Some Memory Plays Before the “Memory Play”

Attilio Favorini

Talk about memory has become the language through which we address some of our most pressing concerns. This is because in modernity memory is the key to personal and collective identity.

—Michael S. Roth, The Ironist’s Cage: Memory, Trauma, and the Construction of History

In my own case the earliest childhood memories are . . . regular scenes worked out in plastic form, comparable only to representations on the stage.

—Sigmund Freud, “Childhood Memories and Screen Memories”

Hysterics suffer mainly from reminiscences.

—Freud and Breuer, Studies on Hysteria

Though comparatively neglected, memory may be reckoned as significant as race, gender and class as a feature of dramatic character construction. As André Malraux once put it—presciently, in light of contemporary neuroscience—“One day it will be realized that men are distinguishable as much by the forms their memories take as by their characters.” But if dramatic criticism has largely ignored memory, memory studies have characteristically overlooked drama: excellent, comprehensive, and essential works such as those by Edward S. Casey and Douwe Draisma make reference to not a single play. Just as the history of drama could be rewritten to include memory, the history of memory could be rewritten to include drama. We need to establish the category of “memographers”—thinkers and writers about memory irrespective of discipline.

Focusing singularly on the dramatic construction of memory has the disadvantage of seeming to ignore the many other memory sites within theatre. But such concentration offers a vantage point for recognizing how dramatists have contributed to the conception of memory alongside philosophers and psychologists, as well as social and cognitive scientists. It also offers the salutary challenge to

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seek a *lingua franca* for discussing a phenomenon studied from the perspectives of so many disciplines. So wide-ranging is memory as a phenomenon, concept, and term that Graham Richards, half tongue-in-cheek, notes that “it might, perhaps justifiably, be suggested that the category ‘memory’ is simply too sweeping, a folk-psychological term of scant scientific utility.” But, as with other conceptually complex, if flawed, markers of self, memory heuristically places us on a grid whose coordinates are both constructed and determined. Like race, which helps locate self in a context both socially constructed and ethically determined; and gender, which helps locate self in a context socially constructed and sexually determined; and class, which locates self in a context socially constructed and economically determined, memory helps locate self on a continuum of characteristics socially constructed and both autonomically and auto-noetically determined, that is, driven by one’s neurocognitive profile and history. We may “have” memory, but memory also has us: it tells us who we are.

As a “time art” (like music, dance, and literature), rather than a “space art” (architecture, painting, sculpture), theatre has a formal affinity for memory. Murphy and Kovach relate the differences between “space arts,” which render an aspect of the world into permanent form, and time arts, which capture “the flowing character of all temporally ordered experience” to differences in sciences, noting that the life sciences have shifted from the former to the latter. Memory study itself reflects such a transformation. Philosophical arguments over whether human nature is fixed (with such features as aggression, familial loyalty) or changing (what new motivating forces, cognitive structures, or values might we develop?); tensions felt in psychology between identifying typologies, drives, and instincts vs. functional, developmental, and environmental orientations; and the cognitive science debate pitting artificial intelligence models vs. evolutionary biological models for the human brain—all these impact on whether memory is considered a more or less static record of impressions and traces of the world or an adaptive and constructive response to it. Adopting a distinction made by Edward Casey, we may identify these positions as the passivist and activist memory traditions, which Casey traces back respectively to Aristotle and Plato. Theatrical renditions of memory, I contend, contribute to these intellectual and cultural formations.

In order to grasp how the drama contributes to the construction of memory, it is necessary briefly to lay out two contexts: the topography of a field that may be called memory studies and the range of ways in which theatre remembers. The phenomenologies of memory and theatre interpenetrate one another. On the one hand, theatre’s fundamental mode of repetition makes it a child of memory. This by no means renders theatre unique among the arts—all the Muses, not just Thalia, are daughters of Mnemosyne, goddess of memory. Yet, theatre seems particularly thick with memory. From rehearsals to memory plays to theatrical memorabilia to theatres themselves—which constitute the exoskeleton of theatre’s
memory—theatre can be fruitfully contextualized as an activity of remembering. On the other hand, theatrical metaphors and vocabulary have historically been useful in modeling not just memory, but all of consciousness—Bernard J. Baars going so far as to assert, in a considerable exaggeration, that theatre metaphors are “essentially all we have” to describe mental functions. If theatrical enactment is seen as suffused with memory, remembering may also be usefully recognized as an exercise of scenic imagination.

Theatre and memory overlap, interweave, and commingle with one another like the planes in a drawing by M. C. Escher, though it cannot be denied that the study of memory has largely “belonged” successively to philosophical, experimental, clinical, and cognitive psychology. The roominess of this disciplinary home has “placed” memory in juxtaposition now with learning or development theory, now with notions of perception and imagination, therapeutics, and/or theories of consciousness. Thus, memory has historically been a concept that mediates between self and mind, consciousness and the unconscious, between identity as recorded and reminded and identity as constructed. But memory’s reference to the sphere of the already actualized also links it to the lifeworld and thus to “truth,” history, social formation, evolution, biology, and the neural basis of cognition. In the twentieth century especially, memory quit its already capacious disciplinary home for a nomadic existence. As a concept, memory’s traces may be found in historiography (the memory/history issue), philosophy (history of memory, philosophy of mind), and languages and literatures (memory as “theme,” poetic memory, autobiography). As a category of things or processes, memory suffuses religious studies (ritual reenactment, Holocaust studies), art history (retrospectives, influence, “Neo-” formations, revivals), film studies (documentary, homage, remakes), and Medieval and Renaissance studies (memory arts and systems). As a store of information, memory occupies sociology (collective memory), law (precedent), and anthropology (traditional life ways, oral history). As a neurocognitive capacity, memory permeates a variety of fields in the physical sciences, such as evolutionary biology (memory faculties as naturally selected), physical education (body memory), and cognitive science (research on the neurophysiology of memory traces and networks, sometimes identified respectively as “local” and “global” orientations)—among others.

