

## Inbetweenness: Spatial Folds in Theatre Historiography

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Thought thinks its own history (the past), but in order to free itself from what it thinks (the present) and be able finally to "think otherwise" (the future).

Gilles Deleuze, *Foucault*

In his recent book, *Soundings in Critical Theory*, Dominick LaCapra discusses the critical and self-critical nature of historiography. Noteworthy is a passage introducing the dialogic exchanges between the theoretical systems of Marx, Derrida, Foucault, and other contemporary theoreticians, in which LaCapra talks about the nature of criticism today:

Any assembly of "critics" today will have representatives of various established departments who are uneasy with their own representative function and may find more to say, listen to, or at least argue about with other critics than with more securely "representative" members of their own department or field. Indeed contemporary critics are no longer content with interdisciplinary efforts that simply combine, compare, or synthetically unify the methods of existing academic disciplines. Their questioning of established disciplines both raises doubts about internal criteria of purity or autonomy and unsettles the boundaries and protocols of given fields. Criticism in this sense is a discursive agitation running across a variety of

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disciplines and having an uneasy relation to its own institutionalization. It seeks out threshold positions that cannot securely locate their own theoretical grounds, and it may even cultivate the risks of insistently hybridized discourses--discourses that may breed fruitful variants but may also prove to be sterile if not monstrous. At least in terms of academic politics, the strategy of criticism is thus transgressive, and it demands not a quarantined place in the margins of established discourses or disciplines but a generalized displacement and rearticulation of them.<sup>1</sup>

This passage is a summary *par excellence* of, at least, three major transformations which are taking place in criticism as well as in historiography today. First, not content with interdisciplinary efforts to establish fixed point-objects on a diachronic/synchronic scale, criticism is moving steadily away from the unifying methods of established scholarly traditions. Second, having questioned academic hegemony and its apparatuses of control, criticism has abandoned rigid rules of methodology by unsettling boundaries. Finally, criticism is viewed as a transgressive strategy whose function is to revitalize discourses by a continuous process of displacement and rearticulation. LaCapra's observations about the nature of critical theory, echo those of Lyotard, Foucault, and Ulmer, all of whom have expressed concerns about the practice of and attempts to stabilize the boundaries of discourse.<sup>2</sup> More importantly, however, LaCapra's statement suggests the changed position of discourse: from a two-dimensional structure of power/knowledge within the stabilized boundaries of an ideological scheme, to a transgressive formation within a destabilized field of displacements and rearticulations.

In this essay, I would like to address the issue of this transfer in space, as observed by LaCapra, and to explore the concept of transgressive formations within historiographic discourses. I will suggest that these discourses do not move from point to point or threshold to threshold within the realm of a passive space, but constitute space-discourses that overlap, converge, and diverge in a multi-dimensional fold.

## I.

The pairing of historiography and physics merits particular attention. The subject of history and of the arrangement of its records have traditionally been associated with philosophy and/or with sciences such as biology, psychology, or anthropology. Recent years have witnessed the emergence of yet another discourse within the realm of intellectual inquiry: the incorporation of physics and its theories into literary and critical studies.<sup>3</sup> Though many scholars perceive this incorporation as foreign either to their experience or to their discourse, such a pairing is not a new phenomenon in Western culture. In *Physics and Philosophy*, Heisenberg showed that ontology and phenomenology

have always been connected with how physicists defined space, time, matter, and motion:

... the nineteenth century developed an extremely rigid frame for natural science which formed not only science but also the general outlook of great masses of people. This frame was supported by the fundamental concepts of classical physics, space, time, matter, and causality; the concept of reality applied to the things or events that we could perceive by our senses or that could be observed by means of the refined tools that technical science had provided. Matter was the primary reality.<sup>4</sup>

