

Saints and Soviets Again--Inventing The 'New Man' By American Capitalism And Soviet Communism Revisited

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Issue: Vol 5, no. 2 (2021)

Abstract

The paper argues and demonstrates that American capitalism, or conservatism, and Soviet communism show a convergence on the invention of the 'new man' as a novel human type. It then elaborates and specifies the main characteristics of the invented type. The paper constructs an index of the American and Soviet 'new man' composed of certain indicators of the latter as its components. It presents the results of an empirical analysis consisting of numerical 'new man' indexes for American capitalism and Soviet communism or the US and Russia, as well as other comparable societies such as countries belonging to The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). It discusses the empirical results, notably the shared complete failure of American capitalism or conservatism and Soviet communism, to invent a new human type. It concludes, draws theoretical implications, and suggests directions for further research.

Keywords: Capitalism, Conservatism, Communism, Index, Indicators, New Man

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The distrust of natural man as completely corrupted by original sin (is) an idea driven to the extreme in all Protestant dogmatics (and) with the purpose of producing a new artificial man--Max Scheler (1964 (1916), p. 16).

1 Introduction

Scholars have identified and emphasized certain specific forms and degrees of latent or potential convergence, commonality and partial equivalence between American capitalism and Soviet communism or more precisely socialism, along with their manifest and declared divergence, separation and opposition, as overarching contesting economic-social systems during the Cold War. In such accounts, these forms or degrees primarily include an economic convergence, commonality and partial or seeming equivalence between the two systems or countries during the postwar period. This shared property specifically consists in the sense of both economic-social systems converging on and even moving in tandem toward initially a shared industrial and subsequently post-industrial economy and society with its characteristic class structure and culture (Bell 1973; Bendix 1974; Dahrendorf 1959; Parsons¹ 1949; Wright and Martin 1987; for related later insights see Beck 2000; Block 1990; Esping-Andersen 2003; Goldberg 2001; Inglehart and Baker 2000; Lenski 1994).

Relatedly, such a shared property involves their convergence on and partial equivalence in rapid technical progress, high and sustained economic growth, increasing consumption and living standards, rising life expectancy, decreasing wealth and income inequality, as well as shared basic financial and

1. For example, Parsons (1949, pp. 333-4) suggests that 'capitalist and socialist industrialisms (are) tend variants of a single fundamental type, not as drastically distinct stages in a single process of dialectic evolution. The differences between capitalist and socialist societies, particularly with respect to stratification, are not as great as Marx and Engels thought. In both types there is a variety of potential sources of class conflict centering about the structure of the productive process.'

related constraints², and so on (Kuznets 1972; Sternberg 1951; for broader later observations see Deaton 2003; Dowrick and Quiggin 1997; Inklaar and Rao 2017; Jae et al. 2019; Piketty 2014; Ravallion 2018; Rodrik 2010; Slaughter 1997). For example, in a postwar account, both systems converged on reaching the ‘age of high mass-consumption’—with American capitalism preceding Soviet communism or socialism that was ‘technically ready for this stage’—as the highest and last of the ‘stages of economic growth’ (Rostow 1960; also, Field 2003; Foellmi and Zweimüller 2011; Matsuyama 2002; Wilmers 2017). In other accounts, their convergence also comprised converging on growing concentration and declining competition in the economy through monopolization and an oligopoly market structure as the shared ‘new industrial state’ (Galbraith 1967; Galbraith and Parker 2017).

In addition, some accounts suggest secondarily a certain degree of political convergence, commonality and equivalence between the two economic-social systems during the Cold War. This involves a secondary democratic convergence or commonality in the form of established full and enduring, so it seemed, democracy in American capitalism and emerging limited and transient democratization and liberalization in Soviet socialism starting post-Stalin and expanding during Gorbachev (Bockman and Eyal 2002; Habermas 2001; Murrell 1996). It especially includes a stronger convergence on and even partial equivalence between the two systems in the development and expansion of the welfare state, including that in the US since the New Deal or the Great Society period (Inglehart and Baker 2000; Piketty, Saez and Zucman 2018; Somers and Block 2005; for their healthcare systems see Beckfield, Olafsdottir, and Sosnaud 2013).

Especially, Sorokin in his work *Russia and the United States* posits and identifies certain social, including political, cultural and socio-psychological, similarities between the two societies, especially the first during its pre-revolutionary times and the second since the American Revolution and its independence. Historically, Sorokin (2006) suggests that the relations between Russia and the United States have been mostly ‘exceedingly warm, friendly, and co-operative’, with Russia (along with France) being among the ‘first foreign powers’ helping the United States as a ‘sovereign nation’. In sociological terms, Sorokin (2006) points to the ‘essential similarity’ between the two societies by virtue of both being ‘melting pots of diverse racial, ethnic, national, and cultural groups and peoples.’ Notably, Sorokin (2006) identifies an ‘important similarity’ between Russia and United States consisting in the ‘essentially democratic structure of their basic sociocultural institutions.’ In this connection, Sorokin (2006) recounts that the Russian political system from the ninth to the twentieth century was, as a whole, ‘virtually as democratic as the governmental regime of most European nations’, thus by implication being similar to that of the United States. In addition, Sorokin (2006) emphasizes that another ‘basic similarity’ between Russia and America pertains to the ‘psychology and mentality of the

2. Even the anti-communist crusader and US President Reagan while condemning via projection Puritan-style the Soviet Union as an ‘evil empire’ once reportedly admitted during a meeting with Gorbachev during the 1980s that both Americans and Russians share the same financial constraint—struggling to ‘pay their bills’.

two nations' in that both have absorbed the 'cultural values' of other societies like those of Latin America, Europe, Asia, and Africa, and finds the 'parallel of the 'universal soul' of the United States and Russia is 'rather striking'. On the basis of the preceding similarities, Sorokin (2006) concludes and predicts that in respect of 'ethical values' and other respects, 'no fundamental antagonism or irreconcilability' does and will exist between Russia and the United States.

Alternatively, other accounts suggest that American capitalism and Soviet socialism displayed political convergence, commonality and even equivalence in terms of coercion and repression of their populations to the point of both representing, even if in various degrees and ways, 'totalitarian' or authoritarian systems, which conservatism or the radical right, including McCarthyism and Reaganism or conservative populism, and Stalinism exemplify, respectively. (See Adorno 2001; Altemeyer 2007; Baudrillard 1994; Bauman 2001; Blee and Creasap 2010; Bourdieu 1998; Bourdieu and Haacke 1995; Dahrendorf 1979; Gross, Medvetz, and Russell 2011; Habermas 2001; Jacobs and Dirlam 2016; Lipset 1955; MacLean 2018; Plotke 2002; Pontikes, Negro, and Rao 2010; Pryor 2002; Rydgren 2007; Schutz 2001; for broader historical insights on fascism and populism also, Berezin 2019.) Relatedly, some observers propose that the two systems converged on or even shared equivalent methods of systematic ideological indoctrination of their citizens through various instruments of propaganda, although its content was different and even opposite (Adorno 2001; Altemeyer 2007; Mann 1970; Merton 1968; Myrdal 1953; for related observations see Bénabou and Tirole 2006).

Further, some accounts depict American capitalism and Soviet socialism as featuring a convergence, commonality and even equivalence in respect of nationalism; militarism, imperialism and aggressive war, compounded with authoritarianism within society (Altemeyer³ 2007; Bonikowski and DiMaggio 2016). In these accounts, they converge in this respect in that both appear and act as highly militaristic and imperialist systems ('evil' empires) by massive military-industrial complexes in a frantic arms race ('defense spending') and subjugating or controlling other societies through multiple offensive wars or military interventions during the Cold War, with the invasions and occupations of Vietnam and Afghanistan as just the respective most notorious exemplars

3. Altemeyer (2007, p. 50) implies such equivalence in that he observes 'both sides (the United States and the Soviet Union) invaded neighbors to control their international allegiance, lied to their own people and to the world, made disarmament proposals for public relations purposes on the world stage, and so on. And when their government did such things, the authoritarian followers in both countries tended to believe and support them more than others did.' Further, Altemeyer (2007, 246-7) suggests that present societies, especially American society, 'produce millions of highly authoritarian personalities as a matter of course, enough to stage the Nuremberg Rallies over and over and over again. Turning a blind eye to this could someday point guns at all our heads, and the fingers on the triggers will belong to right-wing authoritarians. We ignore this at our peril.' This evidently anticipates the rise of the Tea Party and Trumpism as species of right-wing authoritarianism, simply neo-fascism, in America.

among many (Dell and Querubin 2018; Dube, Kaplan, and Naidu⁴ 2011; Kentor and Boswell 2003; Munch 2001; Savelsberg and King 2005). In turn, in other accounts, the two shared the inhibition on the use of nuclear weapons by resisting the temptation to use them in their various wars even in the face of crushing and humiliating defeats, as in Vietnam and Afghanistan, respectively, thus avoiding the MAD (mutually assured destruction) outcome (Schelling 2006; also, Gibson 2011; Habermas 2001).

Lastly, other accounts suggest that these two systems manifested certain forms or degrees of cultural convergence, commonality and partly equivalence. This especially comprises their converging on and sharing what Merton (1968) calls the ‘ethos of science’ and consequently scientific-technological progress--with the Soviet launching of Sputnik acting as an inspiration or rather agent provocateur, alarm and panic trigger for the US government to finally appreciate and support science and scientific knowledge as societal power--and the ‘educational revolution’, notably the expansion of higher education (Ginzberg and Solow 1974; for related broader insights see Bloome, Dyer, and Zhou 2018; Habermas 2001; Schofer and Meyer 2005). Thus, a crucial aspect of their cultural convergence was the emergence of Mannheim’s science-based and broader intelligentsia and thus a scientific community, more broadly growingly educated populations, notably college graduates and post-graduates, in both social systems, as in other contemporary societies (Gauchat 2012; Schofer and Meyer 2005; Wejnert 2005).

However, during and despite the all-encompassing and potentially self-destructive Cold War, American capitalism and Soviet socialism exhibited another salient convergence or shared common the psychology and mentality of the two nations ality and even partial equivalence that most historical and current accounts of these social systems and times overlook or downplay and insufficiently theorize and analyze, despite some intimations or implications (Dahl 1985; Faris 1961; Kelley 1984; Meyer 1967; Schutz 2001; Tiryakian 1981; Wallerstein and Zukin 1989). This is their convergence on and commonality and indeed partial equivalence in what can be described following early sociologist Max Scheler as the compulsory and compulsive invention of a ‘new man’, *homo novus* in Pareto’s words⁵ in the substantive sense of a novel human type (and not

4. Dube et al. (2011, p. 1377) find that ‘antidemocratic political transitions have often been instigated, planned, and even partially executed from abroad, most notably by the US and the former Soviet Union during the Cold War. (e.g.) 24 country leaders were installed by the CIA and 16 by the KGB since the end of World War II. In the US, covert operations designed to overthrow foreign governments were usually first approved by the director of the CIA and then subsequently by the president of the US.’

5. In terms of what he terms ‘class-circulation’ involving the ‘circulation of individuals’ between upper and lower strata, Pareto (1963, pp. 1427, 1839) characterizes the “new man” as ‘the upstart, the parvenu’, citing the expression *homo novus* from Mommsen. Marshall (1961, pp. 163, 348) conceives a ‘new man’ exclusively in terms of economic activity and innovation such as ‘his energy and flexibility, his industry and care for small details’ in ‘bold and tireless enterprise’, being ‘in his element’ by ‘his quick resolutions and dexterous contrivances, and perhaps also a little by his natural recklessness.” Tocqueville (1945) apparently having in mind America observes that ‘among democratic nations it often happens that an officer has no property but his pay and no distinction but that of

literally a new man).

Specifically, both American capitalism or its main ideological rationalization and political ally, conservatism and Soviet socialism converge on and partially are equivalent in inventing coercively and compulsively what Scheler denotes in the opening citation a ‘new artificial man’ and thus implies that such an attempt at invention can only produce an artifice or mechanical construct. Conversely, by inventing the ‘new artificial man’ both systems aim to eliminate and in that sense to de-invent or deconstruct in a compulsory and compulsive way too, in Scheler’s (1964) words, ‘natural man’⁶, although they define and denounce the latter in their own distinct ways. On this account, the ‘new artificial man’ becomes through double external and internal compulsion the prime economic agent and generally social actor, briefly a role model in both American capitalism or conservatism and Soviet socialism. The two systems may ostensibly differ from and declaratively oppose and battle each other in multiple and even most respects, including their core economic, political and cultural elements, but they come close together in, as Scheler puts it, ‘producing a new artificial man’ as their shared human ideal expressing what Sorokin (2006) denotes the ‘psychology and mentality’ of the United States and Russia.

The general traits of the ‘new artificial man’ that both American capitalism/conservatism and Soviet socialism aim to invent and disseminate are, as Scheler implies, purity, perfection, immutability and universality. In brief, both produce and propagate a pure, perfect, immutable and universal ‘man’, in Sorokin’s (2006) words, the ‘universal soul’ of the United States and Russia. Consequently, American capitalism and Soviet socialism manifest a convergence on and partial equivalence in the invention and diffusion of the ‘new’ human type that, as supposedly pure, perfect, immutable and universal supersedes impure, imperfect, transient and particular ‘flesh and blood’ humans as they both find them in the real life (Bowles 1998; Gray and Silbey 2014; MacKenzie and Millo 2003; Stenhouse

military honors; consequently, as often as his duties change, his fortune changes and he becomes, as it were, a new man.’ In turn, Laski (1936) proposes that ‘Machiavelli’s prince might well stand as the portrait of the new man of his age.’ To preempt feminist and related objections, one understands throughout the essay the ‘new man’ or *homo novus* in gender neutral or inclusive terms to include both genders by analogy to ‘mankind’ understood to include ‘humankind’—i.e., as the new human ideal or type, not literally a new man, as feminism and similar, in Simmel’s words, ideology of ‘social hatred’ would construe and reject with disgust this concept.

6. Sombart (1928) also refers to Puritanism’s ‘transformation of the natural man in a rational man’ but apparently understands the latter in the sense of ‘economic man’ rather than what Parsons (1967, p. 57) terms ‘men of the humanistic Renaissance’ and by implication of the rationalistic Enlightenment, notably of science, as in essence the opposites of his ‘Puritans’. In this connection, Rettig and Pasamanick (1961, p. 22) comment that the ‘relationship between social class and the severity of judgment on generic moral issues (so cultural conservatism) is curvilinear, reaching a peak in the lower middle class and descending in the adjacent strata. (e.g.) Ascetic Protestantism (i.e.) Calvinism in the 16th century and Puritanism in the 17th century (were) movements of the lower middle class. (For Sombart), the lower middle class must be morally rigorous because otherwise it would jeopardize its own existence. (Its) moral rigidity also serves the function of expressing resentment against the higher classes.’

2012). In this regard, they converge on human and cultural purism, moral absolutism or perfectionism, immutability and universalism across and regardless of social space and time versus societal relativism and historical specificity (for related observations see Cooney and Burt 2008; Jouet 2017; Munch 2001).

As a corollary and specification, the ‘new artificial man’ explicitly in American capitalism or conservatism and by implication in Soviet socialism is essentially a species of saint in opposition to sinner as a ‘fallen man’, as Scheler implies in the opening citation for Protestant capitalist societies in response to Weber’s Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism thesis. In this regard, the two social systems and ideologies converge on the compulsory and compulsive reinvention and reproduction of saints or the life of sainthood, although they define them in their own distinct ways, in the economy and society, inventing and reproducing them out of sinners or imperfect humans and lives that they find to exist and numerically prevail in reality (Campbell and Schoenfeld 2013; Cooney and Burt 2008; Gorski 2003; Smilde 2005).

To that extent, American capitalism and Soviet socialism appear as the convergent and partly equivalent systems of the demographic prevalence and indeed economic-societal domination of presumed saints and the life of sainthood and the forcible extinction or subjection of sinners and ‘unholy’ or imperfect life. In brief, saints in certain forms predominate and their opposites are destined or forced to become an extinct or rarified species in both systems, linking the two despite their other differences. Hence, sainthood is the essence and primary defining and identifying element of the reinvented and diffused ‘new artificial man’ in American capitalism and Soviet socialism alike as they define and coercively enforce it in their own ways. As Scheler implies, the supposition and compulsory imposition (or compulsive self-imposition) of human sainthood, and conversely the observed fact that most humans evidently are not saints (or ‘angels’) who hence only exist as a fiction in an ‘imaginary community’ à la Durkheim, precisely render the American Protestant and Soviet socialist ‘new man’ (*homo soveticus*) into an artificial creature, so an artifice (for related insights see Cooney and Burt 2008; Fischer and Mattson 2009; Somers 1998).

This paper is to the writer’s best knowledge probably the first explicit endeavor to identify, argue, elaborate and specify the convergence of American capitalism/conservatism and Soviet socialism on the coercive (and obsessive) invention and diffusion of the ‘new artificial man’ that each defined, enforced and generalized in their distinct ways⁷. Therefore, the paper aims to contribute to the historical and comparative sociology of capitalism/conservatism and communism/socialism and their respective American and Soviet models. This is a potentially important contribution historically and comparatively because most previous accounts miss or downplay the fact or possibility that the two otherwise hostile social systems and ideologies during and in spite of the Cold War generally converged on and shared in the project, process and outcome

7. For example, Dahl (1985, p. 96) refers to the ‘New Soviet Man’ but does not analyze the latter in relation to the American counterpart and thus does not posit their convergence or commonality.

of the compulsory and compulsive invention and dissemination of the 'new artificial man' as a novel human idea, with some particular variations. The paper is especially continuous with and builds on Scheler's original insights about the Protestant design of 'producing a new artificial man' but goes beyond them by specifically applying them to American Calvinist capitalism/conservatism as an exemplary application and especially expanding them to Soviet socialism that his framework does not comprise yet. It also elaborates and expands on earlier related observations, specifically Sorokin's observation of the similar 'psychology and mentality' and indeed the 'universal soul' of the United States and Russia and those that American capitalism and Soviet and other socialism shared moralistic and repressive 'Puritanism' in religious and non-religious meanings, respectively (Faris 1961; Kelley 1984; Meyer 1967; Tiryakian 1981; Wallerstein and Zukin 1989).

The paper proposes, investigates and demonstrates their convergence on this 'new man' project, process and outcome. Especially, it estimates whether and to what degree American capitalism/conservatism and Soviet socialism have succeeded to reinvent, disseminate and reproduce the 'new man' as characterized—or failed to do so and in which extent. For that purpose, the paper constructs a qualitative 'new man' index composed of certain components such as the indicators and proxies of this supposed human model. It also calculates quantitative 'new man' indexes for American capitalism/conservatism or the US and Soviet socialism or its descendant and proxy, contemporary Russia, as well as for other comparable societies such as OECD countries for comparison and contrast. To wit, high positive quantitative indexes would indicate the success in this process of inventing and diffusing the 'new man', and conversely. The main empirical result is that both social systems or countries have failed to reinvent and propagate the 'new man' to the effect of sharing a clear and complete failure. Thus, their 'new man' indexes are substantially low, specifically that of the US being the single and of Russia the third lowest among contemporary societies, and indeed negative, thus indicating such a shared failure.

