Book Reviews

David P. Deavel and Jessica Hooten Wilson, ed., *Solzhenitsyn and American Culture: The Russian Soul in the West*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2020. Xxviii + 362 pp. $60.00. Hardbound.

After the dissident Soviet writer Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn was exiled from the Soviet Union in 1974, many American anticommunists enthusiastically embraced his fierce criticism of détente and his denunciation of godless communism. Yet when Solzhenitsyn subsequently declared that the West was not a model for the transformation of Russia and scolded Americans for their decadent consumerism, the number of his American admirers dwindled. After the Soviet Union disintegrated in 1991, many American and West European intellectuals ridiculed and dismissed Solzhenitsyn as rambling, shrill, foolish, and irrelevant.

The central purposes of *Solzhenitsyn and American Culture*, a stimulating collection of 21 essays, are to challenge such harshly negative views of Solzhenitsyn and to revive interest in him as a writer and an ethical thinker. As editors David P. Deavel and Jessica Hooten Wilson argue in the Introduction, "Solzhenitsyn was not simply a crank rejecting modernity in favor of a mythical Russian past. He was a noteworthy thinker and artist" whose messages about the foundations of real liberty and the problems of secular modernity have enduring importance (xviii-xix). Deavel, a professor of Catholic studies, and Wilson, a professor with a special interest in Catholic literature, dedicate the volume to Edward E. Ericson, Jr., a scholar of Solzhenitsyn. Like Ericson, they seek to turn attention to Solzhenitsyn's literary and ethical voice as a Christian writer with a profound "vision of life" that has lasting value (xix, xxi).

Some of the contributors attempt to dispel misunderstandings about Solzhenitsyn's political views. In one of the most compelling essays, Deavel argues against the "myth" that Solzhenitsyn was anti-American (38). He notes the exiled writer's admiration of the grassroots democracy he observed while living in Cavendish, Vermont and explains that Solzhenitsyn's critique of how the selfish pursuit of happiness eclipsed the valuation of life and liberty was not a rejection of those fundamental American values. Focusing on Solzhenitsyn's Templeton prize address in 1983, William Jason Wallace, a professor at Samford University in Alabama, presents a sympathetic discussion of the Russian writer's criticism of the West as well as the East for having "forgotten God" (237). According to Wallace, "Solzhenitsyn's great insight is that tyranny flourishes … by first distorting human nature as lacking eternal substance or significance" (244). Wallace notes Solzhenitsyn's rebuke to Billy Graham for saying that he did not notice the persecution of religion when he visited the USSR in 1982. But he does not consider whether the extensive exchanges between religious leaders in the West and in the Soviet Union during the 1980s did more to promote religious freedom in the USSR than harsh condemnation from abroad.

In an essay first published in 2016, novelist and historian Eugene Vodolazkin expressed the hopeful view that "If the West is able to move beyond its geopolitical disagreements with Russia and take a good look at the conservative project that's taking shape in Russia now, it will see one possible future for our common European civilization" (26). After the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, that seems extremely unlikely. While one can share the editors' belief that "dissatisfaction with Russian politics … should not be a block to learning from Russian culture" (xvi), Russia's fight for the Donbas region (which Solzhenitsyn called "historic Russian lands" wrongly transferred to Ukraine by the Bolsheviks) is likely to dim American interest in Russian literature.

The contributors to the volume occasionally acknowledge that some of Solzhenitsyn's public statements, particularly about the decline of the West, were "over-the-top" or perhaps "too bleak" (xii; 246). Yet they offer little analysis of why Solzhenitsyn was at times so badly wrong about the United States and the West. For example, Deavel quotes Solzhenitsyn's assertion in 1983 that after World War II Westerners decided to shut their "ears to the groans emanating from the East" (41), yet he does not address why Solzhenitsyn disregarded the United States' espousal of liberating the Soviet bloc through aid to anticommunist guerrillas and broadcasts by the Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, and Radio Liberation (to which Solzhenitsyn himself later listened).

