The Pedophile in Me: The Ethics of *How I Learned to Drive*

Andrew Kimbrough

*I want my learned readers to participate in the scene I am about to replay; I want them to examine its every detail and see for themselves.…

—Humbert Humbert in Nabokov’s *Lolita.*

The vilification of the pedophile in the closing decade of the twentieth century has created a rather bizarre and galvanizing moment in recent North American history, one in which feminists and gay rights activists find themselves aligned with conservative family advocates in their condemnation of the North American Man Boy Love Association. At a time when academics and social critics unanimously bemoan the impossibility of a workable and just notion of community in our economically and racially divided, relativistic and multi-hyphenated society, the panic engendered by the malevolent image of the child molester has united the American public in an unforeseen way. The phenomenon has created a consolidated community of outrage which includes people of every age, race, political persuasion and personal practice. With the slight exception of the pedophile.

The novelty of Paula Vogel’s *How I Learned to Drive* (1997) is its successful attempt to reconcile the exclusion of the pedophile by creating a model of community that is radically inclusive of contemporary society’s last great pariah. One would think this task not too difficult given that the American public has been nurturing a love affair with movies and television (and sometimes theatre) that have been sympathetically portraying murderers, drug dealers, pornographers and psychopaths for several decades now. Still, as the dearth of scripts seriously dealing with the subject of children and sex indicates, Paula Vogel transgressed accepted practice when she presented the alcoholic pedophile, Uncle Peck, not as an antagonist at all, but as someone who is complex, compassionate and sincerely attentive of his niece, albeit deeply in need of help. It’s not as though Vogel’s play is subversive; critics and audiences understand exactly what *Drive* is all about.

Donald Munro of the *Fresno Bee* echoed the sentiments of many reviewers when he wrote,

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Pedophilia used to be considered a taboo subject, but in today’s talk-show-soaked climate, the sexual abuse of children has become a hot topic. What’s still taboo, however, is to depict the pedophile as anything but a one-dimensional, smoldering sack of evil. It’s still taboo to depict the relationship between the abuser and the abused as just that: a relationship, no matter how twisted and wrong it might be.²

Writing in Detroit, Michael Margolin agreed, observing, “In the end, the greatest appeal of How I Learned to Drive is that it has the ring of truth. In life, victims are not always blameless, and perpetrators are not just villains. Vogel’s play casts the plumb line on that truth.”³

But as we are constantly reminded, truth is relative. On the other side of the critical fence were the responses that seemed more in keeping with the moral certitude expressed in the “talk-show-soaked climate” that has informed recent knee-jerk legislation aimed at both pedophiles and the NEA. In Los Angeles, Rebecca Baldwin regarded Drive as “a play that celebrated pedophilia” while in Long Beach, G. B. Loganbill felt that “this play’s theme was repulsively revolting.”⁴

Of course it is the rare play that does not have its detractors, but my task here is not to reconcile disparate and conflicting opinions. I simply wish to point out a paradox. In the play, L’il Bit revisits a past of incest and abuse in order to overcome her personal demons, advocating a reinvestment in such notions as “family and forgiveness,” two values far from unfamiliar to mainstream American mores. While the play never condones pedophilia, its benevolent regard for Peck indirectly reflects the American belief, inherited from Enlightenment thought, that every human being is created equal, innocent until proven guilty, and deserving of due process, a belief that slumbers at the heart of the U.S. Constitution and is from time to time discerned in U.S. judicial practice. How I Learned to Drive simply promotes what the Constitution aims to guarantee and secular humanism endorses, that Uncle Peck, and by extension all pedophiles, be afforded all the rights of a lawful citizen and regarded as one among equals. It should be no surprise that Drive, despite its few naysayers, has earned the Pulitzer Prize—its sentiments reflect the principles which lie at the heart of our social psyche. The paradox is betrayed by the fact that in the face of such noble ideals we still insist on scapegoating a portion of our society as unredeemably degenerate and therefore expendable.⁵

The problem may be that we, a collective of relatively progressive modernists made up of differing politics, ethnicities and nationalities yet beholden to one another by the fragile civility of common courtesy, really do not believe and therefore refuse to espouse the ethics we have created for ourselves. We may indeed thirst for the blood of sacrificial scapegoats and are bound to indulge in practices that preclude true, inclusive community. Or it may be that we are suffering from a
Spring 2002

communal malaise made up of irrational fears and feelings of estrangement which we seek to vent on whomever we can consider evil, and the ideal community is still out there waiting to be attained once we have found a way to heal and readjust. While stopping short of claiming a definitive solution to a persistent problem, this essay forwards an argument that Paula Vogel’s How I Learned to Drive offers a model of community that is profoundly ethical and operable because it is radically understanding and inclusive of those whom we identify as different and undesirable. Vogel is not content, however, to recycle the tired cliches and platitudes of moralistic works that oversimplify the excruciating problematics and ambiguities of the human condition by appealing to cheap sentiment. Her play sidesteps the naive notion that difference is bridged when we simply choose to emphasize sameness, compassion, and fellow feeling. Rather, her play testifies to the radical and self-implicating belief that community begins when we recognize that what we find most abhorrent and intolerable in others is really that which we find most fearful and shameful about ourselves.

