
The release of Ackerman’s work, which took place on the eve of the 100th anniversary of the Great Russian Revolution, emphasizes the relevance of the study of significant episodes in the political biographies of its key figures. As the subject of his research, the author chose the ten-week stay of L. D. Trotsky in 1917 in New York. Western and Russian historiography has already developed certain approaches to the study of this event. In contrast with the works of A. C. Sutton *Wall Street and the Bolshevik Revolution*, (1974), J. Nedava *Trotsky and the Jews*, (1971), that specify certain conceptual framework in the explanation of this episode, Ackerman’s research is aimed at considering the facts from different angles—political, psychological, conspiracy, etc. The task implemented by the author—to investigate a historical event from different points of view—is reflected in the style and structure of text, combining two levels—artistic and scientific.

In the presentation of the actual material Ackerman from the beginning follows the narrative style, the focus of which is the original structure of the composition, built on the geographical principle—the location of Trotsky in New York. The title of every chapter, as a place-name, defines the specific plot of the narrative and binds the movement of Trotsky around New York City with events in the world of politics. The stylistic features of the text include cinematic historical description. It is created with the help of a technique which is analogical to the movie flashbacks—when the chronological series of 1917 is interrupted by the inclusion of episodes from the previous time. Thus, the presentation of the New York odyssey of Trotsky is supplemented by information about his participation in the first Russian revolution, exiles to Siberia, past relationships with immigrants, etc.
Turning to the scientific component of the text, it is worth noting that the book presents a fresh look at one of the short-term and at the same time intricate episodes of Trotsky’s political biography. The historian traces Trotsky’s entire journey in New York, from his arrival there aboard the “Montserrat” on January 13, 1917 to his departure to Russia in May 1917, interpreting the stages of this journey in the context of the most important events of the early 20th century history. The book shows how Trotsky’s political biography was associated with a complex set of domestic and foreign policy factors in Russian, European and American history. Analyzing Trotsky’s publicist and propaganda activities, Ackerman skillfully demonstrates the growing radicalism of Trotsky’s political thinking and behavior. The content of the radical views is revealed quite laconically: “That to him was revolution: taking power and keeping it” (p. 83). These views are explained not only by ideological preferences, but also by the growing course of events, pushing the energetic politician to take action in emigration. The author emphasizes the special influence that discussions of the previous and New York periods with the key leaders of the political opposition – Lenin, Bukharin, Parvus—had on the revolutionary consciousness of Trotsky of that time.

From the scientific point of view, significant is the development of the problem of Trotsky’s connection with the American socialist movement, and the definition of his role in this movement. The author notes that, once in New York, Trotsky sought to influence the strategy of the American Socialist Party, pushing it to greater radicalism in opposition to the regime and active participation in international events, which provoked mixed reactions in American socialist circles and negative political consequences for the movement on the whole. On the one hand, it is shown how some figures of the American socialist movement, including its leader Morris Hillquit, reacted negatively to interference in their internal affairs; on the other hand, it is noted that some of them were influenced by the Russian revolutionary. The causes of the differences between Trotsky and Hillquit, according to Ackerman, consisted in the fact that Trotsky was not sufficiently competent in the matters of American policy and was guided by ideological templates. “He had no concept of the brewing passions in America over joining the European fight and no idea how politics worked in New York City.” (62)

The author includes in the chapter “Riverside Drive,” a substantial body of material on the peculiarities of the American Socialist Party under the leadership of Hillquit at the beginning of the twentieth century. Evaluating its activity from the point of view of radicalism advocated by Trotsky, Ackerman comes to the conclusion that it was far from revolutionary strategies of the realization of the Marxist doctrine in practice which was rather an efficient political brand for the party. “The new party transformed Marxism into a distinctly American brand.” (69) Thus, the characteristics of the work of The American Socialist Party revealed by the author allow to explain the specificity of its position in relation to the world war and the decisive events of the revolutionary movement, such as the conference in Zimmerwald. The book suggests that due to the small numbers and locality of influence, the party could not become a leading force in American politics, and Trotsky’s radicalism only aggravated its position.
Concerning the source base of the research, it should be noted that the author mainly uses the American periodicals of that time: newspapers like The Guardian, The New York American, The New York Times, The New York Tribune, etc., which makes it possible to understand the state of American public opinion, as well as to identify the degree of Trotsky’s influence on him. In addition to periodicals, certainly valuable are the archive data from the following sources: British National Archives, Hoover’s Institution Archives: Albert Glotzer Collection, and a number of others. The author also actively engages the memoir literature and accounts of the witnesses of those events: from Trotsky’s autobiography, My Life, to the memoirs of his childhood friend Grigory Ziv, of the American politician Ludwig Lore, and others. In general, the sources used give an opportunity of the comprehensive analysis and reconstruction of the various facts of Trotsky’s New York saga.