In one of the finest contributions to the volume, Ralph C. Wood, a professor of theology and literature at Baylor University, beautifully illuminates how the Orthodox faith instilled in Solzhenitsyn by his grandmother, mother, and Aunt Irina influenced his writing. More specifically, Wood elucidates the Orthodox aspiration to make oneself more closely resemble the image of God implanted in all humans. He argues convincingly that in the short story "Matryona's Home" the long-suffering, elderly peasant Matryona, who embodies her faith in her uncomplaining way of life, serves "as Solzhenitsyn's sharply etched emblem of Holy Mother Russia -- before it was crushed" by Soviet atheism and modernization (103). Wood also shows how in the novel *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich* the calm, patient convict Ivan Shukov, who "has a virtually mystical regard for his work as a mason at the work camp," illustrates the Orthodox belief that "divine presence permeates everything" (108-9).

The last part of the volume ranges beyond Solzhenitsyn. It presents excellent essays on Orthodox thinking about the reformation of criminals (with a focus on Fyodor Dostoevsky's *The Brothers Karamazov*); the influence of Russian writers on African American authors (particularly Alexander Pushkin on Alain Locke and Maxim Gorky on Richard Wright); the ways nineteenth-century Russian writers inspired Flannery O'Connor's emphasis on human imperfection and self-sacrificing charity in her short stories; how Catholic activists Dorothy Day and Thomas Merton drew wisdom from Russian Orthodox writers, particularly Vladimir Soloviev and Boris Pasternak; and the tribulations of free, moral individuals in a brutal totalitarian system depicted in Vasily Grossman's searingly powerful novel *Life and Fate*.

Some of the contributions to *Solzhenitsyn and American Culture* are not entirely convincing. For example, a political scientist's comparison of Westernizers in Imperial Russia to the contemporary US professional class and Slavophiles to Americans like Steve Bannon who prioritize the white working class seems a bit of a stretch (250, 259).

Yet on the whole this volume is revelatory and thought-provoking. The brevity of most of the essays would make it easy to assign some of them as supplemental readings in courses on Russian literature and on relations between Russia and the West.

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Andrei P. Tsygankov, *Russia and America: The Asymmetric Rivalry*, Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2019, viii. 245pp. Index. $24.95, Paper.

Historical debate about the current state of affairs between the United States and Russia centers around an integral question: Are we in the midst of another Cold War? Andrei Tsygankov gives a resounding "no" in his book, *Russia and America: The Asymmetric Rivalry*. He vehemently asserts that viewing twenty-first century relations within a Cold War framework is misleading because it "fails to grasp the nature of the contemporary world and Russia's objectives in it" (6). The Cold War narrative relied on an inherent understanding that the U.S. and former Soviet Union were formidable superpowers competing largely with just one another. Tsygankov strives to ascertain how Russia's foreign policy has altered since Vladimir Putin's return to power in 2012 and how that has contributed to a new conflict with the U.S. within the multipolarity of the post-Cold War period.

Tsygankov attempts to reach a Western readership overwrought with what he considers unjust Russophobia exacerbated by media mischaracterizations. Yet his staunchly revisionist approach will likely alienate those who adhere to the more widely accepted post-revisionist scholarship that understands the complexities in which both countries have exacerbated geopolitical tensions. Tsygankov instead argues that the U.S. is to blame for everything from the escalating crises in Ukraine and Crimea to information wars to Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. His selective and sometimes conflicting use of evidence for these declarations is problematic. For instance, he asserts that the West's "lack of recognition of Russia's interests" resulted in Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea (1). He tacitly agrees with former Ambassador Jack Matlock's assertion that Ukraine is a state rather than a nation. Matlock bases that declaration on the belief that the haphazard way in which Ukraine was assembled in the aftermath of World War II led to its current disunity. Tsygankov blames America rather than failed post-war negotiations for depriving Russia of "great power status" (193). Yet he earlier justifies Russia's expansion into Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea as analogous to when European countries sought to preserve and enhance their influence with the establishment of colonies in the 18th and 19th centuries (8-9).

