Contents

The Artist-Nomad

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"We're not breaking the frame. We're outside all the frames, in between them. We were born in a time of broken frames."
—Alexander Melamid

When Ronald Reagan infamously declared the Soviet Union to be the "Evil Empire," and Margaret Thatcher accused labor unions of being socialist "enemies within," they were merely articulating a widely accepted understanding of Cold War politics: a perception that one must side with either capitalism or socialism, and that the two systems are mutually exclusive. From this binary point of view, it was assumed that when a group of dissident Soviet artists arrived in the West, their art would be strongly anti-communist and feed into Western society's self-congratulatory sense of superiority. However, many of these artists were quickly disillusioned with capitalism upon arrival in New York and, rather than adopting a pro-Western philosophy, these refugees remained highly skeptical of both dominant systems of government. The predetermined expectation that their art would express a pro-Western viewpoint led many observers into premature, misguided interpretations. "I think we are accepted here as artists ninety percent because we're exotic. Russian," artist Alexander Melamid said at the time, "So people think of what we're doing in ways that are completely strange to me, completely different from what we think we're doing...I feel like a fool." Artists like Melamid soon realized that the enthusiasm surrounding their art had much more to do with the fact that their work was being read as Cold War propaganda, than it did with the actual artistic messages they were attempting to convey.

Confronted with viewer expectations to create anti-Soviet, pro-Western artworks, artists more explicitly turned their critical lens on a dual criticism of both political frameworks. Emblematic of this shift in focus is Alexander Kosolapov's *Coca-Cola Lenin* (1980). On its surface the work immediately betrays a certain level of contempt toward both Leninist ideology as well as Western corporate capitalism. Far from dispassionate political critique, the work is a very personal, self-critical reflection of the fact that at different points in his life, Kosolapov was deeply invested in the ideology of both. Kosolapov was raised in

the Soviet system and, like all children, was taught about the virtues of socialism and the inevitability of communist utopia. At some point, however, he became disillusioned with official ideology, like many Soviet citizens. While attending an International Youth Festival, he found himself in the American section: "The Coca-Cola company gave away free samples. This was like a dreamland for me. This was American culture…The taste of Coke was like the milk of paradise." As with many youth of Kosolapov's generation, dissatisfaction with official culture manifested as a fascination with Western society.

Alexander Kosolapov, *Coca-Cola Lenin*, 1980

Created in Cold War-era New York, the work was immediately interpreted as an affront to Coca-Cola's image by suggesting Lenin's endorsement. The fondness with which Kosolapov recalls his first encounter with Coca-Cola makes such a definition seems unlikely, or at the very least, incomplete. To read this work as an attack on Coca-Cola assumes a negative value judgment toward Lenin. Indeed, the work would have been equally outrageous in Soviet Russia, but for precisely the opposite reason: rather than Lenin's presence sullying the reputation of Coca-Cola, it would have been the association with Coca-Cola which compromises Lenin's image. The power of the work lies precisely in the tensions between Leninism and capitalism and the tremendous feelings of ambivalence the artist feels toward each. This ambivalence, it's worth noting, is not an indecision or lack of strong feelings toward either, but the more precise meaning of the word which is both a strong attachment and repulsion toward the object. Such conflicted emotions are apparent in Kosolapov's own reflections on the work: "Somehow the two paradises came together in that work with Lenin and Coca-Cola. I found in them a meaning of paradise—one, a paradise lost, the other, not quite found." The disappointment expressed in this statement is palpable and is directly re-

lated to the artist's experience at the International Youth Festival which portended every intention of embracing Western culture. Like many Soviets who left the U.S.S.R. and were confronted with the realities of living in the West, Kosolapov found himself caught in a liminal state of homelessness—no longer Soviet, but not quite American. The artist's dispossession is made manifest in the way he describes his work in spatial terms. Specifically, he envisions the work as inhabiting the space between two non-existent paradises; a utopia (literally, "nowhere") that is impossible to locate. Kosolapov's work is almost apophatic in that it attempts to define paradise by juxtaposing two things it is not, thereby hinting at what it is somewhere in the nebulous in-between.

The misdirected expectation that these artists would be "anti-Soviet," which led to reactions contrary to the artists' intentions, may find its roots in the misperception of them as immigrants rather than emigrants; or more precisely migrants rather than nomads. Philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari explain the difference: "The nomad is not at all the same as the migrant; for the migrant goes principally from one point to another, even if the second point is uncertain, unforeseen or not well localized. But the nomad goes from point to point only as a consequence and as a factual necessity; in principle, points for him are relays along a trajectory…Although the points determine the paths, they are strictly subordinated to the paths they determine, the reverse of what happens with the sedentary." This distinction, as it applies to these artists, suggests that they do not see themselves as Americans from Russia (as would an immigrant) nor as Russians living in America (as would an emigrant), but instead as a person disconnected from, but familiar with, both countries and systems. Theirs is not a journey from one ideological position to another. Artist-nomads move through and between the milieus of competing ideologies, often retracing their own steps, placing particular emphasis on the zones in which these milieus overlap and compete.

Because artist-nomads prioritize the paths over the points, "in-between" is often central to their practice. Such a focus is certainly evident in Kosolapov's *Coca-Cola Lenin*. To find meaning in this work, the viewer can not focus too much on any one element, but must instead balance the competing connotations of all elements together: socialist icon and capitalist logo, text and image. The flat red plane of color common to each provides a convenient setting whereby definite boundaries can not be drawn. It is in this redness that the milieus of capitalism and socialism overlap and compete; it is here that one not only is confronted by the two systems' differences but also, and perhaps especially, by the similarities that undermine the apparent polarity behind Cold War politics. In this work the nomadic Kosolapov refuses to pick sides, instead inhabiting the undefined and challenging space between socialism and capitalism.

Kosolapov's refusal to adopt a binary view of the world is mirrored in the work of other Soviet artist, such as sculptor Leonid Sokov. Sokov's works also employ the juxtaposition of eastern and western styles to relate his personal experience, albeit with less explicitly geopolitical overtones than Kosolapov. In his work Lenin and Giacometti (1989), Sokov creates a clash of two very distinct

styles of art—one representing Soviet Socialist Realism, the other western abstraction. Standing pensive and humble, hands in pockets, Lenin is executed in a typical pose repeated in the pervasive propagandistic representations of him. Lenin's introspective demeanor was a well-known trope to represent his constant attention to the problems of organization of the workers, electrification of the country, and promotion of the international proletariat. But Sokov gives him a new object of consideration—western culture. The abstract, elongated and ghostly form of Giacometti's walking man approaches Lenin, and even seems to stretch out his hand in greeting. It appears that Lenin will not return the gesture as he instead gazes back at the stranger with curiosity and some indignation. The viewer's initial reaction is one of uncomfortable humor, as it seems very strange to be confronted simultaneously with both styles of sculpture encountering each other in the same space. The viewer is also left to ponder over the artistic motivation behind this juxtaposition. First, it is useful to remember that Giacometti developed this figural style during his post-war turn from surrealism to existentialist representation. As Rosalind Krauss notes, Giacometti's elongated figures are closely related to the writings of Sartre in whose philosophy: "consciousness is always attempting to capture itself in its own mirror: seeing itself seeing, touching itself touching."

The subjects in Giacometti's work, often presented in pairs, are not encountering other personages; they represent an individual's confrontation with his or her own double. While the contemplative expression on Lenin's face has traditionally been interpreted as him thoughtfully contemplating solutions to society's issues, Sokov draws on Giacometti's existentialist content to suggest that Lenin's thoughts are also not external but introspective. Perhaps mirroring the artist's own experience, confrontation with the West leads Lenin to reevaluate accepted Soviet truisms. Of course, this work is not about Lenin the person, but Lenin as a symbol of the artist's own Soviet identity: "I—we—are culturally infected with Russian bacteria," Sokov explains, "Traces of my past are in my work when I combine, say, a traditional figure of Lenin with something based on modern Western art."[1] The sculpture stands as a symbolic, existential self-portrait of the artist as nomad. Forged out of Soviet ideology, his identity is forever locked in a tug of war between an ideology he never truly believed and another he is unable to completely accept.

An important aspect of both Kosolapov's and Sokov's works, which aligns them closely with nomadism rather than migrancy, is that not only do they not embrace and assimilate themselves into American society, they also do not self-identify with the culture that they left behind. Seeing themselves neither as Russian emigrants nor American immigrants, Sokov, Kosolapov, and other artists of their generation found themselves in an unstable and ill-defined border zone somewhere between the two ideological and cultural positions. The disconnection from their native culture experienced by dissident artist-nomads did not occur upon emigrating from the Soviet Union, but stemmed from a prior loss of faith in official ideology—or, for some, a failure to ever believe in the first place. Feel-

[1] Baigell, *Soviet Dissident Artists,* 118.

ings of cultural alienation within the Soviet Union have been expressed by many of these artists—both by those who eventually left as well as those who stayed behind in Russia. Eduard Shteinberg, who chose to remain in Russia, feels that he is nonetheless a displaced person, "I do not leave, although I know that I am an immigrant here. But to be an immigrant in the West means to be an immigrant twice."[2] Likewise, artist Mikhail Chemiakin, points out that he became dislocated long before he left Moscow in 1971, "We lived on a different planet from other Russians. We lived in a state of inner exile."[3] No doubt, emigration from the Soviet Union was nonetheless a profoundly disconcerting experience for those artists who made their way to the West. For the artist-nomad, however, the sense of loss associated with physical relocation was merely secondary to the cultural estrangement that led to their producing dissident art in the first place.

Of his own cultural alienation and his reasons for pursuing an unofficial course in his art, Sokov explains: "There was no relationship between the system and what I needed to do…I was educated in a classical mode. The world was not a classical one. I had to look at everything afresh."[4] American psychiatrist Robert Jay Lifton writes about how such realizations can play a role in alienation from one's own society. His principle of "doctrine over person" states that within totalizing systems, such as that which existed in the Soviet Union, members of society are likely to confront a situation "when there is a conflict between what one feels oneself experiencing and what the doctrine or dogma says one should experience."[5] The rigidity of the Soviet system demanded that its citizens subordinate their reality to correct party principles—this was true especially for a generation of artists who spent their childhoods under Stalinism. The inability of individuals to properly code their daily experience led to a fundamental social disconnect. Consider the following statement by the leading Soviet conceptualist Ilya Kabakov: "This awareness began in my early childhood: a feeling that the outside was not coordinated with, or is not adequate to, what's taking place inside…My problem was how to learn to have a double mind, a double life, in order to survive, so that reality wouldn't destroy me."[6] For artists such as Kabakov, the ability to cultivate a split personality was absolutely necessary for survival.[7] Not only were

[2] Ibid., 208.

[3] Ibid., 303.

[4] Ibid., 115.

[5] Robert Jay Lifton, "Cults: Religious Totalism and Civil Liberties," in *The Future of Immortality and Other Essays for a Nuclear Age* (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1987), 215.

[6] David A. Ross, "Interview," in *Ilya Kabakov,* eds. Ian Farr and John Stack (London: Phaidon Press, 2001), 11.

[7] This isolation and alienation was not unique to artists, but may have been the condition of a majority of Soviet citizens. Historian Dimitry Pospielovsky explains, "the effect of the all-penetrating terror was fear and total isolation." (Dimitry Pospielovsky, "From Gosizdat to Samizdat and Tamizdat," in *Canadian Slavic Papers / Revue Canadienne des Slavistes* (Vol. 21, No. 1, March 1978), p 47). While the death of Stalin changed the situation by degree, it was still necessary for citizens experiencing this ideological isolation to adopt survival strategies. As Alexei Yurchak suggests, this often took the form of the outward participation in the rituals of the Soviet state, accompanied with a private re-

official commissions needed to provide financial support, but unemployment was illegal in the Soviet Union. To take care of their needs and to stay out of prison, many artists were put in the difficult position of needing to create official works of propaganda in their public lives, while simultaneously opposing that very same official art in their private endeavors. "A whole generation of people had to think in a double way," explains artist Igor Makarevich, "It permeated our bodies and our blood. It became a part of our very marrow."[8]

The necessity of living a dualistic life and the resultant isolation led many artists to intellectual and ideological nomadism. This alienation was powerfully explored in Ilya Kabakov's album entitled *Sitting in the Closet Primakov* (1972-75). The albums are comprised of illustrated stories told about members of Soviet society which are, to varying degrees, a mixture of the most mundane aspects of life and fantastical whimsy inspired by Kabakov's work as a children's book illustrator. The albums also serve as semi-autobiographical stories of the artist's life in the Soviet Union. Kabakov acknowledges his connection to the stories of these protagonists and describes his reasoning, appropriately, through an ostensibly fictional eccentric in a later installation entitled *Ten Characters* (1989). In the text accompanying one of the figures, "The Person Who Describes His Life Through Characters," Kabakov writes:

> He undertook once to describe his life, mostly so that he could find out from this description who he himself was, now that he had lived more than half his life…he suddenly realized that even these variegated fragments belonged not to his single consciousness, his memory alone, but, as it were, to the most diverse and separate minds…He made a decision: to unite this diversity into a kind of artistic whole, but to allow them to enter into arguments, to outdo one another, but let all express themselves in turn…He began to work. It ended up taking the shape of 10 albums…[9]

At the end of his account, he lists off the ten albums this artist wrote, which are the exact albums Kabakov had produced while still living in the Soviet Union, including the aforementioned *Sitting in the Closet Primakov*. Because the albums are written in the manner of a children's fairy tale, the viewer is hard-pressed to extract much in the way of concrete details of the artist's life from them. It is rather akin to separating fact from fiction in Homer's *Iliad*. However, it is precisely

interpretation of that ideology. But even in such instances where a person's reinterpretation of ideology allowed them to view themselves as good citizens, the system still required a double existence to which public performance clashed with private practice (Yurchak, "Soviet Hegemony of Form").

[8] Baigell, *Soviet Dissident Artists,* 286.

[9] Ilya Kabakov, *Ten Characters,* ed. James Lingwood, trans. Cynthia Martin, Todd Bludeau, Sabina Perkeland Ruth Barton (London: ICA, 1989), 34-35.

Kabakov's fantastical style that lends the folios their unique ability to convey to the viewer what it felt like to live under Soviet dictatorship—a potent mixture of anxiety, fear, boredom, and protocol.

The tale of Primakov, for instance, spread across forty-seven pages, relates the experience of a young boy who has begun to feel himself estranged within his own family and home. The first page is completely black and from the text we learn that it is the view of a young boy sitting in a closet who refuses to come out. Over the next few pages the image remains completely dark, and Primakov's other senses, in the absence of sight, are heightened as he listens intently to banal, everyday noises such as his sister doing her homework or the wind blowing outside. Using Primakov, Kabakov conveys his own feelings of isolation as he realizes the world is not like what he was told. Disillusionment and boredom cause Primakov (Kabakov's alter-ego) to reconsider the smallest details of life, to once again pay attention to his material surroundings as they are, instead of viewing them against the bright future of communist utopia.[10] As Primakov begins to open the closet, he stares out at his newly unfamiliar surroundings. The viewer, through Primakov's eyes, is presented with a scene of his family sitting around a table, but nobody acknowledges him—they are presented from a distance, almost like they are on display for him to contemplate. Like an unnoticed apparition, Primakov goes to the window to stare out into the courtyard of his apartment block with similar sense of wonder. At this point, Primakov flies out the window and ascends higher and higher into the sky. Along the way he sees the street where his apartment is located, the surrounding region, and the entire district, until finally the earth melts away and Primakov finds himself enveloped by pure sky. The end of Primakov's story is a series of white sheets of paper which for Kabakov is a symbol of death and oblivion.

Primakov's story is an apt analogy for Kabakov's own estrangement from society. As noted above, pursuing unofficial art was equivalent to living as an immigrant; one's surroundings become strange and family and friends distant. While Kabakov had not actually emigrated from the Soviet Union at the time he created this album, his perception of his environment was fundamentally changed, and all sense of familiarity was shattered. Having lost faith in the Soviet system and resolved to not fully participate, Kabakov's situation was not unlike that of a child who rejects the religion of his parents: his surroundings have not changed but his entire understanding of them has, and he can no longer relate to the world in the same way as family and friends. This paradigm shift (what Robert Lipton earlier described as a confrontation with the principle of "doctrine over person") created a strong feeling of disorientation and was, like death, a definitive transition from which there was no going back. Primakov's growing awareness while sitting in the closet leads to a reevaluation of the significance of the everyday actions of his

[10] That Primakov sees himself as separate from the family group does not necessarily indicate that he is an individual while the family operates as an ideological collective still believing in utopian ideology. In all likelihood, they would feel alienated from each other as well. This is particularly true since this is reflecting on Kabakov's childhood, which took place under Stalin's pervasive rule, when any form of interaction was dangerous.

family. Like a child trapped in a dark closet, Kabakov becomes hyper-aware of his surroundings, but unlike the fictional child, he only dreams of flying into oblivion. His reality was that he had to walk out of that closet and, publicly at least, pretend nothing had happened. From this we learn nothing factual, but something much more consequential.

Occupying the Peripheral Space of State Ideology

The cultural alienation of Soviet unofficial artists, resulting from their own disillusionment with state ideology, has shaped their creative production both in Moscow as well as New York. Understanding of the dimensions of the artists' dislocation can be expanded through a topographic conception of Soviet ideology. Called upon to be "engineers of the human soul,"[11] artists in the Soviet Union were placed in the precarious position of negotiating the dangerous space of the periphery. Having found themselves unintentionally outside the parameters of party-sanctioned activity, many adopted nomadic strategies of survival.

Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari argue that the fundamental distinction between nomadic culture and the sedentary culture of the state is their respective conceptualizations of space: "Sedentary space is striated, by walls, enclosures, and roads between enclosures, while nomad space is smooth, marked only by 'traits' that are effaced and displaced with the trajectory."[12] By imposing a system of organization on the land, the state territorially stakes a claim on that space and, by extension, the people that inhabit it. In the Soviet Union, the program of propaganda was designed to mark out territory for the state, not only figuratively, but physically; "Works of totalitarian art do not describe the world," argues Boris Groys, "they occupy the world."[13] Based on Tommaso Campanella's *Civitas Solis*, Lenin's program of monumental propaganda, later extended under Stalin, inundated the public spaces with statues and murals proclaiming Soviet authority.[14] These monuments were reinforced by the more ephemeral banners and art exhibitions aimed at reinforcing Soviet ideological dogma. But perhaps no action was more territorial than the renaming of cities, streets, regions, and natural landmarks after Soviet leaders, heroes, and accomplishments of the state. Delineating and mapping the space of the state, and anchoring it with propagandistic markers, represented a clear attempt at establishing a sedentary space, inhospitable to nomadic wandering.

In his wildly popular 1947 book *Map of the Motherland,* Nikolai Mikhailov writes, "We love our glorious, dear Volga, but we don't wish to have it quiet as

[11] This phrase is attributed to Stalin, and was presented at the Soviet Writers Congress in 1934 in a speech by Andrei Zhdanov, apparently based on a conversation he had with Stalin.

[12] Deleuzes and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus,* 381.

[13] Boris Groys, "The Art of Totality," in *The Landscape of Stalinism,* ed. Evgeny Dobrenko and Eric Naiman (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2003), 98.

[14] Campanella's novel describes a society in which the citizens are instructed through a series of murals that educate them on proper behavior and doctrine. Lenin's program, while it retained some of the didactic elements of Campanella's conception, also adopted more traditional iconography of victory and domination.

it is…The dams of hydroelectric stations will lock up the water…With our own hands, using well-considered blueprints, we are building our country, we are creating a new landscape."[15] While the Soviet Union is certainly not the first nation to fantasize about controlling nature, the immobility so highly valued in Stalinist culture is certainly palpable in Mikhailov's description of this vision. In the Soviet conception of space, the ideal is quite similar to Deleuze and Guattari's description of sedentary space, with its walls and enclosures. Dissident writer Yevgeny Zamyatin made prescient observations about the future of the Soviet Union in 1921 when D-503, the protagonist of his dystopian novel *We* says in defense of the communist state: "It is clear that the entire history of mankind, insofar as we know it, is the history of transition from nomadic to increasingly settled forms of existence. And does it not follow that the most settled form (ours) is at the same time the most perfect (ours)?"[16] He goes on to elaborate, explaining, "Oh, great, divinely bounding wisdom of walls and barriers! They are, perhaps, the greatest of man's inventions. Man ceased to be a wild animal only when he built the first wall."[17]

In his painting *I, You, He, She* (1971), Leonid Lamm highlights another troubling aspect of the state's territorial tendencies: "If you want to be a member of society, you have to be measured—to have a social security number, or else you are nothing."[18] In other words, delineation of the Soviet landscape included not only its geographic, but also its human resources. In a country founded on the principles of Taylorism[19]—a system that treats the body as a mechanical machine that must be measured and controlled to achieve maximum efficiency—Lamm's works investigate the process of breaking down a human being into a set of mathematical data. His painting was inspired by the popular Soviet song "We are like one family: We consist of 100,000 I's."[20] Against a flat black background, the silhouettes of four white heads are lined up in a uniform manner. On each head are the four pronouns: I, You, He, and She. Surrounding each word are the artist's precise measurements of every aspect of the letters. The careful precision of the whole work suggests that a person can ultimately be understood and categorized

[15] Evgeny Dobrenko, "The Art of Social Navigation," in *The Landscape of Stalinism,* eds. Evgeny Dobrenko and Eric Naiman, trans. Glen Worthey (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2003), 194-95.

[16] Evgeny Zamyatin, *We,* trans. Mirra Ginsburg (New York, NY: EOS, 1999), 11.

[17] Ibid., 93.

[18] Baigell, *Soviet Dissident Artists,* 113.

[19] Based on the theories of Frederick Winslow Taylor, Taylorism was a system of efficiency that proposed the analysis of the most minute movements of the worker to increase production dramatically through small adjustments. Taylorism became a favorite theory of over-zealous Communist Party workers, who even formed brigades whose specific task was to search out any type of inefficiency. For a good analysis of Taylorism and its influence throughout Europe, see Charles S. Maier, "Between Taylorism and Technocracy: European Ideologies and the Vision of Industrial Productivity in the 1920s," in *Journal of Contemporary History* (Vol. 5, No. 2, 1970).

[20] Alla Rosenfeld, "Word and/as Image," in *Moscow Conceptualism in Context,* ed. Alla Rosenfeld (New York, NY: Prestel, 2011), 202.

using a process of empirical observation. The loss of any sense of subjectivity in the piece heightens the sense that people in the Soviet Union are depersonalized and regarded as assets to be measured and inventoried. In a Taylorist state that treats individuals like machines on the factory floor, territorial claims are placed upon the citizen as property of the state—a situation that led artist Vagrich Bakhchanyan to joke, "We all have the honorary brand 'Made in the USSR' on our foreheads."[21] Soviet cultural historian Vladimir Paperny writes about how such quantifying of Soviet citizens eventually led to immobility, even within the union: "Beginning in 1932 the internal passport system was gradually implemented…In 1940 the 'voluntary departure of employees from factories and offices' was forbidden once and for all. Thus the man of [Stalinist culture] loses his mobility in geographical space."[22] It is not surprising, then, that many of the dissident artists came under their greatest persecution from authorities when applying for a visa to emigrate, not for creating and exhibiting their work in the underground.[23]

The primary effect of striation upon the citizens of the state is that it fosters a sense of stasis that in turn reinforces the permanence of the state's power. The Soviet Union was certainly no exception to this rule. Susan Buck-Morss notes, "Stalinist culture abhorred uprootedness. Cosmopolitanism became synonymous with betraying the motherland."[24] The propaganda created under Stalin was markedly different from that which was created in the early years of the Soviet Union, when the present was emphasized as merely a transitory and relatively unimportant stage in the eventual attainment of communism. "Life has improved, Comrades. Life has become more joyous," proclaimed Stalin in 1935, reassuring Soviet citizens that the time of transition had been replaced by stability and stasis.[25] Under Stalin's leadership artists were responsible for reinforcing these notions of immobility and territoriality. Exemplifying the ideals of Socialist Realism and its advocacy of a sedentary, striated space for the state is Alexander Gerasimov's painting *Comrade Stalin and Voroshilov in the Kremlin* (1938). Standing with the leader of the Soviet Union's military, Stalin looks peculiarly immobile despite the simple narrative displayed: a casual walk in the Kremlin. Gerasimov makes deliberate formal comparisons between the two men and the prominently visible

[21] *A-Ya: Unofficial Art Revue. Vol. 1*, eds. Alexei Alexeev and Igor Shelkovsky (Elancourt, France: A-YA, 1979), 46.

[22] Vladimir Paperny, "Movement—Immobility," in *Tekstura: Russian Essays on Visual Culture,* eds. and trans. Alla Efimova and Lev Manovich (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 61.

[23] A striking example of the persecution that came as a result of applying to emigrate is Leonid Lamm. Lamm and some friends actually took the bold step of splashing a monument to Mayakovsky with red paint in the dead of night. But this incident did not cause him trouble for over six years when it was used as a pretext to imprison him after he peacefully applied for a visa to emigrate. Only then did he receive his prison sentence.

[24] Susan Buck-Morss, *Dreamworld and Catastrophe* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2002), 122.

[25] This quote was taken from Stalin's "Speech at the First All-Union Conference of Stakhanovites," which was delivered November 17, 1935. J. V. Stalin, *Problems of Leninism,* trans. Unattributed (Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1953), 783.

Vodovozny Tower of the Kremlin. Writing of the painting, Gerasimov extolls the virtue of stone-like immobility: "These poses are supposed to express that the peoples and the Red Army are the same, are one *monolith* [emphasis added]."[26] Gerasimov's work was inspired by the famous pre-revolutionary painting by Viktor Vasnetsov, *Three Bogatyrs* (1898). The work depicts three wandering warriors from Russian epic poetry—Dobrynia, Ilia Moromets, and Alesha Popovich—who ride the countryside, protecting the people. Of Vasnetsov's work, Gerasimov said, "I admit that this picture was constantly before my eyes; there are three warriors there, and here stand two warriors—our Soviet ones."[27] In both works the viewer is reassured that there are warriors standing guard to protect them from outside hostile forces: Vasnetsov's in the nomadic steppes, Gerasimov's in the very center of a highly striated state. The most heroic figures in Stalin's state are immobile; they are not men of action, but men of inaction.

Gerasimov's work, which is often pegged as the most important example of Soviet-era painting, features prominently the walls and barriers praised by Zamyatin's protagonist D-503: the fence beside Stalin and Voroshilov, the walls of the Kremlin, and the embankment of the Moscow River all speak to the clear delineation of the Soviet topography. The further away from the central figure of Stalin the eye ventures, the less ordered and striated the space becomes. Far in the distance, the silhouette of a church is visible, indicating unfinished labor yet to be done; it supports Mikhailov's assertion that "building communism, we are remaking the country with rational calculation, we are changing its geography."[28] The work of Socialist Realism operates doubly as a confirmation of Stalin's infallible status and as a call to arms for Soviet citizens—not so much to forge a new future, but to arrest the deleterious forces of the present.

In order to do so, artists had to be in a position where they could properly understand the difference between the striated space of the state, marked off by walls and barriers, and the unmarked space of nomadic existence. During Stalinism, progress came to be defined by the continual expansion of ideological territory, the incorporation of smooth, nomadic space into the state. As ideational people, artists (along with high-ranking officials) were tasked with negotiating the border between Soviet and anti-Soviet concepts, an assignment that carried great risk because any misstep could result in ostracism, denunciation, and arrest. With the risks of being an artist, came the potential for great reward in the form of privileges such as country retreats, lavish apartments, and access to luxury items not available to the average Soviet citizen. Weighing in on this situation, historian

[26] Jan Plamper, "The Spatial Poetics of the Personality Cult," in *The Landscape of Stalinism,* ed. Evgeny Dobrenko and Eric Naiman (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2003), 32.

[27] Jan Plamper, *The Stalin Cult* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2012), 105.

[28] This quote is from the popular 1947 book by Nikolai Mikhailov, *Map of the Motherland.* In this book, Mikhailov frequently declared the supremacy of the Soviet Union to lie in its ability to change the landscape from chaos into rational resource, using "well-considered blueprints." Thus Mikhailov touts the accomplishments of turning the lands around the Aral sea from desert into fertile land, just as American prairies are washed out and turned into dust bowls. Dobrenko, "The Art of Social Navigation," 196.

Evgeny Dobrenko likewise takes under consideration the risk/reward qualities of life on the periphery: "The border lived its own special life, full of dangers and heroic feats, and therefore full of heroes and enemies."[29] Because the artists were believed to possess the power to shape the very souls of the people, the feeling that "you're either for us or against us" was particularly palpable.

The ideological boundary between delineated space of the state and smooth nomadic space beyond was never a solid line. Instead, it marked a zone of persistent struggle that the artist was responsible to navigate: "Smooth space is constantly being translated, traversed into striated space," explain Deleuze and Guattari, "striated space is constantly being reversed, returned to smooth space."[30] Placed on the front lines of the shifting interpretations of the acceptable and unacceptable, the artists are continually in danger of finding themselves on the wrong side of the line ideologically. It was, therefore, very difficult for an artist to inhabit the gray zone between ardent support of the party, and dissidence. For many of these artists, becoming a dissident was not a conscious choice but resulted from shifting political terrain, insufficiently or improperly decoded. For example, the artist Gustav Klutsis, a major propagandist throughout the 1920s, fell into disfavor and was executed by Stalin, despite his ardent support of the Communist Party. Klutsis' eventual fall from grace was not the result of any change in his artistic approach, nor was it the result of his having challenged party leaders. Like many artists of his generation, Klutsis fell victim to an ideological shift in the upper echelons of the Communist Party that redefined his art as "formalist" and anti-Soviet. A similar fate befell many artists and composers, most famously Dmitri Shostakovich whose work *Lady Macbeth of Mtsensk* was first praised in official print and subsequently denounced.