The remainder of the paper continues as follows. Section 2 argues and demonstrates the convergence of American capitalism/conservatism and Soviet communism or socialism on the compulsory invention of the 'new man' and elaborates and specifies the main characteristics of the latter. Section 3 constructs a 'new man' index comprising certain indicators and proxies of the latter as its components. Section 4 presents the results of an empirical analysis, such as numerical 'new man' indexes for American capitalism and Soviet socialism, or the US and Russia, respectively. Section 5 engages in a discussion in light of the empirical results. Section 6 concludes and draws theoretical implications and directions for further research.

2 Convergence On Inventing The 'New Man'

American capitalism or conservatism and Soviet socialism display their convergence on the conception and compulsory invention and production of the 'new man', Pareto's *homo novus* exalted as the supposed pure, perfect,

immutable and universal human type, simply a universal ideal. This amounts to their converging on conceiving, inventing and producing a ‘new artificial man’ so long as the attempted invention of a human type typically produces an artifice, as Scheler implies, and in that sense approximates a process of ideological fabrication or an act of simulation (as observed for America overall in Baudrillard 1999). This shared fabrication of the ‘new artificial man’ connects with or parallels the tendency of both systems to engage in the ideological manufacturing or political simulation of ‘democracy’ and ‘freedom’ even if defining the latter in their own respective theocratic and communist or rather socialist ways and relatedly in the “politics of dissimulation” especially during McCarthyism/Reaganism and Stalinism, respectively (Bourdieu 1998; Habermas 2001; Gross et al. 2011; Jacobs and Dirlam 2016; Pontikes et al. 2010; for broader remarks see Correll et al. 2017). The two systems claimed both to have invented the ‘new man’ and to have produced the ‘true and only’ democracy and freedom, thus having the ‘best’ people and being the ‘most democratic’ and ‘freest’ alike—simply, ‘the best’, as Reagan et al. explicitly proclaimed and their Soviet counterparts implied (Baudrillard 1999; Beck 2000; Jouet 2017).

Conversely, both social systems and ideologies strongly distrust, devalue and seek to eliminate what Scheler calls ‘natural man’ regarded as the distant antecedent, antithesis and enemy of the ‘new artificial man’. They therefore attempt to discredit, eradicate or subdue and in that sense de-invent or deconstruct real-life impure and imperfect ‘flesh and blood’ human agents in society (Gray and Silbey 2014; MacKenzie and Millo 2003; Stenhouse 2012). Thus, they identify and fear actual ‘natural man’ as the aberration from and nemesis of their own ‘new man’ ideal and essentially incongruous with both American capitalism or conservatism (as opposed to liberalism⁸) and Soviet socialism. This suggests that the two converge on abolishing human spontaneity and reality and thus spontaneous, real-life social interactions in favor of, as Scheler implies, artificial humans, artifices, compulsory actions and simulations (also, Adorno 2001; Arendt 1951; Merton 1968). Both American capitalism/conservatism and Soviet socialism endow and celebrate the ‘new artificial man’ with the qualities of purity, perfection, immutability and universality in opposition to the inverse traits of ‘natural man’, notably impurity and imperfection. Simply, for both systems this is a pure, perfect, immutable and universal ‘man’ as a supreme human ideal to supersede ‘natural man’ as the condemned opposite.

Consequently, by virtue of the above qualities the ‘new artificial man’ represents or approximate a kind of saint, an embodiment of sainthood in both American capitalism/conservatism and Soviet socialism. In this regard,

8. Lynd (1993, p. 1595) comments that ‘American liberalism is forever announcing its impending fulfillment in a new continent, a new man, a new deal, a new frontier, or a new covenant. But the liberal vision of a commonwealth of equal citizens is pasted over the continuing hierarchical relation between employer and employee.’ If so, this implies that the ‘new man’ of American liberalism, while not explicitly defined, fundamentally differs from that of conservatism that instead envisions a commonwealth of unequal citizens and even from capitalism that continues the ‘hierarchical relation between employer and employee.’

both systems converge on recreating saints from humans and enacting a life of sainthood out of the real life in the economy and society overall, thus what Weber (1976) calls, especially with regard to Calvinism and its Anglo-American extension Puritanism, ‘sanctification’ of economic and all social life (also, Brink 2014; Gorski 2003; Hartz⁹ 1963; Smilde 2005; White 2006). The ‘new artificial man’ in American capitalism/conservatism and Soviet socialism alike is primarily a species of saint so long as most humans in Scheler’s implicit view naturally and factually are not saints or angels as perfect emanations of super- and non-human attributes (Cooney and Burt 2008; Fischer and Mattson 2009; Somers 1998). Alternatively, the ‘new man’ in both social systems and ideologies is an ‘artificial’ creature primarily because of being or claiming to be a saint and pursuing or approaching a life of sainthood via ‘sanctification’ of all life, which is what Scheler implies and Weber (1976) denotes an ‘impossible contradiction’ for most real-life humans, thus a sort of ‘impossibility theorem’ for the latter.

Accordingly, American capitalism/conservatism and Soviet communism/socialism share the tendency to reinvent and transform by coercion and indoctrination humans as they find them in existence into the ‘new artificial man’ by reinventing and transforming them into saints placed in a different reality or conceivable future. In this sense, these social systems construct and reside in an alternate world that ultimately turns out to be a fiction so long as most real-life human beings are not and cannot be made super- and non-human saints. For instance, this is what their shared and failed alcohol Prohibition as an exercise in compulsion demonstrated, as did their other temperance wars on ‘private immorality’, including the ‘war on drugs’ especially in American conservatism since Reaganism (Kelley 1984; also, Campbell and Schoenfeld 2013; Cooney and Burt 2008; Mueller 2013; Thaler 2018).

The general substance, core of the ‘new artificial man’ and thus of the saint is similar in American capitalism/conservatism and Soviet socialism, although not identical. In both systems and ideologies, the ‘new artificial man’ as the saint is a purist or perfectionist, which makes them converge on what Keynes (1936) would call human-actor purism (although not on his notion of ‘financial purism’). Specifically, the ‘new artificial man’ qua the saint is in American capitalism or conservatism, as Scheler implies, a Protestant-dogmatic, more precisely Calvinist, purist—simply, a Puritan or Puritanical subject (Adorno 2001; Faris 1961; Jouet

9. Hartz (1963, p. 369) actually claims that ‘fragmentation would detach Puritanism from the European past, would elevate it to the rank of a national absolute, (yet) in secular terms): the movement of Locke from the Old World (‘the depravations of Europe’) to the New, not quite the movement of Calvin.’ This claim oddly denies or overlooks that Puritanism established a ‘coercive theocracy’ in colonial America after Calvin’s model in Geneva (the ‘Holy Commonwealth’, ‘Christian Sparta’) and thus perpetuated the ‘European past’ and transmitted the ‘depravations of Europe’ to the ‘New’ world and generally represented the ‘most totalitarian’ species of Calvinism (as showed in Kaufman 2008; Munch 2001; Stivers 1994; Zaret 1989). On this account, such claims are either historical errors or attempts at rationalization and rehabilitation of Puritanism and thus what Weber (1976, p. 37) diagnoses as its ‘unexampled tyranny’ exercised through the ‘theocracy of New England.’

2017; Kelley 1984; Mueller 2009; Munch 2001; Scitovsky 1972; Wagner 1997). In Soviet and related socialism, the equivalent or analogue is a non-Protestant and generally nonreligious purist or puritan, aside from some religious connotations or exceptions, as in communist but still Orthodox Christian Russia, as well as Catholic Poland and Cuba within the former Warsaw pact and beyond (Faris 1961; Kelley 1984; Sorokin 2006; Tiryakian 1981; Wallerstein and Zukin 1989).

As a corollary, the ‘new artificial man’ assumes in American capitalism/conservatism the shape of a Calvinist saint, Puritan, evangelical crusader, Christian angel and the like. In this regard, this novel human creature is an emanation of what Schumpeter (1991) calls *homo religiosus* deemed an exemplar of irrational *homines* and an antithesis of *homo economicus* (also, Iannaccone¹⁰ 1998). The American *homo religiosus* arises in declarative disgust of—but probably, given what Weber (1976) refers to as the Puritan ‘pure hypocrisy’ of ‘Americanism’, secret admiration and intense envy for—and revolt against, in Schumpeter’s words, *homo eroticus* à la Freud, yet in a Weberian elective affinity and intimate relationship with *homo economicus* within Calvinist or evangelical capitalism. In turn, the ‘new artificial man’ in Soviet and similar socialism takes on the form of a non-materialistic, non-individualistic, non-egoistic and public-spirited person such as a socialist personality type and in that sense a ‘saint’ or ‘angel’ in these nonreligious terms¹¹ but seemingly equivalent or similar to the original ‘Christian man’ ideal, as Pareto implies, and also Sorokin (2006) in reference to the Russian Orthodox Church. By analogy, this creature is an incarnation of what following Schumpeter can be tentatively termed *homo collectivus*, more precisely, *homo soveticus* with Puritan-like hypocrisy or insincerity (Zinoviev¹²

10. Like most rational choice theorists as well as religionists, Iannaccone (1998, 1492) takes on the mantle of a prophet by prophesizing that the ‘economics of religion will eventually bury two myths—that of *homo economicus* as a cold creature with neither need nor capacity for piety, and that of *homo religiosus* as a benighted throwback to pre-rational times.’ But most rational choice theorists as well as ‘libertarian’ economists prove to be what Samuelson (1983) referring to Hayek’s prophecy of the welfare state as the ‘road to serfdom’ deems false prophets.

11. Mises (1951) predicts that the ‘new man of Socialism will be free from base self-seeking; he will be morally infinitely above the man of the frightful age of private property and from a profound knowledge of the coherency of things and from a noble perception of duty he will devote all his powers to the general welfare.’ However, he seems too blinded by his vehement and dogmatic anti-socialism—by lumping together Scandinavian social democracy and the US New Deal with Russian communism—to realize that his picture of the ‘new man of Socialism’ is essentially identical to that of the American and other ‘new Christian man’. Instead, this is what Pareto (2000, p. 53) suggests by noting the ‘resemblance’ of socialism with Christianity, including ‘its resemblance to the Protestant Reformation.’ Pareto (2000, p. 54) elaborates on this resemblance by observing the rise of ‘similar anticipations’ of the future among socialists and the millenarian Christians. In addition, he notes that ‘Catholics, Protestants and socialists, they all feel more or less carried by the religious wave’ as well as that ‘many people imagine that they can effectively combat socialism by combating (Marx’s) theories, just as others believed it possible to combat Christianity effectively by pointing out the scientific errors of the Bible’ (Pareto 2000, pp. 90, 99).

12. Zinoviev [1985, p. 53] states that the Soviet Man ‘would be glad to be [sincere],

1985), in contradiction to individualistic *homo economicus* and largely, but not invariably, to *homo religiousus* while being in complicated, ambiguous relations to *homo eroticus*.

In passing, the ‘new man’ that Nazism invented is a saint or purist in the sense of the ‘pure’ Catholic, Lutheran and other Christian, moralistic and conservative German belonging to the wider family of authoritarian conservatism or rightism through Hitler’s promised ‘broad coalition of the right’ (Bourdieu and Haacke 1995; Ferguson and Voth 2008; Mann 2004; Satyanath Voigtländer, and Voth 2017). The new Nazi and generally ‘Fascist man’ (Esping-Andersen 1990) is hence an emanation of *homo religiousus* in conjunction with *homo economicus*—given Nazism’s preservation of capitalism, notably large-scale private industry and alliance with major capitalists a la Krupp et al. and the stock market—and opposition to (mixed with glorification for) *homo eroticus*, thus being closer to that of American Puritanical conservatism than to that of Soviet socialism¹³. In this connection, Sorokin (2006) suggests that Nazism was more brutal than Soviet socialism and pre-socialist Russia remarking that the ‘traditional policy’ of the Russian government toward subject populations has been ‘extraordinarily fair and generous’ and the ‘number of victims’ of the Russian Revolution is ‘negligible’ compared to the ‘tens of millions of persons,’ largely foreigners, suffering extermination by the Nazis.

In addition, the ‘new Islamic man’ that Islamism creates due to being a saint-puritan and holy warrior qua jihadist and thus another emanation of *homo religiousus* is essentially equivalent to the Calvinist saint, Puritan or evangelical crusader—who is basically a Christian jihadist imposing a Biblical equivalent of Sharia law, as in the US ‘Bible Belt’—in American religious conservatism (Edgell, Gerteis and Hartmann 2006; Juergensmeyer 2003; Mueller 2009; Turner 2002). This is consistent with the functional equivalence between Islam and Calvinism/Puritanism in terms of theocracy and religious revolution and war, along with the doctrine of predestination, as Weber (1968) classically shows in his comparative sociology of religion.

but he can't, because he considers that he is always sincere in one respect or another. So if he is ready to change one sincerity into another from one minute to the next, this isn't a sign of insincerity.’

13. Kirkpatrick (1937, p. 652) remarks that the Nazi ‘attitude toward sex is a mixture of Puritanism, glorification of vital forces and a vague desire to reconcile a moralist attitude toward illegitimacy with exigencies of population politics.’ Merton (1939, p. 437) observes that *Puritanism’s* New England Primer ‘finds its analogue in the various Nazi primers (viz.) the displacement of aggression against a convenient out-group (especially in periods of economic strain (plus) the impugning of out-group morality (and other) myths and tactics of nativist movements before and since.’ Woodard (1938, p. 645) states that Puritanism and modern Fascism share the ‘masochistic ecstasy of pain (or) moral masochism’. Fromm (1941, p. 96) suggests that ‘Luther and Calvin psychologically prepared (new) man for the role which he had to assume in modern society: of feeling his own self to be insignificant and of being ready to subordinate his life exclusively for purposes which were not his own. Once man was ready to become nothing but the means for the glory of a God who represented neither justice nor love, he was sufficiently prepared to accept the role of a servant to the economic machine—and eventually a “Fuhrer”.’

Characteristics Of The 'New Man'

As noted, the 'new artificial man' of American capitalism/conservatism is a Calvinist saint, Puritan, evangelical crusader and generally Christian angel, thus the epitome of *homo religiousus*, in opposition and 'holy' war against *homo eroticus* but in an affinity and alliance with *homo economicus* within a Weberian Protestant ethic and capitalist spirit framework. In turn, the 'new artificial man' in Soviet socialism is a non-materialistic, non-individualistic, non-egoistic and public-spirited person, thus an exemplar of *homo collectivus* in the form of *homo soveticus* (Soviet man), aiming to supersede individualistic bourgeois *homo economicus* as well as to some degree *homo religiousus* while standing in ambivalent relations to *homo eroticus* (Smirnov 1980; for a criticism see Zinoviev 1985).

First, both the American and Soviet 'new artificial man' is a saint, although of different kinds. The American capitalist or conservative 'new artificial man' is a Calvinist saint, pursuing the life of sainthood after the model and image of original saints in Calvinism since Calvin in 16th century France, albeit most US Calvinists and religious Americans overall do not seem aware that their master was a French born, raised and educated near Paris¹⁴, as well as the French-speaking Swiss town of Geneva (Benedict 2002; Brint 2014; Gorski 2003). Similarly, the Soviet or Russian 'new artificial man' is a saint but of a non-Calvinist and so nonreligious kind, aiming at the life of secular sainthood explicitly or implicitly after the ideal and vision of primitive and modern communism or rather socialism, hence the new, 'socialist type of personality' as a product of the 'revolutionary transition to a new form of society'¹⁵ (Smirnov 1980).

Consequently, the American 'new artificial man' by being a saint is a consistent and ultimate ascetic, a human incarnation of what Weber (1976) identifies and emphasizes as intense and permanent Calvinist asceticism (also, Akerlof 2007; Young 2009). Such a human creature is the face of, in J. S. Mill's words, humanity 'abnegated' through 'Christian self-denial' as the essence and substance of Calvinist asceticism, including by implication masochism mixed with sadism (Adorno 2001; Altemeyer 2007; Fromm 1941). Reportedly, Calvinism is not just an overwhelming and coercive external force ('out there') in a 'sick society, but also within', thus inside the American and similar, especially Anglo-Saxon, ascetic 'new man' (Stenhouse 2012). In a similar vein, the Soviet

14. On a lighter note, given their 'blissful ignorance' of other societies, regions and cultures, most Texan and other Southern Calvinists or 'born again' evangelicals upon hearing that Jean (not John) Calvin was born, raised and educated near Paris (Nayon) might think of Paris, Texas, if not that Paris, France received its famous name after it (Davis 2010).

15. Smirnov (1980, p. 10) states that the 'emergence in the USSR and other socialist countries of a new type of personality is a fact of outstanding historical importance, acknowledged throughout the world by both the friends and enemies of communism. The shaping and development of this new type of personality is a result of the revolutionary transition to a new form of society, of the building of socialism and communism (i.e.) the socialist type of personality.'

‘new artificial man’ is an ascetic, although of a non-Calvinist, nonreligious variety and perhaps in a lesser degree or less disciplined way than the American Calvinist counterpart, specifically an emanation of primitive and modern communist or socialist asceticism. Likewise, this is the facet of ‘abnegated’ humanity through, as Pareto suggests, Christian-style self-denial’ or its non-Christian variation manifesting communist or socialist asceticism by possessing ‘outstanding moral and ideological qualities’ (Smirnov 1980). And just as Calvinism in America, socialism is both a prevailing and coercive external force in a pathological society and within humans, so inside the ‘new Soviet (ascetic) Man’ (Dahl 1985; Smirnov 1980).

A particularly salient and indeed perpetual aspect of such Calvinist asceticism via abnegation or self-denial consists of what Scheler denotes ‘unchastity’, creating the ‘external espionage system’ against it, as well as ‘drinking, vice and luxury of all sorts’ in America and other Protestant countries. Scheler therefore apparently refers to the criminalization of pre- and extra-marital ‘unchastity’ through adultery and fornication laws and the prohibition of prostitution leading to what contemporaries Sombart and Mencken as well as Taine earlier diagnose as ‘prudery’ in America¹⁶ (as well as England) since its Calvinist colonial beginning through present days (Adamczyk and Hayes. 2012; Davis 2010; Gorski 2003)..

