valuable insights that may foster peaceful religious leadership beyond local and regional contexts, opening new pathways for scholarly research on the ethics of nonviolence within religious studies.

I conclude this research with an account that illustrates the steadfastness of the current Druze religious authorities in maintaining this conduct. A Lebanese high-ranking security official visited Shaykh Amīn al-Ṣāyigh, their current spiritual leader, to become acquainted with him. During the conversation, the official asked him about the Druze's secret in warfare. Shaykh al-Ṣāyigh briefly replied: "Others acquired weapons to protect their faith, but we, our faith protects our weapons." [284] In light of what this research has demonstrated, Shaykh al-Ṣāyigh's laconic message to the security official, and through him to the public at large, shows that at a time when violence and bloodshed are being used more and more each day at an alarming pace and in horrific ways, especially in the name of religion, the Druze ʿUqqāl offer a valuable contribution to the heritage of humanity: "A faith that protects weapons" from injustice and aggression.

[284] Muʿīn al-Ṣāyigh.

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Article

The Druze District Governor Nasib Beik Jumblatt and the Ottoman Policy in Mount Lebanon

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Abstract

This study examines the policies of the Ottoman Empire in the Shouf region during the 19th century, focusing on the prominent figures of the area. In this context, the Ottoman state's approach to the influence of Nasib Jumblatt, a significant political figure from the Jumblatt family, in the region will be discussed. As the Ottoman central government's authority weakened in the 19th century, the rivalry between the Jumblatts and Arslans, two long-standing families in the region, intensified. As a result, acquiring the district governorship of Shouf, where the Druze were densely populated, became crucial for perpetuating the influence of both families. For this reason, this study examines the political maneuvers of the Arslan and Jumblatt families in order to control the district of Shouf, as well as the activities of Nasib Jumblatt as district governor. The study will also discuss the manifestations of international interventions in Mount Lebanon. Finally, the Ottoman state's approach to the British influence in shaping Nasib Jumblatt's political identity will be another aspect of the study.

Keywords: *Ottoman Empire, The Druze, Nasib Jumblatt, Shouf*

Introduction

In the nineteenth century, the changing policies of the Ottoman Empire in Mount Lebanon impacted the region's sectarian structure. The Druze community was significantly affected by this transformation. Although they had to share administrative authority with the Sunni Shihab family during the eighteenth century, the Druze, who had long held the title of *Amir (Prince)* in the region, had managed to preserve their social and political influence through prominent Druze families. One of these families was the Druze Jumblatt family, whose members long held the title of Sheikh.

The Jumblatts were able to control the political and sectarian transformation in Mount Lebanon by considering the region's internal and external dynamics after the establishment of the *mutasarrifate* in 1861. In this context, the Jumblatts sought to maintain stability in their relations with the Ottoman government and engaged in power struggles with the Arslan family, another influential Druze family in the region. The most prominent arena of this power struggle was the Shouf region. Shouf became the most important arena of power struggles because it was one of the centers of silk production and because it contained a large Druze population (Traboulsi 2012, 45).

Jumblatt bin Said settled in the Shouf district of Mount Lebanon in 1630 upon the invitation of the Druze Emir Fahreddin II. He later transformed this region into a political and administrative center for himself and his family (al-Shidyaq, 1995, 162). The Shouf region, one of the first places where the Druze settled in Lebanon, was crucial in terms of the well-being and survival of the sect and, hence, for the continuity of the cultural influence of the family that would dominate it. For this reason, the region became a constant arena of competition. The Jumblatts first competed with the Yazbakis and later with the Arslans for the leadership of the Druze in the Shouf. In addition to controlling land through the iqta (tax farming) system, which was a distinctive feature of the time, the primary goal of the Jumblatts was being a leader or, in other words, a strong *muqataa* holder to the Druze peasants. As for the Ottoman Empire, Druze dominance in the region was important in terms of the loyalty of the Druze community to the state and stability. Therefore, apart from minor disturbances in the Mount Lebanon region, which included the Shouf district, the environment of trust created there also strengthened the state's relationship with the Druze.

However, the establishment of the Mount Lebanon Mutasarrifate in 1861 led to a change in the iqta system, decreasing the power of muqataa holders. On

the other hand, the growing visibility of foreign states in Ottoman territories and the weakening of the Ottoman central authority began to push the Jumblatts towards different paths. From the 1890s, a political network of relations developed in the Shouf district, involving England, France, the Ottoman State, and the Jumblatts. Therefore, the administration of the Shouf region was not just about appointing a district governor by the Ottoman State. The activities of France and England in the areas where the Druze were densely populated attracted the attention of the state. The information provided in a report submitted to the State in 1887 regarding the migration of the Druze and the measures taken by the State, as well as the warnings from the state about interventions by the governors exceeding their powers, indicated that the Shouf region was an important example in state-society relationships. The report contained the signatures of six hundred and fifty Druze people from the district who described the atrocities committed by Nasib Jumblatt, who was elected as the District Governor of Shuof.[1] Accordingly, the ranks given to Shouf administrators from foreign countries also drew attention. In this context, it was necessary to appoint an authoritative figure to ensure regional stability.

Since the establishment of the mutasarrifate in Mount Lebanon, the Ottoman State has preferred members of the Arslan family for the district governorship of Shouf. Accordingly, six of the eight people appointed to the position between 1862 and 1915 were chosen from the Arslan family. Only one person, Nasib Beik, was appointed to that position from the Jumblatt family. Nasib Beik, who had complex relationships with the Ottoman State and the Druze community, served as the district governor of Shouf three times at different periods.

Nasib Beik Jumblatt remained in his first term for seven years when the Ottoman authorities became more familiar with his name. Although he carried out significant administrative and political activities in the Shouf region during his first term, complaints about him from the Druze to Istanbul began to pile up after some time. Some of the Druze who did not want Nasib Beik as district governor began to leave Shouf.[2] Since the Mutasarrifate of Mount Lebanon had become one of the most sensitive administrative units, the Ottoman State had to consider different factors when evaluating these complaints. Because other powers now had influence in the region, the state had to approach appointment issues cautiously.

[1] DAB, Y.EE, 104-55. 24 Shawwal 1304 (16 July 1887)

[2] DAB, Y.PRK. UM. 25-16. 1 Safar 1310 (13 August 1892), from Rauf Pasha, governor of Syria, to Istanbul.

The influence of France and England in the region and the relationships they established with different sects and prominent families constituted one of the sensitive points of state-society relationships. Indeed, Nasib Beik Jumblatt's connection with France and England had formed the basis of Sultan Abdulhamid II's political mindset regarding the Jumblatts in the late nineteenth century.

This study will be conducted under three main domains. Firstly, the reflections of the sectarian crisis on administrative appointments will be examined in a small area of the Ottoman Empire. The reasons behind the opposition to these appointments will be viewed. The reasons behind the competition between the Arslan and Jumblatt families in the Shouf region will be examined in this context. The Jumblatt's relations with the governor (*mutasarrif*) and religious leaders will be reviewed to illuminate this rivalry's political and religious dimensions. Secondly, the political identity of Nasib Beik Jumblatt, who was appointed three times as the district governor of Shouf, will be discussed. Finally, the question of the Ottoman State's approach to Nasib Beik Jumblatt due to his close contact with England will be examined. In this sense, the details of the diplomacy conducted by the state through regional administrators, considering the possible disturbances in the region and the danger of intervention by England and France in Ottoman territories, will be discussed through the activities of Nasib Beik Jumblatt.

Appointment of Nasib Beik Jumblatt as the district governor (qaim-maqam) of Shouf

Nasib Beik Jumblatt, the eldest son of the prominent Shouf leader Said Beik, was born in Mukhtara in 1854. He first received his education at Madrasat al-Wataniyya in Beirut and later attended the Syrian Protestant College, where he studied law. Thanks to the quality of his education, he was appointed as the administrator of the Shuf Sowayjani region in 1869, thus embarking upon his political career (Saeed 2021, 170).

During that time, the district governor (*qaimaqam*) of Shouf was Amir Mulhim Arslan. The Ottoman government had selected prominent members of the Arslan family for the position of the Druze subdivision under the system of two district governorships *(qaimaqamatayn)* that prevailed in 1841-60. Similarly, Amir Mulhim Arslan was appointed as the district governor of Shouf under the Mutasarrifate in 1869. However, following this appointment, complaints about his administration began to reach Istanbul. Reports suggested that Amir Mulhim incited specific individuals to seize Druze endowment lands. In addition, Amir

Mulhim confiscated some Druze lands on behalf of the state in order to provide income for the schools the state built for Druze children. Moreover, only seventy of the 150-man military units appointed by the governor for the Shouf region were on duty, and the Amir had discharged the rest and confiscated their salaries.[3] Therefore, Mulhim Arslan could not remain in office any longer.

In 1873, Mustafa Arslan took over the position from Mulhim. His increasing influence, along with the Arslan family's growing power in the region, was one of the concerns for the Ottoman Empire. In a report forwarded from Governor Vasa Pasha to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Nazarat al-Dakhiliyya, there were many complaints about Mustafa Arslan. According to Vasa Pasha, while the 1861 regulations abolished all privileges of tax farmers (*muqataajis*), the Arslan family retained these privileges due to their long-standing control of the district governorship of Shouf. As a result, Amir Mustafa appointed officials from his own family to handle administrative affairs. His nepotism and policies intensified tensions and hostility among the Druze. Reactions to court decisions considered unjust were particularly evident.[4] Vasha Pasha had previously complained about the unfair practices of the judges of the majority sect against other sect members, and he made some changes regarding the authority of the judges (Akarlı 1993, 134). He also wanted to prevent communities from the same sect from being mistreated due to family rivalry.

In 1884, Vasa Pasha took steps to undermine the privileges of the Arslan family. Pasha considered the competition of prominent notable families belonging to the same sect. He aimed to appoint officials who would work harmoniously with him while ensuring that those who took part in the administration had effective influence in the region. In fact, the Ottoman government agreed to Mustafa Arslan's dismissal from office but did not want someone from the Jumblatt family to take his place. The government believed that safety and security could not be ensured if the reigns of Shouf's administration were handed over from one family to another, as such family rivalry would cause constant unrest. It would soon be understood that the central government thought that the qaim-maqam of Shouf should be from neither the Jumblatt nor the Arslan family. Ideally, he should not be from Shouf, either.[5] However, Vasa Pasha felt that appointing someone from outside Shouf might pose problems, and he considered it appropriate to select

[3] DAB. HR. SYS. 1947-31, 29 Safar 1329 (8 May 1872).

[4] DAB. Y.EE. 104-169. 7 Shaban 1301 (2 June 1884).

[5] DAB. Y.EE. 104-55. 25 Shawwal 1304 (17 July 1887).

someone from another prominent Druze family. Consequently, he dismissed Amir Mustafa and appointed Nasib Beik from the Jumblatt family in his place. Nasib Beik was influential in Mount Lebanon as the new qaim-maqam. Before he became the qaim-maqam, Vasa Pasha appointed Nasib Beik as the head of the Appeals Court in 1883 and qaim-maqam a year later (Basha 2010, 403; Al-Khuri 1908, 430).

Behind Vasa Pasha's choice of the Jumblatts was the indirect influence of the French consul, who had visited the Jumblatt family in Shouf during the early days of Vasa Pasha's Mutasarrifate. While the British maintained their approach to the Druze, the French also attempted to establish good relations. Using the Jumblatts, France aimed to create an alternative Druze option and gain a new ally in the region (Spagnolo 1977, 176). Taking this into consideration, Vasa Pasha not only wanted to prevent the Arslan family from becoming the sole political representative of the Druze but also intended to thwart the French attempts to establish a new ally. He believed assigning roles to the Jumblatts in the administration could help achieve this balance.

The Jumblatt family had maintained a close relationship with the British government since the time of Nasib Beik's father, Said Beik Jumblatt. Additionally, the British occupation of Egypt in 1882 had caused great concern in the Ottoman Empire and the Arab regions. Therefore, the repercussions of this occupation were bound to be felt in Mount Lebanon (Akarlı 1993, 44). Alongside his father, the affinity of Nasib Beik, who had been educated at the Syrian Protestant College, with Britain could not be ignored. The importance of this closeness in the selection of Nasib Beik was significant, as it would help counterbalance the influence of France and Britain and their growing proximity to the Druze in Mount Lebanon.

Reactions Against Nasib Beik and Political Developments Behind His Dismissal

The appointment of Nasib Beik Jumblatt to the administration of the Shouf region marked the beginning of a new era. Firstly, the Shouf district was the largest district in Mount Lebanon, stretching from Jazzin to Matn and from the Lebanese mountain range to the Mediterranean. In this regard, holding the administration of Shouf meant having *"the greatest administrative position that the sons of Bani Ma'rouf could dream of" (*Yazbak 1983, 298*)*. Therefore, Nasib Beik's appointment immediately initiated political reactions within Shouf. He faced initia-

tives that could jeopardize his position. One of these initiatives was a petition of complaint sent from Shouf to Istanbul in 1886, bearing the signatures of 650 people. According to this petition, Nasib Beik had appointed his relatives to head the courts and had managed to prevent the Yazbakis from taking office. Vasa Pasha remained silent despite these injustices because he supported Nasib Beik. The petitioners expected justice from Istanbul and demanded Nasib Beik's removal from his post.[6] The Sublime Porte found itself in a dilemma regarding Nasib Beik and, therefore, requested an explanation from Vasa Pasha to inquire about the situation in the region.[7] One of the matters the state considered was the possibility of foreign intervention if public order deteriorated. Indeed, the British and French influence was growing in the region, and European powers were interested in the region through education and political means. Therefore, whether or not Nasib Beik should remain as the district governor of Shouf was critical for controlling foreign influence in the region.

In this case, Vasa Pasha expressed his intention to prevent the concentration of administrative power in the hands of a single family, the Arslans. He believed that establishing administrative balance would alleviate the ongoing power struggles in Mount Lebanon since the early nineteenth century. In addition, he reminded the Sublime Porte that the *Réglement* of Mount Lebanon called for the termination of traditional privileges and expressed his determination to implement this principle to bring the region closer to the Ottoman center, even when its administration remained autonomous.[8]

Vasa Pasha's response persuaded the Sublime Porte to agree to keep Nasib Beik in his position. Moreover, it rewarded Nasib Beik by honoring him with the *"Order of the Medjidie"* of the third class.[9] While the Ottoman archival documents do not mention the reason for the award, it was clear that Nasib Beik had gained Vasa Pasha's trust. This trust may have been because Nasib Beik covered the expenses of the bridge built on Nahr al-Kabir and had a water source built in Baaklin, even before his appointment as a qaim-maqam (Basha 2010, 404). However, what mattered more was that Nasib Beik had the strength to stand up against the Arslan family and had a good relationship with the British diplomats.

Nasib Beik's district governorship opened a new door in the rivalry be-

[6] DAB. Y.EE. 104-55 /1, 23 Shaban 1304 (17 May 1887)

[7] DAB. Y.EE. 104-55 /2, 25 Shawwal 1304 (17 July 1887)

[8] DAB. Y.EE. 104- 115

[9] DAB. IDH. 1137 - 88738

tween the Jumblatt and Arslan families. As the first member of the Jumblatt family to acquire this position, Nasib Beik entered an administrative power struggle with the Arslan family, from whose ranks the *qaim-maqam* of Shouf emerged for thirty years uninterruptedly. One of the outcomes of this struggle was Amir Mustafa Arslan's agitation of the people of Shouf against Governor Vasa Pasha until 1890. Considering these reactions, the state initiated efforts to send Mustafa Arslan to Tripoli (Trablousgharb) so as not to affect the public further.[10] However, they also understood that Nasib Beik could not continue in his position. The events had gone beyond the dimension of the competition between the Arslans and the Jumblatts and had led to the mobilization of the Druze people living in Shouf. Information reaching Istanbul suggested that the Druze were leaving or preparing to leave Shouf and migrating to Haouran. The Governor of Syria, Rauf Pasha, indicated that this migration would cause trouble in Haouran and requested a decision regarding Nasib Beik as soon as possible.[11]

In fact, during that time, there had been uprisings among the Druze in Haouran, which persisted until 1893 (Samur 1994, 407). In such a complicated situation, according to Rauf Pasha, no one wanted the Druze coming from Mount Lebanon to create new disturbances. In addition, the Druze leaders who had lost their power in Mount Lebanon might want to regain influence in Haouran. At this point, migration would disrupt demographic balances and create new political influences. Furthermore, another warning came from Muhammed Emin Efendi to the government about the possible dangers arising from migrating the Druze of Mount Lebanon to Haouran. He stated that the Druze people who were not affiliated with the Jumblatt family hated Nasib Beik and thus were leaving Shouf. According to Muhamed Emin Efendi, the Maronites would come one step closer to achieving regional independence if the Druze left Mount Lebanon. If the demographic balance shifted against the Druze, it could lead to renewed conflicts with the Maronites, and the Druze might be unable to return to their lands.[12]

Muhammed Emin Efendi drew attention to another point that involved an issue the Ottoman Empire had not been very interested in until that moment. He declared that the Arslan family and the previous district governor, Mustafa Arslan, were Sunni Muslims. Nasib Beik, on the other hand, was a non-Sunni Druze and was unsuitable for the district governorship due to his sect. According to

[10] DAB. Y.EE. 104 – 97, 28 Zilkaadah 1307 (16 July 1890)

[11] DAB. Y.PRK. UM. 25-16, 1 Safar 1310 (25 August 1892)

[12] DAB. Y.PRK. ASK. 88-18, 9 Rajab 1310 (27 January 1893)

Muhammed Emin's report, Nasib Beik also had a close relationship with Britain. Therefore, Nasib Beik's dismissal involved a political, social, and religious issue, so much so that the issue gained an international dimension because of Britain's involvement.

For these reasons, Naum Pasha, who succeeded Vasa Pasha, decided on Nasib Beik. Naum Pasha blamed Vasa Pasha for dividing the Shouf district and disturbing stability. According to Naum Pasha, the Arslan family was ruling the region quite well, especially Mustafa Arslan, who was an important and loyal figure to the Ottoman State. However, Vasa Pasha disrupted this order and intensified competition between the families. Worse yet, the balance among the Druze disappeared. Therefore, Naum Pasha removed Nasib Beik from the office and chose someone else. However, Naum Pasha did not mention Nesib Jumblatt's sectarian identity. For the Pasha, who prioritized political reasons, it was not important that the district governor was a Druze. Thus, Muhammad Emin's emphasis on sect was not important for Naum Pasha or the Ottoman government leaders in Istanbul.

Naum Pasha's remarkable decision for the region was actually in line with the Ottoman State's initial preference. By choosing to stay away from both families, he appointed Qadi Said Hamdan, a member of the Hamdan family and a member of the Court of Appeals. He had also won the people's love in his earlier positions. For Naum Pasha, only this decision could ensure security.[13]

While Naum Pasha's decision surprised Nasib Beik, he did not directly intervene. Instead, he asked Druze Sheikh al-'Aql Muhammad Tali' to be the intermediary to solve the problem. Nasib Beik asked Sheikh al-'Aql to contact the Sublime Porte to convince the state not to accept Naum Pasha's decision. The Druze religious leader accepted Nasib Beik's request and informed the Sublime Porte that the Druze people trusted Nasib Beik and were safe thanks to him. According to Sheikh al-'Aql, Nasib Beik's enemies had influenced Naum Pasha and made him hate Nasib Beik. Therefore, the state was requested to act justly and mercifully and reinstate Nasib Beik to his position.[14]

Religious leadership was as important as political leadership for the Druze community. As a matter of fact, religious leaders who were effective in protecting the sect played important roles in guiding the community and meeting their needs. The Ottoman Empire also respected minorities' religious freedom. Therefore, there was a harmonious relationship between religious authorities and the state.

[13] DAB. Y. PRK. UM. 26-15

[14] DAB. HR. TO. 398 - 16 - 0

However, the Druze religious leadership began to split between rival families in the nineteenth century, and the Jumblatts began to have more influence over the Sheikhs al-'Aql. Regardless, Nasib Beik predicted that if a request from the Druze religious leader reached Istanbul, it would have an effect. However, the state did not yet have a sharp opinion about Nasib Beik's critical position and did not see the change of duty as a big problem. At this point, the state responded negatively to Muhammed Tali's inquiry and did not allow Nasib Beik Jumblatt to return to his position.

Reappointment of Nasib Jumblatt as District Governor

In 1891, Said Hamdan was appointed as the new district governor to replace Nasib Beik. However, he lasted only one year in that position as the Hamdan family's influence was not strong enough in the region. As a result, Naum Pasha appointed Mustafa Arslan as Shouf's district governor, restoring the Arslan family's leadership status. Nevertheless, the Shouf region was also under the influence of the Jumblatts. Therefore, both the Ottoman Empire and the governors of Mount Lebanon had to deal with the competition of the two families over administrative positions. The report submitted in 1894 by Louis Sabunji to the Sublime Porte revealed the power struggle between the two families and explained the crisis the state would fall into if it did not take urgent action. According to Sabunji, there was great anger in the Shouf region against Amir Mustafa Arslan's immoral behavior. If the state did not remove Amir Mustafa from his position, this anger could spill over to involve France, as Amir Mustafa's opponents intended to publish a newspaper in France against the Ottoman Empire. This newspaper would state that the people were mistreated because the state ignored Amir Mustafa's immoral behavior as an administrator. Such provocative publications would invite the intervention of both France and Great Britain in the region. Sabunji held that a big crisis would emerge if the state did not take urgent action.[15] Louis Sabunji also recommended at the end of his report the immediate dismissal of Amir Mustafa and the reappointment of Nasib Beik Jumblatt, who stood out with his services as the district governor of Shouf.

The report of Louis Sabunji, a prominent journalist of the reign of Abdulhamid II, was significant in several respects. Abdulhamid II relied on the press and his press advisors for information regarding international politics and maneuvers against his rule (Hızlı 2022, 3). Therefore, the state considered Louis Sabunji's

[15] DAB. Y. PRK. TKM. 32-17.

letter. Still, it did not take immediate action regarding the issue. In this sense, Abdulhamid II had to follow sensitive policies in the Arab regions of the Empire (Yıldız 2021, 33). As a matter of fact, Nasib Beik Jumblatt's dismissal was also due to increased complaints about him. However, the situation was precarious then, and Nasib Beik's appointment in Amir Mustafa Arslan's place could have created complications for the government. A more suitable replacement had to be searched for, but this would take a long time. Because of this, Amir Mustafa Arslan remained in office until 1902.

Even though the Ottoman Empire sought different solutions, such as appointing Shakib Arslan instead of Mustafa Arslan, Nasib Beik remained a crucial figure for the Ottoman Empire, not only because of his activities within Shouf but also regarding his relations with foreign states. One of these states was Iran. In 1891, Shah Nasiruddin, who was the head of the Qajar dynasty reigning in Iran, conferred the Shir-u Khurshid order (*nishan*) to Nasib Beik with due permission obtained from the Sublime Porte. In addition, the Shah awarded Nasib Beik a Shir-u Khurshid order of the second rank in 1894.[16]

With this "order" issue, some remarkable points emerged. First, Nasib Beik Jumblatt had no direct political relationship with the Iranian State. In addition, although the Druze faith derived from Shiite Islam, it was an offshoot of the branch of Ismailism and not of the Twelver Shiism dominant in Iran. In other words, there was no denominational commonality between the Druzism and Twelver Shiism sects of the Qajar dynasty. Moreover, the issue did not have a social basis as the Shiite population in the whole of Mount Lebanon was only around 15-20,000 people. Therefore, Iran could not dominate the Shiite community in the region through the administrators in Mount Lebanon. However, the awards conferred by the Shah to Nasib Beik suggest that he and the Qajar dynasty in Iran had common interests. Hence, looking closer at Iran's conferring these orders to Nasib Beik is necessary.

In the Ottoman Empire, only the Sultan had the authority to bestow an official decoration, or *nishan*. Additionally, foreign states were required to obtain permission from the sultan before awarding orders to Ottoman citizens (Aydın 2021, 42). During the nineteenth century, giving orders became common and one of the indispensable elements of diplomatic practice in the Ottoman Empire and Iran. The medal of *Shir-u Khurshid* was the most frequently awarded order by the Qajar Shahs. The order/*nishan* was often used as a method to establish close rela-

[16] DAB. DH. MKT. 1778-90

tionships in the 1880s (Kiren 2019, 158).

Awarding a medal to an Ottoman subject had a significant meaning in Iran. According to Kiren, Istanbul had a distinctive place compared to European capitals in the eyes of Iranian rulers and officials because it was clearly considered the most important administrative center of the Islamic world and a kind of gathering point on the pilgrimage routes of Muslims. Furthermore, many Iranians settled in Istanbul and other major Ottoman cities for trading and other work opportunities. Bearing an influence on them, other Muslims and Ottomans who contributed to Iran's contact with the West were very important to the Shahs. The fact that the Qajars awarded medals to Ottomans engaged in trade or even to people in the lower layers of Ottoman society showed their importance to business with the Ottomans and the Ottoman public (Kiren 2019, 177).

However, different possibilities regarding the Iranian dynasty's bestowal of decorations on Nasib Beik come to mind. One of these possibilities is related to Iran's relations with Britain. During the reign of Nasir al-Din Shah, the British influence in Iran steadily grew, bringing about multiple changes in their relationship. The British played a pivotal role in turning Iran into a semi-colonial status and prepared the political basis for this transformation (Karadeniz 2019, 235). They also pressured the Qajar dynasty to weaken its political power and forced it to offer concessions to the British. The pressure increased during Nasir al-Din Shah's reign, leading to his granting of significant privileges to the British.

The British also pursued a policy to increase their influence in the Lebanon region. The rivalry between Britain and France in this regard was visible through sectarian divisions, which drew the British closer to the Druze community. One of the actors who played a role in British-Druze relations was the Jumblatt family. Indeed, Nasib Beik's father, Said Beik, preferred to approach the British for support. Consequently, the British government proposed the appointment of Said Beik as the head of the Druze district during the Two District Governments (qaim-maqamatayn) period in 1842-1860 to improve the British-Druze connection in the region (Jumblatt 2020, 477). Nasib Beik also managed to maintain the stability of this relationship. Therefore, Nasib Beik's return to the district governorship of Shouf was crucial for the British, and Iran helped fulfill this aim as a good intermediary. Iranian decorations awarded to Nasib Beik might also increase his prestige in the eyes of the Ottoman government.

Nasib Beik also received an Ottoman decoration, not as an Ottoman reaction to Iranian action, but upon Nasib Beik's own request. In 1894, Nasib Beik

sent a letter to the Minister of Interior (Dâhiliye Nezareti) explaining the services he provided in the Shouf region, both during and after his time as district governor. These services included providing land for the military barracks and serving the Mutasarrifate without fee.[17] He requested his promotion to a rank higher than his current fourth-level rank. The central government approved his request and promoted him to the rank of first class.[18] However, Nasib Beik had higher ambitions than rank. After being dismissed from Shouf, he left Mount Lebanon and settled in Beirut, where he lived quietly with his family for a long time. However, he could no longer resist the temptation of being involved in politics. In 1897, he returned to the Shouf region to pursue an administrative position again.

Nasib Jumblatt's decision caused significant discomfort for the Governor of Beirut, Rashid Mümtaz Pasha. In a letter addressed to Sultan Abdülhamid II's private secretary, Mabeyn-i Hümayun, Rashid Mümtaz Pasha referred to Nasib Beik's meetings with the British consul during his stay in Beirut. The governor expressed concern that if Nasib Beik returned to Shouf, competition and unrest would resurface among the Druze in the region. Moreover, there was apprehension that Nasib Beik might misuse the political trust he had gained through his association with England for specific disruptive purposes. According to the Pasha, the state should consider assigning Nasib Beik to a new position elsewhere to keep him away from Mount Lebanon.[19]

While the Ottoman Empire held vast territories, it faced a crisis in determining the governance of a relatively small area like Shouf and delayed a conclusive solution. In response to the request of the Governor of Beirut, Nasib Beik was appointed as the district governor of Sidon in 1897.[20] However, this appointment did not satisfy Nasib Beik, and the people of Sidon did not welcome their new district governor.[21] The Governor of Beirut sent a new letter to Istanbul emphasizing that Sidon was not a suitable region for Nasib Beik. The Grand Vizier recognized that the complications associated with Nasib Beik Jumblatt could no longer be tolerated and removed him from Sidon.

In 1902, the newly appointed Governor of Mount Lebanon, Muzaffer Pasha, implemented a new policy that differed from Naum Pasha's approach. Mu-

[17] DAB. DH. MKT. 301-42-3

[18] DAB. DH. MKT. 301-42-9

[19] DAB. BEO. 1012 - 75884

[20] DAB. BEO. 1032 - 77367

[21] DAB. Y.A.HUS. 379 - 42 - 0

zaffer Pasha reinstated Nasib Beik as the governor of Shouf. Shakib Arslan, who had briefly taken over the position replacing his uncle Amir Mustafa, had to step down due to pressure from Governor Muzaffer Pasha. Ultimately, the Jumblatts took over the governorship (Atlıoğlu 2015, 7). The Ottoman state approved Muzaffer Pasha's decision upon reviewing the entire network of these relationships and concluded that keeping Nasib Beik in Mount Lebanon would be in its interest.

According to some researchers, Muzaffer Pasha was a weak administrator, so the appointment of Nasib Beik would strengthen him (Suveyd, 2004, 235; Spagnolo, 1997,225). At any rate, the Pasha paid particular attention to the Druze community. He valued the influence of the Jumblatts and believed Nasib Beik would assist in ending the injustices in the region. Indeed, Nasib Beik was willing to support Muzaffer Pasha in maintaining regional stability. However, Nasib Beik could remain in Shouf for only two years. The persistence of complaints against him obliged the central government to demand an explanation from Muzaffer Pasha.[22] In his response, the Pasha stated that Nasib Beik fulfilled his duties justly and that the Arslan family incited the complaints. According to the report, the allegations of Nasib Beik mistreating the populace were baseless, and these complaints were made by the former Shouf governor, Amir Shakib, in Damascus, inciting the public.[23] However, the state also requested a detailed report from the Pasha based on the reinvestigation of the complaints against Nasib Beik.[24] Istanbul might have been unconvinced. In 1904, the central government dismissed Nasib Beik and appointed Sami Arslan instead (Jumblatt 2020, 540).