1. The Dysfunctional Community

Critics and audiences do not need to be reminded that the past two decades have witnessed a sharp rise in the awareness of perceived sex crimes against children and the propagation of the unquestioned belief that such crimes are on the rise. How I Learned to Drive appeared at a time when versions of California’s “Three Strikes” ruling and New Jersey’s “Megan’s Law,” passed in the wake of two grisly child abduction murders, became federally mandated. Coincidentally, in the decade preceding the publication of Vladimir Nabokov’s Lolita (1955), the novel Paula Vogel credits for being the inspiration of her play, approximately half of the United States passed new legislation aimed at sex crimes against children and women. As it turns out, Vogel’s and Nabokov’s work have more in common than just a sympathetic pedophile. Both texts are insightful social commentaries on what America chooses to frame as epidemics and crises, and also on what it chooses to ignore. Such a coincidence is not lost on Philip Jenkins, whose study Moral Panic (1998) points out that the recent child sex abuse panic is the third such panic in the past century alone, the first occurring in the 1910s and the second during the 1930s and 40s. Unfortunately, Jenkins does not foresee an end to the cycle any time soon. For some reason we seem to be addicted to our proclivity for creating hysteria and passing legislation.

Symptomatic of the manufacture of panic is our unawareness that this practice constitutes a problem. Jenkins believes that, whereas recent studies of the two previous sex crime panics recognize their constructed nature as reflective of social fears that have little to do with crime, scholarship that focusses on the 1980s and 90s does not apply the same skeptical criteria.
The consensus is that although earlier panics arose from ignorance, hysteria, and self-interest, contemporary formulations of child abuse are sober depictions of objective truth. . . . In neither our conceptualizing of the problem nor our devising of counter-measures is there much evidence of our having learned from history.  

Jenkins equates the "sex psychopath statutes" of the 1910s and 1940s with recent legislation such as "Megan's Law" in that they were passed under public pressure and contained elements likely to invoke constitutional challenge. He observes that sex laws in the past failed to fulfill a genuine social need and were ultimately repealed, and he foresees a similar fate to the sex laws of the 1990s, predicting that they will acquire a "malodorous historical reputation." He has not had to wait long. Joe Klaas, grandfather to Polly Klaas, after whose murder California's "Three Strikes" ruling was drafted, published an editorial in The Los Angeles Times on August 25, 1999, less than five years after the law's passage, complaining that it did not address the problem for which it was intended.

Jenkins' assertion is not that sex crimes are not a problem (which he admits they are) but that the public conception of sex crime does not address crime at all, arguing that it is more indicative of "the concerns, prejudices, and fears of the society that thus defines its deviants and outsiders," providing "an index of shifting social attitudes to matters as diverse as the status of children, the structure of the family, the range of acceptable sexual behaviors, and the tolerance of alternative sexual orientations." He also shows that concepts regarding sexuality have never been constant, and that new legislation in every era has been marked by the incorporation of questionable contributions from the evolving (and often equivocal) fields of psychiatry, medicine, and the social sciences. Jenkins implies that much of our problem with perceived sexual abuse stems from our not knowing exactly how we feel about our own sexuality.

When Paula Vogel wrote her play she was aware that the public discourse on child sexual abuse had reached a level of absurdity. As she noted in interviews, she was consciously working against the victimization and blame mentality that is too often reflected in our culture's media. Instead, she investigates a problem without offering easy solutions while at the same time raising difficult questions. One such question addresses the notion of changing concepts of sexuality and propriety, not as products of social evolution, but as indicative of our own discomforts. Vogel juxtaposes her teenaged lead, the precocious and curious L'il Bit, a relative sexual innocent despite her unique circumstances, against her grandmother, a woman who "grew up during the Depression" and who had a child bride at the age of fourteen. The difference between the two illustrates that today it is practically criminal to consider a woman of fourteen as sexual while earlier in
the century, as Grandma asserts, “It was legal, what Daddy and I did! I was fourteen and in those days, fourteen was a grown-up woman.” Given the contemporary social climate, such legality appears arcane; but as Jenkins points out, in the first decades of the century five southern states still set the age of consent at ten years and Delaware’s stood at seven years. Vern Bullough reminds us that throughout history up until the first half of the twentieth century, brides in their early teens were commonplace, a fact not lost on Lolita’s Humbert Humbert, whose hero, Edgar Allen Poe, married his thirteen year old cousin at the age of twenty-seven in 1836. Yet even though ages of consent rose slowly in the past hundred years, today there is still no consensus. The age of consent for girls in Canada stands at fourteen, while most states locate consent between sixteen and eighteen. Jenkins claims that in the U.S. today sexual activity is permitted in girls as young as twelve or thirteen. Lil Bit’s family illustrates the conflicting pressures cultivated by North American culture: on the one hand is Grandpa, who believes that women are at best breeding machines and who sexualizes his adolescent granddaughter at every opportunity; on the other hand is Grandma, who would prefer to shelter her children from all sexual knowledge until they are married.

In light of the figures, it is not ironic that Peck could molest his niece when she was eleven but remain determined to wait until she was eighteen before attempting intercourse. The notion of sexual boundaries in both a historical and contemporary regard has always been a more relative than fixed matter. Only recently has society deemed to conflate the sexuality of children and adolescents. As Jenkins observes, the word pedophilia, as it is currently employed, denotes sexual contact between an adult and anyone under the age of eighteen, when quite literally pedophilia is defined as an attraction to pre-adolescent children, usually under the age of twelve. The word which refers to the attraction to adolescent youths is ephebophilia, which also describes the attraction Peck has for L’il Bit, since at the age of eleven she had already developed breasts. The point is that ephebophilia is not considered as transgressive as pedophilia, and therefore not as attractive and useful to a public discourse that aims to inflame rather than dispel hysteria and misinformation. Vogel skated within the narrow boundaries of our collective discomfort when she presented her “victim” as a prescient teenager aware of her budding sexual allure, engaging in an incestuous relationship that is in reality one step removed from incest (Peck is her uncle by marriage, not by blood), and not strictly pedophilic. Except for the early instance of molestation, L’il Bit and Uncle Peck mirror the real life example of Woody Allen and Soon Yi Previn, who are at this date married and raising a child together. Although their case may violate notions of good taste, their actions have been within the law. Nonetheless, while questions of legality and propriety reflect our shifting discomforts with sexuality, they do not adequately account for the persistent and prurient allure and demonization of pedophilia.
Taking on everything from the sensationalized trials of Polly Klaas's and Megan Kanka's killers to the Menendez brothers and Michael Jackson, from child beauty pageants and advertising to the "teacher sex scandals," James R. Kincaid in his study *Erotic Innocence* (1998) argues that "we are all implicated in a contemporary discourse on children, sexuality, and assault so mighty that it comes close to defining our moment." He proposes a theory that American society has created its own myth of the child molester, what he calls a "story" that the public feels compelled to propagate. He begins the construction of his argument with two assumptions.