Obviously, then, the matrix for this disciplinary growth is not a phenomenon confined to the individual mind. As Edward Casey eloquently demonstrates in the second half of Remembering (“Pursuing Memory Beyond Mind” and “Remembering Re-membered”), memory is embodied; it is a feature of cultural formation; it inheres in place; and it is socialized when undertaken with others in reminiscing and commemorations. Richard Dawkins’s concept of a cultural replicating unit he terms a “meme” (for its suggestion of both gene and memory) is also to the point, as is biochemist Gerald Edelman’s position that the “memory”
of DNA replication and the memory of the immune system in recognizing likes constitute “a new principle” ultimately leading to the evolutionary development of the mind. To cite further evidence of the pervasiveness of memory in human development—as well as memory’s archaic connection with enacted representation (proto-theatre)—there is Merlin Donald’s hypothesis that early hominids developed a “mimetic culture” prior to evolving symbolic language. Mimetic culture entails the invention of representational acts with the purpose of social communication; it is a specific form of reproductive memory subject to recall and interpretation and thus crucial to the modeling of social structure. Recent breakthroughs in cognitive science suggest that mimetic culture is supported by “mirror neuron” systems in the brain that fire empathetically in observing others and “that specialize in carrying out and understanding not just the actions of others but their intentions, the social meaning of their behavior, and their emotions.” Memory may connect us, brain to brain.

As a feature of character construction, memory ebbs and flows in the history of drama. The Greeks, who mythologically paired Mnemosyne, mother of the Muses, with Lesmosyne or Lethe, dramatized both memory and forgetting via what Aristotle called recognition. Shakespeare was equally memorious: Hamlet and Pericles can fruitfully be read in light of Renaissance ideas about memory. Then, the memory scene largely empties—just as the “passive” memory tradition displaces the “active”—until the end of the nineteenth century; plays whose situation and subject matter offer the potential for remembrance are almost bare of retrospection: The Rival Queens, All for Love, Fatal Curiosity, even Rip Van Winkle don’t look back.

In the twentieth century the trend is reversed. As Greek protagonists, whether in tragedy or comedy, are strong-willed problems-solvers; as Elizabethan heroes are essentially explorers of every social and psychological corner, even as their Renaissance counterparts searched the globe; as the contestants of French classical theatre are conflicted between duty and desire; as dramatic characters from the Romantic age are isolated above, below or outside society—modernist dramatis personae are natural rememberers.

Theatre of the modern era is theatre of memory. What the standard history of modern theatre terms a “century of innovation” is also a century of memoration, in which memory becomes a persistent and intrusive subject of the drama, as well as an object whose contours are shaped by the many arts of theatre. Coincidental with the rise and maturity of psychology as a modern life science, dramatists brought memory in a major role to the field of play; aptly enough, at just about the same time, modern thinkers about memory discovered the theatrical metaphor as explanatory model. The concept of a “scene” that frames and/or enables a system of cognition encompassing both perception and memory was as indispensable to Freud at the beginning of modernism as it is today, post modernism, as evident in
Bernard Baars’s “theater model” for consciousness and Gerald Edelman’s assertion that in cognition “the world can be correlated and bound into a scene,” which carry over Freud’s metaphor from psychology to cognitive science. In each case, the implication is that the mind frames, organizes, and highlights self and non-self experience as the playwright constructs the unit of action. But whether the seeker of the source of consciousness is a philosopher, a psychologist, or a playwright, the modernist path towards understanding self and subjectivity goes through the forest of memory.

Modernist memographers though disparate in their approaches are united by their goal of attempting to reckon the ongoing influx of the past into the present and to determine the way in which, as evolved, psychological, and socio-cultural beings, we are utterly past-inflected. The sciences of memory, then, are a feature of modernism, and Ian Hacking is correct in asserting that the “systematic attempt to uncover facts [emphasis mine] about memory” begins “only late in the nineteenth century.” Freud’s development of psychoanalysis as prolonged anamnesis; Bergson’s success in freeing memory from pure mentalism, in grounding memory in matter and registering how “the past survives as a bodily habit”; Stanislavsky’s delivery of the tool of emotional memory into the hands of actors; T. S. Eliot’s insistence that the poet must live “not merely [in] the past, but the present moment of the past” and that “the historical sense involves a perception not only of the pastness of the past, but of its presence”; Maurice Halbwachs’s insight that “We preserve memories of each epoch in our lives, and these are continually reproduced; through them, as by a continual relationship, a sense of our identity is perpetuated”; F. C. Bartlett’s comprehension of memory as an evolutionary adaptation to the challenge of dealing with absent objects experienced in the past, and his recognition of the “mark” of remembering as when an agent “acts as if it were being predominately determined by some distant event in its history, using this directly to help it solve some immediate problem”—such propositions as these originate from no single intellectual viewpoint, however fortuitously they may all feed a mainstream of thought that thematizes memory in discourses of the self, the mind, and the lived world.

The diverse disciplinary passages negotiated by memographers are distinguished by landmark publications in many fields. As the field of psychology (a term that did not come into common English usage until the nineteenth century) itself divided, both the experimental and clinical wings could lay claim to memory. On the clinical side, Théodule Ribot’s Les Maladies de la Mémoire (1881) and Pierre Janet’s L’Automotisme psychologique (1889) entail elaborate description and classification of amnesias connecting memory loss or forgetfulness with neurotic symptoms. Freud and Breuer’s Studies on Hysteria (1895; English tr. 1909) builds on Janet and relates memory to affect and repression, while Freud’s “Childhood Memories and Screen Memories” (1907; English tr. 1914 in Psychopathology of Everyday Life)
and “Remembering, Repeating and Working Through” (1914; English tr. 1924) taxonomize true and false recollections. Jung’s “La Structure de l’inconscient” (1916; revised and published in English as The Relations between the Ego and the Unconscious in Two Essays on Analytical Psychology [1928]) creates a new blend of clinical psychology and cultural anthropology, which posits archetypes as a species of genetically shared memories. On the experimental side, William James’s The Principles of Psychology (1890) undertakes an almost phenomenological analysis of the act of remembering and binds memory to physiology. More theoretically, the bodily basis of memory is explored in Bergson’s Matter and Memory (1896; English tr. 1911) and Richard Semon’s The Mneme (1904; English tr. 1921), which theorizes the “engram” as the brain’s record for a remembered event. Bridging psychology and sociology, Maurice Halbwachs’s The Social Frameworks of Memory (1925; English tr. 1992) and The Collective Memory (posthumous, unfinished, 1950; English tr. 1950) emphasized the impact of social pressure on the implantation of memories. F. C. Bartlett took stock of both Halbwachs and Jung to test whether their hypotheses were compatible with experimental protocols in Remembering: A Study in Experimental and Social Psychology (1932), which put forth revolutionary ideas on memory systems and shifted focus from memory trace to memory process. The pioneering developmental psychologist Jean Piaget’s The Language and Thought of the Child (1923; English tr. 1926), Judgment and Reasoning of the Child (1924; English tr. 1928), The Child’s Conception of the World (1926; English tr. 1929), and Memory and Intelligence (1973) furthered the idea that through memory “there is a continuous reciprocity—the mind taking its shape from interaction with the outer world, with which it carries on perpetual commerce.”