In addition, Scheler presciently thereby predicts alcohol Prohibition in America that was driven by Calvinist asceticism through evangelical temperance movements and wars, as well as its vestiges during Reaganism—for example, the increased legal drinking age from 18 to 21, the highest in the West and among all OECD countries--and in what Merton (1968) calls ‘dry’ states in the South. Moreover, he therefore implicitly predicts Reagan’s Puritanical ‘war on drugs’ causing an unparalleled explosion of the prison population through mass incarceration of drug users as moral offenders (Campbell and Schoenfeld 2013; Cooney and Burt 2008; Mueller 2009). As a result, the American ‘new artificial man’ is a model of chastity and non-drinking as well as of no-drug use, an invariably and supremely chaste and anti-alcohol human creature whose principle of action or credo is, as Weber (1976), Sombart (1928) and other scholars note, Calvinist asceticism’s injunction--‘work is good; sex is evil’ (Stenhouse 2012).

In addition, a manifest, though less persistent, dimension of communist or rather socialist asceticism is ‘unchastity’, also resulting in an ‘external espionage system’ against it, just as, at least temporarily, ‘drinking, vice and luxury of all sorts’, in the Soviet Union and to a lesser extent other countries, including China and Cuba, under socialism (Tiryakian¹⁷ 1981; Wallerstein and Zukin 1989).

16. Scheler’s contemporary Sombart (1928, p. 62) observes that in Protestant ‘Anglo-Saxon peoples chastity degenerated into prudery. And Puritanism has certainly done much to develop in English and in U.S. states of New England this false modesty and the hypocrisy in sexual matters, which have persisted to this day.’ Mencken (2006, p. 232) detects the ‘somewhat diffident prudery of the 40’s (in the 19th century) and the astoundingly ferocious and uncompromising vice-crusading of today’, namely the 1910-20s in America. Similarly, Taine (1885, p. 238) reports that in late 19th-century England Protestant ‘religious prudery often leads to hypocrisy.’

17. Tiryakian (1981, p. 1049) observes that the ‘persistent affinity’ between Puritanism

Thus, just as America and other Protestant countries, the Soviet Union induced by socialist asceticism enacted the prohibition of prostitution permanently since its founding and even its own alcohol prohibition transiently during the 1980s apparently inspired by or emulating religion-driven American Prohibition. To that extent, almost like the American counterpart, the Soviet 'new artificial man' is an example of chastity, a chaste human, although in a somewhat lesser degree or less disciplined way, whose precept of conduct or motto is socialist asceticism's Calvinist-style stipulation 'work is good; sex is shame' in the sense of 'private immorality' (Kelley 1984).

Second and as a corollary, both the American and Soviet 'new artificial man' is essentially an unfree human actor, although in different forms or degrees. Thus, the American 'new artificial man' is a Calvinist unfree human creature. This trait of the 'new artificial man' is consistent with Calvinism as the religious system of unfreedom, even in Weber's (1976) words, the 'most absolutely unbearable church control' of individuals and thus suppression of their freedom through 'Biblical theocracy' as 'Divinely ordained', as well as with Calvin's predestination dogma that by its 'extreme inhumanity' axiomatically denies human free will or freedom of choice (also, Brink 2014; Friedman 2011). That this new human creature is in essence unfree by being denied freedom of choice is what also J. S. Mill suggests observing that the 'Calvinistic theory' stipulates 'You have no choice; thus you must do, and no otherwise.' Hence, Calvinism proclaims to the American 'new artificial man' directly or via Calvinist evangelicalism: 'do what you're told and you'll be all right; don't dig too deep into yourself' (Stenhouse 2012, p. 151).

Accordingly, the American 'new artificial man' by being deprived of the freedom of choice endures and indeed endorses and perpetuates the 'most absolutely unbearable church control' of individuals by Calvinist 'Biblical theocracy,' simply what Weber (1976) terms 'Bibliocracy', such as the reportedly proto-totalitarian 'Bible Belt' in the US South that lasted for several ante- and post-bellum centuries with no end in sight and instead reviving, intensifying and expanding to the rest of conservative America during current times (Bauman 1997; Mueller 2009). For example, this novel creature submitted or resigned to alcohol Prohibition with its various replays and vestiges, including the dramatically increased legal drinking age and 'dry' states in this region and beyond, and its sequel the Reagan 'war on drugs' (let alone the prohibition of prostitution) in America as if they were Divine commandments rather than, as Pareto (1963, 2000) describes them, instances of the US government's compulsory 'enforcement of morality by law' driven by Calvinist, notably Puritan, 'religious and sectarian sentiments'.

More broadly, this 'new artificial man' because of the Calvinist denial of freedom of choice is invented and conditioned to be a fundamentally anti-revolutionary and in that sense anti-change conservative human actor for whom no second American revolution will or should ever happen despite the actual potential or hypothetical possibility for the approximation of the conditions

and revolution is a 'phenomenon observable in a wide range of political revolutions, from the English revolution of the 17th century to the Chinese and Cuban ones of (the 20th century).'

causing the first (on anti-revolutionary neo-Calvinism see Van der Kroef 1948). In this regard, this is a fundamentally unfree 'man' because of the incapacity to imagine, let alone create, a different future of society caused by, as J. S. Mill implies, the 'Calvinistic theory' suppressing all human capacities and free actions in favor of blind obedience to what he calls the 'alleged will of God'. Counterfactually, such a conservative 'new artificial man' would have perpetuated the condition and structure of society, or just stopped acting, prior to the American revolution and the Civil War--feudalism or colonial rule and slavery as the 'will of God' (Blanchard 2007; Manent 1998).

The preceding also holds for the Soviet 'new artificial man', with proper modifications. The Soviet 'new artificial man' as the socialist type of personality is essentially an unfree human consistent with state socialism as the nonreligious system of unfreedom and control, although perhaps less intense, disciplined, strident and enduring than Calvinism and its theocracy and generally religion-driven regimes or movements (Friedland 2001; Juergensmeyer 2003). This applies to the extent that, like Calvinism, state socialism denies free will or freedom of choice to individuals and command 'you must do, and no otherwise', although on different, nonreligious and thus somewhat less stringent or 'sacred' grounds. It follows that the Soviet 'new artificial man' due to having no freedom of choice withstands and even supports and sustains repressive communist-party rule by resulting from and rejoicing the 'building of socialism' (Smirnov 1980), although for a much shorter time (around 70 years) than does the American counterpart (instead doing this perpetually) and even contributing to and witnessing its eventual end (Baudrillard 1994; Habermas 2001). For instance, like the American counterpart, this new human creature submitted or resigned to the Soviet version of alcohol Prohibition at least temporarily, as well as to the long restriction on foreign travel, the prohibition of prostitution and other restrictions of political and personal freedoms as if they were 'objective laws' of state socialism rather than exercises of arbitrary state power analogous to the US government's imposition of puritanical morality by law

Generally, like the first, the Soviet 'new artificial man' is produced to be a fundamentally anti-revolutionary and thus anti-change conservative human actor not making or expecting a second revolution but instead persisting in the 'building of socialism' in spite of the actual or potential approximation of the conditions leading to the first, with the difference that a kind of quasi- or peaceful anti-Soviet revolution still occurred to end socialism and make the Soviet Union a disunion (Habermas 2001). In this sense, like the American counterpart, the Soviet human type is a fundamentally unfree 'man' with no genuine convictions—reproducing Soviet Russia as a 'society of chameleons'¹⁸--because of the incapacity, at least for some time, to imagine and create a different future of society due to communism

18. Zinoviev (1985, p. 74) depicts the Soviet Man as follows: 'I haven't got any convictions. If a man has convictions it is a sign that he is not intellectually mature (and) more often convictions have no effect on people's behavior. They merely beautify vanity, relieve unclear consciences and cover up stupidity. indeterminacy, fluidity, mutability, block- and multi-think are peculiarities of Soviet society (as) a society of chameleons.'

or rather socialism, like Calvinism, devaluing most human capacities and free actions in favor of its supposed ‘laws’ (Zinoviev 1985).

As a consequence or correlate of their denied freedom of choice, both the American and Soviet ‘new artificial man’ is a sinless human, living what Calvinism imposes and socialism implies as, in Weber’s (1976) words, a life ‘free of sin’, thus out of coercive necessity rather (or more) than free choice, albeit in different forms or degrees. Especially, the American ‘new man’ is a Calvinist sinless human being invented and conditioned to be and live a life totally and unconditionally ‘free of sin’, as Calvinism defines it and J. S. Mill, Weber, Scheler, Pareto, Sombart and other scholars classically imply. This fully accords with Calvinism’s injunction that, as J. S. Mill puts it, ‘whatever is not a duty, is a sin’. More broadly, it is consistent with what Scheler identifies as Calvinism’s (Protestant dogmatics’) ‘extreme distrust of natural man as completely corrupted by original sin’. In this sense, the American ‘new artificial man’ not only is or leads a sinless human being or life but also is forced or resigns to somehow expiate and indeed in some situations to punish severely and cruelly¹⁹ by association other humans for ‘original sin’ by, as Pareto²⁰ notes, tormenting oneself and others, although ‘natural man’ perpetrated it (Graafland 2014; Rawls 2010).

On this account, such a tendency to tormenting oneself and others for present and past transgressions reveals what sociologists and social psychologists call a compounded ‘sadistic-masochistic’ and generally authoritarian personality structure that typifies conservatism and Calvinist Puritanism (Adorno 2001; Altemeyer 2007; Calhoun 1925; Fromm 1941; Miller, Slomczynski, and Kohn 1987; Woodard 1937). It follows that the American ‘new artificial man’ has an intense and perpetual dual obsession with current sin and vice and with ‘original sin’ and seeks proscription and eradication of the first and masochistic self-punishment (or alternatively self-absolution) and severe, even if delayed, sadistic punishment of others by association for the second (Mueller 2013; Wagner 1997).

The above applies to the Soviet ‘new artificial man’ as well, with appropriate qualifications. Like the American counterpart, the Soviet ‘new artificial man’ is a sinless human but of a non-Calvinist and nonreligious variety also reproduced to

19. Ross (1912, p. 489) remarks that the Calvinist ‘doctrine of election in its crude form would accentuate the tendency to cruelty in Calvinism.’ To that extent, this implies that the American Calvinist sinless ‘new man’ is largely a cruel human type, but the producers of the latter do not state or acknowledge cruelty, so the paper does not consider such an attribute; this also applies to the Soviet counterpart.

20. Pareto (2000, p. 107) observes that ‘certain men experience great delight in tormenting themselves and others’, invoking the Scotch Presbyterian clergy’s code that ‘all the natural affections, all the pleasures of society, all the pastimes, all the gay instincts of the human heart were so many sins.’ Pareto (2000, p. 107) adds that ‘long before, the monks had carried this kind of (Protestant) insanity to the utmost limit’, citing the observation that ‘pleasure and crime were synonyms in the monastic (and Puritan) idiom’ and concluding that ‘they still are to our modern ascetics.’ Calhoun (1925, p. 53) describes the ‘natural Puritanism of a ‘pain economy’ and thus implies Puritan sadism-masochism. MacCracken (1927, p. 368) registers that the ‘older Puritanism of conduct (was) intolerant.’ More broadly, Finney (1927, p. 208) identifies the ‘swinging pendulums in history—as from Puritanism to Bohemianism and back again’.

live a life 'free of sin' as the 'building of socialism' (Smirnov 1980) redefines it, although in a lesser degree or less disciplined manner than the first. This accords with socialism's explicit or implicit Calvinist-like declaration that 'whatever is not a duty, is a sin' in its nonreligious redefinition, aside from its earlier religious definitions, such as those of the Orthodox Christian Church in socialist and even more pre-revolutionary (and probably post-socialist) Russia, as Sorokin implies (along with Catholicism Poland or Cuba). At this juncture, Sorokin (2006) suggests that the Russian Orthodox Church in its 'spirit and philosophy' holds an 'intermediate position between Roman Catholicism and Protestantism', especially that the principle of Caesarism as dictatorial rule has definitely 'far less authentic expression in the Russian ecclesiastical system than in Roman Catholicism or Calvinism'.

Unlike the American counterpart, however, the Soviet 'new artificial man' only strives to become or lead a sinless human being or life and is neither forced nor resigns to atone and punish others for 'original sin' because of being of a non-Calvinist, nonreligious type, barring some religious exceptions as noted above and especially Sorokin (2006) emphasizes by the religiously based 'psychology and mentality', indeed 'universal soul' of Russia, just as of the United States. Due to the absence of 'original sin', this human type probably shows lower degrees of sadism and masochism by instead possessing 'outstanding' ethical and other qualities (Smirnov 1980), at least of those religiously induced, as well as less endurance, consistency, conviction and trust (Zinoviev²¹ 1985) than the American counterpart, as its effective euthanasia shows through the peaceful death of Soviet and similar socialism (Baudrillard 1994; Habermas 2001).

Third and consequently, both the American and Soviet 'new artificial man' is a puritan, although in different forms, meanings or degrees. Specifically, the American capitalist/conservative 'new artificial man' is a Puritan in the form and sense of a specifically Anglo-Saxon Calvinist purist or saint. Therefore, the aforesaid of the Calvinist saint defining this 'new artificial man' holds for the Puritan in particular, with some additional extensions and accentuations consistent with that Puritanism is the American-English extension and intensification, notably the most 'totalitarian' or repressive and moralistic species, of French Calvinism occasionally going beyond the latter, for example, by the prohibition of alcohol and sex cum 'fornication' that even Calvin permitted or tolerated (Kaufman 2008; Munch 2001; Stivers 1994). Hence, the American 'new artificial man' is specifically a Calvinist Puritan, and not any puritan or purist that exists in various shapes and shades in other Christian branches and virtually all religions, especially Islam paralleling Calvinism/Puritanism, as well as ideologies, including communism and socialism.

As a consequence, this new human type represents, or is conditioned to be, a 'pure man' in moral and religious terms or 'purified' from any such impurities, compatible with Puritanism and Puritans claiming to be the only 'pure' church/morality and humans. In this sense, the American 'new artificial man' becomes

21. Zinoviev (1985, p. 202) cites the Soviet Man: 'Do not trust anyone. Remember, the more you trust, the more cynically they will deceive you.'

the Puritan model of purity or purification in matters of morality and religion (Gunther 2014; Wagner 1997). And such a 'new man attains purity or rather is subjected to compulsory purification almost invariably through the imposition and generalization of Puritan morality and to some degree religion by overt or subtle coercion, including mass imprisonment and potentially (e.g., for drug and sexual offenses) widespread death sentences and executions.

As a result, the American 'new artificial man' while constructed as a perfect Puritan and supremely pure human faces in reality the strongest prospect of being imprisoned for moral impurities (e.g., alcohol and drug uses, prostitution) and even sentenced to death and executed among Western and adjacent societies such as OECD countries (Becky and Western 2004; Jacobs, Carmichael, and Kent 2005). For instance, Pareto²² (1963) observes in the United States 'a mass of hypocritical laws for the enforcement of morality' which he characterizes as 'replicas of laws of the European Middle Ages', thus referring to Prohibition and predicting its sequels like the 'war on drugs' and the resulting explosion of the prison population and the potential application of the death penalty (e.g., for drug trade in the federal law). In extension, the American 'new artificial man' remains a Puritanical human type even after the demise or official disestablishment of Puritanism during the early 19th century and its succession by mostly Puritan-inspired evangelicalism (Barro and McCleary 2005; Munch 2001). This means remaining substantively a Calvinist Puritan, save in form or name. For example, 'Puritanical' evangelicals, allied with other religious groups, including orthodox Catholics, within the theocratic Christian Right, reportedly continue to oppose the right to abortion, as well as scientific progress and liberal democracy, in modern America (Mueller 2009; also, Bénabou, Ticchi and Vindigni 2015; Domhoff 2013; Keister 2008).

Likewise, the Soviet 'new artificial man' is a puritan, albeit of a non-Calvinist and generally nonreligious variety²³ (Faris 1961; Kelley 1984) in the form of possessing 'outstanding' moral qualities resulting from the 'building of socialism' (Smirnov 1980). Accordingly, the above about the Soviet kind of saint or ascetic applies to this variety of puritan or purist, with some additions and specifications. This is consistent with that Soviet and to a lesser degree other communism developed and functioned as a nonreligious variation or emulation of moral puritanism or purism, even manifesting some similarities with specifically religious, Calvinist Puritanism (Tiryakian 1981; Wallerstein and Zukin 1989).

In a way, the Soviet 'new artificial man' is a puritan without Puritanism and more broadly religion, abstracting from some possible puritanical or

22. Pareto thus implies that the American 'new artificial man' is in fact a 'hypocritical' human, as does Weber (1976, p. 52) by referring to the 'pure hypocrisy' of Puritan-rooted 'Americanism', but since the inventors of this human type do not propose or admit this trait, the present paper does not consider it.

23. Faris (1961, p. 4) remarks that 'Marx's successors in modern Russia conspicuously emphasize many of the (Puritan) personal values and with no credit acknowledgment to Puritanism or a Protestant ethic.' Also, Kelley (1984, p. 701) observes that 'emphatic condemnations, in the Yankee mode, of private immorality (come) from the (Soviet) authorities.'

ascetic influences of the Russian Christian Orthodox Church (or Catholicism in Poland during socialism and Cuba) that Sorokin (2006) implies by noting its ‘intermediate position between Roman Catholicism and Protestantism’. Like the American counterpart, this human type consequently is (conditioned to be) a ‘pure man’ morally and ideologically or ‘purified’ from any impurities in this regard consistent with the claim of communism or socialism and communists to be a ‘pure’ morality/ideology and ‘outstanding’ persons of a nonreligious kind (Smirnov 1980). Thus, just as the first, the second becomes the model of purity or purification in the domain of morality and by contrast also in ideology instead of religion. Likewise, the Soviet ‘new artificial man’ reaches purity or is subjected to purification typically through the coercive imposition and generalization—although perhaps in a less severe, consistent or disciplined manner—of socialist ‘outstanding’ moral qualities, as of ideology, including mass imprisonment and executions especially during the early phases of socialism, though in Sorokin’s (2006) account ‘negligible’ compared to Nazism. For illustration, for this human type ‘outstanding’ moral qualities includes the prohibitions of prostitution, some forms of sex and drugs enduringly and of alcohol temporarily, just as does all of these for the American Puritan counterpart perpetually. Still, unlike the latter following the official demise of Puritanism, the Soviet, including Russian, ‘new artificial man’ mainly ceases to be a puritanical human type and instead almost turns into an opposite after the disintegration of socialism.