Nasib Beik's Last Appointment Amid a Changing Political Environment

The Ottoman Empire was deeply concerned with reforms and administrative issues in the Mutasarrifate of Mount Lebanon until the beginning of World War I. Every appointed *mutasarrif* was involved in a new reform effort. However, given the relative stability of the Shouf district, they preferred to maintain the old traditions there. Therefore, Nasib Beik once again handed over the governorship of Shuf to the Arslan family until his re-election in 1910. Shakib Arslan played a significant role in the return of the governorship to the Arslan family.

[22] DAB. DH.TMIK.M., 139-30, 25 Zilkaadah 1320 (23 February 1903), DAB. DH. MKT. 753-411, 26 Jamaziyal Avval 1321 (20 August 1903)

[23] DAB. DH. MKT. 753-43- 6, 28 Rabiul Avval 1321 (24 June 1903)

[24] DAB. DH. MKT. 753-411, 26 Jamaziyal Avval 1321 (20 August 1903)

After Nasib Beik Jumblatt, Amir Sami Arslan, Taoufiq Arslan, and Shakib Arslan served as district governors of Shouf successively. In 1910, Yusuf Franko, who was appointed as *mutasarrif* in 1907, unexpectedly appointed Nasib Beik as the district governor of Shouf. Several factors stood out in Nasib Beik's last appointment. Firstly, Mustafa Arslan's name was also among the candidates alongside Nasib Beik's. However, the Arslans and the Jumblatts (under the leadership of Mustafa and Nasib, respectively) had reached an alliance at this point. According to Spagnolo, Mustafa Arslan realized that this rivalry had deprived him of political power for years (Spagnolo 1977, 237). Therefore, when Nasib Beik was chosen for the position, Mustafa Arslan did not object. This situation indicated a decrease in the intensity of the competition.

For Yusuf Franko, there were more significant reasons for Nasib Beik's appointment. Sultan Abdulhamid II was forced to reinstate the Ottoman constitutional regime in 1908 and was dethroned in 1909. The Committee of Union and Progress led these developments and announced the beginning of a new era for the Ottoman Empire in a different political direction. The initiation of the new era led to an atmosphere of freedom. As a result, serious opposition began to form among intellectuals against Yusuf Franko Pasha. According to Mount Lebanese, Yusuf Franko Pasha maintained an arbitrary and authoritarian rule as a mutasarrif, thus losing the people's trust. The political change in the Ottoman Empire needed to be reflected in Mount Lebanon as well. Those advocating for administrative reform argued that the system of governance, where powers were concentrated in the hands of a single mutasarrif, no longer complied with the requirements of the time. Therefore, it was advocated that Mount Lebanon should benefit from the new system that the reinstatement of constitutional monarchy (II. Meşrutiyet) introduced (Sezer, 2021). These initiatives and developments undermined the mutasarrif's authority, and the Second Constitutional Era was the most significant political factor that stimulated these initiatives. On the other hand, Maronite Patriarch Butrus al-Hoveyik, who favored maintaining the status quo, thought that the new system would harm the church's privileges and disrupt the current order's stability. Thus, the patriarch and church circles were against sending representatives to the parliament. Nevertheless, the group that wanted change was able to prevail more than the Maronite church.

In the face of the opposition that formed against him, Yusuf Franko Pasha reacted strongly, rejecting the demands for reforming his authoritarian governance. Yusuf Franko Pasha's stance caused significant discomfort among the peo-

ple of Lebanon, leading to telegrams of complaints being sent to Istanbul against him. As reactions increased within and outside the mutasarrifate, Yusuf Franko Pasha eventually stepped back and accepted the demands. Shakib Arslan's process of becoming the governor of Shuf began after these events in 1908 (Arslan 2009, 14; Sezer 2021, 42). After Yusuf Pasha accepted the demands, he was forced to dismiss some high-ranking local government officials, including Taoufiq Arslan. He appointed Shakib Arslan to replace Taoufiq (Kılıç et al. 2023, 82).

One of the most important issues of the early years of the Second Constitutional Era concerning Mount Lebanon was the issue of sending representatives to the Parliament (*Meclis-i Mebusan*). The liberals in Mount Lebanon supported this because they believed Mount Lebanon was an inseparable part of the Ottoman Empire and did not want the Lebanese to be seen as foreigners in the Empire. The opponents argued that Mount Lebanon was a privileged province and, as such, not within the scope of the constitution. According to Shakib Arslan, both sides favored preserving Mount Lebanon's privileges, but participating in the Parliament would not eliminate these privileges; it would guarantee them. Moreover, participating in the parliament was the best way to escape from the "one-man dictatorship" in Mount Lebanon (Sezer 2021, 44; Der Matossian 2016, 118-119). This discussion also revealed the incompatibility of Yusuf Franko and Shakib Arslan's views.

The issue of sending representatives from Mount Lebanon to the Parliament evoked an international crisis. An article published in a journal that had begun to be published in France covered Ottoman politics and themes related to Ottoman Arabs, extensively addressing the issue. It stated that it was almost impossible to participate in the Ottoman Parliament without giving up special autonomy, and consequently, this was an international issue concerning the guarantor states (Sezer 2021, 45). The process that led Nasib Beik back to the governorship began with the order from the central Ottoman government to hold the elections required to send representatives to the Parliament. Nasib Jumblatt was the group leader who accepted, in principle, the continuation of privileges while sending representatives to the Parliament. Also, Shouf became the only district in Mount Lebanon that agreed to send representatives to the Parliament in keeping with the central government's instructions (Kılıç 2023, 80).

With Nasib Jumblatt's increasing importance, Yusuf Franko Pasha dismissed Shakib Arslan in 1910 and appointed Nasib Beik as the district governor, believing he could work harmoniously with him. Essentially, both Nasib and

Shakib were supported by the Committee of Union and Progress, but Shakib's opposition to Yusuf Franko was much more evident. Shakib advocated the complete annexation of Mount Lebanon to the Ottoman Empire. Nasib, on the other hand, was in favor of preserving privileges. Yusuf Franko agreed with him. For this reason, the appointment of Nasib to the Shouf administration was necessary for the mutasarrif to maintain his position and balance the region and the center. However, Nasib Beik's last term as district governor of Shouf lasted only three years, and he was dismissed in 1913 and replaced by Amir Taoufiq Arslan. In the power struggle between the Jumblatts and the Arslans, the Arslans emerged victorious once again.

Conclusion

Mount Lebanon was one of the regions where the Ottoman Empire tried to re-implement its centralist policies. For this reason, the Empire sought to follow a sensitive policy to gain the trust of the minority sects in areas such as Shouf. Consequently, it wanted to have confidence in the officials it appointed to that region. Although the central government favored the members of the Arslan family in administrative appointments for many years, the changing political system in the nineteenth century made the state feel the need to balance influential families in the region. International interventions began to deepen along with the establishment of the *mutasarrifate* regime. The British and the French pursued policies that involved establishing good relations with the prominent local families to secure the Druze on their side. Therefore, complaints against the appointed governors from the Arslan family or concerning the implementation of specific regulations could also be backed by British and/or French diplomatic pressure. These pressures could oblige the central government to shift its support from one family to another. Under such circumstances, Nasib Beik became the first Jumblatt appointed as the district governor of Shouf. However, this situation intensified the competition between the two families and put the central government and the governors of Mount Lebanon in a quandary.

Name	Date
Amir Mulhim Arslan	1862-1873
Amir Mustafa Arslan	1873-1884
Nasib Beik Jumblatt	1884-1891
Said Hamdan	1891-1892
Amir Mustafa Arslan	1892-1902
Amir Shakib Arslan	1902
Nasib Beik Jumblatt	1902-1904
Amir Sami Arslan	1904-1905
Amir Taoufiq Arslan	1905-1909
Amir Shakib Arslan	1909-1910
Nasib Beik Jumblatt	1910-1913
Amir Taoufiq Arslan	1913-1915
Amir Adel Arslan	1915

Table 1. *List of district governors of the Shouf region (1862-1915)*

The state adopted a policy based on loyalty rather than religious and sectarian unity in its relationship with society. Therefore, the sectarian affiliation of a Druze district governor was not as significant as his political identity. Nasib Beik was a Druze leader born in the Shouf region and familiar with the area, but he lacked political experience compared to the Arslans. Despite becoming the district governor of Shouf with British support amidst a tense political atmosphere, he could not maintain stability. Nevertheless, the Jumblatt family became as crucial to the Ottoman state as the Arslans. Hence, balancing these two families to ensure regional stability became pivotal for the central government.

In the Ottoman Empire, relationships with the subjects were not determined solely by orders from the center. The complexity of appointing an administrator in such a small region demonstrates the intensity of the state's efforts to maintain stability. Indeed, the sectarian character of Mount Lebanon was a

significant factor in reaching appropriate political decisions backed by solid bonds. Nasib Jumblatt was one of the important actors who played a role in state-society relations due to his activities and political identity in the region. Therefore, understanding his political identity also helps in understanding the changing policies of Ottoman politics at different times. Highlighting past political dilemmas and societal relations may also shed significant light on the present day.

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DAB. Y.EE. 104-55
DAB. Y.EE. 104-55 /1
DAB. Y.EE. 104-55 /2

Druze Studies Journal

Article

Religious Unification, Regional Divergence: Exploring Multifaceted Linguistic Practices and Identities among the Israeli Druze and the Druze Community in the Golan Heights

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Abstract

This study delves into a comparative analysis of language and identity within two distinct Druze communities: those residing in the Golan Heights, who transitioned from Syrian to Israeli governance post the 1967 War, and their counterparts within Israel proper. Both communities find themselves situated as 'sandwiched' communities, with the Golan Druze caught between Israeli and Syrian nationalisms and the Israeli Druze positioned amid the dynamics of Israel and the Arabs. Given the fluid nature of collective identities, which are subject to continuous shaping by sociopolitical influences within and beyond state boundaries, this study focuses on two pivotal political debates in each community during the fieldwork period. The Israeli Druze community is primarily concerned with the Israeli-Nation State law controversy. Meanwhile, the Golan Heights Druze community is grappling with the intensifying and widely publicized speculation regarding secret negotiations between Assad's regime and Israel, which suggests that the Golan was sold to Israel rather than being a result of a 'lost war.' This study explores how these debates gradually shape the collective identities of the respective communities. The research illuminates how navigating between opposing forces leads to the emergence of novel national identities and linguistic variations within these 'sandwiched' contexts.

Keywords: *Undefined Identity, language, Druze, code-switching, Israel, Syria, Golan Heights, 'nation-state' law, Hadbawi.*

Introduction

Bucholtz and Hall (2004, 382) defined identity as 'an outcome of cultural semiotics, accomplished through the production of contextually relevant sociopolitical relations of similarity and difference, authenticity and inauthenticity, and legitimacy and illegitimacy.' Thus, identities extend beyond individual and group attributes; they also characterize situations, making identification an ongoing social and political process.

Identity work involves downplaying differences within groups that share an identity and accentuating distinctions between members within the group and those outside it. Frequently, as language reflects the semiotic processes of practice, indexicality, ideology, and performance, this manifestation of identity occurs through language. The deployment of specific linguistic features and styles symbolizes and iconically embodies a group's unique identity and way of existing in the world (ibid 2004).

Undoubtedly, numerous linguists and scholars specializing in identity emphasize the inherent connection between language and identity. Language plays a pivotal role in shaping identity, acting as the medium to represent various ethnic and nationalist perspectives (Bucholtz and Hall 2004). Identities are expressed in language through the categorizations and labels that individuals and collectives ascribe to themselves and others. They use specific speaking methods to indicate belonging and interpret linguistic cues (Joseph 2016).

According to Auer (2007, 2), collectivities are akin to unique quasi-beings that express their identities through distinctive linguistic features, employing language to establish and convey their identity. For instance, bilingual minorities may utilize language to establish a connection with their community's identity. This involves how bilingual individuals speak both majority and minority languages, incorporating various mixing and switching styles considered authentic and 'natural' representations of their identity. In essence, linguistic practices, which include choices among linguistic varieties and accessible languages within a community, not only express but also actively contribute to shaping and reshaping the identity of a collective.

Considering the interconnected nature of language, sociopolitical contexts, and identity, this study investigates the nexus between codeswitching, mixed varieties, relevant sociopolitical circumstances in the case study, and identity within the Druze communities in the Golan Heights and Israel. The research provides a comparative analysis focusing on language use, identity formation, and sociopolitical

influences within the Druze communities in the Golan Heights and Israel. Using theories and concepts from intersubjective contact linguistics, this paper illustrates how communities positioned as 'sandwiched' between contrasting influences forge novel national identities and linguistic variations.

The Israeli Druze and the Druze of the Golan Heights

The Druze people, known as Al-Muwaḥidūn (the Unitarians, or those who seek oneness), predominantly inhabit the Middle East, specifically in Lebanon, Syria, and Israel, with a scattered presence globally. Lacking a distinct homeland, the Druze express their allegiance to the state of residence by embracing its ideologies, affiliations, identity, and nationalism. Consequently, Israeli Druze adopt a sense of Israeli national consciousness, while Syrian Druze align themselves with Syrian nationalism. In unique cases, like in the Golan Heights, which transitioned from Syrian to Israeli control after the 1967 War, the situation becomes precarious, carrying profound implications and uncertainties for the community and its collective identity. Scholarly research has highlighted that the Druze community does not consistently adhere to a sentiment of non-resistance, particularly in instances of persecution or perceived disrespect. Numerous studies illustrate this phenomenon, showcasing instances such as the Druze rebellions against the Ottoman Empire and the French Mandate. Additionally, scholarly observations extend to more contemporary events, such as the recent Civil War in Syria, during which many Syrian Druze expressed opposition to the Bashar al-Assad regime (Betts 1988; Firro 1992; Talhamy 2012). This pattern underscores the complexity of the Druze response to external pressures and challenges the notion of unwavering non-resistance within the community.

The Druze community in Israel, inclusive of those in the Golan Heights, numbers 150,000, representing approximately 1.6% of Israel's total population. This substantial Druze population is distributed across 19 localities in Israel, with 13 having a Druze majority. In the remaining settlements, Druze coexist with Arab Christians and Muslims, forming the majority or minority in various proportions. Notably, in Druze settlements in the Golan Heights—Majdal Shams, Buq'ata, Masada, and Ein Qiniya—the Druze comprise the entire population, accounting for a total of 23,000 individuals (Central Bureau of Statistics, State of Israel 2023).

The Druze community in Israel has cultivated a distinctive political and national identity as part of the Israeli state's deliberate policy to differentiate between Israeli Druze and Arabs (Firro 2001; Halabi 2006). Druze-Jewish collaboration

reached a significant milestone during the War of Independence in 1948 when Druze individuals willingly enlisted in the Israeli Defense Force (IDF), aligning their efforts with the Jewish population against the Arabs. This collaboration culminated in forming the Druze unit within the IDF (Azrieli and Abu-Rukon, 1989; Firro, 1999; Gelber, 1995; Nisan, 2010).

In 1949, the Israeli army chose the Druze religious shrine, al-Nabi Shu'ayb, as the venue for its inaugural swearing-in ceremony. New Druze recruits pledged their allegiance to the Jewish state during this ceremony. Al-Nabi Shu'ayb's selection, with its religious significance as the father-in-law of the prophet Moses in Druze beliefs (Jethro in Judaism), symbolized a profound historical connection between the Druze community and the Jewish people. This gesture aimed to reinforce the shared heritage between the two communities (Firro 2001).

Simultaneously, the Israeli media, including radio and press, regularly employed the terms 'Druzes' and 'Druze community' to emphasize the distinctiveness of the Druze community from the broader Arab population in the country (Firro 2001). Subsequently, in 1956, conscription of Druze males into the IDF became mandatory. This historical progression underscores the evolving relationship between the Druze community and the State of Israel. Zeedan (2019) asserts that the state of Israel and the Druze achieved a positive peace, characterized by cooperation and integration, following their integration into the army.

In a significant move in 1962, Israel initiated a transformative measure in identity labeling for the Druze, altering their nationality on birth certificates and identity cards from Arab to Druze. This change, while legally maintaining Arab status for the Arab Christians and Muslims, marked a pivotal step. Furthermore, the Druze received an independent education system that stood apart from the Arab educational framework, fostering the development of a distinct 'Druze and Israeli' consciousness.

According to Firro (2001), during the early 1970s, deliberate initiatives were undertaken to instill an 'Israeli Druze consciousness' through education, countering a trend of 'Arabization' among Druze youth. This consciousness found expression in specialized citizenship education classes, reinforcing the Druze sense of belonging to the Israeli state. Additionally, special military service preparation programs and workshops enhanced the youth's commitment to and contribution to the Israeli state. The establishment of special days for both Druze and national ceremonies, the adoption of special symbols of the state of Israel, the use of Hebrew alongside Arabic in Druze schools, and textbooks in Hebrew further so-

lidified this process. Court and Abbas (2010) explored in detail the role of Druze high schools in shaping students' identities. Additionally, the linguistic landscape among the Druze communities has consistently shifted towards increased usage of Hebrew in various villages and towns (Isleem 2015).

This multifaceted process has positioned the Israeli Druze in a 'sandwiched' dynamic between Israel and the Arabs. Despite cultural and linguistic similarities with the Israeli Arab citizens, the Israeli Druze have, over time, developed a connection to Israel influenced by social, religious, historical, and political factors (Kheir, 2023).

As a testament to their integration into Israeli society, a significant number of Druze individuals predominantly identify themselves as Israeli Druze. Extensive research on the identity affiliations of Arabs and Druze in Israel (Amara and Schnell 2004; Halabi 2014; Kheir 2023) indicates that most Druze place significant importance on their religious identity and Israeli citizenship. Nisan (2010, 576) emphasizes that, for the Druze, embracing an Israeli identity is a distinctive communal marker, signifying that Israeli-ness encompasses not only Jews but also non-Jews. Additionally, Nisan (2010, 585) and Zeedan (2019) emphasize the divergence in political identification between the Druze and Israeli Arabs, highlighting voting patterns in Israeli elections. They support their claim that 'Druze vote for Jews, and Arabs vote for Arabs,' with evidence from voting behavior and party preferences. Exceptions exist, such as "The Arab-Druze Initiative Committee," which aligns with the Palestinian cause and opposes mandatory conscription of Druze in the Israeli Defense Force. Nevertheless, such groups remain marginal, failing to garner substantial support among the Israeli Druze. This is primarily because the majority of Druze do not perceive themselves as Palestinians, lack connections or ties to the Palestinian people, unlike the Arabs, and take actions against Palestinians as part of their duty in the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and other security services (Nisan 2010; Zeedan 2019).

The Druze community in the Golan Heights forms a distinct entity, exhibiting specific differences from the Israeli Druze in various aspects. These distinctions encompass cultural practices, customs, and habits (including dress code, exogamy practices, religious observances, and attitudes toward the consumption of alcoholic beverages, particularly among women), collective identity, secularism, and linguistic practices (Kheir, 2023). The paramount differentiator, however, lies in ideology. While the Israeli Druze have assimilated into Israel through historical collaborations with the Jewish community, compulsory military service, and

the adoption of state-related ideologies across education and other domains, the Druze of the Golan Heights maintain complex relations with Israel due to several sociohistorical factors, briefly outlined as follows.

Following the conclusion of the 1967 War, the Golan Heights, including the four Druze villages, transitioned from Syrian to Israeli control. It is essential to highlight that Seheta, a fifth smaller village, was demolished by Israel after the conclusion of the 1967 War (Alkhalili, Dajani, and Mahmoud, 2023). This geopolitical shift led to the creation of a new border between Syria and Israel, causing the separation of Druze families. By the end of 1981, the formal annexation of the Golan to Israel prompted the Knesset to apply Israeli law and regulations to the region. This decision, compelling the Golan Druze to acquire Israeli residence or citizenship, sparked unrest and a non-violent campaign against Israel. The Golan Druze religious leaders, influenced by pro-Syrian parties in the Golan and their relatives in Syria, issued threats of ostracism against those accepting Israeli identity cards and citizenship. Consequently, a majority of the Golan Druze at the time resisted, some willingly and others out of fear of social exclusion, even from receiving Israeli residence certificates (Kennedy 1984; Dana 2003).

Their objection stemmed from two primary factors. Firstly, the division of Druze families and fields created a situation where the Golan Druze faced pressure from the Syrians not to collaborate with Israeli authorities, fearing potential harm to their families and properties by the Syrian authorities. Secondly, the Golan Druze harbored concerns about the eventual return of the Golan Heights to Syrian rule. This fear compelled them to refrain from any form of identification with Israel, as such an act could brand them as 'traitors' in the eyes of the Syrians. This apprehension intensified after the 1973 War when Syria attempted to regain control of the Golan, leading the Golan Druze to display Syrian affiliation and distance themselves from Israel openly. The underlying fear also originated from precedents of the return of Israeli-occupied territories, discussions within the Israeli Cabinet about returning the Golan to Syria, statements from Israeli politicians suggesting tangible options for compromise on the Golan, and the broader context of Israeli-Syrian peace negotiations (Kennedy 1984; Dana 2003).

The Israeli Druze, headed by the Druze spiritual leader at the time, Shaykh Amin Tarif, tried to close the rift between the Golan Druze and the Israeli authorities but failed to do so as the Golan Druze explained that political circumstances forced them to act with extreme caution. Opposition to the Israeli move to grant them Israeli identity cards, implying Israeli citizenship, grew due to their

fear and uncertainties regarding their future. The entire community often shunned those who accepted them, resulting in only a few individuals taking advantage of the Israeli identification offer. Being caught between Syria and Israel—while both countries, in collaboration with local allies, had attempted to inculcate Syrian and Israeli national consciousness within the population through a variety of practices and discourses—many remained on the fence, while others attempted to cultivate an alternative form of national consciousness in the Golan (Kennedy 1984; Dana 2003; Phillips 2016). This alternative national consciousness arose mainly as a result of the Syrian state's chronic inability and unwillingness to recapture the Golan and an increasingly growing and publicized speculation that Assad's regime had conducted secret negotiations with Israel and had actually sold the Golan to Israel rather than 'lost a war.' Talks about this 'Golan secret deal' began around 2011 and continued to gain publicity as more Syrian army generals provided 'evidence' of the deal. Golan activists, therefore, called for the Golan Druze to detach their sense of belonging to the Syrian nation from their community's endorsement of Assad (Al Jazeera Arabic 2015; Phillips 2016).

In contemporary times, there has been a transformation for the Golan Druze, particularly for those without Israeli citizenship who maintain Israeli permanent residency. They now benefit from state privileges, and some claim to be undergoing a gradual 'Israelization' process. This evolution is evident in the assimilation of the younger generation, the adoption of a more Westernized lifestyle, an increasing number of individuals applying for and receiving Israeli citizenship, the permanent relocation to Israel by those studying and working there, and a linguistic shift in certain towns towards the predominance of Hebrew. Despite the occasional demonstrations that may still occur on the Syrian national holiday, many locals acknowledge these as merely 'acts of loyalty out of precaution.'

It is crucial to acknowledge that the Golan Heights has transitioned from a dictatorial regime to a democracy. The elders have deeply ingrained Syrian nationalism at both conscious and subconscious levels, and their love and loyalty to Syria remain undeniable. There have been varying degrees of success in passing this nationalism on to the next generations. Some of the participants in the current study have embraced it. In contrast, others have rejected their parents' doctrines, entering a new reality where they can distinguish between the oppressed lives their parents led and their freedom of choice. One participant wisely pointed out, 'There are always exceptional cases, on either extreme side of the dichotomy.'

Theoretical Approaches

Identity holds significant sway in various aspects of everyday life and has become a focal point in diverse fields of study. It originates from many sources: age, gender, race, sexual orientation, class, generation, institutional affiliation, geopolitical locale, religion, community, society, status, ethnicity, and nationality. Identity serves as a personal anchor in the world, establishing a connection between the individual and the society in which they live. Identities are dynamic, contested, and decentred. Individuals perceive themselves differently across time and social contexts, intertwined with power dynamics, and shaped by numerous forces that render their self-concept susceptible to change under different circumstances.

While individual identity tackles the question, 'Who am I?', collective identity delves into the matter of 'Who are we?' (Weedon 1996; Woodward 1997). Social forces and historical developments, spanning tribal, religious, family-based, racial, linguistic, ethnic, national, and civic dimensions, have been molded by collective identities throughout history. These identities continually shape and are shaped by evolving political and social forces within and beyond the state. In conflict scenarios, an ethnic group's collective identity can play a pivotal role in their interactions with other ethnic groups and the state, with the nature of the conflict intimately linked to identity dynamics.

However, given their fluid and contested nature, identities adapt in response to significant social forces, giving rise to new loyalties, groupings, identifications, and commitments. Consequently, they both influence and transform responses to sociopolitical changes (Rohana 1997).

Most experts conceptualize identities as nested, non-binary, cumulative, context-dependent, flexible, and often negotiated—frequently, indeed, negotiated, expressed, and organized through language. As such, linguistic processes lie at the heart of identity dynamics, where identity perceptions and constructions influence the deployment of linguistic resources. Given that language varieties and distinctions can demarcate the boundaries of ethnic belonging, diverse linguistic elements can be fashioned to distinguish individuals and communities. Language becomes a tool for individuals to convey aspects of their personal identity and a medium to construct, convey, and negotiate collective identities. In this sense, language can generate images of groups and communities (De Fina 2016).

Increased contact among people, and consequently among identities, has given rise to various linguistic varieties and resources that express and convey these identities. One prominent phenomenon in this context is codeswitching, which

involves spontaneous alternation between two or more languages. This alternation can occur either between sentences (inter-sentential), wherein a whole clause is produced in one language before switching to another, or within the same sentence, where elements of two languages coexist. However, a considerable debate exists regarding the classification and extent of labeling a particular language use as codeswitching (Kheir 2019).

Myers-Scotton (1997, 3) offers a more specific definition for code-switching, describing it as 'the selection by bilinguals or multilinguals of forms from an embedded variety (or varieties) in utterances of a matrix variety during the same conversation.' Here, the matrix language signifies the dominant language in the speech, while the embedded language plays a supplementary role, participating in speech production to a lesser extent. The matrix language establishes the morphosyntactic framework[2] of sentences involving code-switching, determining the order of morphemes,[3] and supplying the syntactically relevant elements in constituents containing morphemes from both languages.

Extensive research on codeswitching has revealed that different code-switchers within a community may exhibit distinct ways and styles of switching. This diversity has prompted scholars to distinguish between various types of codeswitching. Myers-Scotton (2002), for instance, identified two main types: classic and composite. In classic codeswitching, one language (the matrix/dominant language) furnishes the morphosyntactic frame, while the embedded (additional) language primarily contributes content morphemes, such as verbs, nouns, and expressions. Both participating languages contribute to the morphosyntactic frame in composite codeswitching, resulting in a composite (mixed) matrix language frame.

Differentiating between various types of codeswitching is essential for comprehending the diverse motivations, causes, and effects associated with codeswitching. Building on Eckert's (2004) performance and style theory, Kheir (2023) proposes considering codeswitching as a stylistic resource. Individuals positioned at different stances on conflict or political issues exhibit variability in how they select, combine, and situationally deploy codeswitching. According to Eckert (2004), style

[2] A morphosyntactic frame involves the way different components of a sentence fit together, including information about word forms, grammatical categories, and the overall syntactic structure. It helps describe the rules and patterns governing the combination of words in a language.

[3] Morphemes are the smallest meaningful units in languages. They can be words themselves or parts of words, such as prefixes, suffixes, and roots.

is not a fixed entity but a practice—an activity through which people create social meaning. Style is inherently dynamic and represents the visible manifestation of meaning.

Furthermore, as a deliberate and self-aware social display, performance involves stylization that highlights ideological associations (Bucholtz and Hall 2004). From this perspective, we can view code-switching as a form of stylization that manifests and accentuates sociopolitical identity (Kheir, 2023). Eckert (2004) asserts that the selection of variables in performance is based on the speaker's interpretation of meaning potential. Since "a stylistic move is to be put out into a community for the purpose of being interpreted, speakers select resources based on their potential comprehensibility in that community" (Eckert 2004, 44).

Hence, speakers and the community approach the use of code-switching with caution, viewing it as a reflection of a state identity dimension. Speakers conscientiously select, combine, and situationally deploy codeswitching; in some instances, they may modify it to align with their own ideology and the community's expectations (Kheir, 2023). According to Eckert (2004), prestige and stigma have emerged as primary social meanings linked to variables. This emphasis prompts individuals to strive for prestige and avoid stigma, influencing how speakers manage style to invoke a particular identity or establish distance.

An alternative model by Irvine and Gal (2000) has detailed a linguistic ideology process known as erasure. This process involves elements going unnoticed, being explained away, or, in extreme cases, eradicating elements that do not align with the ideological scheme. To eliminate the perceived threat, one must either ignore, transform, or act against 'problematic' elements. Irvine and Gal (2000) have also identified another semiotic process called iconization. This process transforms the sign relationship between linguistic features and the social image they are linked to. Linguistic features thus become the iconic ideological index of a social group's essence.

Given that code-switching has the potential to denote a state identity or a mixed identity, individuals seeking to distance themselves from that specific identity may perceive it as a stigmatized variant to avoid or, more radically, a variant to actively oppose. Conversely, those aiming to highlight that identity may embrace codeswitching as their iconic style (Kheir, 2023). Myers-Scotton asserted in her Markedness Model (Myers-Scotton, 1993) that unmarked (default) codeswitching may serve as an index of intergroup harmony, while marked (non-default) codeswitching may indicate conflict and tension. Consequently, little unmarked

codeswitching is anticipated in places where languages symbolize intergroup conflict or considerable tension.

Furthermore, Bucholtz and Hall (2004) articulate analogous concepts in their model Tactics of Intersubjectivity, which delineates the relational dimensions of identity categories, practices, and ideologies. The model encompasses three pairs of tactics related to the interconnected concepts central to identity—markedness, essentialism, and institutional power. The first pair, adequation and distinction, involves the pursuit of socially recognized sameness between individuals or groups either by setting aside potentially salient differences (adequation) or by emphasizing differences (distinction).