The first is that these stories are doing something for us: we wouldn't be telling this tale of the exploitation of the child's body if we didn't wish to have it told. The second is that what these stories do for us is keep the subject hot so we can disown it while welcoming it in the back door.

In no uncertain terms, Kincaid accuses the American public of an attraction to the image of the eroticized child, an image it at once creates while at the same time condemns. Given such a construction, Kincaid sees only a proliferation of sex scandal stories and the concomitant fallacy that sex crimes against children are on the rise when evidence points to the contrary, that adult sexual behavior with minors and children occurs less frequently now than it did in the past.

The appearance of *How I Learned to Drive* on stages across America at a time when child sex abuse hysteria was (and may still be) on the rise begs the question of whether Paula Vogel was simply capitalizing on the popularity of the story or doing something to address its viral nature. Two issues might serve to compromise its position. First, cropping up in the play is the familiar notion that Uncle Peck is a victimizer because he himself was a victim of abuse, an oft-repeated "fact" which psychologists Randall Garland and Michael Dougher find unsupportable. After reviewing the available studies, which Garland and Dougher found to have poorly defined methodologies and a high variability of findings, they believe the abuser/abused hypothesis "inadequate and incorrect." Second, even more questionable is the portrayal of a large-breasted lead (who, judging from production stills, is always played by an attractive actress) who is herself an adult even though she plays a teenager, thus providing the audience with a less troublesome and more accessible experience of her four or five sexualized encounters with her uncle.

Epitomizing such an experience is the scene of the photo shoot during which occurs, if the production follows the suggestion of the script, the projection of images "a la *Playboy*, Calvin Klein and Victorian/Lewis Carroll's Alice Liddell." Though the play unquestionably aims to challenge the production of sexualized female imagery, the imagery is nonetheless provided and may be therefore
interpreted or enjoyed according to the individual sensibilities of the audience members. Furthermore, since we do not actually see a thirteen year old but an attractive adult pose provocatively for her uncle, a layer of emotional disturbance is removed and, possibly, replaced by a titillating sexual voyeurism. Vogel may have unintentionally provided a means for us to condemn pedophilia while at the same time indulge our erotic tastes.\(^{30}\)

But I do not believe such challenges to the play or Vogel’s intentions holds up against the view, already affirmed by the critical response to the play, that \textit{Drive} takes on, as do Jenkins and Kincaid, the faulty and misleading image of the pedophile as produced in both the media and the popular public conception. In the face of such a powerful and self-perpetuating story Kincaid proposes to, and I think Vogel succeeds in, startling those stories out of currency with the goal of providing a more realistic, balanced and ethical consideration of the problem of child sexual abuse. Kincaid believes that the best way to escape the trap of “scapegoating porn-speak” is to replace the old stories with new ones, by in fact frankly admitting, “Yes, we all feel the attractiveness of children.” He does not shy from stating, “I believe most adults in our culture feel some measure of erotic attraction to children and the childlike; I do not know how it could be otherwise,” but such an admittance does not mean that he fears anyone will then feel compelled to have sex with children. On the contrary, he simply wonders whether we are doing ourselves more harm by displacing our anxieties instead of confronting our constructions of the eroticized child.\(^{31}\)

David Savran considers the photo shoot the center of the play because it graphically represents L’il Bit’s objectification, for her uncle as well as herself. Savran echoes Kincaid’s social analysis when he argues that L’il Bit “suddenly discovers that she has become an actor in a drama that has been scripted for her by an exploitative, if well-meaning spectator who is, in turn, the product of a society that values women for their allure.”\(^{32}\) In Kincaid’s view, however, it is a society that prefers children for their allure, possibly more so than women, and everyone is implicated in the exploitation. The originality of Vogel’s play stems from its attempt to break the cycle. This is accomplished when individuals identify when and how they are objectified. Like L’il Bit, they can then learn, as Savran observes, to “re-member” and “reconstruct” themselves, taking control of their lives and offering positive examples for others.\(^{33}\) Kincaid argues that the cycle can also be broken when individuals learn they are doing the objectifying.\(^{34}\) My belief is that when the audience focusses on L’il Bit, they are in part unwittingly standing in Uncle Peck’s shoes, gazing at her through the lens of the camera. They are uncomfortable not because L’il Bit is honestly enjoying herself while her lascivious uncle is snapping away, but because they are the ones manipulating the camera and the child.