Tsygankov's approach therefore hinges on the underlying attempt to absolve Russia of all responsibility without sufficient incorporation of evidence to substantiate such generalizations. According to him, Russia's information war is merely a defensive effort to "confuse and disorient the West" (148); yet what of the misinformation spread within Russia's domestic borders? Tsygankov admits that Russia's interference in the U.S. 2016 presidential election is "likely," but declares its motives as simply for "power-demonstration purposes" (165). This simplification omits evidence as to the extensive social media campaign carried out by the Internet Research Agency (IRA) with Project Lakhta and the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Russian Army (GRU) military units 26165 and 74455 performing cyber-attacks using two forms of malware: "X-Agent" and "X-Tunnel". The Mueller Report found that over 127 million Americans had been in contact with IRA-controlled accounts. Tsygankov's declaration that Russia only carried out such extensive interference to demonstrate that it could is perplexing and worrisome. Other issues receive similar justifications by Tsygankov. He asserts that America's desire for energy dominance has given Moscow no choice but to develop its capacity as a "global middleman" (173). Yet he fails to mention Russia cutting off gas to Ukraine in 2006 and 2014 – what noted strategist Timothy Ash calls energy blackmail. Tsygankov's selective use of evidence with his ambitious assertions falls into the begging the question logical fallacy; a more holistic examination would have lent greater credibility to his arguments.

Therein lies an inherent dichotomy with Tsygankov's book. Although he reprimands the West and specifically the United States for attempting to overpower Russia, he tacitly adheres to what he is admonishing – that is, that Russia is entirely dependent on the West to determine its actions (or reactions) rather than a superpower capable of taking responsibility on its own volition. If Russia's foreign policy is contingent on reacting to that of the United States, how does it expect for the West to view it with equity and parity? The Kremlin's continued – and perhaps rightful – resentment of the West's declaration of victory in the Cold War and its refusal to treat Russia in an equitable manner on the world stage has, according to Tsygankov's interpretation, created a self-fulfilling prophecy whereby Putin rails against this characterization and demands greater recognition and respect, yet then continues to react rather than act.

Greater incorporation of evidence, a more cohesive approach to assertions so as to avoid contradictions, and a more discerning analysis would have enhanced Tsygankov's overarching argument. It also would have prevented the very readership he is attempting to reach from being further alienated. The organization would have strengthened had he devoted an entire chapter to the conflicts in Ukraine and Crimea since they hold such geopolitical significance – especially in the wake of Russia's current assault on Ukraine. He discusses the regions piecemeal throughout his book, but they do not get the focused attention they deserve. Similarly, a dedicated chapter on nuclear security and a separate one on cybersecurity would have improved those analyses; that combined section is a bit choppy and does not segue cohesively between the two issues.

Despite such drawbacks, Tsygankov largely delivers on what he sets out to achieve – that is, provide an alternative examination as to why tensions continue to escalate between America and Russia. He fears that they will continue the current asymmetric rivalry with limited bouts of cooperation (193), but hopes that they can develop a mutual appreciation and "come to recognize the commonality in their perception of global threats and opportunities" (190-191). Had he taken a more post-revisionist stance with his analysis, Tsygankov would have adhered to his own aspirations, lowered the temperature on the U.S.-Russia dialogue, and set the tone for further conciliatory scholarship on such a pivotal subject.

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Aaron Weinacht. *Nikolai Chernyshevskii and Ayn Rand: Russian Nihilism Travels to America*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2021. xiii, 166 pp. Index. $95, Hardback.

Ayn Rand (1905-1982, born Alissa Rosenbaum in Saint Petersburg) loved Friedrich Nietzsche in her youth, in Russia, but later repudiated his philosophy. We know this from interviews and an abundance of other archival material, including her own marked up copies of a couple of Nietzsche's works. Nevertheless, assessing whether or to what extent Nietzsche had an influence on Rand remains difficult: it requires (*inter alia*) a knowledge of the thought of both Nietzsche and Rand, including a nuanced understanding of their different conceptions of egoism and the philosophies that underlie them, as well as a recognition of the other influences on Rand and of her originality as a philosopher. It is not enough to point to the fact that Rand knew Nietzsche's works, and that both were atheists and egoists, and thus declare that Rand was influenced by Nietzsche or was in fact Nietzschean.

As difficult as this is in the case of Nietzsche and Rand, it is considerably more so (if not impossible) for anyone attempting to establish that Nikolai Chernyshevskii (1828-1889) had an influence on her. For she never mentions Chernyshevskii—not in her published works or early journals, nor in interviews about her life in Russia, nor is there any other evidence in the substantial holdings of the Ayn Rand Archives.[1] And this difficulty persists even granting the assumption that she *had* read Chernyshevskii's *What is To Be Done?* (*Chto Delat'?*). So one not only requires the same sort of knowledge and understanding mentioned in the previous paragraph (*mutatis mutandis*), but also a healthy dose of caution concerning the limitations put on an historian of ideas inquiring into a possible Chernyshevskii-Rand connection.