Artists of the Cold War era were equally as prone to inadvertently creating art that fell outside acceptable parameters. Oleg Vassiliev related his experience in 1961 of applying for union membership as an artist, for which he submitted a series of linocuts on the subject of the Moscow Metro: "Upon examination by the Reception Committee of the MOSKh (the Moscow Department of Artists' Union), the linocuts were referred to as too preoccupied with formal issues, so I remained a candidate for the Union for seven years."[31] Vassiliev's works were not deliberately subversive, and their subject, the glorification of the Moscow Metro, would seem incontestable according to the status quo. Despite the official pushback, Vassiliev had no intention of joining the dissidents. He writes, "I did not take part in the movement and even actively avoided it. . .However, in our social system, even this pursuing of one's own work was criminal. . .Officially, therefore, I found myself in the circle of 'unofficial' artists."[32] Likewise, Vassiliev's close friend Eric Bulatov writes that from the beginning, he had every intention of becoming a dedicated

[29] Ibid., 186.

[30] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus,* 474-75.

[31] Oleg Vassiliev, "How I Became an Artist," in *Oleg Vassiliev,* eds. Alexandra Bruskin, Anne Schneider, and Joan Beecher Eichrodt (Saint Petersburg, Russia: Palace Editions, 2004), 25.

[32] Ibid., 26.

Socialist-Realist. At one point in his studies, though, he found that what he was doing was unacceptable, and this often caught him by surprise:

> Until about 1958 I had consciously included myself within the tradition in which I was raised. But it became apparent to me that what I had begun to do, and what I intended to do, would not be the same…At the Surikov Institute in the mid-1950s this separation of private and public thoughts and attitudes became painful, particularly because the 1950s were years of crisis for us. I realized that everything we had learned was a lie and that I really had to start over again, to learn everything from scratch. When I finished studying at the Institute in 1958, I had to face the question: was I a dissident? ...I had no idea what kind of artist I would become, but I had to be absolutely free in my choices and free from the officially accepted art styles.[33]

Faced with the situation of being on the wrong side of the party line, artists really had three choices. The first option was to display penance and resubmit oneself to the state, thereby retreating safely within the ideological confines of the striated state.[34] The second possibility also involved abandoning the liminal border zone, but rather than retreating back to the state, the artist stops trying to balance competing systems and establishes a position within a competing, though equally well-defined, ideological or aesthetic system such as abstraction. The final option, adopted by the artists under consideration here, is to embrace the ill-defined, smooth space of ideological nomadism. What separates the latter two options (which were both adopted by unofficial artists) is a matter of conceptual framework. This difference is analogous to Deleuze and Guattari's distinction between migrants and nomads: "Whereas the migrant leaves behind a milieu that has become amorphous or hostile, the nomad is one who does not depart, does not want to depart, who clings to the smooth space left by the receding forest, where the steppe or the desert advances, and who invents nomadism as a response to this challenge."[35] Ideological artist-migrants, such as those in the Lianozovo Group, left behind the official cultural elements of Socialist Realism and propaganda and sought refuge in other cultural and stylistically defined regions such as abstraction, symbolism, and religious imagery.

On the other hand, many Soviet dissident artists adopted a survival strategy of ideological nomadism as a response to the hostilities of the state. Artist-nomads were not interested in staking territorial claims of their own; instead, they carried out deconstructive projects that were inclined toward an analysis of territorialization itself. Artists, like Komar and Melamid, Kosolapov, Sokov, and Kabakov

[33] Baigell, *Soviet Dissident Artists,* 153.

[34] This strategy was famously adopted by Shostakovich who, after his official denunciation mentioned above, withdrew his Fourth Symphony and took up work in the much-less controversial field of writing music for propagandistic films.

[35] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus,* 381.

borrowed from numerous historical traditions, but aligned themselves with none of them. From this position, these artists carved out smooth spaces within striated ideological systems. Rather than eschewing the imagery of official culture entirely, they engaged it in such a way as to disassociate it from its intended purpose. Importantly, leaving the physical territory of the state was not necessary in order to abandon the role of the artist-engineer in favor of that of the artist-nomad. Deleuze and Guattari note, "Even the most striated city gives rise to smooth spaces: to live in the city as a nomad…movements, speed and slowness, are sometimes enough to reconstruct a smooth space."[36] Rather than seeking out a more hospitable space, the artist-nomad strives to transform the hostile milieu of the state to something more preferable.

Nomadic Dwelling

That artist-nomads like Kosolapov, Sokov, and Kabakov were not seeking to adopt or create an alternate stratified system to that of the Soviet state had a profound influence on how they confronted the ideological "other" of the Cold War era upon arrival in New York.[37] As in the case of their works that combine imagery from East and West, these artists approach was not one of choosing and supporting one system over the other, but was a rejection of systems as such; while the territory in the West was new, the process of institutional territorialization was not. [38] In a world largely occupied by competing political systems that claimed exclusive supremacy, artist-nomads strove for a way of living independent of the territorial claims of state ideology. They had to learn how to dwell as cultural outsiders in a globalized world.

Having considered themselves as something other than Russian for a long time, displaced artists did not seek out the Russian diasporic community when they arrived in New York. Boris Groys, himself a displaced Soviet, writes: "What they took with them as they moved to the West was not their cultural identity, but their cultural nonidentity."[39] In America they neither sought refuge in the familiar cultural surroundings of the diasporic community nor did they seek to fully invest in an American identity. That their estrangement from society predates emigration also helps explain why so few of them chose to return to Russia when the Soviet Union collapsed in the early 1990s, and those who did rarely received an enthusiastic reception.

In their nomadic wandering, Soviet dissident artists had to negotiate the terrain between competing ideological milieus: capitalism and communism; Russian

[36] Ibid., 500.

[37] This may also explain why they may not have designated themselves as dissidents – viewing a dissident as an advocate for an alternate ideological system.

[38] While the artists were not interested in endorsing either side of the Cold War, Donald Kuspit points out that because their art was a rejection of Soviet socialism, it was often interpreted as an endorsement for Capitalism—an unintended result to be sure. Donald Kuspit, "New York Contra Moscow, Moscow Contra New York: The Battle in the Soul of the New Russian Immigrant Artists," in *Forbidden Art,* ed. Garrett White (New York, NY: Distributed Art Publishers, 1988), 166.

[39] Boris Groys, *History Becomes Form* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2010), 109.

nationalism and western progressivism; socialist realism and avant-garde abstraction. "The notion of the milieu is not unitary," explain Deleuze and Guattari, "not only does the living thing continually pass from one milieu to another, but the milieus pass into one another; they are essentially communicating. The milieus are open to chaos, which threatens them with exhaustion or intrusion."[40] It was against the potential chaos induced by the opposing milieus that artists sought refuge in their work. At the heart of artworks such as Kosolapov's *Coca-Cola Lenin* and Sokov's *Lenin and Giacommetti* is the terrain in which the competing milieus overlap and confront one another. Within the space of the artwork, the artists attempt to bring together elements carefully to create some sort of order within the chaos. Deleuze and Guattari address this condition by positing a hypothetical situation in which a child is scared while wandering in the darkness. To assuage the fear, the child almost instinctively begins to sing a song. "The song," they explain, "is like a rough sketch of a calming and stabilizing, calm and stable, center in the heart of chaos."[41] The imposition of some semblance of order into the child's situation has a comforting effect and begins to create a sort of ephemeral and mobile dwelling-place. "But home does not preexist," Deleuze and Guattari emphasize, "it was necessary to draw a circle around that uncertain and fragile center, to organize a limited space."[42] Soviet artists were conscious of the possibility of using creative and expressive means to not only record their lives, but structure them. Eric Bulatov notes, "When you create a painting, you are creating yourself. Art is a way of getting through life."[43] The rhythmic play of signs and their corresponding connotations creates a temporary, ideological home for the artist.[44] Artist-nomads such as Komar and Melamid were very aware of the possibility that their art could constitute an ephemeral dwelling. "Our art is very close to architecture," explains Melamid, "each panel is a building block, painted separately with no thought of where we might eventually place it. When we assemble the panels, it's a little like making a house."[45] From this emboldened position, the individual can engage the chaos of the world anew: "One launches forth, hazards an improvisation. But to improvise is to join with the World, or meld with it. One ventures from home on the thread of a tune."[46]

The idea of the artwork acting as a home was carried out in a very literal sense by Kabakov upon his arrival in the West with his installation project *Ten Characters* (1989). As mentioned earlier, this work can be seen as a continuation of his previous project *Ten Albums*, as one of the characters is the author of the albums. The installation consisted of the recreation of a communal apartment from Soviet times. Each room is occupied by eccentric and fantastical figures such as "The

[40] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus,* 313.
[41] Ibid., 311.
[42] Ibid., 311.
[43] *A-Ya: Unofficial Art Revue. Vol. 1.* 31.
[44] "Rhythm is critical; it ties together critical moments or ties itself together in passing from one milieu to another. It does not operate in homogeneous space-time, but by heterogeneous blocks." Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus,* 313.
[45] Ratcliff, *Komar & Melamid*, 55.
[46] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 311.

Man Who Flew Into Space From His Apartment," and "The Man Who Never Threw Anything Away." While the installation itself does not explicitly confront the West in the same way as Kosolapov or Sokov, its presence in New York itself provides the context for such a confrontation. The Western viewer was no doubt filled with some measure of astonishment at being presented with an alien living arrangement. The Soviet émigré, on the contrary, feels a strange dislocation as the familiar is presented in a disconnected land. However, the installation lends itself to comparisons with apartments in New York, surely some familiarity with cramped spaces and run-down architecture. In its particularity to another time and place, it nonetheless highlights something deeply universal.

The artist's nomadism is emphasized when the viewer understands this work as being *in-stalled*, in the manner in which that term implies a temporary stasis in an existence otherwise defined by motion. Even when the ideological home is a literal one, it is still necessarily a temporary one. Boris Groys notes, "The installation *demonstrates* the material of the civilization in which we live particularly well, since it *installs* everything that otherwise merely *circulates* in our civilization."[47] From this perspective it is equally plausible to see *Coca-Cola Lenin* and *Lenin and Giacommetti* as artistic installations. At any given moment, the totality of our lived cultural environment is composed of numerous signs and associations that, depending on context and chance, come together in infinite combinations. The works of the artist-nomad draws on this reservoir of cultural signs and symbols in a careful way to re-present them in a conscious, structured way thereby temporarily creating an ordered space for inhabitation.

"With the nomad," Deleuze and Guattari further elucidate, "it is deterritorialization that constitutes the relation to the earth, to such a degree that the nomad reterritorializes on deterritorialization itself."[48] The artist-nomad presents a rhythmic world in which cultural elements come together arbitrarily and without any sort of underlying meaning assigned by a totalizing ideology. By stripping the exclusive territorial claims made by the state from an object or idea, the artist-nomad creates a smooth space for themselves—a less-hostile dwelling from which to engage the world.

By composing works of art, the artist-nomad does not begin dwelling. Rather, the works demonstrate that the artist-nomad already dwells in-between the rival ideological milieus of capitalism and socialism. The creation of the work of art merely defines a space and creates a home for that dwelling. In so doing, the work of art redefines the space of both ideological systems. In a sense, we can understand the work of art as analogous to Heidegger's metaphor of a bridge in that it redefines that which it engages: "It does not just connect banks that are already there. The banks emerge as banks only as the bridge crosses the stream. The bridge decidedly causes them to lie across from each other. One side is set off against the other by the bridge…the bridge brings to the stream the one and the other expanse of the landscape lying behind them. It brings stream and bank and

[47] Boris Groys, "Multiple Authorship," in *The Manifesta Decade*, ed. Barbara Vanderlinden and Elena Filipovic (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2005), 95.

[48] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus,* 381.

land into each other's neighborhood. The bridge *gathers* the earth as landscape around the stream."[49] The *in-stalled* work of art stands as a structure that allows for a temporary stasis, a vantage point from which the striated lands on either bank can be reclaimed as smooth territory and evaluated against one another.[50] The two ideological systems are shown not to be mutually exclusive opposites, as asserted in the rhetoric of leaders like Reagan and Thatcher. Rather, they are rivals in the literal etymological meaning of the word—two that share the same river. They are two sides of the same coin.

By erecting these conceptual bridges between East and West, artist-nomads are prevented from becoming sedentary; by consistently destabilizing their own position and moving forward with new perspectives, they avoid becoming part of a single politico-ideological system. Vitaly Komar explains his understanding of this process when he says, "You paint a painting, then frame it. You make an object and set it apart from the rest of the world. Then you get the idea of breaking the barrier between the world of the artwork and the spectators' world. But you have to set up this barrier before you can break it."[51] In other words, that the artist-nomad's general condition is characterized by motion does not mean that he or she does not pause and dwell upon a certain ideological position or element of material culture. Rather the artist-nomad will arrest that motion temporarily in consideration, subsequently breaking free and roaming further. In his analysis of dwelling, Immanuel Levinas points out that constructing a home is not the ultimate aim: "The privileged role of the home does not consist in being the end of human activity but in being its condition, and in this sense, its commencement."[52] By operating as temporary nomadic dwellings, works of art like *Coca-Cola Lenin* and *Lenin and Giacometti* do not express permanent philosophical points of view. They should instead be understood as momentary expressions of the artist's current relationship to the world around him—a point in an indeterminate life journey.

About the Author

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[49] Martin Heidegger, *Poetry, Language, Thought,* trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York, NY: Perennial Classics, 2001), 150.

[50] Considering a work of art that spans a river, it is difficult not to consider Vladimir Tatlin's infamous *Monument to the Third International* of 1921. Conceptualized as the tallest structure in the world, it was to house all important functions of government in a position suspended above the Neva River. Interestingly, Tatlin envisioned a strict order being imposed on the structure as the buildings would rotate every day, month, and year respectively. The permanence and ordering associated with this work would have allowed a certain amount of control over the smooth and wild nature of the river.

[51] Ratcliff, *Komar & Melamid*, 32-33.

[52] Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, trans. Alfonso Lingis (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1961), 152.

The Rhythms of NEP
The Fox Trot Calls the Time

Lyubov Ginzburg

The following article recalls several New Economic Policy (NEP)-era anecdotes that intricately intertwine ideology, politics and culture, revealing the universal and humanistic nature of the latter and arguing that it may become a prevailing and uncontrollable force running afoul of those in power to define its norms and preferences, shape trends and shepherd developments. The case in point is a historical vignette convolving around the peripeteias of a popular American jazz tune in the maze of late-1920s Soviet cultural space. In spite of being patently emblematic of the epoch, the story behind Dmitri Shostakovich's orchestration of Youmans's "Tea for Two" has previously been referred to by scholars of Russian history and arts only occasionally and in passing. Yet when revisited within a broader context impregnated with an array of new circumstances and participants, the episode becomes bestowed with new meanings and symbols that reverberate into such disciplines as comparative studies and international relations.

As an overture, the article contextualizes NEP not only as an era when the Soviets were infatuated with American technological advances, contemplating the application of principles of Fordism and Taylorism within Soviet social organization,[1] but also as a time, when they had a soft spot for "a kind of Taylorism of the dance floor," and an innovative American art form known as jazz. The article examines how cultural gatekeepers and guardians of social norms, behavior and morality in Russia and in the United States reacted to jazz that firmly established itself as a "trend setter" in modish dances and flapper fashion. It argues that in spite of obvious ideological distinctions in the treatment of syncopated rhythms, the condemnation in both countries was conditioned by a similar desire of authorities to mitigate the effects of "social and sexual upheaval" triggered by "the kinesthetic spectacles" of jazz (Gordon 1996:424-425), winning respective prodigal citizenry back to virtue.

[1] This tendency is described in many works dedicated to NEP. See, for example, Fitzpatrick, Sheila, Alexander Rabinowitch, and Richard Stites, eds. 1991. *Russia in the Era of NEP: Explorations in Soviet Society and Culture*. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. Especially the essay by Jeffrey Brooks "The Press and Its Message: Images of America in the 1920s and 1930s," 231-252 (239-240). See also Ball, Alan M. 2003. *Imagining America: Influence and Images in Twentieth-Century Russia.* Lanham, Boulder, New York, Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, INC., especially Part I.

Among other influential artistic personalities contributing to Shostakovich's interest in innovative music, the article features Valentin Yakovlevich Parnakh (1891-1951), who was at the center of the debate about American jazz, when its "raucous sound" and the novelty dances associated with it "enthused and confounded" Soviet theatre, and when the cultural establishment attempted to define it within an authentic social and national context, "befitting the needs of the first workers' state" (Gordon 1996: 423). This central figure in the history of jazz in the Soviet Union was silenced and died in obscurity. Even in the West, his name and achievements in the theory of dance, languages and poetry, as well as his passionate endeavor to introduce jazz to the Russian stage, emerged from oblivion only at the very end of the twentieth century, notably with the publication of an article entitled "Valentin Parnakh, Apostle of Eccentric Dance" by famed and unorthodox drama scholar Mel Gordon, in 1996.

The discussion about Shostakovich's experimentations with syncopated music is placed within the context of the expanding theatre mania that swept through the Soviet Union after the Bolshevik victory, and was, according to Gordon, "unparalleled in European culture since the French Revolution" (1982:2). It analyses multiple attempts by Parnakh and like-minded theatre directors, such as Vsevolod Meyerhold and Sergei Tret'yakov, to integrate jazz with its sense of improvisation and quickened rhythms into innovative productions, first as a purely esthetic element, that broke through the constrains of traditional means of expression, and, later, as a propaganda tool incorporated to denounce the decadent west in an ongoing ideological struggle.

Also observed are the "competing notions of the primitive and the modern" (Gordon 1996:425)—the stigma imposed on the non-European origins of jazz as discordant and uncivilized is compared with Parnakh's belief that the new cultural idiom would unlock "unfettered elements of the new age" (Ibid.), rebuffing alleged racial stereotypes and emphasizing the interconnectedness and continuity between various cultural forms from all over the world.

Finally, by contemplating the fate of the innovative Soviet artists, who were directly or indirectly associated with Shostakovich's attempts to transcend genres and styles, the article suggests the exploration of the inner struggle sparked by the realization that creative aspirations and pursuits may not be possible without artistic and ideological compromise with Soviet ideologues. The narrative builds upon scholarly contributions of those researchers who studied infamous ideological skirmishes with so-called formalism that put an end to the raging experimentation in Soviet theater and music in the 1920s and 1930s,[2] recalling how, along with other modern art forms and artistic trends, jazz was disparaged as a cultural and ideological pariah, while its practitioners were silenced, persecuted and prosecuted.

[2] See for example Bliss Eaton, Katherine, ed. 2002. *Enemies of the People: The Destruction of Soviet Literary, Theater, and Film Arts in the 1930s.* Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press.

Fox-trotting to communism: jazz craze at the dawn of socialism

At the beginning of the 1920s, as the young socialist state was recovering from the First World War, the revolution, its aftermath, and the civil war, the dictatorial policies of War Communism were being replaced with the so-called New Economic Policy (NEP) intended to provide a "breathing space" for Soviet society and impose "a new timetable" on the transition to socialism. It was now to be built gradually "through cultural work, rather than through political and military struggle" (Gorsuch 2008:177). New social and political conditions were taking shape, with small private businesses legalized, and control over cultural production languished. That period of relative freedoms in economics and culture revealed "profound connections and continuities" between a young socialist state and the West (Gorsuch 2008:175), resulting in an influx of Western mass media imagery permeating rather porous physical and cultural borders. Fashionistas were drawn toward economic extravagances and "decadent" Western-influenced cultural idioms, including the 'flapper' sensation of "frivolous modern dance," and the "seductive rhythms of American jazz" (Gorsuch 1994:3; Gorsuch, 2008:175).

Large Russian cities, no less than thriving international ports and world capitals, were "enthralled" by American music and dance; the Charleston, Shimmy, and Fox Trot became "perennially modish dances" and the entertainment industry "was in one way or another intertwined with that new art form from America that was called "jazz" (Kater 1992:5). For Soviet 'flappers' and 'fox trotters,' jazz meant, above all, the emphatic syncopated rhythm that one could dance to. The term "jazz" was used to describe a wide variety of dance compositions, even though they were also labeled more specifically by their steps. A prime example is Youmans's "Tea for Two," one of myriad compositions referred to as a "jazzy tune". The basic rhythm of "Tea for Two" is dotted quarter, followed by an eighth note, analogous to the various permutations of 'first slow, then quick step sequences in the fox trot, though dancers need not be limited to those patterns.'[3]

Dance mania in Russia reflected a postwar, European-wide rejection of "the sober and self-controlled respectability so common to the Victorian era" (Gorsuch 1994:9). For many of those who "flocked to dance the fox trot" in the unsettled and contentious environment of the 1920s the vibrant new dances were "an emotional retreat", "an antidote to the traumas of war and revolution and post-revolutionary problems" (Gorsuch 2008:176, 184; Gorsuch 1994:8). For many the desire to imitate frivolous Western styles also reflected their deviation from certain patterns of "traditional" and persistently imposed working-class culture (Gorsuch 2008:184-185). Soviet performers labeled their acts as "American dances", and domestic jazz ensembles, such as Teplitsky's First Concert Jazz Band, advertised their repertoire as featuring "the latest American music", well aware that it would attract larger audiences (Starr 1983:69). Young communists were not immune to the order of the day, and "to the dismay of Bolshevik moralists, dancing the fox trot and the tango seemed to take place everywhere", including Komsomol

[3] I would like to acknowledge jazz critic and author Kevin Whitehead, who taught jazz history at the University of Kansas and who kindly and patiently explained to me the peculiarities of rhythmical patterns of fox trot in general and "Tea for Two" in particular.

and factory clubs (Gorsuch 2008:183). As Frederick Starr concluded in *Red and Hot*, the fundamental study of the history of jazz in Russia and the Soviet Union, "Russia was fox-trotting to communism and when the official publishers could not meet the demand for new fox trot melodies, the writers published them on their own, often engaging the best designers to do the covers" (1983:59).

"The inventor of stanzas and dances": early Russian advocate of jazz as a universal and humanistic artistic form

For one of the earliest advocates of that new American cultural idiom, the futurist poet, editor, cultural critic, and choreographer Valentin Parnakh, jazz also was, above all, dance music, "a vehicle for the fox trot and shimmy," (Starr 1983:44) one-step, two-step, Spanish paso doble, and Scottish rag-time (Parnakh 2000:149). Parnakh was likely the first to introduce the word джаз (*jazz)* to the Russian language, and see in that music the "interweaving of world cultures, the combination of modern eccentricity, machinery, and biomechanics, with the ancient idea of musical communication between peoples" (Batashev 2007). In *Soviet Jazz*, published in 1972, Alexey Batashev writes that in 1922, after the end of the Russian Civil War, Valentin Parnakh returned to Russia from France, where he had been elected as a chair of the Paris Chamber of Poets, a group of literary Russian emigres (8). He published several articles on the artistic and aesthetic development of music and the performing arts in the 1920s in Europe and Russia, introducing the phenomenon of jazz and a series of new dances to the Soviet audience. One such article, "Jazz Band," was first published in 1922 in the Berlin journal *Veshch' (Thing)*, an avant-garde Russian émigré publication.[4] The term was translated as "tumult orchestra" (Batashev 1972:9). Parnakh first heard Louis Mitchell's Jazz Kings in Paris in July 1921 at the Trocadero nightclub, and, like those around him, "was mesmerized by the playful antics of the black musicians…" (Gordon 1996:424; Batashev 1972:8-9). The innovative music and dance generated within its 'syncopated entrails' became the primary theme of a number of Parnakh's early poems, distinguished by the rhythms of deliberately redundant sentences, "plosive vividness, metaphorical buffoonery, phonetic asperity, conversational syntax, and free versification." (Arenzon 2000:14)

> Banjo chatter, saxophone jams.
> Convulsions. Karamba!
> Insatiable jazz-bands
> Strike the cymbals incandescing
> Ardour.
> …
> Unyoking!
> A Negro jovial and queer
> disgorged the sounding spasms all of a sudden,
> languishing with novel blissful quiver… (Parnakh 2000:53)

[4] Starr also believes that Parnakh published this article before leaving for Russia (Starr 1983:44).

Proclaiming himself "the inventor of stanzas and dances," Parnakh poeticized the universality of expressive culture's ancient meanings, and paid tribute to syncope that, according to the author, was featured not only in jazz, but also in ancient languages, such as Sanskrit and Hebrew. He alluded to the eccentricity of modern dance steps, pointing to the "grotesque trot of two entwined persons who are speeding up, abruptly pulsating with machine-like regularity, keeping time broken down by syncopated beat," that he thought was the only tempo capable of obscuring fears, and satisfying desires of postwar dancers (Parnakh 2000:149). Parnakh referred to certain elements of those dance steps and music as originating in "ancient polyrhythmic and acoustic traditions of American Negroes and Indians."[5] However, he refused to label syncopated rhythms, musical lamentations and entreaties, mastery of improvisation, or responsorial, as folklore idioms that accommodate ethnic and social identities curtailed by time and space. He argued that those features have always existed as archetypal universal and humanistic artistic forms historically and socially making transitions from one cultural milieu to another (Parnakh 1932:73).[6] Thus, rather than being "representative of racial stereotypes," they have become unifying "protean, flexible, and cognizant mechanisms of cultural expression" with distinct diverse peculiarities folded into them (Krasner 1996:73).

Unlike other early interpreters of jazz, Parnakh learned, in the words of cultural historian Lawrence Levine, to be "comfortable" with the fact that "a significant part of our heritage derived from Africa and other non-European sources" and that it is not an "embarrassing weakness but a dynamic source of strength" (1989:8). Parnakh elaborated by studying non-European artistic forms first in Russia, where he explored Germanic and Slavic influences, and the consequences of ghetto culture in the transformation of the ancient Hebrew tradition of performing arts.[7] Later, he revealed another element of diverse cultural

[5] Lawrence Levine considers this fact to be one of the reasons why jazz, while being an integral part of American culture, has experienced "a long-standing neglect by historians and their colleagues in many other disciplines" in this country. Levine argues that, unlike early interpreters and critics of jazz elsewhere, scholars in the United States had to overcome "the values and predispositions of the larger society" in order to express their enthusiasm about jazz music. Levine concludes that it has happened only recently and resulted in "the increasing scholarly interest in jazz" (1989:6). Among those, who, according to Levine, distinguished the value of non-European elements such as African American 'melodies' or some idioms of Native Americans' culture back at the end of the 19th century were Czech composer, Antonin Dvorak (*New World Symphony*) who lived and worked in the United States for many years, and Edward McDowell (*Indian Suite*) (1989:9, 10).

[6] In this interpretation of syncopated music and jazz dances Parnakh seems to be prophetic foreseeing the ideas of such a cultural critic as Lawrence W. Levine who, though writing on a different continent some forty years later, also considers universality and archaism of jazz elements stating that similar to the word 'culture' as it was understood at the turn of the 20th century in the United States when "a music or musics that came to be known as jazz appeared," the word jazz was not necessarily new. It was, paraphrasing Levine, an old word with new meaning. Another writer of our times David Krasner also seems to agree with Parnakh and Levine stressing its universality and discovering in what has become known as jazz dances culturally expressive forms used as a cross-over commodity and transgression of the racial divide.

[7] Parnakh documented his analysis in an article entitled "Gabima and Hebrew Theatre" published in *Europe* in Paris in 1926. The author explores the possibilities of the resurrection of

influences by collecting and translating poetic works of Jewish authors who were victimized and executed in Spain and Portugal by the Catholic inquisition and whose contributions to Romance philology had been unjustly underestimated or ignored. When a collection of Parnakh's poems was released in 1922, reviewers referred to him as an "ideal anti-romantic that embodied the essence of Latino-Mauritanian culture" (quoted in Arenzon 2000:25). Thus, comparing the non-European rhythmic movement patterns of modern dances[8] with syncopation in jazz, the element that he thought approximated them to an immemorial antiquity of Africa and the Orient (Parnakh 2000:160), Parnakh continued to emphasize the interrelatedness and interconnectedness of various world cultures. He concluded that while featuring an exchange of extreme movements, as well as static and dynamic elements, jazz dance and music that had caused such a sensation in the Old World, were powered with emotional charge, and set in motion between various means of expression.[9] In "Advice to the Public,"[10] one of his early poems, Parnakh warns "Do not hold up to shame modern dance like / the Pope does…/ It's time now to learn to syncopate/scratch and scramble along, shy aside…" (2000:74, 75).

This point of view differs from other early efforts to define "the old-new" elements of syncopated music in other parts of the world. For example, Levine refers to an article from *The New Orleans Times-Picayune*, "Jass and Jassism," published in 1918, only a year earlier than the first series of Parnakh's jazz poems and critical essays. The piece reflected an atmosphere of "rapidly accelerating cultural hierarchy" (Levine 1989: 11) in the United States and characterized "jazz music" as a "manifestation of a low streak in man's tastes that has not yet come

Hebrew theatre, acknowledging the importance of preserving Jewish traditions in the centers of Russian orthodoxy. It is interesting that Parnakh was infatuated with and advocated for both the Hebrew language that he would like to hear from the professional stage and jazz that he introduced in "highbrow" theatres. Later on though both Hebrew and jazz were under attack—Hebrew as a "bourgeois" language (Parnakh 2000:197), used mostly during religious rituals (as opposed to Yiddish which was considered the language of the masses), and jazz as the music of the capitalist colonial West. At the end of the 1940s, when Stalin deployed his anti-Semitic campaign known as the assault on "rootless cosmopolitans" the Jewish tradition would again be under attack as well as any pro-Western cultural idioms such as jazz. The latter was denounced as part of rootless formalism which included "the entire high-culture tradition in the twentieth century music" (Starr 1983:220).

[8] For example, Badger describes the development and the popularity of such dances as one-step and fox trot and concludes that they were "understood from the very beginning as African American in origin." In his book he quotes from the article "Negro Composer on Race's music: Jesse Rees Europe Credits Men of His Blood with Introducing Modern Dances," in the *New York Tribune*, November 26, 1914, and reprinted in the *New York Age*, November 26, 1914 (quoted in Badger 1995: 281).

[9] It is interesting that some early instructions of how to dance fox-trot with very clear literary description of the steps, rhythms, and movements echoes Parnakh's excitement with the dance that he refers to with such figurativeness. See for example Vernon Castle's instructions in *Ladies Home Journal*, 31 January, 1914: "… two slow steps (a glide, stride, or drag) followed by four quick ones (hop, kick, and stop) …" (Castle 1914: 24). Badger noticed that this article can be seen as "yet another indication of the Castle's victory in the battle to gain respectability for social dancing" that was denounced by Edward Bok, the reserved editor of *Ladies Home Journal*, who had formerly been among the opponents of such dancing (1995:115).