Kincaid believes that an admittance of culpability is a way out of the trap.
Ironically, it is not Peck who has this realization, but L’il Bit. Even though she is read as the victim and protagonist of the piece, when she revisits the scene of the crime with the intention to recognize and confess her own complicity, she takes responsibility for a past for which she, as a child, could not have had responsibility. As part of the process of her growth and healing, such an admittance and acceptance of culpability is a very real and empowering way in which L’il Bit breaks the cycle. Paula Vogel is aware that “the most crucial forgiveness would be L’il Bit’s forgiving L’il Bit. L’il Bit as an adult looking at and understanding her complicity.” By admitting that she has become part of the problem, she can then take steps to overcome the problem. Paula Vogel reflected this sentiment when she stated,

We live in a misogynist world, and I want to see why. And I want to look and see why not just men are the enemy but how I as a woman participate in the system. . . . At the moment, we women are colluding with the patriarchal system and with the class structure. You can’t deport the enemy, the enemy is inside us.36

Kincaid agrees, proposing a refocus of attention on ourselves as the source of difference as a strategy to address the problem of the scapegoating of the pedophile.

It is my belief that an understanding of the history of this dilemma and a shift in our focus will cause us not only to see differently but to know differently. From altered forms of knowing can come new actions and new feelings about actions we take. In this case, I think we can find a happy paradox: by locating the problems within our common heritage—that is to say, within ourselves (and giving up on the monsters)—we will find it in our hearts (and in the way we see the problem) to be easier on ourselves and, consequently, easier on our children.37

2. The Mimetic Community

The paradox of the crisis surrounding the pedophile in contemporary American society makes sense when viewed through the paradigm of Rene Girard’s mimetic theory.38 In summary, the mimetic theory posits that a primary impulse in a human being is a mimetic rivalry that aims to possess what is perceived as desirable by an other, a rivalry that escalates into violence and death. As a result, communal safeguards in the form of sacrificial rituals have developed as a means to keep violence safely channeled and controlled, providing for the safe and peaceful maintenance of society as opposed to an otherwise free reign of chaos. Girard interprets all of human civilization as practicing ritual sacrifice in order to secure
its survival against the threat of latent violence, believing that “humanity’s very existence is due primarily to the operation of the surrogate victim.” The role of the surrogate is central to the process, since the victim acts as a substitute for all the members of the community, who project onto the surrogate both communal and individual tensions, rivalries and hostilities. Victimization may be random or deliberate, but victims are always scapegoats, usually chosen from groups perceived as outsiders, different or transgressive, and not necessarily guilty of the crimes for which they are sacrificed. Instead, every individual of the community puts to death with the surrogate that which it hopes to purge from within itself, making of the victim a “monstrous double” of the self.

While the scapegoating mechanism and ritual sacrifice serve to maintain community, such practices are not necessarily healthy, since the history of humankind has been marked by cycles of barbarity and destruction that can only be attributed to a self-perpetuating system that will never rid itself completely of the violence it aims to expel. In the case of enlightened, industrialized societies that naively believe they have rid themselves of ritual forms reminiscent of primitive and superstitious religious practice, the scapegoating mechanism operates completely unrecognized, having become sublimated to the degree that sacrifice operates under the more civilized cloak of world war, genocide, and localized forms of vigilante justice. Girard argues that the unique value of Christianity, indeed the essence of its promise of salvation, is the denial of the sacrificial impulse in favor of a radical embrace of love and non-violence. Unfortunately, humanity has been so conditioned by mimetic rivalry and the belief in the efficacy of sacrifice that such an extreme ethic, although universally applauded and idealized, is believed impractical. Hence, given that our modern society rationally condemns sacrifice for what it perceives as barbaric behavior, we remain blind to our perverse sacrificial practice of scapegoating elements of our own population. We have substituted sacrifice with forms of retributive justice or blatant persecution, vainly attempting to exorcize the pariah from among us, not from within us.

Girard formulated his theory after a close scrutiny of classic literary texts, seeing in them veiled sublimations of mimetic rivalry and sacrifice. In similar fashion, the scapegoat principle operates within How I Learned to Drive. Even though Uncle Peck is not identified as a pedophile by his own community and does not experience public humiliation and punishment, in the world view of the play he is identified as a malevolent element that disrupts and imperils community, and there is no alternative for him but to die. The play elevates Peck to the status of tragic hero—in Girard’s reading a sacrificial victim—in keeping with the mythological formula of the Greek tragedies, a parallel that Vogel intentionally stages by surrounding her two leads with a “Greek Chorus,” three actors who play all of the other characters. But Uncle Peck does not occupy the center of the play. Significantly, How I Learned to Drive breaks from the traditional affirmation of
sacrifice seen in tragedy when it presents Peck's transgression and tragic fate as secondary to L'il Bit's more crucial attempt to come to terms with her own complicity in a past of blame, guilt, and abuse.43

The play opens with L'il Bit making a simple declaration: "Sometimes to tell a secret, you first have to teach a lesson."44 One beguiling aspect of the play is that L'il Bit never explicitly identifies that secret, since a shroud of ambiguity obscures her attitude toward the events. Certainly she reveals one secret by presenting the complicated history of sexual activity that she experienced with her uncle. But she could be pointing to a secret of abuse she received at the hands of her family and schoolmates, as well as to the secret of her sexual orientation. Another possibility may simply be found in what is implied in the end, that L'il Bit has forgiven the abuses of her past and she now prepares to get on with her life. But if these are the secrets, what could be the lesson? What could L'il Bit desire to teach that is not already implied in her secret? I believe that in order for L'il Bit to communicate a secret about abuse and forgiveness to an audience predisposed to judgement and scapegoating, she first has to demonstrate a radical breaking with the cycle of violence and victimization. Throughout the entire play, L'il Bit never condemns or blames her uncle. Instead, she embarks on a journey of empathetic identification with the one person who undoubtedly did her a great deal of harm, taking the form of his monstrous double, and finding forgiveness for him once she has located the transgression within herself.45