Aaron Weinacht, in the monograph under review, attempts to establish such a connection: that Rand is an egoist and nihilist in part because of Chernyshevskii's influence (and that of similar figures, like Pisarev). The book consists of an introduction, four main chapters—on egoism (ch. 1), heroism and creativity (ch. 2), 'Youth, Suffering, and the Man-God problem' (ch. 3), and love, sex and gender (ch. 4)—and a brief conclusion. In my estimate, Weinacht fails to establish any of his substantive claims. This is in part because he devotes more time to derivative topics (e.g. gender and sex) and trivialities (e.g. fantasy authors who were fans of Rand) than he does to issues that should have been front and center, for instance what Rand wrote in defense of her own conception of egoism.[2] In the end, his 'demonstration' of a Chernyshevskii-Rand connection amounts to a geographical connection and historical *post hoc* argumentation (Rand came after Chernyshevskii, and being Russian must have read him) in combination with noting superficial parallels, with little attention to detail, while regularly getting Rand wrong.

I focus in what follows on two issues: Chernyshevskii's and Rand's conceptions of egoism, and Rand on nihilism in *Atlas Shrugged*. I should mention that I am a scholar of ancient Greek philosophy, as well as a Rand scholar, but that my knowledge of Chernyshevskii is limited to reading *What Is to Be Done?* in translation.[3]

Any competent comparison and analysis of the egoism of Chernyshevskii and of Rand should involve first of all determining whether either (or both) assumes or defends psychological egoism (the view that human beings simply *are* all ultimately motivated by self interest) or ethical egoism (the view that one *ought* to pursue one's own self interest). Weinacht seems unaware of this distinction. If it is established that a figure is an ethical egoist, further distinctions must be made: Is the egoism consequentialist (and if so, what kind, e.g.hedonistic), or something akin to virtue ethics, or what? Does the conception of egoism permit the sacrifice of others for one's own sake, or regard that as inconsistent with genuine self-interest?[4] These questions can be answered in detail with respect to

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[1] In interviews Rand gave in 1960-1961 (transcripts in the Ayn Rand Archives), she was specifically asked about the literature that interested her during her time in Russia.

[2] Weinacht mentions, but does not discuss with sufficient care, Rand's *The Virtue of Selfishness: A New Concept of Egoism* (New York: Signet, 1964).

[3] Nikolai Chernyshevsky, *What is To Be Done?* Translated by Michael R. Katz (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989).

[4] Weinacht claims that Chernyshevskii's egoism is similar to Rand's in not necessitating sacrifice (p. 99); but apparently, he does not think the distinction is significant, as is clear in his earlier discussion of Max Stirner (pp. 32-37), whose egoism is radically different from Rand's in this respect, though Weinacht treats them together.

Rand's egoism, but you would not know that from reading Weinacht.[5] Turning to Chernyshevskii, it is not clear what sort of egoism he defends or presupposes, if he even held a clear and consistent conception. But it does not strike me as similar to Rand's, and in any case is not based on a systematic philosophy, as hers is. As far as I can tell, he seems to be a mix of psychological and ethical (particularly hedonistic) egoism, and it is an egoism that he considered consistent with socialism—which itself (*pace* Weinacht, pp. 52-53 n. 96) makes it markedly different from Rand's egoism.[6]

When we turn to Rand's purported nihilism, Weinacht is even worse, for Rand is not a different kind of nihilist, rather she saw herself as *combating* the growing nihilism in Western culture. Part of the problem is that Weinacht does not make clear what he thinks nihilism is. He seems to equate it with regarding the ego as of primary importance, and rejecting traditional religion. Even so, he should not have missed these descriptions (a mere sample) of the views of the *villains* in *Atlas Shrugged*:[7] the "emotion which they preach as an ideal: Indifference—the blank—the zero—the mark of death" (p. 741); their "ultimate ideal, the triumph over life, the zero!" (p. 931); "the collapse to full depravity, the Black Mass of the worship of death, the dedication of your consciousness to the destruction of existence" (1020); they are "worshippers of the zero" (p. 1024); "the ideal they strive for: the reign of the zero" (p. 1037). Weinacht does not discuss these passages, and seems (oddly) to be unaware of them.