[10] The poem is alluded to in Dadaist manifesto "To the Public" by Georges Ribemont-Dessaignes.

out in civilization's wash" (Jass and Jassism, 1918). The article suggested that there was this "great assembly hall of melody," "inner sanctuaries of harmony," and below them all, "down in the basement, a kind of servant's hall of rhythm:"

> It is there we hear the hum of the Indian dance, the throb of the Oriental tambourines and kettledrums, the clatter of the clogs, the click of Slavic heels, the thumpty-tumpty of the negro banjo, and, in fact, the native dances of the world ("Jass and Jassism," 1918).

Unlike Parnakh, who thought that such universal means of expression as rhythm, movements, various imitative sound effects, etc., "explore and convey dramatization of life itself and reconstruct the wholeness of existence" (Arenzon 2000:14), *The New Orleans Times-Picayune* article warned its readers about such "atrocity in polite society" as ragtime or jazz, whose "musical value is nil," but "possibilities of harm are great," and concluded that it should be "a point of civic honor to suppress it" ("Jass and Jassism," 1918).[11] Parnakh, in turn, rejected "adjectival boxes and categories" (Levine 1989:7) created in such publications, and wrote that differentiation in the arts does not help to recognize the close correspondence between ancient elements of artistic forms such as theatre, poetry, music, dance, and painting (2000:155). One element common to music, language, and movement was, according to Parnakh, syncopation (2000:156). Transfigured by modernity, ancient syncope and its related forms in language, versification, music, dance, and theatrical art were bursting into the twentieth century (Ibid.:201).

The poet was immediately welcomed into the very 'epicenter' of the artistic circles of Moscow, including a group of poets known as "Moscow Parnassus," and published innovative and provocative articles, while touring with lectures about modern dance and jazz music. In 1922, Parnakh organized the first jazz band in Russia. His orchestra performed on various stages, including the podium of the Fourth Congress of the Comintern, where the delegates "had shown scant interest in the racial problem in America" and had adopted its famous "Negro Thesis," calling on black Americans "to take up the cause of revolution and spread it back to Africa" (Starr 1983:101). Parnakh's repertoire varied from hits like "Kitten on the Keys" by Zez Confrey to sophisticated modernist experiments such as Milhaud's ballet suite "Le Boeuf sur le Toit."[12] Parnakh staged the first lecture-performance in the newly established Institute of Theatre. During the show, he not only spoke about jazz orchestras he had heard abroad, but also exhibited musical instruments, demonstrated the ways they were used by jazz musicians, and danced ragtime,

[11] Many African American performers and social critics also saw "potential harm" in performing certain dances and music, warning that they were becoming more and more "a fad among some colored people, encouraged by the whites," and denouncing them as being beneath "the dignity of the better class of 'the race'" (*The Indianapolis Freeman*, 1898: 4).

[12] Later Parnakh initiated a serious comprehensive and professional analysis of the aesthetic potential of jazz in the music of the French composer. His thoughts were published in the article "Innovative Ideas in Music" published in the Russian *Zhizn' Iskusstva* in 1925.

shimmy, and, most importantly, the fox trot, combining the steps with pantomime and grotesque robotic movements.[13] The show was so successful that it was soon repeated at the House of the Press, the gathering place of Moscow's artistic bon monde. There he encountered his former acting teacher, theater director Vsevolod Meyerhold, who was soon incorporating jazz into his plays. (Arenzon 2000: 5-14; Starr, 1983: 43-53, Batashev 1972:11). Parnakh's interpretations of fox trots on Meyerhold's stage soon inspired the young composer Shostakovich to create his famous orchestration of one of the tunes.

Between cultural milieux: the integration of music and drama

"The tempo and brassiness" of American popular music had great appeal for Meyerhold and he "employed it not only for mood and intermission entertainment, but also involved it directly in the production" (Symons 1971: 132). Already in his early works, the director expressed one of his most basic concerns as a theatricalist: "the integration of music and drama" (Symons 1971:132). Later, Meyerhold reconsidered the constrained arsenal of traditional means of expression, striving for the integration of language, gesture, musical themes, and rhythms.[14] He introduced a jazz band to accompany the Chechotka (a kind of tap dance) in his production of Fernard Crommelynck's *Le Cocu Magnifique* in April, 1922 (Law 1971:70, Starr 1983:50). Law writes that when the production opened that spring, the music was played on a piano. However, that autumn Meyerhold introduced a jazz band that accompanied dances on stage and entertained audiences during intermission (70). Although Law does not mention who was playing, others noted that it was a jazz band led by Valentin Parnakh, who returned to the Soviet Union in the summer of 1922.

A year later, Meyerhold caricatured modern decadents, featuring American popular music in his production of *Lake Lyul*, written by Alexey Faiko. But the real transformation of a political review into a musical and dance revue appeared in the play *D. E.* (*Give Us Europe!*, 1924), based on Ilya Ehrenburg's science fantasy novel, *Trest D. E.* and Bernard Kellerman's *The Tunnels*, and touched upon novels by Pierre Hamp and Upton Sinclair. Ehrenburg himself acknowledged that

[13] As Arenzon argues in the commentaries to Parnakh's works, the performance was influenced by "the surprise strategy" of Jean Cocteau who staged his famous grotesque pantomimes, one of which "Le Boeuf sur le Toit" was later transformed in Darius Milhaud's surreal ballet.

[14] Symons believes that music and musical concepts played a much larger part in the Meyerhold theories and methods than is generally acknowledged (Symons 1971:158). And yet, Symons does not mention Parnakh, who was in charge for music accompaniments in Meyerhold's theatre for many productions analyzed in his book. Other critics also did not do enough research analyzing musical accompaniment of the play. Thus, Llewellyn Hedgbeth makes a remarkable mistake in his article about "D. E.," when he writes that Meyerhold "asked Sofia Parnok to organize the Soviet Union first jazz band for the performance." Hedgbeth is repeatedly mistaken, as the first jazz band was organized in 1922 not 1924 when "D.E." was staged. It was led by Parnakh and not by his sister, and it was Valentin who directed the choreography. Hedgbeth provides an interesting detail that none of other researches mention with regard to the performance of the play. According to the author of the article "Meyerhold's D. E." the director invited Sidney Bechet to play during the performance when the jazzman visited Russia with his quintet in 1925. Llewellyn writes: "Meyerhold asked Bechet and his group to perform in D.E.," and for some time the visitors of the Meyerhold theatre were thrilled by the group artistry" (Hedgbeth 1975: 28).

the production was interesting: "Europe perished amidst a great deal of noise, as the panels of the set were hustled off the stage, the actors changed their make-up in a hurry, and a jazz band played deafeningly" (Hedgbeth 1975:25).

The "decaying West" was represented by tangos, shimmies, and fox trots, performed by a jazz band organized and led by Valentin Parnakh. In order to persuade the audience that the music was "*le dernier cri*" of the perishing bourgeois, the program proclaimed that band leader Valentin Parnakh "introduced a number of new dance moves that he had used in Paris, Rome, Seville, and Berlin" (Rudnitski 1969:284). *Zhizn' iskusstva* reported that "foxtrotting steps were performed masterfully." The author of the article, Konstantin Miklashevskii, praised Parnakh for "the perfected techniques, remarkable tempo patterns, and finely-drawn rhythm" (Miklashevskii 1924:11). Some critics stressed the bourgeois characteristic of the jazz accompaniment and described the "breathless shimmy" that "had [a] rather doleful impression," being "the lascivious dance of the decaying civilization" (Rudnitski 1969:284).

Pravda also described Meyerhold's technique of communicating satirical condemnation of Western decadence and wrote that "music was successfully used for the manifestation of the dramatic action rhythm and for maintaining the persistent pulsation of the performance" (Braudo 1924:7). The newspaper paid special attention to the director's choice to perform the passage from Darius Milhaud's ballet *Le Boeuf sur le Toit*, referring to it as to "a representative of the most innovative French art of sounds" (Braudo1924:7, Miklashevski 1924:11).[15] It reported that the jazz band consisted of a saxophone, xylophone, grand piano, violin, contrabass, snare drum, percussions, and various sound effects devices. The author referred to the ensemble as the best way to musically imitate modern urban uproar when performed alongside "melodically and rhythmically impudent, spicy, and morbid fox trots, the dances of apaches, and other musical scum of the modern city" (Braudo 1924:7).[16]

Two years later, that tradition of staging the ongoing ideological conflict between good communists, their sympathizers, and bourgeois philistines (Symons 1971:147) continued in Sergei Tret'yakov's anti-colonial play Roar China! (1926).[17] It was directed by Vasily Fedorov, Meyerhold's student, who joined the theatre in 1922, as a production assistant. Symons describes Fedorov's work as an effort "of a devoted disciple working under the supervision of his master" (145). The director divided the cast into two groups: Asians, as colonized people, and the white Europeans, as colonizers. The former were depicted with unprecedented tenderness and fondness. "For working up a Chinese atmosphere, especially in the last acts, he [Fedorov] employed a slow tempo, chanting voices to musical

[15] Miklashevski also mentions the performance of "Le Boeuf sur le Toit" by Darius Milhaud as the appropriate accompaniment of the action taking place in France.

[16] Gordon writes that the show remained in the repertory of Meierkhold's Theatre until 1930, and that it is uncertain how long Parnakh continued to conduct his jazz band for that production (428).

[17] According to Symons, Tret'yakov's work was highly praised by Bertolt Brecht, who reportedly said in an interview that "in Russia there's one man who's working along the right lines, Tret'yakov; a play like *Roar, China!* shows him to have found new means of expressions." Symons quotes from *Breht on Theatre*, edited by J, Willet, 65 (Symons 1971:147).

accompaniment concealed in the background, with suffering groans and gestures intensifying the tragic torment of the masses…" (cited in Symons 145). While the Chinese were pictured simply and naturally as vital and human, the imperialists were presented with the spirit of deliberate sharp social grotesqueness, as villains, demoralized by the omnipresent corrupting fox trot.

Not everyone agreed that the satirical portraits of Western "slickers" aroused condemnation of capitalist mores, as "the audience evinced an undue fascination with them and their evil ways" (Symons 1971:108). Symons contended that "the scenes depicting capitalist decadency—sexy dancing girls in black mesh hose and tights moving to a pulsating jazz accompaniment—were more exciting and 'real' than the scenes depicting the good, clean, upright proletarian man" (1971:121).[18] Although the corrupting music and dances were supposed to denounce "the decadent influences of Western bourgeois culture," the audience perceived them as "a playful, public expression to post-revolutionary concepts of "sexual liberation," "free love," and the demise of 'bourgeois' marriage" (Gorsuch 1994:8-9).

Such a development was quite distinct from the situation in America, where cross-over into "authentic" and "exotic" cultural idioms were not supposed to violate social taboos and dancers had to find "acceptable ways to transgress racial boundaries" and "to balance sexuality" against the risk of alienating the reputable public (Krasner 1996:81, 82). While in the United States, the cultural advancement of jazz dance was transformed into a "social grace," "stylish manners," and "modern gestures" with offensive "extravagances" being eschewed, "expressions of sexuality" omitted, and "coquetry" removed (Krasner 1996:81), in Russia, where the "cakewalk and fox trot were both swept immediately into middle-class urban life," people "seemed to wish the music to have an even more erotic and disreputable background than it had" (Starr 1983:34).

The response prefigured "the revolution of taste that would set the stage for a new art" (Segel 1987: xvii). Cultural hierarchies in Russia were becoming less evident, as the "high" and "low" arts merged. As a result, jazz fit neither 'high culture' nor folk heritage, having created its own cultural and social space within deep-rooted folk music, rich symphonic and classical musical traditions, operatic tunes, and the newest communication technologies (Jackson 2003: 46-51, Starr 1983: 24).[19]

A rhythmical renaissance and the revolution of taste

Many musicians, for their part, confessed that jazz represented a "rhythmic renaissance." Some referred to fox trot as music that is "free of the strict phrase or sentence," and can be improvised "without violating any earlier musical

[18] Critics mentioned a similar tendency analyzing, for example, "Trust D. E." performance (Hedgbeth 1975:35).

[19] There are other views on such a successful and effective merging of jazz and European cultural idioms. According to David Krasner, in "Rewriting the Body: Aida Overton Walker and the Social Formation of Cakewalking," jazz and modern dance choreography did not necessarily merge with other cultural forms in Europe, rather they were taken over, or shaped by preconceptions that Europeans imposed on them (Krasner 1996: 67).

law" (Danzi 1986: 47). Others included syncopated music and dance tunes in their compositions. Jazz elements were adopted by classically-trained maestros, to be orchestrated and performed in the sanctuary of Euterpe. The keepers of Russia's musical heritage, as well as their many European counterparts, showed a remarkable openness to jazz. Among them was Nikolai Malko, the principal conductor and director of the Leningrad Philharmonic, with an international reputation, who believed that "jazz would open up new areas of musical timbre for composers of the future" (1923:5). Rising star Dmitri Shostakovich was another musician moved by the "fox trot craze."

It was Nikolai Malko who gave the first performance of Shostakovich's graduation composition, his youthful *Symphony No. 1*, which hurtled the composer to instant fame.[20] It was the same Nikolai Malko who encouraged Shostakovich not to be a "music snob,"[21] and to enjoy various styles and genres, given that the atmosphere of the musical life of Leningrad at the time encouraged the suggestion.

Sofia Moshevich describes that environment as rich and varied. She writes that besides a classic Western and Russian repertoire, concert programs also featured the French group Les Six, Ernst Krenek, and Stravinsky (Moshevich 2004:15). Other authors also point to a "novelty-starved" audience and numerous guest artists who visited the Soviet capitals in the course of the 'New Economic Policy' period of the 1920's (Schwartz 1972:44). Boris Schwartz, for example, noticed that "the peculiar responsiveness of "the Russian audience" as well as "the musical curiosity of young Russian professionals" struck "a responsive chord among the foreign visitors who returned home, deeply impressed" (1072:44).

Alla Bogdanova mentions Shostakovich's interest in multiple genres that characterized his early works and reflected upon some common developments in opera elsewhere. Thus, Bogdanova notes operas by Krenek and Gershwin performed in Leningrad at that time (1979:90). Shostakovich admitted that "during my years of study at the conservatory, I heard as much music [of all possible genres] as I did in all the following years put together. I'm strongly persuaded that this was of great benefit to me" (quoted in Moshevich 2004:47).

The composer referred to the excitement brought to the Russian musical stage by Oscar Fried, Otto Klemperer and other orchestral conductors of the Austro-German school, by pianists Egon Petri and Eduard Erdman, who explored modernism, and by the violinist Joseph Szigeti, whose "intense, angular style,

[20] Sophia Moshevich refers to Shostakovich's Symphony No. 1 as "an accomplished artistic masterpiece in which only the captivating vitality and exuberant temperament betray composer's youth." She writes that when Nikolai Malko, the chief conductor of the Leningrad Philharmonic, heard the piece, he was impressed both by the new composition and Shostakovich's playing the piano. On the 12 May 1926, the Symphony No. 1 was premiered by Nikolai Malko conducting the Leningrad Philharmonic Orchestra. This date is considered a turning point in Shostakovich's career. The Symphony "acquainted the world with a new musical genius and was destined to bring Shostakovich international recognition and fame" (Moshevich 2004:39-41).

[21] The author borrowed that phrase from Levine's article "Jazz and American Culture" where he quotes the bandmaster John Philip Sousa, who complained of the "artistic snobbery" that has plagued his career: "Notwithstanding the credo of musical snobs, 'popular' does not necessarily mean 'vulgar' or 'ephemeral'" (quoted in Levine 1989:10).

so different from the polished Russian tradition of violin playing, captured the interest of professionals and laymen alike" (Schwartz 1972:44).

Shostakovich also pointed to his creative collaboration with composer Bruno Walter, who promised to introduce *Symphony No. 1* to Berlin, the French composers Darius Milhaud,[22] who was the most outspoken advocate of jazz in the group, Les Six, foreseeing jazz becoming a "classical" form of music, and Jean Wiéner, who played jazz piano along with the African American saxophonist and banjoist Vance Lowry (Schwartz 1972:45, Jackson 2003:119). Schwartz mentions Shostakovich as one of those Russian pianists who much-admired Jean Wiéner's "subtle syncopations" (1972:45).

With his voracious musical curiosity, Shostakovich began to frequent concerts of visiting jazz musicians. According to Elizabeth Wilson, who wrote the introduction to his *Jazz Album*, the composer "reported his delight at a jazz band that accompanied a 'negro operetta'" [23] in 1926 (1988:3). The predominance of imported films made movie theatres "ideal conduits for popular songs from abroad" (Starr 1983:27). As a student, the composer tried his hand at American ragtime or jazz "toiling before the flickering screen" (Starr 1983:17). In spite of the fact that it was primarily his financial situation that forced the composer to seek employment as a pianist-improviser, his cinema improvisations were, by all accounts, "markedly different from the-standard fare of musical clichés" (Moshevich 2004: 37). The cinema employment was apparently "draining Dmitri's time, health, and energy," but it proved his "sensitivity to everything new and unusual." Among his friends, he would often play jazz improvisations on the piano (Volkov 1978, Dmitri Shostakovich: 225). Within a few years, the composer was making a conscious attempt to write in modernist idioms. Moshevich mentions Shostakovich's *Piano Sonata No. 1, op. 12* that he completed in October, 1926. The author explains that it was the first large piano work in which the composer expressed himself "without limitations and tried his hand at a number of many 'forbidden' styles and techniques" (Moshevich 2004:43). Jazz critic Kevin Whitehead points to its "ragtimey exuberance," and "long descending glisses" early on in the *Sonata*.[24] But the composer's infatuation with 'syncopated music' has not been widely publicized in his native land. Rather, Russians would know and love Shostakovich for his stern, pathétique, peremptory compositions that reflect the tragic history of the country, looming ideology-driven dictatorial authority, and unending sufferings of its people.

Musicologists in the West, however, have repeatedly referred to Shostakovich's interest in jazz. Frederick Starr briefly refers to the composer's

[22] Shostakovich performed his First Symphony for friends, teachers, and musicians. Darius Milhaud heard it, not long after the premiere, in March 1926, and Bruno Walter—in 1927. The symphony was premiered abroad by Bruno Walter on 6 February 1928 in Berlin and by Leopold Stokowski on 2 November 1928 in Philadelphia.

[23] Wilson mistakenly writes 1925. According to all other accounts, 'negro operetta' and the accompanying Sam Wooding's band "Chocolate Kiddies" toured Moscow and Leningrad in 1926, not 1925. See for example (Kotlyarski 1990:5) or (Starr 1983:54-57).

[24] It does not persuade Whitehead that these were proof of jazz influence. Kevin Whitehead has shared with me his thoughts about Shostakovich's *Piano Sonata No. 1.*

experience with jazz and ragtime and mentions his orchestration of "Tea for Two" (1983:59). Sofia Moshevich, who devoted a book to Shostakovich's brilliant career as a pianist, also points to the fact that he incorporated the fox trot into a ballet score, and writes that it caused the piece to disappear from the composer's repertoire for several decades (2004:188n71). Scholar Laurel Fay mentions the "celebrity" of the composer's "hasty arrangement," writing about Shostakovich's ability to "conceptualize a work in its entirety, and produce his music quickly as the inspiration struck him" (2000:46). But only Solomon Volkov, the most controversial of the scholars writing about the composer's life and creative activity, the author of the (in)famous *Testimony*,[25] and *Shostakovich and Stalin*, shed light on the story behind the composer's orchestration of a famous fox trot and discussed the musician's internal struggle borne of caution and fear, bred within the police state atmosphere of Soviet life.[26] In a 1978 *Musical Quarterly* article entitled "Dmitri Shostakovich and "Tea for Two," Volkov undertakes a revelation of the story behind the composer's transcription of the fox trot, a composition that has achieved perennial success and has been picked up by famous musicians from all over the world.

"Tahiti Trot": The many lives of "Tea for Two"

Vincent Youmans authored that "gaily syncopated score" in 1925 for *No, No, Nanette!*—a quintessential 1920s musical comedy with its "giddy procession of flappers, philanderers and farcical situations."[27] When producer Harry Frazee gave Youmans and co-lyricist Irving Caesar only twenty-four hours to come up with something new and fresh, they responded by writing two songs that became the show's greatest hits, "I Want to be Happy," and "Tea for Two" (Bowers 1989:17). The latter very quickly became "the standard soft-shoe shuffle of the world,"[28] making the musical itself an international hit several months prior to the Broadway performance. *American Popular Song* author Alec Wilder attributed the popularity to "the device of building up to a *b* natural in the melody, then to a *b* flat, then back to a *b* natural and then again to a *b* flat" (1990:132).[29]

[25] The book caused a lot of resonance in the press and in numerous publications in the fields of music and Russian studies. Thus, for example, Laurel Fay obtained the reputation of Volkov's most authoritative and inexorable critic for the article "Shostakovich versus Volkov: Whose *Testimony*?" published in *Russian Review* in the fall 1980, and for "Volkov's *Testimony* Reconsidered," published as a second chapter in *A Shostakovich Casebook*. The author defines two major concerns that were expressed both in the Soviet Union and in the West. One is the authenticity of the manuscript that Volkov used for the *Testimony*, and the other—"veracity of many statements contained therein" (Fay 2004: 12).

[26] See Volkov, 1978. Dmitri Shostakovich and 'Tea for Two' in *Musical Quarterly* 64:2 (April, 1978): 223-28, and the article by the same author "D. D. Shostakovich i Mal'ko" in *Slavica Hierosolymitana* Vol. III (1978): 264-271.

[27] The premiere took place on 16 September 1925, in the Globe Theatre; the musical run was 321 performances (Bowers 1989: 17).

[28] The text is on the sleeve of the audio recording, produced by Columbia, 1971. This is the recording of the forty-six-year-old musical revived on Broadway in 1971.

[29] Due to the seeming ly everlasting success of its two biggest hits, the show remains enshrined as one of the classic comedies of the 1920s. It received "a surprisingly stylish

"Tea for Two" reached Russia and was swept into theatrical performances where Shostakovich heard it. In 1926, it was incorporated in the operetta "The Career of Pierpont Blake" by Boris Fomin (1900-1948), with Russian lyrics by Konstantin Podrevsky (1888-1930), who gave it the title "Tahiti Trot." The tune's name emphasized its fox trot elements and reflected the tendency at the time to delve into the world of exotic and "blatantly lascivious" modern dance. Starr explains that even though Russia's nascent popular music industry was introducing "a well-structured written music," that same industry fostered an image of "uninhibited savages wailing erotic melodies under a tropical moon" when it promoted the new "Negro" dances. According to Volkov, the fox trot also resounded at the same time from the stage of Meyerhold's theatre, the composer's favorite, in *Roar China!* Volkov writes that Shostakovich orchestrated "Tea for Two" from memory and did so in forty-five minutes, "in a wager with Nikolai Malko" (Volkov, Dmitri Shostakovich 1978:224). The conductor himself recollects that "Shostakovich played the fox trot very often and very well on the piano and that he was willing to orchestrate the piece at his [conductor's] request," which he did in October, 1927 (Malko 1930:39).[30]

Analyzing Shostakovich's orchestration, Kevin Whitehead noted certain featured peculiarities that included "repeated performance of the introductory verse," a move which "would very rarely be done by an American arranger." Also, though sections are repeated, "the composer offers a fresh arrangement on every pass, and like other jazzy pop compositions, it's quite flowing, rhythmically." Whitehead thinks that it is comparable with what American counterpart Paul Whiteman was doing in the same period.[31]

Soon after, the "brilliantly witty and original" orchestration was performed at a symphony in Moscow, and later in Leningrad and other cities.[32] "Tahiti Trot" acquired such popularity in Russia that, along with concert hall venues, it was played by dance bands in restaurants and dance halls all over the country.[33] Later, in 1930, on recommendation of conductor Alexander Gauk, it became a part of

and successful" Broadway revival in 1971. A Film version of the musical was released early in 1930, then in 1940, and a third time in 1950. In the 1940 remake Youmans' popular score was replaced by songs written by other composers and reduced to just "Tea for Two" and "I want to be Happy." In 1950 Doris Day and Gordon MacRae stared in Warner's "Tea for Two," which, though omitting the original story entirely, used several Youmans' songs from "Nanette" and other shows.

[30] The conductor refers to the inscription on the score made by Shostakovich that was dated October 1927.

[31] Kevin Whitehead, personal communication. 2007, Lawrence, KS.

[32] Among other places where Malko conducted this orchestration he mentions Kharkiv, Baku, and London (Malko 1930:39). Laurel Fay writes that Malko was so pleased with the orchestration that after giving the premiere at the same Moscow concert in November 1928 with the suite from the *Nose* and another trifle, the transcription for winds of *Two Pieces by Scarlatti*, he included the orchestration in numerous concerts (Fay 2000:47).

[33] In his open letter to the editor, the conductor writes that "in the summer of 1929 the orchestration was so popular that it was performed almost every other day in Kiev in 'Proletarski' park" (Malko 1930:39).

the composer's first ballet, *The Golden Age*.[34] The original libretto was dedicated to the theme of "Russians in the West." It involved the story of Soviet athletes in a capitalist country where an evil Western beauty does her best to seduce the virtuous captain of the Soviet soccer team.

"Tahiti Trot" was so enormously successful that it survived beyond April 18th, 1928, the decisive moment in the politicization of jazz in the USSR. On that day, *Pravda*, the principal organ of the Communist Party, published an essay by novelist Maxim Gorky entitled "On the Music of the Gross." The essay was translated into English by Marie Budberg and first appeared under the title, "The Music of the Degenerate" in the journal *Dial*, that December. It became the "gospel," in Starr's words, of the assault against jazz. Phrases from Gorky's critique appeared in the Soviet press over the following half-century, "whenever it was necessary to settle scores" with the genre, or "simply to contrast the Soviet Union with the degenerate West" (Starr 1983:89). Almost every jazz historian refers to that essay, as illustrating how "a type-cast proletarian from the land of the tsars would feed Soviet xenophobia" (Starr 1983: 89). This is how Gorky describes his perception of jazz in the most widely cited passage:

> In the deep stillness resounds the dry knocking of an idiotic hammer. One, two, three, ten, twenty strokes, and after them, like a mud ball splashing into clear water, a wild whistle screeches; and then there are rumblings, wails and howls like the smarting of a metal pig, the shriek of a donkey, or the amorous croaking of a monstrous frog. This insulting chaos of insanity pulses to a throbbing rhythm. Listening for a few minutes to these wails, one involuntarily imagines an orchestra of sexually driven madmen conducted by a man-stallion brandishing a huge genital member."[35]

In June, 1929, the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party convened a conference on music, at which the "fox trot problem" was singled out for a discussion that resulted in a national campaign against jazz dance and syncopated tunes. The Association of Proletariat Musicians, serving as a semi-official censorship body, defined jazz as "the dominant religion, manipulated by the new capitalist masters in order to secure and extend their dominion" (Starr 1983: 93). As Volkov explains, "the fox-trotting West" was pictured as the embodiment of evil and a threat to culture; and a press campaign was begun against "fox-trotism" (Volkov, Dmitri Shostakovich 1978:225). The first accusations were made against Meyerhold's productions, which were condemned in *Proletarski Musykant (Proletarian Musician)* as being a tribune for propagating distasteful and indecent dances

[34] Volkov researched Shostakovich correspondence with the conductor Nikolai Malko and found out that the original tentative title of the Ballet was "Dynamiada" (Volkov, Dmitri Shostakovich 1978: 227).

[35] Starr quoted the authorized translation by Marie Budberg published in *Dial*, Dec. (1928): 480-84. (1983: 89-90).

and pernicious jazz such as the (in)famous "Tahiti Trot" and other popular tunes that resounded from the stage (*Proletarski Musykant* 1930:30). For committed communists, as Gorsuch put it, flappers' fashion, jazz and popular new dances "violated cultural and political ideals: they signaled a rampant individualism of personal and cultural expression" (Gorsuch 2008:186).

Llewellyn H. Hedgbeth writes that there were problems for Meyerhold when "audiences found the depiction of the Communist world deadly boring in its opposition to the glittering, sinful pleasures of the West." The press condemned the fact that "the pictorial descriptions of the achievements of the October Revolution had disappeared and were instead expressed in the picture of a Communist world that was unpleasant because of its grayness and sameness." Hedgbeth points out that Meyerhold "was accused of 'urbanism' and of being fascinated with life in a bourgeois city" (Hedgbeth 1975:35).

In a 1929 attempt to discredit musical innovations from abroad, *Proletarski Musykant* published a slashing article about Krenek's jazz opera, that only recently had been performed to adulation in Leningrad.[36] The author wrote that the band, fox-trot rhythms and intonations turn the lyricism of the drama into a banal story, while moments touched with eroticism became openly pornographic. He called fox trot a dance of the petty bourgeois and suggested that "our working-class audience deserves better than observing vulgar scenes of fox-trotting philistines" (Kaltat 1929:27).[37]

"Foxtrot at Europe's Rescue" expressed bitter regrets about Europe's inability to secure its cultural venues from being taken over by that new American dance. It blamed the First World War for the inexplicable moral and physical exhaustion of Europeans and proclaimed that unfortunately there was no other way in the West to rescue the troubled Old World but to dance while its restrictive cultural heritage collapsed (Kaltat 1929:25).

People's Commissar of Education (Public Enlightenment) Anatoly Lunacharsky accused the fox trot of embodying "suppressed eroticism and the desire to deaden feeling through drugs" (cited in Volkov, Dmitri Shostakovich 1978:225).[38] He challenged "syncopated music" and declared that the construction

[36] In his first jazz opera Krenek demonstrated his appreciation of the potential for jazz to "rejuvenate" classical music. The composer used instrumentation, that had "the flavor of jazz" in Shimmy, Ivonne's and Jonny's duet, incorporated so called "blues notes" and syncopated rhythms in such numbers as the blues song 'Leb wohl, mein Schatz,' that was later recorded separately in various arrangements. He also orchestrated catchy and jazzy hit from Youmans's musical "I Want to Be Happy," that, together with myriads of other popular compositions, was brought to Germany on records, published as sheet music, and in repertoires of the scores of touring Americans who continued to delight European public well into thirties.