Matter, posited in empty space and changed by time, dominated the Positivists' perception of both the process of cognizance and its representation in the fine arts. Bergson's theory of knowledge was based on the accumulation of information in time. Darwin's world was grounded in the steady progression and development of an organism from simple to complex. The Marxists world was rooted in absolute space and a progressive movement of absolute time from past to future. The French painter, Courbet, believed that art represented real and existing matter.<sup>5</sup> Zola's theoretical writings concerning the subject-matter of paintings, novels, and dramas referred to observable and concrete reality.<sup>6</sup>

The Positivists' attempt to impose linear time upon both human beings and objects (matter) was possible because space was believed to be immutable. In classical physics, space was perceived as a homogeneous medium which existed objectively and independently of its physical content. Its rigid and timeless structure had been described by the axioms and theorems of Euclidean geometry. In the *Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy* (1687), Newton formulated a self-sufficient space, that is, space which was absolute in its own nature and remained always similar and immovable.<sup>7</sup> In philosophical terms, space was treated as Non-Being in contrast to the solidity of matter (Being) posited in it. An extension of this concept can be found in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* where the transcendental ideality of space is discussed at length:

Space does not represent any property of things in themselves, nor does it represent them in their relation to another. That is to say, space does not represent any determination that attaches to the objects themselves, and which remains even when abstraction has been made of all the subjective conditions of intuition.<sup>8</sup>

Toward the end of the nineteenth century, the concept of absolute space as an agent that simply *is* but cannot be acted upon was proved to be contrary to scientific reasoning. Maxwell's field theory, Mach's idea of relative spaces,

Lorentz's experiments with objects moving through a motionless ether, Poincaré's assumptions concerning the inability to measure space itself, Riemann's notion of an  $n$ -dimensional geometry, Minkowski's space-time manifold, Weyl's  $(3 + 1)$  or four-dimensional continuum, and Einstein's special theory of relativity challenged Newton's empty space and Euclidean (flat) geometry.<sup>9</sup> Epistemologically, space as conceived by classical physics was an illusion, although, as Max Jammer pointed out, "for practical purposes a very fruitful illusion--indeed, so fruitful that the concepts of absolute space and absolute time will ever remain the background of our daily experience."<sup>10</sup> The illusionary aspect of absolute time and absolute space is best summarized by Einstein in his "Autobiographical Notes" wherein he states:

Newton forgive me; you found the only way which, in your age, was just about possible for a man of highest thought and creative power. The concepts which you created, are even today still guiding our thinking in physics, although we now know that they will have to be replaced by others farther removed from the sphere of immediate experience, if we aim at a profounder understanding of relationships.<sup>11</sup>

The Theory of Relativity and quantum mechanics rejected the idealized structure of time and space. Traditionally, the term "past" was used to refer to all those events which we could know, read, or hear about, at least in principle. In a similar manner, the term "future" comprised all events that could be influenced, changed, or prevented, at least in principle. These definitions imply that a result of an experiment does not depend on motion or any other properties of an observer, that is, that they are invariant against the position of the observer. The theory of relativity, however, suggested that future and past were not separated by an infinitely short time interval (the present), but were separated by a finite time interval whose length depended on its distance from the observer:

an observer can at any given instant neither know of nor influence any event at a distant point which takes place between two characteristic times. The one time is the instant at which a light signal has to be given from the point of the event in order to reach the observer at the instant of observation. The other time is the instant at which a light signal, given by the observer at the instant of the observation, reaches the point of event. . . . Any event taking place between the two characteristic times may be called "simultaneous" with the act of observation.<sup>12</sup>

Thus two events happen at the same point simultaneously. One of the far-reaching consequences of such a definition of the process of observation is that

when events are simultaneous for one observer they may not be simultaneous for another observer. Descriptions of the process depend upon the position and the velocity of the observer, as well as a frame of reference.