Throughout the play, L'il Bit presents herself as a teenage girl who in some respect harbors an awareness that she is implicated in an inappropriate relationship with her uncle. At the age of eleven she had already internalized the notion that "I can certainly handle Uncle Peck"46 whereas the entire play starkly and sadly affirms the contrary. Nonetheless, even after her initial experience of abuse in the first driving lesson (which we see only at the end of the play), L'il Bit offers to take responsibility for caring for her uncle's troubled emotional life in the kitchen scene of her thirteenth Christmas. By the time she is sixteen L'il Bit understands that a relationship with Peck that involves even a hint of romantic undertones is "not nice to Aunt Mary,47 but regardless of that knowledge, in the very first scene of the play, when seventeen year old L'il Bit and Peck are alone together in the car, we know that the relationship has evolved if not along romantic then certainly physical lines.48

In the language of contemporary "pop psy" psychobabble, we witness a representation of role reversal between an adult and a child, in which the child in a naive and exploited manner is made to play the parent to the adult. As conventional wisdom dictates, the child is unquestionably an innocent, by no means adequate to the task, and can not be made to accept responsibility for her actions. Vogel undermines this conception when she surrounds L'il Bit with dysfunctional family members who are more unaware of their own complicity in abuse than either Peck
or L'il Bit. The three generations of women in L'il Bit's family portray the cyclical nature of the transference of responsibility, exhibiting their unwitting participation in an inheritance of abuse and violence. Grandma was an unwilling child bride who still believed in Santa Claus and the Easter Bunny at fourteen while her older husband, Big Papa, forced her to have sex at least three times a day. Despite Big Papa's voracious sexual appetite, repression in the house was nonetheless so strong that L'il Bit's uninformed mother Lucy became a pregnant teenager forced to marry a dead-beat Dad who ended up leaving his family after a year. When Grandma eludes responsibility for Lucy's unwanted teenage pregnancy, she tells her, "I hold you responsible!" The claim is ironic given that Lucy accuses her mother of failing in her responsibility to teach her about men and sex. But Lucy does not learn from the incident and she readily quotes her mother when she does not want to take responsibility for eleven year old L'il Bit spending seven hours alone in a car with Uncle Peck, especially when she suspects Peck of an unhealthy attraction towards her daughter. In a graphic representation of repetition, Lucy tells L'il Bit, "If anything happens, I hold you responsible."

Vogel questions whether we really believe that our children are not responsible for their actions with adults, or if we would rather not admit, our self-assuring "pop psy" proclamations aside, that we see our children as rivals to our peace of mind, preferring to paint them as scapegoats for our own failures. As a second example, Aunt Mary's confessional monologue drives the point painfully home. In a vulnerable moment alone on stage, Mary takes the audience into her confidence and reveals herself as deeply concerned for her husband's well-being, even though she has been obviously ill-equipped to deal with his problems. As she remarks twice, "I know he has troubles. And we don't talk about them." But in a gesture that risks shattering audience sympathy, she abruptly turns on the heroine of the play, saying, "And I want to say this about my niece. She's a sly one, that one is. She knows exactly what she's doing; she's twisted Peck around her finger and thinks it's all a big secret." The statement comes across as a shock not only because it comes from L'il Bit's aunt, but because it is the audience's first indication that anyone has suspected foul play between L'il Bit and Peck. But caught within a process of mimesis, Mary is unable to assess the situation clearly and falls into the trap of seeing her niece as a rival to her husband, in effect blaming the victim for her husband's pathology. Instead of summoning parental love and compassion, she gives in to an outburst that typifies the violence that is the rival's only response, even though the rival is blood kin.

As an adult L'il Bit has come to learn that the cycle of deferred responsibility and denial of complicity has got to be broken. Her well-being dictates that she must escape the trap of blaming and scapegoating another for her own mistakes and misdeeds, no matter how excusable they may seem. The task does not promise to be easy, especially in light of what she has lost—a family and a life
“in her body,” as well as precious formative years that can never be regained. Given the option of just and acceptable retribution, forgiveness becomes a radical gesture. For L’il Bit to step outside of herself for a moment to consider, “Who did it to you, Uncle Peck? How old were you? Were you eleven?” empowers her to put aside her own pain in order to consider the pain of another, thereby ending a cycle of violence she had inherited from her family. Of course Peck is dead at this point, but L’il Bit’s gesture does not simply aid in her healing and help her creatively reform community, it brings Peck into the community as well. Her embrace of Peck is intentional, reflected in her confession,

Sometimes I see my uncle as a kind of Flying Dutchman. In the opera, the Dutchman is doomed to wander the sea; but every seven years he can come ashore, and if he finds a maiden who will love him of her own free will—he will be released.

This release is precisely what L’il Bit offers. Instead of hate or blame she replies with love. The noble gesture exemplifies the only response anyone can make who is at all committed to transformation and an end to violence.