Especially, both the American and Soviet ‘new artificial man’ is a puritan by condemning, opposing or avoiding sensual pleasures, although in different ways or degrees. In essence, both types have what Veblen may call the ‘trained incapacity’ for enjoying especially sensual pleasures or rather conditioned capacity for experiencing non-pleasures. Thus, early analysts observe that the Puritan ‘American is not predisposed to pleasure’²⁴ and alternatively predisposed to non-pleasure and obsessed with sin, vice and immoral conduct overall, albeit primarily those of others (Bénabou et al. 2015; Mueller 2009; Scitovsky 1972; Wagner 1997). Above all, the American ‘new man’ is a Puritan or Puritanical by being disinclined to pleasures of sexual kind—as a way of proving oneself the ‘regenerate man’²⁵ qua ‘born again’—which Scheler implies by noting that Protestant countries create the ‘external espionage system against unchastity’, along with ‘drinking, vice and luxury of all sorts’, that is without precedent in ‘Catholic lands.’ Though perhaps in a lesser degree or less disciplined way than the American type, the Soviet ‘new artificial man’ still is largely undisposed or unconditioned to sensual pleasures, including those of sexual nature. It is no

24. Ross (1907, p. 387) elaborates that in the US ‘anyone who is an avowed independent in matters of religion may be assured of popular execration. The American is not predisposed to pleasure A few books may be observed in his home, of which the most noticeable are the Bible and sectarian literature. The chief evils are attendance at the theater or the dance and participation in games of cards or of chance (as) reprehensible amusements. The reading of novels is classed as trifling, and sometimes as even dangerous to the moral tone.’

25. Generally, Ross (1912, p. 443) states that the ‘Puritan asserted himself in matters spiritual and temporal (as) the regenerate man.’

wonder that both the American and Soviet ‘new artificial man’ condemn, avoid or are deprived of prostitution which American conservatism and Soviet socialism prohibit and invariably punish, although the former does more severely consistent with the Puritan Draconian severity of punishment for sexual sins that it construes as grave crimes. At least this striking commonality illustrates that the American and Soviet ‘new artificial man’ is or conditioned and forced to be a puritan, albeit a Calvinist, religious Puritan in the first case and a socialist, nonreligious purist in the second.

As a corollary, both the American and Soviet ‘new artificial man’ is a virtuous angel, even if in different shapes, meanings or degrees, through the shared ‘politics of virtue’ (Kelley²⁶ 1984). As self-evident, the American ‘new artificial man’ is a Christian, more precisely evangelical and conservative, virtuous angel through the ‘politics of virtue’ of conservatism or the ‘right-wing’ (Kelley 1984). Therefore, the American *homo novus* possesses and displays all the well-known attributes of a Christian/evangelical and conservative angel. For illustration, this new human type practices chastity and follows Puritans’ precept that ‘work is good, sex is evil’, including prostitution must be criminalized, only (as Pareto implies) drinks water and scrupulously, at least publicly, condemns and avoids alcohol, does not take drugs and generally does not indulge in any sensual pleasures and sins that the US Puritanical government proscribes and punishes as grave crimes (Mueller 2009; Scitovsky 1972; Stenhouse 2012). Accordingly, the American ‘new artificial man’ either zealously subscribes or passively resigns to Puritanism’s and consequently the US coercive and moralistic government’s equation of sensual pleasures with sins and these with crimes that it typically punishes with Puritan Draconian severity through mass incarceration, torture, indefinite detention, widespread death sentences and executions and other acts of religion-driven penal repression to the point of ‘holy’ state ‘political terror’ with ‘no limit to oppression’ (Besley and Persson 2009; Mencken²⁷ 1982).

This is what makes this human type a complete angel and thus a moralistic virtuoso, namely by not only behaving as such but also approving or resigning to state repression and terror such as temperance wars, from Puritan witch-trials to evangelical Prohibition to the conservative war on drugs, and consequent mass imprisonment to coerce those who do not act so into acting as angels and virtuosi (Brubaker 2015; Symonds and Pudsey 2006). Moreover, the American ‘new artificial man’ is willing and ready to sacrifice oneself and others to the higher cause of the regeneration and universalization of the Christian/evangelical angel/virtuoso. This occurs by confessing to one’s secretly committed and indeed contemplated sins and vices as ‘crimes’ (coming out of the ‘closet’) during a ‘life

26. Kelley (1984, p. 701) remarks that in the Soviet Union ‘though Puritanism is not ordinarily termed a Russian trait, the politics of virtue is pervasive, like the desire for order and authority. It is not simply the attribute of the right-wing (as in the US)’.

27. Mencken (1982) apparently referring to the US moralistic cum Puritanical government states that the ‘worst government is the most moral. One composed of cynics is often very tolerant and humane. But when fanatics are on top there is no limit to oppression’, which obviously applies to what he first terms the Southern ‘Bible Belt’ ruled by Puritan-inspired (Baptist-Methodist) ‘barbarism’ and to evangelical America overall.

of sin' and by monitoring and reporting those of neighbors and family members to government authorities through Puritan and conservative vigilantism (for related vigilantism in the US South see Beck, Tolnay, and Bailey 2016; Jacobs et al. 2005). Such monitoring is what Scheler precisely identifies or predicts by pointing to the 'external espionage system against unchastity, drinking, vice and luxury of all sorts' that Protestant countries, including America, invariably create as a form or aspect of an intrusive and repressive police state committing religion-driven political terror to the point of, as Pareto envisions, killing 'in the name of the divine master' (also, Juergensmeyer 2003).

Furthermore, as Scheler intimates, this human type not only publicly denounces and avoids present sins and vices but also expiates and make all other humans expiate by association for 'original sin' that 'natural man' supposedly perpetrated (Graafland 2014). In this regard, the American 'new artificial man' displays an angel-style disgust for and obsession with both actual sin and vice and narrated 'original sin' and in that sense becomes or acts as a perfect Christian/evangelical angel, notably a Puritan-style moralistic and religious virtuoso (Symonds and Pudsey 2006. As a result, the American *homo novus* is a 'regenerate man' in the sense of Calvinism/Puritanism and 'born again' in the meaning of Puritanical evangelicalism—simply, a reconstructed, reborn angel/virtuoso out of 'natural man' and sin (Ross 1912; also, Madsen 2009).

The Soviet 'new artificial man' is also an angel and moralistic virtuoso but of a non-Christian, nonreligious variety, excluding some vestiges of Russian Orthodox Christianity in socialism that, as seen, Sorokin (2006) implies and indeed advocates. As also evident, this is an alternate socialist angel and virtuoso. Hence, *homo soveticus* has all the traits of a socialist angel/virtuoso, as Pareto implicitly identifies them, suggesting the 'resemblance' of socialism with Christianity, including both the Russian Orthodox Church, as Sorokin (2006) suggests, and the Protestant Reformation, and to that extent with the attributes of the Christian, specifically Puritan, counterpart (also, Faris 1961; Kelley 1984; Meyer 1967). For instance, like the latter, the Soviet human type mostly practices chastity and follows the puritan precept that 'work is good, sex is immoral', including the prohibition of prostitution, only drinks alcohol in moderation (as opposed to the old or stereotypical 'Russian man'), does not take drugs and overall does not indulge in any pleasures that the socialist coercive government prohibits and sanctions as criminal or immoral offenses, thus displaying 'outstanding moral and ideological qualities'. Just as the first, the second enthusiastically approves of or passively acquiesces to socialism's own puritan and hence the Soviet moralistic government's equivalence of some sensual pleasures such as sex or prostitution and drugs with criminal offenses that it usually sanctions, albeit perhaps with lesser severity or discipline, by imprisonment, executions and other acts of ideology-driven penal repression or ideological state terror.

Moreover, like the American counterpart, the Soviet 'new artificial man' shows the willingness and readiness to sacrifice oneself and others to the higher cause of the creation and generalization of the socialist angel and the 'building of socialism' by confessing to one's secret committed sin- and thought-crimes

and by being vigilant and reporting those of neighbors and family members to the government. By contrast and definition, this second human types does not atone for and does not make others expiate for 'original sin' that does not exist as a notion in the Soviet ideal of an angel and moralistic virtuoso, excluding the vestiges of Russian Orthodox Christianity in Sorokin's framework. Like the American counterpart, the Soviet 'new artificial man' shows an angel-like disgust for and obsession with actual sin and vice, especially sex or prostitution and drugs, although in a lesser degree or less disciplined manner, but not obsessing with 'original sin' (with some Russian Orthodox Christian exceptions a la Sorokin), and thus appearing as an incomplete angel and moralistic virtuoso from the Christian, notably Puritan, viewpoint. As a corollary, like the American counterpart, *homo soveticus* is a 'regenerate man' but in the sense of socialist puritanism and so 'born again' from the stance of the puritanical communist state, a constructed, reborn angel/virtuoso out of the Russian 'old man' (but still conditioned by the Russian Orthodox Church according to Sorokin) and 'private immorality' (Kelley 1984).

Finally and as an aggregate consequence of the preceding traits, historically and comparatively, the 'new artificial man' of both American capitalism/conservatism and of Soviet socialism is according to these inventors an exceptional, unique, superior and indeed universal human type—simply, a 'superman' and 'master' embodying what Michels (1968) denotes the 'master-caste'. Thus, the American 'new man' as a Puritan-style moralistic virtuoso is a novel, exceptional, unique and superior human species in social time and space, the only and true 'superman' in all history and society²⁸. This superior human type therefore embodies and reveals 'American exceptionalism, uniqueness and superiority', including 'manifest destiny' as the divine 'mission' to rule or dominate other societies, in all spaces and times (Jouet 2017; Munch 2001; Savelsberg and King 2005).

Especially, the American 'new man' is designed and invented to be an exceptional, unique, superior and universal human type in relation to and sharp distinction from that of the 'old Europe', specifically liberal, secular ('godless'),

28. Ross (1912, p. 442) regards the 'modern doctrine of the superman as the expression of a modern Puritanism', remarking that 'we (Americans) do not think of man as the ruin of a noble building, to use Calvin's phrase. We think of him as a building in process of completion. We put perfection not in the past, but in the future'. Also, Weber (1946, p. 308) refers to 'economic supermen' during the 'age of the Puritans'. At this juncture, **Fromm** (1941, p. 254) refers to the "idealistic" position, 'which is represented by Max Weber's analysis, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. He holds that new religious ideas are responsible for the development of a new type of economic behaviour and a new spirit of culture, although he emphasizes that this behaviour is never exclusively determined by religious doctrines.' Also, MacDonald (1965, p. 375) comments that 'Weber was specifically attacking Marx's view that the capitalist, armed with new techniques and driven by rational acquisitiveness, had swept away the old traditional methods and attitudes, and had imposed on society his own ethos or geist as well as the specific capitalist mode of production.' This, for Weber, was not a realistic picture of the process of capitalist development. A more typical sequence, occurring even within Weber's lifetime, was one in which the new man broke into a completely adapted traditional environment in which the mode of production was specifically capitalist. Moreover, the new man was not armed with a new invention, capable of revolutionizing the industry, but with a new spirit.'

rationalistic and welfare-capitalist ('socialist') Western Europe (Jouet 2017; Lipset 1996). This holds even if the first human type appears as far from being historically and comparatively new but as essentially a reinvention and reincarnation of the primeval, pure apostolic Christian man of Biblical times and spaces, including parts of Western or Southern Europe, that Puritanism attempted to recreate—simply, a reinvented apostle (Barnett 1999; Davis 2010; Mullan 1995; Stark 1964; Walden 2012). Thus, according to the designers and inventors, the first type is novel, vigorous, rising, morally pure and practical, thus superior and adjusted, while the second being old, weak, declining, decadent and artistic (in the pejorative sense of impractical), so inferior and outdated (Emerson and Hartman 2006; Lipset 1996).

For the creators, the American 'new man' is radically different from and profoundly exceptional and superior to all other human types and specimens in social history and across societies—except for the Christian apostles of Biblical times—but especially is designed to be an exact opposite and transcendence of the 'old man' of Western Europe, from France and Italy to Germany (with some qualifications with regard to the 'new German' in Nazism) to Scandinavia. In this regard, the first is the antithesis of and supposedly superior to both the old 'Renaissance man' and the old 'Enlightenment man' embodying artistic-humanistic and rationalistic-secular human types and defining early modern Western Europe (Davis and Robinson 2009; Habermas 2001; Mueller 2009). In brief, the American Puritan-rooted *homo novus* is the anti-Renaissance (as Pareto implies²⁹) and counter-Enlightenment 'man' and in that sense an anti-artistic (morally 'pure'), anti-secular ('godly') and anti-rational, including anti-scientific³⁰, 'superman' superior to the decadent and weak 'old man' of Western Europe. This antithesis parallels the sociological contradiction between the substantively theocratic or religiously overdetermined 'American regime'³¹

29. Pareto (2000, p. 47) states that the 'Renaissance only too soon was halted by the Protestant Reformation' in Northern Europe and in extension England and colonial Puritan America.

30. Pareto (1963, p. 1429) classically observes around a century ago that 'in the United States of America one witnesses the rise of no end of strange and wholly unscientific religions such as Christian Science that are utterly at war with any sort of scientific thinking.' A century later, almost nothing substantively changes, as this country, especially the South qua the 'Bible Belt', continues to experience the rise and even to be the world epicenter of 'strange and wholly unscientific religions such as Christian Science that are utterly at war with any sort of scientific thinking,' ranging from creationism, 'intelligent design' and 'godly' prohibition of stem-cell research through the 'flat earth' to 'holy' opposition to climate science (Nordhaus 2019). This makes the 'Bible Belt' and evangelical America overall appear as the probably darkest, i.e., the most irrational and superstitious, as well as illiberal and repressive, region in the Western world and beyond, along with Islamic theocracies, thus evoking and partly replicating the Christian Dark Middle Ages in Europe (Mueller 2009).

31. Perhaps the most bizarre or visible proof or syndrome that religious conservatism has remade America a 'theocratic regime' is that US Presidents and all other political rulers officially and publicly pledge alliance to the Bible, and not just to the Constitution, during their inauguration, which is striking in several aspects. First, by pledging alliance to the Bible, they overtly or covertly enforce its commandments as Biblical law, including the

through the 'Religious Right alliance' between the capitalist rich and the religious poor versus scientific progress and liberal democracy and the 'Western European regime' of liberalization, pluralism and secularization (Bénabou et al. 2015; Mueller 2009; Munch 2001).

Overall, by virtue of such exceptionality, uniqueness and especially superiority the 'new man' of American capitalism/conservatism is a 'superman' and hence a 'master' of other 'men' and human types, thus an embodiment of the 'master-caste', according to these creators. In Schumpeter's terms, this is a 'superman' and 'master' Puritan-style *homo religiousus* existing and acting in a merger or alliance and affinity with *homo economics* ('work is good') within Calvinist capitalism and in disgust of and warfare against *homo eroticus* ('sex is

persecution or exclusion of 'infidels' from political power and process, and thus effectively establish or sustain evangelical theocracy as a proto-totalitarian system in America. It is no wonder that non-religious or secular Presidents and other politicians (aside from few exceptions) are an extinct species, indeed an impossibility theorem, in America in which the 'godly' monopolize the right to pursue and hold political power and oppress and exclude the 'godless'. Second, by pledging alliance to the Bible, US Presidents and other political leaders blatantly violate the Constitutional stipulation against the 'establishment of religion'. Prima facie, such a ritual is precisely an act of the establishment or promotion of religion and thus a clear violation of the Constitution and the separation of church and state. Third and as a corollary, such a ritual violates the rule of law and indeed perpetrates and sustains lawlessness exposing conservatism's 'law and order' slogan as duplicitous. Arguably, such a blatant violation of the Constitution can only produce or maintain lawlessness at all levels, federal, state and local. Fourth, despite blatantly violating the Constitutional prohibition of the 'establishment of religion' and the legal separation of church and state, most Americans indoctrinated by religious conservatism regard US Presidents' pledging alliance to the Bible as normal and even desirable, a facet of superior American exceptionalism versus 'godless' Western Europe. This suggests that such a ritual renders or sustains America as the polar opposite of a rational 'sane' society, so that what Keynes denotes religious 'madmen in authority' make all others, notably the conservative rank-and-file, mad or blind, so long as failing to see that pledging alliance to the Bible by US Presidents amounts to the 'establishment of religion' and violates the Constitution is a symptom of societal madness or blindness. Fifth, historically, the Presidential and universal ritual of pledging alliance to the Bible shows that America under religious conservatism has not advanced beyond Puritanism and its Calvinist Biblical theocracy or simply Bibliocracy (Weber's word) and thus what Hume diagnoses as the Puritan 'madness with religious ecstasies' and Pareto detects as puritanical, moralistic 'insanity'. In this sense, not only the atavistic, ultra-conservative and evangelical South but virtually all of America appears as the 'Bible Belt'. Sixth and comparatively, by virtue of such a ritual, America under religious conservatism appears as equivalent to Iran and other Islamic theocracies. Thus, just as their US counterparts solemnly hold and promise to follow the Bible, Iranian Presidents and all political officials ritually pledge alliance to the Koran and thus enforce the latter's commandments and establish Islamic theocracy. In this respect, conservative religious 'American exceptionalism' actually becomes an equivalence or convergence with Islamic theocracies rather than being exceptional or greatly different in relation to the latter. Conversely, due the above ritual, America under religious conservatism reasserts itself with nationalist pride and joy as the polar opposite to the 'secularization regime' of Western Europe. To that extent, conservative religious 'American exceptionalism' manifests itself as an aberration or deviant case from Western civilization, while manifesting an equivalence with the Islamic and other non-Western world, making America a post- Western, third-world society in these terms, as especially the post-2016 period shows.

evil') and more broadly versus what can be termed the hedonic man of sensual pleasure- and in that sense happiness-seeking (Frey and Stutzer 2010; Mencken³² 1982; Phelps 2013).

Like the American counterpart, the 'new artificial man' of Soviet socialism is according to the creator a novel, exceptional, unique, superior and universal or general human in social time and space (Smirnov³³ 1980), the sole and genuine 'superman' in all history and society, with proper qualifications. Consequently, this second human type embodies and shows a Soviet form of 'exceptionalism, uniqueness and superiority' in space and time, including a non-religious proxy of 'manifest destiny' through the ideological mission to rule or control adjacent countries. Particularly, the Soviet 'new man' is for the inventor an exceptional, unique and superior human by comparison to and distinction from the capitalist or bourgeois 'old man' and more broadly that of class-divided society, including feudalism and slavery, by being the 'alternative to the bourgeois and every other kind of society based on exploitation' (Smirnov 1980). On the other hand, *homo soveticus* represents a reincarnation of the pure, uncorrupted primitive 'communist man' of prehistorical times and (as Pareto implies), to some degree, of the early 'Christian man', specifically that, as for Sorokin, conditioned by the Russian Orthodox Church. As with the American counterpart's creators, the socialist inventor produces this human type as novel, vigorous, rising, morally pure and practical, so superior to the second as old, weak, declining, decadent and, as Pareto puts it, with 'almost morbid' sensibility and sentimentality.

