Theatre History: The Quest for Instabilities

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Every thinking of history is always adequate to the moment at which it appears and always inadequate to the moment that follows.

B. Croce, History: Its Theory and Practice

Recent publications concerning the field of theatre history and panels at various national and international scholarly conferences indicate that many practicing theatre historians have become aware of the changes that have occurred in the perception of theatre history and in the nature of the cognitive tools that enable them to enter any historiographic investigation. That is to say, these theatre historians recognized an ineluctable fact that the field itself is not anymore identical with nineteenth century positivistic/scientific or "objective" manipulating of descriptive detail within the received historical frameworks which have been bestowed upon them by both the tradition and various schools of thought in which they were trained. By so doing, moreover, they have moved away from a dialogical/rhetorical understanding of discourse as a methodology/hypothesis of exclusion in the direction of voicing a different type of discourse thus far dismissed in historiographic investigations. The purpose of this essay is to focus on the current form of an emerging discourse by the way of addressing the practice of historiography of the past/present that

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placed the historian in the privileged position of presiding over the past, developing it, and controlling it. I will also try to show that the emerging discourse facilitated a shift from a methodology toward a strategy, i.e., a practice with the help of which a historian is able to demonstrate his/her ability to detect the paradigms affecting the object, its position in a discursive formation, as well as the changes affecting several discursive formations within a given space of representation. My conclusion will offer a suggestion that this "new historiography" expresses a mode of existence of a form of discourse rather than a practice transforming or imposing meaning, form, context, or theme in the linear/chronological, for this matter causal, investigations in the field of theatre history.

In his *Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism*, Haydn White maintains that historiography emerged as a recognizable scholarly discipline in the West in the nineteenth century as a direct consequence of a hostility to all forms of myth:

> Both the political Right and the political Left blamed mythic thinking for the excesses and failures of the Revolution. False readings of history, misconceptions of the nature of the historical process, unrealistic expectations about the ways that historical societies could be transformed--all these had led to the outbreak of the Revolution in the first place, the strange course that Revolutionary developments followed, and the effects of the Revolutionary activities over the long run. It became imperative to rise above any impulse to interpret the historical record in the light of party prejudices, utopian expectations, or sentimental attachments to traditional institutions. In order to find one's way among the conflicting claims of the parties which took shape during and after the Revolution, it was necessary to locate some standpoint of social perception that was truly 'objective,' truly 'realistic.'

This particular explanation of the emergence of a historiographic process introduces us to and marks a rupture in the nineteenth-century understanding of the nature of historiography. That is, one can discern in it (1) a line of demarcation between historiography defined as a literary art form and as a science grounded in a "verum ipsum factum" principle, and (2) a shift in the direction of the scientific perception of history rooted in some form of an external order of things. This differentiation between various perceptions of history may function, thus, to use Michel Foucault's terminology, as an epistemological threshold which suspends the continuous accumulation of knowledge, interrupts its slow development, and forces it to enter a new dimension.

Multiple questions surfaced as a result of this rupture: how should the past be seen; what is the purpose of the historian; what is the nature of the
questions that should be asked by historians; what are the demands and consequences of historical consciousness? All these questions delineated the border lines and the horizons of the space of representation in which the discourse about historiography emerged in the nineteenth century. This space of representation contained in itself the principles of two major methodologies of historiography, interpretation and explanation, both of which reflect multiple and complex transformations in the concept of the cogito.