The difference between Rand's opposition to nihilism and (for instance) Dostoyevsky's, is that whereas Dostoyevsky saw God and religion as the only alternative to nihilism, Rand saw traditional religion itself as a *form* of nihilism. John Galt, a hero in *Atlas Shrugged*, critiquing religion, states (p. 1035):

> All their identifications consist of negating: [...] God is non-man, heaven is non-earth, soul is non-body, virtue is non-profit. A is non-A, perception is non-sensory, knowledge is non-reason. Their definitions are not acts of defining, but of wiping out.

In her view, the alternative to nihilism (secular or religious) is a philosophy grounded in reason and a recognition of the nature of existence, including human nature.

It is noteworthy that Rand calls Stavrogin, a nihilist in the novel *Demons*,

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[5] Weinacht seems unaware of most of the scholarly literature on Rand's egoism—for instance, Tara Smith, *Ayn Rand's Normative Ethics: The Virtuous Egoist* (Cambridge University Press, 2006), and Allan Gotthelf and James Lennox eds., *Metaethics, Egoism, and Virtue: Studies in Ayn Rand's Normative Theory* (University of Pittsburgh Press, 2011).

[6] Gregory Salmieri, "Egoism and Altruism: Selfishness and Sacrifice," in Allan Gotthelf and Gregory Salmieri eds., *A Companion to Ayn Rand* (Wiley-Blackwell, 2016), briefly contrasts Rand's conception of egoism with "egoistic consequentialism," which includes Epicurus, Hobbes, and Chernyshevskii—Chernyshevskii's egoism being in his view hedonistic (pp. 133-134). Weinacht cites this discussion (p. 52 n. 80), but misses Salmieri's point.

[7] Ayn Rand, *Atlas Shrugged* (New York: Random House, 1957).

"one of Dostoyevsky's most repulsively evil characters."[8] An historian of Russia writing on Rand and nihilism, who mentions the *Demons* and Stavrogin (p. 33), should not have missed this. More to the point, Weinacht could not have integrated this into his claims about Rand's supposed nihilism. But he seems to think that mentioning Rand and Stavrogin in the same passage counts as evidence that Russian nihilism had an influence on Rand. The book is riddled with such 'connections'.

An historian of philosophy requires two competencies: an historian's knowledge of the relevant facts of the life of the philosopher one is writing about and her historical and intellectual context, and a philosopher's knowlege of the views and arguments of that philosopher. It can be difficult to find the right balance, and historians can go wrong in different directions. One way, clearly evident in Weinacht's book, is by paying too little attention to the philosopher's actual ideas and the arguments meant to support them, focusing instead on historical context, and assuming from the outset that her philosophy as been determined by it.

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Fisher, Steven. *Into Russia's Cauldron, An American Vision, Undone; The Newly Revealed Century-Old Eyewitness Journal of Leighton W. Rogers*. Chicago: Forest Cat Productions, 2021. 427 pp., maps, photographs, index, epilogue, paper, $24.99.

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While working as an employee of Citibank of New York at its Kiev, Ukraine branch in 2017, Steven Fisher discovered by chance information relating to a journal that Leighton Rogers kept in Petrograd during the Russian Revolution of 1917. This manuscript was later found in the Library of Congress and is the subject of this book, along with Fisher's introductory material. Rogers had been recruited by Frank Vanderlip, director of National City Bank (NCB), Citibank's predecessor, who saw an opportunity for American banking expansion in Russia, and decided to open a new branch in Petrograd, prominently located on the left bank of the Neva across the river from the Peter and Paul Fortress. Rogers was one of a contingent of recent ivy-league college graduates recruited for the job.

During the volatile year of 1917, while dodging occasional gunfire and forced to eat many meals and sleeping nights at the bank, the contingent also dined out frequently and attended concerts, operas, and other Petrograd venues. They seemed to realize only late that they were "standing on a volcano," as Ralph Barnes described American Ambassador David Francis at that time. The fledgling bankers of NCB also seemed unaware of many other well-funded Americans in the city who made possible the initial success of the bank.

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[8] "What is Romanticism?" in Ayn Rand, *The Romantic Manifesto* (New York: Signet, 1975), p. 107.