While greatly differing from and being supposedly unique and superior to all other human types and examples in history and society—except for that of primitive communism--the Soviet 'new man' is especially created to be an antithesis and substitution of the bourgeois 'old man' of capitalism, (Smirnov 1980) as well as to some extent of religion, with some variations, such as vestiges of the Russian Christian Orthodox Church (Sorokin 2006). In this sense, such a human type is fundamentally an anti-capitalist, anti-bourgeois and largely (but not invariably, as for Sorokin) anti-religious 'man', hence substantively an obverse of the American counterpart, while being formally identical as a novel, exceptional, superior species in these terms. Almost exactly like the American counterpart, the Soviet 'new man' is due to this supposed exceptionality, uniqueness and superiority a 'superman' and thus a 'master' of other 'men' and human species embodying the 'master-caste', although this claim to mastery is somewhat less overt, disciplined or pronounced than in the American counterpart. Using Schumpeter's terms, this is a 'superman' and 'master' *homo non-religiousus* (mainly) that is partly merged with *homo economicus* (at least in the sense of 'work is good' still) but in complicated or ambivalent relations with *homo eroticus* ('sex is shameful') and

32. Mencken (1982, p. 624-5) states that *Puritanism* is the 'haunting fear that someone, somewhere, may be happy', adding 'Show me a Puritan and I'll show you a (SOB).'

33. Smirnov (1980, p. 11) claims that the 'history of Soviet man as a socialist type of person despite his individuality and even uniqueness, contains certain essential features of a general nature that relate to the solution of the complex social problems involved in the formation of a new type of man in all countries of the world.'

generally the ‘hedonic man’, aside from some religious exceptions noted above (e.g., Christian Orthodox vestiges in Russia, as well as Catholic elements in Cuba and Poland, during socialism).

In passing, the ‘new artificial man’ American capitalism/conservatism and Soviet socialism as a ‘superman’ and especially a ‘master’ human type who embodies Michels’ ‘master-caste’ seemingly resemble to some extent the ‘new German man’ as the ‘master race’ in Nazism and more broadly traditional conservatism in Germany. Recall that Nazism presented itself as the ‘new conservatism’ and represented the extreme segment of ‘authoritarian rightism’, just as neo-Nazism is part of the conservative movement or the radical right today (Berezin 2019; Colantone and Stanig 2019; Mann 2004; Rydgren 2007). Notably, the claim to being a ‘master’ human type and the attempt at what Weber (1968) denotes Calvinist-type ‘mastery of the world’, including other societies, appear especially explicit, persistent and pronounced in the concept of the ‘new man’ of American capitalism/conservatism in Reagan’s ‘we are the best’ style and to that extent seem to evoke the notion of a ‘master race’ of Nazism (Bonikowski and DiMaggio 2016; Bourdieu³⁴ 1998; Munch 2001; Savelsberg and King 2005). If the latter is a ‘fantastic notion’, as the US President F. D. Roosevelt decried it, the same designation applies to the concept of the ‘new man’ of American capitalism/conservatism perpetually and to some degree of Soviet socialism transiently, as a ‘superman’ and ‘master’ or an emanation of the ‘master-caste’ (Dahl 1985). And the word ‘fantastic’ anticipates the destiny—namely, what Weber would call the ‘adverse fate’--of both the American and Soviet ‘new artificial man’, as elaborated next by constructing and calculating corresponding indexes for the US and Russia and thus by implication American capitalism/conservatism and Soviet socialism, respectively.

3. A ‘New Man’ Index and its Components

This section constructs a substantive index of the ‘new man’ in the American and Soviet version as the aggregate measure of such a shared ideal or perfect human type (not literally a new man). The ‘new man’ index comprises as its components a certain number of indicators and proxies of this human construct. Specifically, the index is the aggregate of the following indicators and proxies of the American and Soviet ‘new man’.

(1) Low imprisonment. This is a shared indicator or proxy of both the American and Soviet ‘new man’. As a saint, sinless creature, puritan, simply angel, the American and Soviet ‘new man’ does not commit crime and sin and therefore is not imprisoned and otherwise punished by the state as their political inventor or reproducer. Consequently, low and indeed no imprisonment would

34. Bourdieu (1998, p. 35) implies this by stating that ‘it is characteristic of conservative revolutions, that in Germany in the 1930s, those of Thatcher, Reagan (etc.) that they present restorations as revolutions. If this conservative revolution can deceive people, this is because it seems to retain nothing of the old Black Forest pastoral of the conservative revolutionaries (fascists) of the 1930s; it is dressed up in all the signs of modernity.’

indicate and typify the American and Soviet ‘new man’ or the state inventors of this convergent construct. It follows that American capitalism/conservatism such as conservative America and Soviet socialism or its descendant, post-socialist Russia should have low and indeed minimal prison population rates. Further, since the American and Soviet ‘new man’ is in historical and comparative terms an exceptional and superior human type, simply a ‘superman’, both systems or states should feature indeed the lowest prison population rates in history and across societies such as OECD countries. To estimate whether this expectation is correct, prison population rates (per 100,000 population) are available for the US and other OECD countries as well as for Russia in 2019 (see Table 1S). The source of cross-national prison population rates is the International Centre for Prison Studies. If the US and Russia indeed really have the lowest prison population rates among contemporary societies, this will validate the construction of the American and Soviet or Russian ‘new man’ as a crimeless and sinless angel and thus vindicate the constructors. Conversely, if the two turn out to have the highest prison population rates, this will invalidate their shared construct and fail to vindicate the constructors. Such prison population rates will reflect either actual crimes and sins that ‘new man’ commits or the suspicion of the latter as potentially committing them—especially because of ‘original sin’ for the American ‘new man’--thus in both cases invalidating the construct and not vindicating the constructors, with that distrust of humans generating the US ‘less crime, more punishment’ outcome (Cooney and Burt 2008).

(2) No death sentences and executions. This is another common indicator or proxy of the American and Soviet ‘new man’. Even more than regarding crime and sin generally, both the American and Soviet ‘new man’ as a saint/angel does not commit murder and hence is not sentenced to death and executed by their inventor, the state. Especially, as a Puritan saint and Christian angel, the American ‘new man’ does not and pronounce ‘thou shall not kill’ and therefore is not subject to punishment by death by the human-inventing state to which this religious commandment conceivably also applies. In consequence, rare and indeed no death sentences and executions would identify and define both the American and Soviet ‘new man’, especially the first, or their state inventors, all supposedly being bound by the non-killing stipulation in religious or nonreligious formulations (Mueller³⁵ 2009). This signifies that American capitalism or conservative America and Soviet socialism or post-socialist Russia should have low and indeed minimal or zero numbers of death sentences and executions. Furthermore, both systems, especially the first given the ‘shall not kill’ religious injunction, should display the lowest

35. Mueller (2009, p. 394) also suggests this by observing that the ‘US stands out as a dramatic outlier (in) the homicide rate. Attending church regularly and believing that God is very important to their lives does not appear to make Americans less likely to murder one another than people in other rich countries but quite the reverse. One reason for the high homicide rates in the US is, of course, the Constitution Second Amendment, which makes it easier for Americans to acquire guns than in most other developed countries. This does not save the hypothesis that religion makes people behave morally, however, because a religious person who believes that God forbids killing should presumably not use a gun to kill his neighbor just because he owns one.’

numbers of death sentences and executions in history and among contemporary societies such as OECD countries in light of the American and Soviet ‘new man’ being historically and comparatively an exceptional and superior human-angel. In the aim of estimating such an expectation, numbers of ‘recorded executions, recorded death sentences and people known to be under sentence of death’ are available for the US and other OECD countries and for Russia at the end of 2019 (see Table 2S). The source of these data is Amnesty International Global Report, Death Sentences and Executions. As before, if the US and Russia actually have zero or the lowest numbers of death sentences and executions among OECD countries, this will reaffirm the invention of the American and Soviet or Russian ‘new man’ as a non-killing angel and thus the inventors. Conversely, if they show to actually have the highest numbers of death sentences and executions among these countries, this will contradict the invention and inventors. As with prison population rates, death sentences and executions contradict the invention and inventors by expressing actual murderous acts by the ‘new man’ or the distrust of the latter through the state sentencing to death and executing innocent people, as witnessed chronically in conservative America, including the evangelical South (the ‘Bible Belt’), judging by DNA and other post facto evidence (as the Innocence Project documents).

(3) No political terror. This is a related shared indicator or proxy of the American and Soviet ‘new man’. Like in the previous cases, by virtue of being a saint/angel, both the American and Soviet ‘new man’ does not commit any other offenses, including acts of terrorism or violence, and thus does not deserve to be or is not subjected to ‘political terror’ by the state through committing multiple systematic violations of human rights such as disappearance, indefinite detention, police brutality and murders, torture and others, along with mass imprisonment and widespread death sentences or executions that are politically motivated. Especially, the American ‘new man’ as a Puritan saint and Christian angel who follows the Biblical double-edged sword warning does not commit any violent offenses and so does not suffer from state ‘political terror’ as a provoked or unprovoked violent response for which this admonition conceivably also holds. As a result, what would indicate and characterize the American and Soviet ‘new man’ alike, more precisely their state inventors, is no political terror since they all act according to the non-violence precept, including the double-edged sword admonition in the first case. This presumably translates into American capitalism and Soviet socialism having low and indeed minimal levels of ‘political terror’. Moreover, given that the American and Soviet ‘new man’ is an exceptional and superior human-angel historically and comparatively, conservative America and post-communist Russia should evince the lowest levels of ‘political terror’ over their populations in history and especially among contemporary societies such as OECD countries. To check this expectation, ‘political terror’ estimates are available for the US and other OECD countries and for Russia in 2018 (see Table 3S). The source of such estimates is the Political Terror Scale (i.e., Amnesty International’s or Human Rights Watch’s larger scores) that has five levels with an ascending intensity, defining political terror as ‘state-sanctioned killings, torture,

disappearances and political imprisonment' (Gibney et al. 2019). The validation of the invented American and Russian 'new man' as a non-violent angel and so of the inventors will occur if the US and Russia possess the lowest levels of 'political terror' among OECD countries. On the other hand, their invalidation will happen if the two in fact manifest the comparatively high levels of 'political terror' among these countries. As with prison population rates and death sentences and executions, high levels of 'political terror' invalidate the invented human type and inventors in that they respond to actual violence by or distrust the 'new man' as capable of committing such acts by the state terrorizing innocent people by association, for example, associating them with 'original sin' that their ancestors supposedly committed in the American religious case.

(4) No death penalty for drug offenses. This is an additional common indicator or proxy of the American and Soviet 'new man' that evidently relates to and specifies the lack of death sentences and executions as well as of 'political terror'. By being a sinless, puritan, human angel, the American and Soviet 'new man' does not use or trade in drugs, specifically those that the state in both American capitalism and Soviet socialism arbitrarily criminalizes as illicit and punishes their production, possession, consumption and trading, thus not being subjected to the death penalty for drug offenses. Above all, the American 'new man' as a sinless Puritan or evangelical and Christian angel never commits these and related sins, including prostitution and others, that the US Puritanical government redefines and severely punishes as grave crimes by coercively imposing its own type of morality, as neither does to some extent the Soviet 'new man' whose state is similarly moralistic and coercive in this respect. Accordingly, the absence of the effective and even symbolic application of the death penalty for drug offenses indicates and identifies the American and Soviet 'new man' alike or their inventors. As a result, American capitalism/conservatism and Soviet socialism should evince no actual or symbolic application of the death penalty for drug offenses. Moreover, both systems should be the only ones to have this feature in history and among contemporary societies given that the American and Soviet 'new man' is an exceptional and superior sinless human. To see how correct this expectation is, the information on the death penalty for drug offenses is available for the US, other OECD countries and Russia in 2019 (see Table 4S). The source of this information is the International Harm Reduction Association that also states that the 'imposition of a death sentence following conviction for a drug offence (not involving intentional killing) in proceedings which fail to meet international standards of fairness compounds the violations of the rights of the individual to life, to a fair trial, and to be free from torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.' If the US and Russia indeed are the only ones to not apply the death penalty for drug offenses among contemporary societies, this will validate the constructed American and Soviet or Russian 'new man' as a sinless angel not taking and trading in drugs and vindicate the constructors. Inversely, if they prove to engage instead in the effective or symbolic application the death penalty for drug offenses, this will invalidate their angelic construct and contradict the constructors. As before, such an application of the death penalty

will manifest either actual drug offenses committed by or the distrust of the 'new man' as willing to commit them (due to 'original sin' in the American case), as through potential executions of innocent 'offenders', thus failing to validate the construct and to vindicate the constructors in both scenarios.

(5) No share of drug offenders of total prisoners. This is yet another shared indicator or proxy of the American and Soviet 'new man' relating to and specifying low imprisonment, as well as no death penalty for drug offenses. Because the American and Soviet 'new man' as a sinless puritan does not produce, consume and distribute drugs that their state inventor prohibits and punishes drug offenders with imprisonment at least, they form small and indeed no part of total prisoners. As a consequence, the low and indeed zero share of drug and related sinful offenders of total prisoners would help detect and define the American and Soviet 'new man' alike or their state inventors. This yields the expectation that American capitalism/conservatism and Soviet socialism should have such low and even zero shares of drug offenders of the prisoner population. Moreover, because the American and Soviet 'new man' is historically and comparatively an exceptional and superior sinless puritan, especially the first, these opposite systems should have indeed the lowest shares in history and especially among contemporary societies such as OECD countries. To verify such expectations, estimates for the share of drug offenders of the total prison population are available for the US, other OECD countries and Russia in 2019-2020 (see Table 5S). These estimates derive from the US figure (around 20% at the prisoner rate of 655) in a proportionate manner (a rate half lower yield an estimate of 10% and so on). The source of the US share of drug offenders of the total prison population in 2020 is the Prison Policy Initiative that also reports that this share is 44 percent of federal prisoners. As previously, if the US and Russia indeed have the lowest shares of drug offenders of the total prison population, this will reaffirm the American and Soviet 'new man' and the inventors, and conversely, their highest or high share will be disconfirming evidence in this respect. As with the death penalty for drug offenses, imprisonment for such offenses can express either effective or possible sinful acts of the 'new man' and thus disconfirm this invention and its inventors in any scenario.

(6) Strong civic peace. This is an additional common indicator or proxy of the American and Soviet 'new man' that especially relates to low imprisonment and the absence of death sentences and executions and of political terror. Both the American and Soviet 'new man' by virtue of being a saint/angel is a peaceful human type and therefore helps establish and sustain strong civic peace in society. Consequently, peacefulness and strong civic peace in society would indicate and feature the American and Soviet 'new man' and their inventors, respectively. Therefore, American capitalism or conservative America and Soviet socialism or Russia should exhibit strong and even maximal civic peace. Furthermore, both systems or countries should attain and sustain the strongest civic peace among contemporary societies like OECD countries since the American and Soviet 'new man' is historically and comparatively an exceptional and superior human-saint, thus the most peaceful 'superman.' For the sake of verifying such expectations,

peace, more precisely peace disturbance, indexes are available for the US, other OECD countries and Russia during 2020 (see Table 6S). The source of such indexes is the Institute for Economics and Peace characterizing the Global Peace Index as a measure of the 'state of peace using three thematic domains: the level of Societal Safety and Security; the extent of Ongoing Domestic and International Conflict; and the degree of Militarisation.' If the US and Russia indeed evince among the lowest peace disturbance indexes, this will validate the American and Soviet 'new man' and the inventors, and conversely, if they turn out to instead have the highest or comparatively high indexes, they will be invalidating in this regard. Strong (weak) civic peace in the US and Russia almost invariably reflects the peacefulness (lack thereof) of the American and Soviet 'new man', respectively.

(7) Low gun ownership. This is a further shared indicator or at least ideal and proxy of the American and especially Soviet 'new man' particularly relating to strong civic peace, as well as low imprisonment and the lack of death sentences and executions and of political terror. As a saint/angel, notably a peaceful 'superman', the American and Soviet 'new man' does not need and want to own guns for the sake of personal defense from, let alone attacks on, other humans, except for unrelated sporting purposes (hunting, fishing, etc.). Especially, despite the supposed constitutional right to 'bear arms', capitalism's mass production and conservatism's celebration of universal gun ownership, the American 'new man' does not really necessitate and desire them for defense ('stand your ground') by being the supreme Christian saint/angel--who knows well the double-edged sword' from reading the Bible--and thus the most peaceful 'superman', just as the physically strongest human ever, and because the US conservative police-warfare state will provide total protection from aggressors. It follows that low gun ownership characterize both the American and Soviet 'new man' so long as the latter is a genuine saint/angel in the sense of a peaceful 'superman' who projecting own attributes also regards other humans as equivalents who do not need, want or use guns for their defense, apart from sporting activities. As a result, American capitalism or conservative America and Soviet socialism or Russia should manifest low gun ownership so long as they invent the American and Soviet 'new man' as a peace-loving saint/angel within society. Since the American and Soviet 'new man' is a superior human, including the most peaceful 'superman,' in time and space, both systems or countries should have the lowest gun ownership at least for the manifest or latent purpose of self-defense (vs. hunting) among OECD countries. In order to check this expectation, gun ownership rates are available for the US and other OECD countries during 2007 (the latest year for which data are available for most of them) and Russia in 2017 (see Table 7S). The source of gun ownership rates for the US and other OECD countries is the Small Arms Survey and for Russia GunPolicy.org, by providing average rates of civilian gun ownership, such as guns owned per 100 people. If the US and Russia indeed have among the lowest gun ownership rates, they will vindicate the American and Soviet 'new man' and the constructors, and vice versa, their highest or comparatively high rates will be negating evidence in this respect. Low gun ownership will invariably mirror the peacefulness of the American and Soviet

'new man' as the most peaceful 'superman', and conversely, such high ownership mirroring the opposite trait.

(8) No murders by firearms. This common indicator or ideal and proxy of the American and Soviet 'new man' evidently derives from low gun ownership and also relates with strong civic peace, low imprisonment, the absence of death sentences and executions and of political terror. As indicated, the American and Soviet 'new man' as a saint/angel does not and will not kill other human beings and hence does not commit murders by firearms, also because not needing and wanting them to possess for self-defense (and by definition attack. Especially, the American 'new man' as a supreme Christian saint/angel follows the Biblical commandment that one 'should not kill' other humans, not committing murders by firearms as indeed unnecessary for such angels in terms of defense, while expecting others to also refrain from doing so by projecting own attributes onto them. As a consequence, low murders by firearms typify both the American and Soviet 'new man' as a non-killing, human-loving angel. This generates the expectation that American capitalism or conservative America and Soviet socialism or Russia should have no or low murders by firearms. Moreover, they should display the lowest murders by firearms among all societies since the American and Soviet 'new man' is a superior human, the most peaceful 'superman' in terms of non-killing. To examine such an expectation, murders by arms rates are available for the US, other OECD countries and Russia in 2017 or latest year (see Table 8S). The source of these data is DATAUNODC for the US and other OECD countries and GunPolicy.org for Russia supplying homicide rates by firearms per 100,000 population. Low homicide rates by firearms will invariably reflect the peacefulness of the American and Soviet 'new man' as the paradigmatic peaceful 'superman', and vice versa, such high rates reflecting the opposite attribute.