A. R. Luria’s Mind of a Mnemonist (1968, based on studies begun in the 1920s) attempts to link neurophysiological function and personality via the examination of the case of a prodigious hypermnemonist. Distant from psychology, and deploying a range of concepts and practices relevant to how writers remember, T. S. Eliot’s “Tradition and the Individual Talent” in Sacred Wood (1920) and, of course, Proust’s À la recherche du temps perdu (1913-27; English tr. commencing 1922) compel a rethinking of the relationship of the creative act to the literary and personal past. Such manifold approaches derive from the nature of memory as a multifold phenomenon whose complexity has been fully recognized only in the twentieth century.

To the extent that the range of discipline and methodology represented in the books cited above confines memory to the system of mentation, however, they may diminish a full appreciation of its ubiquity in the material world—in the body, in the earth, in matter itself. Indeed, much work on memory from the 1880s to the 1920s labors to overcome the traditional dualism whose eventual attrition allows modern psychology to develop. While all of the models for memory alluded to above might
instructively be juxtaposed with those of modernist playwrights, I offer here only a case study largely circumscribed by the rise of modern clinical psychology.

**Janet, Freud, Ibsen, Strindberg: Case Studies**

Without ignoring the tributaries of thought represented in the propositions and publications I have outlined here, it may nevertheless be granted that the mainstream of modern memory studies springs from psychology. Thus, it will be necessary to survey, if only from the bankside, some of the roiling disputes formative of the modern discipline, while striving to avoid submersion in the “mad weir of tigerish waters”—a Louis MacNeice line quoted in the epigraph to Graham Richards’s critical history of psychology. Let me merely indicate at the outset that the new ideas psychology was compelled to integrate affected how memory was thought about. Evolution led such thinkers as Henri Bergson, Richard Semon, and Théodule Ribot to wonder about memory development as adaptive behavior. Advances in brain research and various conceptions of the unconscious or subconscious as theorized by Charcot, Janet, Freud, and Jung eventually contribute both to a taxonomy of types of memory (working memory, semantic memory, collective memory, episodic memory, etc.) and to a new interest in amnesia—an interest made more urgent by the effects of shock and trauma experienced by combatants in the First World War. The veridicality and reliability of memory come under scrutiny from perspectives as divergent as psychoanalysis and forensic psychology. Finally, as Richards points out, theories of race invite speculation on how a collective past may be inscribed on autobiographical memory.24

Among memographers at the turn of the nineteenth century Pierre Janet and Sigmund Freud emerge as a natural pairing, like Ibsen and Strindberg, by virtue of the intermingling of their ideas and techniques. Edward Casey’s brief historical survey of the history of memory makes Freud and Janet modern heroes, largely responsible for the revival of the “activist” memory tradition.25 Placing the surge of interest in memory in a more specific cultural context, Ian Hacking sees the period 1874–86 in France as “the span of time when the structure of the modern sciences of memory came into being,” when “a new science, a purported knowledge of memory, quite self-consciously was created in order to secularize the soul.”26 Crucially, it is at the end of this period that Freud goes to Paris and becomes directly familiar with the work of Charcot and Janet.

Until the “memory wars” of the 1990s pitted advocates of recovered memory and false memory syndrome against each other, Janet had been largely forgotten as a pioneer of modern psychology. As both Hacking and Janice Haaken have pointed out, the memory wars to some extent replayed the opposition of Janet and Freud on the etiology of dysfunction and hysteric symptoms in trauma: the former holding to the position that “something happened” (the recovered memory position), the
latter allowing for a false or screen memory obscuring, disguising, or otherwise intruding itself between a rememberer and a repressed experience.\textsuperscript{27}

The relationship of Janet and Freud is complex, and I will engage it only to flesh out the memory scene at the turn of the century. Initially, Janet and Freud were in agreement that hysterics were marked by traumatic incidents that had become unconscious to one degree or another, but not “forgotten”—Janet citing Freud and Breuer favorably in \textit{The Mental State of Hystericals} (1894) and they citing him frequently in \textit{Studies on Hysteria} (1895).\textsuperscript{28} Subsequently, Freud and Janet became disaffected over who deserved the major credit for positing the unconscious.\textsuperscript{29} Whether or not one agrees with Daniel Robinson that “Janet all but invents the concept of unconscious motivation,”\textsuperscript{30} his theory of hysteria remained more cognitive than psychoanalytic. Lacan thus faults Janet for equating the ego with “the perception-consciousness system” and takes him to task for keeping a lofty distance from his case histories that, according to Lacan, prevented him from hearing the unsaid in their symptoms.\textsuperscript{31} Where Janet theorizes dissociation, “the mind’s capacity . . . to separate off from normal consciousness a traumatic memory trace,” Freud theorized repression, which might entail concealing a guilt-producing fantasy. Haaken sees these two approaches ultimately as emphasizing an external (Janet) vs. an internal or intrapsychic (Freud) source for distress, though in any case, both dissociation and repression entail unconscious forgetting.\textsuperscript{32} According to Hacking, Janet located the origin of trauma in a sort of depersonalized state (something \textit{happened}), while Freud saw trauma originating in a human intention or action that may not be identical with what is “remembered” (\textit{something} happened).\textsuperscript{33} Though Freud disparaged Janet for finding a “constitutional”—i.e., body-based—cause for hysteria,\textsuperscript{34} Janet’s physiological orientation looks more prophetic in the light of cognitive science and the turn of psychiatry towards biology and pharmacology.

Casey, Haaken, and Hacking, as is typical of so many writers on memory, make no reference to theatre, and so they do not notice that contemporaneous with Janet and Freud, Ibsen and Strindberg constructed memory as dynamically operative in character formation. In my understanding, Freud and Ibsen also shared a method of considering characters as case studies that makes comparing the psychologist and the playwright a rich exploration. Clearly, when Freud wrote about Ajax, Philoctetes, Richard III, Hamlet, or Lady Macbeth,\textsuperscript{35} he was studying their “cases,” and this was particularly so of what he had to say about Ibsen’s characters. I want to suggest here that Ibsen himself took a clinical attitude towards his characters, not only the most familiar cases of the troubled Rebecca West (to whom Freud devoted a seven-page analysis)\textsuperscript{36} and Mrs. Alving (whom Ibsen displays against the glass wall of the conservatory as if she were in an operating theatre or under a bell jar), but especially Irene in \textit{When We Dead Awaken}, certainly Ibsen’s clearest case of what the era would call hysteria.\textsuperscript{37}
In the late 1890s, or about the time Freud embarked on his self-analysis, paying particular attention to the significance of fragmentary memories, Ibsen was at work on his tiresome and brilliant last play. *When We Dead Awaken* recapitulates many themes and motives from earlier Ibsen—the artwork as child, the irreconcilability of sexual desire and love, the artist tempted to impossible heights—and so to tease out a single theme is reductive but I trust forgivable in the immediate context. *When We Dead Awaken* shows Ibsen in a profoundly “ruminescent” (Casey’s coinage for reminiscent and rumination) mode, particularly if one accepts the identification of the sculptor Rubek with the playwright and Irene with Ibsen’s wife Suzannah.