[37] Starr documents in his book that the show of Krenek's opera was closed in Moscow (1983:85). Interestingly, in the USA, things were no better. At the first performance in New York in January 1929, the singer taking the part of Jonny had to be clearly recognizable as a white man wearing black make-up. The opera was a flop there, as it had been in Paris before that. (Jonny Spielt Auf: Between Jazz and New Music1993:29).

[38] Anatoly Vasilievich Lunacharsky, "A Stenographic Report of Lunacharsky's Speech," quoted in Volkov, "Dmitri Shostakovich", 225. Lunacharsky's interpretation echoes an earlier assessment made by W.E.B. DuBois who saw another dance of African origin, such as cakewalk as though

of socialism in the Soviet Union had its own "vast rhythm of human movement, which in the end, comes together in a single enormous symphony of motion and labor" (Lunacharsky 1929:19). Lunacharsky and Gorky linked jazz not only with dancing but also with "degradation of sexual mores." Frederic Starr explains that by their criticism of the sexuality of the dance and accompanying music, both Lunacharsky and Gorky condemned jazz as "the instrument of a deliberate capitalist plot" (Starr 1983:92) to make man live "through his sexual organs, so that during the intervals between work he will be preoccupied with these sides of his existence" (quoted in Starr 1983:92-93).

From that time, the syncopated music that contradicted the cultural dogmatism and gloomy Puritanism of Soviet social reality was defined as "a tool of the capitalists to control the true forces of liberation and class struggle" (Starr 1983:93). Yet, while the fox trot was identified by officials as a frontal assault on Soviet culture, it continued to find a responsive urban audience. Starr and Gorsuch explore "the multiple meanings" of jazz, both for the public and for Soviet authorities who struggled with the personal and political influences of jazz, while facing the challenge of "creating cultural hegemony" (Gorsuch 1994:19). Despite official ideology which presented the music as an accompaniment to philistine amorality and apolitical debauchery, it had a profound effect on a new generation of the Soviet urban population. That tendency was notably depicted in Mayakovsky's play *Bedbug*, staged by Meyerhold and featuring the music of Shostakovich. The prototype for both Bayan and Pierre Skrypkin in the dance class scene was undoubtedly Parnakh, and the principal dance—the fox trot. Lampooning fox-trotting couples in his play, the poet dubbed them "four-legged hermaphrodites."

In fact, Bolshevik moralists "had much in common with their European and American counterparts" (Gorsuch 1994:19). Gorsuch, whose research is devoted to the analysis of youth culture in Soviet Russia, argues that in the West there was also concern about the "decadent" behavior of youth centered around dangerously polluted "alien" music (Gorsuch 1994:20). The condemnation of jazz on both sides of the Atlantic sounded strikingly similar. Gorsuch refers to a 1921 issue of *Ladies' Home Journal*, where jazz was described as "the accompaniment of the voodoo dancer, stimulating the half-crazed barbarian to the vilest deeds" (Gorsuch 1994:19).[39]

The tendency to blame jazz for "sexual excesses" was also reflected in writing all over Europe. Richard Maltby cited such discourses in *Dreams for Sale: Popular Culture in the 20th Century.* "Jazz-savage, primitive, rotted moral

"innocent amusement," but often accompanied by "much drinking and attended by white and black prostitutes" (quoted in Krasner 1996:74). Krasner refers to W.E.B. Dubois.1899. *The Philadelphia Negro.* New York: Benjamin Blom, 320. The term Great Turn or Great Break came from the title of Stalin's article "Year of the Great Turn: marking the 12th anniversary of October" ("God velikogo pereloma: k XII godovschine Oktiabria"), published on 7 November 1929 in *Pravda*, № 259.

[39] Frederick Starr refers to very similar editions as he describes the great controversy over jazz in the United States. Thus he refers to R. McMahon, "Unspeakable Jazz Must Go!" *Ladies' Home Journal*, Dec. (1921): 115-16; "The Jazz Path of Degradation," *Ladies' Home Journal*, Jan, (1922): 26-71; Jaap Kool, "The Triumph of the Jungle," *Living Age* Feb. 7, (1925*):* 338-43.

fiber, spread a whorehouse culture, polluted children, caused illegitimacy and all manner of unspeakable crimes" (Maltby 1989:72). *Proletarski Muzykant* articulated analogous arguments when it suggested that to popularize jazz band music meant to reveal our degrading, unbridled, savage inner selves. Kaltat would condemn Krenek's infatuation with jazz and write that "African Americans are probably enjoying watching their masters' disgrace, while the latter are slipping away from the grace of minuet and the lively verve of waltz, being captured by the cynicism of the fox trot and cramped with Charleston convulsions…" (1929:27).

Yet, as is clear from these examples, there were also explicit differences between Soviet officialdom and Western cultural gatekeepers' perspectives on the baleful menace of jazz. Western writing reveals racist hypocrisy, while Russian proletarian exhortation reflects a prudish Bolshevik neo-Victorian "obsession with regulating the expenditure of sexual energy" (Carleton 2005:75). American and European critics worried more about the "barbarian" characteristics of African American jazz culture, while Bolsheviks, on the contrary, would "attribute much of youth's "decadent" behavior to the corrupting influences of the lecherous bourgeoisie," condemning European distortion of African folk authenticity (Gorsuch 1994:20). African American cultural idioms were associated with subtle resistance to the Eurocentric economic, political and social oppression, and denunciation of their ruthless exploitation by pleasure-seeking capitalist scoffers went hand-in-hand with a heightened indictment of racism by Soviet ideologues during the late 1920s and early 1930s.[40] They called for refinement of jazz from "the tavern mood of vulgar Europe that resorted to Negro cultural extravagancy to revive its [European] seared sensuality…" (Kuz'min 1926). Such rhetoric reflected not only a tendency to capitalize on racism, exposing the glaring contradictions of capitalist societies, but also distinguished Soviets from their Western contemporaries, as in the policy-making process they utilized sociohistorical categories of nationality and class rather than the biological category of race.[41]

[40] For a more nuanced analysis of the role of African American folklore, humor and music in resisting their oppression, as well as the controversy surrounding anti-racist discourse on the one hand and reinforced nationalism used to support Soviet ideology on the other, see Roman, Meredith L. 2012. *Opposing Jim Crow: African Americans and the Soviet Indictment of U.S. Racism, 1928–1937.* Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, especially Chapter II.

[41] Roman writes, that Soviet authorities appeared to be ahead of their contemporaries in playing the "race card", as they denied racial hierarchies as backward, at a time when other leaders celebrated the superiority of "white men's countries" (Roman 2012:10-11). Other scholars, such as Eric Weitz, point out that in spite of the rejection of the biological category of race, Soviet nationalities politics were essentially racial "without the overt concept and ideology of race". Weitz explains that in spite of the fact that in official Soviet ideology, the friendship of nations within the Soviet federation had "completely eliminated the racism typical of fascism and of capitalist societies", traces of racial politics crept into Soviet nationalities policies. As a result, particular populations were endowed with immutable traits that every member of the group possessed and that were passed from one generation to the next. These traits could be "the source of praise and power, as with Russians, or could lead to round-ups, forced deportations, and resettlement". See Weitz, Eric D. 2002. "Racial Politics without the Concept of Race: Reevaluating Soviet Ethnic and National Purges." *Slavic Review* 61, no. 1(Spring):1-29 (3).

Such interpretations point to the frustrations of Soviet authorities and to an ongoing struggle in Russia between the apologists for jazz, for whom it would be imperative to define it as the music of oppressed people "indigenous to the 'Southern Black Belt,'" and those who denounced it as the music of the degenerate West, warning against its decadent bourgeois influences and intimate connection to the capitalist mode of production (Starr 1983:102).

In the midst of that ideological debate, neither the considerable revisions of the libretto of *The Golden Age*, nor the talented choreography in the Academic (Kirov) Theatre could save Shostakovich's orchestration of the fox trot from condemnation by the authorities (Moshevich 2004:188). In 1930, *Proletarski Musykant* published a list of responses from prominent cultural figures who followed the journal's call to fight NEP fashion, and "gypsy-foxtrotting"[42] bands. The head of the Council of Performing Arts and Literature, F. Kon, proclaimed that "it is necessary to mercilessly extirpate gypsy tunes and fox trot as the products of the most hostile and alienated classes and subclasses." Henrikh Meigauz, a professor from the Moscow Conservatoire, echoed that sentiment, concluding that "the so called light genre in music is the same as pornography in literature" (1930:22).[43] Rector of the Moscow Conservatoire Pshibyshevski warned that the "so called light genre in music is one of the most dangerous and enduring sources of NEP ideology that is so inimical to the working class. All those various gypsy romances and fox trots invariably cloud the worker's mind with venomous intoxicants demoralizing one's will even more than alcohol, eliminating class consciousness" (1930:22).

Outrage over the fox trot coincided with the so called "Great Turn" (Velikii perelom), a fundamental re-orientation in all spheres of Soviet life, including its cultural and artistic aspects, proclaimed by Stalin, in 1929.[44] That radical change in state policy meant the end of NEP and the acceleration of collectivization and industrialization. It also signaled a significant ideological shift that determined the end of NEP-era liberties in many forms of artistic expression. Instead, the concept of socialist realism, first proposed by Stalin, was publicly introduced as the officially preferred and sanctioned artistic style that was to snare all arts, including

[42] It is worth mentioning the comparison between the popularity of gypsy orchestras and dances among aristocracy and bourgeois in pre-Revolutionary Russia and the popularity of jazz dances among the middle class urban public in the 1920s. Laurel Fay mentions that gypsy music was referred to as "exemplifying the degenerate legacy from the bourgeois past" and that was compared with the fox trot "subsuming jazz and decadent influences from the West." (Fay 2000:59). Thus, it is not surprising that critics compared the influences of jazz music with the impact of gypsy performances that, as Starr reminds in his book, were "embellished with an aura of Oriental exoticism," and "combined music, dancing, and sex in about the same proportion as in Storyville" (Starr 1983: 25, 26).

[43] Interestingly, Levine also mentions that the condemnation of jazz music in the United States, especially by analogy, had become "a favorite sport." Levine refers to numerous articles in the *New York Times*, *Harper's* and other publications from 1920s in which critics insisted that jazz "bore the same relationship to classical music as a limerick did to poetry, or a farmhouse to the cathedral" (Levine 1989:12).

[44] The term Great Turn or Great Break came from the title of Stalin's article "Year of the Great Turn: marking the 12th anniversary of October" ("God velikogo pereloma: k XII godovschine Oktiabria"), published on 7 November 1929 in *Pravda*, № 259.

theater and music, to propagate an "easily understood, unambiguous picture of life and human nature coupled with an unflagging optimism" (Bliss Eaton 2002: xviii). Innovative artists, such as Parnakh, Shostakovich and Meyerhold would be labeled as formalists, a term that came to be used in the early 1930s as an official condemnation of avant-garde arts, as well as in independent science and teaching. They would come under attack for their "affronts against Soviet sensibilities" and "reticence [would] become the norm of life" more than ever (ibid., xviii-xix).

Volkov writes that under these circumstances, Shostakovich became unnerved. He sent his own memo to *Proletarski Musykant*, then the influential organ of a group of musical personalities who stood close to the party leadership "and fought against "bourgeois ideology" (Volkov, Dmitri Shostakovich 1978:225). In his note, Shostakovich readily calls upon all the forces of heaven and earth to assistin "light music's" total destruction (Volkov, Dmitri Shostakovich 1978:225). The composer writes: "To combat the "light genre," the most advanced segment of the musical community must seek the aid of the party, the Young Communist League, the trade unions, radio, the most active elements of club membership, and organizers of musical entertainment" (Shostakovich 1930:25).[45] Volkov describes the letter as being completely loyal on the surface, but ironic and mocking beneath (Volkov, Dmitri Shostakovich 1978: 226). The postscript to Shostakovich's letter reveals more struggle and less irony. "I consider it a political mistake on my part to have granted conductor Malko permission to arrange my orchestration of "Tahiti Trot," since "Tahiti Trot" (a number from the ballet The Golden Age), when performed without an appropriate setting showing the *composer's attitude toward the material*, might create the erroneous impression that I am an advocate of the 'light genre'" (Shostakovich 1930:25).

At the time, Malko was on tour in Prague. The conductor did not delay in responding. He observed "quite justly" that Shostakovich's remark about having "granted conductor Malko permission to arrange my orchestration" was not comprehensible to him. He had been granted permission to perform the piece in 1927, long before the ballet was even a project, and since then the musician had been conducting exactly the same arrangement. Neither had he heard about "the composer's attitude to the material," nor about any ban imposed on it (Malko 1930: 39).[46] *Proletarski Musykant* published the conductor's letter with the following postscript: "Along with publishing this letter the editors wish to observe that since conductor Malko has more than once in a number of cities performed the fox trot orchestrated by Shostakovich, he is no less responsible than the composer for the propagandizing of this 'gem' of light-genre music" (*Proletarski Musykant* 1930:39).[47]

Since then, that early work of Shostakovich had almost been forgotten in Russia. His orchestral transcription had not been performed for more than forty-five years. The ballet *The Golden Age* also quickly disappeared from repertory,

[45] Shostakovich's letter was translated by Barry Rubin and cited in Volkov, "Dmitri Shostakovich and 'Tea for Two'" (Volkov, Dmitri Shostakovich, 1978:226).

[46] Malko's response to Shostakovich was also translated by Rubin and cited in Volkov's article.

[47] As it is translated by Rubin and cited in Volkov's article.

and the original score of the orchestration remained in the possession of the conductor's widow, Berthe Malko, in New York.

Meyerhold, Tret'yakov and Parnakh too were silenced and fell victims to Stalin's terror. The poet was consigned to cultural oblivion and died in obscurity in 1951. Until recently, Parnakh's legacy has been almost entirely eliminated from cultural discourse, aside for a few relatively brief references to his creative personality profiled in Starr's and Batashev's books devoted to the history of jazz. Parnakh is absent from the literary encyclopedia Kratkaya literaturnaya entsiklopedia (KLE, 1962-1978), considered one of the most comprehensive reference editions in the field of literary studies in Russia. The family name Parnakh, or Parnok, was associated only with Valentin's sister Sofia, a poetess recalled in the memoirs of Marina Tsvetaeva. Sofia was honored with an entry in the KLE literary reference edition. Even though she devoted a number of her poems to her brother (Parnok 1979:220), their artistic credos were very different. Parnakh's creative work simply "dissolved in the artistic capillary flow of his time" (Arenzon 2000: 19), with the last edition of his poems published in Moscow more than seventy years ago, and lost in its entirety. Only in 2000 was Parnakh's early poetry finally republished in Russia, in an attempt to return his work and cultural legacy to contemporary artistic consciousness.[48]

Even though Shostakovich attempted to detach himself from the fox trot affair, he did not avoid a fate of humiliating disfavor. He became withdrawn, following attacks upon his work, especially in 1936 and again in 1948. When a Communist Party censure of Soviet arts uncovered a "sprit of decadence and bourgeois estheticism" in the music of a number of Soviet composers, the Central Committee ruled that seven of them, including Shostakovich, Aram Khachaturian, and Sergei Prokofiev, were guilty of creating and encouraging anti-democratic works" (*New York Times;* 1948, "Soviet Artists Find Selves 'Decadent'"). Along with Sergei Prokofiev, Shostakovich accepted the Central Committee's criticism and interpreted the party's rebuke as "fatherly concern for us—the Soviet artists" (*New York Times.* 1948, "Shostakovich Welcomes Party's 'Fatherly Concern"). As the cold war progressed, perceived Western influences upon Soviet culture were thoroughly filtered. All musical performances were subject to prior censorship. The tiniest hint of hedonism was outlawed. In a world where natural and sincere manifestations of emotion were impossible, "where everything was stifled by 'social necessity,' jazz became a safety valve, an outlet for the realization of individual life, for the manifestation of human privacy." It had clearly been perceived as the music of free self-expression, surrounded with a "Dionysian atmosphere," that created contact between performers and audience, uniting them in their opposition to "musical dogmatism and Party prescriptions" (Barban 1985:12).

[48] Over the last two decades, Parnakh's legacy has been well established in both Russian and Western scholarship. Some of his most popular and important works have been publicized, analyzed and integrated into the literary discourse pertinent to the history and theory of the Russian literature and culture. See for example the 2012 edition of a collection of his poems, *Tri knigi* (Moskva: Sam&Sam).

To turn to jazz meant to recognize in it a form of escapism, "of flight from odious and depersonalized reality," (Barban 1985:12) and thus to challenge the state's monopoly over culture and the arts. To recede from it meant to avoid being crushed by a regime that controlled almost every aspect of human existence. Shostakovich, apparently, had chosen the latter. In January 1959, the *New York Times* published an article by Max Frankel entitled "Jazz is Deplored by Shostakovich." Frankel writes that the composer expressed his great disappointment at "the passion" of young people for that "genre" and called for a healthy art instead (1958:9). Frankel referred to Shostakovich's address to Soviet musicians published in the government newspaper *Izvestiia*, where the composer invited his colleagues to write "as much as possible about love, friendship, and comradeship, 'heroic songs about the exploits of our people,' about 'conquerors of virgin lands and about mighty builders who erect electric power stations'" (cited in Frankel 1958:9).

Yet not everyone gave credence to the image of the composer as "the pride of the Soviet Union." Solomon Volkov believes that Shostakovich "expressed himself frankly only in his music" (Volkov 1979: xiv). The author refused to rely upon articles in the official press with the composer's name at the bottom (Volkov 1979: xv).[49] In his book, *Testimony: The Memoirs of Dmitri Shostakovich*,[50] the typescript of which had been smuggled to the West, the musicologist describes his meetings and conversations with the composer in the 1960s and early '70s, at a time when Shostakovich seemed most dissatisfied and "was trying to distance himself from his music" (Volkov 1979: xiv). Volkov suggests that the fear, despair and political compromises in his creative pursuits, constituted Shostakovich's inner rather than external tragedy. The references to his experiences with jazz as well as the episode around the orchestration of Youmans's fox trot, and the fate of the composer's first ballet, that had fallen into disgrace, reveals the early 'leftist' Shostakovich, who for many decades had remained officially banned, and "defamed in music history classes and textbooks" (Volkov 1979: xii).

In 2006, on the occasion of the composer's 100th birthday anniversary, musicians and ballet-masters paid tribute by reviving his works after decades of disfavor. In July, 2005, the world was treated to Shostakovich's revived avant-garde ballet *The Bright Stream* (*Svetlyi ruchei*), and in February, 2006, seventy-four years after its composition, the 'industrial ballet' *The Bolt* was finally performed in public. When renowned choreographer Yuri Grigorovich premiered a revival of *The Golden Age* with "Tea for Two" that accompanied a gracefully-staged choreography in the Bolshoi theatre in March,[51] it formed a crown in a triad of Shostakovich Ballets brought back to the Russian stage.

The belated acknowledgement did not end the ongoing discourse about the paradox surrounding syncopated music initiated in Russia by versatile

[49] Volkov writes that in many instances composers had not even been asked to sign their "own" articles, since "such a formality was considered unnecessary."

[50] See the footnote 23 above.

[51] It was also Yuri Grigorovich who staged *Golden Age* with changed libretto in 1982. The Ballet was withdrawn from the Bolshoi in 1995 to be brought back only ten years later.

artist-eccentric Valentin Parnakh. To the contrary, the increasing interest in Shostakovich's challenged legacy would inevitably lead to further exploration of the heated debates about jazz, its meaning, and its impact on the spiritual and emotional aspirations of the Soviets in the first few decades under Communist rule.

Conclusion

In comparing the charges brought against the fox trot in the West and Soviet Russia, I have shown that in both instances, jazz and salon dance were dismissed as the expression of depravity, with almost identical accusations in the contemporary American and Soviet press. I analyze how the cultural establishment and guardians of mass ideology distorted, in Levine's words, jazz meaning and its character, and often "pigeonholed it, stereotyped it, denigrated it," even though the reasons for doing so were different on either side of the Atlantic. Levine attributed "a long-standing neglect" of "a central element in American culture" (Levin 1989:11) to the disgrace of racism, while Anne Gorsuch observed that advocates for class struggle categorized jazz as the music of the bourgeois, too Western and too decadent to be propagated among the Soviet people.

During the NEP, jazz music and dances were first welcomed as a powerful artistic novelty "winning over the cultural avant-garde," but later dismissed as ideologically weak cacophony, "seducing the public at large" (Starr 1983:45). The fate of Shostakovich's orchestration of the popular dance tune "Tea for Two" and his attempt to incorporate it into classical ballet fell prey to the ideological interpretation of the music's social function. Its story brought together curiously intertwined lives of a classical composer, innovative theatre director, and avant-garde poet and choreographer, who shared the destiny of syncopated music that succumbed to the dissonant notes of political reaction, fading away in the ephemeral history of NEP Russia.

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Surgeon Grow: An American in the Russian Fighting

Laurie S. Stoff

The remembrances of Dr. Malcom Grow, an American surgeon who served with the Russian Imperial Army for several years during World War I, serve as a valuable addition to our understanding of the war experiences on the Eastern Front. The war in the East is significantly underrepresented in publications on the Great War than that of the Western Front. While one may peruse shelf after shelf of memoirs, journalists' accounts, and scholarly assessments concerning the participation of Western nations in the First World War, the same cannot be said about Russia's Great War. Loath to celebrate an imperialist war, in fact, for many, merely perceived as prelude to revolution, the Soviet officials failed to engage in extensive official commemoration of the war akin to that of the British and French; Soviet historians similarly shied away from extensive analysis of the conflict. Western scholars, as a result of language barriers and general lack of attention to Eastern Europe, tended to focus their histories on Western actors. Russia's participation in the First World War was thus often overlooked, and ultimately overshadowed by the Revolution, and then, by the devasting impact of the Second World War.[1]

Nonetheless, the war in Russia deserves considerable attention (and in recent years, has begun to obtain it)[2], not only as a result of the fact that it was a primary area of conflict, but also because Russia's Great War was substantively different in numerous ways. Perhaps most importantly, the war was far from the stagnant trench warfare along a relatively stable front that characterized the combat in places like France. Rather, the conflict in the East was highly mobile. Indeed, as a result of the fact that the lines of battle moved too quickly, impeding on civilian territory too often, thus rendering obsolete any official attempts to separate the military

[1] Some recent works have demonstrated the extent to which there was some attempt at commemoration of the war in Soviet memory, including Karen Petrone, *The Great War in Russian Memory* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2011, but overall, the number of scholarly works devoted to the study of Russia's Great War is significantly smaller than that of Western nations.

[2] There have been a number of works focusing on Russia's World War I experience published over the last several years. One major scholarly effort being undertaken is the series *Russia's Great War and Revolution*, which is in the process of publishing over twenty volumes dedicated to various aspects of the war in the East.

Malcom C. Grow, Lt.-Col, Imperial Russian Army Medical Corps

zone from the civilian in the Russian theater of war, we are forced to rethink the very definition of the "front" and challenge its traditional separation from "rear" or "home front" as spaces outside the war zone. It suggests that an entirely different conceptualization of "front" is necessary—one in which temporality and functionality are the primary determinants rather than physical place and space. Furthermore, the nature of this "total" war also challenged conventional demarcations between "combatant" and "non-combatant," significantly blurring lines that artificially separated participants in warfare.

Grow's commentary thus presents us with a first-hand account of wartime experience that is a welcome contribution to a growing body of new literature

on the history of the war and revolution, and that challenges us to reconsider Russia's participation in the conflict. His account highlights a number of pertinent issues of Russia's experience of total war, particularly those concerning the need to redefine our understandings of ossified categories of both primary actors and spaces in wartime. Unlike most other foreigners' accounts of Russia during the war, primarily written by journalists, diplomats, or civilian observers who spent little, if any, time at the "front," Grow's narrative provides a somewhat unique commentary on the experience of war from the intimate perspective of someone embedded with the Russian troops. Therefore, not only does it focus additional necessary attention on the region, it reveals much about war experience. While military historiography is replete with studies of battle plans and strategies, troop movements, numbers of casualties, territorial gains, and decisions of state actors, war is so much more than these, as one of the most influential events in the human experience. Serving with a frontline medical unit attached to combat troops meant that Grow was "right in the thick of it," experiencing the fighting up close. Although he was a surgeon and his mission with the Russian Army was as a regimental doctor, which ostensibly meant his primary concern was with medical care of wounded and ill soldiers, Grow's narrative focuses much attention on the fighting, particularly his experiences observing operations from the trenches, but also occasionally being drawn into the fighting. His work as a doctor is not completely neglected, and there are passages that detail his efforts to serve the wounded, but his story often centers more on military aspects of his experiences. One might speculate that he thought his readers more interested in hearing about the fighting, the close calls with danger, the shelling, his encounters with enemy soldiers, than the medical treatment he was providing. But perhaps a more convincing explanation is that the lines of separation between combatants and non-combatants are wholly inadequate, as members of groups such as medical workers were exposed to dangers, deprivations, physical, and psychological traumas that paralleled the experiences of combatants. As such, Grow's book demonstrates clearly the problem with such strict separations of categories and expands our understanding of war experience considerably. Grow also offers observations concerning the Russian Revolutions of 1917, in particular, their impacts on the troops and the fighting capacity of the army.

A Brief Biographical Sketch

Malcom Cummings Grow was born November 19, 1887 in Philadelphia. He received his medical degree from Jefferson Medical College in Philadelphia in 1909, having specialized in internal medicine. When the First World War began, he was in private practice in his home city. In August 1915, he visited Washington, DC, where he became acquainted with Dr. Edward Egbert, who at the time was serving as Chief Surgeon of the American Red Cross Hospital in Kiev and was on a brief leave. Egbert described the dire situation concerning Russia's military medical services, particularly its shortage of qualified doctors, and persuaded Grow to offer his expertise to the war effort there. Grow was sympathetic to the Russian plight, while also eager for the opportunity to further develop his surgical skills

and lured by the excitement of war. As a result, he agreed to accompany Egbert back to Russia. One month later, he arrived in the Russian capital, Petrograd.[3]

Initially, Grow served as a civilian doctor at one of the medical facilities (which he called the "Hussar Hospital")[4] located at Tsarskoe Selo, a small suburban village outside of Petrograd where one of the Imperial palaces (Tsar Nicholas II's preferred residence) was located. Working safely behind the lines was not what he had in mind and therefore he began pursuing the opportunity of joining the Russian military at the front. He was introduced to Colonel Andrei Ivanovich Kalpashnikov-Camac (Kalpaschnecoff in Grow's writing), a noble scion from a prominent Penza family. Kalpashnikov's connections in both American and Russian society undoubtedly made him a logical choice to help Grow achieve his goal. His mother was a godchild of Tsar Alexander II and descended from Peter the Great's mother, while his father's sister married Philadelphia notable John Burgess Camac, with whom Kalpashnikov lived in Paris until the age of 12 (after which Camac was officially added to his family name). After attending law school in Russia, Kalpashnikov was sent to Washington as an attaché to the Russian embassy. In 1913, he was transferred back to Petrograd to serve in the foreign office. When war broke out, although exempt from military service as a result of his diplomatic status, he volunteered for service in the Russian Red Cross. Despite the fact that he had no medical training he was assigned as commander of the 21st Flying Column, attached to the 1st Siberian Army Corps. [5] Grow convinced the

[3] The original name of the city, St. Petersburg was changed when the war broke out because it sounded too "German."

[4] Most likely, Grow was referring to the infirmary of the Life (Imperial) Guards of the Hussar Regiment. There were more than 80 other medical facilities established at Tsarskoe Selo and in neighboring Pavlosk during the war. The Empress Aleksandra Feodorovna, who trained as a nurse along with her two eldest daughters Olga and Tat'iana, organized Hospital No. 3 in the palace itself. There was a separate officers' wing organized in one of the outbuildings of the Palace Hospital. There were also medical facilities established in the Charitable Home for Disable Warriors, the Officers' Artillery School, the Serafim Refugee Shelter No. 79, the Cathedral of St. Fedorov, the Holy Trinity Sister of Mercy Community, and the private homes of S. P. Shuvanov, E. G. Volters, and the Kokorev mansion.

[5] During and after the war, Kalpashnikov continued his American connections. In 1916, he led a successful mission to the U.S. to raise funds for the purchase of American ambulances for the Russian Red Cross. In September 1917 he went to Jassy (Iasi), Romania, to serve as a representative of the Russian Red Cross at the headquarters of the American Red Cross, and remained there until just after the October Revolution, when he returned to Petrograd. He was arrested in late December 1917 and held for several months on false charges of taking American money to fund opposition to the Bolsheviks and tsarist sympathies. He made a failed attempt to escape his prison cell in the Peter and Paul Fortress, and was only saved from being shot by the fact that the Bolshevik government was in turmoil in the process of moving to Moscow. After being interrogated by Felix Dzerzhinskii, head of the Cheka (secret police) he was released at the end of April 1918. After narrowly escaping re-arrest, he fled Russia with false papers and moved to the United States. See George F. Kennan, *Soviet-American Relations, 1917-1920. Vol. 1, Russia Leaves the War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1956), 191-218 and Andrew Kalpaschnikoff [sic], *A Prisoner of Trotsky's* (New York: Doubleday, Page & Company,

Colonel that he could be of more use at the front and as a result of Kalpashnikov's efforts, received a military appointment, commissioned a Lieutenant Colonel in the Imperial Russian Medical Corps.

Grow possessed no military experience and spoke very little Russian,[6] but nonetheless was able to secure a fairly high rank in the Russian Imperial Army Medical Corps as well as a position in a frontline medical unit, largely as the result of his acquaintance with the "right" people. He related how Colonel Kalpashnikov was able to cut through the notoriously heavy bureaucracy of the Russian Red Cross, barraging his way through the offices of the administration, brushing aside secretaries like flies, until he had the ears of the top brass, who readily complied with his request to commission Grow and dispatch with Kalpashnikov's flying column to replace the surgeon he had just lost in the field. The shortage of qualified surgeons in Russia undoubtedly made this a more compelling case. Grow served as regimental surgeon under Kalpashnikov on the Russian Western Front, where the army was engaged against the Germans, and then was transferred with the unit to the Southwestern Front to fight the Austro-Hungarians in the massive offensive that took place in the spring of 1916.