The criticisms relate to the following aspects of the work. First of all, in Chapter 11, “Spy Versus Spy,” which sets out the material on the participation of the British spy William Wiseman in the American political affairs, the nature of his relationship with Trotsky is not fully clarified. Secondly, the stylistic features of the text create eclecticism in the presentation of certain sections of the actual historical material. Thirdly, there is some bias in the assessment of certain historical figures and previous periods of Russian history. Nevertheless, the existing shortcomings do not diminish the scientific value of Ackerman’s research and the work is a certain contribution to the development of the themes of the great Russian Revolution and American-Russian relations of the early twentieth century.

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Three Duke University seniors contemplating what to do on their winter semester break in 2013, on an apparent whim, decide to celebrate Christmas in Mongolia. Why not? The next question was: How do we get there? Through Russia, of course. The narrator of this adventure is a second generation Indian American (he mentions visiting a grandmother in New Delhi). The others are his roommate Jeremy and another Indian friend, Avi. The book consists of 22 short chronological chapters, each followed by a brief one or two page “lesson”, a digression or commentary on the experience of the preceding chapter, such as comments on American and Russian racism. It is a nice, appropriate arrangement that evokes the experiences of many American novices traveling through Russia since the 18th century.

Moreover, this trip is undertaken with little advance planning and on a shoestring, that is third class travel all the way. They do manage to arrange advance reservations at hostels in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and a few other places on
their journey, but they start off without any study of the language or the country. Above all, they pack sparingly, not taking into account the weather in Siberia in December (one photograph depicts Avi standing in the snow in athletic shorts). They, nevertheless, have a great time, marveling at Red Square in Moscow, and the Hermitage in St. Petersburg, to which they go back for a second visit, getting lost in maze of unfamiliar streets, and enduring what cheap food might be found along the way, and, above all enjoying their encounters with a mix of Russian traveling companions. Of course, no other Americans would be found on the Trans-Siberian in December, at least in third class.

These three Duke musketeers go out of their way to meet people, who they find overall friendly and understanding, though amazed at finding that they do not fit the American stereotype, as brown skinned Americans traveling with a white friend. One highlight is when a teenage Russian hockey team gather in their small compartment on the Trans-Siberian to share information in broken English and sign language, for a whole day! They especially enjoy their Irkutsk stopover for their first showers in five days and to see pristine Lake Baikal, and then on to their destination, Ulan Bator, for Christmas. They leave by separate paths to South Korea and the Philippines.

The three Trans-Siberian, round the world, travelers apparently had a bonding experience and have since journeyed together to see Argentina, Morocco, and South Africa. But the author concludes, “There will never be another trip like the Trans-Siberian.” Vijay Menon graduated with degrees in Statistics and Economics and as the Duke Debate Champion and began work for Microsoft in Seattle. The book, amply provided with amateur photographs of the trip, is an easy read that may recall similar experiences by many readers.

Norman Saul
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Jenifer Parks’s well-written study tells the story of Soviet sports officials’ engagement with the Olympic Movement from the U.S.S.R.’s entrance into the Helsinki Olympic Games in 1952 through 1980 when Moscow became the first socialist city to host the Summer Games. Parks draws on the archival records of the All-Union Committee on Physical Culture and Sport of the Soviet Union (Sports Committee), the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and the International Olympic Committee (IOC) in order to detail the relationship between Soviet sports bureaucrats on the one hand, and Communist Party leaders and international sports officials on the other. Parks casts the U.S.S.R.’s integration into the Olympiad as a pivotal moment in Cold War relations that provided vital space for peaceful interaction and cultural exchange. By the late 1950s, international sports relations
became an integral component of Soviet foreign policy thanks to the hard work of Soviet sports bureaucrats whose skillful negotiations made the U.S.S.R.’s commitment to and influence on the Olympic Movement a reality. Indeed, Parks uses the agency that sports administrators exercised to shed light on the broader processes of decision-making within the Soviet party-state which she insists were hardly irrational (contrary to popular perception) when compared with Western political systems.