The statement that the historian had to interpret his/her materials in order to construct the pattern of images in which the form of the historical process was mirrored is reflected in the interpretative models of historiography created by Hegel. In his *Philosophy of Mind*, Hegel postulates that the process of cognizance takes place in the infinite mind wherein the object is, first, perceived (sensuous consciousness); second, referred to the universal (sense-perception); and, third, reduced or raised to the appearance of a self-existent inner being (intellect). All these processes, in which the individual object relates itself to consciousness, are a determination of reflection. For this process to be valid there exists a need for self-consciousness which, in Hegelian phenomenology, is the truth of consciousness. Its function is to question the one-sided activity of the Ego, (Ich), that is, self-consciousness is a reflection-into-self, the other confronting the self in the process of shaping the external object. In his "reflective historiography," Hegel established thus the cognitive/interpretative authority of the historian by the fact that it was the historian who perceived and selected an object of inquiry, referred it to the abstract universal, and, finally, gave it shape guided by a critical self-consciousness. The object, in this case the representation of the past/history, was thus written from a point of view of consciousness which was corrected by self-consciousness.

Such a perception of historiography was, however, sharply criticized by the positivists because, in their view, the "interpretation" could not be fully classified as a legitimate form of knowledge since interpretation was only an opinion which, in scientific terms, was subjective in nature. They rejected the interpretation as a tangible approach in historiography and in its stead introduced the concept of the "explanation" entrenched in cause-and-effect patterns, continuities, linear succession, chronology, and an attempt to define totality. Historiography was "verum ipsum factum" deeply rooted in the external order of things defined by a social matrix or ideological narratives. "Up until now," asserted Marx, "philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it." Yet another significant aspect of the Marxist school of historiography was not only a shift in the cognitive process but also a shift in the definition of what history was. As Poster observes:

History, for Marxists, is written neither for amusement nor for self-cultivation. One writes history in order to promote revolution.
Class struggles of the past, however diverse their characters, are gathered by these historians and confirm the movement of social liberation in the present. Hence the continuity of the past and the present is maintained. The Marxist historian is no mere curator of a museum of forgotten struggles but, by virtue of his or her knowledge, a privileged participant in the present situation of revolt.  

The idealist or the positivist attitude notwithstanding, history/historiography then, and, I would suggest, also today, is dominated by the confines of one methodology. For example, in her article, "Psychoanalysis and the Polis," Julia Kristeva provides an in-depth analysis of both directions indicating the shortcomings of either of the two methodologies or their variations. More importantly, however, her article posits yet another rupture and signifies a movement away from historiographic monism in the direction of relativism. Kristeva suggests to her reader that a political reading is inherent in both an idealist interpretation as well as in a positivist explanation. That is, interpretation, wherein the position of a historian is not questioned, presents the subject-object relation in a form of a dynamic transformation controlled by the subject and the language used to describe this relationship; explanation transforms the subject-object relation in terms of expressing the subject's necessity to turn this dynamic into an action. As a corollary, both interpretation and explanation express the desire to give meaning to what is being analyzed, perceived, or evaluated:

Even if interpretation does no more than establish a simple logical connection, it is nevertheless played out on the scene of speaking subjectivity and the moment of speech. Two great intellectual ventures of our time, those of Marx and Freud, have broken through the hermeneutic tautology to make of it a revolution in one instance and, in the other, a cure. We must recognize that all contemporary political thought which does not deal with technocratic administration--although technocratic purity is perhaps only a dream--uses interpretation in Marx's and Freud's sense: as transformation and cure. Whatever object one selects, its interpretation reaches its full power, so as to tip the object toward the unknown of the interpretative theory or, more simply, toward the theory's intentions, only when the interpreter confronts the interpretable object.

Furthermore, Kristeva warns the supporters of either mode of operation that political interpretations have produced nothing more than two powerful and totalitarian results: Fascism and Stalinism, both of which destroyed rather than contributed to an intellectual forum. According to Kristeva, in order for historiography, understood as explanation/interpretation, to function,
psychoanalysis must be imposed so as to control the process: "Psychoanalysis, critical and dissolvant, cuts through political illusions, fantasies, and beliefs to the extent that they consist in providing only one meaning, an uncriticizable ultimate Meaning, to human behaviour. The psychoanalytic intervention is an antidote to political discourse." Thus Kristeva calls for the abandoning of monism and the acceptance of relativism as a guiding intellectual force in the quest for the answers to the questions of how the past should be seen, what the purpose of the historian is, and what historiography is, questions already asked in the nineteenth century, asked again here with a different methodology to provide the answers and a different taxonomy to describe the phenomena.