Grow left Russia and went back to the United States briefly in 1916 on leave, and then again in January1917 in an attempt to secure supplies and vehicles to transport wounded soldiers for Russia's medical services. He was held up in Christiana, Denmark, however, as a result of a German blockade and forced to remain there until March. As a result, he was not in the country when the February Revolution that brought down the tsarist regime occurred. Rather he received news of it while awaiting permission to depart for the U.S. In July 1917, he returned to Russia, serving as part of an American Red Cross mission in Vladivostok. He was anxious to reunite with his old unit at the front and did so in August for a week. Distraught by what he witnessed there, he went back to Petrograd, but then left Russia permanently and returned to the U.S. before the October Revolution.

Back in the United States, Grow joined the U.S. Army Medical Services. After a number of years of service, he achieved the rank of general. In 1934, he was appointed the Chief Flight Surgeon of the Army Air Corps, a position he served in until 1939. Along with Major General Harry Armstrong, he established the Aero Medical Laboratory at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio. While working there, Grow was instrumental in the development of light body armor and steel helmets to protect air combat crews from wounds incurred by low-velocity missiles. The work he did in this area yielded him the Legion of Merit.

1920). For more on the American Ambulance, see Joshua Segal, "American Humanitarian Volunteerism in Russia's Military 1914-1917," Ph.D. Diss., George Washington University, 2018.

[6] Grow may have spoken French or German, particularly the latter, which was often required in medical schools at the time, and which would have given him some ability to communicate with officers of the Russian Imperial Army. This cannot be confirmed, however. Nonetheless, he seems to have picked up enough Russian, and there were individuals with sufficient command of English, to allow him to function fairly effective embedded with the Russian corps.

He also earned the Distinguished Service medal for his role in creating a number of innovative items used to protect combat personnel from a variety of hazards. Additionally, he established a new system of rest homes, a special pass system and training for medical officers in tactical unit.

In 1945, Grow was appointed acting Air Surgeon for the Army Air Forces and Air Surgeon in 1946. He then became the first Surgeon General for the U.S. Air Force in 1949 and served in that role until November of that year. Grow retired from the Air Force in December, 1949 and passed away in October 1960. The Malcolm Grow Medical Center at Andrews Air Force Base is named in his honor.

Grow's Experiences on the Russian front

Dr. Grow arrived in Russia after that country had already been fighting a total war for an entire year and was struggling considerably against its adversaries. From the very start of the conflict, Russia experienced serious problems with the production and distribution of supplies and support service, resulting in shortages of weapons, ammunition, artillery, food, and other materials necessary to wage mechanized warfare. The tsarist administration and military establishment were weighed down by inefficiency and corruption. Additionally, poor leadership and bad strategic planning plagued nearly all levels of the military and the industrial system that was supposed to support it. The result was that the nation struggled considerably against the better-trained and equipped Germans. The Russian Imperial Army had suffered significant defeats at the hands of the Germans in a number of battles during the first year of the war. Particularly devasting blows came at the hands of the Germans at Tannenburg and the Masurian Lakes in the fall of 1914. Greater success was achieved against the Austro-Hungarian Army in Galicia and Bukhovina. But the Central Powers launched a massive offensive in April 1915, the result of which was a sustained retreat by the Russian Army for the next five months, during which Russian forces were pushed back hundreds of miles. Thus, when Grow finally arrived at the front, although it had finally stopped retreating, the army was stinging from its significant losses: casualties of over one million, another million captured, and the loss of extensive territory in Poland, Lithuania, and Belorussia.[7]

Indeed, Russia struggled throughout the war to provide its military with adequate medical care. Upon the outbreak of hostilities in August 1914, the Russian government began mobilizing resources and personnel for the war effort. However, similar problems of production and distribution of goods and obstacles in organization and provision of services affected medical work. Russian officials were caught somewhat off-guard by the scope of total war (despite warnings from those who had experienced these difficulties in the Russo-Japanese War) and had not correctly anticipated the vast numbers of medical personnel, facilities,

[7] On the military aspects of Russia's Great War, see Norman Stone, *The Eastern Front, 1914-1917* (New York: Scribners, 1975), David R. Stone, *The Russian Army in the Great War: The Eastern Front 1914-1917* (Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 2015), and Joshua Sanborn, *Imperial Apocalypse: The Great War and the Destruction of the Russian Empire* (New York; Oxford University Press, 2015).

equipment, and supplies that would be required. The extensive scale of the war coupled with the lack of experience and reluctance to utilize civilian sources of support often hindered efficient provision of medical services.[8] This would prove troublesome for the Russian armed forces, which suffered particularly high casualties: by September 1917, the numbers of Russian troops wounded in the war was approximately 2.5 million and another 2.3 million soldiers had fallen ill as a result of the spread of highly contagious epidemic diseases (typhoid fever, typhus, cholera, and dysentery, as well as other illness such as pneumonia or scurvy).[9] For many (both the soldiers who contracted them and the medical personnel who treated them), these illnesses proved fatal.[10] Ultimately, this caused a breakdown in public health and contributed to an already shaky confidence in the tsarist system to meet the needs of its people.

Because the Russian military medical corps was significantly underprepared for the treatment of the millions of ill and wounded soldiers that soon flooded in, it quickly became reliant on a number of civilian organizations to supplement care. These included the Russian Society of the Red Cross and a number of voluntary organs associated with the Union of *Zemstvos* and the Union of Towns (collectively known as *Zemgor*), which played vital roles in the provision of wartime services. *Zemgor* organs were an amalgam of local efforts, charged with medical, sanitary, and food provisioning duties for both the military and civilian populations.[11] They were staffed by some professionals, but many more volunteers, including thousands of women, who received very quick and cursory training before being put to work.

Despite the good intentions and positive actions of these groups, as well as the intense need for their services, the autocracy as well as the military establishment remained wary of them (and most civil society efforts) and their staffs of liberal professionals, many of whom opposed the tsarist system. In attempt to maintain centralized control over wartime medical services, the Russian Society of the Red Cross, the most trusted of these organizations (although not immune to problematic relationships with government and military authorities) was assigned sole responsibility over the front and given exclusive authority to operate across the line of demarcation that was supposed to separate the active war zone from the rear.[12] All other organizations providing medical services were limited to

[8] John F. Hutchinson, *Politics and Public Health in Revolutionary Russia, 1890-1918,* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), 110.

[9] Tsentral'noe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie, Otdel Voennoi Statistiki, *Rossiia v mirovoi voine, 1914-1918 goda (v tsifrakh)* (Moscow: Tipografia M.K.Kh. imeni F. Ia. Lavrova,1925), 25.

[10] Tsentral'noe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie, *Rossiia v mirovoi voine, 1914-1918 goda (v tsifrakh)*, 99.

[11] For more on the *Zemgor* organizations, see William Gleason, "The All-Russian Union of Towns and the All-Russian Union of Zemstvos in World War I, 1914-1917," Ph.D. Diss., Indiana University, 1972.

[12] The highly mobile nature of the war on the Eastern Front, unlike the more stagnant positional warfare of the Western Front, made this largely impossible and impractical, as frontlines shifted quickly and often.

evacuating soldiers away from the front and treating them in the rear. The central government's original desire was to cut off the rest of the country from the regions directly affected by the war. The Union of *Zemstvos* and the Union of Towns thus were placed under the "flag" of the Red Cross, in a subordinate position to the latter, and in the rear only. These organizations and their personnel suffered from conflicts with the central government, the Red Cross, and with one another. Even the Russian Imperial Army, despite its dependence on such aid, expressed resistance, and was somewhat hostile to interference from civilian quarters. The Russian Red Cross in particular had been unable to overcome pre-war accusations of corruption, ineptitude, and acting to curry political favor that had convinced some military medical officials that the Russian Red Cross was a "weak entity" that had "lost its constructive energy," and was unable to undertake effective action.[13] The overly bureaucratic nature of the Russian Red Cross beleaguered the organization and meant that the smallest actions required permission from some higher authority. Waiting for such approval was often painstakingly long and prevented medical personnel from carrying out important activities when immediately necessary.[14]

Shortages of trained medical personnel, especially doctors, were particularly acute in the Russian military medical corps. Thus, the appeal made by Grow, an experienced surgeon, to join the efforts at the front, was likely welcomed by Russian officials. Nonetheless, assignment to a frontline unit was seen as a turn of good luck. Even Dr. Egbert, who had convinced him to give up the safety and security of his private practice in Philadelphia and join the war effort in Russia expressed his jealousy at Grow's frontline assignment. Egbert lamented that he was stuck in a rear hospital while Grow was going to where the "real" action was. Such sentiments were fairly common among medical workers in Russia, as many were reluctant to serve in establishments on the "home front" and wanted to be as close to the fighting possible. While many were able to fulfil this desire, others had to be content with staying in the cities and towns, since wounded soldiers only received cursory medical treatment at the frontlines before being dispatched to the rear for further treatment, surgery, and recovery.

Despite the seeming wisdom of such a strategy, ostensibly done to remove the wounded from areas of continued danger and provide them with more comprehensive care, it was not effectively implemented. At the beginning of the campaign, there were very few frontline units of the Red Cross. Military commanders were often reluctant to send non-military organizations and personnel into the war zone. With insufficient numbers of Red Cross units at or near the front, and with the Red Cross (at least initially) being the only non-military organization allowed in active frontline areas, other groups equipped to offer medical support for the army found themselves unable to extend that aid

[13] "Otchet doktora meditsny S. K. Solov'ev, zaveduiuvaiushchii meditsinkoi chastiu severnom front," RGVIA f. 12674, op. 1, d. 10, ll. 374-377.

[14] M. N. Vasilevich, *Polozhenie russkikh plennykh v Germanii i otnoshennie Germanstev k nasileniiu zaniatykh imi oblastei Tsarstva Polskago i Litvy* (Petrograd: 1917), passim.

until they received permission to enter the war zone. This also made it difficult to transport the wounded and ill from the front to medical facilities behind the lines. This problem was complicated by the fact that many of the mobile medical units were only able to perform cursory triage and provide temporary care. According to the medical war plans, this was the sole purpose of such units. Patients who needed further treatment and time for recovery were to be transported to interior medical facilities, more permanent and extensive establishments in the rear. This was often impossible, as advances and retreats of troops often cut off these mobile units from roads and railways, forcing them to hold patients much longer than was medically sound, without the resources or ability to provide necessary continued or more complex treatment. Weeks would often go by before the wounded could be evacuated to facilities that did possess such capabilities. President of the Russian Duma (parliament) Mikhail Rodzianko was appalled when, at the Warsaw-Vienna railway station he came across hundreds of wounded men laying on dirty straw in the rain on the platform, receiving little to no medical attention, some with wounds that had remained undressed for five days.[15] Other times, mobile medical units were physically unable to get to casualties who remained on the battlefields until long after the action subsided. Medical personnel risked their lives extracting the wounded from the battlefields and treating them in frontline dressing stations, as the enemy did not abide by Geneva Convention protocols that prohibited attacks against them and Red Cross facilities.

Despite the dangers of serving on the frontlines, Grow seemed to relish these experiences. He was wounded and even temporarily lost his hearing, serving in dressing stations that were extremely close to the fighting and that came under enemy fire. He even shot an enemy officer. His efforts were rewarded by the Russian Imperial government, receiving both the Order of Saint Stanislaus, 3rd class with swords and the Cross of St. George, 4th class, for gallantry in action.

Grow's Commentary on Russia and Russians

As an American doctor serving with the Russian Army, Grow seemed endlessly fascinated by Russia and its people. He made a number of remarks about Russian culture and customs, often taking time to explain to the reader aspects of Russian daily life, particularly at the front. He seemed to genuinely enjoy the new experiences he had, the food and beverages he sampled, the rituals associated with socialization, and other elements of daily life. While he did his best to provide exposition for what he assumed to be an audience unfamiliar with Russian traditions, his narrative suffers from some weaknesses and inadequacies. He consistently misspells Russian words, names, and places—usually defaulting to a phonetic interpretation that does not always match closely to the actual verbiage. Somewhat questionable as well is his repetition of dialogue and conversation by Russians, particularly that of common soldiers and low-ranking medical personnel such as orderlies, who likely spoke no English (or other languages such as German or French that Grow may have known). Since Grow did not initially

[15] M. V. Rodzianko, *The Reign of Rasputin: An Empire's Collapse*. Trans. Catherine Zvegintzoff (Gulf Breeze, Fl.: Academic International Press, 1973), 112-116.

speak Russian, we must take his early reports of things said by these individuals either as translations provided by the few officers and other personnel who did know English, or as Grow's interpretations of what was said based on context, body language and other cues he might have used. As a result, it is likely that at least some of what he reported as speech originating from average Russians was inaccurate. Grow did seem to pick up some Russian language as he served, and eventually, his ability to converse with the average Russia improved. Therefore, his later reportage might be more accurate

Perhaps more importantly, as an American, Grow orientalizes Russia and Russians to a great extent—so even while he applies positive attributes to them, they are still framed as the inferior "other" against the standard of the West and his paternalistic, patronizing attitude pervades much of his commentary. "The Russian is a simple-minded, childlike individual, but he is also an idealist and at heart he loves his fellowmen. Being primitive, his passions, either of love or hate, admiration or scorn, are naturally colossal. He is also sensitive to extraneous influences," he remarked (pp. x-xi). His comments reflect very common stereotypes and simplified conceptualizations about Russian soldiers, strong, stoic, patriotic, willing to endure great hardships, loyal, but simple, even primitive. These are consistent both with conceptions held by Westerners about Russian people in general at this time, as well as with Russian elite attitudes about peasant-soldiers and pro-war attitudes expressed in patriotic publications. While Grow's work was published in the U.S. and therefore not required to pass the kind of censorship controls that Russian works were subjected to during the war, his commentary is entirely in line with the official rhetoric about the war.

Grow also reflected very common attitudes of the Entente, including the pro-war public in Russia, concerning the Germans and their "barbarity" during the war. He expresses some surprise at the acts of a supposedly "cultured" people, such as bombing and shelling Red Cross facilities, commenting that should they have been "wild savages" such as Africans, he would have not been shocked. These were widespread notions that, from the beginning of the war, were used as propaganda to drum up support for the war.[16] Grow therefore is very much a product of the time and place in which he operates.

Somewhat surprisingly, despite the fact that in the provision of medical services in Russia during the war female nurses outnumbered doctors three to one, and many thousands served on the front lines, Grow only mentioned encountering nurses once, and that was during his brief service in the "rear." Although official regulations sought to keep them at least three to four miles behind the lines, women were often found in medical units very close to the fighting. Thus, while frontline units like Grow's flying column were supposed to be staffed by male

[16] On wartime propaganda, see Stephen Norris, *A War of Images: Russian Popular Prints, Wartime Culture, and National Identity, 1812-1945* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2006) and Hubertus F. Jahn, *Patriotic Culture in Russia during World War I* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1995).

personnel, with medical students and orderlies providing support to doctors, in many cases female nurses ended up comprising the staffs of these units.[17]

Of the nurses he did mention working with in the hospital at Tsarskoe Selo, however, Grow was very adulatory, commenting:

> All the nurses except one were titled women who, at the beginning of the war, had taken the six months' training course required to become a war-sister. They had given up everything else and devoted themselves resolutely to the task in hand.
>
> The exception was a lady who had been a professional nurse for many years, and who acted as assistant in operations and had charge of the operating room . . . All of the sisters spoke English perfectly, many of them having received their education in England and all having travelled and spent much time there. This was a great relief to me and in conjunction with the charming friendliness and courtesy with which I was received quickly put me at my ease. (pp. 21-22)

He complimented them on their expert work, which contrasts with some other Western observers of Russian medical services in general and nurses specifically, who were sometimes critical of lack of advanced knowledge and other deficiencies of the Russian medical system. Grow stated, "The sisters worked like veteran nurses and everything in the operating-room was like clock-work" (p. 22). The nurses in his view were "tireless," "patient," and "gentle." He remarked that "these women, not one of whom before the war had ever done a stroke of disagreeable work or even had to experience anything unpleasant, went about their tasks cheerfully and smiling, always gentle and kind, caring for those peasant soldiers as though they were their very own children" (p. 28). However, he did note that the Russians suffered from hindrances to proper care resulting from deficiencies in supplies, medicine, and equipment.

Aside from these nurses, women are nearly completely absent from other aspects of his narrative. Other than the (very) occasional encounter with a peasant woman or two, Grow's narrative suggests that he operated in an almost exclusively male preserve. He did mention a woman doctor who was serving in

[17] See for example N. Chelakova, "Iz zapisok sestry miloserdii," *Novoe Russkoe Slovo* (June 1969); Florence Farmborough, *With the Armies of the Tsar: A Nurse at the Russian Front in War and Revolution, 1914-1918* (New York: Cooper Square, 2000); Khristina Semina, *Tragediia russkoi armii pervoi velikoi voiny 1914-1918 gg. Zapiski sestry miloserdiia kavkazskogo fronta*; Violetta Thurstan, *Field Hospital and Flying Column: Being the Journal of an English Nursing Sister in Belgium and Russia* (London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1915); Lidia Zakharova, *Dnevnik sestry miloserdiia (na peredovykh pozitsiiakh)* (Petrograd: Izdatel'stvo biblioteka "Velikoi Voiny," 1915) among others. For more on nurses during the war in Russia, see Laurie S. Stoff, *Russia's Sisters of Mercy and the Great War: More than Binding Men's Wounds* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2015).

the Hussar Hospital at Tsarskoe Selo. This seems odd, especially since, according to an article about Col. Kalpashnikov's flying column, the very unit with which Grow served, there were two nurses among its personnel.[18] Yet Grow never even mentioned them. It seems that he did not serve directly with them, despite their presence in the unit.

The other exception to this near total absence of women in Grow's book is a photograph of a young female volunteer with a caption describing her actions. Having disguised herself as a man, she entered the 1st Siberian Army Corps and fought alongside her male compatriots until she was discovered after being wounded in a battle near the town of Postovy and treated at Grow's dressing station. However, this woman, nor the thousands of others who served as soldiers in Russia's Great War, never made it into Grow's narrative. Why he believed that she deserved a picture with a short caption, but little exposition, is unknown. Grow also fails to mention the most striking example of female combat participation, the organization of several all-female units by the Provisional Government that took power following the fall of the tsarist government in the summer of 1917.[19] The all-female battalions were media superstars for the short period of their existence, reported on in publications from Petrograd to New York, and mentioned in most of the other foreign observers' accounts of Russia at this time, and thus is it highly unlikely that Grow would not have heard about the,. One such unit, the 1st Russian Women's Battalion of Death, was even assigned to fight with the 1st Siberian Army Corps, the very unit to which Grow's flying column was attached. Therefore, again, it is somewhat puzzling as to why Grow leaves them out of his book. One may speculate that Grow's conceptualization of war was a masculine one, and therefore left little room for women, despite their actual presence and participation.

Revolution

Grow's memoir not only gives us insight on the experiences of a doctor on the Russian front and a participation in the action of the war, but also glimpses of the turbulent events of the revolutions of 1917. Again, we must take care in accepting his observations uncritically, as they reflect many of the misconceptions and stereotypes of the moment. Grow maintained the idea that Russian soldiers were completely loyal to the tsarist government and served well, with no thought of *not* carrying out their duty, until *after* the February Revolution (despite the fact that he was not even in Russia when it occurred, having left in January and did not return until July). He seemed entirely surprised by the revolution and taken aback by what he saw as a sudden transformation of the once formidable, obedient, and long-suffering Russian troops to a chaotic, undisciplined, petulant,

[18] "Young Hero Tells of Russia's 'Flying Column' of Red Cross," *The Nashua Reporter* (Nashua, Iowa), January 25, 1917, 5. My thanks to Joshua Segal for directing me to this source.

[19] For more on women soldiers in Russian during the First World War, see Laurie S. Stoff, *They Fought for the Motherland: Russia's Women Soldiers in World War I and the Revolution* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006).

unruly mob. Problems and failures of the Russian military are attributed almost exclusively to nefarious foreign forces working to sabotage Russia's war effort. He blames all the dissatisfaction and disruption of military and lack of morale on German agitation. He thus presented the revolution as simultaneously coming out of nowhere and the product of nefarious forces working to bring it about. He was convinced that prior to the February Revolution, Russian soldiers were completely committed to the war and fought gallantly despite all of the obstacles they faced. Grow seemed not only to accept that idea that the entire Empire was behind the war effort, but the Russian social and political order itself, never questioning the extent to which this proved to be the greatest barrier to Russian military success or that the peasant-soldier ever could have questioned either the legitimacy of the tsarist system or the war itself. In fact, as indicated above, he benefited from the network of connections based on status and influence that was characteristic of life under the old regime.

Rather than acknowledging the extent to which wartime failures were the result of internal problems, Grow wrote about how pro-German agents worked to spread rumors that broke down morale. The only faults he attributes to the Russian soldiers are their childlike naiveté and susceptibility to external influences. Blissfully unaware of his own biases, Grow claimed he was just 'telling it like it is':

> The book I have written contains no argument. I have tried to tell the simple story of what I saw, to relate my own experiences and impressions in a purely narrative style, leaving the reader to draw his own conclusions. My earnest desire is to bring plainly before the American people the heroic fight these peasant soldiers put up while suffering under most adverse conditions in the field and while many baneful influences were at work in the rear, undermining the organization of the Russian government and military machine. (pp. xi-xii)

None of this should be surprising, as it was a view held by many Americans at the time. In a review of Grow's book in 1918 in *The Outlook*, with the amazingly original and succinct title "A Good Book on Russia," correspondent and adventurer George Kennan[20] wrote that despite the fact that dozens of Americans had written on the state of Russia preceding, during, and following the Revolution, most of the information they conveyed was "superficial, inaccurate, and sensational, and some of it is wholly untrustworthy and misleading."[21] But Grow's book was not among them, according to Kennan, who ascribed the failure to correctly depict

[20] This Kennan was the older cousin of the more famous diplomat George F. Kennan, who authored the book mentioned in footnote 3. He was an expert on Russia, having traveled there extensively. He was particular noted for his book *Siberia and the Exile System*.

[21] George Kennan, "A Good Book on Russia," *The Outlook: With Illustrations*, vol. 119 (1918): 128.

the Russian situation to a lack of previous knowledge of Russian history and culture. Despite the fact that Grow did not really possess such knowledge, Kennan asserts that he had remained there long enough to get an "accurate" picture of the situation. The time that Grow spent embedded with the Russian army, serving directly on the front lines and in the trenches, getting to know the Russian officers and soldiers, according to Kennan, gave him the insight necessary to understand the situation in ways that others were unable to.

Grow lamented, and Kennan echoed, conceptions concerning the Russian army, reiterated time and again by other outside observers, and even some insiders, that it was a spectacular fighting force, propelled by undaunted dedication on the part of stoic, courageous, and undyingly loyal peasant-soldiers, but was thwarted by poor leadership, impeded by shortages of weapons, equipment, and ammunition that were the result of betrayal by spies and saboteurs, and undermined by pernicious propaganda. Grow repeated the commonly-held idea that soldiers "never had sufficient rifles" and that "many times they had to wait until rifles could be taken from wounded" and given to them as a result of German intrigue and subterfuge.[22] He called the Russian army "a magnificent fighting machine" prior to the Revolution, and argued it was the effects of the post-February (dis) order that caused the its ultimate collapse. He took the standard, conservative military line asserting that "had the Provisional Government taken a firm stand from the beginning and failed to recognize the soldiers' committees, backing up the generals and officers in their efforts to enforce discipline and retaining the death penalty for insubordination," the Russian army would have been able to maintain coherence and continue being an effective fighting force. Thus, Grow's contribution fits squarely with the contemporary Western and Russian émigré literature that viewed the Revolution an anomaly, a series of calculated machinations by forces working against the interests of Russia.

While his ideas were consistent with many contemporary views of Russia's dedication to the war effort, and certainly patriotism and nationalism were strong among many in the Russian public during the war,[23] they obscure the numerous internal problems that the Russian armed forces faced, as well as the less-than-enthusiastic attitude of many rank-and-file troops toward the war. Although initial mobilization of troops was largely successful, putting over 4 million men from

[22] For the actual reasons behind Russia's supply and distribution problems, many of which were largely resolved by the end of 1915, see Lewis Siegelbaum, *The Politics of Industrial Mobilization in Russia, 1914-1917: A Study of the War-Industries Committees* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983).

[23] After the war, many scholars, particularly those among the Russian émigré community, advanced the thesis that Russia lacked well-developed sense of nationalism and national duty, which contributed considerably to its failures in the war. Recently, several historians have argued that a sense of belonging to a national community was strongly present in wartime Russia. See for example Melissa Stockdale, *Mobilization the Russian Nation: Patriotism and Citizenship in the First World War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016). Grow's perceptions support the idea of widespread patriotic support for the war effort, but at the same time, seem to indicate that some in the West began to doubt this.

disparate arears of the vast Empire into battle, there were some problems that revealed underlying tensions. Riots and protests against conscription occurred in several regions.[24] As the war dragged on, but long before the effects of the February Revolution were felt, the Russian army suffered from problems of poor morale and lack of discipline like other armies fighting in this war, including fraternization, voluntary surrender, desertion, insubordination, and war-weariness.[25] All of Grow's commentaries seem oblivious to the manifestations of deeply rooted dissatisfaction with the contemporary social, political, and economic structures and systems, but also the tremendous impact of the total war, which proved to be too great a burden for these systems to endure and thus, in many ways, amplified this discontent and provided opportunities for new political forces to capitalize on imperial failure. He entirely missed that the February Revolution had broad military support, as a result of both short and long-term dissatisfaction with the tsarist regime and is incompetency in waging the war. After the February Revolution, which seemed to take him somewhat by surprise, Grow became distraught over what he perceived as licentious behavior on the part of a soldierly that misunderstood the concept of liberty now afforded to them following the fall of tsarism. Instead of accepting the grave responsibility that came with this newfound freedom, the soldiers, according to Grow, merely acted on their base impulses.

Perhaps even more surprising is the nearly complete lack of commentary about the role of the Bolsheviks or any other socialist parties.[26] Grow, unlike

[24] Joshua Sanborn, "The Mobilization of 1914 and the Question of the Russian Nation: A re-examination," *Slavic Review* Vol. 59, No. 2 (Summer 2000): 275-277.

[25] For a better understanding of Russian soldiers' attitudes about the war and the breakdown of the army, see Nikolai N. Golovin, *The Russian Army in the World War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1931); Joshua Sanborn, *Drafting the Russian Nation: Military Conscription, Total War, and Mass Politics, 1905-1925* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2003); and Allan K. Wildman, *The End of the Russian Imperial Army*. vol. 1, *The Old Army and the Soldiers' Revolt (March-April, 1917)* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980) and *The End of Russian Imperial Army*. vol. 2, *The Road to Soviet Power and Peace* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987). On more specific problems of the army, see Marc Ferro, "Russia: Fraternization and Revolution," *Meetings in No Man's Land: Christmas 1914 and Fraternization in the Great War*, (London; Constable, 2007), 212-233; Aleksandr Astashov, "The Other War" on the Eastern Front during the First World War: Fraternization and Making Peace with the Enemy," in Laurie S. Stoff, Anthony Heywood, Boris Kolonitskii, and John Steinberg, eds. *Military Affairs in Russia's Great War and Revolution, 1914-1922, Book 1: Military Experiences.* Russia's Great War and Revolution Series (Bloomington, IN: Slavica Publishers, forthcoming) and Paul Simmons, "Desertion in the Russian Army, 1914-1917," in Stoff, et al., *Military Experiences*. For sources in Russian, see Mikhail S. Frenkin, *Russkaia armiia i revoliutsiia 1917-1918* (Munich: Logos, 1978); A. B. Astashov, "Dezertirstvo i bor'ba s nim v tsarskoi armii v gody pervoi mirovoi voiny," *Rossiiskaia istoriia* 4 (2011): 44-52 and Astashov, *Russkii front v 1914-nachale 1917 goda: voennyi opyt i sovremennost'* (Moscow: Novyi Khronogrof, 2014).

[26] The Bolsheviks were a communist party led by Vladimir Lenin, originally the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party, who led the second revolution to overthrow

Kennan and many other American observers, is uncharacteristically quiet about the spread of socialist ideology among soldiers. In fact, his only mention of any socialist influence comes only peripherally, when he claims that Russian soldiers were in communication with the International Workers of the World (IWW) in late summer 1917. He does not speak about the creation or actions of the Soviets in 1917 or the Bolsheviks in opposing the war and counterrevolution, in the unrest during the summer of that year, in stopping Kornilov's attempted revolt, or in opposing the Provisional Government. None of the Bolshevik leaders, who were extremely active during the spring and summer of 1917, such as Vladimir Lenin and Lev Trotsky, make it into Grow's story. He does not even connect his comments on the effects of German subterfuge to the Bolsheviks, which was an widely held opinion among many at this time, including the notion that Lenin and the Bolsheviks were German agents. Considering his numerous references to German conspiracies as the source of Russia's troubles, this omission is surprising. Thus, Grow's book stands in stark contrast to many other American accounts of the revolutionary year, many of which devote considerable space to these figures and activities.

Although such absences are somewhat strange, they might be explained by the fact Grow's perspective was somewhat limited. He was no student of Russian history or politics, either before or during his time in the country. He served with a single unit, in specific and delimited areas of the front and associated primarily with officers and soldiers who seemed fiercely loyal to the tsarist regime. He experienced the war only through these finite and narrow contacts and experiences. Thus, this may have a result of the fact the soldiers and officers he served with were not focused on the political situation, but rather on day-to-day issues of survival. Lack of awareness of revolutionary politics was not uncommon among many Russian troops and indicates the importance of the war experience in and of itself, rather than as a precursor to the Revolution. It indicates clearly that the war was an all-consuming event, and the revolution was not necessarily a foregone conclusion (although certainly the impact of the war was substantial in precipitating a national crisis). Moreover, the extent to which the Russian army was revolutionized, and more specifically, Bolshevized, has been the subject of some debate among scholars, but there were definitely groups that were more influenced by radical ideas than others. Arriving a full year after the start of the war, he was unable to assess the processes of conscription and the protests that accompanied mobilization that reflected serious discontent, the lack of identification with the Empire's war aims on the part of millions of peasant soldiers, the tremendous problems associated with industrial organization, supply, and distribution, the devasting defeats suffered by the Russian Army in that first year, or any problems faced by the army such as fraternization with the enemy, voluntary surrender, desertion, or insubordination. He also seemed to have little idea of the pressures on soldiers and their families. He did come into contact with the latter, after the February Revolution, where he mentioned soldiers

the Provisional Government in November 1917 (October according to the old Russian calendar, and thus the reason it is often termed the "October Revolution).

getting letters from home complaining about the hardships their families were facing without their labor participation. But he never seems to make a connection between the suffering of the Russian people and the desire for revolution. In fact, his commentary about shortages of food and scarcity and inflation of necessities on the home front seems to suggest that these were effects, rather than causes, of revolt. He was not in Russia when either Revolution occurred, and spent little time in the capital, Petrograd, where political events were unfolding. He also wrote his story immediately upon returning to the U.S., the finished product appearing in March 1918, before the outbreak of the Russian Civil War.