Despite the domestic climate of anti-cosmopolitanism that was so characteristic of late Stalinism, chapter one discusses how Soviet sports officials successfully made the case to Party leaders that the Olympic Games would provide the U.S.S.R. with an international platform to display “the superior technique and training achieved by the Soviet system of mass collective physical culture” (23). In addition to meeting the prerogatives of Party authorities, Soviet sports administrators deftly navigated the requirements and priorities of IOC officials who expressed concern over amateurism in a state-run system like the U.S.S.R. Their invocation of the discourse of peace that was central to both Soviet and Olympic ideals ultimately helped them to realize their goal of sending a Soviet team to Helsinki. Parks thus casts Soviet sports administrators as adept political actors whose “bureaucratic skill to co-opt ideological language and to cultivate personal patronage was perfected in the Soviet party-state system and transferred easily to the Olympic arena” (24).

The United States and Soviet Union dominated the Olympic Movement after the latter’s entrance in 1952. Yet the period corresponding with the reign of Nikita Khrushchev, the focus of chapter 2, was the time when “Soviet athletes secured their status as the dominant sports power, winning the most medals at every Olympic Summer and Winter Games held between 1956 and 1964” (34). In addition to establishing the authority of Soviet athletes on the world stage and making technical perfection a long term legacy of Soviet influence, Soviet sports authorities aspired to “‘democratize’ the arena of international sports. Their vision of democratization entailed dismantling the IOC and International Federations as “Eurocentric gentlemen’s clubs,” making women’s sports a major component of the Olympiad, and expanding the Games to increase the number of participating countries especially those aligned with the U.S.S.R. (35). The organization of track and field competitions between the United States and Soviet Union from the late 1950s through the mid-1980s constituted one significant consequence of the cultural exchange agreement that leaders signed in 1958. These track and field meets, Parks argues, facilitated the professionalization of the sport, and fostered the growth of track and field as a women’s sport in the United States.

The long process that allowed the U.S.S.R. to become the first socialist country to host the Olympiad in 1980 commands the focus of the book’s final three chapters. Soviet sports bureaucrats were not deterred by their failed 1970 bid to host the 1976 Olympics. Instead, they learned from their errors and got an early start in cultivating support among international sport officials for their 1974 bid to host the 1980 Summer Olympics. Parks credits Leonid Brezhnev with sharing sports administrators’ desire to host the Olympiad. Soviet officials
took the task of hosting the Games seriously and traveled to previous host cities, namely Montreal and Munich in order to draw from their foreign colleagues’ expertise. Sports bureaucrats wanted to use the Games to showcase the superiority of the Soviet way of life yet they had to navigate the challenge that the Soviet economy did not produce the updated sports equipment and supplies that foreign athletes and officials expected. Parks attributes the success of the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games despite the boycott of sixty nations to the professionalism and managerial skill of sport bureaucrats at all levels. As Parks contends, although Brezhnev’s policy of lifelong job security fostered indifference and corruption “it also provided the experienced cadres necessary to make the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow succeed” (109). The persistent efforts of Soviet authorities to democratize the Olympic Movement by including more non-European nations also manifested in the debut at the Moscow Games of non-Western countries like Vietnam, Botswana, and Mozambique. Therefore, even in the face of the Politburo’s devastating decision to invade Afghanistan in 1979 Parks posits that developed socialism could still make possible a major achievement like the Olympic Games.

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In this wide-ranging book historian Erin Elizabeth Redihan examines the dynamics of Cold War competition involving the Olympic Games. She argues that from 1948 to 1968, “the United States and the Soviet Union sought to ‘win’ the Games via all possible means, using success on the world’s most visible playing field as a Cold War barometer” (93). A matchup of the USSR and the US did not simply offer an exciting athletic event, but a “contest of east versus west, Moscow versus Washington, communism versus capitalism” (1). In other words, these competitions functioned as “proxy Cold War battlegrounds” (4). The book analyzes how athletics played an expanding role in each superpower’s tactical plan and drew increasing support from key political leaders.