In singling out memory, I follow up to a point the clearly marked footsteps of Oliver Gerland, whose suggestive article in *Modern Drama* linked certain features of the plot of *When We Dead Awaken* to the psychological theories of Janet. Gerland makes a strong case that Janet and Ibsen were both exploring the disruptions of traumatic memory and that both dramatist and psychologist concluded that a failure to integrate a traumatic event into a life narrative can be associated with the repetition of the trauma. I want to add here that Ibsen’s subtle analysis of the etiology of Irene’s hysteria and Rubek’s discontent bears at least as much resemblance to Freud’s views on remembering and forgetting.

In the first act we meet the world-famous sculptor Rubek and his far younger wife Maja at the Norwegian seaside resort where they encounter Irene, Rubek’s former model, whom he initially claims not to remember. In the following two acts, which take place in the mountains, as Maja is lured off by the bear hunter Ulfheim, Rubek and Irene reestablish a relationship as fraught with misunderstanding and discrepancy as it had been in the past. For Gerland, the key incident in the play occurs when the two are grouped momentarily like the sculptor’s masterpiece *The Resurrection Day*. He makes the neat point that the sculpture has fixed or frozen a traumatic memory which, as in cases reported by Janet, triggered obsessive behavior: “*The Resurrection Day* group is an emblem of Irene and Rubek’s traumatic history, both its product and its abstract . . . [:] located within its confines, Irene and Rubek . . . are possessed by the traumas of their past just like Janet’s patients at the Salpêtrière.” But, Gerland allows, the sculpture group may also be thought of in Janetian fashion as a recollection rather than a repetition. This would permit their encounter to be interpreted as therapeutic, for it enables them “to build their relationship anew.” They may both perish virtually as double suicides in the famous or infamous avalanche at the end (so adroitly managed with white satin sheeting in Robert Wilson’s production), but even so, Gerland contends, their death is accompanied by Maja’s song of freedom, lending an “irreducible ambivalence” to what Ibsen had to say about the past.

While I agree that “Janet posits two kinds of memory—narrative and traumatic—associated with two modes of expressing memory—recollection and reenactment,” I am not sure that Gerland has parsed out how the creation of the
sculpture grouping represents differing—and different kinds of—memories for Rubek and Irene. Furthermore, Gerland does not address forgetting in the play—an odd omission in light of Janet’s renowned writing on amnesia. Finally, I suggest it is Freud rather than Janet who describes memory “scenes” of the sort Gerland shows Ibsen is constructing.

Gerland’s account of the plot and his linking of Ibsen to Janet sideline key elements that complicate how Ibsen constructs personal or autobiographical memory. Gerland downplays how differently Irene and Rubek have dealt with the memory of their relationship and de-emphasizes Irene’s psychotic behavior, as she drifts wraith-like and confused amidst the scenery. In Ibsen’s description of Irene “her features are stiff and immobile; her eyelids are lowered, and her eyes seem to stare unseeingly. . . . She walks with stiff and measured steps,” Ferguson connects Irene’s stiff way of walking to Suzannah’s rheumatism, but I wonder if it isn’t meant to be a hysterical symptom similar to what afflicted the case of Fräulein Elisabeth Von R., who “walked with the upper part of her body bent forward,” and who was easily fatigued from walking. Irene’s other symptoms—social dysfunction, paranoia causing her to carry a knife with which she secretly threatens Rubek, and what may or may not be delusions of killing her husband and children—suggest dementia praecox (subsequently termed schizophrenia), one of the new diagnoses that eventually replaced the catch-all category of hysteria.

Irene is truly locked into repetitive behavior. Ever since parting from Rubek, she has wandered in search of him, evidently wreaking havoc on surrogates of both the artist and his art—the sculpture she insistently calls “our child.” She “posed as a naked statue in peep shows” in a sordid repetition of her modeling for Rubek. The dagger she now carries with her is another repetition, a surrogate for the sharp needle she concealed in her hair, to fend off the touches of Rubek she both dreaded and desired, but which never came. This troubling arousal is surely meant to be one source of the hysteria she later lives out. Another source is an incident Irene recounts that went unremarked by Rubek when it happened, but has changed her life. As their artist-model relationship came to a close Rubek summed it up to Irene as a “delightful episode,” a characterization that irredeemably demeaned it in her eyes. This double diminution—sexual and social—constitutes the trauma she has spent her life trying to exorcize.

By contrast, Rubek has found a way of working through their relationship, which Irene has not, and her reappearance emphasizes how different their lives have been. In the first act, he initially denies to Maja that the woman in white whom he has spied is his former model, and he subsequently tells Maja that he had forgotten Irene long ago, claiming that he can forget “extremely easily . . . when I want to” (emphasis Ibsen’s). In the second act, we learn details of his ability to “forget” that both substantiate and belie it. After the departure of Irene, Rubek in fact reconfigured the sculpture, making it a larger grouping to include “the cracked and heaving earth.”
and a swarm of “women and men—as I knew them in life.” Irene, who had been the sole figure, is now placed in the middleground of a group. That is, Rubek acted to accommodate the memory of Irene in a larger, living, and changing context, while Irene fled, her attempts to exorcize the traumatic relationship only causing her to cling to it, repeating the past. The change in the sculpture signifies, even literalizes, the fact that Irene and Rubek have different memories of their relationship. Ibsen’s point is not only that their “reminiscences” are divergent, but that Rubek’s active refashioning of their relationship is productive and in some sense therapeutic, while her passive clinging to the memory is pathogenic: it is while Rubek recounts the remaking of the sculpture that Irene comes closest to stabbing him. Though the Rubek we meet in the play is far from happy, he has continued to create and has moved on in his life, incorporating Irene as an “episode” in it. He has sublimated his bitterness and sadness in the animal likenesses he has concealed in the portrait busts he sculpts on commission. He has also transferred to Maja the inspirational function formerly Irene’s.