Adequation serves as a means to preserve community identity amidst cultural shifts, enabling bilingual speakers to 'locate themselves simultaneously within two different identity frames by syncretically combining elements of each language into a single sociolinguistic system' (Bucholtz and Hall 2004, 383). Adequation often forms the basis for political organization and alliance, either by building coalitions across lines of difference or collapsing such boundaries for politically motivated strategic essentialism, creating a shared identity as a social achievement.

Distinction, however, underscores salient differences rather than erasing them. It highlights identity differentiation by resisting the assimilating forces of modernity and the nation-state. Hence, 'speakers of minority or unofficial languages often elaborate linguistic differences between their own language and the language of the state (Bucholtz and Hall 2004, 384). While distinction typically operates in a binary manner, constructing social identities as oppositional may facilitate a process wherein groups establish an alternative to either pole of the dichotomy.

The second pair of tactics, authentication and denaturalization, correspondingly involves the construction of a genuine or credible identity and an identity deemed non-authentic. These tactics involve rewriting linguistic and cultural history and repositioning speakers of a national language as more 'authentic' to the historical workings of the nation-state. In this context, language plays a role in nationalist identity formation by imparting unity and cohesion to the language speakers (ibid 2004).

When nationalistic rhetoric authenticates the identity of a language and its speakers, the linguistic variety turns into an index of ways of being and belonging to the nation-state. Consequently, individuals may convey multiple ethnic, nationalist, and political stances through their linguistic practices.

The third pair of tactics, authorization and illegitimate, involves speakers attempting, respectively, to legitimize particular identities through co-legitimating an institutional power or authority or, conversely, to suppress or withdraw such identities by removing or denying structural power. In this context, legitimation can function as a mode of resistance to the state or the dominant authority. At the same time, authorization entails invoking language in ways recognized and sanctioned by the state (ibid, 2004).

This study primarily examined conversational, interview, and survey data by applying relevant theories and concepts. It explored both micro and macro-level aspects of language and identity, drawing insights from the abovementioned theories of language and identity contact and the field of sociolinguistics.

Data, methodology, and examples

The participants in this study consist of 40 individuals from various Druze and Arab/Druze mixed villages and towns in Israel (50%) and the four distinct Druze towns in the Golan Heights (50%). All participants are multilingual speakers, demonstrating high proficiency in both Arabic and Hebrew. The gender distribution among participants is uneven, with 23 females and 17 males. The age range of participants spans from 25 to 55 years.

This study derived its data from various datasets recorded in 2019 and 2020. These datasets included recordings of naturally occurring conversations (conducted without the researcher's presence), questionnaires, and interviews. All conversations and interviews were audio-recorded in different Druze and mixed Druze/Arab towns and villages in Israel, as well as in the four Druze towns in the Golan Heights. Each recording lasted 60 to 90 minutes.

After the recordings, the researcher administered questionnaires to gather information about identification, subjective attitudes towards codeswitching, identity, and affiliations. The questionnaires featured a set of choices and an option for participants to provide their responses. The researcher recorded two to three closely related participants (friends, relatives, colleagues, etc.) at a time. The researcher handed the recording device to the participants without any mention of codeswitching or language styles. After the conversations, the researcher returned to collect the device, distributed questionnaires for completion, left the room again, and returned solely to collect the completed questionnaires. This approach aimed to minimize the researcher's impact on the nature of the conversations, codeswitching, mixing styles, and participants' responses to the questionnaire.

The researcher conducted interviews after the recordings, asking participants about their self-identification, group affiliations, collective identities, and their personal perspectives on their relationship with the state of Israel. In the case of the Golan Druze, discussions also encompassed their connection to and perceptions of Syria. The researcher delved deeper into two major political debates prevalent within their communities at the time of the fieldwork. Sharing the same ethnic background and L1 as the participants, the researcher provided questionnaires in both Arabic and Hebrew, allowing participants to choose, add comments, and amend for their own comprehension and self-expression.

Subsequently, the study compared the objective data from spontaneous recordings to the participants' subjective responses in the questionnaires and open-ended interviews. Additionally, the examination extended to the correlation between sociopolitical identity and specific linguistic practices such as codeswitching, mixing, and language preference. The present study predominantly features participant statements reflecting their perspectives, self-expression, experiences, feelings, perceptions, identification, sense of belonging, and affiliations, presented in their own words.

Language and Identity Dynamics among the Druze of the Golan Heights: Navigating Classic to Composite Codeswitching and the Evolution of a Collective 'Undefined' Identity Toward a Proto-National 'Hadbawi/Julani' Identity

According to Bucholtz and Hall (2004, 372), the unmarking of powerful identities is shaped by various supra-local ideologies, with the process occurring at the local level, where 'unmarked identities may be reproduced, challenged, and reinscribed with identity markings.' Therefore, this study explores how the speculation surrounding the 'Syrian Israeli secret Golan deal,' which revolves around the idea that the Golan was sold to Israel rather than being a result of a 'lost war,' influenced the consciousness of the Golan Heights participants and its impact on their collective identity. Drawing from performance and style theory (Eckert 2004), Kheir (2023) proposes viewing codeswitching as a stylistic resource wherein individuals with diverse positions on conflict/political issues display variability in how they select, combine, and deploy it situationally.

It is noteworthy that the Golan Druze experience less language contact compared to their Israeli Druze counterparts since, unlike the latter, they do not serve in the Israeli army and mainly work in their own region. Following Kheir

(2023), the codeswitching scale's levels were defined as light, moderate/average, and heavy. Light codeswitching is characterized predominantly by borrowings and monolexemic switching; average codeswitching involves classic codeswitching; heavy codeswitching encompasses intensive codeswitching approaching convergence and composite codeswitching. The data yielded five categories**,** from which five participants were chosen to be representative, one for each category:

a) 'Without Citizenship/Without Nationality,' with Average Codeswitching (15%)
b) 'Druze Including the Israeli Component, Excluding the Syrian Component,' ranging from Average to High Codeswitching (15%)
c) A 'Salient Syrian Identity Component,' with Light Codeswitching (25%)
d) 'Unknown/Undefined,' ranging from Average to High Codeswitching (35%)
e) A 'Salient Israeli Identity Component,' ranging from High Codeswitching to Predominantly Hebrew (10%)

Most interviewees underscored the 'Julani' (Golani) identity component, with some expressing it directly and most indirectly. The speech data from most Druze participants in the Golan Heights predominantly revealed classic codeswitching with instances of composite codeswitching. This is evident in Examples (1)– (4) through incorporating Hebrew content morphemes and expressions, while Arabic serves as the matrix language and the primary source of relevant morphemes. Hebrew, functioning as the embedded language in this data, contributes content morphemes and embedded language expressions that align with the matrix language frame model (Myers-Scotton 1997; Myers-Scotton 2002), maintaining its role as an embedded language.

Example (1) is excerpted from the discourse of a male participant in his 30s who identifies as an "individual without citizenship" and views his identity as "undefined." The participant stated that he grew up in an environment that voiced an issue of a struggle with a 'sense of belonging'; however, he felt that this issue was not a local issue but rather a global one, or, in his words, 'the whole world suffers from a sense of belonging, and the next step for humanity is a life without national belonging.' When asked about Syria, this participant said he followed the public's belief in the conception according to which Syria had a secret agreement with Israel by which 'the Syrian authorities sold the Golan to Israel and that all the signs,

according to his own experience and the stories of the elders who lived throughout the duration of the war, alongside recent testimonies of Syrian soldiers and commanding generals who took part in the war, prove that the theory is grounded in reality.' He also expressed his wish for the Golan to 'never go back [to Syria], ever.' According to the participant, 'the public opinion is very powerful in the Golan, and it is a composite of highly educated individuals and those who work down [in Israel].' This participant asserted that the public opinion had successfully promoted the collective undefined identity among the Golan Druze, leading to the point that one of the popular bars in Majdal Shams was called 'Undefined' and later renamed 'Why' by the new owners as a concept of 'why do we need identity at all, what for, who cares?'

In terms of language practices, the participant naturally integrated Hebrew elements into his speech, viewing language as unrelated to identity. His codeswitching style was primarily classic, involving the insertion of content morphemes and expressions from Hebrew. There were a good number of instances of a composite, such as in Example (1), where he inflected the Arabic habitual pronominal clitic *b-* to the Hebrew future verb *yestadr-ú* 'get along', which is an indication of a composite since it denotes a mixed imperfective form of Arabic and Hebrew tenses. In Arabic, the equivalent would be *b-yetdabar-ū* 'get along,' while, in Hebrew, the correct form would be *mestadr-ím* 'get along.' Additionally, the speaker inserted monolexemic switches in the form of nouns, such as *zkhoyót* 'rights'; discourse markers, as in *bekhlál* 'at all'; and the expression *ló kayám* 'non-existent.' Hebrew elements are underlined in the transcriptions as well as their glosses; other elements are from Arabic, and morphemes under discussion appear in bold.

(1) *men nahet inno aākhth-in* **zkhoyót** *mish aākhth-in*
zkhoyót bekhlál *hāi esh-shi* ***ló***
with regards to that take-PRS-1PL **rights** not take-PRS-1PL
rights at all this the-thing **not**
kayám *'en-na lēsh laenno wein mathuti-na en-nās hāi elli*
hon ***b-yestadr-ú***
exist at-us why because where put-PRS-1PL the-people this that
here **FUT-get along-3PL**

'In terms of acquiring or not acquiring rights, that does not apply to us at all because we, the people here, will get along anywhere, anyway.'

Example (2) is extracted from the speech of a female participant in her 50s, who was born when the Golan was still under Syrian rule but came under Israeli control when she was very young. She expressed that Syrian affiliation is not a part of her consciousness but rather that of her parents. She stated, "Other than being historically Syrian, it is completely alien to me." She continued:

"My parents say we are Syrian, but I do not have any ties to the place. I do not know anything about it other than the destruction we see on TV, and I do not want to be a part of it. I feel very scared to live in a place where it is not safe, and I would choose to stay only here [in Israel]. I am happy in my own place. I am a citizen [of Israel], giving my duties to and receiving benefits from the state. Do I feel completely Israeli? No. Do I feel Syrian? No. There is some sense of bewilderment. I do not have a sense of belonging to Syria, nor do I feel completely Israeli. I have almost fully assimilated in Israel in terms of work, education, social ties, etc., but Israel has this discrimination of first-class and second-class citizens, with the Jews being first-class and everyone else classified as second-class. However, I do unequivocally perceive myself as a first-class citizen. I respect this state, and this state respects us; this is the place I live in, and I belong to my nation—here, to my land, to my town, to Majdal Shams, to my home, to my life. However, the fear [of the Golan returning to Syrian control] is always resonant, so we are on the fence, uncertain about our future and our destiny."

When asked about self-identification, the participant asserted that, above all, she identified as a human being, not tied to any specific geography or individuals, expressing, "In our core definition, we do not really know where we are, undefined." Regarding the increasing suspicion about the Israeli Syrian deal theory, she commented:

"We know for sure that it is true since my parents said [Syrian authorities] told us that Quneitra fell when Quneitra had not fallen yet. The Quneitra has been sold, all the signs show that [the speculation of selling the Golan] is true."

She seamlessly incorporated numerous Hebrew elements into her speech in her linguistic practices, maintaining a positive attitude towards Hebrew and code-switching. She emphasized the significant role of language in shaping one's identity and expressed that using Hebrew elements in her daily speech felt natural, driven by comfort and assimilation. Her code-switching style predominantly adhered to the classic type, frequently using Hebrew nouns, verbs, and expressions. Additionally, there were instances of composite codeswitching, exemplified in Example (2), where she combined the Arabic habitual pronominal clitic "*b-*" with the

Hebrew future verb "*yeshtalev*" and 'assimilate.' This blending indicates a composite style, reflecting a mix of Arabic and Hebrew tenses in a unified imperfective form. In Arabic, the equivalent would be *b-yenexret*, while in Hebrew, the correct form would be *meshtalev*.

Moreover, the use of the mixed Determiner Phrase (DP) construction (Arabic definite article prefixed to a Hebrew noun), as seen in "*el-shinúi*" (the change) and "*el-ʦa'ad*" (the step), further indicates a composite style. According to Kheir (2022), the construction's uniqueness lies in representing a mixture of the two languages in one combined DP and in changing the intrinsic rule of prefixing. While both Arabic and Hebrew have definite articles—*al-* or *el-* in Arabic and *ha-* in Hebrew—which are typically prefixed to nouns and adjectives, there is a notable difference in pronunciation consistency. In contrast to Hebrew, in which the article has consistent pronunciation, the *l* in the Arabic article maintains its original pronunciation unless it is prefixed to a word beginning with a sun letter (t, θ (th), d, ð (th), r, z, s, sh, $s^ʕ$, $d^ʕ$, $t^ʕ$, $z^ʕ$, l, n), in which case it assimilates. However, mixed DPs violate the assimilation constraints. For instance, in Example (2), the assimilation rule was applied when prefixing the Arabic definite article "el-" to an Arabic noun beginning with the sun letter 's' (siyase), forming "es-siyase" (the politics) instead of *el-siyase. Conversely, when prefixed to a Hebrew noun beginning with a sun letter 'sh' (shinúi), the assimilation rule was violated, and instead of "esh-shinúi" (the change), "el-shinúi" was used. The speaker also inserted monolexemic switches, such as the Hebrew adverb "kvár" (already). It appears that the speaker was following the process of adequation (Bucholtz and Hall 2004, 383) as a means "to locate [herself] simultaneously within two different identity frames by syncretically combining elements of each language into a single sociolinguistic system."

(2) *el-wahad* ***b-yeshtalev*** *aāni lamma 'melt toar rishón w-'melt toar shení* ***kvár***
the-one **FUT-integrate** I when did degree first and-did degree second **already**
aāni 'melt ha ***el-shinúi*** *ya'ni aāni bd-it* ***b-el-ʦa'ad*** *w-ha behem-ni ktir*
I did this **the-change** meaning I start-PST-1SG **in-the-step** and-this important-1SG a lot

el-tsa'ad *et-ta'limi* *pakhót siyasi* *laenno* ***es-siyase***
bhes *masaleh fiya-sh haq w-'adl*
the-step the-educational less political because **the-politics**
1SG-PRS-feel interests have-not right and-justice.

"The individual assimilates; when I pursued my first and second degrees, I had already embarked on that transformation. It is significant to me, focusing on the educational aspect rather than the political one. I believe politics is driven by self-interests, lacking fairness and justice."

Example (3) is extracted from a female participant in her 40s, born after the Golan came under Israeli control. Notably, the participant's parent was a pro-Syrian activist during what they referred to as 'the war of identities' in 1982, triggered by Israel's attempt to confer Israeli citizenship to the Golan Druze, a move resisted by some, including the participant's parent. Consequently, the participant did not possess Israeli citizenship but held permanent residency status. Describing the event, she expressed it as "an act of fear and resistance. For us, as **Syrians**, it felt like our nationality was being taken away. While some refused to accept it, others did so out of fear for themselves and their children, as their children would automatically receive it. We haven't accepted it; we have permanent residency. I am one of the mothers who got condemned because my [parent] discarded the identity card and stepped on it. My [parent] was one of the activists." (emphasis in original)

When questioned about the suspicion surrounding the Israeli Syrian deal theory, the participant commented, "We hear about it all the time, but it is not certain, not 100% proven. You can't enter this politics, and you can't believe it." Regarding identification, the participant expressed a profound and lasting sense of bewilderment, stating, "We are **Syrians** in an occupied territory; no one can deny that. It is true that we live here in Israel, but one cannot say I am Arabian-Arabian, nor can he say I am Israeli. I was born in Israel; however, I love Syria. I am Syrian, Hadʿbawiye ['Heightetian', from Hadʿabe, 'highland', referring to 'the Heights']. I do not say I am Israeli; the Golan is Syrian. However, we are not traitors. We do not stand with Israel against Syria, nor do we stand with Syria against Israel, but there are ever exceptional cases." (emphasis in original)

When discussing Syrian oppression, she remarked, "It is true that, in Syria, you are not allowed to say, 'I am Druze, Muslim, or Christian'; you are only allowed to say, 'I am Syrian Arab.' This, in a way, although it seems oppressive and imposes an identity upon a nation, is a sign of equity."

After some thought, she added, "I am neither Syrian nor Israeli. I cannot say I am a 100% [Syrian] national because I work with the state, I receive payslips, and I receive benefits from the National Insurance Institute of Israel for me and my children. Whoever wants to say I am a free Syrian Arab should not receive benefits from the state. So, I cannot say I am Syrian, nor can I say I am Israeli. I live in Israel; in fact, I live in the Heights, meaning not Syrian and not Israeli. If I were to state my identity, I will unequivocally say I am Hadbawiyye, Julaniyye [Golani]. I am a Hadabe native."

The participant's final statement about her identity immediately sparked an inevitable comparison to the situation in Alsace, which has moved back and forth between German and French control. While both the Germans and the French tried to instill their own nationalism in the locals, the people established their own distinct Alsatian identity, which was neither French nor German. When the participant was told about the situation in Alsace, she said, "That is exactly the case here, exactly the same case here, for sure." This is where Bucholtz and Hall's (2004) process of distinction can be applied—not in the sense of operating in a binary manner, establishing a dichotomy in which social identities are constructed as oppositional or contrastive, but in facilitating a process in which groups establish an alternative to either pole of the dichotomy, with Hadʕbawi/Julani being the alternative to either Syrian or Israeli.

Regarding her linguistic practices, the participant integrated very few Hebrew elements into her speech, held a negative attitude towards Hebrew, and did not believe there was any link between language and identity. Her speech yielded only a few instances of codeswitching and borrowings, such as in Example (3), where she used borrowings mainly from the technology domain, introducing many Hebrew borrowings primarily because they represented new concepts filling a linguistic void. Notably, the noun mat'en and adjective sbeir 'spare' were phonologically adapted into Arabic, with the former pronounced matén and the latter, spér, in Hebrew. According to Kheir (Kheir 2023), when a community or an individual is less socially and politically identified with the state or dominant culture, they tend to phonologically adapt 'code-2' into 'code-1'. In this participant's case, codeswitching is the marked mode of communication, reflecting a stronger affinity to Syrian nationalism. It seems that the processes of erasure (Irvine and Gal 2000) and illegitimation (Bucholtz and Hall 2004) are applicable to such participants, both in language and identity. The state's effort to instill Israeli nationalism and the pervasive Hebrew influence upon their language is rendered invisible, suppressed, or

denied. Since code-switching has the power to denote a state identity or a mixed identity, it is presumably viewed as a stigmatized variant to be avoided by those who wish to distance themselves from that specific identity.

(3) *badd-ek fi* ***mat'en*** *thani fik-i tjib-i battariyye* ***sbeir***
itthalla ma'k-i aw btisal-i
want-PRS-2SGF there is ***charger*** *second can-2SGF bring battery* ***spare***
stay with-2SGF or ask-PRS-2SGF
hinaki ba'refe-sh el-iphone btiji battariyt-o bti-tghayyar-sh gheir la-tghayr-i
el-makhshir *fi iphon-at heik*
there know-not the-iphone come battery-its PASS-change-not other until-change-2SGF
the-device *there are iphone-PL like it*

'If you'd like, you can grab an additional charger, consider bringing along a spare battery, or inquire there. I'm not sure, but some iPhones have non-replaceable batteries, requiring a device replacement for a battery change.'

Example (4) is extracted from the discourse of a male participant in his late 20s. Expressing an unknown or undefined identity, the participant asserted that "our nation is not Syria; we are way before Syria, native to this region, and believed to be originally Armenian." This belief aligns with research in Nature, which explored the genetic connections between Israeli Druze and various populations, revealing a notable affinity with ancient Armenian and Turkish ancestry (Marshall, Das, Pirooznia, and Elhaik 2016). Their DNA study highlighted a significant prevalence of ancient Armenian ancestry, distinguishing the Druze from other Levantine populations. The participant emphasized their connection to the land, stating, "If they tell us the borders are open, go to Syria, we will say 'no way'; this is our land, and the land is here. Syria can come, as can Mozambique, America, England, Jordan—we are here, and you are all welcome; we will not move away from our land."

The participant expressed the prevalent confusion among people regarding identity and belonging, remarking, "Whenever I am overseas, and someone asks me, 'Where are you from?' Do you know how many things flow in my head? It is really very perplexing; some say, 'from Israel,' some say, 'from Syria,' others say, 'Golan Heights,' then they ask, 'What is the Golan Heights?' and you start explaining."

The participant shared that the locals had grappled with issues of collective identity and nationality for a while until they concluded, "We do not need an identity, why would we need one? What is identity anyway? 'Undefined' or 'lacking identity' is the solution." While telling the researcher about some Golan history and stories, the participant raised the Golan deal theory entirely on his own, unprompted, providing details of testimonies from locals who were active during the war. He stated, "I believe that the Golan has been sold, and I have personally heard the true story of what had actually happened there from a local who was an active soldier in the Syrian army back then. Everything he said made perfect sense, and all the signs show that it is true and the whole world knows that they declared that the Golan had fallen 17 hours before the Israelis even got there and that the Syrian authorities had publicly executed the Syrian soldiers who refused the order to retreat and go back!"

He believed this speculation affected the locals' collective identity in a way he could not explain. Regarding his language practices, he frequently integrated Hebrew elements into his speech, describing them as automatic for him and expressing uncertainty about whether there is a link between language and identity. He codeswitched frequently, incorporating numerous Hebrew content morphemes and expressions. Several instances of a composite were observed, including his frequent use of the mixed determiner phrase (DP) construction, as in Example (4). Similar to Example (2), the assimilation rule of the definite article "el" was violated when prefixing the Arabic definite article "el-" to a Hebrew noun beginning with a sun letter, as seen in "b-el-tekhat-év-otí" ('in the CC'), where normally the "l" would assimilate into "t" and be pronounced as "b-et-tekhat-év-otí." The uniqueness of this mixed DP construction is discussed in detail in Example (2) above.

(4) *hati-hin fish ma'-i wrāq* ***la-l-medpeset*** *kil ma iysīr ma'-i belek*
give-IMP-them not have-1PS papers **for-the-printer** each that become with-me part
ba'mal sriká ***w-ʕa-l-meil*** *el-ek w-il-ha*
b-el-tekhat-év-otí *'ashan t-kūn heiy* ***b-el-'enyaním***
will do scan **and-to-the-mail** to-2SGF and-to-3SGF
in-the-CC so that FUT-be she **in-the-matters**

"Pass them to me; I currently lack documents for my printer. Once I obtain some, I will scan and forward them to your email, with a copy sent to her for awareness."

Example (5) features a female participant in her 40s who permanently moved to Israel in her early 20s, seeking what she termed "a genuine life." According to her, this life involved making personal choices in thought rather than being dictated what to think. During the 'war of identities' as a child, where activists propagated Syrian nationalism and hostility towards Israel, she experienced what she described as "brainwashing" and sought to distance herself from that narrative. She preferred anonymity, concealing any trace of her Hadabe or Druze identity. Even today, she remains guarded about revealing her background and avoids discussing it further. Rebellious from a young age, she questioned the narratives presented to her, looking for a more neutral, quiet, and story-free environment, aspiring to adopt aspects of Western culture similar to Israelis. She stated, "It really upset me, so I wanted to get away from all that; I wanted to get lost in a city where no one knows who I am, what I am...I am still deeply affected by it and, until today, I do not like anyone to know who I am or what I am. I usually hide any trace of identity, whether it is Hadabe or Druze. Nothing. I only say if I have to once, and I refuse to talk about it any further. I was always rebellious; I was the child that went according to 'not what he has been told,' so I have never believed their stories. True, I have felt for them, humanely speaking, but I have always looked for a better place, more neutral, more quiet, more 'lacking stories', 'lacking miseries', so I wanted to be like [Israelis], like them is the Western culture."

In her analogy, the participant likened the situation to a confused child of divorced parents, unsure of which parent is right or what is better for them—here or there. She believed this confusion gave rise to a new generation, markedly different from the past. According to her, this generation is highly accomplished, driven to progress, eager to be distinct, and even adopts a different language. Drawing a comparison with the situation 35 years ago when the region faced significant challenges, she noted that the current generation is remarkably Westernized, secular, and highly educated, with professionals in engineering and high-tech fields. Crucially, they are entirely detached from the Syrian theme, identifying neither as Syrians nor Israelis. Instead, they wholeheartedly embrace an 'undefined' or 'lacking' identity, demonstrating a lack of concern for the broader issue and having fully assimilated into their chosen way of life. In her words: "this creates a new gener-

ation, a completely different one, and we can already see this. They are extremely accomplished, desiring to advance, to be different, to be dissimilar, even speaking a different language, everything is different… if we compare the situation 35 years ago, in which the place was completely in dire straits, and now, they are top-Westernised, secular, highly educated, engineers, high-tech experts, etc., and they are completely detached from the whole Syrian theme. They are neither Syrians nor Israelis. They have completely embraced the 'undefined' or 'lacking' identity, and they do not even bother themselves with the whole issue. They do not care, and they have fully assimilated."

When informed about the parallel with the situation in Alsace, she affirmed, 'absolutely the same thing here, it's all about the need to be distinctive, entirely different from everything else.' Regarding her connection to Syria, she expressed that aside from it being her parents' place of origin, she had no ties to it—no emotional connection, no affiliation, and no sense of belonging. In contrast, Israel had a significant place for her:

"I am captivated by the West. I love democracy. I love witnessing progress. I am immensely proud of this state, and I truly love Israel. It is sufficient for me that it is a democratic state; it respects me and my children, and we are all very proud to be Israelis."

When questioned about the Israeli Syrian Golan deal theory, she initially maintained a neutral stance but later added, 'there are very high chances that there was a deal there, I tend to believe the conspiracy theory.' However, she remained uncertain about the potential impact on collective identity. Linguistically, her speech predominantly featured Hebrew, with minimal switches to Arabic, as exemplified in Example (5). This linguistic pattern remained consistent throughout the interview. The participant, displaying a deep appreciation and extremely positive attitude toward Hebrew compared to Arabic, proudly acknowledged undergoing a complete language shift into Hebrew. She firmly believed in the role of language in shaping one's identity. By applying Bucholtz and Hall's (2004) process of authentication, she aligned both language and identity, adopting the national identity (Israeli) and using the national language (Hebrew) as a means of authentication to signify ways of being and belonging to the nation-state.

(5) *lákhats lákhats aní gám óved-et me-a-bayet óvedet me-shama óvedet kól a-zmán*
pressure pressure I also work-1SGF from-the-house work-1SGF from-there work-1SGF all the-time

*shishí lakhútṣ **fi** tkufá **qal-et-lī** a-yaldá má má*
kará gám ba-bayét
Friday stressed **there is** period **tell-3SGF-me** the-girl what
what happened also at-home
át keìlú kól a-yóm b-a-makhshév gám át megi'-á meukhár
má kará
you that is all the-day on-the-computer also you get-2SGF late
what happened
*má la-'asót **kill-u** kashé zé má shi-ṣaríkh shúm davár ló kál*
what to-do **all-it** hard this what that-needed no thing no easy

"The pressure is immense; I work both at home and elsewhere consistently, even on Fridays. There was a moment when my child questioned, "What's happening? You're always on your computer, arriving home late. What's going on?" It's challenging; I tackle what needs to be done, and nothing comes easy."

Applying Intersubjective Tactics to the Golan Heights Druze

The conversational data, complemented by additional interview data and surveys, prompted a natural comparison to the situation in Alsace. Alsace, a region that has shifted between German and French control, experienced attempts by both Germans and the French to instill their respective nationalism and language. However, the people of Alsace managed to forge their unique proto-national Alsatian identity and language, distinct from French and German.

Before the emergence of the 'Golan secret deal' theory, the Syrian dimension held significant prominence in the collective identity of the Golan Druze. However, since the theory gained traction in 2011, the salience of the Syrian component appears to have gradually diminished. Consequently, a new collective identity is taking shape. By employing intersubjectivity tactics (Bucholtz & Hall 2004), it becomes apparent that, through the tactic of adequation, the Druze of the Golan Heights are fostering political organization and alliances, temporarily setting aside potentially divisive differences between pro-Israeli and pro-Syrian voices. They are consolidating a unified, seemingly denaturalized, and undefined identity using the tactic of distinction.

This process of distinction, establishing an alternative to either pole of the dichotomy, combined with authentication, is giving rise to a new authentic proto-national 'Hadbawi/Jūlani' identity that transcends both Syrian and Israeli affiliations. Simultaneously, a new dialect is evolving, distinct from Arabic and Hebrew,

known as Hadbawi/Jūlani. Preliminary analysis indicates that this emerging dialect features a blend of English and Hebrew elements and structures, region-specific terminology and slang, a lenition process affecting Arabic emphatic phonemes ([tˤ], [sˤ], [dˤ], [zˤ]), merging with their non-emphatic counterparts ([t], [s], [d], [ð]), and emphatic vowel lengthening. These structures, among others yet to be thoroughly explored, contribute to the distinctiveness of the Hadˤbawi/Jūlani dialect. As authorization can also function as a local practice to contest or confirm dominant forms of power, this linguistic variety may confer an 'alternative legitimacy' to its speakers.