If the special theory of relativity irrevocably altered the perception of time in physics, the general theory of relativity dynamized the structure of space. Einstein suggested that gravitational forces produced by masses were due to properties of empty space. If gravitation is connected with properties of space, these properties of space must be influenced by the masses. Since the properties of space seemed to change with gravitational fields, its geometry had to be presented as the geometry of curved surfaces (Riemann), where the straight line of Euclidean geometry was represented by a geodetical line with a changing curvature. Einstein's geometry was, thus, concerned not with a three-dimensional empty space, but with the four-dimensional manifold of space and time.

The theory of relativity destabilizing the boundaries of time and space exerted a tremendous impact on how physicists viewed reality. The epistemological, phenomenological, and ontological consequences of this process are best visible in the structures established by quantum mechanics. Quantum Reality #1 (the Copenhagen interpretation) suggests that there is no deep reality. Bohr insisted that everyday phenomena constitute solid reality which was translated into abstract quantum descriptions. In this sense, Bohr's epistemology, in which a physical description is a starting point of experimental arrangements, questioned the concept of the quantum world of a mental process defining reality, in order to caution against speculative hidden realities.<sup>13</sup> Quantum Reality #2 (the Copenhagen interpretation) deals with the proposition that reality is created by observation. "No elementary phenomenon is a real phenomenon until it is an observed phenomenon."<sup>14</sup> Consequently, the choices made during an observation determine what the past had to have been and what the future will be (Wheeler's 'delayed-choice' experiment). Quantum Reality #3 proclaims that reality is an undivided wholeness. Fritjof Capra explains in his *Tao of Physics* that the world is an inseparable whole despite its obvious boundaries and partitions.<sup>15</sup> Heitler develops this idea by suggesting that the act of observation dissolves the boundary between observer and observed:

The observer appears, as a necessary part of the whole structure and in his full capacity as a conscious king. The separation of the world into 'an objective outside reality' and 'us,' the self-conscious onlookers, can no longer be maintained. Object and subject have become inseparable from each other.<sup>16</sup>

Quantum Reality #4 indicates that reality consists of a steadily increasing number of parallel universes created by each act of measurement, that is, for any situation in which several different outcomes are possible, all outcomes, no

matter how contradictory occur. In order to accommodate the results of the measurement new universes emerge, identical in every detail except for a single outcome that initiated the process.<sup>17</sup> Quantum Reality #5 states that the world obeys a non-human kind of reasoning/logic. Quantum logicians call for an entirely different mode of reasoning which will reflect changes in physics. "Einstein threw out the classical concept of *time*; Bohr throws out the classical concept of *truth*. . . . Our classical ideas of logic are simply wrong in a basic practical way. The next step is to learn to think in the right way, to learn to think quantum-logically."<sup>18</sup> Quantum Reality #6 presents us with a model in which the world is made of ordinary objects, that is, objects which possess their own attributes whether or not observed (Einstein, Planck, Schroedinger, de Broglie).<sup>19</sup> Quantum Reality #7 privileges the idea that reality is created by consciousness. Von Neumann believed that physical objects would not have any attributes unless a conscious observer were watching them:

It is not possible to formulate the laws of quantum mechanics in a fully consistent way without reference to the consciousness. All that quantum mechanics purports to provide are probability connections between subsequent impressions of the consciousness. . . . It will remain remarkable in whatever way our future concepts may develop, that the very study of the consciousness is an ultimate reality.<sup>20</sup>

Quantum Reality #8 is the world of Heisenberg which consisted of potentials and actualities. The quantum world is not a world of actual events, but a world full of numerous unrealized tendencies for actions. These tendencies are in a constant motion; they merge, coalesce, diverge. However, despite this activity nothing ever happens since everything remains in the realm of possibility. These two worlds of potentials and actuality interact in the act of measurement, during which one quantum possibility is singled out to surface in our world as an actual event. The unobserved universe, the universe of quantum *potentia*, consists of possibilities that measurement reduces to a single, actual event in the contextual reality.<sup>21</sup>