Nonetheless, it seems doubtful that he would have been completely oblivious to such important aspects of the revolutionary year. One might assume that he intentionally avoided discussing what he could have perceived as controversial issues. Since one of his goals was to convince an American audience that the Russian contribution to the war was a worthy one, he might not have wanted to touch on subject-matter that put them in an unfavorable light, considering the virulent anti-Bolshevik sentiment that prevailed in many American circles.

Despite his biases and the shortcomings of his vision, his memoir is an important source on Russia and its war experience. His descriptions of the action he saw and his role as a medical worker provide us with detailed accounts that reveal much about the experience of participation in mechanized total war. He was distinctly pro-Russian, and even if he was overly optimistic, his commentary provides a counterpoint to many that are biased negatively. Grow never lost faith in the Russians and continued to believe that the sacrifices they made during the war were not in vain. He was heartened by the entry of the United States into the conflict and was certain this would turn the tide in favor of the Entente. Although Grow's narrative stops short before the Russians withdrew from the conflict in early 1918 and one can only wonder what his reaction to this decision would have been, the book nevertheless provides an interesting glimpse into the trials and tribulations that Russia faced during the war. One does get a strong sense of the serious obstacles the country faced in attempting to wage a total war, particularly the challenges involved with industrial warfare, its destructive effect on the human body, and its impact on Russia in this pivotal moment of its history. Therefore, it is a valuable resource in our attempts to further understand the complexities Russia's Great War and Revolution.

About the Author

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American Phenomenology of the Russian Revolution: 1905 from the Other Side of the Atlantic

Victoria I. Zhuravleva

Introduction

The foundations for the overall American vision of the Russian Revolution—the revolution that, according to the American observers, the society needed for its political renewal and progress—were laid precisely during the period of the First Russian Revolution (1905-1907). This revolution became the climax of the first American crusade for Russia's democratization, initiated at the close of the 19th century by Russian political immigrants and by George Kennan, the Liberal journalist who had made a journey to Siberia and acquainted the West with the punitive system of the Tsarist regime[1]. As it watched the Russian Revolution unfold, the American society lived through its first cycle of hopes (concerning the prospects of Russia's modernization/westernization) and disappointments (with its results); as a consequences the Russian Empire became the object of the US world-reforming mission.

This article will be structured so as to follow through the distinct stages of this "cycle of hopes and disappointments". When the cycle was on the upswing, it was, as a rule, dominated by liberal universalist myths that framed the image of the romantic Russian "Other" and shaped the range of meanings peculiar to the liberal universalist discourse: about the Russians' ability to carry out Western-type revolutions and to create "the United States of Russia", about the essentially democratic Russian society that was dominated by the xenophobic and retrograde government, and about the Americans taking an important part in the process of reforming Russia. When the cycle was on the downswing, it was, as a rule,

[1] For details about the first wave of the American "crusade for Russian freedom" at the end of the 19th century, see: Victoria I. Zhuravleva, *Ponimanie Rossii v SShA: Obrazy i Mify, 1881-1914* (Moscow: Russian State Humanitarian University, 2012), 149-209; David S. Foglesong, *The American Mission and the "Evil Empire". The Crusade for a "Free Russia" since 1881* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 12-33. On George Kennan's personal "crusade for Russian freedom", see: Frederick F. Travis, *George Kennan and American-Russian Relationship. 1865-1924* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1990).

dominated by Russophobic myths that played an important part in maintaining the image of the demonic Russian "Other" and shaped the range of meanings peculiar to the conservative pessimistic discourse : about the Russian political system as essentially authoritarian due to the peculiarities of the Russian national character ; about Russia's imperial ambitions and the implementation of the "Russian way" that had negative consequences for the US foreign policy interests and for the entire civilized community.

The first and all the subsequent American "cycles of hopes and disappointments" about Russia[2] are impossible to explain outside of the American context. It is this context that has determined and still determines the hierarchy of Russia's images, placing some of them at the center of the stage and delegating others to the periphery. This article does not consider all the existing images, but instead focuses on the central ones (of the "demonic" and "romantic" type) that reflected the current agenda of the American society and the socio-cultural traditions of its development.

The methodological framework of the article is grounded in the findings of social constructivism and is focused on comparative study of background ideas, images, cognitive stereotypes, and myths that operate at the normative level in a given national environment, as well as on the study of communicative traditions that are imprinted in the cultural and historical memory of a nation and use the conceptual pair "Self/Other."[3]

Given such a methodological framework, the author does not limit her task to studying the process of mutual perception through the lens of narrative analysis—a customary tool for describing images of other cultures that allows us to assess the difference between the American images and the Russian reality. Rather, she strives to answer a broader set of questions. Why were the Americans imagining the Russian revolution in a given way and not in other ways? What kinds of discursive practices were used to create an image of the Russian revolution? What was the logic of verbal and visual writing used for its construction? Finally, what role did it play in the identity formation of the American society? Hence, we are talking not only about reflection, but also about self-reflection, since the answer to the *why* question is found in the American political and sociocultural context that engendered these images of other nations. The socio-cultural context helps us to determine the identity markers that have become dominant in the American soci-

[2] The next cycle after 1905-07 took place between the 1917 February and October revolutions; the last one (so far) has followed the collapse of the USSR and the end of the Cold War.

[3] In creating a methodological base, the author relied especially heavily on the work of those scholars who based their studies of identity problems in international relations on the concept of dialogism introduced by Mikhail Bakhtin. This framework posits the existence of the "Other" as a necessary condition for defining the "Self" and includes research on mental geography with an emphasis on the study of mythologization of time and space as well as studies that present the US foreign policy as a field of identity construction and analyze the ideological and cultural dimensions of this policy. The author list for the former current includes such researchers as Tzvetan Todorov, Edward Said, Larry Wolff, Iver Neumann, Alexander Wendt; the latter current is represented, among other authors, by Emily Rosenberg, Michael Hunt, David Campbell, and Walter Hixson.

ety in the long run. The American political context (or the agenda)—the specific configuration of domestic and foreign policy issues that are important at a given stage of development of the American society—explains the mechanisms through which the Russian «Other» is being used.

In terms of the sociocultural context, it has to be said that Americans could not remain indifferent to revolutions outside of the United States, because, ever since the US was founded, its inhabitants thought it to be their mission to present their country to the world as the ideal model of political regime that arose from an ideal kind of revolution. They became ever more convinced of their right to world leadership as they watched the unsuccessful attempts of other nations to reproduce their experience. France had spectacularly failed this test for the first time at the end of the 18th century and then again in 1848 and in 1870-71. The Latin American revolutions of the early 19th century were the worst nightmares of their northern neighbor come true. The Russians' turn to prove that they were capable of producing a true American-style revolution came in 1905, during the third revolutionary wave of 1890s-1910s, that also swept Cuba, Puerto Rico, Mexico, and China.

Michael Hunt, an American scholar, points to two different manners of evaluating the revolution that were used in the US and whose origins can be traced, respectively, to John Adams and Thomas Jefferson. John Adams feared the revolution that went over limits, when its destructive potential broke forth, and the revolutionaries were unable to protect society from anarchy and arbitrary power. By contrast, Thomas Jefferson saw the revolution as a cleansing hurricane that was beneficial to society. Over time, these two visions grew closer, since they both emerged from the same American revolutionary heritage. Both focused on the constitutional phase of the revolution as the final one. The capacity of the French and later of the Slavs to make a successful revolution was seen as an indicator of their readiness to become leaders of civilization development[4].

At the beginning of the 20th century, the American society was living through the Progressivist era. Although Progressivism clearly influenced both the domestic and the foreign US policy, it was a rather amorphous ideological movement that was based on various strands of reformist ideas and on the faith in progress. The Progressivists' reformist zeal was focused on the spheres of industrial development and urban environment, as well as on various aspects of the US domestic political life and foreign policy. Progressivist leaders dreamt of leading the Nation (and with it the whole world) out of the late-19th century state of social chaos and into progress, with the help of the State and of the scientific and professional approaches to social problems. Progressivist ideas have stimulated a more active state involvement into the American foreign-policy expansion and have strengthened the Americans' sense of a civilizing mission that their country undertook in order to bring progress to all regions of the world. However, the mechanisms of this civilizing mission toward the backward countries remained the subject of internal debate among the Progressivists: while some advocated the

[4] Michael H. Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 92-98.

use of military interventions, others proposed softer tactics, such as the promotion of education and Protestant faith through missionary activities and the spread of mass consumption goods. While the first group opted for the guns, the second chose school manuals, the Bible, the sowing and the reaping machines. This turn-of-the-century debate has remained important for the US foreign-policy makers and ideologues up to the present days.

The idea of the American mission attracted the national attention to the revolutionary movements and the political changes abroad; Progressivists believed that the American democratic government had to be useful not only at home, but also in other countries. Calls for domestic reforms and sacrifices in the name of greater justice for the less successful members of the American society were easily transformed into the demands for overseas "crusades" and missionary campaigns that would remake the world in the US image and likeness. The process of internalization of the American reformism has acquired new momentum, and the contemporaries took it as a sign of its success.

Taking part in Russia's modernization and in its first revolution had become an important component of the Progressivist reform movement, since these processes fitted the Americans' image of their own revolutionary heritage. Yet, it has to be noted that what stood behind the harsh tone and demands were plans for relatively moderate reforms, the Puritan worldview, and the patriotic fears related to the destruction of the traditional American ideals by the modern political and economic system (which produced an energetic rejection of the anarchist and the socialist varieties of radicalism). Actions were indeed taken to raise funds for the victims of Jewish pogroms or for the Russian political figures who undertook propaganda campaigns in the US. Yet, at times, the rhetoric became more important than the actions, and the crusading spirit of the Progressivist epoch could rapidly turn into disenchantment. The Russians had learned all of this first-hand during the 1905-07 Revolution.

The progress ideology influenced both the reformers and their more conservative compatriots. However, the process of observing Russia's revolutionary experience made the differences in their positions all the more apparent both in their interpretations of events and in their judgements about the reasonable limits of social and political changes.

The author based her analyses on primary sources of different types ; press materials, including political cartoons, hold a special place among them. The main characteristics of a political cartoon relevant for this research are : its close connections with the engendering socio-cultural context, its timeliness, since a cartoonist, like a political journalist, always reacts to the current internal and international political situation, its disregard for the political and social taboos, its symbolism and grotesque style. A satirical drawing speaks to the emotional perceptions of the recipient audience, translates the facts from the language of logical concepts to that of visual images, and allows to express ideas that are at times difficult to verbalize.

Typologically, the cartoons analyzed in this article can be classified as "cartoons of opinion". They appeared in newspapers and magazines of different party

affinities and regional origins. The author's analysis of the political cartoons as historical sources includes such aspects as the manner of its presentation, the language and symbolism of the cartoon and of its verbal component (the name, the caption, and the speech bubbles), its relationship with other texts about Russia, its location within the print issue—the cover, the center spread, or the editorial page ; within the text of the relevant article or apart from it (in the former case the impact on the reader is stronger). Special attention is paid to the moods of the Americans themselves (the American context) and to the evolution of their representations.[5]

The author's observations and conclusions about the image of the Russian Revolution in American political cartoons are based on reviews of newspaper and magazine collections at the US Library of Congress. The political drawings of then-famous cartoonists that have become the quintessence of press attitudes are analyzed in greater detail. These artists belong to what is rightly considered "the Golden Age" of the American political cartoon, which comes to its heyday in the three comic weeklies—the democratic "Puck", the independent "Life", and the Republican "Judge"—that have made a true revolution in political cartoon-drawing. At the turn of the 20th century political cartoons began to spread through the newspapers as well[6].

For this particular research theme, cartoon analysis allows not only to detect the hidden evaluations that the Americans made about Russia, its historical past and future, but also to determine with greater accuracy the timing of real changes within the American society with respect to the Russian Revolution, since political cartoons both illustrate the current attitudes, prejudices, and stereotypes of the public to which they are addressed and at the same time serve to construct new social preferences.

Political cartoons, due to their specific genre, are a convenient mechanism for maintaining the "one-dimensional" perception of Russia, for emphasizing one set of components seen in the Russian reality and for downplaying other such sets, and also for visually framing long-standing American myths about Russia and Russians. Yet this is precisely what makes cartoons a valuable source for discerning long-standing trends of Americans' views on Russian Revolution determined not only by the Russian context, but also by the self-representations of Americans themselves.

In 1903-1905, the time of the first crisis in Russian-American relations whose main facets were the Kishinev pogrom, the conflict in the Far East, and the 1905-

[5] On the methodology of cartoon analysis and their use as a historical source see, for example, Thomas M. Kemnitz, "The Cartoon as a Historical Source," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 4 (Summer,1973): 81-93; Ernst H. Gombrich, "The Cartoonist's Armory," *South Atlantic Quarterly* 62, no 2 (1963): 189-228; Zhuravleva, Foglesong, "Konstruirovanie obraza Rossii v amerikanskoy politicheskoy karikature XX veka," in: Vadim A. Koleneko, ed., *Mify i realii amerikanskoy istorii v periodike XVIII-XX vv.*, vol. 1 of 3 (Moscow: Institute of World History RAN, 2008): 187-193.

[6] Frank L.Mott, *American Journalism. A History of Newspapers in the United States Through 250 Years. 1690 to 1940* (New York: Macmillan, 1962), 512, 581-587; Stephen Hess, Sandy Northrop, *Drawn and Quartered. The History of American Political Cartoons* (Montgomery, Elliott & Clark Publishing, 1996), 59-60, 64-79.

07 Revolution, hardly any issue of a newspaper or magazine that had an editorial cartoonist on staff came out without a "Russian" cartoon. The Russo-Japanese war had undoubtedly contributed to the fact that the "Russian theme" dominated the subjects of international cartoons. The themes of war and revolution were inextricably linked in American representations, while the use of dichotomies such as "East-West" and "Barbarism-Civilization", the spreading of pro-Japanese attitudes through the American society and the position that the Washington administration occupied during the conflict in the Far East had facilitated the casting of the Japanese as the "Yankee of the East" and of Japan—as the catalyst of Russian Revolution. Thus, the Americans had symbolically "expelled" the Russian Empire from the "club of civilized powers", while the Westernized Japan was, albeit temporarily, admitted into it.[7]

In 1904-1905, American public and political figures, religious activists and reformers, journalists and cartoonists started the first "image war" against the official Russia in the history of Russian-American relations, and honed the techniques of verbal and visual messaging that have been used ever since and up to the present day.[8]

I. "The United States of Russia": on the wave of hopes

By the second half of 1904, serious and passionate talk about an impending revolution in Russia had begun in the US. In October 1904, the Society of American Friends of Russian Freedom (SAFRF)[9] reemerged in Boston and began working at its full capacity, summoning a mass meeting in New York, whose attendants denounced the Tsarist government's domestic policy and declared that Americans were ready to make their contribution to the cause of Russia's liberalization. The

[7] This idea was a constant in the publications of George Kennan, who supported his conclusions with references to Russian history, in which wars laid bare all the weaknesses of the regime, stimulated the popular discontent and usually ended in reforms or revolutionary explosions. See George Kennan, "The Social and Political Condition of Russia»"; "The Economic and Financial Condition of Russia," *Outlook* Vol. 76 (January 1904): 211-216, 261-265. See also: "The Emancipator of Russia," *Outlook* Vol. 80, (June 1905): 357; Edmund Noble, "America and the Russian Crisis," *Free Russia* (March, 1905): 35. For editorial cartoons see, *Chicago Daily Tribune*, January 24, 30, 1905; *Brooklyn Eagle*, January 27, 1905 ; *Los Angeles Times*, March 6, 1905; *Philadelphia Inquirer*, February 23, April 1, May 14, 1905 ; *Chicago Inter-Ocean*, March 12, 1905; *Life*, March 9, 1905.

[8] For a more detailed account, see, Zhuravleva, *Ponimanie Rossii v SShA*, 544-568.

[9] This society was modeled on the English SAFRF and was first created in Boston in 1891, through the efforts of the Russian revolutionary, Sergei Mikhailovich Stepniak-Kravchinsky and with the support of progressive American activists, whose ranks were dominated by former Abolitionists. In 1892, the American SAFRF began publishing "Free Russia". In 1894, after the defeat of its campaign for the denunciation of the Extradition Treaty that the Russian Empire and the US signed in 1887 and that the Senate ratified in 1893, the activity level of the SAFRF and of the first wave of the American movement for Russian freedom began to decrease. This treaty gave the Tsarist government the right to demand the extradition of Russian revolutionaries that sought refuge in America, because it excluded regicides and their accomplices from the category of political criminals.

assembled held up to shame the despotism and the expansionism of the Tsarist government and encouraged their compatriots to create Societies of Friends of Russia Freedom all over the United States.[10]

Russian Liberals and Radicals that crossed the ocean in order to canvass American support for their fight to free Russia helped to convince Americans that Russian Revolution was going to be a constructive movement of the Western type. First and foremost among them were Pavel Nikolaevich Miliukov, a historian and a future leader of the Constitutional Democrats' Party, and Ekaterina Konstantinovna Breshko-Breshkovskaya, one of the leading Socialist-Revolutionaries who spent most of her life in prison and exile and became a true symbol of freedom fighting in Russia.

Miliukov was giving a series of lectures in the United States between 1903 and 1905, when he found himself in the middle of the first crisis in Russian-American relation. The image of the Russian Revolution, which he created, was that of a liberal-constitutionalist movement; it helped to feed the existing American illusions about Russia's prospects for political modernization and its readiness to adopt the Western development model. How could it be otherwise, if every Russian schoolboy knew Abraham Lincoln's biography and admired this emancipator-President?[11] *Russia and Its Crisis*, the book based on Miliukov's American lectures, made an important contribution in forming the Americans' ideas about the meaning and the contours of the Russian Revolution, while Miliukov seemed to be just the kind of Western-style revolutionary that they held so dear.[12]

Breshko-Breshkovskaya also assured her American public that a revolution was inevitable in Russia. In speeches that she gave at mass meetings, clubs, colleges, and private receptions, she avoided mentioning the terrorist methods used by the Socialists- Revolutionaries party, its peasant insurrection program, and the thorny issues of political assassination and radical revolution. Instead, she focused her attention on the fight for civil rights and freedoms, on transferring land ownership to the people, and on the political growth of the peasants through their participation in *zemstvos*. She never tired of repeating that the Russian people would know how to use their freedom wisely, were aiming for a social revolution that would establish a democratic form of government, and were more than ever in need of moral and material support from across the Atlantic.[13]

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[10] "The Awakening of Russia," *Review of Reviews* Vol. 30, (July 1904): 90; J.F. Green, "The Cause of Russian Freedom in the USA," *Free Russia* (November 1904): 88; Alice S. Blackwell, "The Friends of Russian Freedom," *Free Russia* (April, 1906):10.

[11] Pavel N. Miliukov, *Memuary* (Moscow: Political Literature Publishers, 1991):145, 148; "Talks of Situation in Russia," *Chicago Daily Tribune*, February 14, 1905

[12] Pavel Miliukov, *Russia and Its Crisis* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1905): 7-12. The author of the *New York Times* review of this book whose publication coincided with the Tsar's August manifesto welcomed Miluikov's main proposition about Russia being in the state flux and development that contradicted the myth of the "Immutable Russia": *New York Times*, August 26, 1905. See also the book review from *Nation*, "The Russian Crisis," *Nation* 82 (January 1906): 57-58

[13] Emma Goldman, *Living My Life*, in 2 volumes, volume 1 (New York, Da Capo Press, 1970): 362; Blackwell, "Welcome to a Russian Woman," *Woman's Journal* Vol. 35

Breshko-Breshkovskaya's visit facilitated the creation of an SAFRF branch in New York. Together, the New York and the Boston branches became the operation centers of the renewed and expanding American crusade for the creation of a Free Russia. After the onset of the Russian Revolution, the New York chapter of the SAFRF became one of the main centers of the movement for Russia's democratization, as it broadened the scale of its activities and extended its membership to the members of the Jewish community and to all sorts of Progressive-era reformers. The latter were attracted to the SAFRF, since, according to the Progressivism ideology, supporting the fight for freedom beyond the US borders aided the cause of preserving freedom and democracy at home.

Overall, the Liberals and the Radicals who came to the US from Russia to boost support for their political causes were equally effective in fostering, *a la* George Kennan, an oversimplified picture of the Russian Revolutionary movement and in creating the romantic myth of the Russian Revolution aimed at founding "the United States of Russia" and at repeating the American experience. These simplistic representations fed the American messianic mood, created false illusions, and subsequently provoked a relatively fast transition from a universalist euphoria to pessimistic evaluations of Russia's overall revolutionary prospects and its revolutionary leaders.

After the "Bloody Sunday" of January 1905, the images of official-reactionary Russia and of popular-revolutionary Russia turned into two parallel realities in the representations of the American observers. An overwhelming majority in the US press had harshly condemned the shooting of a peaceful demonstration in Saint-Petersburg, seeing it as a display of medieval cruelty.[14] This attitude and the spread of false information about thousands of victims[15] also became reflected in the political cartoons that in their turn had helped to "barbarize" the image of Nicholas II. Some represented him as a satrap, up to his knees in blood of his subjects who received a load of lead instead of freedom and no longer trusted their ruler. In others, he appeared as Humpty Dumpty who fell from the wall of public veneration for "the Little Father" or as a passenger of the "Russia" ship that

(December 1904): 401; "Sympathy for Russian People," *Providence Journal*, February 23, 1905.

[14] "The Massacre in St. Petersburg," *Outlook*, Vol. 79 (January 1905); 201; "World-Politics," *North American Review* Vol. 180 (March 1905): 461-466; "Loyalty to Czar Turns to Hatred," *Chicago Daily Tribune*, February 19, 1905; Noble, "America and the Russian Crisis," *Free Russia* (March 1905): 34-35.

[15] "Troops Slay Two Thousands and Wound Five Thousands in St. Petersburg Streets," *San Francisco Chronicle*, January 23, 1905. According to the official sources, there were 130 dead and 299 wounded (these figures were given in the report made by the Director of the Police Department to the Minister of Internal Affairs). See *Revolutsiya 1905-1907 gg. v Rossii: dokumenty i materialy* Vol. 4, Book 1 (Moscow: Academy of Sciences of the USSR, 1961), 103, 118. Subsequent research cites the revised figures of 200 dead and 800 wounded. See Richard Pipes, *The Russian Revolution. Agony of the Old Regime. 1905-1917 (Russian translation)* (Moscow, ROSPEN, 1994), 35. Nevertheless, the Soviet historiography propagated the figure of 4600 dead and wounded that was presented by Vladimir Lenin in the 18th issue of the *Forward* periodical, published on January 31, 1905.

was hit by the "Saint-Petersburg" mine, with other mines—"Poland", "Finland", "Caucasus", and "Moscow" at the ready around him. Yet others made him into an "Autocracy" scarecrow, surrounded by a pack of bloodthirsty wolves—"Official Oppression", "Military Cruelty", and "Bureaucracy".[16]

Dissonant notes in this chorus were sounded by the publications of the *New York Herald*, a newspaper that belonged to James Gordon Bennett Jr. and whose staff had been in contact with the Russian Embassy in Washington since 1901, and also by the reports of the Saint-Petersburg correspondent of the *Associated Press* that tended to support the Russian authorities.[17]

The New York branch of SAFRF helped to organize a mass rally at the Music Academy of New York. After seeing Bartley Campbell's melodrama *Siberia*, the moved public sang "La Marseillaise" and shouted: "Death to the Tsar!" The Russians, the Poles, the Jews, and the Finns were prevailing groups among those who took part in this rally, although many Americans were there as well. Meetings of this kind were also held in Chicago, Boston, Philadelphia, and other cities.[18]

The visual conception of the Russian Emperor that existed in the USA during the First Russian Revolution was constructed with the aid of two personal precedent images. The first image—that of Louis XVI—became a warning to the Russian Emperor not to repeat the mistakes that had cost the French king his head. Thus, Joseph Keppler's cartoon has the shadow of Louis XVI warning Nicholas II, seated on his throne and surrounded by darkness: "Warily, Brother". The shadow points to the image of a guillotine—reminder of his execution by the risen French people and of the fate that awaits the Russian Emperor, should he not hurry to answer his people's plea for reforms (represented as several pairs of hands raised towards the throne with a scroll of "Petitions").[19] (Figure 1)

Figure 1: A Voice from the past

Thomas Sullivant from the *San Francisco Examiner* gave an-

[16] See the editorial cartoons in the *Chicago Daily Tribune*, January 23, 24, 1905; *Philadelphia Inquirer*, January 30, 1905; *New York World*, January 30, 1905; *New York American*, January 25, 1905. See also the cartoon compilation in the *Literary Digest* Vol. 30 (February 4 and 11 1905):154-155, 195.

[17] *Rossiya i SShA: Diplomaticheskie otnosheniya v 1900-1917 gg.,* Grigorii N. Sevostianov, ed. (Moscow: MFD, 1999): 363-364 ; Goldman, *Living My Life*, 359.

[18] "Cry Death to Czar at Big Mass Meeting," *New York Times*, January 30, 1905.

[19] *Puck*, February 8, 1905 (cover).

other interpretation of the same idea and by adding to the shadows of Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette, executed during the French Revolution, that of Charles I who fell during the English Revolution. The three shadows point to the smoking ruins around the enthroned Nicholas II and caution him not to repeat their sad fate.[20]

The other precedent historical image used at that time was the figure of Ivan the Terrible. John McCutcheon's cartoon has this tsar move the hand of Nicholas II as he is signing the order to shoot the peaceful demonstration and looking at the portrait of Louis XVI. McCutcheon portrayed Ivan the Terrible as the founder of the Romanov imperial dynasty, even though Ivan died 29 years before this dynasty came to power. The cartoonist did not care about making this historical substitution: what mattered was the invariant of perception of this precedent name, activated through a graphical representation.[21] (Figure 2)



Figure 2: The spirit of the first of the Romanoff seems to be the power behind the throne.

[20] *San Francisco Examiner*, February 3, 1905.
[21] *Chicago Daily Tribune*, January 24, 1905.

It must be noted that the English translation of the tsar's name ("Ivan the Terrible") had a very clear negative connotation, and his image functioned as a semantic code that fixed the perception of "medieval" and "uncivilized" methods of government used in the Russian Empire and of its autocratic ruler's "bloody deeds". In general, the opposition "Medievalism vs. Modernity" became one of the favorite communicative strategies used in American visual representations of the Russian Revolution.

Meanwhile, the American Russophiles who advocated modernization from above, since it would preserve the unique Russian culture and the unity between the Tsar and the people, wrote with much enthusiasm about the readiness of the Russian Emperor to promulgate reforms. Their high spirits were boosted by three decrees that Nicholas II had signed in February, in which he exhorted the population to help the authorities to restore order, invited opinions on questions of State-building, and instructed the Minister of Internal Affairs, Aleksandr Grigorievich Bulygin, to write a draft law about the creation of a legislative-consultative body that was soon christened as "Bulygin's Duma".

Charles Emory Smith, the US ex-envoy to Russia who had done a great deal to strengthen friendly relations between the two countries during his time in Saint-Petersburg, wrote in an article that Russia was a country of extraordinary contrasts and that its history was as multi-faceted as its reality: "It is illuminated with the progressive measures of the great Emancipator. It is darkened with the shadows of the Kishinev and the Finnish oppression. The far-reaching reforms which are now dawning on the nation give promise of a new and more hopeful era. Russia has prodigious recuperative power; […] and if through the disasters she is now suffering she shall through of the shackles of the bureaucracy that have weight her down and come to share the progressive spirit of the age, she will through present tribulations and final regeneration enter, as we hope she may, on a new and brighter epoch."[22]

However, it soon became clear that the concessions made by Nicholas II were half-hearted, and that he was so hesitant and so late in making them that they were counterproductive and only caused further discontent. The American press wrote that Russia's road to freedom was filled with pogroms, massacres, and assassination attempts, while Nicholas II lacked the wisdom to grant his people their freedom, and the people no longer trusted him. By consequence, anarchy and violence replaced law and order, respect for life and property disappeared, class rose against class and race against race, and various regions of the country were falling into a civil war of the worst kind.[23]

[22] Charles E. Smith, "Russia," *The National Geographic Magazine* Vol.16, no 2 (February 1905): 63.

[23] Emile J. Dillon, "Progress of the Russian Revolution," *Review of Reviews* Vol. 32 (August 1905): 202. See also: "The Condition of Russia," *Quarterly Review* Vol. 202 (April 1905): 581-606; "Progress of Revolution Spirit," *Review of Reviews* Vol. 31 (May 1905): 536; "Changing Russia (Topics of the Time)," *Century* Vol. 69 (April 1905): 954-955; "World-Politics," *North American Review* Vol. 181 (August 1905): 309-310.

The June issue of the *Chicago Daily Tribune* opened with John McCutcheon's cartoon, in which Nicholas II was drowning under the rain of "Revolution". His tiny figure could hardly be seen next to a pair of enormous "State boots". The cartoonist's idea was made clear by the caption: "Wanted—a Washington, a Napoleon, or a Bismarck"—anyone of these three could fill the shoes that are too big for the Russian Tsar who was too petty and narrow-minded to handle the State problems in Russia.[24] Frederick Morgan, the cartoonist of the *Philadelphia Inquirer* also used an American precedent image, but instead of George Washington he referred the reader to the President-Emancipator Abraham Lincoln. In his drawing, the Russian people appear as a figure tied to a pillory by the chains of autocracy. Next to the figure there is a soup bowl with the inscription "Promise of Reforms"; the caption "Wanted—A Lincoln" refers the reader to the American development model: the Russian people are waiting for a Russian Lincoln that would come and deliver them from political slavery[25]. Thus the communicative strategy "Freedom vs. Slavery" found its visual representation in the American cartoon drawings.