Language and Identity among Israeli Druze: Transitioning from Composite Codeswitching to a Mixed Variety and the Emergence of a Collective 'Israeli Druze' Identity Towards a 'Druze' Ethnonational Identity

Since collective identity is dynamic and affects and is affected by the evolving political and social forces within the state and outside it (Rohana 1997,4), this study investigates the impact of Israel's controversial nation-state law on the political consciousness of Israeli Druze participants and its potential influence on collective identity. Criticized for its perceived racism and undemocratic nature, the nation-state law diminishes minority rights and downgrades the status of the Arabic language in Israel. Notably, all Druze representatives in the Knesset, except Ayub Kara, voted against the Nation-state Law, and some high-ranking military and police officers resigned in protest, expressing their disappointment and demotivation to serve the country further. The majority of participants in this study identified themselves as Israeli Druze, considering it as their collective identity, which aligns with similar findings in studies by Amara and Schnell (2004), Halabi (2006; 2014), and Kheir (2023), which show that a majority of the Druze participants place significant importance on both their religious identity (Druze) and their Israeli citizenship. However, a recurring element for almost all participants was the Druze identity component, extending beyond the religious/ethnic sense. In terms of linguistic practices, recent studies (Kheir 2019; Kheir 2022) have indicated that the language of the Israeli Druze community is undergoing convergence and composite matrix language formation, resulting in a mixed variety based on Myers-Scotton's matrix language turnover hypothesis (Myers-Scotton1998; Myers-Scotton 2002) and Auer's (Auer 1998; Auer 1999) and Myers-Scotton's (Myers-Scotton 2003) models of mixed languages. This aligns with the present study, where the mixed variety was observed to be the predominant unmarked mode of

communication. Notably, it was observed that codeswitching and mixing were much more widespread among the Israeli Druze compared to the Israeli Arabs, who predominantly utilized borrowings and mono-lexemic switches (Kheir 2023; Kheir forthcoming). The data were categorized into five main groups, from which five participants were sampled respectively:

a) 'Salient Israeli identity component,' with unmarked mixed variety (15%)
b) 'Israeli Druze,' with unmarked mixed variety (35%)
c) 'Druze/Arab,' ranging from average codeswitching to marked mixed variety (10%)
d) 'Druze,' with unmarked mixed variety (25%)
e) 'Israeli Druze,' with a predominantly Hebrew speech (15%).

Example (6) is extracted from the dialogue of a female participant in her 30s. This participant identified strongly as Israeli, emphasizing that this sentiment goes beyond mere citizenship—it embodies her profound sense of belonging and love for the state:

"I feel Israeli at my core being. It mirrors my identity and upbringing; it feels like my inherent way of being. The Druze community has consistently maintained a unique connection with the state, feeling an inseparable bond."

When questioned about her perspective on Israel's controversial nation-state law, which has provoked significant disappointment and anger, particularly among Druze and Arabs who perceive it as racist and undemocratic, she expressed her lack of understanding about the controversy, asserting that it reflects a pre-existing reality. Israel, she noted, has always been predominantly a Jewish state, and the inferior status of Arabic to Hebrew existed even before the law's enactment:

"I don't see what the fuss is all about. It's just putting into law something that has always been the case. Israel has always been a Jewish state, which, in my opinion, is excellent; at least it is a democracy. The Druze in Israel live in a much better situation than those in Arab countries, that's for sure. The fact that Israel is a Jewish state is what distinguishes it from Arab countries. I'm grateful to be here, and this law hasn't changed anything for me. In my view, people have just misunderstood it, that's all."

The participant, whose speech seamlessly blended Arabic and Hebrew elements, held a highly favorable view of Hebrew. She considered the mixed variety to be her default mode of communication:

"When I'm abroad and engage with people from Arab countries, attempting to speak pure Arabic, I find myself very aware of my speech. It's like speaking a foreign language as if I'm making an effort because the mixture is my natural way of speaking. It flows effortlessly and comes naturally to me. That's my way of speaking, my language."

The process of iconization (Irvine and Gal 2000) is applicable in this context, where linguistic features become the ideological index of a social group's essence. A mixed variety serves as an iconic style, denoting either a state or mixed identity. It is embraced by those who aim to highlight that identity as their iconic style (Kheir 2022). In Example (6), the mixed variety is notably evident in the systematic tense mixture of the Hebrew future form and Arabic past progressive form to convey a past progressive sense, as seen in "kan-ye-sté" ('was deviating') and "kan-ye-stór" ('was contradicting'). These verb phrases blend the Arabic auxiliary "kān" ('was') with Hebrew future forms of the verbs "ye-sté" ('will deviate') and "ye-stór" ('will contradict'), respectively. In Hebrew, a similar construction would use the auxiliary "hayá" ('was') with the present forms of the verbs, resulting in "hayá soté" ('was deviating') and "hayá sotér" ('was contradicting'). Conversely, in Arabic, the equivalents would be "kān ye-neħref" and "kān y-naqed," respectively. Additionally, the pronoun "hoū" ('he') merges both the Arabic pronoun "hōwi" ('he') and the Hebrew pronoun "hú" ('he'). Such usages were consistently observed in the data from all Israeli Druze participants.

(6) *qult-ilo fi tsvi'út mesuyem-et qal-i āh hai meaa-akhúz hoū*
1SG-PST-tell-him there is hypocrisy certain-F 3SGM-tell-me yeah this hundred-percent he
kaman ***kān-ye-sté*** *men el-'inyán* ***kān-ye-stór*** *et 'atsmó b-šaghlát*
also **was- deviating** from the-matter **was-contradicting** ACC himself in-things

"I pointed out a degree of hypocrisy to him; he agreed, acknowledging the presence of it, but simultaneously, he was deviating from the issue and contradicting himself in certain respects."

Example (7) is excerpted from a male participant in his 40s, identifying as Israeli Druze. He expressed a perspective on the intricate challenge the Israeli Druze

face regarding identity and language:

"The Israeli Druze grapple with a profound dilemma of identity and language, akin to schizophrenia. On one hand, they are not Arabs; their native language isn't Arabic. Conversely, they are not Jewish, and their language isn't Hebrew. It's a blend of both—speaking both Arabic and Hebrew in a singular language. Even our education system diverges from both Arab and Jewish frameworks; it's distinctly Druze. Acknowledged in academic circles, there is a recognized challenge concerning our identity and language. It's like the Hebrew saying, 'yoshev ʻal hagader, regel po, regel sham' [sitting on the fence, one foot on this side and one on the other]...The Druze lack a fixed identity. Historically, coerced much like the Jews, their survival strategy involved assimilation—' in Jordan, I am Jordanian; in Syria, I am Syrian; in Israel, I am Israeli; in Lebanon, I am Lebanese,' et cetera—forming a 'nation without an identity.' Concealing their true identity, they lived in secrecy. It was only revealed about [1,006] years ago. Even then, they acquired a definitive identity, but the vestiges of that survival strategy linger perhaps a genetic legacy."

When queried about the nation-state bill, he remarked, "It neither signifies nor alters anything; it simply reaffirms the Jews' status in their homeland. It doesn't diminish the status of the Druze." Expanding on his viewpoint, he added, "Some assert that Arab and Left parties instigated the Druze against it to dissuade them from supporting the right-wing parties as they typically do. The reality is that the Druze in Israel constitute a minority, akin to their status in Arab countries. However, unlike in Arab countries, the Druze here enjoy a significantly better position: residing in a democracy, they relish freedom of speech and can voice grievances against prominent Jewish figures, whether presidents or prime ministers."

To underscore his argument, the participant elaborated that they hold representations in the government, Knesset, aviation, elite combat units in the military, and various other spheres. He emphasized, "None of the Arab countries can match the democracy in Israel, none! Every minority in the world encounters discrimination. Even the Jews face discrimination in other regions, but they acknowledge their minority status and reconcile with it. At least, we are a minority under a democracy, unlike the Druze minorities in Arab countries."

In terms of language practice, the participant's default mode of communication was the mixed variety, as evident in Example (7) in "b-yekákh" 'takes,' where the Hebrew future form "yekákh" 'will take' is suffixed to the Arabic habitual indicative morpheme b-, denoting the mixed imperfective form. In Arabic, the

correct form would be b-yākhod 'takes,' whereas in Hebrew, it would be lokeákh 'takes.' The participant also inflected a Hebrew masculine noun with the Arabic feminine plural suffix -āt typically suffixed to the feminine singular stem of nouns in Arabic. The result was "kibuts-āt". In Hebrew, the plural suffix -ìm is added to masculine singular nouns; thus, the standard term would be kibuts-ìm 'collective settlements.' Notably, this common hybrid plural form (a Hebrew noun with the Arabic feminine plural suffix -āt) is only used when the Hebrew singular noun is masculine. When the noun is feminine, it is either entirely in Hebrew (a Hebrew noun with the Hebrew feminine plural suffix -ót), as in bakhor-ót 'ladies,' the plural form of the Hebrew singular feminine noun bakhor-á 'lady,' or entirely in Arabic (an Arabic noun with the Arabic feminine plural suffix -āt), as in ħanafiyy-āt 'taps,' the plural form of the Arabic singular feminine noun ħanafiyye 'tap.' There was also an instance in which the Arabic content morpheme w 'and,' usually prefixed to Arabic morphemes, was prefixed to the Hebrew passive construction "me-tupál" 'taken care of.'

(7) *harì bi-ruħ el-lakokh-ót taba'-ono*
fì-l-kibuts-āt
that is IND-3SG-go the-cient-PL POSS-3SGM
in-the-collective settlement-PL
b-yekákh *men* ***el-kibuts-āt***
w-me-tupál *hetev*
IND-3SGM-take from **the-collective settlement-PL**
and-PASS-take care-3SGM very well

"That is, he visits the collective settlements, and his clients come from there. He takes clients from the collective settlements, and he is very well taken care of."

Example (8) is extracted from a female participant in her 40s. The participant, who identifies as Druze, "not in a religious sense but beyond that," expressed profound distress due to the nation-state law:

"They took away an integral part of our identity. The Druze have always had a deep connection to the state, and now, it is as if we are being cast away from our Israeliness. I do feel much less Israeli now than I did before, for sure. It is as if we are no longer included there. I hope that Bibi [the Prime Minister of Israel who passed the law] will be ousted."

Regarding her language practices, the participant, who held a negative attitude

towards Hebrew, exhibited slightly less frequent mixing than the average participant in certain utterances, even though the mixed variety was her default. She believed that language, to some extent, determines identity and mentioned consciously limiting the integration of Hebrew elements into her speech, as it sounded more elegant without them. However, she acknowledged that mixing was inevitable, as illustrated in Example (8). This mixing was mainly evident in the recurrent use of the mixed DP construction and tense mixing, such as in "b-a-tlabésh" 'get dressed,' where the Hebrew future form a-tlabésh 'will get dressed' is suffixed to the Arabic habitual indicative morpheme b-, forming the mixed imperfective form. In Arabic, the correct form in such a case would be b-albes 'get dressed,' while in Hebrew, it is me-tlabésh-et 'get dressed.' According to Eckert (2004,45), 'prestige and stigma have come to be the primary social meanings associated with variables, and formality brings a focus on prestige and an attempt to avoid stigma.' In the sociopolitical context of the present study, codeswitching into Hebrew and the mixed variety are associated with 'Israeliness' or a mixed identity. They can be viewed as a stigmatized variant to be avoided by those who wish to distance themselves from that identity. Additionally, since linguistic means can keep one's ethnicity salient rather than assimilating fully into the dominant culture (Myers-Scotton and Bolonyai 2001), the participant attempted to make the mixed variety her marked mode of communication rather than the default.

(8) *yomet-ha kān fi iriúa' keìlú pridá la-hada* ***el-menahél***
el-kodém *taba'-na*
day-that was in event that is farewell to-this the-manager the-previous POSS-1PL
issa kān et-taqes helu w-ana dayman ***b-a-tlabésh***
tóv w-bemyukhád la-kull
now was the-weather nice and-I always IND-1SG-get dressed well and-especially for-all
el-iru'-ìm ***el-kshur-ìm*** *b-esh-shughul*
the-event-PL the-related-PL in-the-work

"On that day, there was a farewell party for our previous manager. The weather was pleasant, and I always make an effort to dress up, especially for all work-related occasions."

Example (9) is from a female participant in her 40s who identified as Druze. The participant held a neutral stance towards the nation-state law: "I'm not entirely sure about this whole thing. There are both supporters and opponents of it among the Druze. Some say it downgrades the Druze status in the state, while others argue that Leftist politicians are manipulating the uncertainties surrounding it to incite the Druze against Bibi and the right-wing parties. It's unclear, and before we see its actual impact on the Druze, we cannot judge it as either good or bad. The Druze are Israelis at their core, and I don't believe that this law is going to affect that in any way. Their love for the state is stronger than that. But you can never know; we shall wait and see."

The participant held Hebrew in very high regard, and this is reflected in her unmarked mixed variety, as in *'am-b-ya-ʦdìk* 'is justifying,' in Example (9), where she combines the Hebrew future form of the verb with an Arabic present progressive form an auxiliary to denote a present progressive sense. The verb phrase *'am-b-ya-ʦdìk* is a combination of the Arabic auxiliary 'am (am/is/are) and the Hebrew verb le-haʦdìk (to justify). In Hebrew, the correct form would be maʦdìk 'justify/PRS,' whereas, in Arabic, it would be 'am-bi-barrier 'is justifying.' This conforms to Myers-Scotton's (1993) notion that unmarked codeswitching—or, in this case, a mixed variety—can practically indicate intergroup harmony. Additionally, the participant exclusively used the merged pronoun "hoū" or 'he' throughout her speech, which is a mix of both the Arabic pronoun hōwi 'he' and the Hebrew pronoun hú 'he.' The merged pronoun hoū is followed by an entirely Hebrew clause, which includes yet another merged morpheme -ya'ní 'that is,' which also has the variation ya'nú. The morpheme "ya'ní" is originally an Arabic word that was borrowed into Hebrew and then re-borrowed from Hebrew and is often used in both of its variations, ya'ní, and ya'nú, in the mixed variety.

(9) *b-tij-i la-zurúf el-beit keìlú el-wahad mish*
'am-b-ya-ʦdìk *avál* ***hoū***
come to-circumstances the-house that is the-one not
AUX-IND-3SGM/FUT-justify but he
apáti keìlú avál én má le-hashvót ***ya'ní***
ét-am bekhlál
apathetic that is but there not what to-compare **that is**
ACC-3PL at all

'You go back to the situation at home; that is, I am not trying to justify it, but he is apathetic. But you cannot really compare it to them at all.'

Example (10) is from a male participant in his 20s. The participant, identifying as Israeli Druze, expressed a strongly negative stance towards the nation-state law. However, he believed that it had actually strengthened the Druze sense of belonging to the state, emphasizing the historic Druze connection. He stated,

"Those who thought that this extremely racist and undemocratic law would take away our Israeliness are mistaken. We now feel more Israeli than ever before, and we are displaying it publicly. Bibi represents only himself and his followers." To reinforce the Druze connection to the state, he added, "No one can deny the Druze contribution to the state that started even before its establishment. We have fought wars with the Jews and helped them win wars they would have lost without us. We are an integral and inseparable part of the state, and if people were unaware of our contribution, now everyone knows. They will have to revere us and amend the law to fix our status."

Regarding his linguistic practices, his speech was predominantly Hebrew, with very few switches into Arabic. In Example (10), he uses almost exclusively Hebrew morphemes, except for two instances of mixtures: "hoū" 'he,' a mix of the Arabic pronoun hōwi 'he' and the Hebrew pronoun hú 'he,' and "ya'ni" 'that is,' originally an Arabic word borrowed into Hebrew, which can count as a mix. This aligns with Bucholtz and Hall's (2004) notion of authentication, as the participant's language preference was the national language, used as a vehicle for authentication to index ways of being in and belonging to the nation-state.

(10) ***hoū*** *kafé-mis'adá* *ka-zé* *ve-hém* *os-ìm* *t-a-kafé* *itsl-ám*
ya'ni *anì* *mamásh* *obév* *ta-makóm* *a-zé*
he café-restaurant like-this and-they do-2PL ACC-the-coffee at-them
that is I really love the-place the-this

'It is like a coffee-restaurant, and they brew the coffee on-site. I really love this place."

Applying Intersubjective Tactics to the Israeli Druze

The conversational data, interview data, and surveys underscore the distinctive identity and linguistic practices within the Israeli Druze community. Before the enactment of the nation-state bill, the Israeli dimension in the collective iden-

tity of Israeli Druze was prominently featured and proudly embraced. However, since the bill's implementation in 2018, the Israeli component has diminished in salience, potentially giving rise to a new collective identity.

Applying Bucholtz and Hall's (2004) tactics of intersubjectivity, it appears that Israeli Druze are using the tactic of adequation to seek socially recognized commonality and build coalitions across differences. This involves setting aside potentially divisive issues related to the 'more Israeli'/'more Arab' dichotomy sparked by the nation-state law and consolidating a unified Druze identity through the tactic of distinction. This Druze identity extends beyond religion or ethnicity to become a national one. Consequently, Israeli Druze are seemingly establishing an alternative to both poles of the dichotomy, cultivating a new authentic, national Druze identity that is neither Israeli nor Arab. Simultaneously, they are developing a language variety that is neither Hebrew nor Arabic but a distinct mixture of both, as thoroughly examined in Kheir's studies (2022, 2023).

They use the tactic of adequation to position themselves within both identity frames while maintaining their distinctiveness through the tactic of distinction. Salient differences between Israeli and Arab identities are produced and realized through binary logic, differentiating along multiple axes simultaneously. Unlike Druze in most Arab countries, the democratic context allows the local Druze to claim an authentic, collective, national Druze identity. Through the tactic of authentication, the mixed variety indexes ways of being and belonging to the nation-state, illustrating the interconnectedness of these elements. Concurrently, the adoption of mixed languages by ethnic groups often signifies a desire to distinguish themselves from other groups collectively, forming a unique identity that sets them apart from both the Israeli Arab and Jewish communities they engage with (Kheir 2019).

Conclusion

Given the interconnected nature of language, sociopolitical circumstances, and identity, this study investigates the correlation between codeswitching, mixed language varieties, sociopolitical conditions related to the case study, and identity. It presents a comparative analysis of the Druze communities in the Golan Heights and Israel. The study employed theories and concepts from intersubjective contact linguistics and indexicality to illustrate how communities caught between different influences forge new quasi-national identities and linguistic varieties.

In the context of the Druze in the Golan Heights, the examination of con-

versational data, supplemented by additional interviews and surveys, reveals parallels with the situation in Alsace. Alsace, a region that has shifted multiple times between German and French control, has witnessed attempts by both powers to instill their respective national consciousness and language in the local population. Nevertheless, the locals have developed their own distinct proto-national Alsatian identity and language.

Applying Bucholtz and Hall's (2004) tactics of intersubjectivity, it becomes evident that, through the tactic of adequation, the Druze of the Golan Heights are forming alliances by downplaying their significant differences related to the pro-Israeli vs. pro-Syrian struggle. This struggle, reignited by the Israeli Syrian Golan secret deal theory, is a focal point. They are consolidating a unified, seemingly denaturalized, undefined identity through the tactic of distinction. However, by employing the tactic of distinction, which involves establishing an alternative to both poles of the dichotomy, alongside the tactic of authentication, a novel authentic proto-national identity, labeled Hadʿbawi/Jūlani, is taking shape. This process coincides with the emergence of a new dialect, potentially providing an alternative legitimacy to its speakers.

In the context of the Israeli Druze, applying the same tactics (Bucholtz and Hall 2004) reveals that, through the tactic of adequation, they seek social recognition and establish coalitions by downplaying differences stemming from the 'more Israeli' vs. 'more Arab' dichotomy, notably reignited by the nation-state law. The Israeli Druze are thus solidifying a unified quasi-national Druze identity through the tactic of distinction. Consequently, this tactic of distinction enables the Israeli Druze to foster a novel, authentic, quasi-national Druze identity, and a newly developed mixed linguistic variety.

Residing in a democratic country facilitates a process where the Israeli Druze can assert an authentic, collective, quasi-national Druze identity. Through the tactic of authentication, the mixed linguistic variety becomes an index of their ways of being and belonging to the nation-state. Simultaneously, the use of mixed languages by ethnic groups serves as a means to collectively distinguish themselves from other groups, forming a distinct identity (Bakker 1997). The Israeli Druze, situated between the Arabs and Jews, creates a unique mixed variety and identity, marking them as a distinct group separate from both groups whose languages they speak (Kheir 2019).

The language-mixing features observed in both the Israeli Druze and the Druze of the Golan Heights underscore the significance of developing a mixed

language for sandwiched communities. This serves as a mechanism for these communities to differentiate themselves from the groups on either side of the dichotomy.

In conclusion, despite the commonalities in the processes and outcomes of identity construction and language change experienced by the Golan Druze and Israeli Druze, the transition of the Golan from a dictatorial regime to a democracy appears to exert a distinct influence. The Israeli Druze readily and proudly integrates the Druze identity component—beyond its religious and ethnic dimensions—as a default in their identity repertoire. They also freely engage in language mixing. In contrast, a significant portion of the Golan Druze, influenced by the first-generation elders who were 'not allowed' to identify as Druze, display greater reluctance in incorporating this aspect into their identity.

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Druze Studies Journal

Book Forum:

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Abstract

The book Druze Reincarnation Narratives: Previous Life Memories Discourses and the Construction of Identities, edited by Gebhard Fartacek, offers an interdisciplinary exploration of the Druze belief in reincarnation (taqammuṣ) and the phenomenon of Nutq, where individuals recall previous lives. Scholars in anthropology, religious studies, and related fields contribute to understanding how these beliefs shape Druze social structures, personal identities, and community cohesion. The forum includes reviews by Maha Natoor, Dmitry Sevruk, and Jens Kreinath. Natoor appreciates the book's accessibility and balanced presentation of Druze reincarnation narratives while raising ethical concerns about anonymity and the use of religious texts. Sevruk commends the clear scientific language and interdisciplinary approach, emphasizing the book's contributions to Druze history and culture and suggesting further exploration of the psychological mechanisms behind reincarnation beliefs. Kreinath praises the detailed ethnographic insights and methodological rigor, noting researchers' challenges in engaging with the Druze community. He also critiques that some contributions focus on broader social, cultural, and political contexts rather than directly addressing reincarnation. Overall, the book provides valuable insights into the resilience and adaptability of the Druze in preserving their unique religious identity amidst broader societal changes.

Keywords: *Druze; Reincarnation; Taqammus; Nutq; Identity construction; Ethnography.*

DEBATE

Exploring Druze Beliefs in Reincarnation and *Nutq* Narratives, by Maha Natoor

The Druze live primarily in the Middle East and maintain religious homogeneity. Conversion is not allowed, and endogamy, that is, marriage within the same group according to tradition or law, is practiced. Their faith is monotheistic, with a principal belief in reincarnation—*taqammuṣ*. A phenomenon related to this belief is called *Nutq*, where individuals remember and speak about their previous lives.

This book is about the Druze in the Middle East, focusing on their belief in reincarnation and narratives of *Nutq*. Scholars from various disciplines have contributed to it, seeking to explore its various facets thoroughly. The book is clear, accessible, and understandable to readers who may not be familiar with the Druze community or the *Nutq* phenomenon. Each chapter offers a unique contribution.

Gebhard Fartacek, a social anthropologist, examines narratives of *Nutq*, providing detailed examples. He delves into the main themes in these narratives and draws conclusions from their analysis, particularly in the context of stories where individuals identify their previous incarnations. This chapter offers an in-depth exploration of the different narrative types, relying on two types of knowledge: "semantic knowledge and narrative-episodic knowledge"(Fartacek 2021, 16). The author also discusses the effects of these stories on individuals, family dynamics, and community relations.

Lorenz Nigst**,** research associate at the Institute for the Study of Muslim Civilizations, authored two chapters: He explores the concept of divine justice, presenting the idea that human actions influence the future incarnations of the soul. He draws a distinction between the belief in reincarnation as found in religious texts and the more popular belief in the phenomenon of *Nutq* and explores the consequences of the "return" of the deceased in their new form, both for the individual and the community. The chapter addresses the dual social positions occupied by individuals with *Nutq*.

In his second chapter, Nigst discusses the Druze's religious text, which neither non-Druze nor secular Druze can access. This chapter provides a unique perspective on reincarnation and *Nutq*, shedding light on the attitudes of religious Druze leaders towards these topics. Through analyzing their statements in the media, the author explores how they navigate between engaging in broader discussions about the *Nutq* phenomenon and relating to personal experiences while

conveying messages to the Druze community and beyond. Thus, they talk about the subject ambiguously or "leave it in abeyance."

Similar to Nigst**,** Eléonore Armanet, a socio-cultural anthropologist, deals with questions of subjectivity in a context where the fundamental concept is the repeated recurrence of souls within the group. She reflects on her position in relation to the research field, a significant discussion for those studying minority groups and sensitive religious issues. Furthermore, she provides a brief overview of existing literature on reincarnation among the Druze in both psychological and anthropological contexts, highlighting the Eurocentric perspective, which prioritizes the European perspective in politics, culture, and history, that often approaches these subjects. Armanet underscores the Druze's spiritual kinship, which transcends location, time, or family affiliation, and how language and rhetoric reflect this closeness.

Nour Farra Haddad, a social anthropologist, explores Druze holy places in Lebanon and their significance, with a focus on tombs of prophets. She discusses the principles of the Druze faith, its diverse sources, the central prophets, and their connection to the belief in reincarnation. This chapter takes readers on a historical journey, tracing the origins of Druze's belief in reincarnation to ancient Greece. The author discusses various pilgrimage practices, and their meanings are discussed, pointing to the significance of material culture in these rituals. These sites offer a space for Druze to seek support and blessing from their prophets in times of distress.

Salma Samaha, landscape ecologist and cultural geographer, explores the subject of Druze cemeteries in Syria and Lebanon, a topic rarely studied. She demonstrates how, compared to Syria, coexistence with Christians in Lebanon has influenced burial practices and led to shared burial spaces despite differences in the perception of death. Further research into the burial practices of Druze living beyond the Middle East could offer valuable insights into the fascinating intersection of beliefs, practices, landscape, and social influences.

Tobias Lang, a doctoral candidate in Political Science at the University of Vienna, comprehensively describes the demographic, political history, and changes that have occurred among the Druze in Syria, Lebanon, and Israel. He offers a rich portrayal of these communities, describing their political positions, key figures, and the complex relationships between the state and the Druze minority in each region. He emphasizes the challenges within these communities and how the Druze minority continuously works to preserve itself.

In his concluding remarks, Fartacek focuses on the "concrete" *Nutq* cases that arise in the context of the belief in reincarnation. These cases not only reinforce this belief but also demonstrate the Druze community's unity and capacity to overcome the many challenges they face, including political and geographical divisions.

This book is thought-provoking, especially for me as a Druze researcher. I want to share two of the dilemmas that have arisen for me. The first challenge concerns preserving anonymity within a small community that widely shared *Nutq* stories. To safeguard the anonymity of the participants, is it sufficient to alter their names while retaining the main elements of their stories? Could these stories inadvertently expose interviewees who prefer to remain anonymous, especially when dealing with sensitive or conflictual cases?

Secondly, given the community's restriction on outsiders' access to the Druze scriptures, should researchers use religious texts to understand Nutq? Although these texts might be available, a question emerges when researchers establish personal connections with members of the community they are studying, who trust them and share their stories. In this case, to what extent is a researcher obliged to respect the group's rules, such as the non-disclosure of religious texts? Different answers may emerge, but these questions deserve consideration.

In conclusion, this book is rich and detailed and is a significant source for those interested in learning about the Druze belief in reincarnation and the Nutq phenomenon.

Unveiled: Understanding Druze Reincarnation Narratives through Interdisciplinary Perspectives of *Taqammuṣ,* by Dmitry Sevruk

As its title suggests, the book Druze Reincarnation Narratives: Previous Life Memories, Discourses, and the Construction of Identities deals with the concept of taqammuṣ (transmigration of souls) and its role, first of all, in the social life of the Druze community in Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and Jordan.

Editor of the volume and author of the most significant contribution is Gebhard Fartacek, an Orientalist, ethnologist, and anthropologist from the Austrian Academy of Sciences. Two articles were contributed by the cultural and social anthropologist Lorenz Nigst (Aga Khan University in London), whose research interests are focused on the Arab Middle East. Another Austrian author is the political scientist Tobias Lang. He is especially interested in positioning the Druze communities in the political systems of their respective states. French socio-cul-

tural anthropologist Eléonore Armanet, who primarily focuses on the intersections of body, gender, and the sacred, has summarized in her texts the results of her field research in the Upper Galilee (Israel). A pilgrimages and religious tourism specialist, Nour Farra Haddad (Lebanon), contributed a chapter about an important Druze sanctuary. The essay of Salma Samaha, a landscape ecologist and cultural geographer from Lebanon, is a comparativist study of the Druze and Christian funerary practices in Lebanon and Syria. Each contributor discusses the Druze belief in the transmigration of souls and does it through the prism of his/her own discipline.

Complementing one another, the authors create a complex picture of the phenomenon known in the Druze religious tradition as *taqammuṣ*. In preliminary remarks to his own contribution, Gebhard Fartacek articulates his main aim as well as his methodological approach (Fartacek 2021, 15): *"The research design for this project adopts a constructivist research approach. This means that the collection and analysis of the data are not focused on the question of whether people have in fact been "genuinely" reincarnated (from an objective point of view). Instead, the research explores the role played by conceptions of the transmigration of souls and rebirth in the daily lives of the Druze population and the extent to which such conceptions appear viable within Druze communities"*. The researcher can extend this approach to other chapters in the volume, albeit with some reservations. Each text deals with the influence of the *taqammuṣ*-concept on one or another aspect of the life of the Druze community: ethics and construction of specific forms of kinship (Fartacek, Armanet), personal constructions of identity and its connection with the cosmological principles as a part of shared identity (Nigst), a holistic perspective of the reincarnation belief (Armanet), *taqammuṣ* as one of the means to display the political solidarity among the Druze (Lang). Lebanese researchers (Haddad, Samaha) place the concept of *taqammuṣ* in the broader context of the Druze conceptions of death and life. The declared constructivist approach, however, is not an obstacle for the authors to take a critical attitude toward some of the episodes they describe (e.g., Case D in Fartacek 2021, 32). Another advantage of the book under review is its lack of apologetics, something scholars of different disciplines sometimes find difficult to avoid.

Each chapter can undoubtedly be characterized as a serious and noteworthy study that contributes to a better understanding of the Druze community's history, culture, and religious beliefs. Most authors (Fartacek, Nigst, and Armanet) reveal and analyze the functioning of intrafamily and community ties, which emerge from reincarnation narratives and are strengthened through rituals (Haddad, Sa-

maha). Tobias Lang, sometimes turning to history, carefully analyzes the situation of the Druze in three countries with completely different political systems –Syria, Lebanon, and Israel. The audiovisual materials collected and published by some authors (Fartacek, Haddad, and Samaha) could become valuable objects for additional research. First, this concerns the unique interviews with so-called *nāṭiqs* (speakers of their previous lives) from the cases described and analyzed by Gebhard Fartacek. At the same time, the researcher does not pursue the goal of discovering the mechanisms of the emergence and constant reproduction of such beliefs. Nevertheless, it could be an exciting task to understand these psychological phenomena.