These eight examples of quantum reality remind us that the laws of physics refer to our relationship to the universe of which we are a part. This relationship, however, does not create a stable system of reference, since it constantly changes with the position of the referent. At the same time, we are reminded that quantum is a strategy or a tool rather than a method, that is, a conceptual theory that predicts for any quantum entity which values of its physical attributes will be observed in a particular measurement. Quantum physics is, then, about probabilities rather than certainties, about open-ended rather than closed systems, about instabilities rather than stabilities, and about practices *produced* rather than facts *discovered*. The laws of physics cease to

function as unquestionable truths and facts, since facts, as Aronowitz observes, have become "theory, language, and technique laden, making *relations*, not things, the true object of inquiry in contemporary science."<sup>22</sup>

## II.

Space has frequently been disregarded or perceived as immutable in traditional scholarship and historiography. A focus upon changes in matter over time has thus been informed and determined by the scholarly apparatuses at the disposal of the historian which allowed him or her to discuss the distribution, ordering, and composition of phenomena.<sup>23</sup> Normative and ideological categories created the matter, the function, the form, and the location of the object for study. The object was perceived as a point in space "created" for the purpose of constituting knowledge. In a way, the relationship was that of the Hegelian master/slave functioning within boundaries delineated by the master. The object was spoken to and responded to the voice that created it. The appeal to an eternal and unchangeable order (ideology) provided a stable standard that existed as long as historians agreed to the significance of the order. Alexandre Kojev's definition of history as "the history of desired Desires" encapsulates perfectly the relationship between subject and object in traditional, time-oriented scholarship.<sup>24</sup> While discussing the political praxis of philosophical investigations, Kojev suggests that it is a process during which historians attempt to satisfy their desires for creativity, recognition, preservation, and conservation by dominating the object (matter) while ordering the past with their time/ideology matrix.<sup>25</sup> Nothing exemplifies this process better than the revisionist history or "historicism" employed in medieval scholarship. These critical approaches attempt to decenter privileged theories of the twentieth century by bringing to the fore different distributions and transmissions of objects posited in the immutable space of the medieval period.

Helmut de Boor's 1967 *Die Textgeschichte der lateinischen Osterfeiern* moves us away from theoretical issues concerning the moment of the origins of medieval drama and theatre discussed by Chambers, Young, and Hardison, and toward an analysis of all available forms of the *Quem quaeritis* and their variants.<sup>26</sup> Rather than being a chronological study, de Boor's is a study of regional differences. De Boor refers to his analysis as a *Textgeschichte*, that is, a textual history that constructs the history of the *Quem quaeritis* by establishing categories according to which the *Quem quaeritis* can be grouped and normalized. Two functional categories, *Faier* and *Spiel*, are introduced in order to distinguish between the forms and the position of the *Quem quaeritis* and the *Visitatio Sepulchri*. His discussion of the *Quem quaeritis* focuses on the discussion of the biblical sources of the trope, the "characters" used, and the biblical references for specific lines. The literary framework produces a sentence by sentence analysis of the text of Easter tropes. The tropes are then

categorized through a precise analysis of variations in the question posed by the Angel, the answer given by the Marys, the statement by the Angel, and so forth. Finally, the tropes are analyzed as self-contained units and geographical types. This historiography is grounded in the study of the literary qualities of *Quem quaeritis* compositions for the purpose of establishing patterns, traditions, and similarities among the types. In this process, de Boor establishes the categories that locate, distribute, and systematize various forms of the *Quem quaeritis* according to their literary value. Its critical and analytical value notwithstanding, this methodological operation reduces the differences between the texts belonging to either of the two functional categories. Ultimately, a literary analysis of the texts and their geographic distribution perpetuates an evolutionary, anthropological model and its scheme of emancipating plays from religious rituals. Such an analysis is possible if the space wherein those tropes appeared, the secular or monastic context, is erased for the purpose of presenting a totalizing textual theory of the *Quem quaeritis*. In quantum terms, the *Quem quaeritis* becomes a matter that is formed by normative and functional categories.