A more direct illustration of L’il Bit’s coming to terms with her relationship with her uncle transpires during her “long bus trip to Upstate New York.” At the age of twenty-eight, after Peck had been dead three years, and ten years since she saw him last, L’il Bit allows herself a sexual liaison with a young man whom she does not believe when he claims to be a senior in high school. As she notes in an aside, “The light was fading outside, so perhaps he was—with a very high voice.” In essence, L’il Bit identifies herself as the transgressive other when she decides to engage in behavior identified with her pedophilic uncle—having sex with a minor, someone under the age of consent. However, it is unlikely that many in the audience would understand this particular implication of the scene. We never hear his age, only that he says he is a senior in high school. L’il Bit neither confirms nor denies his age, but elliptically says “perhaps he was.” The statement is intentionally ambiguous, but what further buffers audience reception of a sense of transgression is the persistent sexist notion that it is acceptable and encouraged in American culture for boys to experiment sexually at a young age, but not girls. Accordingly, this particular scene is written to be viewed as a coming of age moment for the boy while framed as a revelatory moment for L’il Bit, and the transgression L’il Bit commits gives her the ability to understand Peck in a way left inaccessible by judgement and condemnation. In a radical identification with her uncle, she reverses the doubling process by locating within herself the transgression normally projected onto the scapegoat. As a result, she has an embodied experience that communicates to her.
I lay on my back in the dark and I thought about you, Uncle Peck. Oh. Oh—this is the allure. Being older. Being the first. Being the translator, the teacher, the epicure, the already jaded. This is how the giver gets taken.59

In her quest to understand her uncle, she learns to recognize the ephebophile/pedophile within her. She learns that nothing human is alien to her, and the alien lives within.

It may be that most of us are unwilling to take L’il Bit’s journey, which is why audiences find the catharsis provided by a play like How I Learned to Drive so gratifying. Then again, as Girard might argue, many of us may be unable to admit our own transgressions, and instead we continue to create doubles and scapegoats, like Nabokov’s Humbert Humbert who suffers delusions that he is pursued by a nemesis, Clare Quilty. In the context of the novel, Quilty is Humbert’s creation and both men are the same, the difference being that Humbert transfers all of his pedophilic leanings onto his fictitious antagonist, whom he finally murders for having kidnapped Lolita—the crime for which Humbert alone is guilty.60 Whereas Vogel’s work is a meditation on forgiveness, Nabokov’s is a parody, aimed to implicate the reader in Humbert’s pathetic solipsism and narcissism. Nabokov was aware that as his readers enjoyed the graphic, though technically “clean,” depictions of sexualized teenaged women, were they to condemn Humbert for his pedophilia, they would have to recognize their condemnation of themselves. As L’il Bit learns, Humbert Humbert is everyman.

3. The Ethical Community

None of the ethical implications of this essay are substantially new. The humanist ideals which we have seen reiterated by such differing writers as James Kincaid, Rene Girard, and Paula Vogel form the bedrock of our western civilization. The belief that humankind would benefit greatly were it to stop scapegoating and persecuting others for perceived differences is hardly revolutionary. To note that we nonetheless seem doomed to indulge violence while at the same time demand its eradication falls short of enlightening. All of it has been said before, and yet nothing seems to change—at least not fast enough. For this reason one can more readily understand why four influential thinkers of the late twentieth century, Emmanuel Levinas, Jacques Derrida, Jean-Francoise Lyotard, and Jean-Luc Nancy, share the one belief that an acceptable, ethical response to the violence and difference in our postmodern world must come from outside of the systems of language and knowledge we currently employ. Everything so far, they believe, has proved woefully inadequate.

Were we to accept the hypothesis of the wholesale failure of the Enlightenment project, we may be tempted to agree that universal justice is impossible and ethical
thinking, in demand now more than ever, is in a state of crisis. To her credit, Julia Kristeva does not follow her French compatriots down rhetorical alleys that hope to locate ethical agency outside of language structures altogether. In Strangers to Ourselves (1991) she revisits ancient Greek, Hebrew, Pauline, Renaissance and Enlightenment thinking in order to remind us that the disparate roots of western civilization have always advocated an inclusion of strangers and foreigners, regardless of whether such inclusion has been practiced. Applicable to our era, Kristeva points to The Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen (1789) as sufficient in its principle, though not necessarily in its content, to guarantee a universal dignity that safeguards every individual a freedom from terror. In this light, Kristeva may be aligned more with Americans Richard Rorty and Todd May who eschew the fixation on insurmountable difference in favor of a recognition of sameness and who discount the stalemate of post-structural relativity in favor of pragmatic praxis. Kristeva differs with Rorty and May, however, in that she sees difference as a recurrent theme because it remains a persistent problem.

The ethical tack that Kristeva proposes in Strangers shifts the focus away from the foreigner altogether and refocusses on the self as the significant site of difference. The work opens with a consideration of the self and the other that is highly reminiscent of Girard’s reflection of the self in the monstrous double:

Strangely, the foreigner lives within us: he is the hidden face of our identity, the space that wrecks our abode, the time in which understanding and affinity founder. By recognizing him within ourselves, we are spared detesting him in himself. A symptom that precisely turns ‘we’ into a problem, perhaps makes it impossible, the foreigner comes in when the consciousness of my difference arises, and he disappears when we all acknowledge ourselves as foreigners, unnamable to bonds and communities.

Unfortunately, neither Girard nor Kristeva have commented upon each other’s work, but that they reach similar conclusions should not be altogether surprising. Although Kristeva does not acknowledge the mimetic theory as such, she shares Girard’s agreement with one of Freud’s propositions, that violent behavior in individuals be interpreted as the projection out of the self “what it experiences as dangerous or unpleasant in itself, making of it an alien double, uncanny and demoniacal.” On the other hand, that Kristeva receives more critical attention for her philosophic work is understandable, given Girard’s impatience not only with psychoanalysis but with contemporary critical thought altogether. More important, as Girard himself admits, his sense of an ethics of love and non-violence based completely upon Christian faith simply will not find approbation in a secularized world.
However true this last point may be, it indicates the double bind theorists face. Given a polyglot and multicultural world, secular and religious, there is no ready recourse to one system of thought, despite how close one system may come to offering what seems a workable solution for the hostilities between all parties involved. Surely no serious thinker can easily disparage such universally appealing ideals as love and non-violence, despite Girard’s claim that the problem to be overcome is not thought but behavior. The endeavor to formulate and practice a universal code of ethics, then, may only succeed after what will no doubt prove to be painstaking and often bumbling and failing attempts to establish world peace and safeguard human rights. Kristeva posits that a solution, a “middle way” between totalitarianism and anarchy, presupposes two considerations, the first being a national balancing of the status of citizens and foreigners, the second a recognition of the “strangeness” of every individual.