As the descriptive vocabulary of the previous two paragraphs suggest, I propose that the psychological analogues to the divergent ways of constructing memory engaged in by Rubek and Irene are not to be found in Janet, but in two of Freud’s classic essays, “The Aetiology of Hysteria” (1896), published while Ibsen was at work on When We Dead Awaken, and “Remembering, Repeating and Working Through,” first published in 1914. Freud declares in the earlier essay that the symptoms of hysteria “are determined by certain experiences of the patient’s which operate traumatically and are reproduced in his psychic life as memory-symbols of these experiences.” “Memory-symbols” are not true memories, necessarily, but may be constructs that have to be penetrated to get the patient to focus on the originating traumatic scene. In the later essay, Freud makes clear that therapeutic remembering, which disentangles the remembered situation from the present one, disposes of the patient’s compulsion to repeat, and frees him for the next stage in his life. In the play, Rubek’s revision of the sculpture is literally a remembering in order to forget, a reconstruction of the memory of Irene, putting their experience in a different psychological place in his life. Though Rubek may not have fully worked through his resistances, and seems rather to be arrested in what Freud called a “transference-neurosis’ . . . an intermediate region between illness and real life,” for Rubek as for Freud, remembering is, therapeutically speaking, an “auxiliary of forgetting.” But Irene can make no such adjustment and, in the third act, demonstrates her repetitive behavior in the ways already noticed, but also by confusing in her mind the scene of her traumatic parting with Rubek at the Taunitzter See years ago with the conversation they had just the day before. The inability to distinguish past from present is for Freud and Janet alike the surest sign of pathology and explains one of the epigraphs for this article: “Hysterics suffer mainly from reminiscences.” Her disturbed and disturbing recollection comes just a
page before Irene and Rubek are buried in the avalanche and makes it very difficult to interpret their entire reunion—psychologically—as anything but the seduction of Rubek into the world of Irene’s dementia.

A further distinction needs to be made concerning Irene’s behavior, which is different from the sorts of unconscious reenacting of a forgotten traumatic incident that Janet describes and Gerland cites. Where Janet recounts unconscious or trance-like reenactments, Freud describes repetitions, which are acted out as a result of repression: the patient reproduces “what he has forgotten and repressed... not as a memory but as an action; he repeats it, without, of course, knowing that he is repeating it.” What the patient repeats are not memories but symbols of memories that display his “inhibitions and unserviceable attitudes and his pathological character-traits.” The symbols are linked into “memory-chains” that lead “infallibly... to the realm of sexual experience” in childhood. While I hasten to add that neither Janet’s nor Freud’s case studies precisely describe Irene—who has not repressed the memory of her troubling attraction to Rubek—the sexual source of her hysteria certainly evokes Freud. She may not have been a child when subject to the sexual feelings she could not cope with, but both her vulnerability and youth are emphasized in the text. We are told she left her family and home to go with Rubek, a decision she characterizes as her “childhood’s resurrection.”

It perhaps needs to be explicitly stated that the foregoing takes no stand in the dispute between the partisans of Freud and those of Janet over who discovered the unconscious, nor on the validity of psychoanalysis, nor on Freud’s controversial abandonment of the “seduction theory.” For my purposes, it is fitting enough to notice that Janet and Freud agreed that various kinds of “nervous” disorders were characterized by pathogenic reminiscence, that hysterical symptoms could be tied to amnesia, and that forgotten phenomena “are not entirely destroyed; they are not inactive; they continue to act either to increase the amnesia or diminish it,” to quote Janet. At the same time, a more dynamic and complex conception of the workings of memory that includes notions like memory-symbol, repression, transference, and sublimation was shared by Freud and Ibsen, but not by Janet:

You will now see in what it is that the difference lies between our view and Janet’s. We do not derive the psychical splitting from an innate incapacity for synthesis on the part of the mental apparatus; we explain it dynamically, from the conflict of opposing mental forces and recognize it as the outcome of an active struggling on the part of the two psychical groupings against each other.

What Freud here calls “psychical splitting” and Janet called dissociation are notions that may have both sprung from the single source of French psychology in the period of 1874-86, as Hacking asserts, but their division had profound
implications. The Janetian tributary channeling trauma, amnesia, dissociation, and therapeutic hypnotism flowed underground for decades, only to resurface in the era of multiple personalities, recovered memory, and “alternative” therapies. The Freudian stream of fantasy, repression, and the talking cure long ago overflowed its banks to flood modern culture. Hacking draws a further distinction: Freud, unlike Janet, thought that a cure could occur only if a patient was made to deal with the Truth; by contrast, Janet was willing to hypnotize his patients into thinking a trauma never occurred. Hacking concludes that

In the matter of lost and recovered memories, we are the heirs of Freud and Janet. One lived for truth, and quite possibly deluded himself a good deal of the time and even knew he was being deluded. The other, a far more honorable man, helped his patients by lying to them, and did not fool himself that he was doing anything else.

Ethical judgments aside, Freud’s way was also Ibsen’s, or, more properly, vice versa. The psychologization of trauma and the problematizing of memory were crucially formative of modern drama before Freud put pen to paper. The popular premise of modern melodrama in which the soul of one is taken over by a “Svengali” (Trilby was published in 1894) is similarly continuous with the motif of controlling “alters” in accounts of multiple personality disorder like Sybil and compatible with the ideas of Janet. It is no accident that Robert Louis Stevenson corresponded with Janet when writing Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde or that Strindberg in writing Miss Julie was likely influenced by the ideas of the great therapeutic hypnotist Hyppolyte Bernheim, whom Janet championed.

Ibsen was to write no more plays and died on March 26, 1906. Very soon thereafter, his contemporary Strindberg began work on the chamber plays, completing all four in a burst of creativity in 1906 and 1907. If Ibsen wrote his last two plays with Strindberg’s portrait on his wall, Strindberg likewise wrote in the shadow of Ibsen, whom he both deprecated and revered. Of the four chamber plays, The Burned House is most haunted by the memory of several Ibsen plays, but especially Ghosts. In constructing a plot that features a disreputable gardener, a fire exposing family secrets and an insurance payment not made, was Strindberg subconsciously trying to burn down Ibsen’s house and extirpate his memory? Or was he, in writing about a brother who returns to the home of his childhood, recognizing his Ibsenian origins? Biographical implications aside, The Burned House offers great riches to the student of memory, for in returning an adult to his childhood home Strindberg has created a scene of great “memorial potency.”