The Summer Olympics of 1936 in Berlin and 1980 in Moscow have received significant attention from scholars. This book provides a comparative analysis of interaction between these years, which has been the focus of less research by academic historians. The USSR joined the International Olympic Committee in 1951, so it did not compete until 1952; the survey ends in 1968 due the rise of US-Soviet détente and the increasing global and commercial complexity of the Games.

The volume progresses chronologically, dedicating one chapter to the Summer and Winter Games of 1948 (London and St. Moritz), 1952 (Helsinki and Oslo), 1956 (Melbourne and Cortina d’Ampezzo), 1960 (Rome and Squaw Valley), 1964
(Tokyo and Innsbruck), 1968 (Mexico City and Grenoble). The author provides helpful context for this survey by providing an introduction to the pre-World War II development of the culture of sports in the US and the USSR. Each chapter balances discussion of prominent issues faced at each Games with the political contexts of the Cold War; descriptions of heated rivalries in basketball and hockey appear alongside debates on visa denials, funding for athletes, and recognition of national Olympic teams. The work focuses more on organizational issues rather than the experiences of athletes or the strategies of coaches. The discussion utilizes a variety of primary sources, such as documents from the archives of the International Olympic Committee and the papers of Avery Brundage, and contemporary media sources, such as articles from *Sports Illustrated*. The book relies heavily on English-language sources, so readers will need to consult other studies for details on issues within Soviet or other national programs.

Several key themes emerge in multiple chapters: the controversial views of Avery Brundage, the debate over recognition of independent West and East German teams, defections of athletes, views on amateur and professional athletes, increasing globalization, the role of television, and rising commercialization. Avery Brundage served as president of the International Olympic Committee from 1952 to 1972; he has been the only US citizen to fill this role. He strongly supported requiring amateur status for athletes, although he turned a “blind eye” to Soviet financial support of Olympians (15). Brundage attempted to ensure a measure of separation between sport and politics, but this was often impossible. On more than one occasion he stated that “the Olympic Games are contests between individuals and not between nations” (23).

The book features two of the most visible Olympic episodes which fused political and athletic conflict during the era of this book: the 1956 brawl between Soviet and Hungarian water polo players and the 1968 Black Power salutes by US track medal winners Tommie Smith and John Carlos. The Soviet invasion of Hungary fueled the water polo conflict in Melbourne, while the controversial 1968 display in Mexico City reflected US racial injustice—which was highlighted by Soviet journalists. Throughout the book, the author demonstrates that for Cold War-era US leaders, “beating Moscow on the playing field was critical to beating Moscow in the wider Cold War” (25). Olympic success was valued even more highly as evidence of national ability and spirit within the USSR: However important sport was to American society and politics during the Cold War, it was even more so behind the Iron Curtain because it fulfilled so many purposes. The Soviets shared the emphasis placed on the Olympics and international athletic competition more broadly that characterized American sport during the Cold War. Like the United States, Moscow began to view Olympic achievement as a means of demonstrating political supremacy after World War II. . . . The Soviet Union also used sport to demonstrate the superiority of the communist way of life to its satellites. . . (49-50).

The centralized government of the USSR provided more direct support for its Olympic program than the US administration. As a result, Soviet athletes faced stricter regulations of public activity and communication.
This is an engaging volume which thoughtfully examines the energy, tensions, conflicts, and paradoxes of the Olympics during the Cold War. Instructors in undergraduate world, US, European, and Russian history courses should consider the adoption of this helpful book due to the clarity of the survey and the presentation of multiple issues for classroom discussions.

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Most existing scholarship examines the pivotal Cold War period on a global scale. Although the focus of Cold War discussions varies between politics, socio-cultural exchanges, brinkmanship incidents, and Third World hotspots, the general consensus is the same: the Cold War proved a seminal chapter in international relations. One of the key figures from this period—the prominent U.S. statesman and former ambassador George Frost Kennan—often factors into the ongoing historical dialogue. His daughter, Grace, witnessed Kennan’s participation in strategic historical events that played out on the international stage. Yet her memoir entitled *Daughter of the Cold War* characterizes Kennan not as the “Father of Containment,” but rather as the more important role he played to Grace and her siblings—that simply as father.