Hegel, Marx, and Kristeva see historians and history as mediators between past and present. Historiography has, therefore, been perceived by them as a temporal science investigating objects in terms of their permanence and the dimensions of both the changes they undergo and our awareness of the passing of time in which these changes take place. What differentiates the works of these three people are the methods of their inquiry, shaped by either cognitive intellectual processes (Hegel), social matrix/dialectics (Marx), or psychoanalysis (Kristeva). Consequently, historical inquiry has been viewed as a process in which an object's features are imposed upon it by a methodology, any methodology--prelogical, antilogical, or dialectical--in order to establish its image, trace its absence, or set up a network of coherency and orderliness between the elements of the evaluated material. Moreover, defined in terms of a methodology, historiography automatically bestows the authority, be it ideological or totalitarian, upon the speaker/writer. This very act of placing, for example, a historian in a privileged position implies that s/he "knows" a certain truth about the past (i.e., defines where the act is taking place) and represents it in his/her writing (language used to describe the act). The whole process becomes an act of creation justified by the cognitive methodology used and producing a discourse with a set of meanings reflecting the idealists', positivists', liberals' assumptions concerning the nature of historiography. Historical writing and history itself are then nothing more than a practice of bringing to the fore only this history which produces a kind of continuous history by excluding (i.e., setting up the binary opposites) or erasing (i.e., ideological erasure) this discourse which imposes the closure or difference between the past and the present. However, as Michel Foucault observed in his *Archaeology of Knowledge*:

If the history of thought could remain the locus of uninterrupted continuities, if it could endlessly forge connexions that no analysis could undo without abstraction, if it could weave, around everything that men say and do, obscure synthesis that anticipate for him, prepare him, and lead him endlessly towards his future, it would provide a privileged shelter for the sovereignty of consciousness.
Continuous history is the indispensable correlative of the founding function of the subject: the guarantee that everything that has eluded him may be restored to him; that certainty that time will disperse nothing without restoring it in a reconstituted unity; the promise that one day the subject—in the form of historical consciousness—will once again be able to appropriate, to bring back under his sway, all those things that are kept at a distance by difference, and find in them what might be called his abode.\(^{14}\)

The consequences of such a perception of historiography can be seen in various articles and books published on, for example, medieval theatre and drama, and specifically on the nature of the \textit{Quem quaeritis} and the \textit{Regularis Concordia}.\(^{15}\)

As long as historiography is defined in terms of uninterrupted continuities supported by hypotheses and methodologies, we will always find ourselves participating in the dispute that originated in the nineteenth century and whose purpose was to convince the audience about the myth called "progress." By consciously or subconsciously accepting this myth, theatre historians have been led to discuss history in terms of such notions as patterns, successions, traditions, influences, similarities, differences, repetitions, resemblances, developments, evolutions, links, connections, trends, themes, concomitance, structures, etc., in order to isolate and establish a group of phenomena which would allow them to view history as a single hypothesis established via a retrospective methodology which reduces the differences between objects, separates the new, or discusses origins. By so doing, they rewrote, transcribed, translated, approximated, transferred, and systematized the objects of the past into the objects of the present, imposing upon them the categories set up by the above-mentioned procedures of intervention as legitimatized in their own time.\(^{16}\)

As indicated by Einstein and Heisenberg in physics in the first decades of the twentieth century, temporal series of succession and analogy had proved to be inadequate since it is impossible to state that time is absolute, that it is universally the same, or that it flows steadily from the past toward the future. Moreover,

it is impossible to determine with arbitrary high accuracy both the position and momentum (essentially velocity) of a subatomic particle like the electron. The effect of this principle is to convert the law of physics into statements about relative probabilities instead of absolute certainties.\(^{17}\)