While the characters in When We Dead Awaken can be measured by whether they succeed or fail in putting the past behind them, the impulse to sort out the
autobiographical past is scarcely the sole motivation of the characters of *Burned House*, for whom memory is social as much as personal, deconstructive as much as recollective-constructive. *Burned House* thus surveys a far greater segment of the topography of memory, as recognition, reminding, reminiscence (frequently divergent), body memory, and place memory crowd Strindberg’s scene.

Such a congeries of contested, fragmented, and unreliable memory was magnificently unpacked by Freud in “Childhood Memories and Screen Memories,” written—intriguingly enough—at exactly the same time (the early months of 1907) that Strindberg was working on *Burned House*. Freud defines a screen memory as an apparently inconsequential memory that interposes itself between the rememberer and the repressed content. It is of course coincidental but no less intriguing that Freud’s autobiographical case study for screen memory bears striking similarities—in its details of a thieving nurse, an older brother, and a disappearing mother—to an incident in Strindberg’s play. Apparently, the dramatist and the scientist, independently and simultaneously, developed remarkably similar ways to describe the dynamics of childhood memory.

In Strindberg’s plot, a suspicious fire has destroyed the home of the Dyer Rudolph Valstrom, whose family has occupied it for generations. The burned house and its furnishings are the central scenic element. Suspicion of arson falls upon the Student, who received free board in exchange for tutoring the family’s young children. Someone had locked all the doors and taken the keys, making the fire harder to put out, and an Inspector is investigating. The businesses of others in the neighborhood are affected, including a Gardener and a Tavern Owner who cater to the adjoining cemetery. The characters are almost always thus referred to by their trade (as the Stonecutter, Painter, etc.) rather than by name.

Arriving on the scene is a Stranger, subsequently identified as the Dyer’s younger brother Arvid, who had left for America thirty years before. Though Arvid had never claimed his share of the family’s inheritance, he has now returned, so he says, only to “find the house of my childhood again.” As Arvid encounters figures from his past, a pattern of what might be called anti-reminiscence emerges, in which the conversants have divergent memories that disillusion or destroy commonality. The Painter, for example, remembers Arvid testing him for color blindness and preventing his entrance to art school. When Arvid defends his decision, the Painter reveals it wasn’t that as a child he couldn’t distinguish colors, only that he didn’t know their names. When Arvid meets Mrs. Vesterlund, Rudolph’s former nursemaid, they exchange contradictory memories of her husband. For a third example, years ago the Stonecutter had testified in a paternity suit that Arvid fathered a child, but now Arvid reveals that he was not the father, and merely stood forward to support the child because he was fond of her mother. The Stonecutter becomes deeply anguished over having given false witness, influenced by rumors. Reminiscence,
normally indulged to establish community, is here put in the service of its opposite, as divergent memories are deployed to destroy an imagined commonality.

The agon of memory and counter-memory is chiefly played out by the two Valstrom brothers, however, directly in front of the ruins of their childhood. Confronted both by Arvid’s revelations and the material evidence of double house walls exposed by the fire, Rudolph is compelled to recognize that the family fortune derived from smuggling rather than the dyeworks, which metaphorically enough disguised their true activities. In another telling exchange, Arvid and Rudolph each remember separately finding the memoirs of Casanova behind the sermons in their father’s bookcase, but while Rudolph takes this casually (“You too?”), Arvid follows up his memory almost directly with the revelation of his attempted suicide by hanging himself in the closet at age twelve. Further details come to us in snapshots or freeze frames from a visualized narrative accessible only in fragments—a name carved in a door, hiding in the garden, a sawed-off tree branch—like the reminiscencia strewn among the ruins of the house: a child’s book, a piece of a portrait frame, the end of a bedstead, a clock that falls to pieces when Arvid touches it. Where we see only fragments, however, Arvid perceives a pattern. “No matter how life shaped itself, I’ve always found some connection with the past, or some repetition,” he says. “There are scenes in my life that have occurred many times. . . . Finally life came to seem like a play that was being staged especially for me.”

Only in retrospect can we piece together what Arvid means. Accepting a sort of psychic determinism, Arvid understands that he has continued to play out in his life his contentious relationship with his brother. Similarly, accused unjustly of seducing another’s wife, he accepted the role, just as he accepted that his family’s illegitimate business would continue to brand him.

Most of the brothers’ conflicting and conflictual memories are associated, one way or another, with care-giving women: their mother, the nursemaid Mrs. Vesterlund, and their stepmother. The circumstances here are difficult to determine, as the brothers’ conversation seems to proceed almost by free association, with denial frequently blocking the way. In the essay on childhood memories quoted in my epigraph, Freud similarly returns to childhood incidents whose significance initially defies interpretation, but which are recalled so vividly that he is compelled to call them “regular scenes” and “comparable only to representations on the stage.” Chief among these is a memory Freud dates to his third year, in which he is standing in front of a cupboard and screaming some demand. His older half-brother holds the cupboard door open. Then his mother, looking beautiful and slim, walks into the room. Freud adds that contemporary with this memory were dreams about his nurse, which included such inconsequential details as his handing over small coins to her.

Freud’s interpretation of the memory and the attendant dreams was aided by information he gleaned as an adult from his mother. During the time his mother was
“in confinement,” that is, pregnant with his younger sister, the nurse was removed from the house and indicted on charges of theft lodged by his older brother. As a child, Freud understood vaguely that his older brother had something to do with the disappearance of the nurse. When he asked him where she went, his older brother flippantly remarked that she was “boxed up” or as we might say in English “put away.” When his mother as well disappeared in confinement, he demanded that his brother open the place, the cupboard, where things were put away. Freud adds “I now understand, too, why in the translation of this visual childhood scene my mother’s slimness was emphasized: it must have struck me as having just been restored to her” after pregnancy.\footnote{75} Freud finishes by observing in a footnote that the cupboard was likely a symbol of his mother’s womb and that the child of three might have suspected his older brother of somehow placing the child inside it.