As Lyubov Ginsburg's dissertation (completed in 2010) on the American community in the city, cited in the bibliography, and the late Vladimir Noskov's epic study (published in St. Petersburg in 2018) on the American diplomatic colony (embassy and consulate) noted many other Americans resided in the city, ranging from followers of the American Methodist church through an expanded embassy and its new Second Division, under Basil Miles, that supervised the neutral care of German and Austrian prisoners of war, many of the latter would form the Czechoslovak Legion. They also included contingents of American Red Cross, the YMCA, the staff of New York Life, the largest insurance company in Russia, that occupied a prominent symbol of the United States in the "Singer building" on Nevsky Prospect. In addition, there were the members and large staffs of the Root and Stevens Commissions as well as a veritable horde of journalists who descended on the city to explore the "Russian experiment" for readers at home. All sought a reliable place to keep money.

Though betraying signs of amateurishness (his first book), Steven Fisher deserves credit for employing excellent secondary sources–Figes, Kennan, Hasegawa, Foglesong, Pipes, and others--and including the works of contemporaries of Rogers, such as John Reed, Albert Rhys Williams, and Pauline Crosby, and several more, and especially for rescuing this manuscript from archival oblivion. This is an important story of an interesting, even exciting American chapter in the Russian Revolution.

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Benjamin Tromly, *Cold War Exiles and the CIA: Plotting to Free Russia*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2019, xv, 329 pp. Index, $45, Hardcover.

Legend has it that Henry Kissinger, when asked why academic politics were so vicious, replied, "Because the stakes are so small." Benjamin Tromly's *Cold War Exiles and the CIA* demonstrates that the same is true of émigré politics. In it, he traced the history of various anti-Soviet organizations created by and for Russian émigrés, and the role of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in them, from 1945 to the early 1960s.

This history is kaleidoscopic. As Tromly observes, Russia's émigré community in western Europe and the United States consisted of monarchists who had fled the 1917 Revolution, Social Democrats who had fled the Bolshevik and Stalinist terrors, collaborators with Nazi Germany who fled the advancing Red Army, and (eventually) defectors fleeing the bland squalor of postwar Russia. Each group had *very* different ideas not only about how Russia should develop but about what it was. They agreed only in their fear of and contempt for other émigré groups that represented various ethnic groups within the old Russian Empire, particularly Ukrainians. To make matters worse, this motley crew and the organizations through which they worked had to deal with constant efforts of Soviet intelligence to disrupt their operations. Undoubtedly some influential figures in these organizations were Soviet agents.

The CIA nevertheless forged ties with and provided vital support for these organizations. In some cases, it created them. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, Josef Stalin completely cut Russia off from the rest of the world, creating a major problem for outsiders who wanted to know what was going on there, much less to influence events. Émigrés offered a window into this world, however imperfect, and the CIA exploited them. For their part, émigrés often lived precarious lives in New York, Paris, or West Germany. The CIA offered them a purpose and income. Émigrés gathered intelligence and, more important, participated in "psychological warfare" designed to destabilize the Soviet government. Unfortunately, most of these efforts yielded little if any fruit. Radio Liberty, which the CIA created for émigrés to broadcast their message to Russia and eastern Europe, was the exception, providing modest but solid service throughout the Cold War. Throughout, émigrés feuded constantly with each other, often in public, often to the dismay of their American handlers. By the early 1960s, the CIA had largely abandoned the project, recognizing that it had not gained much from its involvement with émigrés. Meanwhile, the "Thaw" in Soviet society after Stalin's death created better opportunities to gather intelligence.

Benjamin Tromly has done a very good job of discovering and recounting this story. It has no central narrative, and archival sources are scattered and, in many cases, classified. To present a comprehensive, coherent account of this subject is a technical achievement of the first magnitude. The book's chief weakness is its subject. In the end, the activities of these émigrés had little impact on anyone besides themselves, their CIA handlers, and their KGB watchers. They do not seem to have affected the course of the Cold War at all. The book is valuable as a window on émigré politics in general, which are the same everywhere. *Cold War Exiles and the CIA* is perhaps most useful for the light it sheds on Russian identity, or rather identities. All nations are, to some degree, works in progress, but that is particularly the case with Russia. Émigrés included monarchists, social democrats, and fascists who all agreed on nothing except that Russia should be great. Seventy-five years of communism did nothing to resolve this question. Is Russia part of the west or a distinct civilization? Is its character autocratic or democratic? Like the émigrés Tromly studies, today's Russians agree on little except that they should possess Ukraine.

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