The "romantic" image of the people's Russia was being constructed in parallel with the "demonic" image of the official Russia—the reign of darkness, despotism, and arbitrary power, of the country that a deceitful ruler and a mediocre government were pushing into the abyss of chaos and defeat. The American society was living through a period of genuine enchantment with the Russian revolution and placed its best hopes on the Liberals who, it was thought, could best accomplish its main purpose—introduce political reforms and establish a constitutional government. This Universalist euphoria overshadowed not only the doubts that the American Liberal-Universalists had as to whether the Russian "dark people" were sufficiently enlightened and prepared to take part in the government process, but also the Conservative perceptions of the "Immutable Russia" that emphasized its "alien" and "Eastern" nature. All these fears and doubts were eclipsed by the "romantic" image of Russia—a country ripe for political revolution and religious modernization and ready to adopt the Western development model. What the Americans had to do was to help Russia to secure itself on this path.

The divergence among the images of the Russian Revolution created by the Conservative, Liberal-Universalist, and Radical discourses would only become evident later, by the early 1906. Yet, during the early phases of the First Russian Revolution, the different political currents were in relative agreement that the peculiarities of Russian development trajectory and national character would not impede the progress of freedom through the Russian Empire. According to the *Saturday Evening Post*, cities, towns, and farmsteads all over the United States were unanimous in their condemnation of the official Russia.[26] The pages of the American newspapers and magazines were full of images of Russian people rising from dark dungeons to fight for their rights and freedom, struggling to break the bondage of the Romanov dynasty, coming to the helm of the State ship, cutting the tentacles of "Despotism", "Religious Intolerance", "Exile", "Cossackism",

[24] *Chicago Daily Tribune*, July 1, 1905.
[25] *Philadelphia Inquirer*, February 13, 1905.
[26] *Saturday Evening Post*, May 27, 1905.

"Greed", "Incompetence", and "Oppressive Taxation" from the "Bureaucracy" octopus, urgently knocking the door of the "Department of Justice" and rightly demanding reforms, or coming out of the "Revolution" bottle like a genie.[27]

Charles Bush managed to create the image that synthesized the sentiments of the American society in the days of its enchantment with the Russian Revolution and propagated them : Russia is called to arise and fight by a woman with a sword in her arm and a Phrygian hat on her head—an object that, since the end of the 18th century, symbolized not only freedom, but also revolution.[28] (Figure 3)

Figure 3: Arise!

[27] *Harper's Weekly* Vol. 49 (February, 1905): cover; *Atlanta Constitution*, February 4, 1905; *Life* (June 22, 1905): cover; *New York World*, February 6, May 31, 1905; *Chicago Daily Tribune*, June 5, 1905; *Puck* (June 21, 1905): two-page spread; see also the cartoon from the *Columbus Evening Dispatch*, reprinted in the *Literary Digest* Vol. 30 (June 17, 1905): 882.

[28] *New York World*, May 31, 1905.

This cartoon could have been a perfect illustration for Edwin Markham's poem *Russia, Arise!*, first published in 1905:

> This is the hour; awake, arise!
> A whisper on the Volga flies;
> A wild hope on the Baltic lips,
> A terror over the Neva creeps;
> A joy is in the trail that goes
> Reddening the white Siberian snows;
> The cliffs of Caucasus are stirred
> With the glad wonder of a word;
> The white wave of the Caspian speaks,
> And Ural answers from her peaks,
> The Kremlin bells in all their powers
> Wait trembling for the Hour of Hours,
> When they shall cry the People's will—
> Cry Marathon and Bunker Hill.[29]

It is no accident that the Battle of Bunker Hill appears in the poem, since this was the first great battle of the War for Independence between the British troops and the American Colonists. Even though the British forces gained victory that day, their losses (1054 dead) were much greater than those suffered by the Colonists (450 dead). This battle raised the morale of the Americans who in 1776 were beginning to make their own revolution that successfully concluded in 1789 with the adoption of the US Constitution and the creation of a new state.

The press publications of that time were full of analogies between the American and the Russian Revolutions. The Americans were searching for Russian "Founding Fathers" among the characters of the 1905 historical drama. Some thought to find them in *zemtsy* with their "bill of rights", others presented Pavel Nikolaevich Miliukov as a new George Washington, yet others pointed to Sergei Yulievich Witte who, after a visit to the US, drafted the text of the October 17 Manifesto and was preparing a draft law on the elections of the Duma deputies.[30] The "Bloody Sunday" victims were compared with those of the "Boston massacre"[31], while the shadow of Patrick Henry[32] hovered over the Tsar's domain[33]. The pro-

[29] Cited from: *St. John Sun*, July 30, 1906.

[30] Arthur W. Thompson, Robert A. Hart, *The Uncertain Crusade: America and the Russian Revolution of 1905* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts, 1970), 25.

[31] The Boston massacre—the clash between British and Colonial troops that took place in Boston on March 5, 1770 and left five Americans dead. This event catalyzed the consolidation of the patriotic movement in the American Colonies.

[32] Patrick Henry—member of the legislative body of the Virginia Colony, and one of the radical-wing leaders of the patriotic movement in the Colonies. His famous phrase "Give me liberty or give me death" became the battle call for the champions of American Independence.

[33] Thompson, Hart, *The Uncertain Crusade,* 30, 34, 100. See also: *Outlook* Vol. 79 (January, 1905): 218. Some authors went as far as trying to trace the influence of Theodore

gressive magazine *Arena*, well-known for its social-reformist orientation, insisted that the Russian people were capable of making a political revolution and ready for self-government, and that wise and intelligent leaders akin to Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin, and George Washington would promptly appear on the revolutionary stage.[34] All in all, the American observers thought that the Russians were fast approaching their analogue of the American 1776. The main hopes were obviously placed on the Liberals who would direct the reform process and defend the cause of freedom from extremist attacks from both the Left and the Right.[35]

Meanwhile, in winter and spring of 1905, US religious leaders felt very inspired by the idea of a religious reform that would lead to freedom of worship in Russia. While the Catholic publications expressed hopes that the Lithuanians and the Poles could improve their situation, members of Protestant Churches argued that the spread of Protestantism would become part and parcel of Russia's national revival[36]. The news about the Freedom of Worship Manifesto issued by Nicholas II in April 1905 received special attention on the other side of the Atlantic. George von Lengerke Meyer, the US Ambassador to Russia and the US President Theodore Roosevelt's close friend greeted it with much enthusiasm,[37] while, as David Foglesong rightly notes, the Adventists, such as Ludwig Richard Conradi, and the Methodists, such as George Simons, saw the Manifesto as a signal to step up their campaigns to spread "the true faith" through the Russian Empire.[38] At the same time, the *Missionary Review of the World* published an article, whose author turned to the all-too-familiar comparison of the Russian and the Ottoman Empires as states with no political or civil freedoms, where the rulers were reluctant to introduce reforms and eager to cancel them afterwards, and emphasized that even though Russia's 70 million peasants did need both religious and civic guidance, the Protestant missionaries would not be successful there, unless they accepted the leadership of the Young Men's Christian Association and collaborated with the Orthodox Church.[39]

Discussions about the religious reform in the Russian Empire helped to turn it into an object of the US world-reforming mission. In the first half of 1905, "the

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Roosevelt's books *The American Ideals* and *The Strenuous Life* on Father Gapon: V. Bienstock, "Father George Gapon," *Independent* Vol. 58 (February 1905): 352.

[34] "The Russian Situation," *Arena* Vol. 33 (February 1905): 210-213.

[35] "The Lines of Russian Reform," *Nation* Vol. 80 (June 1905): 450; Charles Johnston, "The Leaders of the Russian People," *Harper's Weekly* Vol. 49 (August 1905): 1226, 1243.

[36] Thompson, Hart, *The Uncertain Crusade*, 75; Noble, "America and the Russian Crisis," *Free Russia* (March 1905), 35.

[37] George von Lengerke Meyer to John Hay, May 5, 1905 in: *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)*, *1905*, (Washington: the US Department of State,1906), 76 ; George von Lengerke Meyer to Theodore Roosevelt, May 5, 1905, in: Mark Antony De Wolfe Howe, *George von Langerke Meyer. His Life and Public Services* (New York, Dodd Mead, 1920), 149.

[38] Foglesong, "Redeeming Russia? American Missionaries and Tsarist Russia, 1886-1917," *Religion, State and Society* Vol. 25, no 4 (1997): 356-357; Foglesong, "The American Mission and the 'Evil Empire'", 34-36.

[39] George Washburn, "The Government, Church, and the People," *Missionary Review of the World* Vol. 28, (September 1905): 641-642, 645-646.

crusade spirit" hovered over America, and the Russians were placed next to the Cubans in the messianic plans of political and public leaders, religious activists, philanthropists, and journalists. Plans to give real help to the Russian people in their struggle for freedom were discussed in earnest on the pages of newspapers and magazines, in clubs and at mass rallies, at churches and universities, in trade union and immigrant societies, at business and charity meetings. Proposals included sending over ships loaded with weapons, food, medicine, and, most importantly, printed materials—political pamphlets explaining the principles of American democracy and religious ones expounding the advantages of rational faith.

Telegrams, petitions, editorials, and resolutions addressed to the President and the Secretary of State contained demands for more drastic actions: breaking diplomatic relations, denouncing the Russian-American Trade and Navigation Treaty of 1832, excluding Russia from participation in the next Hague conference, turning US embassies and consulates on Russian territory into safe havens for political and religious dissidents, and, finally, organizing a "humanitarian intervention" similar to the Cuban campaign during the Spanish-American War. The Russian version of such a campaign would include sending a military fleet over to the Gulf of Finland, from where Saint-Petersburg could be attacked in case of necessity.[40] Such rhetoric greatly inspired Russian Revolution-makers who were not always aware of how fickle the general mood could be in the US and of the fact that "the crusade spirit" of the Progressivism epoch did not always turn into real actions.

Political cartoons published in the first half of 1905 serve as an excellent indicator of American public preferences, related not only to the real events in Russia, but also to their own visions of an ideal revolution, their messianic enthusiasm, ideological zeal, and political ideals. Playing with the images of Darkness and Light became the cartoonists' favorite communicative strategy for representing American messianic sentiments. In their drawings, "the Sun of Freedom" rose time and again, coming from over the ocean towards "the Empire of Darkness" in order to disperse the clouds of "Ignorance", "Oppression", "Anarchy", and "Assassination" and to shine the light of "Peace", "Prosper-



Figure 4. Hands across the sea.

[40] Thompson, Hart, *The Uncertain Crusade*, 19-20.

ity", and "Intelligence" over the Russian people[41]. Hands full of American dollars were stretched across the ocean from the land of Light to the victims of Jewish pogroms in the land of Darkness.[42] (Figure 4)

Frederick Morgan's 4th of July cartoon expresses these messianic sentiments most clearly. In it, Uncle Sam holds a torch that sends "sparks of freedom and independence" flying over the head of a chained *muzhik*, representing Russia. Packs of dollars are scattered around the prisoner's feet, and he asks, looking at Sam's happy face: "I wonder if I'll ever have a glorious fourth like that?" This text has a double meaning, since it reflects both the messianic impulse felt by the Americans and their perception of Russia as a "dark twin" of the United States[43]. (Figure 5)

THE GLORIOUS FOURTH

Figure 5. The Glorious Fourth.

John McCutcheon entered into direct dialogue with this text through his ingenious cartoon that visualized Russia's image as the "Other" of the United States:

[41] *Chicago Daily Tribune*, January 31, 1905; *New York World*, February 25, 1905; *Columbus Evening Dispatch*, November 1, 1905. See also the cartoon from the *Minneapolis Tribune*, reprinted in the *Literary Digest* Vol. 27, (July 18, 1903).

[42] *Chicago Daily Tribune*, November 13, 1905.

[43] *Philadelphia Inquirer*, July 4, 1905.

Roosevelt receives greetings from his jubilant people on the day of his inauguration, graced by fireworks and the American national anthem, while a horrified Nicholas II awaits his last hour, hearing the thunder of the Japanese cannons, surrounded by bombs, insurgents, and revolutionaries who curse him while waving red flags and brandishing knives. The caption functions as a semantic code : "**U**.**S**.**A**.—R**u**S**s**I**a.**"[44] (Figure 6)



Figure 6. March Fourth.

Drawing parallels between the Russian Revolution and the two major 18th-century revolutions—the American and the French—became one of the favorite communicative strategies in American representations, and this communicative strategy demonstrated that the Americans considered the Russian Revolution to be a political movement of the Western type.[45] However, the American and the French models played different roles: the first one was a reference, while the second was used as a reminder about the dangers of social chaos, anarchy, and terror that accompanied an all-out destruction of the "old order". According to Michael Hunt, even the French who stood next to the Anglo-Saxons in race hierarchy had not proved capable to follow the American revolutionary script, for even small differences in national character had produced quite divergent political behaviors,[46] and the Russians would do well to take into account the sad experience of the French. This kind of reasoning explains the large number of references to the French Revolution made by the press as well as by the American diplomats, businessmen, public and political leaders. This comparison was first made in late 1904, when *zemtsy* held their assembly in Moscow,[47] and remained important all throughout the First Russian Revolution.

[44] *Chicago Daily Tribune*, March 6, 1905.

[45] "Is a Russian Revolution Imminent?", *Harper's Weekly* Vol. 49, (May 1905): 640; "The Representative Institution Proposed for Russia," *Harper's Weekly* Vol. 49 (May 1905): 785.

[46] Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy*, 117.

[47] See, for example: "Is there Hope of Self-Government for Russia?", *Harper's Weekly* Vol. 48 (December 1904): 1832-1833.

The Ambassador George von Lengerke Meyer filled his letters and dispatches with references to the revolutionary France of the late 18th century. In December 1905, he compared Witte to Necker, the Duma to the General Estates, and Nicholas II to Louis XVI and lamented that the Russian Tsar had not given himself time to study the sad story of his French counterpart. In January 1907, as he observed an interminable train of assassination attempts, von Lengerke Meyer reminisced about the Jacobin terror and the Paris Commune in a letter to his wife.[48] The American Consul in Warsaw agreed that the current Russian situation brought to mind the "Great Terror" of the French revolutionary epoch.[49] The Putilov workers' strike in January 1905 was compared with the disturbances that preceded the break-out of the French revolution. Commentators drew parallels between the August law on the election of deputies to the "Bulygin's Duma" and the convocation of notables and then of the General Estates by Louis XVI[50].

The historical reference models of the Russian Revolution that, one after another, came to dominate the American discourse allow us to evaluate the overall evolution of its American representations. This process of using the historical past in the construction of the "Other" national image has an underlying general logic: the movement from the precedent images of the Western-type revolutionary movements (from the American revolution as the ideal to the French one as a warning) to the "Revolution *à la russe*".

II. Crossing the limits of the acceptable in revolution: on the wave of disappointments

There is no doubt that political terrorism and growing social tensions within the Russian Empire did preoccupy the American radical and partly liberal reformers, and not just the Conservatives. However, press analysis allows us to draw a firm conclusion that some observers enchanted with the Russian Revolution had condoned political murder, albeit indirectly and temporarily, as a means of speeding up political modernization in countries as backward as Russia.

This trend became apparent as early as July 1904, when the reactionary Minister of Internal Affairs, Vyacheslav Konstantinovich Plehve was assassinated, because he impeded the progress of reforms. At that time, most American periodicals would have concurred with the *Philadelphia Press* that called Plehve's murder "a natural retribution for his crimes,"[51] because "the bomb was still a reformer's weapon in Russia," where the reformers had to contend with despotism and arbitrary power.[52] Samuel Harper, a Liberal and a Russophile who was in Russia at that time, reported than even members of conservative circles approved the

[48] Howe, *George von Langerke Meyer,* 233-234, 241, 327-328.

[49] Albert Leffinwell to Robert Bacon, December 1, 1905 in: National Archives and Record Service (NARS), Record Group (RG) 59, Dispatches from U.S. Consuls in Warsaw, Microfilm (M) 467, Reel (R) 3.

[50] "Rioting in St. Petersburg," *Independent* Vol. 58 (June 1905): 174; "The Russian Reforms," *New York Times*, August 20, 1905.

[51] Cited from the *Literary Digest* Vol. 29 (August 1904): 155.

[52] *Forum*, Vol. 36 (October, 1904): 193-194.

murder of this man, who became a symbol of ruthless repression, and that terror seemed politically justified, since it allowed to secure concessions.[53]

February 1905 brought another important political assassination—that of the Grand Duke Sergei Aleksandrovich, the Tsar's uncle, close friend and adviser, Moscow's governor-general and an ardent opponent of the reforms. The American press responded to this event with numerous publications arguing that this act of vengeance was provoked by Nicholas II himself, since his reluctance to make good on his promises induced further growth of the revolutionary violence. The murdered Grand Duke was known as "Ivan the Terrible" of modern Russia, since he was infamous for his depravity, cruelty, and unscrupulousness, as well as for his fanatic hatred of Jews, Protestants, and Catholics. This leader of the reactionary party, a consistent champion of autocracy, and a convinced opponent of more enlightened forms of government for the Russian people was responsible for the Khodynka tragedy and for the disappearance of donations that the Russians had made to the Red Cross Society for helping soldiers wounded in Manchuria. The death of this individual was seen as an exceptional case, that of a political murder that could help to establish internal and external peace.[54]

Samuel Harper who monitored not only the events of the revolutionary Russia, but also the Americans' reaction to them, ascertained that, at first, the latter found the terror justifiable: "The bombing of grand dukes was all right, and perhaps even the peasant attacks on landlords were understandable."[55] After all, this seemed to be the Russian way to freedom. Terror was also accepted by members of American Friends of Russian Freedom societies as a legitimate means of struggle against autocracy, since it was supposed to facilitate the establishment of a Western-style parliamentary regime. After the assassination of the Grand Duke, Edmund Noble prepared a special survey for *Free Russia*, in which he emphasized that neither the American press, nor the US President had even attempted to make any analogies between the fate of the Grand Duke and those of the assassinated US Presidents—Abraham Lincoln, James Garfield, and William McKinley.[56]

The March 1905 issue of the *North American Review* magazine featured a pamphlet entitled *The Czar's Soliloquy* that sounded a clarion call to resist the tyrants and was written by Mark Twain, who was an old-time member of the American Friends of Russian Freedom movement. The pamphlet presented Nicholas II just after the "Bloody Sunday" as a puny naked man who had just come out of a

[53] Samuel N. Harper, *The Russia I Believe In. The Memoirs of Samuel N. Harper. 1902-1941*, Paul V. Harper, ed., (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1945), 20.

[54] "Hated by Russian People. Sergius Called a Modern Ivan the Terrible," *Chicago Daily Tribune*, February 18, 1905; "Sergius Held Harsh Views," *San Francisco Examiner*, February 19, 1905; "Sergius Hated Talk of Reform," *Atlanta Constitution*, February 19, 1905; "Aid to Peace in Sergius' Death," *Chicago Daily Tribune*, February 19, 1905. See also the cartoons published by the *Philadelphia Inquirer*, February 18, 20, 1905; *New York World*, February 19, 1905; *Life,* March 9, 1905.

[55] Harper, *The Russia I Believe In*, 29.

[56] Noble, "American Views of Russian Assassination," *Free Russia* (April 1905): 50-51.

bath and was looking at himself in a mirror, while the author, masked as another, imaginary monarch was evaluating and condemning him. Using the ironic paradox as his main artistic technique, Mark Twain made the masked antihero expose serious ideas about civilization, the human nature and the nature of power, true and fake patriotism, submission and the right to insurrection. Quotes from the New York and the London *Times* as well as the Tsar's own comments masterfully woven into the text made it sound as a complete negation of autocracy's very foundations and as an exoneration of the revolutionary violence against the Tsar.

Mocking the moralist's musings about the viciousness of regicide, he pontificates: "There is no Romanoff of learning and experience but would reverse the maxim and say: 'Nothing politically valuable was ever yet achieved except by violence'. The moralist realizes that to-day, for the first time in our history, my throne is in real peril and the nation waking up from its immemorial slave-lethargy ; but he does not perceive that four deeds of violence are the reason for it : the assassination of the Finland Constitution by my hand ; the slaughter, by revolutionary assassins, of Bobrikoff and Plehve; and my massacre of the unoffending innocents the other day. But the blood that flows in my veins—blood informed, trained, educated by its grim heredities, blood alert by its traditions, blood which has been to school four hundred years in the veins of professional assassins, my predecessors—it perceives, it understands! Those four deeds have set up a commotion in the inert and muddy deeps of the national heart such as no moral suasion could have accomplished; they have aroused hatred and hope in that long-atrophied heart; and, little by little, slowly but surely, that feeling will steal into every breast and possess it. In time, into even the soldier's breast—fatal day, day of doom, that! [...] The nation is in labor; and by and by there will be a mighty birth—Patriotism! To put it in rude, plain, unpalatable words—true patriotism, real patriotism: loyalty, not to a Family and a Fiction, but loyalty to the Nation itself!"[57]

Assassinations of reactionaries in Russia were heartily welcomed by the inhabitants of the New York East Side who harbored radical ideas, by the Socialist-leaning periodicals created with the participation of Russian-Jewish immigrants, and by the American radicals in general, who saw the Russian Revolution as a great inspiration for the US Socialist movement that they considered to be still in its infancy.[58] As the Revolution turned more radical and passed from the political to the social stage, respectable Americans grew increasingly disenchanted with what they considered to be the violation of permissible limits in making a revolution. The American Socialists, by contrast, grew ever more enthusiastic about it.

Jack London, who was a member of the US Socialist Party and one of the leaders of the most radical SAFRF—the Californian one, made a lecture tour of the US after "the Bloody Sunday" and presented his ideas about the meaning of the Russian Revolution and its special romanticism to students, businessmen, and

[57] Mark Twain, "The Czar's Soliloquy," *North American Review* Vol. 180 (March 1905): 324.

[58] Vladimir Simkhovich, "Terrorism in Russia," *International Quarterly* Vol. 11 (July 1905): 266-287; Thompson, Hart, *The Uncertain Crusade,* 70-73, 82.

people of very diverse professions and political views. Jack London perceived this revolution as "the heroic battle for freedom is being fought almost exclusively by the Russian working-class under the intellectual leadership of Russian socialists". This revolution inspired him by its fundamental difference from the Western ones.

In March 1905, Jack London published *Revolution*—an article based on his lectures that justified political assassination: "There has never been anything like this revolution in the history of the world. There is nothing analogous between it and the American Revolution or the French Revolution. It is unique, colossal. Other revolution compare with it like asteroids compare with the sun […] It passes over geographical lines, transcends race prejudice, and has even proved itself mightier than the Fourth of July, spread-eagle Americanism of our forefathers […] The government executes the revolutionists. The revolutionists kill the officers of the government. The revolutionists meet the legal murder with assassination […] I speak, and I think, of these assassins in Russia as 'my comrades'. The worth is shown by the fact that we do back up the assassinations by our comrades in Russia. They are not the disciples of Tolstoy. Nor are we. We are revolutionists."[59]

The strong-spirited character that had always been the focus of Jack London's literary work now had all the markings of a Russian Revolutionary, with his desperate heroism, sense of self-sacrifice, and a great gift for advocacy. *The Iron Heel*—London's novel written between August and December 1906 and published in 1907—was the result of his reflections about the Russian Revolution.[60]

Yet those who thought that political assassination was an admissible method for politically backward countries were far from being the majority in the American society. Talks about "Russia backsliding into Nihilism" and about the extraordinary activity of the revolutionary party made up of "Nihilists and bomb-throwers" began right after Plehve's murder.[61] Some have even gone as far as seeing this act as a proof that the Russians were "Oriental" and incapable of governing themselves.[62] As the use of political terror in Russia kept growing, the Americans evaluations of this method of political struggle began to shift from positive to negative, and this change of attitude indicated that the Universalist euphoria and the enchantment with the Russian Revolution were on the decline in the American society.

After the assassination of the Grand Duke Sergei Aleksandrovich, even the *New York Times* that had always denounced absolutism as the cause of revolutionary violence remarked that "this awful crime" impeded the restoration of order and the advancement of freedom in Russia.[63] The *Atlanta Constitution*—a newspaper that supported the Democratic Party—published Lewis Gregg's ambivalent

[59] Jack London, "Revolution," in: *Revolution and Other Essays* (London& New York: The Macmillan Company, 1910), 12-14, 16-17.

[60] Jack London, *The Iron Heel* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1908).

[61] "The Recrudescence of Nihilism," *Harper's Weekly* Vol. 48 (August 1904): 1237-1238; "Revolutionary Progress in Russia," *Review of Reviews* Vol. 30 (September 1904): 280.

[62] Thompson, Hart, *The Uncertain Crusade,* 23.

[63] *New York Times*, February 20, 21, 23, 1905.

cartoons, one of which, entitled "Who is next?" presented a terrifying spirit of the Russian Revolution with a bomb in its hands hovering over the Grand Duke's lifeless body. In another cartoon, Gregg drew some drunken Russian Nihilists who were amusing themselves in a "bomb-shooting gallery" that had the figures of Russian Grand Dukes as targets.[64] Claudius Maybell from another Democratic-leaning independent newspaper The *Brooklyn Eagle* later took up this theme of "bomb-throwing as a special kind of sport and diversion" in Russia and created the image of a "Russian terrorist-athlete" in a "shot put circle". Authors of some publications took the assassination attempts against Russia's high officials as evidence of the perverse methods used by Russian Revolution-makers and of the dangerous trends of that Revolution. The Conservative *Los Angeles Times* published a cartoon, in which a peasant in a frock coat with a scroll of demands in his hand looked disapprovingly at an Anarchist armed with a bomb and a dagger and said bitterly: "And the world thinks he represents us."[65] (Figure 7)

Figure 7. It is a mistake.

Slightly later, on the pages of the Conservative *Philadelphia Inquirer*, Frederick Morgan presented the image of a Russian commoner in a Phrygian hat who looked like a French sans-culotte and was climbing out of the "Revolution" cauldron.[66] (Figure 8)

Through these images and texts, the perception of the destructive Russian Revolution that resembled a spasm of the social organism got fixed in American representations. A politically respectable magazine the *North American Review* warned its readers that the Russian Revolution was so radical that it could not be compared even with the French Revolution, let alone with the American one, and insisted on the necessity of gradual learning about the foundations of parliamentarism. Its Saint-Petersburg correspondent emphasized that "the Bloody Sunday" was the watershed, after which the Russian Revolution entered a new phase, characterized by the disorganization of bureaucracy, mass strikes and conspiracies,

[64] *Atlanta Constitution*, February 19, 26, 1905. See also the February 20, 1905 issue for "Fear of Dread Bomb Grips Russ Royalty."

[65] *Los Angeles Times*, March 18, 1905. See also: *Living Age* Vol. 244 (March 1905): 696.

[66] *Philadelphia Inquirer*, July 1, 1905.

THE BEGINNING OF THE END

Figure 8. The beginning of the end.

ubiquitous bloodshed and anarchy, and red and white terror. His conclusion was that, for the first time in Russian history, the autocracy had come to depend fully upon the Army and the police, while the entire society was being revolutionized. On one side of the trenches stood a feeble-minded Tsar that made and broke his promises, backed by the police that acted arbitrarily and instigated ethnic strife; on the other was the general insurrection, backed by bombs and dynamite.[67]

Andrew Dickson White, a diplomat and a historian, who in 1892-94 served as the US envoy to Russia and later as the first president of Cornell University, wrote a comprehensive article about the Russian crisis for the *Collier's* magazine. In it, he argued that the autocratic bureaucracy stood in the way of Russia's effective development, hindered the advancement of education, and suppressed individual initiative. Yet, at the same time, he expressed a deep mistrust of Russian reformers and revolutionaries—"Nihilists, Socialists, and Anarchists". Like many American Conservatives, White insisted that constitutional government and parliamentary traditions could only be introduced by an enlightened people, and that the Russians did not fit into that category. Therefore, this American intellectual considered that the Russian autocracy had to reform itself first and then undertake the

[67] *North American Review* Vol. 180 (February 1905): 300; (April 1905): 620-626; (May 1905): 780-788.

task of educating its "dark people." Without this, the reforms would turn into a political farce.[68] In the end, the participants of the Conservative-pessimist discourse about Russia were the first ones to begin describing the Russian Revolution as a meaningless and ruthless mutiny.

In general, Americans looked favorably upon the Russian Revolution as a possibility, but when it actually occurred and broke the prescribed scenario, it caused anxiety and disenchantment by its "dangerous trends": the growth of social tensions, naval and army uprisings, strikes and lock-outs, the creation of workers' deputies' Councils (Soviets), and the never-ending Jewish pogroms—to sum, all the manifestations of Freedom-fighting that became known as the "Revolution *à la russe.*"

A radical change in the American sentiments towards the First Russian Revolution occurred in November-December 1905. The October general strike and the Tsar's October 17th Manifesto that made provisions for introducing the freedoms of conscience, speech, assembly, and associations and also granted law-making powers to the Duma constituted an important watershed in American perceptions. Many American periodicals likened this Manifesto unto the Great Charter of Liberties and compared the importance of the date of its adoption to July 4th, 1776 in the US and to July 14th, 1789 in France.[69] However, when these events were followed by a growing tide of social violence instead of the anticipated stabilization, the euphoria of Universalism began to turn into the notion that the Russians were crossing the limits of the acceptable and that their revolution could plunge the country into anarchy and chaos.

These changes in the American public preferences can already be detected in November 1905 press reviews, even though harsh criticisms of Nicholas II continued (especially in reformist publications).[70] The Tsar's cartoon images also remained extremely negative: he was a weak-willed and frightened dwarf-ruler who had lost all power and control over the situation in his domain, and the only freedoms he had granted to the Russian people were those that he could not impede them to take by force.[71] At the same time, the *New York Tribune* and the *Chicago Examiner* doubted whether the Russian society had sufficient self-governance experience to draw upon. The *Chicago News* observed that the majority of Russians would do well to go to school for a few years before starting to experiment with a republican form of government, while the *Chicago Record Herald* thought that the Russian Revolutionaries were as unreasonable as college freshmen.[72]

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[68] Cited from: Noble, "America and the Russian Crisis," *Free Russia* (March 1905): 36.