The Stranger Arvid’s memories of his mother are both more detailed and less coherent than Freud’s. We note at the outset that only Arvid mentions his mother at all, and there are no corroborating or corrective memories from other characters. His initial memory of his mother is not triggered by someone else mentioning her, but by his older brother mentioning the name of his nursemaid, Mrs. Vesterlund, who now owns the adjoining tavern called “The Coffin Nail.” This is the same Mrs. Vesterlund whom Arvid subsequently reports “robbed us blind for ten years.” Her name touches off in Arvid a vivid motor memory of the pressure on his chest of the heavy nursery air, of his brother attempting to smother him, of beatings and flights to the garden. Still mystified as an adult at this treatment, Arvid muses elliptically “but she was my mother.” While the context might suggest that Arvid is referring to the surrogate Mrs. Vesterlund, we are twice told, by Rudolph and Arvid, that she was the older brother’s nursemaid, not Arvid’s. It is, then, a maternal absence rather than a presence that Arvid associates with his painful memories. The association angers Rudolph: “Be quiet!” he warns. “Well, you were the favorite, you could do no wrong,” Arvid answers, “Then we got a stepmother. . . . Her father was a professional pallbearer.”\footnote{76}

As the scene continues, Arvid adds a few other maternal details. Their Mother (capital “M” in the text) praised Rudolph’s swimming ability over Arvid’s and she favored unripened pears from the orchard that the children loathed. (Arvid does not suspect, as Freud certainly would have, that the memory of pears screens the image of a mother’s breasts, though “unripened,” i.e., not offering milk.\footnote{77}) Finally, the only other mention of their birth mother comes very near the end of the play, when it is revealed that Rudolph has cheated his brother of his inheritance, and Arvid taunts him with “You’re my mother’s son after all.”\footnote{78}

It is difficult to make sense of these details in isolation. Other of Arvid’s memories and recollections associated only indirectly with his mother add perspective, however. The same interview with his brother that yields Arvid’s memories of his mother and Mrs. Vesterlund also features the account of his
attempted suicide after reading Casanova. Arvid further reports that when he awoke from the death-like sleep following his hanging, he had “forgotten most of my previous life and had to begin a new one. You all thought me very queer.” Then in the abrupt, transitionless manner in which their conversation proceeds, Arvid asks his brother “Have you remarried?” Rudolph responds that he has a wife and children, and the subject is immediately dropped. Now we already know from the gossip of the tradespeople that Rudolph’s first wife “ran away” and that his second wife had been his children’s governess. Not unexpectedly, Strindberg is drawing on some autobiographical detail. His mother Eleonora, bore a child, Strindberg’s elder brother, when she and Strindberg’s father were betrothed, but not married. When Strindberg’s mother died (he had just turned thirteen), Strindberg’s father remarried within a year. His second wife had been the children’s governess. In any case, that Arvid raises the issue to his brother in the context of remembering their own childhood points us to a central question raised implicitly rather than explicitly in the text: what happened to the birth mother of Arvid and Rudolph?

What I make of all this is what Freud might have. Arvid’s remembering Mrs. Vesterlund’s thievery, put together with Arvid’s accusation that Rudolph treacherously is “my mother’s son,” and with other seemingly inconsequential memory fragments, constructs a wall of screen memories interposing themselves between Arvid and repressed content. Like the child Freud, Arvid associated a thieving nurse with the disappearance of his mother. Like Freud, Arvid had an elder brother who stood as a rival for his mother’s affections. There may also be a similar sexual subtext suggested in the circumstances that led to Arvid’s suicide attempt, and I offer the interpretation that Arvid has repressed the information that his mother, like Rudolph’s wife, ran away, perhaps because his childhood sensibility made him think that he and his brother had somehow caused their mother’s departure with their lustful thoughts inspired by the memoirs of Casanova.

Early in their interview, Arvid reminds Rudolph that as children they would “read” the ashes of the fireplace, and that they can do the same now with the ruins of the burned house, and that is exactly what Strindberg has them do and certainly what Freud would have them do. Already in “Aetiology of Hysteria,” Freud had compared recovery of repressed memories to combing through the ruins of an ancient palace. The Valstrom house may have had double walls and locked doors—Freud’s screen memories—but they can neither fully conceal nor contain the past. In the embers of deep retrospection, the most intimate memories are illuminated—perhaps even more to the discerning spectator than to Arvid, who prides himself on his “excellent memory.” The pile of furnishings atop which Arvid spies the family album is an ash heap of memories displaced, ransacked, destroyed. Arvid twice addresses the ruins as “house of my childhood,” which for Strindberg as for Freud is a landscape of vividly remembered scenes and shadowy amnesias.
It is perhaps of more than passing interest that Freud himself leaves us an interesting example of the technique I have applied to Strindberg in his interpretation of an apparently insignificant childhood recollection in Goethe’s autobiography, *Dichtung und Wahrheit*. Freud notes that Goethe remembers only one incident from his early childhood, recorded in a page-long account of being mischievously encouraged by three young friends to toss piece after piece of newly-bought crockery through a window into the road and enjoying the merry sound of their being smashed to bits. Freud recounts his own extended puzzlement over the parsimony of the incident in yielding insight into the great man, until he recognized the incident as a screen memory. Freud’s understanding of Goethe was enhanced by encountering in his patients memories of breaking items by tossing them through a window as associated with feelings of resentment over the birth of a sibling. Though he had harbored an intuition about the Goethe incident, it wasn’t until Freud’s analysand produced a compact narrative linking information about the imminent birth, witnessing a primal scene of his parents, and throwing brushes and shoes through a window into the street, that Freud “threw all doubts to the winds. When in analysis two things are brought out one immediately after the other, as though in one breath, we have to interpret this proximity as a connection.” Noting that just before the crockery incident Goethe reveals that he barely survived his birth, Freud also discovered through research that four of Goethe’s siblings failed to survive childhood and that one, Hermann Jakob, died somewhere close to the time of the crockery episode. As was the case with Freud’s analysand, Goethe’s hurling of objects out the window was displaced aggression originating in rivalry with his brother. Freud’s gloss is that Goethe’s memory in effect declares “I was a child of fortune: destiny had preserved me for life although I came into the world for dead. Even more, destiny removed my brother, so that I did not have to share my mother’s love with him.” In *Burned House* there is a similar concatenation of fraternal rivalry and a retrospective act of destruction; the heap of destroyed objects presumably hurled through the gaping wreckage of the house are symbols of resentment as palpable as Goethe’s broken dishes. It is of interest that four of Strindberg’s siblings did not survive childhood, that his mother bore four more surviving children after August’s birth, and that the close confines of his childhood flat would have made it almost inescapable that he witnessed a primal scene.

*The Burned House*, like the constructions of the classical memory arts, stands as a powerful example of the intimacy of memory and place. In developing analogies between place and memory, Casey notes that the duration of a “scene” at a remembered place serves as a sort of temporal horizon, and that horizon-like phenomena pervade the phases and modes of memory. Strindberg’s play is rife with the phenomena. What Casey calls “aura,” the blurred fringe or margin of what is remembered, is virtually reified in the charred walls of the burned house. Various characters encounter the same phenomenon in reminding, where it is manifested as
“the outer edge of the adumbrated remindand,” as when the Gardener’s reminder to fetch a bouquet disappears in a mist of associations; in recognizing, where it is manifested as the “limits of the perceptual suffusion,” as when the Old Woman just fails to recognize the Stranger, who looks like his brother but is taller; and in reminiscing (the beginning and ending of the reminisced-about event), as when the Painter’s memory of the testing of his color sense begins where Arvid’s ends.