The totalizing nature of the *Textgeschichte* has been challenged by numerous methodologies and theories which question the authority and priority of the text. Hansjurgen Linke's 1985 "Drama und Theater des Mittelalters als Feld interdisziplinärer Forschung"<sup>27</sup> and Johann Drumb's 1981 *Quem quaeritis: teatro sacro dell'alto medioevo*<sup>28</sup> exemplify this shift. Though Linke's article focuses on the German drama, he indicates that only an interdisciplinary approach can be relevant for the discussion of German, French, or English medieval drama and theatre. Linke suggests that the medieval drama be viewed in relation to twenty-five subject areas divided into five major categories: transmission studies (bibliography, paleography, manuscript studies, diplomacy, etc.), intellectual/religious/social functions (the history of literature, church, and state, political, social, and economic history, etc.), content studies (history of ideas, history of medicine, etc.), modes of presentation (theatre history, musicology, art history, etc.), and reception (secular and vernacular). These categories, are, however, secondary to literary scholarship, since, for Linke, drama is primarily a form of literature. Johann Drumb's *Quem quaeritis: teatro sacro dell'alto medioevo* differs from the critical studies of Chambers, Young, Hardison, and de Boor in that the origins of the *Quem quaeritis* are discussed in the context of monastic history. Consequently, Drumb does not study the *Quem quaeritis* for its dramatic qualities, but perceives it as a liturgical ceremony associated with monasticism. Therefore, the questions that are posed are not questions concerning theatrical elements, but those concerning the place, the reason for the appearance of the *Quem quaeritis*, and the liturgical significance the "author" intended for the ceremony. Drumb's study reminds us of the ideological stakes in the quest for the "origins" of medieval drama and theatre. By locating his argument in monastic history, he moves us away from literary studies, textual analyses, or



anthropological research. Drumbl's questions about the transfer of the *Quem quaeritis* are answered in the context of shifts in the history of the Church in the ninth century, and, specifically, in the context of the monastic reforms at Fleury instigated by Odo of Cluny. His analysis of the reform of the Easter procession suggests to Drumbl that the *Quem quaeritis* was an autonomous ceremony, rather than a ritual, a form of liturgical poetry that was inserted into the service to accommodate changes in the procession on Easter Sunday. Thus, medieval drama did not originate in ritual, but was a literary form from its very beginnings.

These three studies remind us that historiography based on the desires to establish the permanence of objects and on a quest for similarities and differences between them can only function in absolute space and absolute time. The methodologies of de Boor, Linke, and Drumbl can preserve and systematize relationships between objects (points) only if the boundaries of the space wherein those objects are posited are stabilized and immutable. Immobility of the space can be achieved by the imposition of external processes of ordering grounded in

the order of experimental verification, logical validation, mere repetition, acceptance justified by tradition and authority, commentary, a search for hidden meanings, the analysis of error, references, critical discussions.<sup>29</sup>

These procedures are supported, as Heisenberg indicates in *Physics and Philosophy*, by the concepts and understanding of classical space, time, matter, and causality. They also reflect Kojév's analysis of history as the history of "the desired Desires," in this case the desire to produce legitimized knowledge by determining the form and function of matter (the *Quem quaeritis*) moving from point to point in time. In this sense, the object is spoken to and forced to reveal those attributes and only those attributes that will provoke new forms of knowledge. These new forms of knowledge are a reflection of the historian, projecting his or her image onto the empty and silent form of the object. This process of transference is possible because it happens, as Kant would make us believe, in "space [which] does not represent any determination that attaches to the objects themselves, and which remains even when abstraction has been made of all the subjective conditions of intuition."<sup>30</sup>