Taken together, the American and Soviet 'new man' qualitative index is the aggregate of the following components: 1 low imprisonment, 2 no death sentences and executions, 3 no political terror, 4 no death penalty for drug offenses, 5 no share of drug offenders of total prisoners, 6. strong civic peace, 7 low gun ownership and 8 no murders by firearms (See Table 1 and Figure 1).

4 Results

The ensuing presents the results of an exploratory substantive empirical analysis such as quantitative 'new man' aggregate indexes for the US, other Western and comparable societies such as OECD countries, as well as Russia. (An appendix gives the results of preliminary statistical analyses involving a correlation matrix and a confirmatory factor analysis.)

Table 2 reports 'new man' quantitative aggregate indexes, along with their components, for the US, other OECD countries and Russia. For uniformity, these indexes and their components are standardized coefficients such as standard scores expressed in standard deviations from the mean. Such indexes are hence the aggregate or average of 8 components such as the above indicators and proxies transformed into standard scores. Index calculation proceeds by first standardizing the indicators and proxies (Columns x1-x8), then aggregating them as standard

scores (Column 'Total'), dividing the aggregate by 8 and multiplying it by -1 to obtain the correct sign of the index (Column 'Index') and lastly multiplying the result by 100 for convenience (Column 'Index * 100').

Table 2 (in Columns x1-x8) gives the 8 indicators and proxies of the 'new man' index as standard scores, so standard deviations from the mean. Focusing on the US and Russia and comparing them with OECD countries, these scores show the following. First, the US prison population rate as a standard score (x1) shows that it is 4.46 standard deviations above the mean and thus almost 4.5 times higher than the OECD average. Also, Russia's prison population rate indicates that it is 1.7 standard deviations above the mean and so nearly 2 times higher than the OECD average. Taken together, the US has the highest prison population rate (655 per 100,000) among all OECD countries and Russia the third highest (341) if included in the latter, following Turkey (with 344). By comparison and sharp contrast, Iceland's and Japan's prison population rates as standard scores (-.98, -.96, respectively) are around 1 standard deviation below and thus equivalently lower than the OECD average and so on. In absolute numbers, the US prison population rate turns out to be around 18 times higher than that of Iceland (37), that of Russia just over 9 times higher and so on. To that extent, this result patently invalidates the concept of the American and Soviet 'new man', especially the first, as the crimeless/sinless angel who is thus hardly ever imprisoned, and hence contradicts their inventors, US capitalism/conservatism and Russian socialism, respectively.

Second, the US's number of death sentences and executions as a standard score (x2) statistically signifies that it is 5.91 standard deviations above the mean and hence nearly 6 times higher than the OECD average. In substantive terms, this expresses the fact that the US features by far the highest number of death sentences and executions (2638) among OECD countries (followed by large distance by Japan with 126 and South Korea with 61) and is even the only Western country to apply capital punishment at all. On the other hand, Russia's standard score statistically indicates that its number is .18 standard deviations below the mean and so correspondingly lower than the OECD average and substantively that it does not actually apply the death penalty in common with most OECD countries but in contrast to the US. In this regard, the result flagrantly violates the construct of the American 'new man' as a Christian angel always acting according to the 'shall not kill' Biblical injunction--assuming that capital punishment applies to actual killings rather than to innocent persons as one often witnesses in the US penal system--and discredits the constructor, US capitalism or religious conservatism. By contrast, the opposite apparently holds for the constructed the Soviet or rather post-Soviet Russian 'new man' and the respective constructor, not considering the frequent application of the death penalty during socialism for which data are unavailable.

Third, the US's other 'political terror' standard score (x3) shows that it is 1.43 standard deviations above the mean and thus almost 1.5 times higher than the OECD average. Similarly, Russia's score indicates that it is 2.44 standard deviations above the mean and so nearly 2.5 times higher than the OECD average.

Together, the US has the fourth highest other 'political terror' level (3) among all OECD countries, after Israel, Mexico, Turkey (all having 4), and Russia the single highest (4), along with these three cases, if included. In absolute numbers the US's level is exactly twice the OECD average (1.5), and Russia's just over 2.5 times higher. If so, the result evidently negates the invention of the American and Soviet 'new man' as a nonviolent angel who never commits terrorism and so is not subjected to state terror--assuming that the latter responds to the former rather than operating independently according to its own logic, as often witnessed in both systems--and thus compromises the respective inventors, US capitalism or conservatism and Russian socialism.

Fourth, as a variation on death sentences and executions overall, the US's death penalty for drug offenses score (x4) statistically means that it is 4.13 standard deviations above the mean and thus just over 4 times higher than the OECD average. Substantively, this reflects the fact the US is the only Western society and even OECD country (together with South Korea) to provide for the application--even if 'symbolic' but constantly threatened to be effective--of the death penalty for drug and thus non-violent criminal or sinful offenses. In turn, Russia's score statistically conveys that it is .24 standard deviations below the mean and so analogously lower than the OECD average but substantively suggests this country does not in fact provide for the effective or symbolic application of the death penalty for drug offenses like most OECD countries and unlike the US. On this account, the result again patently invalidates the invented American 'new man' as a Christian sinless angel never committing drug-sins and so not potentially subject to the death penalty for drug offenses, thus discrediting the constructor, US capitalism or religious conservatism. By contrast, the opposite may apply to the constructed Soviet or rather post-Soviet Russian 'new man' and the respective constructor, not taking account of socialism's probable application of the death penalty for drug offenses for which data are unavailable.

Fifth and replicating prison population rates, the US's share of drug offenders of total prisoners as a standard score (x5) shows that it is 4.46 standard deviations above the mean and so nearly 4.5 times higher than the OECD average. Similarly, Russia's share indicates that it is 1.7 standard deviations above the mean and thus almost twice the OECD average. Altogether, the US has the highest actual share of drug offenders of total prisoners (19.86) among all OECD countries and Russia is estimated to have the third highest (10.34) if counted among them after Turkey (with an estimate of 10.43). In comparison and stark contrast, reflecting their prison population rates, Iceland's and Japan's estimated shares of drug offenders of total prisoners (standard scores -.98, -.96, respectively) are about 1 standard deviation below and so correspondingly lower than the OECD average estimate and so forth. Hence, absolutely, the US actual share of drug offenders of total prisoners is about 18 times higher than the estimate for Iceland (1.12), while Russia's estimated share being 9 times larger and so forth. In this light, the result evidently invalidates the created American and Soviet 'new man', particularly the first as a Christian sinless angel who neither commits drug sins-as-crimes nor is imprisoned for such offences, thus discrediting their creators, US capitalism or

conservatism and Russian socialism, respectively.

Sixth and related to the first three results, the US's peace index negative as a standard score (x6) shows that it is 1.32 standard deviations above the mean and thus 1.3 times higher than the OECD average of civic peace disruption. Also, Russia's peace index negative indicates that it is 2.87 standard deviations above the mean and so nearly three times the OECD peace disruption average. Together, the US has the fourth highest peace index negative in absolute terms (2.31) among all OECD countries--and indeed the highest within the Western world--while Russia having the single highest (3.05) if placed among them. By comparison and strong contrast, for example, Iceland's peace index negative as a standard score is 1.26 standard deviation below and so equivalently lower than the OECD average and so on. In absolute terms, the US's peace index negative is just over two times (2.17) higher than that of Iceland (1.08), Russia's nearly 3 (2.8) times larger and so forth. Accordingly, the above result obviously invalidates the manufactured American and Soviet or post-Soviet Russian 'new man' as a peaceful Christian and communist or other angel, respectively, who sustains and never disrupts civic peace in society, and hence compromises their respective manufactures, US capitalism or conservatism and Russian socialism.

Seventh and connected with civic peace disruption, the US's gun ownership rate as a standard score (x7) shows that it is 4.19 standard deviations above the mean and so just over 4 times higher than the OECD average. In turn, Russia's gun ownership rate indicates that it is .37 standard deviations below the mean and so almost .4 times lower than the OECD average. Taken together, the US has the single highest gun ownership rate (88.8 guns per 100 persons) among Western societies and even all OECD countries, while that of Russia (12.3) being at the lower or middle range. Especially, in absolute numbers, the US's gun ownership rate is nearly 5 (4.77) times higher than the OECD average (18.6). This result clearly invalidates the produced American 'new man' insofar as the latter is a Christian angel who does not need and use guns for self-defense from, let alone offence against, other humans, aside from sporting activities, and hence discredits the producer, US capitalism or conservatism. By contrast, the result unexpectedly has opposite implications for the Soviet or post-Soviet Russian 'new man' and the producer, Russian socialism.

Lastly and as a corollary of gun ownership, the US's murders by firearms rate as a standard score (x8) shows that it is .95 standard deviations above the mean and thus equivalently higher than the OECD average. Russia's firearm homicide rate indicates that it is just .03 standard deviations above the mean and so analogously higher than the OECD average. Altogether, the US has the single highest murders by firearms rate among Western societies and the second highest (3.4 per 100,000 population) among all OECD countries, only after that of Mexico (16.5), while Russia's rate is largely in the middle. Notably, in absolute numbers, the US's rate is just over 4 (4.19) times higher than the OECD average (.81), while that of Russia (.9) is slightly more than 10 (11.1) percent larger. Consequently, the above result patently invalidates primarily the reinvented American 'new man' as a Christian angel who does not kill other humans for whatever reasons by

firearms as otherwise redundant and secondarily the Soviet or post-Soviet Russian 'new man' with similar traits, and thus discredits their respective inventors, US capitalism or conservatism and Russian socialism.

Overall, the US ranks substantially above the OECD average on what are the negatives (i.e., negative reciprocals or inverses) of all the 8 indicators and proxies of the American 'new man', ranging from mass imprisonment, widespread death sentences and executions, severe other 'political terror', the application of the death penalty for drug offenses and the large share of drug offenders of total prisoners to weak civic peace, pervasive gun ownership and high murders by firearms rates. To that extent, all these results patently and strongly invalidate the creation of the American 'new man' and hence discredit the creator, US capitalism or conservatism. In turn, Russia ranks significantly above the OECD average on 4 negatives of the 8 indicators and proxies of the Soviet or post-Soviet Russian 'new man', such as wide imprisonment, severe other 'political terror', the large share of drug offenders of total prisoners and weak civic peace, while ranking marginally above the mean on 1 negative, high murders by firearms rates, and slightly below the mean on the other 3 negatives. On this account, the results at least partially invalidate the construct of the Soviet or post-Soviet Russian 'new man' and thus compromise the constructor, Russian socialism or post-socialism. Evidently, the results so far provide primarily invalidating and discrediting suggestive evidence against the realism or viability of the American 'new man' as a Puritan saint and secondarily versus that of the Soviet or post-Soviet Russian 'new man' as a communist or post-communist puritan.

As a corollary, Table 2 (in Columns Total, Index and Index * 100) provides 'new man' aggregate indexes for the US, other OECD countries and Russia. First, aggregating the 'new man' negative or inverse indicators and proxies standardized into standard scores generates equivalent total scores ('Total') for these countries. Then dividing these totals by the number of indicators yields 'new man' aggregate indexes in standard scores as averages of 8 components, which are multiplied by -1 to obtain their proper, positive sign reflecting the concept of the 'new man' as a positive construct whose high indexes express and validate it, and conversely. Lastly, these aggregate indexes are further multiplied by 100 (Index * 100) for convenience. Concentrating on the US and Russia in comparison with other OECD countries reveals the following.

First, the US has the single lowest--and indeed the largest negative--aggregate 'new man' index (-335.64 when multiplied by 100) among Western and comparable societies and even all OECD countries. This index hence reflects and summarizes the US's lowest rankings on most (5) of the 'new man' indicators and proxies by ranking the highest on the equal number of their negatives and, overall, substantially above the OECD average on all of them. Specifically, the US's index indicates that its 'new man' degree lies 3.36 standard deviations below the mean and thus is over 3 times lower than the OECD average. To that extent, the index dramatically invalidates the reinvented American 'new man' as a superior human type among all societies and discredits the inventors and their claim to the universal superiority of their invention. Counterfactually, if their invention were

a universally superior 'man', the US's index should have been instead the largest positive value such as the same or similar number of standard deviations above the mean and thus equivalently higher than the OECD average, but is actually the highest with a negative sign indicating the exact opposite.

Second, Russia has the third lowest or third highest negative aggregate 'new man' index (-99.55 when multiplied by 100) if counted among OECD countries, only after that of the US as well as of Mexico (-120.5). Its index therefore expresses and condenses Russia's lowest rankings on some (2) of the 'new man' indicators and proxies by ranking the highest on the same number of their negatives as well as significantly or marginally above the OECD average on others (3). For illustration, Russia's index suggests that its 'new man' degree is .99 standard deviations below the mean and hence correspondingly lower than the OECD average. On this account, the index mostly invalidates the constructed Soviet (or post-Soviet Russian) 'new man' as a superior human and compromises the creators so long as they claim universal superiority for their construct. Counterfactually, if their construct were a superior 'man', Russia's index instead of actually being the third lowest and negative casting doubt on that claim should have been a large positive value such as the above or other number of standard deviations above the mean and thus correspondingly higher than the OECD average.

Third, by comparison and sharp contrast, for example, Japan has the single highest and positive aggregate 'new man' index that is .59 standard deviations above the mean and hence around .6 times higher than the OECD average. Next, the Netherlands, Denmark and Iceland have the second, third and fourth highest indexes by being .5, .48 and .47 standard deviations, respectively, above the mean and thus .5 or so times higher than the OECD average, and so on. Thus, compared with these and indeed most other OECD countries (30), the US's and Russia's aggregate 'new man' indexes are not just quantitatively lower, if there were positive, but different and opposite in quality or substantively by being negative and large ones. Alternatively, the US and Russia are the only cases with negative 'new man' indexes, along with just 5 other OECD countries (Chile -14.03, Korea -34.21, Israel -63.69, Turkey -97.51 and Mexico -120.5). This result dramatically casts doubt on the American primarily and Soviet 'new man' secondarily as a superior human type and thus contradicts their producers' claims to universal superiority for their product across all societies.

In general, 'new man' aggregate indexes patently invalidate the concepts and projects of the American and Soviet 'new man' as a superior human among all societies and discredit their inventors and their claim to superiority for their inventions. Especially, the US's by far lowest and negative index flagrantly violates the concept and project of the American 'new man' as a Puritan 'superman' across all social space and time and compromises its creators and their superiority claim for their supposedly exceptional creation.

5 Discussion

The preceding results permit the following discussion and inferences or impressions. First, in light of these results, both the American and Soviet 'new

man' seem to experience a kind of adverse fate in contemporary society. More precisely, the act of inventing of such a human type by such inventors as American capitalism/conservatism and Soviet socialism seems to end in or move toward a clear and complete failure. Especially, reinventing the American 'new man' as a Puritan saint, Christian angel and 'superman' in all space and time looks or qualifies as a dismal and total failure in view of the above results, notably the US's incomparably lowest aggregate 'new man' index or conversely its highest and generally high rankings on most of the negatives of the latter's components, such as mass imprisonment, widespread death sentences and executions, severe other 'political terror', the application of the death penalty for drug offenses, the large share of drug offenders of total prisoners, weak civic peace, pervasive gun ownership, and high murders by firearms rates. This holds, although seemingly to a lesser extent, for inventing the Soviet or post-Soviet Russian 'new man' as a communist or post-communist angel, puritan and superhuman, given Russia's third lowest index or conversely its highest and otherwise high rankings on some of the latter's negative components such as wide imprisonment, severe other 'political terror', the large share of drug offenders of total prisoners and weak civic peace. In view of these strongly disconfirming results, the American and Soviet 'new man' share the same adverse destiny, just as sharing many common attributes as a convergent human type, and in that sense are fallen angels and failed 'brothers in arms' manifesting the abysmal failure of reinvention of humans by their ambitious and pretentious inventors. In short, these results confirm that both the American and Soviet 'new man' are failed or spurious inventions by incompetent or overzealous inventors.

It is not only their strikingly low and large negative 'new man' aggregate indexes that in themselves indicate the patent and whole failure of reinventing the American and Soviet 'new man'. Also, comparing their indexes with those of comparable Western and other societies such as OECD countries reveals the magnitude and severity of the failure of such convergent human reinvention in comparative terms. Thus, the US features the single lowest, more precisely the largest negative, 'new man' aggregate index not only among Western societies but also all OECD countries, along with Russia. This is clear and strong sign that the project of reinventing the American 'new man' not only seems to fail but most superbly or spectacularly so compared to other comparable societies, notably the Western world. Similarly, but to a lesser extent, Russia features the third lowest, or third largest negative, 'new man' aggregate index if counted among OECD countries, thus lower only after those of the US and Mexico. Analogously, this is also a clear and strong signal that the blueprint of inventing the Soviet 'new man' has been a near-complete failure as that of the American variant by comparison to these countries, especially the Western world.

Moreover, the fact that the US and Russia are the only societies, together with merely five other OECD countries, with negative aggregate indexes indicate the extent to which their shared reinventing of the 'new man' fails in this comparative broader setting. Furthermore, their negative and large indexes substantively suggest that not only these societies fail to reinvent such a new human type but that

the unintended and indeed perverse outcome ('latent function') of their attempted reinvention of humans is an exact opposite—a negative of the American and Soviet 'new man.' This simply means that most real-life, flesh and blood Americans and Russians turn out to deviate from and act opposite to the reinvented American and Soviet 'new man', respectively. At this juncture, the problem for the latter and their putative creators is not only that the US and Russia share the lowest 'new man' aggregate indexes which, if they positive, may just contradict the claim that this human type is superior across societies and time alike. An even more serious problem is that their indexes are negative and large ones and to that extent negate the very concept and existence of this type and suggest the inverse or reversal of the American and Soviet 'new man' in the form of actual non-Puritan, non-angelic Americans and non-puritan, non-communist Russians.

Hence, it is a perverse or highly ironic result that the US and Russia as the respective creators of the American and Soviet 'new man' belong to those few (7) OECD countries that effectively negate this construct by their negative aggregate indexes. In this connection, it appears as if American capitalism or conservatism and Soviet socialism only attempted to reinvent but did not implement the concept of the 'new man' instead leaving the implementation to other societies, except for these five OECD countries with negative indexes as well. This may or may not express and evoke Weber's Puritan-rooted 'pure hypocrisy' of 'Americanism' and is analogue in Soviet socialism, but it is evident that neither of these two systems or countries implements the concept of the American and Soviet 'new man', respectively, but instead unwittingly leads to the opposite as their shared perverse effect judging by their negative indexes. Especially, the US's by far largest negative index implies that the real-life 'American character' may well be—or is construed and punished by ruling conservatism and evangelical theocracy—as a complete antithesis of and in rebellion against the American 'new man' as a Puritan saint or Christian angel. This also applies, albeit perhaps to a lesser extent in view of the lower negative index, to the actual 'Russian soul' in relation, specifically in opposition to the Soviet 'new man' as a communist puritan.