There must be an ethics, the fulfillment of which shall depend on education and psychoanalysis. Such an ethics should reveal, discuss, and spread a concept of human dignity, wrested from the euphoria of classic humanists and laden with the alienations, dramas, and dead ends of our condition as speaking beings. Individual particularistic tendencies, the desire to set oneself up as a private value, the attack against the other, identification with or rejection of the group are inherent in human dignity, if one acknowledges that such a dignity includes strangeness.

Vogel precisely stages such a therapeutic process, what Kristeva calls “a journey into the strangeness of the other and of oneself, toward an ethics of respect for the irreconcilable.” In Drive, the pedophile is not a generalized evil that can safely be ostracized as an anonymous, transgressive other. Instead, the other is made radically the same. Peck is one of us. He lives in our families, eats at our tables, and cares for our children. To confront the particular disturbance of Peck is not to confront the evil of the other, but to confront the evil in oneself. L’il Bit leads her audience on a journey of violation and healing in which they confront their own pedophilic and transgressive natures in a radical identification with Uncle Peck.

When Vogel substitutes an adult actress for the teenage L’il Bit, she creates a semiotic distancing that allows the audience easier access to their own and L’il Bit’s emotional journeys. Ironically, however, for the substitution to work, the audience must transform the adult actress into a teenager and eventually into an eleven year old girl. The audience and not Vogel manufactures the image of an eroticized child being molested by a middle-aged man. The actor playing Peck on stage is actually fondling a consenting adult, but the audience is very deftly and
convincingly (a result of long practice) creating the child abuse, being horrified at it, and condemning it. In other words, the play succeeds as all good plays succeed: the audience is allowed to experience the transgression of limits and taboos they must avoid in real life.

Difference disappears, Kristeva argues, the moment we admit our ability to transgress, when we lay bare the internal boundaries of our own strangeness instead of projecting them outward. “Strange indeed is the encounter with the other—whom we perceive by means of sight, hearing, smell, but do not ‘frame’ within our consciousness.”\(^70\) As a defensive strategy we tend to regard our hostilities as a product of the outside world, completely exterior to us, and as a result our experience of the world lacks authenticity. On the other hand, sensorial detail saturates Vogel’s text. Her construction of L’il Bit is fascinating in that she has the unique ability to interiorize and evaluate what her senses feed her; she is profoundly connected to her senses, and by extension her immediate, physical world. The moment when L’il Bit lies on the hotel bed with Peck, “because sometimes the body knows things that the mind isn’t listening to,”\(^71\) reveals her connection with him. The body indeed has a language of its own, as we recognize all the senses in the “Recipe for a Southern Boy:” hearing in the drawl and the whisper of the zipper, taste in the gumbo and Bay Rum, smell in the sweat of cypress and sand, etc.\(^72\) Although the senses (and the body) beg L’il Bit to enter further into an inappropriate relationship with Peck, they exemplify a deep connection that surpasses family ties, propriety, and even time, given that the scene transpires in L’il Bit’s memory. Past and present, inside and outside collapse, the sense of doubling solidifies and yet dissipates, Peck is indeed framed within L’il Bit’s consciousness, and the two for a moment are one.

L’il Bit’s identification with her uncle must be read as an empowering gesture. To interpret her reconciliation with her past as an annihilation of the self, or worse, as an excusing of the pedophile or an endorsement of pedophilia, is a great injustice to the text. The temptation to do so is testimony to the radical, and for some individuals disconcerting, power of forgiveness. To turn the other cheek is easier said than done. “To worry or to smile, such is the choice when we are assailed by the strange; our decision depends on how familiar we are with our ghosts.”\(^73\) L’il Bit accepts that she has been robbed of valuable years and valuable relationships; she even accepts that part of her may have been damaged beyond repair. Vogel seems to be dispelling the utopian dream of a day in which all people are free of pain, suffering or cruelty, since no one can point to a life free of pain and loss. Pain and loss are constituent of life. The last image of the play illustrates that L’il Bit is aware that her past will always be with her.

*As L’il Bit adjusts the rearview mirror, a faint light strikes the spirit of Uncle Peck, who is sitting in the back seat of the car.*
She sees him in the mirror. She smiles at him, and he nods at her. They are happy to be going for a long drive together.

We are left to understand that L’il Bit accepts that the ghost of Uncle Peck will be going everywhere with her. But since she has come to exorcize and heal the demons of her past, the haunting is not malevolent. The victim does not have to wallow in a past of disappointment and bitterness; she may indeed choose happiness. Given the options, L’il Bit makes the most sensible choice, made possible only by daring to confront the spirit of Peck within her.

How I Learned to Drive does not simply stage an ethics of love and non-violence, it helps us understand why a practice of love and non-violence is so difficult, at times believed impossible. To forgive wrongs, especially those for which forgiveness is not sought, not only resists accepted and reasonable recourse to retribution and punishment, but it seems to indicate an acceptance of a loss of integrity, a loss of identity. Forgiveness not only defies rationality, it exists beyond comprehension. But as daily existence reminds us, our flimsy adherence to what we perceive as justice only guarantees us a tenuous peace, undergirded by tension and anxiety. Surely there is nothing really to lose were we to take that agonizing chance and embrace love and forgiveness beyond all hope of return. The rewards must be better. We have always hoped so.