The chapters in the volume, written in clear scientific language, stand out for their well-thought-out structure and argumentation, making them worth reading. Their potential audience could be anyone interested in the cultures and religions of the modern Middle East. However, the book is addressed to ethnologists, anthropologists, orientalists, and religious scholars. An outside academic look at the community will likely interest the Druze themselves. The book may also interest sociologists and psychologists who are trying to comprehend the mechanisms of the emergence and self-reproduction of specific religious ideas and who require authentic material for this purpose.

On the Significance of Religious Secrecy and Reincarnation Beliefs among Religious Minorities in the Eastern Mediterranean, by Jens Kreinath

With Druze Reincarnation Narratives, Gebhard Fartacek edited a very fine piece of ethnographic research dedicated to a unique tradition of sharing reincarnation accounts unknown in mainstream research on the Eastern Mediterranean. This volume is one of only a handful of publications on this topic, making it significant for understanding the esoteric traditions of the autochthonous Druze community. It is the first of its kind to present a thorough, comprehensive, and contextual account of reincarnation narratives among the Druze. It draws on reincarnation narratives as an integral part of their ethnoreligious identity and secretive traditions of religious practice, with the ethnographic material being collected at the places of their residence, which are scattered across the broader region of Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Israel.

In this volume, Fartacek assembled some highly informative and ethnographically grounded contributions by known scholars in the field. All contributions,

while displaying different theoretical orientations, utilizing varied methodological approaches, and having distinct focal points of research, relate in varying degrees of elaboration to the main trajectory of this volume as outlined in the lead three chapters written by the editor, his main collaborator, Lorenz Nigst, and by Eléonore Armanet. Following the detailed and meticulous lines of documentation, as outlined in the introduction and lead chapter by Fartacek, the reader can sense the practical difficulties in establishing contact and maintaining rapport with members of the secretive ethnoreligious community of the Druze. The lead researchers brought to light highly personal and often very sensitive accounts of individuals who communicated their unique, often compelling, and quite mind-boggling first-hand accounts of their reincarnation.

The reliability of the collected data is assured by providing highly reflexive and contextual data about who was present during the interviews and how the narratives were recorded. The meticulous outlines of all methodical procedures indicate the process of collecting these narratives. Most importantly, the reader of these accounts gains a sufficient understanding of how the interlocutors were willing to tell stories about their reincarnation experiences and how they decided to search for the families they were members of in their previous lives. To provide further relevancy to the research conducted in Syria, Lebanon, and Israel, the final contribution put into perspective the social and political context in which these interviews were conducted: at remote locations and disconnected areas spread across the borders of these antagonized countries that are rattled by decades of war, conflict, and famine. Additionally, the highest degree of professionalism and research ethics, in which the case studies are subsequently analyzed and placed within the broader scheme of research on ethnoreligious minorities in the Eastern Mediterranean, is outstanding and speaks to the quality and significance of the information presented in this volume. However, it is essential to note that not all contributions address the topic; instead, they aim to provide some social, cultural, and political context that features the research of the first three contributions. Thus, only these, along with the final comment by Fartacek, can come into the focus of this review, as only they deal directly with reincarnation narratives within the Druze community. Most notably, this review aims to evaluate the significance of the ethnographic research in this volume and explore ways in which these findings resonate with existing research or can be applied to similar traditions of reincarnation narratives among Arab Alawites in Hatay.

In his lead chapter, "Ethnographic Insights: Narratives, Dealing with Previous Life Memories among the Druze," Fartacek presents excerpts from ten meticulously documented reincarnation narratives with an empirically grounded research framework. Although the Druze religious doctrine holds that all humans are reincarnated as humans, people who can remember the details of their past lives are extremely rare, as this volume indirectly seems to suggest. Fartacek conducted interviews with men and women from all social and economic strata as well as from different educational backgrounds. In his heuristic analysis of diverse reincarnation narratives, Fartacek emphasizes that reincarnation cases occur more frequently in specific families and regions. He further suggests that these case narratives have varying effects on the kinship relationships established among the families where reincarnation occurs. In comparing the reincarnation narratives with a focus on the similarities in the recurring themes and structural features of these narratives regarding the different effects on the formation of new family ties, Fartacek identifies the fateful causes of death, the content and nature of antecedent life memories while featuring the moments of recognizing or encountering people significant in the previous life.

Fartacek establishes the general plot structure and framework for analyzing the featured reincarnation cases. These include different forms of proof, such as being able to detail the circumstances of death, navigating environments for the past life, demonstrating certain linguistic skills, exposing specific birthmarks, or portraying distinct phobias. Four interconnected features comprise this: the abrupt and often violent manner of death, the presence of specific memories with an identifiable moment of discovery, a usually unambiguous manner of death, and the significance of the story for the here and now, where the speaker's present identity and the general situation of the involved community are inseparable. However, as Fartacek emphasizes, the reincarnated person needs to supply unquestionable evidence to the family from which he or she claims to have descended through rebirth. More important are the reactions and the differing degrees of acceptance, considering the proof demanded by every party involved. As Fartacek convincingly demonstrates, people with specific memories searching for proof of their claims to be someone from a different generation or family often encounter highly delicate and uncomfortable situations. The reactions of the identified families can vary from instantly formed kinship relationships to chaotic forms of alienation, which, according to Fartacek, represents the moral of the story as "a departure point for further reflections in which semantic knowledge is shared" (Fartacek

2021, 56). Such findings reveal the core value of the reincarnation narratives Fartacek and Nigst collected jointly.

The belief in reincarnation is still alive and primarily transmitted orally in often remote parts of Israel, Lebanon, and Syria. It is also shared among other ethnoreligious communities of the Eastern Mediterranean, such as the Arab Alawite/Nusayri, Anatolian Alevi, Ali-Haqq, and Yezidi. These groups are at the margins of mainstream Islam and are often identified as the extreme Shi'a. However, research on these communities is less comprehensive. In contrast to the other ethnoreligious communities, the Arab Alawite/Nusayri share similar traditions of reincarnation narratives. Unlike the Druze, the Alawite reincarnation belief details the possibility of humans reincarnating as non-human entities such as animals and plants, despite the lack of narratives to explain such traditions. Research on these two ethnoreligious communities indicates that people who seem to have been reincarnated can usually clearly remember the details of their previous lives. Even though such detailed narratives among the Druze and Alawite are very rare, the persons who remember such details were usually victims of an assassination or accident.

The Arab Alawites, mainly residing in southern Turkey, have reported various reincarnation narratives, among which Stephan Procházka and Leila Prager have most recently and thoroughly documented. However, the research on the other dimensions in the religious cosmology of Arab Alawites, which relate to forms of reincarnation as common among the Druze, is limited. Unfortunately, there are only a few full narrative accounts of reincarnation experiences among Alawites in Hatay. These few accounts given by people who were able to recount sufficient details resemble the narratives collected in Fartacek's volume. Comparing the structural and thematic features of Druze reincarnation narratives with those among the Alawites reveals significant differences in these traditions' social, cultural, and political significance. As for the Alawites, reincarnation is a general feature of the common belief system and is not confined to their religious secrecy tradition. In this regard, reincarnation primarily exists as a folk belief unrelated to or directly impacting their religious secrecy traditions. These traditions mainly stem from the secretive practice of their religious rituals, which they strictly maintain despite centuries of ritual seclusion. In addition, the reincarnation narratives among Alawites are more generic and not tied to specific family constellations or the formation of new ones, as suggested by the accounts collected in Fartacek's volume. Other than in the cases Fartacek and Nigst collected, the Alawite/Nusayri reincarnation narra-

tives in Hatay are often tied to celebrity assassination stories, like John F. Kennedy or Lady Diana. Thus, Alawite's reincarnation narratives may tend to feature figures who are famous in pop culture.

More importantly, Druze reincarnation narratives clearly impact the reconfiguration of their community and family relations that may occur through the sharing of reincarnation narratives with the specific families involved or implicated in these narratives. In a way, Druze reincarnation narratives are delicate as they tend to irritate and interfere with private, if not intimate, family relations in cases where someone claims to be the reincarnation of a deceased person of a foreign family and thus creates new family ties through such narratives if the reincarnated person is able to provide proof about the names of other family members or if they are able to reveal personal secrets that only could have been known by the deceased person. This is only very rarely the case among the Arab Alawites in Hatay. However, the scale of these real-life effects or consequences of such reincarnation narratives as they relate to the Arab Alawites is not known yet. There might be more similarities and differences, but it would be challenging to determine further specifics about the Druze and Alawite traditions of reincarnation without further ethnographic research.

One other aspect that would require a broader approach to reincarnation is encapsulated in the concept of metempsychosis, the transmigration of the soul after death, which is an integral belief for several other ethnoreligious communities and traditions in the region, like the Anatolian Alevi, Ali-Haqq, and Yezidi. However, research on reincarnation narratives and their relation to the cosmologies and worldviews about the reincarnation of souls remains limited. With the research template and the case studies that Fartacek provided in this volume, future research on Alawite reincarnation narratives would profit tremendously from the findings presented in this volume.

Other important inquiry features integral to Alawite and Druze reincarnation narratives also relate to the themes covered in the three last contributions to the volume. Nevertheless, they are not sufficiently addressed in the respective chapters and raise questions for future research. One relates to the question of the physical or virtual presence or embodiment of the saints or prophets in different tombs or cenotaphs, which should have been discussed in the contribution by Nour Haddad. Numerous saints are venerated at different locations, and each saint is present at the sites of his or her veneration. In the contribution by Salma Samaha, the necessary nexus between the specific architectural features of the mor-

tuary dwellings and their relationships to reincarnation beliefs remains somewhat elusive and should have been further elaborated on regarding the relevance of material structures for studying religious cosmologies and the different forms of embodiment of religious beliefs in durable traits like mortuary dwellings. Finally, the last research-based contribution to this volume focused mainly on studying the Druze as "a political entity" without any effort to enhance the study of the role of Druze reincarnation beliefs or narratives in the political sphere. There is some evidence that Druze reincarnation beliefs influenced their willingness to sacrifice themselves during the civil war in Lebanon. In addition, there may be specific reasons why Druze individuals are specifically well suited to serve in Israel's military and police forces.

In conclusion, Druze Reincarnation Narratives presents an intriguing array of cases and contexts that can only further and enhance existing and ongoing research on a form of religious cosmology that is only in its nascent stages and for which Fartacek's volume provides a bold opening.

RESPONSE

Looking back at *Druze Reincarnation Narratives*. Reflections on methodology and avenues for further research, by Gebhard Fartacek

As the editor of 'Druze Reincarnation Narratives: Previous Life Memories, Discourses, and the Construction of Identities', published by Peter Lang in 2021, I would like to extend my sincere thanks to all three reviewers for their thoughtful and remarkably insightful comments. While each review reflects the perspective of a different discipline, all three authors get to the core of the issues dealt with in the book and make perceptive comments that reflect their profound engagement with the material. Their analysis draws attention to highly relevant questions and reaches plausible and compelling conclusions.

In her summary, Maha Natoor highlights fundamental challenges in ethnographic data collection methodology and raises two specific questions I would like to address here. Please interpret my comments as heuristic approaches, not as definitive answers.

One of these challenges is maintaining the anonymity of interviewees; while I did change the names in my book contribution, interviewees are nevertheless easily identifiable within and beyond their small communities by specific details from their narratives. One can take this criticism further, as this lack of true anonymity

is not only an issue for the interviewees themselves but also for all other people who are mentioned (sometimes very critically) by the interviewees in their stories.

Indeed, one cannot dismiss this point lightly, especially in the case of the relatively small localities in Upper Galilee. However, I consciously withheld a considerable amount of information that interviewees shared with me about themselves and others in cases where such disclosures might have caused interpersonal conflict. I sought a compromise here, as my personal standpoint as a social anthropologist is that describing the localities and social settings in which *nuṭq* cases emerge has value and that something would be lost from the ethnography if these stories were wrested out of their contexts and "washed clean." Detailed contextualization also has value—as Jens Kreinath underscores—for readers seeking to understand and appraise the research results. Looking beyond the specifics of this publication and taking a more comprehensive view, I find that the increasing pressure on scholars worldwide to publish their research results in English and open-access formats is influencing this particular problem. While we must broadly welcome the trend towards making research understandable and freely accessible as a contribution to democratization, publishing research in a global lingua franca and open-access formats creates some specific challenges for ethnological field research. Twenty or thirty years ago, problems concerning confidentiality were largely theoretical. When they did arise on a practical level, they did so mainly in the political sphere: intelligence services have always been able to read ethnographic research, and ethnographers have always had to think carefully about what material to omit to protect informants. However, when it comes to interpersonal relationships and the potential for conflicts between specific individuals and families in the area studied, there is a significant difference between ethnographic research results, which are essentially available only in selected specialized libraries, and those that are freely accessible from virtually any living room sofa. I believe that the possible ramifications for research participants when publications based on ethnographic field research are available in open-access formats are a fundamental problem that our discipline at large, not only by individual scholars, needs to address in a more targeted way——to clarify what is appropriate for specific regions.

Natoor's second question relates to whether it is really necessary to consider religious texts to understand *nuṭq*. After all, this is a sensitive matter, as Druze doctrine states that these texts are reserved for the initiates only. While it would, of course, be possible to trace the phenomenon of *nuṭq* using only the toolbox of ethnology (including interviews and participant observation) and without drawing

on religious texts, social anthropology focused on the Middle East has a long tradition of cooperation between anthropology and the philological and text-based disciplines. Several significant reasons support this approach. First and foremost, given the generally inadequate state of research in most social anthropology topics in the Middle East, forgoing opportunities to integrate relevant expertise from Arabic and Islamic studies would be unwise. Furthermore, the area has a tradition of writing that dates back thousands of years, which, although admittedly restricted to limited strata of the population for most of this time, nevertheless exerted a decisive influence on local cultures (that can be understood in terms of Robert Redfield's model of little and great traditions). Lived religion and scriptural tradition are mutually interdependent, and many systems theory connections unfold in the interaction between these two poles. This means that something would be missing if research into the phenomenon of *nuṭq* and the constructions of identity linked to it were to refrain entirely from considering relevant religious texts. It is clear that anthropologists must respect the rules of the communities in which they conduct research and give this due consideration in their publications. In light of this ethical obligation, I note that the book did not reproduce restricted texts and that the description of these texts does not appear to have the potential to cause any serious offense. However, I acknowledge that divergent views of this may exist among the Druze.

The two points raised by Natoor lead to the implicit question of the book's target audience. Jens Kreinath voices similar doubts—in an insightful and broadly favorable review—when he suggests that it is not entirely clear how the book's final three contributions contribute to the overall discussion of reincarnation narratives. As the volume's editor, I am willing to acknowledge this point of criticism as justified to some degree. However, I would also like to defend the decision to include these studies and reiterate that I greatly appreciate the work of all three authors. While none of them are "reincarnation researchers" as such, their contributions nevertheless represent ambitious attempts to apply their own specific research expertise to conceptions of reincarnation in a targeted fashion. In my view, these articles provide a substantial degree of contextualization relevant to addressing current gaps in the state of research and future research questions.

Anthologies evolve over time, and changes in circumstances and editorial decisions can affect the final outcome. A case in point: Tobias Lang originally conceived his contribution to the Druze's situation in multiple nation-states as an introductory article, but his in-depth and meticulous comprehensive investigation

ultimately exceeded its scope. In contrast to widespread depictions of the Druze as a single cohesive group, his contribution sheds light on disparities between Druze communities, contradictory patterns in embedding the Druze into nation-states, and recent problems and challenges facing the Druze as an ethnic group.

This leads me to the issue of possible future research questions, which Dmitry Sevruk outlined in his remarks. I do not feel competent to speculate on the origins and evolution of the Druze belief in reincarnation, as tracing their history would require the expertise of other disciplines. However, the mechanisms by which these beliefs are maintained and reproduced can be treated similarly to other localized cultural conceptions and practices that continue to be upheld or redefined. In contrast, they continue to fulfill the specific needs of the people concerned and are deemed necessary for coping with life. As I sought to outline in my conclusion to the book, I highlighted the unifying potential of Druze ideas of reincarnation and *nuṭq* cases. These play a crucial role in addressing the intra-Druze disparities mentioned above and their suitability as an "exclusive" marker of ethnic identity in a monotheistic environment. Nevertheless, I fully agree with Sevruk that a more systematic approach to this question is necessary. A thorough examination of the epistemological foundations of reincarnation beliefs in the Middle East, including the relevance of the Neoplatonic emanation theory, deserves particular scrutiny. Building on this, I would also be highly interested in pursuing a systematic comparison with Alawite conceptions of reincarnation, as suggested by Kreinath. However, my prior field research visits to the area around Safita suggest that regional differences may influence the Alawites, similar to the Druze. Last but not least, I could see myself looking more closely at future research work on the (optional) forms of kinship constituted via *nuṭq* and attempting a social anthropological typology in the mode of kinship studies. This would, however, require a multi-sited participant observation over extended periods, which is currently only feasible in a minimal way given the ongoing armed conflicts in the Middle East.

As I believe that research ambitions of this nature can only be realized in teams, I would be very pleased if cooperative research projects proved possible in the future. With that aim in mind, I would like to thank the initiators of the Druze Studies Project at the University of Kansas, who have created an extremely valuable potential for networking and fruitful cooperation in establishing this new journal.

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Druze Studies Journal

Book Forum

"The Office of Shaykh al-'Aql of the Druze in Lebanon," book forum of **Abou Zaki, Said**. 2021. *Mashyakhat 'Aql al-Duruz fi Lubnan: Bahthun fi Usuliha wa-Ma'naha wa-Tatawwuriha [The Office of Shaykh al-'Aql of the Druze in Lebanon: An Investigation into Its Origins, Meaning and Development]*. Beirut: Dar el-Machreq.

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Abstract

This book forum centers on Said Abou Zaki's Arabic book, "The Office of Shaykh al-'Aql of the Druze in Lebanon." It includes contributions from various scholars, each offering a unique perspective on the historical and institutional analysis of Druze religious leadership in Lebanon: Tuba Yildiz, Yusri Hazran, Akram Khater, and Abdul Rahman M. Chamseddine. Yildiz acknowledges the lack of historical readings and erroneous information in early 20th-century works on the Druze. She appreciates Abou Zaki's comprehensive study of Lebanese and Ottoman perspectives, offering a broader understanding of the Druze religious institution's development and its connection with the Ottoman Empire's socio-religious policies. Hazran commends the book for providing a comprehensive historical study of the Druze community's religious and spiritual leadership, shedding light on its evolution from the 11th century through to the Ottoman Empire's fall. Although the book excels in its research methods and historical insights, Hazran suggests strengthening it by addressing specific methodological and historical issues, such as placing the discussion on existing narratives and substantiating Emir Bashir Shihab II's role in the schism. Khater highlights the internal tensions in Abou Zaki's book arising from its threefold goals: serving as a historiographical essay, an origins story, and a history of Mashyakhat al-'Aql. Khater commends the work's critical review of existing literature and acknowledges the book's significant contribution to understanding the position of Shaykh al-'Aql amidst political crises. Chamseddine praised Abou Zaki's critical historiographical approach and genealogical method. Chamseddine highlights the importance of integrating oral histories and local traditions into academic research. He notes that Abou Zaki's work sheds light on the Druze community's religious evolution, although he critiques the book's occasional lack of coherence due to abrupt transitions and unexplained terminology. The reviewers concluded that the book constitutes a significant contribution to Druze Studies.

Keywords: *Druze; Religious leadership; Shaykh al-'Aql; Ottoman Empire; History of Lebanon; Oral Tradition; Oral History.*

DEBATE

"Reevaluating Druze Historiography through a Critical Analysis of Religious Leadership and Community Evolution in Lebanon," by Abdul Rahman M. Chamseddine

Said Abou Zaki's book on the history of the Druze community and its religious leadership in Lebanon offers a meticulous examination that challenges prevailing narratives. Abou Zaki, a lecturer in history and ethics at the Lebanese American University with a master's degree in history from the American University of Beirut, employs a critical historiographical approach to interrogate the epistemological foundations of previous Druze historiography. His genealogical method deconstructs traditional narratives and recontextualizes the evolution of the Shaykh al-'Aql within the socio-political milieu of Mount Lebanon.

The book significantly contributes to understanding the religious organization and development of the Druze over the past five centuries, making it a valuable resource for scholars employing qualitative research methodologies, particularly in the study of minority religious communities where primary sources are scarce. The critical examination of oral histories and familial artifacts provides a model for interdisciplinary research that bridges anthropology, history, and religious studies and sheds light on a somewhat mysterious and secretive aspect of religious thought, opening possibilities for comparative and interdisciplinary research.

Abou Zaki's methodology involves engaging with Druze communities, integrating into their culture, building connections, gathering oral histories, and interpreting familial artifacts and religious documents such as wills, which hold religious significance in Druze culture. This demonstrates the importance of integrating oral histories, familial artifacts, and local traditions into academic research, encouraging scholars to question existing narratives and seek a deeper understanding of the socio-political dynamics that shape minority communities. This framework could apply to the study of other religious minority groups, such as the Yazidis and Alawites, who also have limited written records.

While the book is clear and well-organized, making it simple for readers to follow the author's ideas and analysis, it occasionally suffers from long-winded explanations and abrupt transitions between ideas, detracting from its overall coherence. Additionally, using terms like "Junblatis," "Yazbekis," and others without adequate explanation assumes familiarity that not all readers may have. More introductory context on these terms and the nature of Lebanese/Druze society would benefit those unfamiliar with Druze culture, especially at the beginning.

The book's structure unfolds in four distinct parts, each contributing uniquely to understanding the Druze community and serving as a meticulous critique of prevailing assumptions in Druze historiography. Abou Zaki identifies these assumptions as originating from three influential books from the mid-20th century: Abu-Shaqra (1952), Salman (1963), and Talih (1971) criticizing them for their speculative nature and lack of empirical basis despite their prominence. They collectively constructed a narrative that directly links the contemporary Shaykh al-ʻAql to the foundational Imama of the eleventh century, portraying him not just as a moral heir but also as a functional successor to the Fatimid Caliphs. Abou Zaki's critique dismantles this narrative, prompting a reevaluation of the historical foundations of Druze leadership. However, a more detailed examination of the sources critiqued in previous historiography, providing concrete examples of inaccuracies, would strengthen Abou Zaki's arguments and offer a clearer understanding of the historiographical evolution of Druze Studies.

Abou Zaki's employment of verses from the Qur'an to elucidate Druze terminology and its origins within the Qur'anic text is impressive. Abou Zaki references terms found in Druze communities, such as *al-mansha* and *majalis al-tidhkar*, demonstrating the Qur'anic origins of these terms and the profound connections the Druze community has with the Qur'an while simultaneously developing their unique culture and traditions. This approach highlights the intricate relationship between Druze teachings and the Qur'an, showing the adaptation and integration of foundational Islamic principles into Druze beliefs. The use of Qur'anic references serves not only to authenticate Druze terminology but also to emphasize the spiritual and doctrinal links between Druze practices and broader Islamic traditions. While this method undeniably adds a layer of authenticity and intellectual rigor to Druze's teachings, it may pose challenges regarding selective interpretation.

Overall, the book is valuable for anyone interested in gaining a deep understanding of the history and society of the Druze, particularly those in Lebanon. Researchers and academics in religious and historical studies, as well as readers interested in the history of Lebanese sects and their role in society and those studying social transformations in Lebanon, will find the book beneficial. While the book is only available in Arabic, even non-native readers should find its style clear and concise. Abou Zaki's work is not only a significant contribution to Druze studies but also a testament to the importance of innovative research methodologies in uncovering the complexities of religious and social institutions. By integrat-

ing various primary sources, such as oral histories, the book provides a comprehensive framework for future research on minority religious communities. Despite areas where further detail and contemporary relevance could enhance the study, it remains an impressive work for scholars and researchers in the fields of Middle Eastern studies, religious studies, and anthropology.

"Between Faith and Authority: Tracing the History of Druze Religious Leadership in Lebanon," by Yusri Hazran

This book is an adaptation of a master's thesis submitted in 2008 to the history department at the American University of Beirut. The book's subject is the historical development of the religious and spiritual leadership of the Druze community (Shaykh al-'Aql) from the 11th century until the fall of the Ottoman Empire. The book is divided into four main chapters. The book's first chapter reviews the variety of research and secondary sources written on the subject. In the second chapter, the author reviews archival sources, literature, oral tradition, biographical books, and more. The third chapter of the book has two parts. The first part discusses the conceptual and philological aspects of the concepts "'Aql" and "Shaykh" as well as the combination of the two concepts. The second part initiates a significant historical discussion by addressing the lack of records on the history of the Druze community in the period between the separation of Druze from the Ismaili Imamate in the 11th century and the time of the greatest Druze religious reformer and scholar, Al-Amir al-Sayyid. Beyond that, the author points to the start of Mashyakhat al-'Aql's religious leadership since at least the beginning of the 18th century. However, the Druze sources mention the institution since the second half of the 19th century, that is, since the period of al-Mutasarrifiyyat (1861 – 1916). The fourth chapter of the work is a significant contribution because it examines the structural developments of this institution from the 15th century until the fall of the Ottoman Empire in the second decade of the past century.

Abou Zaki's research excels in several ways, both from a research and historical standpoint. First, this book presents a comprehensive historical study of the development of one of the most important religious institutions in the history of the Druze in Lebanon while they were, for hundreds of years, the political and intellectual center of gravity of the Druze in the region. Second, the book presents historical research based on various sources, including manuscripts, literature, biographical books, oral tradition, and more. The use of manuscripts gives this research a distinctly authentic dimension since these are primary sources used here

for the first time. The third advantage of historical research here is that it touches on the historical development of the institution of religious and spiritual authority among the Druze community. The research shows that since the death of al-Amir al-Sayyid in the 15th century, the religious leadership of the Druze community has been vested with two combined authorities: one as the authority over religious matters and the other as the custodian of the community's religious endowments and holy sites. From the beginning of the 19th century, a separation emerged and took shape between the two parallel authorities. One is a religious authority based on religious knowledge and piety. From the point of view of the religious community, it holds a significant position as the guardian and final arbiter in matters of religion, morals, and religious law, focusing on a conventional process rather than a summarized and organized procedure (Abou-Zaki 2021, 268). In contrast, the institution of Mashyakhat al-'Aql is a representative religious authority, both within the community and outward. The debate over the duality of the two authorities has lasted for decades. The book details the separation of the two authorities towards the beginning of the 19th century, is a significant refinement, and contributes to studying the history of the Druze in Lebanon, which has always been a focus of imitation for the other Druze communities in the Middle East.

As stated, this book presents a historical re-discussion in the sense of following the development of the institution of Druze community religious leadership in Lebanon from the time of al-Amir al-Sayyed to the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Based on a wide variety of sources, the historical research proceeds from the well-known premise that there is no written record of the history of the Druze in the period between the 11th century and the appearance of Al-Amir al-Sayyed in the 15th century. From the introduction of the reform by al-Amir al-Sayyed until the beginning of the 19th century, religious leadership held both the authority of religious guidance and the authority of management of religious life (Abou-Zaki 2021, 265). Since then, a new trend has emerged: forming a dual model of religious-spiritual authority. The first is based on knowledge, and the second is an official religious authority authorized to manage religious life, but usually not an authority in religious guidance (Abou-Zaki 2021, 266-269).

The research focuses on another, no less significant, development that continues to accompany the institution of the Mashyakhat Al-'Aql, and that is the division of the Shaykh Al-'Aql Institution into two wings according to the political division that exists among the Druze community in Lebanon (Abou-Zaki 2021, 276-278): one for the Junblati faction and another on behalf of the Yazbeki camp.

The author goes on to discuss the innovations and the roles assigned to Shaykh al-'Aql (a term that, since the 19th century, mainly indicated the official-representative authority) during the period of al-Mutasariffiyat (Abou-Zaki 2021, 293-298). In this context, it is essential to mention that the office of Shaykh al-'Aql was granted judicial authorities during the Mutasarrifiyyat period (Abou-Zaki 2021, 301).

The author presented a well-founded, consistent, and well-constructed historical discussion. At the same time, there is room to raise three comments. First, it would have been better methodologically to include the discussion in the first chapter rather than in the third and fourth chapters. Contrasting the existing narratives and theses with the author's innovative arguments would have been better. Presenting the author's arguments alongside existing narratives and theses would illustrate the innovation the author brings. Secondly, the author's thesis regarding the involvement of Emir Bashir Shihab II in creating the schism lacks convincing evidence and substantiation. I suggest discussing this question: Was the religious leadership division not a consequence of the political division and even inevitable? To the best of my judgment, the attribution of the split to Emir Bashir Shihab II is based more on the dominance of the Emir in the historical narrative of the Druze in Lebanon than on historical evidence. A third inevitable point is the degree of interaction between the spiritual leadership and the political leadership of the Druze community in Lebanon, particularly since the latter succeeded in establishing an autonomous government in the southern region of Mountain Lebanon. In light of this, it was essential to examine the degree of autonomy of the clerical class compared to the power of a political-feudal leadership that managed to connect the peasantry to it and build a harmonious model between the feudal leadership and the Druze peasantry.

Needless to say, these comments do not diminish the critical contribution of this historical study. We now have another essential contribution to the historical research on the Druze in particular and on Lebanon in general.

"The Evolution and Historical Significance of Mashyakhat al-'Aql in Lebanon," by Akram Khater

Said Abou Zaki's book Mashyakhat 'Aql al-Durūz fī Lubnān: Bahthun fī Usūlihā wa-Ma'nāhā wa-Tatawwurihā is a much-needed, well-researched, and convincingly argued study of the history of the office of Shaykh al-'Aql of the Druze in Lebanon. Its valuable contributions and, at the same time, its internal tensions are embodied in the three different goals it tries to achieve while exploring the rise,

meaning, and development of this highest position of religious authority within the Lebanese Druze community. In equal parts, it is a historiographical essay, an origins story, and a history of Mashyakhat al-ʿAql.

