Jason, Stevens, Ram, Miller, Beasley, and Gleason (2016) invoke particular views of “true science” (p. 4) and “hard science” (p. 7) in their call for “more rigorous and predictive theory” (p. 21) in community psychology. They explain that a theory (as opposed to a framework or a model) makes predictions about causal relationships that are specific enough that they can be empirically tested and either verified or falsified under various conditions. They claim that by moving from frameworks guiding inquiry and action toward unambiguous predictive theories, the field will be “of greater value to the larger scientific community” (p. 3) and could “go a long way toward making significant progress in understanding how complex systems and the contexts in which people live can influence their lives” (p. 7). Their article is valuable for the debate it will produce by staking out such a clear position on a topic on which, as the authors note, viewpoints vary. In my view, the central thrust of their article – away from a pragmatic action orientation to inquiry and toward testing of predictive theories – could actually hamper the field’s progress toward its goals, if adopted more broadly in the field of community psychology.