Finally, in a perverse turn of fate or ironic twist, the 'new man' which American capitalism/conservatism and Soviet socialism aim to invent is more likely to appear in societies outside the US and Russia than in the latter judging by their aggregate indexes. For example, considering their positive and five highest aggregate indexes, Japan, the Netherlands, Denmark, Iceland and Ireland are more likely to comprise the 'new man' especially as a peaceful human type than the US and Russia as the claimed inventors. This remarkable finding only reaffirms that their shared attempt to reinvent and generalize the American and Soviet 'new man' turns out to be a dismal failure compared to these other societies. Alternatively, it suggests that the latter are closer or have more potential to realize the ideal of the 'new man' as such a human type than the former. Thus, aside from Japan, Western Europe overall appears by its indexes the most fertile or likely social space in the 'new man' can develop and act especially as a non-violent human type.

The preceding reopens the question of whether the very existence of these parameters attests to the tendency that the image of a citizen of the future global

world is developing and spreading in the public mind³⁶. In that emerging world, political differences and ideological contradictions (i.e., -isms such as capitalism, socialism, communism, conservatism, liberalism) may well finally be superseded or relegated into irrelevance. (In passing, this is the world citizen and integral society that Pitirim Sorokin envisioned through primarily selfless love as in his view the only social force capable of overcoming lies, violence, and crime inherent in current society.)

6 Conclusion

In essence, the inventing of the ‘new man’ as a novel perfect human type by American capitalism or rather conservatism and Soviet communism or more exactly socialism is at least a doubly dubious endeavor—first, utopian, second, totalitarian. First, the inventing the American and Soviet ‘new man’ alike proves to be a utopian endeavor. More precisely, so long as normal realistic utopias can exist and even become eventually realities, it is an extremely utopian and thus deeply unrealistic and futile attempt that is predestined to fail dismally facing social reality. Judging by the empirical results, the adverse fate of both the American and Soviet ‘new man’ in the sense of the abject failure of their respective inventors, American capitalism/conservatism and Soviet socialism confirms Scheler’s early observations noted above.

More specifically, this failure completely reaffirms that Calvinist-Puritan Protestantism due to its extreme ‘distrust of natural man as completely corrupted by original sin’ purports and indeed produces ‘a new artificial man’ and in that sense a utopian, unrealistic human type as the presumed opposite. At this point, the reinvention of the American ‘new man’ evidently epitomizes and perpetuates this Protestant production of ‘a new artificial man’ driven by the intense moral suspicion of ‘natural man’ and inspired by the theological dogma of human corruption by ‘original sin’ (Stenhouse³⁷ 2012). By contrast, the inventing the Soviet ‘new man’ has non-religious driving forces such as communist moral purism but shares utopian overtones with its Protestant counterpart by also essentially involving the ‘production of a new artificial man’ from pre-Soviet capitalist ‘natural man’, minus ‘original sin’ (Dahl³⁸ 1985). Taken together, the invention of the American and Soviet ‘new man’ is hence the creation of a utopian and in that sense fantastic human type as the shared ideal of American capitalism/

36. I credit an anonymous reviewer for these remarks.

37. Stenhouse (2012, p. 150) observes that the ‘struggle of the natural man against that inhuman crystalline vision of the total depravity of the flesh and the rigid holiness of the elect’ in Calvinism.

38. Dahl (1985, p. 95) remarks that the ‘hope for human regeneration through changes in political, economic, and social structures exerts a magical power on the utopian imagination. Forecasts of a new human being produced by structural changes have been made (from) liberals like Mill, as well as communists, socialists, fascists, and Nazis. Yet these forecasts seem to be regularly discredited by Experience.’ Dahl omits or downplays, however, that such ‘forecasts of a new human being’ is what also American capitalists or conservatives have made since Puritans through ‘born again’ evangelicals and that these forecasts are ‘regularly discredited’ by social experience in America.

conservatism and Russian socialism, respectively, which consequently exposes the two as representing or approximating unrealistic or extreme utopias in respect of their concepts of economic agent and social actor.

Hence, what this paper discusses and elaborates is just a mental social construct of a new man that is essentially utopian and to that extent fantastic or fictional, barring its successful coercive construction in and imposition on society, making what is initially a utopia ultimately a reality, which may warrant the admonition ‘beware utopias, they may come true!’³⁹ Thus, this mental construct seems a ‘fantastic notion’ in the sense of US President F. D. Roosevelt used the expression with reference to the supposed ‘master race’ in Nazism. Moreover, the ‘new man’ construct, especially its perpetual American (versus transient Soviet) variant, may well turn out to be as destructive, including self-destructive in the sense of mutually assured destruction through aggressive wars, as the Nazi notion of the ‘master race’ proved to be for Germany. This is a construct that probably develops whenever and wherever old social structures collapse and society, namely the ruling class, aims to create and consolidate the new social order through various means, including coercive and ideological ones. Then, as both American capitalism and Soviet socialism establish and solidify themselves on the ashes of the ancient system, they in their own unique ways may construct and seek to substantiate the ideal of a new man. Yet, almost invariably a large distance exists between a new ideal and its implementation that typically fails or lags behind, as both American capitalism and Soviet socialism show even if in different degrees and ways. (Further, an ideal may become a perversion in reality, as with the Nazi ideology of the ‘master race’ that led to the extermination of all groups not fitting into that category.)

Second and related, the inventing of both the American and Soviet ‘new man’ turns out to be a totalitarian and generally authoritarian, anti-liberal and coercive endeavor. More specifically, the creation of the American ‘new man’ is a theocratic, thus proto-totalitarian, and generally religiously overdetermined project and process in the form of Puritan or evangelical theocracy and more broadly Calvinist coercion and repression. This generally supports J. S. Mill observing that Calvinism declares ‘You have no choice; thus you must do, and no otherwise’ and later observations to that effect (Stenhouse 2012). It specifically confirms Scheler’s observation of the invariant creation of an ‘external espionage system against unchastity, drinking, vice and luxury of all sorts’ in Protestant countries, especially by implication America.

In addition, it reaffirms Pareto noting in the United States ‘a mass of hypocritical laws for the enforcement of morality’ as no more than ‘replicas of laws of the European Middle Ages’. Further, this corroborates the description of American Puritanism and its theocracy as the ‘most totalitarian’ variation of Calvinism and thus Protestantism, as well as of American evangelicalism (the ‘Bible Belt’) as the ‘proto-totalitarian’ elimination of individual liberty and thus liberal democracy (Bauman 1997; Mueller 2009). Lastly, it relates to the

39. I credit an anonymous reviewer for these remarks.

characterization of the ‘American regime’ as substantively (though not formally) theocratic through the Religious Right alliance between capitalist and religious lower classes against science and liberal democracy, while functioning in contrast and opposition to the Western European secular regime (Bénabou et al. 2015; Domhoff 2013; Keister 2008). On the other hand, the creation of the Soviet ‘new man’ is nonreligious totalitarian or authoritarian blueprint and process confirming earlier observations. Thus, this is a puritan or purist project and process in the communist meaning by analogy to the first as Puritan or Puritanical in the sense of Calvinist Puritanism or evangelicalism, both being inherently or eventually becoming totalitarian projects and processes. Conversely, the totalitarian core of inventing the American and Soviet ‘new man’ is typically puritan or purist in socialism and Puritan or Puritanical in American conservatism. Hence, the productions of both the American and Soviet ‘new man’ share generally in an authoritarian, anti-liberal or illiberal, coercive and repressive design and activity disregarding and eliminating freedom of choice and individual liberty, thus ruling out or reversing liberal democracy (Habermas 2001; Mueller 2009).

Further and as a corollary, the inventing of both the American and Soviet ‘new man’ starts and unfolds as a God- or master-like ignorant and arrogant endeavors. Thus, the conservative and religious inventors of the American ‘new man’ claim to be Divinely chosen agents and thus having Divine rights to produce a substitute to ‘natural man’ and act as masters (due to being of the ‘elect’) over other humans (Emerson et al. 2006; Lindsay 2008). In doing so they are induced by religious and other ‘blissful ignorance’ with regard to the knowledge of human actors or social processes and thus typically act with arrogance in producing the American ‘new man’ (Nordhaus 2019; Wacquant 2002). Similarly but not identically, the communist and nonreligious inventors of the Soviet ‘new man’ claim a higher ideological mandate to produce a substitute to pre-Soviet ‘natural man’ and to act as masters over other humans, while in doing so being actuated by some degree of ignorance of human actors or social processes and so acting with arrogance. Taken together, the inventors of both the American and Soviet ‘new man’ think and act as if the history and society of America and Russia and indeed of the humanity and world began with them and had the mission to accomplish this production of a new human type.

As a corollary of all the above, the inventing and imposing, as well as spreading to other societies, of both the American and Soviet ‘new man’ starts with grand declaration and pretensions but ends in the low destination of dismal failure and discredit, destruction and infamy (Altemeyer 2007; Dell and Querubin 2018; Dube et al. 2011). Thus, the shared extreme utopianism, theocratic or nonreligious totalitarianism and religious and other ignorance/arrogance predestine this process of reinvention of humans and their social actions and processes to fail abjectly and in that sense inevitably doom it. This yields the corresponding prediction that any persistent attempts in this regard, as they especially persist in American conservatism, are doomed to the same destiny in the future as they suffer today judging by the results of the empirical analysis. This provides and suggests a direction for future research so long as such efforts persist and likely to perdure

further in Puritanical American conservatism—given what Hume classically diagnoses as the ‘unreasonable obstinacy’ of Puritanism--as well as its ‘brother in arms’ against liberal democracy, Islamic fundamentalism, in view of the fact that Soviet socialism is dead. Accordingly, given the demise of the latter, future research will likely identify and concentrate on the continuous, indeed permanent production and ‘revolution’ of the ‘new man’ primarily in American conservatism within the Western world and in Islamic fundamentalism and other religious extremism (e.g., Polish and other illiberal Catholicism) in non-Western settings.

Appendix

This appendix reports the results of preliminary statistical analyses such as correlation matrix and a confirmatory factor analysis. First, Table 10S gives the inter-item correlation matrix for ‘new man’ variables. Generally, it shows that these variables almost entirely correlate positively with each. Specifically, of the total of 28 correlations, 26 are positive (92.86%) and so only 2 being negative ones. To that extent, the overwhelmingly positive correlations between the variables generally suggest that they possess internal validity.

Notably, most positive correlations between the 8 variables are strong to moderate. Specifically, out of 26 positive correlations 17 are of high to moderate strength (around and above .4) and only 9 weaker. (Conversely, the two negative correlations are very weak and indeed the weakest of all.) For example, correlations are especially strong to moderate between the prison population rate (x1) on one hand and on the other death sentences and executions (x2), other ‘political terror’ (x3), share of drug and related offenders of total prisoners (by default) (x5), peace index negative (x6) and gun ownership rate (x7). In addition, death sentences and executions correlate strongly to moderately (also) with the death penalty for drug offenses (x4), share of drug and related offenders of total prisoners and gun ownership rate. Further, other ‘political terror’ has strong to moderate correlations (also) with share of drug and related offenders of total prisoners, peace index negative and murders by firearms rate (x8), and so on. On this account, the mostly strong to moderate intercorrelations between the variables particularly evidence their relatively high internal validity. Overall, the reliability estimate for the index is relatively high in standardized terms in which numerical indexes for OECD countries are calculated (Cronbach’s Alpha based on standardized items = .85). Recall that the index is the average of 8 indicators and proxies and hence its overall high reliability reflects the equivalent internal validity of its components.

Second, Table 11S contains the results from a confirmatory factor/principal component analysis of ‘new man’ variables. Its section ‘Total Variance Explained’ suggests that underlying factors or principal components 1 and 2 explain (by their Eigenvalues higher than 1) just over 75 percent of the combined variance of the observed 8 variables, while components 3-8 explaining the rest and thus a relatively small amount (see also the scree plot in Figure 1S). Therefore, these two components can help retrieve most of the content of the observed variables, while discarding the other six (whose Eigenvalues are under 1).

Next, section ‘Component Matrix’ indicates that, except for two, almost all

of the observed variables 'load on' principal component 1 judging by 'factor loadings' as standardized coefficients in the regression of these variables on underlying factors, thus expressing the effects of the second on the first. For instance, the prison population rate (x1), death sentences and executions (x2), other 'political terror' (x3), the death penalty for drug offenses (x4), share of drug and related offenders of total prisoners (x5) and peace index negative (x6) all load on principal component 1, while only gun ownership rate (x7) and murders by firearms rate (x8) loading on principal component 2. Accordingly, principal component 1 can be substantively identified or meaningfully interpreted as the definitely negative of the concept of the 'new man'. By contrast, it is more difficult to identify or interpret principal component 2 that instead appears as an indefinite mixture of the concept of the 'new man' (by negative gun ownership effects) and its negative (by positive murders by firearms rate effects). Statistically, the reliability coefficient for principal component 1 is of similar magnitude as the reliability statistic for the index ($\theta = 0.87$), while that for principal component 2 is appreciably lower ($\theta = 0.52$).

To that extent, the above generates a one-factor model of the 8 observed variables in substantive sociological terms so long as principal component 2 is substantively equivalent to principal component 1 and hence gun ownership rate and murders by firearms rate are considered to load on the latter (which Figure 2S illustrates). In formal statistical terms, it yields a two-factor model of these variables (which Figure 3S represents). In sum, the results a confirmatory factor analysis confirm that the 8 observed variables express or measure the same underlying factor such as the 'new man' concept, more precisely its negative or inverse, and that this latent variable exerts largely strong and significant effects (by 'factor loadings') on these indicators.

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'New Man' Aggregate Index =
 x1 low or no imprisonment + x2 rare or no death sentences and executions + x3 no or weak political terror + x4 no death penalty for drug offenses + x5 no or small share of drug offenders of total prisoners + x6 high civic peace + x7 no or low gun ownership + x8 no or low murders by firearms

Figure 1: Components of the 'New Man' Aggregate Index




Figure 2: 'New Man' Aggregate Indexes, OECD Countries

Table 1. Indicators And Proxies Of The 'New Man'

- 1 Low imprisonment
- 2 No death sentences and executions.
- 3 No or weak political terror
- 4 No death penalty for drug offenses
- 5 No share of drug offenders of total prisoners
- 6 Strong civic peace
- 7 Low gun ownership
- 8 No murders by firearms

Table 2. 'New Man' Indicators And Aggregate Indexes, OECD Countries

Country	x1*	x2*	x3*	x4*	x5*	x6*	x7*	x8*	Total**	Index***	Index * 100
Australia	.18	-.18	.41	-.24	.18	-.61	-.21	-.26	-8.99	.09	8.99
Austria	-.47	-.18	-.60	-.24	-.47	-.85	.71	-.26	-29.41	.29	29.41
Belgium	-.47	-.18	-.60	-.24	-.47	-.38	-.08	-.11	-31.61	.32	31.61
Canada	-.37	-.18	-.60	-.24	-.37	-.80	.74	-.08	-23.58	.24	23.58
Chile	.53	-.18	.41	-.24	.53	.26	-.46	.25	14.03	-.14	-14.03
Czech Republic	.40	-.18	-.60	-.24	.40	-.72	-.13	-.26	-16.49	.16	16.49
Denmark	-.68	-.18	-.60	-.24	-.68	-.83	-.39	-.22	-47.74	.48	47.74
Estonia	.30	-.18	-.60	-.24	.30	.00	-.55	-.30	-15.88	.16	15.88
Finland	-.84	-.18	-.60	-.24	-.84	-.58	1.60	-.22	-23.71	.24	23.71
France	-.39	-.18	-.60	-.24	-.39	.53	.76	-.15	-8.30	.08	8.30
Germany	-.63	-.18	-.60	-.24	-.63	-.39	.71	-.26	-27.72	.28	27.72
Greece	-.37	-.18	.41	-.24	-.37	.42	.24	-.19	-3.50	.04	3.50
Hungary	.16	-.18	.41	-.24	.16	-.25	-.77	-.26	-11.98	.12	11.98
Iceland	-.98	-.18	-.60	-.24	-.98	-1.26	.71	-.19	-46.50	.47	46.50
Ireland	-.66	-.18	-.60	-.24	-.66	-.64	-.59	-.15	-46.28	.46	46.28
Israel	.75	-.18	2.44	-.24	.76	2.30	-.67	-.08	63.69	-.64	-63.69
Italy	-.52	-.18	.41	-.24	-.51	.02	-.39	-.19	-19.80	.20	19.80
Japan	-.96	.11	-.60	-.24	-.96	-.67	-1.06	-.30	-58.55	.59	58.55
Korea	-.37	-.04	.41	4.13	-.37	.32	-1.03	-.30	34.21	-.34	-34.21
Latvia	.27	-.18	-.60	-.24	.27	.04	.03	-.19	-7.33	.07	7.33
Lithuania	.64	-.18	-.60	-.24	.64	.06	-1.06	-.15	-11.14	.11	11.14
Luxembourg	-.38	-.18	-.60	-.24	-.38	-.38	-.19	-.22	-32.22	.32	32.22
Mexico	.08	-.18	2.44	-.24	.08	1.87	-.21	5.78	120.50	-1.21	-120.50
Netherlands	-.75	-.18	-.60	-.24	-.75	-.32	-.87	-.26	-49.57	.50	49.57
New Zealand	.45	-.18	-.60	-.24	.44	-1.01	.25	-.22	-13.88	.14	13.88

Norway	-18	-60	-24	-78	-38	.77	-.26	-30.65	.31	30.65
Poland	-18	.41	-24	.36	-.05	-1.02	-.30	-8.14	.08	8.14
Portugal	-18	-.60	-24	-.34	-.90	-.59	-.22	-42.67	.43	42.67
Slovak Republic	-18	-.60	-24	.38	-.23	-.61	-.19	-15.91	.16	15.91
Slovenia	-18	-.60	-24	-.70	-.65	-.30	-.30	-45.73	.46	45.73
Spain	-18	.41	-24	-.22	.07	-.48	-.26	-13.78	.14	13.78
Sweden	-18	-.60	-24	-.77	-.42	.78	-.15	-29.27	.29	29.27
Switzerland	-18	-.60	-24	-.60	-.66	1.62	-.22	-18.45	.18	18.45
Turkey	-18	2.44	-24	1.72	2.68	-.36	.00	97.51	-.98	-97.51
United Kingdom	-18	-.60	-24	-.13	.19	-.73	-.30	-26.35	.26	26.35
United States	5.91	1.43	4.13	4.46	1.32	4.19	.95	335.64	-3.36	-335.64
Russia	-18	2.44	-24	1.70	2.87	-.37	.03	99.55	-1.00	-99.55

* standard score (standard deviations from the mean)