Gregory Ulmer suggests that "[c]riticism now is being transformed in the same way that literature and the arts were transformed by the avant-garde movements in the early decades of this century."<sup>31</sup> The force that initiated this transformation was indubitably quantum mechanics with its n-dimensional manifold structure of time and space and its recognition of the significance of the observer in the process of measurement. Even though quantum reality is not a unified concept, the impact it has exerted on the fine arts in the twentieth century cannot be dismissed.<sup>32</sup> The epistemological consequences of

this transformation can be observed in the relationship between traditional, representational art and the avant-garde movements of Futurism, Dada, and Surrealism. The abyss that existed between these two traditions in the fine arts, like the abyss that exists between traditional perceptions of reality and quantum reality, will never be bridged because the conflict between them cannot be equitably resolved for lack of a rule of judgement applicable to both arguments. The acceptance of this "differend," as Lyotard posits it,<sup>33</sup> between Newton's and Einstein's physics will allow us to accept that stable systems have been disqualified and replaced by relative probabilities, incomplete information, and complex multi-dimensional structures that unsettle all boundaries.

In what Minkowski called the manifold of time and space, we begin to realize that a document is spoken to by the historian, but also that a document speaks and reveals. This realization finds its parallel in quantum reality, especially in the concepts of parallel universes and Heisenberg's two worlds of potential and actuality. Whereas in the Newtonian world there was only one immutable space, now, we are faced with two realities, two spaces, the space of the document and the space of the observer. Whereas in the Newtonian world, the historiographic process was conceived in terms of the inside appropriating the outside, now we are faced with a multiplicity of insides and outsides and relationships between them. The questions that begin to emerge concern redoubling of spaces, directions and determinations of inside and outside, and the folding of spaces.

In historiography, if we try to establish the position of a document in order to isolate statements, we can do so only if we designate the tools which will allow this process to happen, if we designate the centers of power on which we depend.<sup>34</sup> These centers of power (ideology and methodology) constitute and describe the inside wherein the historian is located. The process of cognizance is the process of first reaching the document (the outside) which is as yet non-stratified, at least as far as the historian is concerned; second of bringing the outside inside (the collapse of the outside); and, third, of shaping the collapsed outside with the historiographic apparatuses of power into stratified epistemological units. The interiorization of the outside is then reduced to an exploration of the elements that make up the document within the boundaries of the inside. The transfer that constitutes historical discourse as a movement from within the inside fails, however, to recognize that this interiorization of the outside by the historian is not a doubling of the inside (the historian projects an image onto an empty object), but a redoubling of the outside. This redoubling of the outside is a process during which thought reaches out to the realm of the document and constructs that document as matter and function parallel to the space of the historian. All outcomes, no matter how contradictory, are now possible, for there is no historiographic apparatus in position to privilege one result over the other, that is, each time the historian "speaks" to a document, the document "speaks" and

"reveals" various formations, all of which are coextensive with the space of the historian. To use a parallel with quantum mechanics, the historian is forced to acknowledge that a historiographic discourse is constituted by the co-existence of the space-discourse of the historian and the space-discourse of the document. Moreover,

every inside-space is topologically in contact with the outside-space, independent of distance and of the limits of a 'living'; and this carnal or vital topology, far from showing up in space, frees a sense of time that fits the past into the inside, brings about the future in the outside, and brings the two into confrontation at the limit of the living present.<sup>35</sup>

The confrontation at the limit of the living present is a spatial linkage between the two discourses in this multi-dimensional fold of time and space. The historiographic discourse becomes a space created by the overlapping of parallel space discourses. The space-discourse of the historian is grounded in the network constituted by the forces (Power) provoking forms (Knowledge), as well as by relations or practices between those forces and forms. The space-discourse of the document is also posited in the relationship and practices between the forces (Power) and forms (Knowledge) characterizing its own space of representation. The new space inbetween these space-discourses is created by thought, a spatial formation responsible for the initial folding rather than for the collapse of the outside into the inside. Thought should not, however, be understood here as an objective or transcendental formation, but as a tool, a probe, or a signal which could find its parallel in quantum measurement, or in Einstein's special theory of relativity.