In his introduction, Abou Zaki sets the stage for the book by discussing the political crisis that engulfed Mashyakhat al-ʿAql in Lebanon, which started with the succession crisis of 1991 and continued through the 2006 parliamentary legislation aimed at regulating the religious affairs of the Druze community in Lebanon. Throughout, the political rivalry between Walid Jumblatt and Talal Arslan cast a shadow on the efforts to designate a singular Shaykh al-ʿAql as the religious leader of the community and an elected council to assist him in regulating the religious affairs and endowments of Lebanon's Druze.

From this premise, Abou Zaki argues that the constant political crises from 1920 forward engulfing–and undermining at times–the position of Shaykh al-ʿAql is due to a lack of understanding of the history of this position. Thus, he contends that his research (first published in 2008 as an MA thesis in the Department of History at the American University of Beirut) is a much-needed step towards overcoming the problems of the position. While perhaps overly optimistic in his assessment of how much attention political elites pay to historians, his book remains pertinent at many other levels.

Abou Zaki dedicates his first chapter to a historiographical essay that dismisses all of the existing secondary literature. From the outset, he notes that every one of these secondary sources suffers from one or more fatal flaws. Within his category of "historical narratives," he argues that the three existing foundational texts about Shaykh al-ʿAql, Abu-Shaqra (1952), Salman (1963), and Talih (1971) are not based on primary sources, are full of errors, and lack any historical rigor. As Abou Zaki notes: "All of these [three narratives] suffer from serious systemic errors because they did not rely on documented historical sources…[and] did not follow the principles of proper scientific research method." (Abou Zaki 2021, 35). From this premise, Abou Zaki then contends that all other non-historical studies that followed copied the errors and assumptions of these three texts.

Abou Zaki then proceeds to list, discuss, and evaluate primary sources that may be useful in writing a more "accurate" history of Mashyakhat al-ʿAql as a way of dealing with these problems. Amongst the various sources he listed are contemporary histories of the community, such as the 15th century Tarikh Beirut, biographies of major Druze religious leaders, European travelers' accounts, and legal and financial documents such as wills, deeds of sale, and even material objects such

as tombstones. Abou Zaki's thorough analysis of each type of primary source, as well as his profound engagement with its limitations and even biases, provide an invaluable service to any researcher interested in Druze's historical studies.

With the foundation laid for "proper historical research," Abou Zaki then proceeds over the following two chapters to present his narrative of how Mashyakhat al-'Aql came to be. He concurs that the development of "local" Druze religious authorities in Bilad al-Sham began shortly after the collapse of their relationship with the Isma'ili imamate in Egypt in the first half of the 11th century. However, he argues against previous narratives that without the existence of reliable primary sources, it is difficult, if not impossible, to write anything definitively about that development between the early 11th and mid-15th centuries or about the term Mashyakhat al-'Aql and its history. Thus, his narrative begins and focuses almost exclusively on events after the 15th century, and particularly on al-Amir al-Sayyid, whom he regards as the foundational figure in the re-invention and invigoration of the position of local Druze leaders in Bilad al-Sham. Abou Zaki dedicates a significant part of his third chapter to an in-depth analysis of the etymology of the two words "shaykh" and "'aql." He then pivots to explore the virtues that anyone aspiring to be Shaykh al-'Aql should possess. In this way, the biography of al-Amir al-Sayyid and his renowned qualities become the template for subsequent religious leaders to emulate. For example, Abou Zaki argues that al-Amir al-Sayyid proclaimed the concept of 'aql as the only way for humans to rise and reach the full extent of their abilities and to do so in order to better worship God (Abou Zaki 2021, 159).

Abou Zaki concludes his book by discussing the historical development of Shaykh al-'Aql's position. Once again, Abou Zaki highlights the oversized role of al-Amir al-Sayyid in two other matters. First, Abou Zaki fully credits him with creating the hierarchy of Druze religious authorities, from the village to the highest position. Moreover, he established the tradition of waqf, or religious endowments controlled by religious authorities, thus giving them greater freedom of action during the Ottoman period in Lebanon. Abou Zaki said these two developments created Mashyakhat 'Aql al-Durūz fī Lubnān. This position was politicized only in the 19th century when Emir Bashir Shihab II punished the Druze rebellion against his rule by introducing a council of elders to govern the community alongside Shaykh al-'Aql. This council was–and continues to be–split between Junblati and Yazbeki factions, thus undermining the unity of the community and the power of Shaykh al-'Aql.

While this last part of his argument seemed rushed and had little historical context, the book nonetheless remains an essential contribution to the history of the Druze community in Lebanon. It is convincing and insightful in its critique of the existing literature on Mashyakhat al-'Aql, enlightening in its exploration of primary sources, and thorough (albeit painstakingly at times) in its narration of the development of offices of Druze religious authority in Lebanon. In this sense, the book is an excellent resource for graduate students and scholars alike who wish to delve further or for the first time into this topic.

"Institutionalization of Druze Religious Leadership in Lebanon and Ottoman Influence," by Tuba Yildiz

The Ottoman period (1516 -1918) holds special significance in the study of Lebanese history. Therefore, research on Lebanon during the Ottoman era must rely on two central perspectives. The first of these centers is Lebanon, which forms the primary base due to its internal dynamics. The second center is the Ottoman capital, Istanbul. The second center's importance lies in revealing policies toward Lebanon, enabling a narrative of state-society relations. In this context, examining both Lebanese and Ottoman perspectives together will facilitate a broader understanding of the subject within the framework of the sectarian dynamics in that period.

In line with the statements above, Said Abou Zaki's comprehensive research on institutionalizing Druze religious leadership from the 11th century to the early 20th century encompasses a multifaceted perspective. This study, prepared as a master thesis in 2008, consists of 4 chapters and 387 pages. In the first two chapters, the author conducts a source analysis by taking an inventory of the studies on the institution of Shaykh al-'Aql and examining the sources (Abou Zaki 2021, 20-125). In this regard, Abou Zaki draws attention to the lack of historical readings necessary for accurately presenting the historical perspective by analyzing three fundamental works in the first section. The author also emphasizes the importance of questioning the information provided by historical sources when investigating a fact in order to reach accurate conclusions. Abou Zaki has found that many works written in the 20th century contain erroneous information about the earlier periods of the Druze (Abou Zaki 2021, 20). As a result, the author's contribution, which aims to achieve true knowledge through comparative studies, is highly significant. Abou Zaki also discusses works on the institution of Shaykh al-'Aql in fields other than the field of history, pointing out that the information provided

without touching on the historical background is incomplete and doubtful (Abou Zaki 2021, 28). The last two chapters highlight the emergence of Shaykh al-'Aql and the role the religious institution played in the historical process. This review focuses on the book's historical perspective, drawing attention to the connection between the Ottoman Empire's policies and the institutionalization of Druze religious leadership.

Abou Zaki provides important clues about the development period of the Druze religious institution and the socio-religious dominance of the Ottoman Empire in the region. In this context, the author quotes Kamal Salibi in the first chapter, who stated that the Druze institutions of Shaykh al-'Aql were subordinate to local administrations or tax collectors (muqataajis) under the Sunni state (Abou Zaki 2021, 24). When questioning the source and validity of this quote by Salibi, the author implies that the state's relationship with the region's administrative structure also influenced the position of religious authorities. The Ottoman State continued this system, which was prevalent during the Mamluk period. Since the Ottoman state, affiliated with the Hanafi sect, did not question the existence of religious institutions of non-Sunni communities or intervene in the religious authority's relation to the muqataajis, it is possible to interpret the state-society relationship differently. For example, after the Druze broke ties with the Ismaili Imamate in Egypt around the middle of the 11th century, there was no clarity regarding the position of religious leadership for a long time. Despite the dominance of the Tanukhis in the region, religious institutionalization developed due to the political transformation of local dynamics with the Ottoman State's dominance. The author mentions that local religious figures took over the religious leadership role in the Druze community from the 11th to the 15th century (Abou Zaki 2021, 48). Therefore, while Shaykh al-'Aql's history began in the 11th century, it is evident that institutionalization intensified during the period of al-Amir al-Sayyid Jamaluddin Abdallah al-Tanukhi (Abou Zaki 2021, 1417-1479) in the 15th century.

Based on the cited references, Said Abou Zaki expresses that information about the position of Shaykh al-'Aql up until the time of Sayyid Jamaluddin remains unclear. This is because extant sources provide general rather than specific information (Abou Zaki 2021, 187). To illustrate, the author emphasizes that before the process of institutionalization, fundamental concepts and principles, such as the distinction between "'uqqal" and "juhhal" and the principles of "al-amr bel ma'ruf wa nahy 'anil munkar," were not fully clarified (Abou Zaki 2021, 191).

On the other hand, the author's observation is noteworthy in understanding

how some local sources perceived Fakhraddin's rebellion. Indeed, Fakhreddin's loss of allies in the center of the Ottoman Empire brought about a crackdown on his activities. Yet, it becomes clear that Fakhreddin's rebellion is seen as important in terms of local dynamics. However, the author does not discuss the topic. If he had included details about the politics of the Ottoman state in the region, he could have increased the book's richness by revealing the central government's perspective in the sections where he discussed the development and transformation of the Druze religious leadership.

The 19th century was pivotal for both Mount Lebanon and the Druze community. Following two civil wars, establishing a new regional administrative system demonstrated the Ottoman Empire's shift in sectarian policies. This change, however, led to a challenging transition for local governance. The political transformation in the region necessitated the redefinition and evolution of religious institutions. Abou Zaki notes that during this period, the Druze formalized their religious leadership, using the term "Shaykh al-'Aql" for the first time following the establishment of the Mount Lebanon Mutasarrifiyyat (Abou Zaki 2021, 167).

Another critical part of the book highlights the role of the waqf in institutionalizing Druze religious leadership (Abou Zaki 2021, 243). Al-Amir al-Sayyid planned for the Druze Shaykhs al-'Aql to avoid worldly works and to have their income sourced from donations to newly established waqfs. The author's detailed explanations on this topic provide critical insights into the development of institutionalization and the integration of Druze religious leadership with the broader community. The study also reveals that the number of waqfs established by senior Druze 'Uqqal increased rapidly during this period (Abou Zaki 2021, 243). This development coincided with the Ottoman Empire's efforts to integrate the waqf system into society. In fact, during the 16th century, Ottoman waqfs experienced their most prosperous period, paralleling the Empire's rise. The largest and most significant waqfs belong to this era. Although waqfs occasionally weakened in later periods, they consistently maintained their vitality throughout the Ottoman era, contributing to the creation of a waqf tradition within the Ottoman Empire.

The Druze waqfs hold significance not only for their own community but also for the ruling Ottoman state's social policies and its emphasis on institutionalization. As a result, political and legal transformations in the region sometimes brought issues related to waqfs to Istanbul's attention. For instance, a case mentioned in the author's work (Abou Zaki 2021, 247) reached the Ottoman archives, where the relevant documents are filed under number DAB, MTZ. CL, 5/182/2/1,

1 Rebiülevvel 1322 (16 May 1904). This highlights how the book provides insights into Ottoman policies. Additionally, the book notes the similarities with the Ottoman waqf system concerning religious waqfs (Abou Zaki 2021, 260). Hence, by setting out the conditions of the waqf, the author also exemplifies the relationship between society and the state.

Another vital part of the work that draws attention is the author's reliance on the science of Islamic theology while making conceptual discussions in the third chapter. In this sense, the book not only serves as a history book but also contributes to enhancing the representation of Druze in the field of science of theology through its philosophical underpinnings.

Said Abou Zaki's work offers valuable contributions to understanding Druze history and sheds light on Lebanon's political and social situation in the 18th and 19th centuries. Therefore, this book will serve as an important reference for understanding the formation of religious institutions and state policies.

RESPONSE

"Revisiting the Office of Shaykh al-'Aql and Druze Institutional Traditions," by Said Abou Zaki

I am honored to have read four critical reviews of my book, written by esteemed scholars from diverse academic and social backgrounds. Each reviewer highlighted aspects related to their respective fields of expertise and research interests, offering varied insights into the book's content, methodology, structure, and scope. I want to start by expressing my sincere gratitude for their thoughtful examination and valuable reviews. The book received positive evaluations from all four reviewers, who suggested ways to strengthen certain sections. In this response, I aim to engage with some of their comments to further clarify what the book seeks to address and what it offers.

In the preface, I expressed my hope that this book would contribute positively to resolving the long-standing conflicts that have plagued the Office of Shaykh al-'Aql in Lebanon over the past 80 years. Khater noted that I might have overstated my optimism about the attention political elites might pay to historians. While I agree that politicians rarely consider historians, I argue that they often rely on flawed historical narratives to advance their agendas. Without a solid and objective historical account of institutions such as the Office of Shaykh al-'Aql and

the Druze Waqf, these narratives can be manipulated to serve political purposes. In the following paragraphs, I will demonstrate how providing a purposeful and rigorous historical account improves our understanding of the crises affecting the Office of Shaykh al-ʿAql and contributes to resolving them.

The relevance of the topics I prioritized became evident early in my research, particularly through interviews with senior Druze religious authorities. These interviews revealed a long-standing conflict between two camps within the Druze religious and political hierarchy, dating back to the 1930s. One camp, composed primarily of the highest religious authorities, represented the Conservatives, while the other camp, composed of leading Druze politicians and ambitious religious figures from secondary ranks, represented the Modernizers. The latter sought to introduce a modern administrative structure to the Druze religious institutions, replacing the customary laws governing Druze's personal status with codified statutes suited to modern times.[1] The Conservatives, however, resisted these changes, seeking to preserve the unwritten customs that regularized Druze religious institutions for centuries. The book's findings reveal that the history of Druze religious institutions strongly supports the Conservatives' stance. However, they were unable to capitalize on this advantage in their struggle with the Modernizers due to their lack of a true historical understanding of the very traditions they sought to preserve (Abou Zaki 2021, 140-141). The Modernizers, on the other hand, leveraged the legislative powers granted to Druze politicians by the Lebanese confessional system to advance their goals by passing binding laws in the Parliament.

The Modernizers achieved their first significant victory in 1948 when the Lebanese Parliament passed the first Druze personal status law, drafted by Druze politicians (Talih 1971, 16-41). After Husayn Talih, the Shaykh al-ʿAql serving in the Junblati seat died in 1949, the two camps engaged in an open confrontation. Druze politicians sought to appoint a religiously uncommitted Druze in his place, aiming to strengthen their camp's ability to implement changes within the Druze religious institutions and practices. Their leading candidate was ʿAref Abu Shaqra, the author of the first modern account of the history of Mashyakhat al-ʿAql, which he published three years later. However, a group of young, activist Conservatives outmaneuvered the Druze politicians by secretly lobbying for a religiously committed member of the same family, Muhammad Abu Shaqra, who had no notable religious standing at the time. They hoped that the Abu Shaqra family, wanting to see one of them appointed to the prestigious office, would rally behind Shaykh

[1] Shaykh Abu Salih Farhan al-ʿAridi, Interview, 2004.

Muhammad because his religious commitment gave him a far better chance of becoming the new Shaykh al-ʻAql.[2]

The Conservatives achieved significant success in 1949. They blocked Druze politicians from appointing the new Shaykh al-ʻAql and influenced them to publicly acknowledge that the right to name the two Shaykhs al-ʻAql belongs to the ʻUqqal (Doha Magazine, 1992, 39–40). They also avoided the precedent of appointing a religiously uncommitted Druze to this office. However, they soon faced major setbacks. Their appointee, Shaykh Muhammad Abu Shaqra, gradually adopted many of the modernizers' objectives. Meanwhile, ʻAref Abu Shaqra's flawed narrative about the office's definition, functions, and history gained ground among the modernizers and the wider Druze community. This added a layer of obscurity to the already forgotten institutional traditions of the Shaykh al-ʻAql office. Despite its lack of historical accuracy or value, this narrative falsely claimed that the Shaykh al-ʻAql was the highest spiritual leader of the Druze and the functional heir to the Fatimid Imam (Abou Zaki 2021, 29-30), a view Shaykh Muhammad eventually endorsed. The Conservatives' failure to invoke these lost traditions in their discourse made it easier for the modernizers to pursue their agenda, as they appeared to be building sectarian laws and institutions on a blank slate.

In 1962, the Lebanese Parliament passed two additional laws drafted by Druze politicians. The first established the Druze Sectarian Council, and the second regulated the election of Shaykh al-ʻAql. The primary function of this Council, which was predominantly made up of religiously uncommitted members, was to manage the Druze Waqf. The new law stripped the Shaykh al-ʻAql of all his traditional functions, and the ʻUqqal lost their right to decide who to appoint as Shaykh al-ʻAql in the future. Moreover, politicians appointed religiously uncommitted Druze to serve as judges in the Druze judiciary, a role previously reserved for the ʻUqqal. All these changes starkly contrasted the long-established Druze institutional traditions, which I uncovered for the first time in my book. The Conservatives viewed these actions as continued violations of the legitimate traditional rights of religious authorities, further deepening the rift between the two camps.

The charismatic and ambitious character of Shaykh Muhammad Abu Shaqra allowed him to appropriate an exaggerated religious and political role, justified by the previously mentioned mistaken definition of the office that he promoted. This expanded role posed a challenge to both Druze politicians and religious authorities, further complicating the position of Shaykh al-ʻAql. His death in 1991 sparked

[2] Shaykh Abu Muhammad Najib Ghannam, Interview, 2004.

another succession conflict, this time between the highest religious authorities and prominent Druze politician Walid Jumblatt. A behind-the-scenes struggle between them and Jumblatt lasted for thirty years, during which the politicians and modernizers achieved all their institutional goals in 2006 after the Lebanese Parliament passed the Law for Regulating the Affairs of the Druze Community. The conflict became public in 2022 when Shaykh Amin al-Sayegh, the current spiritual leader of the Druze in Lebanon, declared that he would not recognize Jumblatt's appointee, Sami Abi al-Muna, as Shaykh al-'Aql. This created an unprecedented situation where a formally appointed Shaykh al-'Aql lacked the recognition of the sect's spiritual leader (Abou Zaki 2023, 6-7).

Many Druze, particularly younger generations, often wonder how such deep dissonance has developed across various sectors of their community. A significant part of the answer lies in the legislative powers granted to Druze politicians by the Lebanese confessional system, allowing them to shape the community's laws and institutions according to their preferences. The other part stems from the complete disregard for Druze institutional traditions. In this latter area, I hope to offer a valuable contribution by rediscovering and explaining the historical evolution of the Druze religious hierarchy and the institutional traditions governing their religious affairs. As Khater suggested, no scholarly research alone, however authentic and credible, can fully resolve these complex disputes. Yet, once a spirit of reconciliation emerges and politicians decide to bridge the gap with the highest religious authorities, a well-researched and objective account of the core issues, as thoroughly explained in this book, will undoubtedly be a valuable foundation for dialogue and a necessary background for resolving these disputes fairly.

The reviewers suggested some improvements to the book. Akram Khater and Tuba Yildiz saw that the historical account of how the Office of Shaykh al-'Aql in Lebanon evolved, especially its institutionalization, lacked sufficient contextualization within the broader history of Lebanon under Ottoman rule. Abdul-Rahman Chamseddine suggested that more examples of the shortcomings of secondary literature would have strengthened my critique. Yusri Hazran indicated that the book lacked an account of the relationship between the Druze religious authorities and the political leaders of the community, mainly the feudal lords of Mount Lebanon. While I generally agree with them on the benefits of their suggestions, I would like to explain certain practical limitations within which I had to frame my research.

I wrote this book to fulfill the requirements for my MA in Arab and Middle Eastern History at the American University of Beirut (AUB). As a result, there were limits on its length and scope, which necessitated a selective focus on topics most relevant to the secondary literature and the concerns of the Druze community in Lebanon. The book's title highlights its central themes—origin, meaning, and evolution—to indicate these limits. I opted for "development" rather than "history" in the title, as the latter would have required adding a separate chapter on the political role of the religious authorities, which was beyond the scope of my research (as explained in the Preface, page 15). This is particularly relevant to the third point in Hazran's critique.

Given the foundational nature of this research, I tried to overcome its limitation by deliberately inserting hints in both the main text and footnotes, indicating topics for further exploration in future studies. When compared with the assertions from specialized scholars about the difficulty of attempting an academic study on the topic (footnote 16, pp. 15-16), the suggestions from the reviewers to elaborate on certain issues highlight the originality of this work and its potential to open new avenues of research. For instance, my periodization of the key developments in the office of Shaykh al-'Aql during the 19th century was designed to allude to the broader historical context. I divided these developments into three phases: the final 15 years of Emir Bashir Shihab II's rule, during which he monopolized power in Mount Lebanon with the support of Muhammad 'Ali Pasha of Egypt, the Double Qaimaqamate, and the Mutasarrifiyyat regime of Mount Lebanon. This division lays the groundwork for future research into how these political and social changes in Mount Lebanon affected the office of Shaykh al-'Aql, addressing the broader contextualization that Yildiz and Khater suggested. Similarly, the analysis I presented in Chapter Three on the local socio-political origins of the title Shaykh al-'Aql helps researchers explore possible links to the Ottoman administrative structure and regional policies, as Yildiz suggested. Yildiz's discussion of the Druze Waqf (charitable endowment) also underscores the originality of my research, which established for the first time the Druze Waqf's organic connection to the office of Shaykh al-'Aql.

Chamseddine noted that my critique of the secondary literature could have included more "concrete examples of inaccuracies" and that specific terms, such as Junblati-Yazbeki partisanship, were not adequately defined for readers. The conciseness of the thematic critique stemmed from my thesis advisor's request to significantly reduce the length of the first draft, advising that I develop the

omitted parts in future academic articles. One of the omitted parts explored the uncertainties around whether, before abolishing feudalism in 1861, Druze subjects' loyalty to the Junblati and Yazbeki parties crossed district boundaries or if it was restricted to their feudal lords' territories. This analysis was important for understanding how the hometown of Shaykh al-'Aql might have influenced his political orientations. However, I excluded this and other significant topics to keep the thesis within its limits.

On a more specific note, Hazran highlighted the importance of the book's argument in explaining the nature of the division that the Office of Shaykh al-'Aql underwent in the 19th century. However, he found the claim that Emir Bashir Shihab II was responsible for this division "lacks convincing evidence and substantiation," suggesting that it stemmed more from the Emir's prominence in the historical narrative of the Druze in Lebanon than from solid historical evidence. In his critique, Hazran implied that my analysis, whether consciously or not, reflected a bias inherent in the Druze narrative. Explaining this division and its historical context was one of my thesis's most challenging yet original aspects. After a thorough examination of contemporary documents, I was able to reasonably demonstrate that the division began in 1825 (Abou Zaki 2021, 272–290), the same year that Emir Bashir II, supported by regional allies, quelled a major Druze uprising, orchestrated the execution of their leading feudal lords by Ottoman provincial authorities, and monopolized political power in Mount Lebanon.

Two written accounts further supported this conclusion. The first was by an unknown Druze historian, Muhammad Abdul Samad, who stated that Emir Bashir II appointed two Shaykhs to the Office of Shaykh al-'Aql in 1825 (Abou Zaki 2021, 278), whom I demonstrated to be the first dual holders of the office. The second account came from British orientalist Colonel Churchill, who lived in Mount Lebanon for a decade, beginning just 17 years after establishing the aforementioned duality in the Office of Shaykh al-'Aql. Churchill noted that Emir Bashir II attempted to bring Druze religious authority under his control by appointing a Shaykh al-'Aql loyal to him. However, he was unsuccessful due to the strict spiritual qualifications required for the 'uqqal to recognize a Shaykh's prominence.

On the other hand, Emir Haydar Shihab, a close ally of Bashir, stated that one of the Druze's highest religious authorities, Shaykh Yusuf al-Halabi, was captured and imprisoned for his involvement in the 1825 uprising against Bashir. Moreover, a widely known oral tradition among the Druze recounts that Shaykh Abu 'Ali Yusuf Abu Ruslan, from Ras al-Matn, who served as the spiritual leader of the Druze

from 1826 to 1828, was also imprisoned after the conflict ended and subjected to torture. The Hamadies of Baʿaqlin, who were Bashir's allies at the time, mediated his release. Although Shaykh Abu Ruslan was freed, he had to reside in Baʿaqlin and spent the remaining three years of his life in one of its religious retreats, Ras al-Nahl, where he was later buried. His grave became a revered shrine among the Druze.

This harsh treatment of Druze religious figures indicates that Emir Bashir II viewed them as a serious threat to his autocratic rule, treating them with the same severity he applied to Druze feudal lords. Thus, it is unsurprising that he sought to weaken their political influence by dividing the prestigious Office of Shaykh al-ʿAql into two seats—one Junblati and one Yazbeki—thereby exacerbating existing political divisions within the community.

Lastly, I believe it is crucial to address Khater's remark about my portrayal of al-Amir al-Sayyed Abdullah al-Tanukhi, where he mentions that I gave him an "oversized" role in developing the Druze local religious institutions. I did not base my emphasis on al-Tanukhi's central role as a religious reformer who firmly re-established the basic religious hierarchy and institutional customs of the Druze community in Mount Lebanon, and which other Druze communities across the Levant later emulated, on mere conjecture. Instead, it was a conclusion well-supported by primary sources (Abou Zaki 2021, 244-245) and reflected in the current practices of the Druze ʿUqqal. While gathering oral histories about the lives and practices of twentieth-century Druze religious authorities, I consistently encountered the meticulous observance of al-Amir al-Sayyed's teachings, even in the simplest aspects of daily life, which further reinforced his profound influence on the community.

With that in mind, the insightful feedback from the reviewers highlighted several areas where future researchers can build on the findings in my book, further enriching our understanding of the Office of Shaykh al-ʿAql and its historical evolution while making new and original contributions to the field of Druze Studies. Finally, I want to sincerely thank Dr. Rami Zeedan, editor of the *DSJ*, for offering this valuable platform to engage in a thoughtful academic discourse about my work.

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Druze Studies Journal

Article

Bibliography of Periodical Literature on the Druze in 2023

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Abstract

This article lists peer-reviewed books, book chapters, and articles published in English in 2023 relevant to Druze Studies. The classification of entries occurs under the following headings: Biology & Health; Education; History; Language & Literature; Politics; Religious Studies; Socioeconomics; and Women, Gender, & Sexuality. The survey included 67 entries in 2023. Through this investigation and the organization of the literature along with the categorization, a few patterns emerged, revealing trends and gaps in the academic literature on the Druze community. The relative lack of coverage on education, language and literature, and religious studies reveals a general gap in the literature on these subjects. However, in several of the other, more robust categories, such as biology & health, politics, socioeconomics, and women, gender, & sexuality, a disproportionate regional focus began to emerge. In these categories and in 2023 literature on the Druze as a whole, a majority of work focused explicitly or in large part on the Israeli Druze community, despite Israeli Druze constituting less than ten percent of the overall Druze population.

Keywords: *Druze; Literature review; Biology & Health; Education; History; Language & Literature; Politics; Religious Studies; Socioeconomics; and Women, Gender, & Sexuality.*

Introduction

For this survey, we have included 67 articles, book chapters, and books published in 2023 that focused on the Druze or included at least one Druze community as part of the research. The "Literature on the Druze in 2023" section lists the entries below. The entries include truncated abstracts, which, where possible, derive from the authors' original abstracts while also explaining the work's relevance to the Druze. As part of the survey, we have included only peer-reviewed publications appearing in English. In future iterations of the Druze Studies Journal's Bibliography of Periodical Literature on Druze, we will consider surveying publications in other languages and include a section on master's thesis and PhD dissertations, among other scholarship.

Through collecting the literature, we decided to organize the scholarship into eight categories—Biology & Health; Education; History; Language & Literature; Politics; Religious Studies; Socioeconomics; and Women, Gender, & Sexuality—with each subject intended to focus the conversation on trends and gaps in the literature.

The Biology & Health category includes 13 publications and predominantly centers on Druze genetics. However, five of the pieces discuss the social dynamics of the Israeli Druze community concerning health. Eight articles in the category discuss only the Israeli Druze community, while four are general, and one studies Lebanese Druze specifically. These publications highlight diverse research areas, focusing on genetic disorders, health disparities, and cultural practices affecting health outcomes within the Druze community. The articles range from genetic screenings, such as Avnat et al.'s study on pathogenic variants in autosomal recessive disorders among the Druze, to broader health and lifestyle issues, such as the impacts of COVID-19 on the quality of life among the Druze and stigma around breast cancer in the Druze community, as discussed by Elsinga et al. and Gershfeld-Litvin et al. respectively. Overall, the literature in 2023 showcases a growing interest in personalized medicine approaches and highlights the unique genetic and health profiles of the Druze, pointing to the importance of culturally tailored health interventions and policies.

The Education category contains four articles and comprises pieces that discuss topics such as achievement predictors in education, the intersection of education and politics, and research methods in Israel and the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights. These publications examine the challenges and dynamics affecting Druze students across various educational settings, reflecting broader themes of

cultural and socioeconomic impacts on educational outcomes. Barselai Shaham et al. explore education under sociopolitical uncertainty, particularly among the Golan Heights Druze, showcasing educational opportunities' personal and societal value in unstable conditions. Orland-Barak et al. address the moral dilemmas mentors face in culturally and politically charged environments, pointing out the intricate link between these challenges and the mentors' cultural and political contexts. Meanwhile, Paz-Baruch and Hazema study the impact of socioeconomic status on self-regulated learning and motivation in STEM disciplines, with significant findings for gifted and high-achieving students from lower socioeconomic backgrounds. Collectively, these studies emphasize the complex interplay between educational achievements and the multifaceted contexts of cultural identity, socio-economic status, and political conditions, advocating for tailored educational strategies that accommodate the unique needs of Druze students.

As a category, the History section is one of the most varied in the study. Split relatively evenly between Lebanese, Syrian, and Israeli history, the eight articles cover predominantly military and conflict history and discuss migration, memory, and religious group relations over time. These publications reflect a deepening interest in examining the role and experiences of the Druze community within broader regional conflicts and transformations across the Middle East. Aboultaif's exploration of the Lebanese Armed Forces highlights the Druze's historical engagement with military structures in Lebanon. Similarly, Lawson and Magued focus on the Druze community's involvement in the Syrian uprising and the broader geopolitical dynamics that affect them, emphasizing sectarian alliances and political resilience.