Post Script

This article was written before 11 September 2001, and as it goes to press, the Catholic Church sex abuse scandal is garnering a great deal of media attention. Presently the United States has two incomprehensible others with whom it must somehow learn to cope and deal constructively: the Middle Eastern Muslims who view the West with disapprobation and violence, and the sexually conflicted Catholic clergy. I propose that the argument of this essay applies to both cases.

Notes


2. Donald Munro, “Dare to ‘Drive’ Down this Dark, Twisting Road,” Fresno Bee 9 April 1999.


5. I acknowledge that the play treats many other themes, for example the relationship between sex and cars in U.S. society, the objectification of the female body, and the pain of adolescence, to
name only three. This essay focusses on pedophilia not only because the relationship between Peck and L’il Bit drives the play and that pedophilia is the one theme emphasized by all of the play’s critics in the popular media, but because the pedophile is a perfect example of the “other” that is of central concern to contemporary theorists of ethics and justice.

6. Compare Drive with another contemporary play on a similar theme, Jane Martin’s Mr. Bundy, a grating, politically correct melodrama replete with moral crusaders, arch villains, and a reformed, repentant sinner. (New York: Samuel French, 1999).


10. 6.
11. 11.
12. 12.


15. 75-93.


22. 7-8, 101. Ironically, the word ephebophilia was not coined until 1955 because before then attraction to adolescents was not viewed as a problem. Along a similar line, note today how the U. S. media no longer uses the word “youths” in reference to teenagers, but instead employs “children” to refer to everyone between infancy and seventeen, particularly in stories about child pornography.

23. The conflation of childhood, adolescence and adulthood in civic discourse becomes further complicated by the contemporary debate surrounding juvenile penal procedures, specifically regarding whether minors should be tried as adults and serve imprisonment in adult correctional facilities. It may appear that in the U.S. now, minors are held accountable for criminal conduct, but not sexual conduct,


25. 6.


29. Vogel 62.

30. Supporting such a view, the aforementioned Rebecca Baldwin in her negative review of *Drive* wonders whether the play would have earned unanimous praise had it indeed placed a prepubescent actor on stage. In opposition, Charles Spencer, writing for London’s *The Daily Telegraph* (“Compelling Drama Let Down by Lamentably Soft Centre” 27 June 1998), implies that a “failing of moral and dramatic nerve” of the play is not having the audience witness “a middle aged man grope an 11-year old.” Vogel herself has noted that when a younger actress plays the role, “more immediate danger” is created on-stage, whereas the play becomes more contemplative with an older actress. See Carolyn Clay, “*Drive, she said.*”

31. Kincaid 24-25.


33. 264-5.

34. Kincaid 284-6.


36. Holmberg.


40. 160-1. The monster is the self, and the double is the self’s outward projection onto another—
hence a monstrous double. "The double and the monster are one and the same being," and may be experienced individually or collectively.

42. 196-199.
43. For Girard on the tragedies, see *Violence and the Sacred*, chapters 1 through 6.
44. Vogel 7.
45. While I side with the editorial view of the play that L’il Bit is a victim and Uncle Peck “undoubtedly” did her harm, not everyone would agree. A small body of research argues the minority view that sexual relationships between adults and minors are not always detrimental. Note the recent case in which, on 12 July 1999, the U.S. House of Representatives unanimously denounced (355-0) an article by Bruce Rind, Philip Tromovitch and Robert Bauserman entitled “A Meta-Analytic Examination of Assumed Properties of Child Abuse Using College Samples” (*Psychological Bulletin* July 1998 vol 124 (1): 22-53) which found prior studies on the long term effects of adult-child sexual contact to be inconclusive. To be accurate, 66 Representatives were absent from the vote and 13 were present and abstained from voting. See *House Concurrent Resolution 107*. See also Carol Travis, “Commentary: Perspective on Psychology” *The Los Angeles Times*, 19 July 1999.
46. Vogel 88.
47. 31.
48. I am aware that my discussion presents the events chronologically whereas Vogel, employing Shklovsky’s *defacilitation*, presents the events in reverse. For Vogel on Shklovsky see Savran 270, 274.
49. Vogel 44.
50. 88. Vogel’s portrayal of Lucy unwittingly illustrates one of Kincaid’s arguments, that the panic surrounding pedophilia “attacks working mothers most viciously” (*Erotic Innocence* 21). I would add that it attacks, by implication, single mothers as well.
51. 67.
52. 58.
53. 86.
54. 86.
55. 40.
56. There is a slight irony here. As far as the given circumstances of the play are concerned, L’il Bit would never have been positive that her uncle ever had intercourse with a minor, so in a sense, as far as she knows, her transgression goes further than her uncle’s.
57. Vogel has noted that some audiences perceive a portrayal of a double standard in L’il Bit’s affair with a younger man. See Carolyn Clay, “*Drive*, she said.”
58. This reading is also reminiscent of Philip Jenkins’ discussion of the relative status of consent laws and the more acceptable status of ephebophilia over pedophilia.
59. Vogel 41.
60. See Alfred Appel’s introduction and notes to Nabokov, *The Annotated Lolita*.
62. For example, Kristeva's concern for an "antidote to Terror" echoes Rorty's proposition that an ethics starts with the attempt to assuage pain and cruelty. See Richard Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1989) 63, 65.


64. 183. For Girard on Freud see *Violence and the Sacred*, chapter 8.

65. See, for example, Girard, *Things Hidden* 135-6.


69. 182.

70. 187.

71. Vogel 81.

72. 81.

73. Kristeva 191.

74. Vogel 92.
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