This displacement of Euclidean geometry and Newton's concept of time as a fixed science and the emergence of Relativity (time), Uncertainty (objects), and Infinity (space) as the tools of inquiry mark a threshold not only in physics
but in historical consciousness itself. If the bankruptcy of the temporal series as a guiding principle is accepted as it was in physics and the twentieth-century avant-garde drama and theatre, historiography faces the task of changing its notions about what is being represented, how it is being represented, and why it is being represented. That is, historiography must confront the task of changing the traditional dynamics between the subject and the object, or between the act and the language used to describe the act. What follows is not yet another perspective about historiographic relativism as suggested by Kristeva; it is an attempt to indicate that historiography is or should be an expression of a shift and transformation in contemporary experience, rather than an attempt to operate as a science dominated by a hypothesis promoted via a retrospective methodology rooted in the Newtonian time sequence.

Contemporary experience can be explained in terms of quantum theory and microphysics. One of the major shifts that has taken place is the alteration of the idea of performance in a stable system in which its evolution could be predicted if all the variables were known. That is, the traditional belief stipulated that if all the particles constitute a determined system in the universe at a moment "t," it is possible to predict its state at a moment $t' > t$. However, as quantum mechanics indicates, a complete definition of an initial system is impossible since it would require an expenditure of energy at least equivalent to that of the system in question. In other words, any historian trying to write a history of a theatrical/literary period would have to set up the boundaries of investigations and include in his/her inquiry all the information at the micro and macroscopic scales. Such an endeavour, as any theatre history textbook shows is futile since any attempt of this nature must lead to the selection of the material based on the availability of data, the relationship between the subject and the object, as well as the cognitive methodology used in the process of defining the stable system. Indubitably, as quantum theory points out, this procedure has its significant limitations that pose valid questions concerning both the predictability of knowledge and the authority of the historian. More significantly, however, quantum theory posits that external phenomena are governed by the principles of uncertainty, unpredictability, and probability rather than by solely the energy brought into the system:

The relation between the scientist's statement and "what 'nature' says" seems to be organized as a game without perfect information. The modalization of the scientist's statement reflects the fact that the effective, singular statement (the token) that nature will produce is unpredictable. All that can be calculated is the probability that the statement will say one thing rather than another. On the level of microphysics, "better" information--in other words, information with a higher performance capability--cannot be obtained. The problem is not to learn what the opponent ("nature") is, but to identify the game it plays.
The principles of uncertainty, unpredictability, and probability, inherent in the "post-modern experience," disqualify then stable systems, links, and patterns by indicating that discontinuities occur in determined phenomena, causing them to take unexpected forms. Thus, one is faced with unstable systems which are characterized by undecidables, the lack of precise control, incomplete information, discontinuities, and pragmatic paradoxes. Such a system produces not the known but the unknown and the tension between the two that appears at the virtual point. It suggests a model of legitimation that has nothing to do with performance as defined by the analyst, but has as its basis "difference" understood as a search not for consensus but for instabilities; a search not for the knowledge about the system but for the multiple formations appearing and disappearing within it.

In this definition of historiography, the historian abandons the quest for a resemblance between things or historical periods and concentrates on similitude. Generally speaking, resemblance can be defined as a device in a cognitive process with the help of which an object of inquiry is recognized, described, and categorized by the historian. It implies a process which is shaped by the external order of things or by various procedures of intervention (i.e., ideology introduced into the historical area) which are accepted in their own time. It is because of resemblance that the historian makes an observation that an object is always the same--it is this thing which is contrasted with that other thing. For example, St. Gall's *Quem quaeritis* is usually contrasted with and compared to the *Quem quaeritis* of the *Regulæ Concordiae* in order to support the treatment of the latter as a liturgical play, drama, or liturgical music-drama since it contains the basic elements of drama--mimesis, action, dialogue, etc. Similitude is a device in a cognitive process with whose help elements covered by the object or obstructed from view are revealed. This process of discovery/disclosure cannot be solely analyzed in terms of the procedures of intervention because the historian does not know exactly what elements will appear from behind the silhouette of the object. The analysis will be an analysis of the tension between values, rather than ideologies brought into the space of representation by the historian, and the shadow emerging from behind the object. An example of such a process may be an analysis of the monastic, vernacular, and secular context in which the *Quem quaeritis* appears in the *Regulæ Concordiae* before any conclusions about the nature of this trope are drawn. 20