Conversely, Naor and Mehmet Ali delve into inter-communal relations and educational strategies affecting the Druze under the Ottomans and early Israeli state, respectively. Tufaro's work on sectarian conflict and Rodriguez's exploration of religious soundscapes in Mount Lebanon provide insights into the socio-political and cultural life of the Druze. These studies collectively contribute to a nuanced understanding of the historical development of the Druze's complex identity and their adaptive strategies in the face of political and social upheavals, offering fresh perspectives on historical and contemporary issues.

The Language & Literature category contains only five publications, including a book on code-switching in Israel, religious and sect-based variation in Syrian Arabic, and two articles on Jordanian Druze Arabic phonology and social perception. These publications emphasize the unique linguistic features and socio-political dy-

namics shaping language usage among the Druze in the Middle East. Alshdaifat and Khashashneh's detailed analysis of Jordanian Druze Arabic marks a significant study of this dialect's phonological characteristics, highlighting intricate aspects such as syllable structure and emphasis spread. Kheir, within a broader sociolinguistic context, explores how language patterns, particularly code-switching, both reflect and construct sociopolitical identity among the Israeli Druze, suggesting a deep intertwinement between language use and identity formation. Meanwhile, Mohamad's examination of linguistic variation in Tartus, Syria, provides insight into how language variants, such as the pronunciation of "Qaf," can signify religious and social affiliation during times of conflict, underscoring the adaptive nature of language in politically tense environments. These studies collectively enrich our understanding of how language functions as a vehicle for expressing cultural, social, and political identities, especially within a minority like the Druze, reflecting ongoing changes and challenges in their sociolinguistic landscapes.

In addition, one piece of literature in this category provides a nuanced exploration of diasporic and fictional narratives that enrich our understanding of Druze's identity and history. Donovan's study on Eveline Bustros focuses on how literary and artistic expression of the complicated nature of Syrian and Lebanese diasporic nationalism is expressed. The piece emphasizes how fluid identities transcend the traditional confines of nation-states and invoke a broader, more intricate view of nationalism influenced by transnational movements and bourgeois mobility.

The Politics category is the most diverse under our organization system, containing 14 articles on various contemporary political issues. Half of these articles focus entirely on Israeli political dynamics, while a further three articles investigate Israel's relationship with the Druze in Syria and the Golan Heights specifically. The remaining five articles cover various topics, including two on Syria, two on Lebanon, and one on Druze in politics. This diversity of topics reflects a comprehensive understanding of the geopolitical and social dynamics affecting the Druze communities across the Middle East. Research from 2023 shows a heightened focus on how regional conflicts and state policies impact the Druze, particularly within the contexts of Israeli, Syrian, and Lebanese politics.

For example, Baker's analysis of Iran's influence in Syria touches on the Shi'afication of regions where Druze communities reside, indicating broader geopolitical shifts affecting minority religious groups. Similarly, the Beeri and Zaidan study evaluates local governance reforms in Israel, including their impact on

Druze localities, emphasizing the community's engagement with political structures. Moreover, studies like Hazran's examination of the Golan Druze's shifting political attitudes highlight the complex interplay of minority rights, national identity, and political participation. Miles' exploration of the effects of Israel's Nationality Law on the Druze showcases tensions between national legislation and minority community sentiments. The research trends in politics in 2023 not only indicate a strong focus on understanding the political positioning of the Druze within broader regional conflicts and state policies but also underscore the significance of these studies for a nuanced exploration of their unique socio-political challenges and transformations.

The Religious Studies category contains four articles with two distinct subcategories. Two articles explore religious issues, discussing its founder and relationship to Shi'a Islam. The remaining two articles investigate the social implications of the Druze faith when considering modernizing worldviews and suicide, respectively. These publications illustrate a broad analytical exploration into historical and doctrinal aspects of religion and their intersections with modern societal changes and psychological impacts. Ansari and Chelongar critically assess Heinz Halm's portrayal of the Fatimid Caliph al-Hakim, challenging the academic's handling of historical sources. Bayram's work dives into the doctrinal interpretations of Radj'a (return) among Shi'a sub-sects, including the Druze, showcasing the diversity and depth of interpretations within these groups. Kheir's study on integrating modernity and religious worldviews among minority students in Israel, including Druze, reveals how modernization influences religious practices and beliefs. Prazak et al. focus on reincarnation beliefs within the Druze community, debunking the stereotype that such beliefs encourage suicidality, instead highlighting how social contexts influence religious interpretations and behaviors. Collectively, these studies underscore a trend toward critically evaluating historical and theological narratives and examining their practical implications in modern contexts, reflecting a deeper understanding of how religious beliefs shape and are shaped by the evolving dynamics of contemporary life.

The Socioeconomics category follows a similar pattern to politics, covering a wide range of social and economic issues related to the Druze community while focusing predominantly on the Druze of Israel. The majority of the category's eight articles center on the Israeli Druze community, while the remaining articles discuss combinations of the Syrian, Lebanese, and general Druze populations. These publications highlight various community responses to socio-political chal-

lenges, emphasizing the adaptability and resilience of Druze communities in different settings. Ganany-Dagan et al. examine the migration of Druze individuals within Israel, showcasing a trend towards urbanization for educational and professional opportunities. Halabi et al. delve into intergenerational attitudes within the Druze community with the goal of finding stability in cultural norms across generations. The research addresses the dynamic interplay between traditional communal values and modern socioeconomic pressures while demonstrating a nuanced understanding of how socioeconomic factors influence community cohesion, identity, and adaptation in changing environments.

The Women, Gender, & Sexuality category, however, demonstrates the most distinct regional breakdown in favor of Israeli coverage. The category contains 11 articles, nine of which discuss only Israeli Druze. One of the remaining articles discusses Lebanon, while the final article splits the focus between Israel and Lebanon. In terms of gender focus, eight of the articles specifically focus on women. Two articles discuss men's roles as husbands and fathers, and the remaining two investigate youth sexuality and communal fertility.

These publications showcase diverse perspectives on Druze women's evolving roles and societal positions, particularly within Israeli and Lebanese contexts. Abu-Hasan's study on gender roles within the household illustrates varying levels of participation in household duties among Druze men, highlighting a notable difference in gender equality across religious affiliations. Barakat's research emphasizes their agency in the professional and religious spheres, showcasing their significant strides toward autonomy and professional integration. Falah discusses the significant educational advancements of Druze women, reflecting a broader societal shift towards gender parity in higher education. Comparative studies like that of Hazran differentiate the political and social activations of Druze women in Israel versus Lebanon, illustrating varied levels of empowerment and public involvement. These publications reflect a dynamic interplay between traditional roles and contemporary shifts towards gender equality, with Druze women at the forefront of negotiating identity, professional opportunities, and societal expectations in their communities.

Through this investigation, a few patterns emerged, revealing trends and gaps in the academic literature on the Druze community. Some categories, such as Education, Language & Literature, and Religious Studies, needed more significance to extract broader trends. However, the relative lack of coverage in and of itself reveals a general gap in the literature. The most striking trend arising from orga-

nizing the literature along our categorization, however, is the dominance of studies discussing the Israeli Druze over Syrian and Lebanese Druze, despite the community only comprising less than ten percent of the total Druze community. For instance, the Biology & Health, Politics, Socioeconomics, and Women, Gender & Sexuality categories all consisted of predominantly Israeli Druze-related scholarship. Overall, nearly 60 percent of the scholarship in 2023 focused explicitly or in large part on the Israeli Druze community.

Literature on the Druze in 2023

1. Biology & Health

Amiel, Aliza, Wasef Na'amnih, and Mahdi Tarabeih. "Prenatal Diagnosis and Pregnancy Termination in Jewish and Muslim Women with a Deaf Child in Israel." *Children* 10, no. 9(2023): 1438-1448. https://doi.org/10.3390/children10091438

The article examines the differences in attitudes towards performing prenatal invasive tests and pregnancy terminations in Jewish and Muslim women in Israel due to deafness. The article also includes an analysis of Bedouin and Druze communities.

Avnat, Eden, Guy Shapira, Shelly Shoval, Ifat Israel-Elgali, Anna Alkelai, Alan R. Shuldiner, Claudia Gonzaga-Jauregui et al. "Comprehensive genetic analysis of Druze provides insights into carrier screening." *Genes* 14, no. 4 (2023): 937. https://doi.org/10.3390/genes14040937

The article investigates recurring pathogenic variants (PV) in autosomal recessive (AR) disorders in Druze individuals. It concludes that the newly identified PVs associated with AR conditions should be considered for incorporation into prenatal screening options offered to Druze individuals, but only after the results of a more extensive study are validated.

El Andari, Ansar, Mira Khazouh, and Issam Mansour. "Assessing population substructure in the Lebanese population: A population study using data on 23 autosomal short tandem repeats." *Molecular Genetics & Genomic Medicine* 11, no. 4 (2023): e2118. https://doi.org/10.1002/mgg3.2118

This study analyzes a compendium of 23 autosomal STRs typed in 1,400 individuals from the seven major Lebanese religious subcommunities, estimating inbreeding coefficients. Results show a low genetic subdivision within the Lebanese population. To assess the Lebanese subpopulation stratification, the authors analyzed data on subpopulation STR allele frequencies for the seven major Lebanese religious communities, including Druze.

Elsinga, Jelte, Paul Kuodi, Haneen Shibli, Yanay Gorelik, Hiba Zayyad, Ofir Wertheim, Kamal Abu Jabal et al. "Changes in Quality of Life Following SARS-CoV-2 Infection Among Jewish and Arab Populations in Israel: A Cross-Sectional Study." *International Journal of Public Health* 68 (2023): 1605970. https://doi.org/10.3389/ijph.2023.1605970

This study collects socio-demographic, COVID-19-related, and health-related quality of life (HRQoL) information using a questionnaire. It compares pre- and post-COVID-19 HRQoL changes between Jews and Arabs/Druze up to 12+ months post-infection using an adjusted linear regression model. Twelve months post-infection, COVID-19 affected the HRQoL of Arabs/Druze more than Jews, with the gap not fully explained by socio-economic differences. According to the authors, the COVID-19 pandemic may widen pre-existing long-term health inequalities.

Gershfeld-Litvin, A., Halabi, S., and Bellizzi, K. M. "Stigma related to breast cancer among women and men: The case of the Druze minority in Israel." *Journal of Health Psychology* 28, no. 2 (2023): 189-199. https://doi.org/10.1177/13591053221115619

This study explores the stigma related to breast cancer among Druze women and men, as well as identifies factors associated with low screening rates among Druze women. The results suggest a need for psychoeducation about breast cancer screening for minority groups such as the Druze, with male partners of women diagnosed with breast cancer being the primary target recipients.

Harris, Daniel N., Alexander Platt, Matthew EB Hansen, Shaohua Fan, Michael A. McQuillan, Thomas Nyambo, Sununguko Wata Mpoloka, et al. "Diverse African genomes reveal selection on ancient modern human introgressions in Neanderthals." *Current Biology* 33, no. 22 (2023): 4905-4916. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2023.09.066

The article analyzes a high-coverage, whole-genome sequences dataset from 180 individuals from 12 diverse sub-Saharan African populations. The analysis aims to understand better the distribution of Neanderthal similar genome regions across sub-Saharan Africa, their origin, and implications of their distribution within the genome for early anatomically modern human (AMH) and Neanderthal evolution. The results indicate that there have been multiple migration events of AMHs out of Africa and that Neanderthal and AMH

gene flow has been bi-directional with genetic implications for the Druze community.

Hassan, Fadi, Helana Jeries, and Mohammad E. Naffaa. "Challenges in the Timely Diagnosis of Behcet's Disease." *Life* 13, no. 5 (2023): 1157-1166. https://doi.org/10.3390/life13051157

This article aims to understand the clinical manifestations of Behcet's disease and how genetic pathogenesis continues to evolve. The authors argue that further efforts should be made to enhance the currently accepted international classification criteria by incorporating genetic testing (for example, family history or HLA typing) and ethnic group-specific features. The discussion of ethnic group-specific features of the Druze community, among other ethnic groups.

Levi, Gili Reznick, Yael Goldberg, Hanna Segev, Itay Maza, Yuri Gorelik, Ido Laish, Zohar Levi et al. "High prevalence of MUTYH associated polyposis among minority populations in Israel, due to rare founder pathogenic variants." *Digestive and Liver Disease* 55, no. 7 (2023): 880-887. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dld.2023.01.151

The article reviews health records of all Arab and Druze polyposis patients referred for counseling during 2013–2020 who fulfilled the Israeli Genetic Society criteria for MUTYH/APC testing in a tertiary center in Northern Israel and four additional gastro-genetic clinics in Israel. The authors found that MUTYH polyposis accounted for 27% of polyposis cases in the Arab population of Northern Israel. At the same time, the pathogenic variants' spectrum is unique, with a high frequency of the founder variant p.Glu452del. The results may inform the genetic testing strategy in the Israeli Arab population, including Druze.

Matlock, James G. "Congenital physical anomalies associated with deceased persons in reincarnation cases with intermissions of less than nine months." *Explore* 19, no. 2 (2023): 170-175. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.explore.2022.08.019

The study performs a literature review of reincarnation cases involving previously identified individuals, including those from the Druze community. The study considers alternative interpretations of the data, such as reincarnation, as inadequate explanatory models. If examples of reincarnation are available, these cases raise questions about when exactly reincarnation occurs and the

nature of the process, which, according to the author, are essential considerations for biology, medicine, and philosophy. This paper encourages additional research in this area.

Naddaf, Rawi, Shaqed Carasso, Gili Reznick-Levi, Erez Hasnis, Amalfi Qarawani, Itay Maza, Tal Gefen, Elizabeth Emily Half, and Naama Geva-Zatorsky. "Gut microbial signatures are associated with Lynch syndrome (LS) and cancer history in Druze communities in Israel," *Scientific Reports* 13, no. 1 (2023): 20677. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-023-47723-3

This article aims to determine alterations in the gut microbiome compositions of Lynch syndrome (LS) patients with and without cancer. The authors' analysis of Druze individuals reveals specific bacterial operational taxonomic units (OTUs) overrepresented in LS individuals and bacterial OTUs that differentiate between LS individuals with a history of cancer. The identified OTUs have the potential to predispose to cancer or the cancer itself. According to the authors, these bacteria can be considered future therapeutic targets.

Penn, Nadav, and Michal Laron. "Use and barriers to the use of telehealth services in the Arab population in Israel: a cross sectional survey." *Israel Journal of Health Policy Research* 12, no.1 (2023):21. https://doi.org/10.1186/s13584-023-00569-6

This study examines telehealth use patterns and barriers to using telehealth services in the Arab population in Israel, including the Druze community. The study found that most of the adult Arab population in Israel faced no technology or internet accessibility barriers.

Sharkia, Rajech, Mohammad Khatib, Ahmad Sheikh-Muhammad, Muhammad Mahajnah, and Abdelnaser Zalan. "The prevailing trend of consanguinity in the Arab society of Israel: is it still a challenge? " *Journal of Biosocial Science* 55, no. 1 (2023): 169-173. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021932021000675

This study aims to determine the trend of consanguineous marriage among the Arab population in Israel, including the Druze. The authors find that the prevalence of consanguineous marriage remains high among the Arab population in Israel, similar to other Arab societies, which will affect the health of future generations and pose a challenge for healthcare professionals.

Shlomovitz, Omer, Danit Atias-Varon, Dina Yagel, Ortal Barel, Hadas Shasha-Lavsky, Karl Skorecki, Aviva Eliyahu, et al. "Genetic Markers Among the

Israeli Druze Minority Population With End-Stage Kidney Disease." *American Journal of Kidney Diseases* 83, no. 2 (2024): 183-195. https://doi.org/10.1053/j.ajkd.2023.06.006

This study characterizes the genetic markers among members of an Israeli minority group with end-stage kidney disease (ESKD). Exome sequencing identified a genetic diagnosis in approximately 18% of Druze individuals with ESKD. According to the authors, these results support conducting genetic analyses in minority populations with high rates of CKD and for whom phenotypic disease specificity may be low.

2. Education

Barselai Shaham, Yasmin, Orr Levental, and Anat Kidron. "Education and a sense of security under conditions of sociopolitical uncertainty: the case of the Golan Druze." *Middle Eastern Studies* 59, no. 6 (2023): 983-994. https://doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2022.2155949

This study examines how people in uncertain sociopolitical environments perceive the opportunity to pursue higher education and the social and personal meaning they attach to it.

Orland-Barak, Lily, Roseanne Kheir-Farraj, and Ayelet Becher. "Mentoring in Contexts of Cultural and Political Friction: Moral Dilemmas of Mentors and Their Management in Practice." In *Studying Teaching and Teacher Education: ISATT 40th Anniversary Yearbook*, pp. 171-180. Leeds: Emerald Publishing Limited, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1108/S1479-368720230000044018

This paper examines the moral dilemmas encountered by mentors from three different social groups, including Druze and Israeli Arab schools, their practical management, and the connection between particular dilemmas and their management strategies. The study reveals that mentors' encounters and management of recurrent moral dilemmas are embedded in cultural and political factors, hindering their mentoring practice within Israeli society's multicultural and politically conflictive context.

Paz-Baruch, Nurit, and Hnade Hazema. "Self-Regulated Learning and Motivation Among Gifted and High-Achieving Students in Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics Disciplines: Examining Differences Between Students From Diverse Socioeconomic Levels."

Journal for the Education of the Gifted 46, no. 1 (2023): 34-76. https://doi.org/10.1177/01623532221143825

The study examines the differences in motivation and Self-Regulated Learning (SRL) between gifted and high-achievers (GHAs) and typical achievers (TAs) in Israel's science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) disciplines by addressing the contribution of socioeconomic status (SES). The participants were from the Druze community. The results indicate that among GHAs, all motivation measures were significantly higher than those of TAs, especially among students from low-SES environments.

Yanto, Elih Sutisna, and Moses Glorino Rumambo Pandin. "The Position of Insider (Emic) and Outsider (Etic): A Review of Deborah Court and Randa Khair Abbas' Insider-Outsider Research in Qualitative Inquiry: New Perspectives on Method and Meaning." *The Qualitative Report* 28, no. 2 (2023): 437-446. https://doi.org/10.46743/2160-3715/2023.6190

The authors discuss Deborah Court and Randa Khair Abbas's work *Insider-Outsider Research in Qualitative Inquiry: New Perspectives on Method and Meaning*. Court and Abbas argue that through their extensive research collaboration and study of the Israeli Druze over almost two decades, they have established mutual trust, which has led to a deeper understanding of cultural norms and the meanings they convey.

3. History

Aboultaif, Eduardo Wassim. "The Lebanese Armed Forces." In *Armed Forces in Deeply Divided Societies: Lebanon, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Iraq and Burundi*, 29-69. Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 2023.

This chapter examines the historical development and crises within the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). The author pinpoints the elements of transformation in the army regarding its composition, decision-making in military institutions, civil-military relations, and proportionality of the LAF. This discussion pertains to Druze's engagement with the LAF throughout the organization's history.

Lawson, Fred H. "Civil wars and international conflicts revisited: insights from the southern theatre of the Syrian uprising, 2011–2017." *British Journal of*

Middle Eastern Studies 50, no. 4 (2023): 809-824. https://doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2022.2027229

This article explores the correlation between civil wars and international conflicts by exploring the southern theater of the Syrian uprising. It discusses various groups and communities in southern Syria, including the Druze population in the Sweida Governorate.

Magued, Shaimaa. "Upgrading Authoritarianism During the Arab Uprisings: Armed Non-State Actors' Confessional Alliances and Aborted Democratization in Syria." *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 25, no. 5 (2023): 871-887. https://doi.org/10.1080/19448953.2023.2167175

This study sheds light on the Assad regime's resilience through the mobilization of armed non-state actors' sectarian alliances. The piece builds on alliance politics theory in arguing for authoritarian upgrading during the uprisings, where armed non-state actors' sectarian alliances manifested a balance of interests, plunged calls for democratization into a security dilemma, and asserted dictators' grip on power. In this conversation, the author discusses Syria's Druze community.

Naor, Moshe. "Iraqi Jewish Immigrants, Palestinian refugees, and intercommunal relations in Tira Transit Camp." *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* (2023): 1-20. https://doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2023.2251121

This article discusses the relations between different Jewish migrant communities during the early 1950s in the Tira transit camp (Ma'abara), which was established on the land of the Arab village of Al-Tira near Haifa. It also examines the crossing of ethnic and national borders and the relations between Jews and Arabs in Israel, including Druze, in this shared space, primarily around the Druze villages of 'Isfiya and Daliyat al-Karmel.

Neyzi, Mehmet Ali. "Life stories - Greater Syria." Chapter 4 in *The Imperial School for Tribes: Educating the Provincial Elite in the Late Ottoman Empire*, 91-122. London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2023.

This chapter discusses Syrian resistance to outside rule, including an extensive discussion of the Druze from the Jabal al-Druze under the French Mandate of Syria.

Rodriguez Suarez, Alex. "The religious soundscape of Mount Lebanon in the 18th and the first half of the 19th century." *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* (2023): 1-17. https://doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2023.2209026

This article examines the use of church bells by the Christian communities of Mount Lebanon in the 18th and first half of the 19th centuries, where a large majority of Druze resided. The author argues that Mount Lebanon's religious soundscape differed significantly from the rest of the Ottoman Levant.

Tufaro, Rossana. "The "Apple of Discord": The Btekhnay Rally and the (Ephemeral?) Subversion of Mount Lebanon's Politics of Space (1965)." Chapter 2 in *Mediterranean In Dis/order: Space, Power, and Identity*, 49-72. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2023.

This article discusses the political history of territorial control over Mount Lebanon, including the sectarian conflict between Lebanon's Maronite Christians and Druze.

Yusufov, Danielle, and Oren Meyers. "Despite everything, love": Commemorative journalism and the rereading of the critical rereading of the Israeli past." *Journalism* 25, no. 4 (2023): 800-818. https://doi.org/10.1177/14648849231161150

This study examines how commemorative journalism shapes collective memory by exploring 18 supplements and special projects commemorating Israel's 70th anniversary. Based on a qualitative exploration, the author classified ethno-national identity according to three subcategories: Israeli Jews, Israeli Palestinians, and Israeli Druze. The authors maintain that the current dominant memory version narrated by the supplements reflects a withdrawal and rejection of recent, more critical journalistic readings of the Israeli past.

4. Language & Literature

Alshdaifat, Abdallah T., and Nedaa Hisham Khashashneh. "Phonological Aspects of Jordanian Druze Arabic." *Theory and Practice in Language Studies* 13, no. 3 (2023): 664-672. https://doi.org/10.17507/tpls.1303.15

This study is among the first to examine the significant phonological features of Jordanian Druze Arabic. The authors report on this dialect's selected melodic and prosodic processes, such as syllable structure, assimilation (definite article assimilation, sonorant assimilation, non-coronal assimilation), emphasis spread, syncope, resolution, umlaut, and raising.

Donovan, Joshua. "The Syro-Lebanese from "Syriban": Nostalgia, Partition, and Coexistence in Eveline Bustros' Imagined Homeland." *Mashriq & Mahjar: Journal of Middle East and North African Migration Studies* 10, no. 1 (2023): 107-136.

This article offers new insights into nostalgia and nationalism in the Syrian/Lebanese diaspora through the literary, artistic, and philanthropic work of Eveline Bustros (1878–1971). The piece touches on Bustros' place in the anti-sectarian tradition, including a discussion of tensions between Lebanese Druze and Christians. According to the author, Bustros' life and work complicate understandings of diasporic nationalism and nostalgia by highlighting fluid identities shaped by multidirectional bourgeois mobility, inviting scholars to consider nationalism beyond the confines of the nation-state.

Kheir, Eve Afifa. *Codeswitching as an Index and Construct of Sociopolitical Identity*. Brill, 2023.

This book presents the language patterns found among the Israeli Druze community, which is profiled against those of the Arabs in Israel through an empirically based examination. For more on this book, review the book review in the *Druze Studies Journal*, issue 1.

Mashaqba, Bassil, Anas Huneety, Suhaib Al-Abed Al-Haq, and Yasmeen Dardas. "Attitude towards Jordanian Arabic dialects: A sociolinguistic perspective." *Jordan Journal of Modern Languages and Literatures* Vol 15, no. 3 (2023): 959-980. https://doi.org/10.47012/jjmll.15.3.12

This study investigates people's unequal attitude toward the main spoken dialects in Jordan. As part of the research design, 234 respondents of different ages, genders, and dialects answered an evaluative/matched guise test, which included eight recordings of the dialects by male and female speakers. The study collected responses from three non-native speakers of any Jordanian Arabic dialect (Egyptian, Iraqi, and Druze).

According to the authors, the results demonstrate that the urban dialect has the most positive attitudes regarding intelligibility, prestige, elegance, education, and social status but the least favorable attitudes regarding courage, generosity, and accent thickness, in which the Bedouin dialect scored the most positive attitudes.

Mohamad, Tamam. "The Status of Religion/Sect-Based Linguistic Variation in Tartus, Syria: Looking at the Nuances of Qaf as an Example." *Languages* 8, no. 3 (2023): 167-188. https://doi.org/10.3390/languages8030167

This study investigates the social and historical dynamics affecting the religion/sect-based linguistic distribution and associations of the Qaf variants in Tartus Center, Syria. The paper discusses many of Syria's various religious communities, including the Druze. It highlights the emergence of [q] as a religiously, socially, and symbolically marked Alawite variant during the war, contrary to the [ʔ], which became a supralocal and religiously neutral variant that speakers of marked [q] backgrounds can resort to at times of tension and social pressure.

5. Politics

Baker, Rauf. "Iran's Hegemonic Drive: Tehran's Shiification of Syria." *Middle East Quarterly* 30, no. 1 (2023): 1-11.

This article discusses Iranian influence over the Assad regime and the subsequent Shi'afication of Syria. Part of this discussion covers interreligious dynamics in Syria, including Sweida's Druze community.

Beeri, Itai, and Akab Zaidan. "Merging, Disaggregating, and Clustering Local Authorities: Do Structural Reforms Affect Perceptions about Local Governance and Democracy?" *Territory, Politics, Governance* 11, no. 7 (2023): 1413-1438. https://doi.org/10.1080/21622671.2021.1908159

The article explores the effects of three specific multilevel governance reforms—the merging, disaggregation, and clustering of local government authorities—on residents' assessments of local governance and democracy, using survey results from 1,733 residents of local authorities in Israel. The authors argue that their findings underscore the importance of public support for structural reform. The sample includes six Druze localities from the Galilee and the Karmel Mountains.

Braverman, Irus. *Settling Nature: The Conservation Regime in Palestine-Israel*. University of Minnesota Press, 2023.

This book focuses on Israel's nature administration orchestrating "animated warfare" on both sides of the Green Line. Chapter 1 focuses on "policing nature" and includes the case of Beit Jann, a Druze village in Galilee. The book argues that the administration of nature advances the Zionist project of Jewish settlement and the corresponding dispossession of non-Jews from this space.

Cañás Bottos, Lorenzo, and Tanja Plasil. "When Heritage Becomes Horizon: The Acquisition of Extra-Territorial Citizenship among Lebanese in Argentina." *Revue européenne des migrations internationales* 39, no. 3 (2023): 43-63.

This article examines how the descendants (of the second and third generations) of Lebanese immigrants in Argentina acquire extra-territorial citizenship in the context of Lebanon's May 2022 general parliamentary elections. It also discusses the Druze community in this context.

Emery, Thomas J., and Rok Spruk. "Long-Term Effects of Sectarian Politics: Evidence from Lebanon." *Socio-Economic Review* (2023): 1-24. https://doi.org/10.1093/ser/mwad004

This article examines the effect of sectarian politics in the presence of weak state capacity on long-term economic growth. It uses the 1956 civil uprising between Maronite Christian and Sunni Muslim factions in Lebanon to estimate the impact of sectarian political tensions on long-term growth. The examination includes insights into the Druze community during the uprising. The evidence from the article's findings indicates extensive adverse growth effects of factionalism.

Hazran, Yusri. "Neither Israelisation nor Zionisation: Civil Trends Amongst the Golan Druze Community in the Wake of the Popular Uprising in Syria." *International Journal on Minority and Group Rights* (2023): 1-36.

This article discusses the Druze community in the Golan Heights and its political struggle against Israeli sovereignty over the Golan. The author argues that in the wake of the outbreak of the popular uprising in Syria in 2011, this opposition has begun showing clear signs of cracks, most prominently among the younger generation.

Herzog, Ben. "Elevating the significance of military service: Knesset members and republican values." *National Identities* 25, no. 5 (2023): 501-515. https://doi.org/10.1080/14608944.2023.2214094

This paper explains why states add superfluous provisions that facilitate naturalization processes after military service by analyzing the Israeli case, including a discussion of a 1987 amendment to the Israeli Citizenship Law relevant to the Druze community. The author argues that in Israel, politicians wanted to emphasize the importance of Republican participation, mainly through military service, as the ultimate sacrifice in constructing the national identity.

Khaizran, Yusri. "The Druze in Israel: Between Protest and Containment." *Jerusalem Quarterly* 96, no. 4 (2023): 8-27.

This article explores the trajectory of protest among the Druze community in Israel and identifies critical inflection points. The author also analyzes the primary obstacles to such protests, including state authorities and the traditional religious establishment in the Druze community.

Kher-Aldeen, Mahmood. "Attitudes Towards the Position of Israel Regarding the Provision of Aid to Druze in Syria During the Civil War in Syria." *Studia Universitatis Babes-Bolyai-Studia Europaea* 68, no. 1 (2023): 189-216. https://doi.org/10.24193/subbeuropaea.2023.1.06

This article examines the perceptions and attitudes toward the position of Israel and Israeli Druze regarding the provision of aid to Druze in Syria during the civil war that took place between the years 2011 and 2017. The article also examines the perceptions and attitudes of senior officials in the Druze community and in Israel regarding the aid provided to the Druze in Syria and its impact on identity among the Druze population in Israel.