So defined, each entrance or exit of thought will alter the mode of stratification of the space inbetween. A visual metaphor for this process can be found in the theoretical writings of Polish theatre director Tadeusz Kantor. Describing theatre space in his *Milano Lessons*, Kantor observes that:

I can feel its [space's] pulse. It is a space which does not have an exit or a boundary; a space which is receding or approaching multi-directionally with changing velocity; it is dispersed in all directions: to the sides, to the middle. . . . Figures and objects become the function of space and its mutability. Space is not a passive receptacle in which objects and forms are posited. Space itself is an object of creation. Space is energy. Space shrinks and expands. And these motions mold forms and objects. It is space which gives birth to forms. It is space which conditions the network of relations and tensions between objects.<sup>36</sup>

It could be suggested that thought entering formed matter as it functions in localized discourses exposes fissures by displacing and rearticulating them in space, no longer viewed as a passive receptacle. Thought dynamizes both the space of the historian and the space of the document by transgressing and expanding their boundaries and by establishing their overlap. This space, this "inbetweenness," as the Kantor passage indicates, will then be governed by the laws of probability and uncertainty characterizing all unstable systems. In an unstable universe, as quantum mechanics reminds us, past, present, and future do not create a continuum but are simultaneous and self-consistent.

In this newly created manifold in which thought, as indicated by Deleuze, "thinks its own history (the past), but in order to free itself from what it thinks (the present) and be able finally to think otherwise (the future)," <sup>37</sup> the space-discourses of the historian and the document become visible and articulate their power/knowledge practices. The functions of visibility and articulation are triggered by the entrance of the probe. It is because of the probe that the order of formations in the inbetween space can be perceived. One could enumerate four concepts that inform this space. First, it is self-reflexive, that is, the space constituted by the overlapping of the two space-discourses, is not a reproductive mechanism mirroring and transferring one discourse onto the other, but an autonomous space which can only fold back upon itself. Second, it is self-consistent because time is one of the dimensions of the manifold rather than an organizing element of the matter, as was the case in Newtonian time sequence. Here, time does not flow from the past via the present into the future moment. Rather, past, present, and future are simultaneous in the process of probing/observation. Third, the space is co-extensive with the discourses of the historian and the document. And finally, it is fractal, like an alloy which consists of two metals with different heating points. During the process of heating, these metals respond differently to the same temperature. In historiography, upon the initial creation of the overlap by thought and upon its further entrances and exits, the space-discourses of the historian and the document respond differently by exposing different aspects or fissures.

When employed in medieval historiography, this strategy will allow us to shift focus from the traditional textual, interdisciplinary, or contextual method of establishing fixed point-objects on a power/knowledge axis to a questioning of the boundaries of methodologies. This transgression will revitalize discourses by allowing us to locate them in space rather than in time. The constitution of space-discourses that overlap in a multi-dimensional fold leads us to a discussion of discursive formations. With the help of this strategy, as I have argued elsewhere, the *Quem quaeritis* in the *Regularis Concordia* will cease to be viewed as drama, play, music-drama, or liturgical music-drama. <sup>38</sup> Instead, rather than establishing fixed points in time, we will be able to perceive the *Quem quaeritis* in its various positions in the tenth century in terms of the historical, secular, and monastic forces in operation at that time. Maybe, the fact that the *Quem quaeritis* had different positions, that is, as an