One becomes aware that resemblance, functioning in stable systems, reveals only the clearly visible--objects that are what the exterior makes them or that assume qualities of other objects which are known to us. Similitude is freed by the affirmation of an unstable model from both stable systems and a temporal perception of objects. Similitude affirms nothing; instead, it represents what objects hide, prevent from being seen, render invisible, or erase from visible representation.
The shift of focus from resemblance toward similitude compels a
historiographic process to enter a different dimension of cognizance which will
be moulded by questions such as: which elements can be isolated from others;
what system of relations (hierarchy, stratification, determination) can be
established between the elements that appear in a given space of
representation; how is this space of representation transformed into a
discourse; what are the processes that alter the objects that appear and
disappear in a given space of representation; and what are the grounds upon
which we might try to establish different historical sequences. All these
questions refer us back to the concept of the search for instabilities and a
concept of knowledge grounded in quantum theory. At the same time, it
becomes apparent that the rejection of temporal series and a unity of discourse
based on the permanence of objects frees us from a historiography understood
in terms of hypothesis and methodology, whether reflective of idealism,
positivism, or liberal/ideological inquiry, all of which can only exist in stable
systems which are controlled by Newtonian time series and Euclidean
geometry.

The discourse which was initiated and which surfaced with quantum
theory and recent theories of cognizance is located in the space where various
objects emerge, re-emerge, and are continuously transformed. This space,
often referred to as a space of representation, is defined in terms of rupture,
discontinuity, and instability. The objects in this space of representation do not
exist in a void, but in a network of relations on microscopic or macroscopic
scales. In addition, the objects, as well as their inherent characteristics, can be
displaced or transformed as they move or when they encounter a threshold in
the space of representation in which they have emerged. As Foucault
observes:

And the great problem presented by such historical analyses is not
how continuities are established, how a single pattern is formed and
preserved, how for so many different, successive minds there is a
single horizon, what mode of action and what substructure is implied
by the interplay of transmissions, resumptions, disappearances, and
repetitions, how the origin may extend its sway well beyond itself to
that conclusion that is never given--the problem is no longer one of
tradition, but one of division, of limits; it is no longer one of lasting
foundations, but one of transformations that serve as new
foundations, the rebuilding of foundations.21

This view of historiography is bereft of all the elements of temporal series
that underlie any methodology. Succession and analogy become obsolete
because they indicate linear, chronological progressions that lead to a single
horizon. But there is no single horizon, on meaning, or one ideology in the
post Einsteinian and post Heisenbergian world. Accordingly, historiography
should not be perceived as a temporal (time oriented) but as a spatial dimension. Time is not entirely rejected in this construct, but is transformed into a function rather than a factor determining the permanence of objects. As has been indicated, the Newtonian concept of time as an absolute and universal element moving steadily from the past toward the future is the foundation of the traditional concept of history. As such, it has been used in various historiographic investigations as the primary tool in delineating the boundaries of various discourses locating them in linear, parallel, or causal frameworks. Most of the standard theatre history books make use of this principle of ordering by presenting twelve, nineteen, or thirty-six periods in the description and analysis of the body of the material. In his recent study, "The Criteria for Periodization in Theatre History," Postlewait not only questions the modes of division, taxonomies used, and, ultimately, the relationship between methodological manipulating of descriptive detail and the detail itself, but also warns us about the problem of reductive explanations characteristic for the systems based on Newtonian physics:

The concept of periodization, in its normative if somewhat misleading usage, delineates one aspect of history, the condition of stability (or identity), in relation to another aspect, the process of change (or difference). These two aspects of human events, though dynamically interrelated and mutually defining, are separated in historical study for descriptive and analytical purposes. The continuous flow of time is organized into heuristic categories, episodes of our creation. As such, periods are interpretative ideas of order that regulate meaning. 22

In the suggested construct based on quantum theory, space, rather than time, is brought to the fore as the locum of historical research since time perceived in terms of being a determining factor establishing the permanence of objects is a normative category. Defined as function, time ceases to be the primary investigative tool in the process of imposing the boundaries upon the space of historical research.

The space in which the historical discourse takes place has no stable qualities, since, as quantum theory indicates, one cannot predict what nature will produce; all that can be calculated is probability. Probability and uncertainty are the key phrases in the description of the space in which historical events occur. The historian in such a construct is stripped of the power and the ideology provided by a methodology. Instead, s/he is forced to enter the field without the notions that made "interpretation" or "explanation" legitimate research methods because s/he cannot control the process which is taking place. Nor is the historian fully aware of shifts and transformations taking place, since information is incomplete and systems are unstable. The historian is, then, primarily assuming the function of an observer of the
ruptures and transformations occurring in the space in which the object of
inquiry has emerged or re-emerged.

Our perception of historiography must alter completely with such a
model. For, rather than a system in which a historian has been empowered to
impose rules and categories upon phenomena, we are faced with a system in
which the historian has seen the futility of his/her actions since s/he has little
to do with what is happening in the space of representation, since the
discourse is not based on the permanence of objects. Equipped with the
understanding of functions operating in a space, the historian has an
opportunity to enter a different, unknown dimension, in order to collect
information about the visible and invisible sides of the object, and to observe
it. The historian ought to realize that rules, strategies, functions, and
categories can be found in the object itself and in the network of relations
between the object and other elements that keep emerging and disappearing.
The nature of the relationship between the historian and the object/space of
representation is best described in True West when Sam Shepard says that
"... the one who's chasin' doesn't know where the other one is taking him.
And the one who's being chased doesn't know where he's going." Thus, the
historiographic discourse is a tension between the processes in the space of
representation (similitude) and the information both located in and brought
into the space by the historian (functions).

Taking power away from the historian is an unprecedented step in
historiography. It removes the historian from the position of supremacy
inherent in arranging information and places him/her in the position of an
observer/participant of the changes occurring in a given space of
representation. More importantly, however, taking power away from the
historian indicates the death of methodology as a cognitive tool. Instead, it
implies that historiography can only be discussed in terms of strategies that are
plotted on the basis of the changes and tensions between and within the
objects in a given space of representation and within the historian. What are
these strategies? How are they formed? How is the space of representation
defined? What processes take place during emergence and disappearance of
objects in a given space of representation? What are the relations between the
objects which are formed? What are the relationships between the objects
constituting a discursive formation? What processes take place between other
discursive formations within a given space of representation? What are the
principles of recurrent redistributions, ruptures, gaps, discontinuities existing
within this and other spaces of representation? What are the levels of the
discourse in this three dimensional space? These are the questions that might
be asked by the historian who sees history as a mode of existence of a
discourse rather than as a practice of establishing and stabilizing the
boundaries of a discourse by the condition of identity or difference.