Kisler, Rudy. "Silenced Heritage: Israel's Heritage Plan Vis-à-Vis Non-Jewish History." *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 30, no.2 (2023): 252-270. https://doi.org/10.1080/13537113.2023.2254040

This paper discusses the case of the Heritage Plan, Israel's official cultural heritage policy. The authors' findings suggest that the Heritage Plan not only privileges Jewish heritage but also serves as a mechanism for

erasing competing, non-Jewish histories. This article presents three silencing case studies, one of which is the Druze Heritage Center.

Levy, Inna, and Nir Rozmann. "Differences in attitudes toward terrorists: Type of terrorist act, terrorist ethnicity, and observer gender and cultural background." *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations* 26, no. 2 (2023): 476-492. https://doi.org/10.1177/13684302211040112

In this article, to explore the interrelationship between "terrorist acts," "terrorist ethnicity," and observing gender and cultural background in Israel, the authors recruited Jewish, Druze, and Muslim participants who read scenarios of terrorist acts. The results indicate that Muslim Arab participants expressed more negative attitudes in cases of Jewish terrorists than Arab terrorists. In contrast, Jewish participants expressed more negative attitudes toward Arab terrorists than Jewish terrorists. Druze participants did not differentiate between Arab and Jewish terrorists.

Mahajne, Ibrahim. "Minority group local government mayors and their relations with welfare bureau social workers." *International Social Work* 67, no. 2(2024): 530-543. https://doi.org/10.1177/00208728221150899

This study examines the issue of minority group local government mayors and their relations with welfare bureau social workers through in-depth, semi-structured interviews with 19 mayors of local Arab governments in Israel. Purposive sampling was used to select the research sample from the list of the "National Committee of Local Arab Government Mayors in Israel," which, apart from providing communication details for all the mayors, divides the different localities according to geographical location and notes the composition of the populations in each locality (Muslim, Christian, and Druze). The authors find that the mayors fiercely criticize the welfare bureaus in four areas of concern, claiming that they ignore particular needs, neglect core target populations, lack culture-sensitive responses, and function defectively.

Miles, William FS. "After Israel's Nationality Law of 2018: Is the "Blood Covenant" Broken for the Druze?." *The Journal of the Middle East and Africa* 14, no. 4 (2023): 415-434. https://doi.org/10.1080/21520844.2023.2273696

This article examines the medium-term effects of Israel's 2018 nation-state legislation on Druze consciousness and prospects for the fu-

ture. The author argues that the passage of the 2018 Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People has shaken a pillar of the "covenant of blood" between the Druze minority and Jewish majority communities in Israel.

Wahab, Hadi. "Sectarian Identity and Mobilization Amongst the Druze: How Do Sectarian Minorities Respond to Religious Terrorism?" *Terrorism and Political Violence* 35, no. 5 (2023): 1147-1160. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2021.2021892

This article studies sectarian identity and religious terrorism against the Druze minority during Syria's sect-coded civil war. The author argues that religion can be a mobilizational tool and marker of group solidarity amongst Druze, Sunni, and Shi'a. However, according to the author, the Druze did not instrumentalize sectarian identity to implement their geopolitical agenda.

6. Religious Studies

Ansari, Raziyeh, and Mohamad Ali Chelongar. "A Critical Assessment of Heinz Halm's Views on the Fatimid Caliph of Egypt al-Hākim bi-Amr Allāh." *Journal of Al-Tamaddun* 18, no. 2 (2023): 105-116. https://doi.org/10.22452/JAT.vol18no2.8

Adopting a descriptive-analytical method, this study aims to assess the views of Heinz Halm, the contemporary Ismaili-era researcher, on al-Hakim bi-Amr Allāh, a central figure in the history of the Druze. According to the authors, the results show that Halm foregrounded, marginalized, and eliminated historical data about al-Hakim while using a wide range of historical sources, reports, and statements to depict al-Hakim's character as justified and sound.

Bayram, Aydın. "The Transformation of Radjʿa Doctrine of Shiʿa: A Case Study on the Nusayrīs, the Druzes and the Bābī-Bahāīs." *Kader* 21, no. 3 (2023): 942-959. https://doi.org/10.18317/kaderdergi.1391455

This study examines three subsects of Shi'ism, namely the Nusayris, the Druze, and the Babi-Bahais, which all interpret the doctrine of Radj'a from a gnostic point of view. It analyzes how the selected subsects of Shi'a Islam have approached the doctrine of Radj'a and the extent of

their interpretation of this phenomenon.

Kheir, Sawsan. "Reflections of modernization in religious worldviews of Israeli religious minority students." *Archive for the Psychology of Religion* 45, no. 2 (2023): 152-173. https://doi.org/10.1177/008467242211453

This study explores how young adult religious minority students in Israel, including Druze, integrate their religious worldviews within modernity, separately for each group and comparatively for both, with particular attention to their conflictual position as minorities. According to the author, the findings reflect how modernization processes can shape minority students' religious worldviews and confirm previous findings on the multifaceted manifestations of religiosity and secularization. Furthermore, the study highlights the indirect manner through which the position of "religious/ethnic minority" might promote secularization.

Prazak, Michael, Rachel Bacigalupi, and Kimberly Adams. "Reincarnation Beliefs and Suicidality: Social, Individual and Theological Factors." *Journal of Religion and Health* 62, no. 6 (2023): 3834-3855. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10943-023-01926-0

This article discusses the meaning of suicide as a reflection of the impact of the death on friends, family, and the broader community; the circumstances of the individual within their community; and the specific religious implications of suicide. With a specific focus on the Druze community, the authors argue that the commonly repeated notion that reincarnation beliefs lend themselves to suicidal behavior has little support. Instead, they argue, it appears that social and pragmatic issues shape the meaning and interpretation of religious beliefs, which in turn buffer or facilitate suicidal behavior.

7. Socioeconomics

Badran, Leena, Hira Amin, Ayelet Gur, and Michael Stein. "'I am an Arab Palestinian living in Israel with a disability': marginalization and the limits of human rights." *Disability & Society* 39, no. 8 (2023): 1901-1922. https://doi.org/10.1080/09687599.2023.2181764

This article examines Arabs with disabilities living in Israel, arguing that the ongoing political conflict predominantly shapes the group's marginalization. Participants in the researchers' study included Muslims, Christians, and Druze. The authors argue that a rights-based model to alleviate the community from this discriminatory framework will only go so far without a significant shift in social awareness and underlying normative perceptions.

Ganany-Dagan, Orly, Rajeh Amasha, Adi Vitman-Schorr, and Zainada Ilatov. "Flexible migration: the case of the Druze in Israel." *Diaspora, Indigenous, and Minority Education* 17, no. 4 (2023): 317-329. https://doi.org/10.1080/15595692.2022.2106210

This research probes the acculturation model of the migration of Druze in Israel from their villages to cities. The authors' findings indicate a process in which Druze men and women moved from villages to cities in Israel for short and long periods in pursuit of academic education and professional training.

Halabi, Shadi, Gabriel Ben-Dor, Peter Silfen, and Anan Wahabi. "The 'preservation of the brethren' principle among Druze Intergenerational Groups in Israel." *Israel Affairs* 29, no. 5 (2023): 931-950. https://doi.org/10.1080/13537121.2023.2247653

This article examines whether Israel's Druze society has fundamentally changed. Specifically, the authors explore the association between people's attitudes towards the principle of "preservation of the brethren" (Hifz al-Ikhwan) and intergenerational groups and community characteristics. The statistical analysis does not show intergenerational conflict concerning people's readiness to uphold this principle, demonstrating the lack of fundamental societal change.

Kastrinou, Maria, Salam Said, Rawad Jarbouh, and Steven B. Emery. "Still There: Politics, Sectarianism and the Reverberations of War in the Presences and Absences of the Syrian State." *Conflict and Society* 9, no. 1 (2023): 147-166. https://doi.org/10.3167/arcs.2023.090110

In this article, the authors theorize and problematize the relationship between sectarianism and the state, exploring the effects of war and occupation in everyday practice and socio-economic and political institutions through cases from two Syrian Druze regions. The authors trace

the displacement of conflict through sectarianism, allowing for thought on state borders and exploration of everyday life concerning economic pressures and geopolitics.

Khoury, Ensherah, and Michal Krumer-Nevo. "Poverty in Arab-Palestinian society in Israel: Social work perspectives before and during COVID-19." *International Social Work* 66, no. 1 (2023): 117-129. https://doi.org/10.1177/00208728221091125

This article analyzes 64 supervision sessions held with Arab-Palestinian social workers to identify context-specific knowledge on the barriers service users face daily. The authors' findings point to economic, sociopolitical, and cultural/political barriers faced by the Druze and other groups in the sample. The article discusses the intersections of these barriers before and during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Prior, Ayelet, and Einat Lachover. "Online Interview Shocks: Reflecting on Power Relations in Online Qualitative Interviews." *International Journal of Qualitative Methods* 22, no. 1 (2023): 1-9. https://doi.org/10.1177/16094069231211201

This study explores how the online setting shapes power relations in qualitative online camera-based interviews (OCBI). The study includes an analysis of 52 interviews involving Druze participants, among others. The authors identify three types of online interview shocks: the shocking use of the camera, the shocking presence of others during the interview, and the shocking body dispositions in online interviews. According to the authors, the findings demonstrate how both interviewers and interviewees use the online setting functionalities, or the affordances of OCBI, to position and negotiate their social-cultural-political stand within the interview.

Tang, Simone, Steven Shepherd, and Aaron C. Kay. "Morality's role in the Black Sheep Effect: When and why ingroup members are judged more harshly than outgroup members for the same transgression." *European Journal of Social Psychology* 53, no. 7 (2023): 1605-1622. https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.3001

Taking a social functionalist perspective, the authors argue that morality is central to the Black Sheep Effect phenomenon and that social cohe-

sion concerns drive it. They examined the phenomenon using the Druze communities in Syria and Lebanon. Using mediation and moderation methods across the studies, the authors find that people judge ingroup (vs. outgroup) transgressors more harshly because of concerns regarding ingroup social cohesion.

Warnke, Kaja, Borja Martinović, and Nimrod Rosler. "Territorial ownership perceptions and reconciliation in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict: A person-centered approach." *European Journal of Social Psychology* 54, no.1 (2023): 31-47. https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2993

This article investigates land ownership claims and reconciliation-related outcomes in the intractable Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The study draws on data collected in the November 2021 Peace Index Survey, which includes samples from the Israeli Druze community. The authors conclude that Jewish and Palestinian citizens of Israel have different understandings of land ownership, endorsing various ownership principles and levels of group identification.

8. Women, Gender, & Sexuality

Abu-Hasan Nabwani, Ola. "Relations of religious affiliation group norms, human capital, and autonomy to Israeli men's participation in household duties." *Family Relations* 72, no. 4 (2023): 1725-1747. https://doi.org/10.1111/fare.12749

This article documents variations in husbands' participation in household duties, an indicator of gender equality, by comparing ethnoreligious affiliation groups, human capital, and autonomy. The article finds that husbands of Arab women were 83% less likely than husbands of Jewish women to share household duties. Among Arabs, Druze husbands were almost three times more likely to participate than Muslim husbands.

Barakat, Ebtesam Hasan. "Pious Women Challenge Arrangements Anchored in the Dominancy of the Religious Discourse: Druze Women in Israel as a Case Study." *Religions* 14, no. 8 (2023): 995-1013. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14080995

This qualitative study examines how the agency of religious Druze women in Israel affects professional identity and religious affiliation, as well as how these, in turn, shape the gender-religious perception in their community, especially in education and employment. One of the main insights that emerged from the study, according to the author, is that Druze women can act autonomously to make their choices, acquire education, integrate into the poor local labor market in professional positions, accumulate economic and social resources through their professional and religious status, and negotiate their status in the religious community.

Eseed, Rana, Iris Zadok, and Mona Khoury. "Religion, Religiosity and Parenting Practices: An Examination of Jewish, Muslim, Christian and Druze Mothers in Israel." *The British Journal of Social Work* 54, no. 4 (2023): 1477–1494. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjsw/bcad175

This study explores the role religion and religiosity play in predicting the maternal use of psychological control and punitive discipline by mothers from Israel who belong to two ethnonational groups, Jews and Arabs, including Druze. The results show that religiosity was significantly and positively associated with mothers' use of both psychological control and punitive discipline. Additionally, it also shows that Arab mothers reported using psychological control more than did Jewish mothers.

Farraj Falah, Janan. "The development of the status of Druze women in the 21st century." *Frontiers in Sociology* 8, (2023): 1206494. https://doi.org/10.3389/fsoc.2023.1206494

This article analyzes the social, personal, and religious reasons for changing the status of Druze women in Israel. According to data from the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, in 2020, 68% of all Druze undergraduate students and 64.8% of M.A. students were Druze women. According to the authors, this increase from prior years has affected the various professions where Druze women work.

Harris, Rachel S. "Beauty and the Patriarchy: Ibtisam Mara'ana's Lady Kul El-Arab (2008)." *Israel Studies* 28, no. 2 (2023): 100-125. https://dx.doi.org/10.2979/is.2023.a885231.

This article explores the overlapping conflicts that emerge when a woman from a conservative society participates in a pageant and the specific

situation of a Druze woman in Israel as depicted in Ibtisam Mara'ana's documentary Lady Kul El-Arab (2008).

Hazran, Yusri. "Unrealized Potential: Druze Women in Israel vs. Lebanese-Druze Women." *Israel Studies* 28, no. 1 (2023): 90-105. https://dx.doi.org/10.2979/israelstudies.28.1.06.

This article compares Druze women in Israel and Lebanon. The author argues that Druze women in Israel have never been able to fulfill their potential in practical terms of political involvement, in contrast to the situation of the Druze women in Lebanon.

Jabareen, Raifa, and Cheryl Zlotnick. "The personal, local and global influences on youth sexual behaviors in a traditional society." *Children and Youth Services Review* 149(2023): 106947. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.childyouth.2023.106947

Using a community-based participatory approach and a cross-sectional design, this study examines the personal, local, and global influences on the sexual behavior of Palestinian-Israeli youth, including youth identifying as Muslim, Christian, Druze, and others. Although the study's Galaxy Model exhibits good model fit predicting sexual behavior for youth living in a traditional society, most variance was explained by personal (for example, self-esteem, religiosity) and local (for example, family, school) influences rather than by global influences (for example internet, cultural dissonance). Accordingly, the authors argue that culturally and socially appropriate services must be created for this youth population.

Khatib, Anwar, Avital Laufer, and Michal Finkelstein. "Family resilience, social support, and family coherence among Jewish, Muslim, and Druze widows who lost their spouses to sudden death." *Death Studies* 47, no. 2 (2023): 211-220. https://doi.org/10.1080/07481187.2022.2043489

This study assesses group differences regarding family resilience, coherence, and social support among 184 widows, including Druze. The authors found no differences between groups regarding family resilience or coherence, but the Druze widows had the lowest social support.

Meler, Tal. "'I represent the police I represent the state' – Justification work following ethno-national boundaries crossing among Arab female police

officers in Israel." *Frontiers in Sociology* 8, (2023): 1296790. https://doi.org/10.3389/fsoc.2023.1296790

The article discusses an Israeli public sector diversity policy that led to the recruitment of many Arab female police officers (FAPO) from backgrounds including Druze. The contributions of this study are threefold. First, it advances the literature on Arab women's labor market integration from the theoretical perspective of boundary crossing. Second, it adds to the theory of boundary-crossing in the labor market for minority women in distinct locations. Third, it provides insights into FAPO's subjective perspectives and experiences, contributing to organizational knowledge about minority policing in a deeply divided society characterized by tense relations between the minority and the police.

Nazifi, Morteza, Nael H. Alami, and Nadia Sorkhabi. "Fathers' parenting style and academic achievement of emerging adults in Lebanon: Mediating roles of psychological control, self-esteem, and self-construal." *Children and Youth Services Review* 155 (2023): 107218. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.childyouth.2023.107218

The authors examined the association between fathers' authoritarian and authoritative parenting styles and the academic achievement of Druze Arab emerging adult sons and daughters in Beirut, Lebanon. They found that Lebanese emerging adult sons and daughters clearly distinguished between the strong propensity of authoritarian fathers to use psychologically controlling practices of shaming, guilt induction, and love withdrawal and the tendency of authoritative fathers to refrain from these psychologically controlling practices strongly.

Winckler, Onn. "A Result without a Cause: The Unique Fertility Pattern of the Israeli-Druze." *Population Review* 62, no.1 (2023): 106-123. https://dx.doi.org/10.1353/prv.2023.0004.

This research sketches the significant trends in Israeli-Druze fertility patterns since the establishment of the state of Israel and explores the reasons for the unique decline in these rates. This decline occurred despite the absence of significant preconditions for a sub-replacement-level fertility rate in line with the Second Demographic Transition theory.

Druze Studies Journal

Book Review:
"Kamal Jumblatt and the Soul of Socialism in Lebanon," review of: **Hazran, Yusri.** *The Druze community and the Lebanese state: between confrontation and reconciliation*. London: Routledge, 2014, 326 pp. ISBN 9780367867522.

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Yusri Hazran discusses the relationship between the Lebanese Druze community and the state from the 19th century until the beginning of the civil war. The author relates this complicated relationship with the Druze rivalry to the Maronite community in Lebanon. The emphasis here is on the Druze feeling of alienation after independence, which according to the author, radicalized Kamal Jumblatt, Druze leader and founder of the Lebanese National Movement (LNM),[2] to begin working with different ideological groups in order to create a secular, nationalist, socialist, and revolutionary system. The book employs a mixture of political, sociological, and historical approaches to substantiate the author's argument about alienation, radicalization, and the anti-establishment approach pursued by Jumblatt.

The book consists of seven chapters. Chapter one serves as a historical background that addresses the Druze political history in Lebanon. Chapter two discusses the Druze political struggle, with a special focus on post-independence Lebanon through the political behavior of the Druze-dominated Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) until the mid-1950s. This chapter provides an important foundation for the book as it hints at the path dependency of the Druze political behavior in modern Lebanon. Chapter three analyzes the civil unrest of 1958 and Jumblatt's PSP stance throughout the process. Chapter four deals with Jumblatt's relationship with the state during the era of Fouad Shihab and his successor until 1970. Chapter five studies Jumblatt's alliance with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and how they both worked to change the system in Lebanon. Chapter six talks about political confessionalism and the role of sectarian affiliation in the Lebanese political scenery, while chapter seven discusses the Druze work on producing a new historical narrative to emphasize their role in the making of the Lebanese political entity.

The book is well-written and researched, with the author employing important primary documents in addition to vital secondary sources to support his argument. It is an added value to the literature of the Lebanese Druze from the prism of communal vs. state relationship rather than studying communal relations exclusively in this deeply divided place. The point I would like to emphasize, however, relates to a major theme in this book about Jumblatt's alliances and political stances. I believe the author has over-relied on the theory of political instrumentalization to explain Jumblatt's anti-establishment behavior. My argument is contrary to

[2] Jumblatt founded the Lebanese National Movement as a coalition of the left-wing, Arabist, and socialist parties to mobilize the population against the right-wing parties.

that, particularly because Jumblatt was known to be a committed socialist and an idealist too. He was pragmatic within limits, and his perception of Arab nationalism was genuine. His support of the Palestinian cause from the first day of the war in 1948 was revealed by President Khoury when Jumblatt asked him to militarize the Druze and the Shia of Baalbek to fight the Zionists, to which Khoury judged that the young man was hot-headed. Jumblatt's stance as a staunch supporter of Palestine is intertwined with his belief in Arab nationalism.

Jumblatt's alliance with the PLO in Lebanon was ideological, and this opened the door for the LNM to benefit from the PLO's military experience. If he wanted an instrumental approach, he would have accepted a deal with Syria's Assad rather than risk severing relations after the famous 1976 meeting between Assad and Jumblatt in Damascus.

With respect to Jumblatt's socialist ideology, it is hard to imagine that he employed an instrumentalist approach to socialism, particularly because of his lifestyle, which resembles something similar to scientific socialism. For instance, Jumblatt sold his property in Sebline to farmers in exchange for a small amount of money and established agricultural cooperatives in different agricultural places around the country. Moreover, he created the famous Sebline cement factory prior to the Civil War, which worked as an industrial cooperative in which workers and shareholders owned the company. He lived in one room in his castle, wore modest clothes, and ate a farmer's diet.

Finally, the book is a good read for any scholar of Lebanese politics. Students and scholars from all fields will definitely enjoy reading this book as it attempts to provide a comprehensive academic understanding of Druze and state relations in Lebanon.

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Druze Studies Journal

Book Review:

"Code-Switching and Sociopolitical Identity among the Druze in Israel," review of: **Kheir, Eve Afifa**. *Codeswitching as an Index and Construct of Sociopolitical Identity: The Case of the Druze and Arabs in Israel.* Leiden; Boston: Brill Academic Pub, 2023. ISBN 9789004534797

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This book focuses on the sociopolitical identity of the Druze and Arabs in Israel through the lens of code-switching. It consists of five chapters. The first and second chapters provided extensive contextual details on the code-switching process, focusing on Arabic, Hebrew, and the Israeli 'Nation-State Law.' Furthermore, the text discussed the Druze faith, the co-existence of Arabs and Druze in Israel, and the interrelation between identity, language, and code-switching. The author's investigation of the language of the Druze community in Israel using Myers-Scotton's Matrix Language Turnover Hypothesis (Myers-Scotton 2002) revealed a process of convergence and the development of a language that combines elements of Arabic and Hebrew within the Druze community. This convergence process resulted in the emergence of a mixed or split language, specifically in the context of bilingualism. An analysis of the longitudinal data collected from the Israeli Druze population in 2000 and 2017 revealed that the phenomenon of individuals transitioning or codeswitching between Palestinian Arabic and Israeli Hebrew was a component of the development of a language that blends Palestinian Arabic and Israeli Hebrew.

The third chapter discussed the novel mixed language and its distinctive features, drawing upon Auer's (1999, 309–332) and Myers-Scotton's (2003, 189–203) (2003, 73–106) views on the occurrence of mixed languages resulting from code-switching. The fourth chapter examined the correlation between code-switching and political identification and evaluated various forms of code-switching within the Israeli Arab Muslim, Christian, and Druze communities. Using concepts from intersubjective contact linguistics and indexicality, this chapter developed a framework that facilitates the examination of codeswitching as a means of expressing and comprehending social identity. The fifth and final chapter looked at Israeli Druze as well as the Druze community in the Golan Heights, a Syrian territory that Israel had taken control of after the 1967 War. Moreover, this chapter examined the interrelationships among code-switching, various mixed language types, identity, and the social and political contexts within the case study, highlighting their interconnected nature. It compared the Golan Heights Druze population and Israel's Druze population. Drawing on theories and concepts from intersubjective contact linguistics, this chapter demonstrated how 'sandwiched' communities develop distinct language forms and identities that closely resemble national identities.

This book primarily examines the phenomenon of code-switching within the Israeli Arab and Druze communities. In recent decades, there has been substan-

tial research on code-switching, which refers to alternating between two or more languages during a discussion. There is still much to learn, particularly in the areas of social, political, and collective identity. Several models and theories have enriched the existing scholarly literature on code-switching research. However, there is a need for more models in literature that explicitly highlight the connection between code-switching and social identity. The study of Palestinian Arabic and the prevalence of Israeli Hebrew in Israel, as well as their effects on the Arab and Druze communities and their languages, remains an insufficiently explored area that needs further investigation. This book introduces a novel framework for understanding codeswitching and sociopolitical identification, explicitly focusing on the codeswitching behavior of Israeli Arab Muslims, Christians, and Druze. The study suggests that sociopolitical identification influences codeswitching patterns that vary across different social groups, resulting in the development of a novel framework.

The author contended that this natural phenomenon could provide valuable insights into significant aspects of Israeli-Arab and Druze societies, as well as contact phenomena in general. These aspects include the dynamics of majority-minority relations, cultural influences, sense of belonging, socio-political identity, and the inevitable impact on the languages individuals speak in these societies. The proposed data collection and analysis in this study aim to provide valuable insights for researchers interested in the field. This will enhance our comprehension of how the dominant languages impact minority groups, the reciprocal relationship between sociopolitical identity and language behavior, and, specifically, the effects of Israeli Hebrew dominance on Palestinian Arabic speakers, influenced by sociopolitical affiliations.

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Druze Studies Journal

Book Review:

"An Ethnographic Exploration of the Druze in Syria," review of: **Kastrinou, A. Maria A. 2016.** *Power, Sect and State in Syria: The Politics of Marriage and Identity amongst the Druze.* London, New York: I.B.Tauris & Co. Ltd. ISBN 9781784532208.

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The book 'Power, Sect and State in Syria: The Politics of Marriage and Identity amongst the Druze' constitutes an exceptional work. It offers one of the few elaborated ethnographic studies of the Druze community in Syria. A. Maria A. Kastrinou, an anthropologist with extensive fieldwork experience in the region, has significantly contributed to scholarly discourse on sectarianism, statelessness, and refugees in the Middle East. In this book, Kastrinou employs marriage as a lens to explore several different aspects of this community, including rituals surrounding births and funerals, architectural features of dwellings, public folklore festivals, and dance performances. This unique perspective allows for a careful exploration of community life. The book's core thesis suggests that sectarianism is not an innate, immutable characteristic but a historical phenomenon shaped by broader social, political, and economic contexts (Kastrinou 2016, 12). It discusses the manipulation of sectarianism by political entities from the European colonial period to the present-day Syrian state. Kastrinou describes the contemporary Syrian state as an imperial rather than a national state, meaning that this power structure positions itself as a guarantor of diversity, thereby ensuring its indispensability to Syrian society (Kastrinou 2016, 151).

The book is structured into eight chapters. In her introduction, Kastrinou traces the roots of sectarianism to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the ensuing European interventions, ostensibly claiming to protect minorities and human rights. These interventions coincided with peasant liberation movements, leading to the use of sectarianism as a foundation for citizenship in Lebanon and Syria. Kastrinou defines sectarianism as the practice of shaping group identities (religious, ethnic, etc.) in a specific historical context as well as the discourse of creating a narrative of difference and "otherness" based on these identities (Kastrinou 2016,13). Endogamy marriages serve to reinforce these imagined sectarian identities, thereby challenging the notion that sectarianism reflects "natural" identities. Furthermore, the author states that sectarianism differs from religious affiliation. Historically, "sect" had a completely different connotation before the mid-19th century. It refers to "a family of rank regardless of its religious persuasion" (Makdisi 2000, 35). Accordingly, a distinctive feature of the Druze community, according to Kastrinou, is the subordination of personal independence to familial obligations (Kastrinou 2016,126). However, she argues that in dividual interpretations maintain social relations that construct community (Kastrinou 2016, 222).

The second chapter examines the interconnectedness of house design, family structures, and cultural symbols. It argued that houses are not ‘things’ but ‘things

of relations' (Kastrinou 2016, 33). The third chapter examines the role of the body in Druze cosmology as well as the ritual practices of birth and death. Chapter Four discusses challenges to endogamous traditions. It also illustrated this subject with the example of a Druze acquaintance who was ostracized for marrying outside the sect is used to illustrate this subject (Kastrinou 2016, 124). Chapter Five delves into the Syrian state's promotion of folkloric festivals inspired by marriage rituals. These festivals aim to deepen regional and ethnic distinctions, reinforcing heterogeneity rather than striving for homogeneity. People portray these state-sponsored events as a form of "soft power," manipulating cultural and sectarian harmony for political ends (Kastrinou 2016, 136). Chapter six offers insights into how young people negotiate power dynamics, contributing to a broader understanding of civil society formation in contemporary Syria.

In the seventh chapter, Kastrinou describes a theatrical performance on marriage and links it to European interventions in Syrian society. She argues that these interventions reflect a condescending Western attitude toward the East rather than genuine acts of goodwill (Kastrinou 2016, 212). Th e concluding chapter brings together empirical and theoretical findings and relates them to the situation in Syria and potential future developments.

Kastrinou's ethnographic data from her fieldwork (2008-2010) with the Druze community in Jaramana, a suburb of Damascus, and a thorough engagement with political and anthropological literature form the foundation of the methodology. Her innovative approach combines original personal observations and insights with historical analysis and comparisons to previous research. Additionally, despite the obstacles presented by the Druze community's protective stance on their community, the author examines concealed meanings, citing the saying, "What happens here stays here" (Kastrinou 2016, 117).

The essay's thesis is easily identifiable, and the title accurately reflects the essence of the work. Nonetheless, given the book's specialized nature, non-specialist readers may encounter challenges grasping certain contexts. The book provides sufficient explanations of the methodology, and the findings seem fairly robust.

Kastrinou's definition of sectarianism is worthy of consideration as it differs from the prevailing perception of the term often associated with religion. This aligns with the sense of sectarianism concerning the Druze, which carries a unique meaning beyond religious implications. However, what applies to the Druze may not necessarily apply to other sects. Furthermore, specific marriage practices and notable social dynamics observed among the Druze may vary from those of different groups within Syria or the broader Middle East.

Furthermore, despite the perception of sectarianism as a construct of imagination and perception, it has undeniably left tangible impacts that are visible to all, particularly concerning the Druze community. Due to endogamy and geographical clustering, this community exhibits common and distinctive traits that blur the line between reality and imagination, warranting further investigation and analysis.

In conclusion, the book compellingly argued it's central thesis, that sectarianism is a historically contingent and politically constructed phenomenon. Kastrinou adeptly ties her findings to the ongoing Syrian conflict and the state's role in perpetuating sectarian divisions. Her analysis illuminates the strategic manipulation of sectarian identities by the Syrian regime. The book critically examines the impact of European interventions in Syria, revealing how these external forces have historically influenced and manipulated local sectarian identities. This dimension adds depth to the discussion, highlighting the geopolitical intricacies. However, its focus on a single Druze community near Damascus limits the generalizability of its findings.

In any case, 'Power, Sect, and State in Syria: The Politics of Marriage and Identity amongst the Druze' represents a significant contribution to scholarship, offering a profound exploration of the Druze community's socio-political dynamics. Kastrinou's methodological rigor and theoretical insights provide a fresh perspective on sectarianism and state power in Syria. Despite its focus on a single community, the book's strengths in offering a detailed, context-rich analysis make it an invaluable resource for scholars and students of anthropology, Middle Eastern studies, and political science.

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