Introit to the Easter Mass or at the end of the Night Office, will not be explained in terms of its textual analysis, geographical distribution, or literary value, but in terms of its function within the monastic tradition. Maybe, the tension that existed between various representations of the *Quem quaeritis* that is, between the strict Benedictine order as practiced, for example, at Cluny, and the Benedictine rule as modified and edited at the Council of Winchester in 965-75 in England will be seen as significant. Maybe, the question of the "shift" of the *Quem quaeritis* will no longer be explained in terms of literary freedom (Young) or anticipation (Hardison), but in terms of two separate traditions of celebrating Easter Day in European monastic houses in the tenth century, one based on the Rule of Saint Benedict which was favored by Cluniac houses and another based on the Antiphonar for secular churches (*Ordo Romanus Primus*) which was accepted in the Lotharingian model of monasticism.<sup>39</sup> At the same time, new questions will emerge in the overlap initiated by thought: what forces and forms are practiced in the power/knowledge space-discourse of the historian and the document? how is the space-discourse changed by the gaze of the observer and the document? what is being changed or excluded? where and how can the change or exclusion be perceived? how is the space-discourse of inbetweenness altered by multiple entrances and exits of thought? what is the relationship between space-discourses in self-reflexive, self-consistent, and co-extensive manifold? which practices of the space-discourses of the historian and the document are dynamized by the entrance of the probe?

All these and many other questions may emerge once we recognize that historiography can no longer be posited according to traditional concepts of space, time, and matter that dominated our cognizance for centuries. As Jammer indicated, the concepts of empty space and of time sequences altering matter were a fruitful illusion that will always remain in the background of our daily experience. Quantum mechanics shows us, however, that this idealization of time and space is the history of "the desired Desires" for the absolute and for order. Quantum mechanics irrevocably altered our perception of the universe, a universe constantly formed and altered by the power of the observer in the same way, as Einstein pointed out, that the observer is formed and altered by the object observed. For these reasons, to question the impact of quantum physics on the fine arts, historiography, or criticism, would epitomize the "differend," that is, an attempt to evaluate quantum reality with the tools of Newton. Quantum physics' concepts of manifold time and space allow us to transgress the established boundaries of historiography, to ask new

questions, as well as to displace and rearticulate the space-discourses of the historian and of the document whose initial folding is instigated by thought, which,

moving in the objective universe, records the section as it comes to it and leaves it behind as *history*, like the process which unfolds itself in space and opens out into time.<sup>40</sup>

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## Notes

1. Dominick LaCapra, *Soundings in Critical Theory* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1989) 11-12.
2. See, Jean-Francois Lyotard, *The Post-Modern Condition* (Minneapolis, MN: U of Minnesota P, 1984), Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972), Gregory L. Ulmer, "The Object of Post-Criticism," *The Anti-Aesthetic*, ed. Hal Foster (Seattle, WA: Bay Press, 1989) 83-110.
3. In 1985, the Society for Literature and Science was officially inaugurated at the International Congress for the History of Science held at the University of California at Berkeley. See *Literature and Science as Modes of Expression*, ed. Frederick Amrine (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989) for further information about the Society and the proceedings of the conference. The volume contains ten out of 75 papers that were presented at three plenary lectures and 19 sessions.
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36. Tadeusz Kantor, "Lesson 3," *The Milano Lessons*, forthcoming in *The Drama Review* Spring 1991. (Translation mine)
37. Deleuze 119.
38. See my "The *Quem Quaeritis*: Theatre History Displacement," *Theatre History Studies* (1988): 35-51.
39. This license in the observance of Easter could be an explanation for the position of nine tenth-century *Quem quaeritis* chants. Three of them--from St. Martial of Limoges (923-34), St. Gall (?950), and St. Martial of Limoges (988-94)--were a part of the Easter Mass. St. Gall and St. Martial were Cluniac houses which used a Benedictine Office. The *Quem quaeritis* found in the *Regularis Concordia* (965-75), the Bamberg troper (tenth century), and St. Vito (tenth century) are unequivocally related to the Night Office. The position of the chant suggests that the celebration of Easter followed the *Ordo Romanus Primus* in those houses. The position of the last three *Quem quaeritis*, that is, the Winchester troper (978-80), the Bamberg gradual

(tenth century), and Vienna (tenth century) is ambiguous. See my dissertation, "*The Regularis Concordia* and Drama and Theatre of the Early Middle Ages" (Graduate School, CUNY, 1987).

40. E. Meyerson, "On Various Interpretations of the Relativistic Time," *The Concepts of Space and Time* 354.



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