These processes have several consequences. First, quantum theory and
microphysics force us to abandon nineteenth-century concepts of cognizance
and to move in the direction of cognizance based on similitude rather than resemblance. As a corollary of this shift, historiography is perceived as a reflection of a spatial, rather than temporal, dimension of human awareness. Second, the acceptance of the spatial dimension of historiography opens up a different level of perception which discloses what has been hidden thus far. The historian will discover the object that stayed in the shadow of permanence based on succession and analogy. The new elements of finitude and infinity will pose new questions about objects and their relation to other elements in the three-dimensional space of representation. The function of the historian will be, then, to observe the emergence of the object, its movement through the network of relations, thresholds, discontinuities, etc., in order to define the elements seminal to each series, to disclose and describe the relations between the series, and to trace their disappearances and redistributions. Third, new questions will surface once the concept of strategy is substituted for the concept of methodology. Historiography perceived in terms of strategy suggests a model that is open, since it is based solely on uncertainty and instability. With the help of strategies defining the basic functions of the space of representation, a historian can observe the rules and categories to be found through the object itself. Fourth, with the disappearance of methodology and the concept of total history, and with the acceptance of strategy, we can see the emergence of historiography which is not moulded by cognitive processes, social matrixes, or psychoanalysis. What emerges is historiography which is an autonomous form governed by its own rules and paradigms:

[Historiography] would be that which puts forward the unpresentable in presentation itself; that which denies itself the solace of good forms, the consensus of a task which would make it possible to share collectively the nostalgia for the unattainable; that which searches for new presentations, not in order to enjoy them but in order to impart a stronger sense of the unpresentable. [A historian] is in the position of a philosopher: the text he writes, the work he produces are not in principle governed by preestablished rules, and they cannot be judged according to the text or to the work. These rules and categories are what the work of art [and the historian] are looking for.24

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Notes

1. An abridged version of this essay was presented at the 1988 ATHE Conference in San Diego, August 1988.


5. The term "reflective historiography" is used not only to define Hegel's concept of history, but also these of Nietzsche's and Croce's. Nietzsche's views on historiography are presented in his On the Genealogy of Morals and "The Use and Abuse of History," wherein he discusses a concept of historical analysis in terms of the opposition to the quest for the origin of things on the grounds that such a pursuit inevitably leads to approximation of information and a tendency to regard the "origins" as the high point of a process of development. He suggests four approaches to historical representation: monumental, antiquarian, critical, and superhistorical which negate history perceived in terms of the uninterrupted continuities and stable forms, and bring forth the analysis of emergence and descent with the help of which one can trace the multiplicity of events behind the so-called "silent beginnings." See F.W. Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals in Basic Writings of Nietzsche, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Modern Library, 1968). Croce's concept of historiography is thoroughly discussed in his History: Its Theory and Practice in which historiography is divided into: romantic, idealist, positivist, and critical approaches. See Benedetto Croce, History: Its Theory and Practice, trans. Douglas Ainslie (New York: Russell & Russell, 1960).


7. Foucault 3.

8. For example, idiographic, contextualist, organicist, and mechanist approaches are examples of the Positivists' attempts to establish their supremacy over the Idealist. A comprehensive discussion of idiographic, organicist, mechanistic, and contextualist approaches can be found in White's "Interpretation in History." White 64-70. For a general overview of the shifts and transformations in the concept of history (history defined as a dialogical/rhetorical discourse) see Dominick LaCapra, History and Criticism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985) or Mark Poster, Foucault, Marxism & History: Mode of Production versus Mode of Presentation (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984).


10. Poster 77.


12. 305.

13. 304.

14. Foucault 12.
15. Depending on the methodology used, i.e., evolution theories (Chambers, Young), ritual theories (Hardison), interdisciplinary studies (Smoldon, Flanigan), historiographic relativism (Bjork, Norton), the Quem quaeritis has been defined as liturgical drama (Chambers), play (Young, Sticca, Anderson, Axton), play of a ritual drama (Hardison), dramatic Office (Craig), and liturgical music-drama (Wickham); the Regularis Concordia has been defined as the early documentation of drama, a record of a theatrical representation, a monastic document. See "The Quem Quaeritis: Theatre History Displacement," Theatre History Studies 8 (1988): 35-51.


20. See Michal Kobialka, "The Regularis Concordia and Theatre and Drama in the Early Middle Ages" (Ph.D. dissertation, Graduate School of CUNY, 1987).


24. Lyotard 81.