Grace Kennan Warnecke deftly weaves the personal with the political. The Cold War may have gained Kennan and his unwavering expertise and devotion to the State Department, but that service often cost Grace her father. She recounts the constant travels and travails caused by her father’s governmental positions. Her memoir’s first portions depict an insecure girl feverishly in pursuit of her parents’ affections. As Grace encapsulates early in her accounts: “He [Kennan] cast an enormous shadow, under which I was both nurtured and hidden” (xi-xii). A former escort officer who had known Kennan during his time in Berlin described him as God, to which Grace retorted, “Well, I am only the daughter of God” (253). The old adage about how one should never meet one’s hero reverberates throughout *Daughter of the Cold War*; she greatly admired Kennan’s contributions to U.S. foreign policy yet often resented his detachment as a father figure. Grace asserts that she was “both admiring and critical of my father…His gifts left me with feelings of inadequacy that took a lifetime to combat” (275). She sheepishly admits that she did not read Kennan’s seminal article “The Sources of Soviet Conduct” in *Foreign Affairs* at the time of its publication and expresses heartache when the Soviet Union declared Kennan persona non grata. Grace’s conflicted feelings toward Kennan are evident throughout her memoir and lend her writing a potency that illustrates a fresh, personal dimension to chilly Cold War relations.

Grace’s writing comes alive when she begins coming into her own. Her life is filled with veritable contributions to key historical events in their own right: she...
tended to Josef Stalin’s daughter, Svetlana, after she defected to the West in 1967; she traveled with Senator Ted Kennedy and his family to visit Leonid Brezhnev in 1974; her dabbling photographic endeavors led to her taking the lead photographs in *TIME* of the attempted assassination of President Gerald Ford; and she traveled with noted singer and activist Joan Baez to Moscow in 1978. While developing SOVUS Business Consultants around the time of the Soviet Union’s dissolution, Grace Kennan Warnecke met then deputy mayor of St. Petersburg Vladimir Putin. As she asserts, “If someone had told me that I had just talked for thirty minutes with the future president of Russia, I would have thought the person delusional” (229). Grace’s excursions therefore placed her at the forefront of history. Grace found solid footing by using her expertise in Russian language and culture to embark on a series of business ventures. Whereas her father altered the trajectory of the Cold War on the political scale, Grace took a more grassroots approach to foreign affairs. In the 1980s she became a part-time consultant for Business Executives for National Security (BENS). The organization was concerned with how Cold War defense costs affected America’s economy. She became an associate producer for the groundbreaking documentaries *The First Fifty Years* and *Inside Russia*. She was the U.S. Director of the Alerdinck Foundation which sought to end the Cold War by bringing together correspondents from the East and West. She saw the potential in using music to bring harmony to U.S.-Soviet relations, serving as executive director of the American Soviet Youth Orchestra. The program proved so beneficial that it continued for fifteen years. Her dedication to service has been unrelenting. She became the vice president of the Alliance of American and Russian Women (AARW). The organization helped Russian women engage in business enterprises. She was in Moscow for one of the AARW conferences when the attempted coup against Mikhail Gorbachev took place. Grace therefore found herself immersed in groundbreaking historical events—though this time on her own accord as opposed to that of her father. Such prestigious accolades and ventures garnered Grace the attention she had desired for so long from her father: “I ended up with the experience that my father regretted he never had: living in Russia side by side with Russians. He had been largely confined to the embassy and the regulated diplomatic life, while I was spending days in a hick town in the Leningrad oblast. Later he admitted how much he envied me. I felt in some way vindicated” (254). It is heart-wrenching to read Grace’s compelling life events and feel the slight despair that she still had not stepped away from her father’s shadow. It is not until her recent stay in Ukraine as director of the Women’s Economic Empowerment Program (WEE) that she finally asserts: “Everything had finally come into focus. I had become someone who made a difference” (271).

Grace Kennan Warnecke is a pivotal historical figure in her own right. Her grassroots contributions to U.S.-Soviet and now U.S.-Russia relations have placed her not on the fringe of history but squarely enmeshed at its heart. She has successfully stepped away from her father’s shadow and has long since embarked on her own life’s trajectory. This is readily apparent based on the events she recounts in *Daughter of the Cold War*. Her memoir makes a seemingly inaccessible time
relatable and personal. The interspersed moments of teenage insecurities, erudite observations about domestic and foreign policies, and compelling contributions to grassroots endeavors successfully humanize a rather contentious historical period. When Grace shared her aspirations of writing her memoirs with her father, his response was a mere “‘Well, you could’” (xiii). She could indeed and the existing Cold War scholarship is that much richer for it.

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