** sum of x1-x8

*** Total/8 * -1

x1 prison population rate

x2 death sentences and executions

x3 other political terror

x4 the death penalty for drug offenses

x5 share of drug offenders of total prisoners

x6 peace index negative

x7 gun ownership rate

x8 murders by firearms rate

Table 3. Ranking by 'New Man' Aggregate Indexes, OECD Countries

Rank	Country	Index x 100
1.	Japan	58.55
2.	Netherlands	49.57
3.	Denmark	47.74
4.	Iceland	46.50
5.	Ireland	46.28
6.	Slovenia	45.73
7.	Portugal	42.67
8.	Luxembourg	32.22
9.	Belgium	31.61
10.	Norway	30.65
11.	Austria	29.41
12.	Sweden	29.27
13.	Germany	27.72
14.	United Kingdom	26.35
15.	Finland	23.71
16.	Canada	23.58
17.	Italy	19.80
18.	Switzerland	18.45
19.	Czech Republic	16.49
20.	Slovak Republic	15.91
21.	Estonia	15.88
22.	New Zealand	13.88
23.	Spain	13.78
24.	Hungary	11.98
25.	Lithuania	11.14
26.	Australia	8.99
27.	France	8.30
28.	Poland	8.14
29.	Latvia	7.33
30.	Greece	3.50
31.	Chile	-14.03
32.	Korea	-34.21
33.	Israel	-63.69
34.	Turkey	-97.51
35.	Russia	-99.55
36.	Mexico	-120.50
37.	United States	-335.64

Table 1S. Prison Population Rates Per 100,000 persons, OECD Countries, 2019

Country	Rate
Australia	169
Austria	95
Belgium	95
Canada	107
Chile	209
Czech Republic	194
Denmark	71
Estonia	182
Finland	53
France	104
Germany	77
Greece	106
Hungary	167
Iceland	37
Ireland	74
Israel	234
Italy	90
Japan	39
Korea, South	106
Latvia	179
Lithuania	221
Luxembourg	105
Mexico	158
Netherlands	63
New Zealand	199
Norway	60
Poland	189
Portugal	110
Slovak Republic	192
Slovenia	69
Spain	124
Sweden	61
Switzerland	80
Turkey	344
United Kingdom	134
United States	655
OECD Average	143.1
Russian Federation	341

Source: International Centre For *Prison* Studies, The World Prison Brief
https://www.prisonstudies.org/highest-to-lowest/prison_population_rate?field_region_taxonomy_tid=All

Table 2S. Death Sentences and Executions, OECD Countries, 2019

Country	Numbers*
Australia	0
Austria	0
Belgium	0
Canada	0
Chile	0
Czech Republic	0
Denmark	0
Estonia	0
Finland	0
France	0
Germany	0
Greece	0
Hungary	0
Iceland	0
Ireland	0
Israel	0
Italy	0
Japan	126
Korea, South	61
Latvia	0
Lithuania	0
Luxembourg	0
Mexico	0
Netherlands	0
New Zealand	0
Norway	0
Poland	0
Portugal	0
Slovak Republic	0
Slovenia	0
Spain	0
Sweden	0
Switzerland	0
Turkey	0
United Kingdom	0
United States	2638
OECD Average	N/A
Russian Federation	0

Source: Amnesty International Global Report, Death Sentences And Executions 2019 <https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/ACT5018472020ENGLISH.PDF>

* include 'recorded executions, recorded death sentences and people known to be under sentence of death at the end of 2019.'

the Russian Federation 'continued to observe moratoriums on executions.'

Table 3S. Political Terror Scale Levels, OECD Countries, 2018 Or Nearest Year

Country	Level
Australia	2
Austria	1
Belgium	1
Canada	1
Chile	2
Czech Republic	1
Denmark	1
Estonia	1
Finland	1
France	1
Germany	1
Greece	2
Hungary	2
Iceland	1
Ireland	1
Israel	4
Italy	2
Japan	1
Korea, South	2
Latvia	1
Lithuania	1
Luxembourg	1
Mexico	4
Netherlands	1
New Zealand	1
Norway	1
Poland	2
Portugal	1
Slovak Republic	1
Slovenia	1
Spain	2
Sweden	1
Switzerland	1
Turkey	4
United Kingdom	1
United States	3
OECD Average	1.5
Russian Federation	4

Source: The Political Terror Scale <http://www.politicalterrorsscale.org/Data/Download.html> Larger scores from Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch

Gibney, Mark, Linda Cornett, Reed Wood, Peter Haschke, Daniel Arnon, Attilio Pisanò, and Gray Barrett. 2019. The Political Terror Scale 1976-2018.

Date Retrieved, from the Political Terror Scale website: <http://www.politicalterror-scale.org>.

'The "terror" in the PTS refers to state-sanctioned killings, torture, disappearances and political imprisonment that the Political Terror Scale measures.'

Political Terror Scale Levels

Level

Interpretation

1

Countries under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their views, and torture is rare or exceptional. Political murders are extremely rare.

2

There is a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity. However, few persons are affected, torture and beatings are exceptional. Political murder is rare.

3

There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment. Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention, with or without a trial, for political views is accepted.

4

Civil and political rights violations have expanded to large numbers of the population. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life. In spite of its generality, on this level terror affects those who interest themselves in politics or ideas.

5

Terror has expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals.

Table 4S. Death Penalty For Drug Offenses, OECD Countries, 2019

Country	Death Penalty	Score
Australia	N	0
Austria	N	0
Belgium	N	0
Canada	N	0
Chile	N	0
Czech Republic	N	0
Denmark	N	0
Estonia	N	0
Finland	N	0
France	N	0
Germany	N	0
Greece	N	0
Hungary	N	0
Iceland	N	0
Ireland	N	0
Israel	N	0
Italy	N	0
Japan	N	0
Korea, South*	Y	1
Latvia	N	0
Lithuania	N	0
Luxembourg	N	0
Mexico	N	0
Netherlands	N	0
New Zealand	N	0
Norway	N	0
Poland	N	0
Portugal	N	0
Slovak Republic	N	0
Slovenia	N	0
Spain	N	0
Sweden	N	0

Switzerland	N	0
Turkey	N	0
United Kingdom	N	0
United States*	Y	1
OECD Average	N/A	N/A
Russian Federation	N	0

Source: Harm Reduction International, Gen Sander, Giada Girelli and Adrià Cots Fernández, *The Death Penalty for Drug Offences: Global Overview 2019* https://www.hri.global/files/2020/02/28/HRI_DeathPenaltyReport2019.pdf

According to Harm Reduction International, the 'legal analysis reflects the principle in international law that the imposition of a death sentence following conviction for a drug offence (not involving intentional killing) in proceedings which fail to meet international standards of fairness compounds the violations of the rights of the individual to life, to a fair trial, and to be free from torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment' (p.).

* Symbolic Application according to Harm Reduction International.

Harm Reduction International reports: 'While President Donald Trump continues suggesting that the death penalty should be expanded to drug offences, analyses of death sentences and executions in the past 40 years reveal that reliance on this measure in the country is in fact shrinking' (p. 39).

Death Penalty Score N = 0, Y = 1

Table 5S. Share Of Drug And Related Offenders Of Total Prisoners, Estimates, OECD Countries, 2019

Country	Prisoner Rate	US/Prisoner Rate	% of Drug Offenders (estimate)
Australia	169	3.88	5.12
Austria	95	6.89	2.88
Belgium	95	6.89	2.88
Canada	107	6.12	3.24
Chile	209	3.13	6.34
Czech Republic	194	3.38	5.88
Denmark	71	9.23	2.15
Estonia	182	3.60	5.52
Finland	53	12.36	1.61
France	104	6.30	3.15
Germany	77	8.51	2.33
Greece	106	6.18	3.21
Hungary	167	3.92	5.06
Iceland	37	17.70	1.12
Ireland	74	8.85	2.24
Israel	234	2.80	7.10
Italy	90	7.28	2.73
Japan	39	16.79	1.18
Korea, South	106	6.18	3.21
Latvia	179	3.66	5.43
Lithuania	221	2.96	6.70
Luxembourg	105	6.24	3.18
Mexico	158	4.15	4.79
Netherlands	63	10.40	1.91
New Zealand	199	3.29	6.03

Norway	60	10.92	1.82
Poland	189	3.47	5.73
Portugal	110	5.95	3.34
Slovak Republic	192	3.41	5.82
Slovenia	69	9.49	2.09
Spain	124	5.28	3.76
Sweden	61	10.74	1.85
Switzerland	80	8.19	2.43
Turkey	344	1.90	10.43
United Kingdom	134	4.89	4.06
United States	655	1.00	19.86
OECD Average	143.11	6.55	4.34
Russian Federation	341	1.92	10.34

Source: The Prison Policy Initiative, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2020 <https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2020.html>

The Prison Policy Initiative reports that in the US 'police, prosecutors, and judges continue to punish people harshly for nothing more than drug possession. Drug offenses still account for the incarceration of almost half a million people, and nonviolent drug convictions remain a [defining feature of the federal prison system](#). Police still make over 1 million drug possession arrests each year, many of which lead to prison sentences. Drug arrests continue to give residents of over-policed communities [criminal records](#), hurting their employment prospects and increasing the likelihood of longer sentences for any future offenses.'

The Prison Policy Initiative estimates that in the US in 2020 there are 450,180 people incarcerated for drug offenses out of 2,267,000, i.e., 'almost 2.3 million people in 1,833 state prisons, 110 federal prisons, 1,772 juvenile correctional facilities, 3,134 local jails, 218 immigration detention facilities, and 80 Indian Country jails as well as in military prisons, civil commitment centers, state psychiatric hospitals, and prisons in the U.S. territories (at the staggering rate of 698 per 100,000 residents.'

US Drug Offenders as % of total prisoners $450,180/2,267,000 = 19.86\%$ Drug Offenders as % of Federal prisoners $100,000/226,000 = 44.25\%$

% of Drug Offenders (estimate) = $19.86/(655/\text{Prisoner Rate})$

Table 6S. Global Peace Index, OECD Countries, 2020

Country	Index Negative
Australia	1.39
Austria	1.28
Belgium	1.50
Canada	1.30
Chile	1.80
Czech Republic	1.34
Denmark	1.28
Estonia	1.68
Finland	1.40
France	1.93
Germany	1.49
Greece	1.88
Hungary	1.56
Iceland	1.08
Ireland	1.38
Israel	2.78
Italy	1.69
Japan	1.36
Korea, South	1.83
Latvia	1.70
Lithuania	1.71
Luxembourg	1.50
Mexico	2.57
Netherlands	1.53
New Zealand	1.20
Norway	1.50
Poland	1.66
Portugal	1.25
Slovak Republic	1.57
Slovenia	1.37
Spain	1.71
Sweden	1.48
Switzerland	1.37
Turkey	2.96
United Kingdom	1.77
United States	2.31
OECD Average	1.64
Russian Federation	3.05

Source: Global Peace Index 2020, Institute for Economics and Peace http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2020/06/GPI_2020_web.pdf

The Global Peace Index 'measures the state of peace across three domains: the level of Societal Safety and Security; the extent of Ongoing Domestic and International Conflict; and the degree of Militarisation.'

* estimated values from comparable countries: Luxembourg from Belgium
Higher index, lesser peace

Table 7S. Average Rate Of Civilian Gun Ownership, Guns Per 100 People

Country	Rate
Australia	15.0
Austria	30.4
Belgium	17.2
Canada	30.8
Chile	10.7
Czech Republic	16.3
Denmark	12.
Estonia	9.2
Finland	45.3
France	31.2
Germany	30.3
Greece	22.5
Hungary	5.5
Iceland	30.3
Ireland	8.6
Israel	7.3
Italy	11.9
Japan	.6
Korea, South	1.1
Latvia	19.
Lithuania	.7
Luxembourg	15.3
Mexico	15.
Netherlands	3.9
New Zealand	22.6
Norway	31.3
Poland	1.3
Portugal	8.5
Slovak Republic	8.3
Slovenia	13.5
Spain	10.4
Sweden	31.6
Switzerland	45.7
Turkey	12.5
United Kingdom	6.2
United States	88.8
OECD Average	18.6
Russian Federation	12.3

Source: The Small Arms Survey 2007: Guns And The City [Http://Www.Smallarmssurvey.Org/Fileadmin/Docs/A-Yearbook/2007/En/Small-Arms-Survey-2007-Chapter-02-Annexe-4-En.Pdf](http://www.Smallarmssurvey.Org/Fileadmin/Docs/A-Yearbook/2007/En/Small-Arms-Survey-2007-Chapter-02-Annexe-4-En.Pdf)

* The estimated rate of private gun ownership (both licit and illicit) per 100 people in 2017. Source: GunPolicy.org <https://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region/russia>

Table 8S. Homicide Rate By Firearms Per 100,000 Population, 2017

Country	Rate
Australia	.1
Austria	.1
Belgium	.5
Canada	.6
Chile	1.5
Czech Republic	.1
Denmark	.2
Estonia	0
Finland	.2
France	.4
Germany	.1
Greece	.3
Hungary	.1
Iceland	.3
Ireland	.4
Israel	.6
Italy	.3
Japan	0
Korea, South	0
Latvia	.3
Lithuania	.4
Luxembourg	.2
Mexico	16.5
Netherlands	.1
New Zealand	.2
Norway	.1
Poland	0
Portugal	.2
Slovak Republic	.3
Slovenia	0
Spain	.1
Sweden	.4
Switzerland	.2
Turkey	.8
United Kingdom*	0
United States	3.4
OECD Average	.81
Russian Federation**	.9

Source: DATAUNODC <https://Dataunodc.Un.Org/Data/Homicide/Homicide%20rate%20by%20mechanisms>

* England and Wales

** the annual rate of firearm homicide per 100,000 population in 2013.

Source: GunPolicy.org <https://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region/russia>

Table 9S. Descriptive Statistics For 'New Man' Variables

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
prison population rate	37	37	655	148.46	113.501
death sentences and executions	37	0	2638	76.35	433.428
other political terror	37	1	4	1.59	.985
death penalty for drug offenses	37	0	1	.05	.229
share of drug offenders	37	1.12	19.86	4.5005	3.44185
peace index negative	37	1.08	3.05	1.6786	.47720
gun ownership rate	37	.60	88.80	18.4622	16.78090
murders by firearms rate	37	.00	16.50	.8081	2.71686

Table 10S. Inter-Item Correlation Matrix For 'New Man' Variables

	X1	X2	X3	X4	X5	X6	X7	X8
prison population rate	1.000							
death sentences and executions	.745	1.000						
other political terror	.605	.238	1.000					
death penalty for drug offenses	.495	.712	.223	1.000				
share of drug offenders	1.000	.745	.605	.495	1.000			
peace index negative	.626	.218	.902	.198	.626	1.000		
gun ownership rate	.365	.696	-.015	.383	.365	-.019	1.000	
murders by firearms rate	.192	.158	.496	.080	.192	.404	.102	1.000

Total correlations = 28 Positive correlations = 26 (92.86%) Negative correlations = 2 (7.14%)
 Reliability Statistics Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items N of Items
 .854 8

Table 11S. Results from Factor/Principal Component Analysis Of 'New Man' Variables

Total Variance Explained		
Component	Total	
1	4.183	
2	1.835	
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.		
Component Matrix		
	Initial Eigenvalues	Extraction Sums of Squared
	% of Variance	% of Variance
	Cumulative %	Cumulative %
1	52.281	52.281
2	22.932	75.213

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Component Matrix

	Component	
	1	2
Zscore(prison population rate)	.934	-.031
Zscore(death sentences and executions)	.803	-.531
Zscore(other political terror)	.719	.625
Zscore(death penalty for drug offenses)	.631	-.429
Zscore(share of drug offenders)	.934	-.031
Zscore(peace index negative)	.712	.615
Zscore(gun ownership rate)	.471	-.639
Zscore(murders by firearms rate)	.386	.436

Extraction Method: Principal Component

Analysis.

a. 2 components extracted

Reliability coefficient (theta) for principal component 1 = 0.87

Reliability coefficient (theta) for principal component 2 = 0.52




Figure S1. Scree Plot For Principal Component Analysis Of 'New Man' Variables

Factor/Principal Component	Factor Loading	Observed Variable (Effect Of Factors)
1	→→→→→ .934	x1 (prison population rate)
	→→→→→ .803	x2 (death sentences and executions)
	→→→→→ .719	x3 (other political terror)
	→→→→→ .631	x4 (death penalty for drug offenses)
	→→→→→ .934	x5 (share of drug offenders of total prisoners)
	→→→→→ .712	x4 (civic peace negative)
	→→→→→ .471	x7 (gun ownership rate)
	→→→→→ .386	x8 (murders by firearms rate)

Figure S2. One-Factor Substantive Model For Observed 'New Man' Variables
Note: →→→→→ indicates left-to-right effects

Factor/Principal Component	Factor Loading	Observed Variable (Effect Of Factors)	
1	→→→→ .934	x1 (prison population rate)	
	→→→→ .803	x2 (death sentences and executions)	
	→→→→ .719	x3 (other political terror)	
	→→→→ .631	x4 (death penalty for drug offenses)	
	→→→→ .934	x5 (share of drug offenders of total prisoners)	
	→→→→ .712	x4 (civic peace negative)	
	2	→→→→ -.639	x7 (gun ownership rate)
		→→→→ .436	x8 (murders by firearms rate)

Figure S3. Two-Factor Statistical Model For Observed ‘New Man’ Variables
 Note: →→→→ indicates left-to-right effects

About the Author

Milan Zafirovski is Professor in the Department of Sociology at University of North Texas, USA. He holds doctoral degrees in economics and sociology. His research interests are interdisciplinary encompassing sociology and economics. He has published thirteen books, including *Identifying a Free Society* (2017); *Conservatism’s Long Secret Journey* (2016), *Modernity and Terrorism* (2013); *The Enlightenment and its Effects on Modern Society* (2011); *The “Destiny” of Modern Societies* (2009); *Democracy, Economy and Conservatism* (2008); *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Authoritarianism* (2007); *Liberal Modernity and its Adversaries* (2007); *Free Society and its Nemesis* (2007); *Market and Society* (2003); *The Duality of Structure in Markets* (2002); and *Exchange, Action and Social Structure* (2001). Also, he has published around a hundred articles as well as book chapters and other publications in peer-reviewed journals and related outlets in the United States, Europe and elsewhere. In addition, he has been a co-editor of *International Encyclopedia of Economic Sociology* (2006), advisory editor in *Economic Sociology* for the *Encyclopedia of Sociology* (edited by George Ritzer) (2015), and advisory editor for *Economy in The Encyclopedia Of Social Theory* (edited by Brian Turner) (2017). Currently, he is the editor of *A Modern Guide To Economic Sociology* (published in 2020) and *International Handbook Of Economic Sociology* (to be published in 2022).