Such delimitations mark what might be termed the internal horizons of Strindberg’s memory scenes. The external memory horizons of The Burned House allow us to locate it among contemporary dramatic constructions of memory such as Ibsen’s, psychological constructions such as Freud’s, and antithetically (if not unexpectedly) among classical and medieval constructions. Strindberg’s absorption with medievalism (as in his alchemical experiments) is reflected in the play’s allegorical infrastructure—recurring images of the expulsion from Eden—and in the mansion-like, central scenic image of a house gutted by fire and visited by a succession of neighbors and tradesmen. Just as medieval plays may be linked to the device of the memory palace, in that stage pictures served as memoranda or emblems of virtuous situations, the burned house may be Strindberg’s image of a trashed memory palace, both anti-memorial and anti-catechismal. The play is oddly like the medieval morality play The Castle of Perseverance deconstructed. The world-traveling Stranger may have arrived on a memorial pilgrimage to “find the house of my childhood again,” but he leaves as a stand-in for objectifying history, abandoning memory in the ruins.

If Ibsen and Strindberg may be said to have raised the curtain on the modernist memory scene, they did not lack for followers. Between them and the eponymous “memory play,” The Glass Menagerie, Luigi Pirandello, Eugene O’Neill, Robert Sherwood, and Thornton Wilder, not to mention the lesser lights who wrote the hugely popular Peter Ibbetson, Forever After, and I Remember Mama, all crafted memory plays that can usefully be placed next to the memory constructions of Jung, Halbwachs, William James, Bartlett, and T. S. Eliot. The memory scene of the early twentieth century is far more crowded than has hitherto been recognized.

Notes


6. “Race,” more than memory, may qualify as a folkish term of scant scientific utility.


16. “One feature of the modern sensibility is dazzling in its implausibility; the idea that what has been forgotten is what forms our character, our personality, our soul.” Hacking 209.


21. For works originally written in a language other than English, I have used the title of the standard English translation (if there is one) and provided both the original publication date and the date of the English translation. In cases where there is no English translation or in which translations incorporate very substantial revisions, I have supplied the original language title. I also note that many of these publications (especially Freud’s) have extremely complicated bibliographic histories, involving several replications with slightly different titles and content. My list does not reflect the subtlety of such variants.


24. Graham Richards, Putting Psychology in its Place 134-5.

25. Remembering 16.

26. Rewriting the Soul 4-5.


30. Preface to Janet, Mental State of Hystericals, xxvi.
32. Haaken, *Pillar of Salt* 63; 84-5, 74.
33. *Rewriting the Soul* 192.
34. In *Character and Culture* 233.
40. Oliver Gerland, “The Paradox of Memory: Ibsen’s *When We Dead Awaken* and *Fin-de-siècle Psychotherapy*,” *Modern Drama*, 38 (1995): 450-61. Gerland does not explore in any detail the complex relationship of Freud and Janet, limiting his remarks to observing (451) the latter’s influence on Freud and Breuer’s *Studies on Hysteria*.
41. It is likely sheer coincidence that Janet chose the pseudonym Irène for the hysterical patient he first wrote about in 1904 and then many times thereafter; *When We Dead Awaken* was published in 1899.
43. 458.
44. 459.
45. 453.
46. See, e.g., *The Mental State of Hystericals* 75-116.
47. Gerland had previously used Freud’s notion of repetition to explain some of Brand’s behavior, though not noticing that Irene is even more disposed to give in to the compulsion to repeat. See “Ibsen and Psychoanalysis: ‘The Compulsion to Repeat’ in *Brand* and the ‘Epic Brand,’” *Scandinavian Studies*, 66 (1994): 361-81.
50. Emil Kraepelin first described the *dementia praecox* syndrome in 1896; Eugen Bleuler renamed it in 1908. While one would be inclined to interpret Irene’s accounts of pitilessly killing her children one by one not literally, but as preventing their birth by contraception or abortion, her tendency towards violent behavior also evokes her as a Medea-figure.
51. *When We Dead Awaken* 266 and following 278; 278-80; 244.
53. “Aetiology” 185.
57. “Remembering, Repeating and Working Through” 150; 151.
59. *When We Dead Awaken* 258, 261-2; 259.
60. Fred H. Frankel’s comment in the course of a review of “flashback” literature is apposite: “There are two quite separate but intertwined issues here: Is the remembered trauma historically true,
and is the recall of historically true trauma necessary for healing. Although both of these questions might be answered affirmatively by many clinicians, there is little or no empirical basis for either conclusion.” See “The Concept of Flashback in Historical Perspective,” *International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis*, 42.4 (October 1994): 328.

61. *Mental State of Hystericals* 111.


63. *Rewriting the Soul* 197.


65. *Rewriting the Soul* 196; 197.


67. Hacking 278, note 12, reports on the Janet-Stevenson link; on *Miss Julie* and hypnotism, see John L. Greenway, “Strindberg and Suggestion in *Miss Julie,*” *South Atlantic Review*, 51.2 (1986): 21-34. It is likewise no accident that multiple personality disorder diagnoses beginning in the 1980s often “uncovered” evidence of Satanic cults—see Haaken 222-239.


72. Presumably Casanova, but referred to in the text only as “the memoirs of a famous cavalier.”

73.

74. “Childhood Memories” 50.

75. 51.

76. 83; 67; 67.


78. *The Burned House* 100.

79. 74; 63.

80. See Meyer 3-15.

81. “Aetiology” 184-5.

82. *The Burned House* 84; 66; 100. My emphasis on mother-deprivation in *The Burned House* has a parallel in Freddie Rokem’s reading of *Miss Julie*; see his *Strindberg’s Secret Codes* (Norwich, England: Norvik P, 2004), 143ff; 164.

83. “A Childhood Recollection from ‘Dichtung und Wahrheit’” (1917), in *Character and Culture* 191-201; 198; 200-1.

84. Biographical details from Meyer, cited above.

85. *Remembering* 76; 204; 204.

86. I am drawing on Casey’s distinctions, which he traces back through Husserl to William James (Remembering 203).

87. Strindberg’s anti-memorial impulse also drives the first of the chamber plays, *Storm Weather*, in which memory serves as a calm before the storm, an indefensible retreat from the forward movement, the passion of life.