[69] "Civil Liberty Proclaimed in Russia," *Outlook* Vol. 81 (November 1905): 531; Johnston, "The Dawn of Liberty in Russia," Harper's Weekly Vol. 49 (November 1905): 1630; "The Russian Magna Carta," *Review of Reviews* Vol. 32 (December 1905): 656-657.

[70] "Civil Liberty in Russia," *Outlook* Vol. 81 (November 1905): 544.

[71] See, for example, the cartoons in the *New York World*, October 29, 1905; *Chicago Daily Tribune*, November 2, 1905; *Harper's Weekly* (November 18, 1905); cover; *Philadelphia Inquirer*, December 7, 1905.

[72] See press reviews in the *Literary Digest* Vol. 31 (November, 1905): 733; Noble, "American Views of the Russian 'Self-Effacement'," *Free Russia* (December 1905):129-130.

The cartoonists' decision to abandon the romantic image of the Russian people (as did for example, Claudius Maybell in the drawing that he created in response to news about Jewish pogroms in Russia) helped forward the changes in the conceptions of the Russian Revolution.[73] (Figure 9)

THE RUSSIAN IDEA OF FREEDOM.
—Maybell in the Brooklyn *Eagle*.

Figure 9. The Russian idea of freedom.

The tide of anti-Jewish violence that began to rise in the fall of 1905 with a pogrom in Odessa and grew again in the summer of 1906 with the Belostok pogrom did much to stir the public opinion on the other side of the Atlantic and to make the Americans reject their romantic ideas about the Russian Revolution in general. While in 1903 diplomats and consuls, public leaders and priests, journalists and cartoonists tended to demonize the political regime and censure the Russian authorities, now they talked about "the barbaric state" of the Russian society,

[73] *Brooklyn Eagle*, November 3, 1905. This cartoon was also used as illustration for a Literary Digest article entitled "Jewish Massacres with Official Approval," *Literary Digest* Vol. 31 (November 1905): 732.

contaminated by Judaeophobia and about the strength of anti-Semitic feelings among the Russian people.[74]

Americans of Christian and Jewish faith reacted to the growth of anti-Jewish violence in Russia with heated protest meetings and mourning processions, numerous press publications, Congress resolutions, and the creation of the National Aid Committee for Pogrom Victims. Together with rabbis and Jewish periodicals, the *New York Times* reprimanded the Christian clergy and the American press for their passivity.[75] Meanwhile, the *New York Evening Journal* that formed part of William Hearst's "newspaper empire," entered into its characteristic sensationalist mode and summoned Americans to donate millions of dollars to help the Russian Jews and the American government—to take immediate action. William Hearst, who was campaigning for the New York Mayor's office and thus needed the support of the Jewish East-Side, reminded one and all how he had helped to start the war for Cuban liberation in 1898 through his press campaign. Now this newspaper tycoon declared his readiness to make the Russian Jews the object of the American emancipatory mission.[76] Such declarations, together with the political cartoons, did much to stir his compatriots' messianic sentiments.[77]

Meanwhile, the influential leaders of the Jewish community, with Jacob Schiff first and foremost among them, tried to put pressure on the White House and the State Department in order to compel the Washington administration to engage in "humanitarian diplomacy," citing the US "humanitarian intervention" in Cuba as a precedent.[78] Yet, neither the President, nor the Secretary of State had any intention to take steps in that direction. In his letters to Jacob Schiff, President Theodore Roosevelt called Schiff's proposal to create an international humanitarian coalition a chimera and insisted that such actions would be completely useless, while a war of all against all was going on in various parts of the Russian Empire and its authorities were incapable of restoring social order and of guaranteeing their subjects' safety: "What would such a coalition do: enforce liberty or order—restore the autocracy or install a republic? Therefore, it is evident we could do nothing, and where we can do nothing I have a horror of saying anything […] The

[74] Thomas Heenan to George von Lengerke Meyer, June 29, November 8, 1905, in: NARS, RG 59, Dispatches from U.S. Consuls in Odessa, M 459, R 7; Albert Leffinwell to Robert Bacon, November 20, 1905, in: NARS, RG 59, Dispatches from U.S. Consuls in Warsaw, M 467, R 3; "The Life and Death Struggle in Russia," *Missionary Review* Vol. 29 (January 1906): 59-62; "Russia and the Jews," *Living Age* Vol. 247 (December 1905): 681-683; "Jews Hacked to Bits by Russian Mobs," *Philadelphia Inquirer* (December 13, 1905); "Another Jewish Massacre in Russia," *Outlook* Vol. 83, (June 1906): 394; *Nation* Vol. 83 (October 1906): 298.

[75] "American Aid to the Suffering Jews of Russia," *Literary Digest* Vol. 31 (November 1905): 773-774.

[76] Thompson, Hart, *The Uncertain Crusade,* 106-109; Moses Rischin, *The Promised City. New York's Jews, 1870-1914* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), 229-230.

[77] See, for example, the double-spread of the *Judge*, September 30, 1905.

[78] *Jacob H. Schiff. His Life and Letters*, Cyrus Adler, ed., in 2 Vols., Vol. 2 (New York: Doubleday, Doran, 1928), 134-138.

outrages on the Armenians were exactly the same as those perpetrated upon Jews of Russia both in character and in extent. But we did not go to war with Turkey."[79]

Overall, the growth of social tensions and political radicalism became the main factor that catalyzed the U turn in the American social preferences. The pages of newspapers and magazines were filled with reports about strikes and lock-outs, endless terrorist acts, unrest in the Army and the Navy, the December armed uprising, and the peasant riots. The authors began to talk about a civil war, in which workers and peasants, soldiers and sailors, as well as ethnic and religious minorities entered into an armed struggle against those that they saw as their oppressors—the government, the capitalists, the landed gentry, and the Army officers. The discussion now revolved around the metamorphoses of the freedom struggle in Russia, the transformation of the political revolution into a social one, whose prospects looked gloomier every day. The word "anarchy" became a peculiar kind of semantic code that was especially frightening for Americans, as were the musings about the October Manifesto that gave millions of illiterate Russian peasants more freedoms than they could handle, given their complete lack of self-government experience.[80] In Samuel Harper's apt summary, "while there had been sympathy for the Revolution before it came, it caused concern when it in fact developed."[81]

Finally, the change of public mood in the USA was also a reaction to the outcome of the Russo-Japanese War. After the Portsmouth Conference, the American investment in Russia began to grow, while the relations between the Washington and the Tokyo governments grew colder, which in turn produced a decrease of Japanophilia within the American society. All of this favored the diffusion of more nuanced perceptions about the official Russia.

The latter trend was also strengthened by the hopes that were placed on Sergei Yulievich Witte. His good performance as the Minister of Finance, his position in the wake of the Russo-Japanese War, his skillful negotiation tactics during the Portsmouth Conference, and, finally, his role in the drafting of the October Manifesto all added to his prestige. To the American observers, Witte seemed just the kind of strong leader that could save Russia from its descent into revolutionary chaos and anarchy and coach its gradual renewal through reforms. In sum, he appeared to be the much-needed "Russian Lincoln" who could free the Russian people from the shackles of political and civil slavery.[82] Positive evaluations of

[79] Theodore Roosevelt to Jacob Schiff, December 14, 1905, in: *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt (LTR)*, Elting E., Morrison, ed., in 8 Vols., Vol. 5 (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1952-1954),113. See also: Theodore Roosevelt to *Oscar* Straus, April 10, 1906; Theodore Roosevelt to Jacob Schiff, July 26, 1906, in: Ibidem, 207, 336.

[80] *Chicago Daily Tribune*, October 28, November 3, December 29, 1905; *Christian Advocate*, November 9, 1905; *New York Herald*, November 28, 1905; *World Today* (December, 1905): 1255-1256; *Literary Digest* Vol. 31 (November 1905): 688; (December 1905): 867; George F. Wright, "The Russian Peasant," *Nation* Vol. 81 (November 1905): 441-442; "World-Politics," *North American Review* Vol. 182 (January-June 1906): 303-309.

[81] Harper, *The Russia I Believe In*, 29.

[82] Isidore Singer, "Sergius de Witte and the Bankruptcy of Russia," *Independent*

Witte's performance dominated the press, even though his image in the American socio-political discourse was not all rosy, especially due to his readiness to turn to the repressive measures advocated by the Police Chief and Saint Petersburg's Governor-General Dmitri Fedorovich Trepov. Illusions about Witte had, albeit temporarily, softened the criticisms directed at the official Russia, even as the political revolution turned into a social one. Yet, by early 1906, Witte's image started to lose its romantic aura, as it became increasingly clear that this "Russian Necker" could not handle the situation, and was losing confidence both of the ruling circles and of the Liberal opposition.[83] This evolution from the model of the American Revolution (the "Russian Lincoln") to the model of the French Revolution (the "Russian Necker") was very symptomatic per se.

In November-December 1905, the American political cartoonists, who were taking an active part in the formation of simplistic images of the Russian Revolution (be they romantic or demonic), illustrated the irreversible turn of the Russian Revolution into a bloody life-or-death skirmish, a wild bacchanal of Nihilists, peasants, and workers.[84] The Moscow armed insurrection of December 1905 was harshly condemned by the American press that wrote about the ungrateful Russians who went to the barricades and ignoring the opportunity they had to create a constitutional regime. What is more, the Russian government was accused of not being decisive enough in restoring order in the country and exposing the surrounding countries to the risk of catching "the revolutionary disease."[85]

The last upsurge of general interest for the Russian Revolution in the USA was related to the convocation of the first Duma in April 1906. Many American observers initially thought it to be the exit from social chaos and financial crisis,

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Vol. 59 (August 1905): 509-511; "The First Russian Prime Minister"; "The Russians and Constitution," *Outlook* Vol. 81 (November 1905): 596-598; (December 1905): 859-860; Perceval Gibon, "Witte: A Great Man Facing Failure," *McClure's Magazine* Vol. 26 (April 1906): 655-662; *Literary Digest* Vol. 31 (November 1905): 688; "Has Witte Left the Czar," *Chicago Daily Tribune*, February 24, 1905; See the editorial cartoons in the *Chicago Daily Tribune*, October 28, November 1, 1905; *New York World*, November 1, December 7, 1905; *Judge* (November 25, 1905): page spread.

[83] "The Russian Revolution from Various Points of View," *Review of Reviews* Vol. 33 (January 1906): 86; "Disintegration in Russia," *Quarterly Review* Vol. 204 (January 1906): 269-270, 274. See, for example, the editorial cartoons in the *New York World*, December 19, 1905; January 7, 1906.

[84] See cartoons from the *Boston Globe* published in *Literary Digest* Vol. 31 (November 11, 1905): 689; *Chicago Daily Tribune*, November 12, 1905 ; *New York World*, December 3, 7, 19, 1905 ; *Puck* (December 27, 1905): page spread. See cartoons from the *Brooklyn Eagle*, *Pittsburg Dispatch*, *Baltimore Evening Herald* published in *Literary Digest* Vol. 31 (November, 1905): 689, 732, 733.

[85] "Madness Not Revolution"; "Russian Chaos," *New York Times*, December 5, 17, 1905; See cartoons in the *Detroit News, Minneapolis Journal* published in *Literary Digest* Vol. 32 (January 1906): 3. These cartoons were used to illustrate the article "Lack of Sympathy for the Moscow Rebels". See also the *Chicago Daily Tribune*, December 28, 1905; *Literary Digest* Vol. 31 (January 1906): 3-4; Stanley Washburn, *The Cable Game. The Adventures of an American Press-Boat in Turkish Waters during the Russian Revolution* (Boston: Sherman, French & Company 1912), 100-101.

the basis for a peaceful transformation of the autocratic regime into a constitutional one, the beginning of a real fight for freedom, and the chance to avoid the Russian versions of both the Jacobin dictatorship and the Thermidor reaction[86]. Yet, in spite of all these hopes, the prospects of a Duma dominated by Constitutional Democrats (*Kadets*) and Radicals caused heated discussions and ambivalent comments within the American society. Some felt inspired by the election results, seeing them as the proof of that the Russians were in fact ready for a constitutional government and hoping that the Duma would be able to stand up to the forces of the old order. Others were pessimistic in their forecasts, due to Witte's loss of prestige and his subsequent dismissal in April 1906, which seemed to make more difficult the dialogue between the State and the Duma. Yet others talked about the apathetic peasants, incapable of comprehending the very idea of a representative government, let along their rights and obligations within it. Some pointed to the financial and moral bankruptcy of the Russian authorities, to the discredited Nicholas II who was hardly capable of taking into account the lessons of the French Revolution and avoiding the fate of Louis XVI. They doubted that the Russian aristocracy could avoid the mistakes made by the French aristocracy and that the Duma deputies would be wiser than the deputies of the National Assembly.[87] The image of the French Revolution was still used as a precedent and a warning, while parallels with the late 18th-century events in France had completely displaced the ideas about "the Russian 1776" that prevailed in the early 1905.[88]

Even though the American press was generally sympathetic towards the first Russian experience in popular representation and continued to criticize "the Russian Louis XVI", the demands made by the Duma deputies had not found favor with the American public that considered them to be too radical. Indeed, it was hard to make sense of such proposals as universal suffrage for a country where the majority of the population could neither read nor write, or universal amnesty and abolition of the death penalty, while terrorism and crime were rampant and were said to be means of political struggle, or the dissolution of the Duma's upper chamber that was the only institution capable of restraining the unreasonable ideas of the lower chamber, or the obligatory alienation of lands without compensation, demanded by the Labor group in the Duma (*trudoviki*). The high hopes that the Americans placed on the Constitutional Democrats were frustrated, as the *kadets* proved incapable of directing the revolutionary movement into the channel of parliamentary competition and, with reckless impatience, rejected gradual

[86] "Evolution or Revolution," *Outlook* Vol. 82 (April 1906): 924-925; H.M. William, "Is the Russian Revolution Constructive?", *North American Review* Vol. 33 (April 1906): 464-466; "Duma and Tsar," *New York Sun*, June 18, 1906; "New Epoch in Russia," *Washington Star*, July 21, 1906. For cartoons, see *New York World*, May 11, 27, 1906; *Philadelphia Inquirer*, May 11, 14, 17, 22, 1906; *Puck* (June 6, 1906): cover.

[87] "How the Elections Went," *Review of Reviews* Vol. 33 (June 1906): 657-658; Dillon, "The First Session of the First Parliament: A Forecast," *Contemporary Review* Vol. 84 (May 1906): 744-748; "World-Politics," *North American Review* Vol. 182 (January-June 1906): 783-784; "Russia's Great Experiment," *Harper's Weekly* Vol. 50 (May 1906): 729.

[88] "The Demands of the Duma," *Independent* Vol. 60 (March, 1906): 1186.

reforms and dialogue with the authorities. On the other hand, American observers lamented the inability of the Russian people to advance strong political leaders from their own ranks – the defect that was readily ascribed to affectivity and impracticality that were so characteristic of the Russian national character.[89]

After the dissolution of the First Duma, voices that urged Russia to learn the main lesson of American Progressivism grew ever stronger. Reforms were to be carefully designed and prepared and were meant to improve the existing system, not to destroy it, while the Russian revolutionaries wanted to renew Russia through destruction, terror, and anarchy. Even the radical *Independent* that had been discussing the possibility that "the Socialist Gospel" would take root in Russia *à la française*, through the realization of the destructive component of its revolution, now insisted that historical parallels of any kind between Russia and France of the late 18th-century no longer worked.[90] The eventual rejection of the Western historical precedent images (of the American and the French Revolutions) indicated that the Americans no longer perceived the Russian Revolution as the Western-style movement.

While in 1906 the Revolution was only beginning according to many Russians, for the majority of Americans it was already over, because it had degenerated into a universal insurrection of the people against their government, an insurrection that was fraught with political and social chaos and symbolized the nation's regress from civilization to barbarism. The American press insisted that the Russian Revolution had chosen riots, strikes, and terrorist acts as its main weapons,[91] and that its destructive forces had manifested themselves most clearly in Poland and in the Caucasus. The murder of the American Consul William Stuart in Batumi on May 20th, 1906 was cited as the best proof of this revolutionary mayhem.[92] The events in the Russian Empire had demonstrated that the Russian

[89] "The Peasants Land Bill," *New York Sun*, July 9, 1906 ; *North American Review* Vol. 183 (1906): 144-145; "The Duma and the Emperor," *Outlook* Vol. 83 (June 1906): 491; "The Duma Defiant," *Independent* Vol. 60 (May 1906): 1247-1248; "The Russian Parliament," *World's Work* Vol. 12 (June 1906): 7593-7594; "Political Neurasthenia in Russia," *Review of Reviews* Vol. 33 (June 1906): 737-738; "Duma's Fight All in Vain," *New York Sun*, July 15, 1906; "Stormy Time in the Duma," *Boston Transcript*, July 5, 1906.

[90] "The Russian and French Revolution (Editorial)," *Independent* Vol. 61 (August 1906): 409-410.

[91] "The Russian Crisis"; "Terrorism in Russia," *Independent* Vol. 61 (August 1906): 360-361, 480-481; "Rebellion in Russia," *Outlook* Vol. 83 (August 1906): 826; "The Russian Reign of Terror," *Review of Reviews* Vol. 34, (October 1906): 407; "Attempt to Assassinate Stolypin," *Current Literature* Vol. 41 (October 1906): 381-386; "World-Politics," *North American Review* Vol. 183 (October 1906): 682-683; "Massacre of Polish Police; Terrorist Murders Go On," *New York Sun*, July 16, 17, 1906; "Bomb Thrower Slays Governor; Murder-Robbery Not Diminishing," *Halifax Herald*, August 4, 23,1906; "Girl Carries Bomb to Kill"; "Terrorists Show no Mercy"; "Assassination vs. Reform," *New York Sun*, August 11, 29, 30, 1906 ; "Very Close Call for Grand Duke," *Washington Star*, August 11, 1906; *Revolution in Russia ! As Reported by the New York Tribune and the New York Herald, 1894-1921* (New York: The Viking Press, 1967), 78-86.

[92] For the diplomatic correspondence on this issue, see: *FRUS, 1906* (Washington, the US Department of State, 1907): 1290-1295.

THE FOE IN FREEDOM'S PATH.
—Carter in the New York *American*.

Figure 10. The Foe in Freedom's Path.

people could only reach freedom through enlightenment and education, since freedom and revolution *à la russe* were the fruits of popular ignorance. Robert Carter has captured this dominant opinion in a visual image that has contributed to the formation of a long-term American vision of the Russian revolution, its logic and general scheme.[93] (Figure 10)

In 1906, periodicals still published reports about the Poles' fight for Independence; there were also calls for granting autonomy to Finland and denunciations of repressions and government terror. Champions of radical discourse were still inspired by the depth and breadth of social revolution in Russia, while Liberal-universalists stressed the great importance of Russia's first parliamentary experience. However, on the whole, the euphoria of universalism was replaced by rancid Russophobia, and the myth of the "immutable Russia" returned to the center stage. Americans were no longer interested in the revolution on the other side of the ocean, and this disappointment in the outcomes of the First Russian Revolution was very well demonstrated by the disappearance of "Russian cartoons" from the American periodicals. The political cartoons that were at once the indicator of the social mood and the mechanism for the formation of new preferences now transmitted the image of Russia as a country that has proved unable to assimilate the Western experience and remained hostile and alien. While the political cartoons simplified the "Russian picture" and fixed the two central images of the Russian revolution (the romantic and the demonic), verbal texts captured the perceptions of the Russian Revolution in a much more nuanced manner that makes it possible to distinguish between different images, produced by the Conservative, the Russophile, the Liberal-Universalist, and the Radical discourses.

A good example of the Conservative discourse is found in the writings and reflections of George von Lengerke Meyer, the US Ambassador to Russia, who has exerted a significant influence on the perceptions that the American Conservative establishment, and especially Theodore Roosevelt, formed about the prospects of the Russian Revolution. The Ambassador wrote to the President: "Russia is entering upon a great experiment, ill-prepared and really uneducated […] The great mass of the Russian people are not much superior to animals with brutal instincts […] Every step or attempt that has been carried on in a revolutionary way has been made without reference to what has gone on before or what is to follow. They do

[93] Reprinted in *Literary Digest* Vol. 32 (June 1906): 967.

not know what they want, except that they want everything at once – what has taken other nations generations to acquire."[94] Meanwhile, Theodore Roosevelt himself saw the causes of the first Revolution's sterility in the fact that it was "led by leaders of the Gorki type" or "the silly visionary creatures who follow Tolstoi and his kind." In Roosevelt's view, Russia's future directly depended on whether it could adopt the values of the Western development model and to stay on the road of gradual modernization, avoiding the extremes of anarchy and despotism.[95]

In their turn, the American Russophiles, such as the well-known translator Isabel Hapgood, came to the conclusion that the Russian people needed control and leadership of a monarchy, since they were prone to fall into anarchy and recklessness. This conclusion resonated with the utterances of the American Conservatives about Russians not being ready for self-government, although, unlike the Conservatives, Hapgood did not consider the Russian national character to be an insurmountable obstacle on the way to progress. What forms this progressive development would take and at what speed it would occur was a different matter.[96]

American Liberal-Universalists thought that the principal gain of the Russian Revolution was to set the stage for parliamentarism and did not lose from sight those political visitors who kept coming to the United States from Russia in search of moral and material aid and adding new fuel to the fire of American Universalist Liberalism as the American society got progressively disenchanted with the outcomes of the First Russian Revolution. Taking stock of the 1905 Revolution ten years later, George Kennan, the father of the first American crusade for a Free Russia, identified three criteria of a successful revolution : its goals, its social bases of support, and knowledgeable and capable leaders that react sensitively to the changes in the political situation. According to this scheme, the main shortcoming of the First Russian Revolution was precisely the lack of competent leaders that could have set adequate goals and consolidate the Russian society in order to achieve them. Neither the *kadets*, nor the Saint-Petersburg Council (Soviet) of Worker Deputies could accomplish this mission, much as they had tried. George Kennan's sense of where the limits of the Russian Revolution lay was consistent with his notion that this revolution was a political movement of the Western type that would have a tangible and predictable result, equally valued by all social strata : a constitutional regime, democratization, and a gradual process of solving the most pressing social and economic problems within the private property framework and without violent spasms of the social organism.[97]

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[94] George von Lengerke Meyer to Theodore Roosevelt, 8/21 May, 1906, September 2, 1906, in: Howe, *George von Langerke Meyer*, 286, 306-307.

[95] "Theodore Roosevelt to Upton Sinclair, March 15, 1906"; Theodore Roosevelt to Theodore Roosevelt, Junior, November 20, 1908, in: *LTR* Vol. 5, 179; Vol. 6, 1372.

[96] Isabella F. Hapgood, "The Russian Peasant: How and Where He Lives," *Craftsman* Vol. 9 (February 1906): 647-648; David Engerman, *Modernization from the Other Shore. American Intellectuals and the Romance of Russian Development* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003): 71-72.

[97] Kennan, "Russia After the War: the Chances of Revolution," *Outlook* Vol. 109 (April 1915): 977-979; Kennan, "The Attitude of the Russian People," *Outlook* Vol. 84 (October 1906): 328-332.

By contrast, the American Radicals neither made analogies between the Russian Revolution and the American and the French ones, nor based their vision of it upon precedent historical models. They thought that the First Russian Revolution was an unprecedented event and, as such, found it very inspiring for those who thought that the American society itself needed renewal. Representatives from various currents of American radicalism, Socialist or not, constructed their own ideological identities as they reflected upon this Revolution. The "Gentlemen-Socialists," such as William English Walling, Arthur Bullard, Durland Kellogg, made a special contribution to the formation of a radical discourse about Russia. Like the Marxists, they thought that the essence of the Russian revolution was in its social dimension, but considered the peasants to be the carriers of social democracy. According to them, the road to Socialism passed not through the industrial capitalism, but through a «peasant revolution». Like Kennan and other Liberal "crusaders," they took the negative traits of the Russian national character to be the result of a despotic regime and were confident that the Russians were capable of building a democracy. Yet they saw the significance of the Russian Revolution in the uniqueness of the social message it was sending to the entire humanity, and not in a movement for the creation of "the United States of Russia."[98]

All these discourses maintained their place in the American society through 1906-07, even though the Conservative discourse, with its characteristic Russophobia and the emphasis on the "eternal Oriental," became dominant. Russian Liberals could not give the Revolution a constructive course, and its people lacked education, were not ready for a representative form of government, and did not know how to use their freedom. While the Revolution was coming to its end in Russia, the first "cycle of hopes and disappointments" about Russia's modernization prospects was ending in the US.

Conclusion

The American attention to the First Russian revolution has actualized the role of the Russian "Other" in the analysis of the American domestic agenda. This phenomenon became reflected in the deliberations of the political and intellectual establishment, public and religious leaders, journalists and political writers, as well as in the drawings of the editorial cartoonists. Parallels between Russia and the US were drawn not only in order to criticize Russia or the domestic political situation in the US, but also in order to demonstrate that the United States, in spite of its imperfections and social conflicts, remained a bastion of freedom and democracy in comparison to the Russian Empire.

First, mass disturbances in the Russian Empire during the 1905 Revolution were compared to the social unrest in the US, especially to the events in Chicago, the city that became the center of the workers' movement and the site of the pow-

[98] William E. Walling, *Russia's Message. The True World Import of the Revolution* (New York: Doubleday, Page, 1908); Arthur Bullard, *Russia's Revolution: 1905-1906*, in: Princeton University, Mudd Library, Manuscript Division, Arthur Bullard Papers, Box 5 ; Kellogg Durland, *The Red Reign: The True Story of an Adventurous Year in Russia* (New York: Century Co.,1907).

erful May 1905 strike that was marked by the protesters' bloody clashes with the police.[99] American Russophiles pointed to the social unrest in Chicago in order to highlight that Americans who criticized Russians would do well to pay more attention to the events at home. Meanwhile, the conservative press had appropriated the image of "Russian nihilist bomb-throwers" as the symbol of the hostile "Other" and used it in its critique of the US political radicalism in order to show that this phenomenon was completely alien to the American model of development and had been brought in by immigrants. For example, the editorial cartoonist of the *Los Angeles Times* represented peaceful citizens of Russia, Chicago, and Warsaw who used brick-proof umbrellas to protect themselves from both the bombs thrown by the strikers and the bullets fired by the army that confronted them.[100]

Second, Russia's image was used on a broader scale as a negative marker in the discussions of the sour points of domestic political development, as the American society was going through a period of racial confrontations, social unrest, and ideological disenchantments. Thus, the Grand Dukes of Russia were mentioned in critiques of political bossism, the captains of the US industry were called Siberian wolves, despots, and bloody autocrats of the monopolist world, who lived in luxury and sent their "personal Cossacks" to disperse workers' strikes. Boston and New York slum dwellers were said to be no better off than the inhabitants of the miserable huts and hovels in the Tsar's domain, etc.[101].

Third, the 1905 Revolution provided a new mold for the analogy between the abolition of slavery in the US and the end of serfdom in Russia that was commonly used on both sides of the Atlantic and had a tradition of growing stronger whenever the bilateral relations became closer. The opposition Freedom-Slavery that was already integrated into the American discourse about Russia, thanks to the efforts of the participants in the first «crusade» for the cause of Russian freedom, had now acquired new overtones. The image of Abraham Lincoln was thus established as a firm reference for all occasions when Americans had to form an idea about the current figure that "liberated the Russian people from the shackles of political and spiritual slavery," be it Sergei Witte in 1905, Pavel Miliukov in 1917, Alexander Solzhenitsyn in 1974, or Boris Yeltsin in 1991.[102]

Forth, the anti-Semitism problem in the Russian Empire resembled the racism issue in the US. The search for analogies between the Jewish *pogroms* and the lynching of African Americans and the state policies towards these two ethnic groups had turned into a very common communicative strategy. The critics of racism in the United States compared the "Jim Craw laws" with Russian anti-Jewish laws, drunken White Americans who lynched Black Americans with vodka-intoxicated Russian peasants killing Russian Jews. Atlanta, the site of an especially cruel African American *pogrom* in 1906, was compared to Kishinev. Quite un-

[99] See, for example, Thomas May's cartoon from the Detroit *Journal* re-published in *Literary Digest* Vol. 30 (May 20, 1905): 732.

[100] *Los Angeles Times*, May 11, 1905.

[101] Thompson, Hart, *The Uncertain Crusade,* 5-17, 22, 79-80.

[102] Zhuravleva, Foglesong, "Konstruirovanie obraza Rossii v amerikanskoy politicheskoy karikature XX veka," 202, 248.



Figure 11. Welcome, Russia!

derstandably, these kinds of analogies were faithfully reproduced by the official and semi-official Russian press and eagerly used by the Tsarist government and its diplomats every time when the US seemed ready to intervene into the solution of the "Jewish question" in Russia. At the same time, quite a few others used Russia as the "dark twin" of the US and insisted that the Jewish *pogroms* in Russia were infinitely worse than the ones against African Americans. At the other extreme of the social spectrum, some white Southerners referred to Pleve's murder in Russia in order to show that lynch trials could at times be justified.[103]

Figure 12. Going home.

The American enthusiasm for the First Russian Revolution as the climax of the first American crusade for Russia's democratization has played an important role in the creation of the American phenomenology of the Russian revolution as such.

After the end of the 1905-1907 Revolution the "romantic" image of

[103] For further details on the subject of Jewish *pogroms* vs. African American *pogroms* dichotomy, see Zhuravleva, *Ponimanie Rossii v SShA*, 468-487, 694-704.

Figure 13. Loaded. But wait until he sobers up.

Russia did not resurge until the wake of the 1917 February Revolution. It became dominant once more in winter and in spring[104] (Figure 11-12); by the fall it was already replaced by a worrisome, although not yet altogether negative image of the Russian Bear who was drunk senseless on freedom[105] (Figure 13), and in November the «demonic» image of Russia that had strayed from the «right path» was back again.[106] (Figure 14)

The "romantic" and "demonic" images of Russia that appeared in 1917 were constructed with the help of the communicative strategies and the rhetorical devices that were honed during the First Russian Revolution and became an important mechanism for maintaining long-term American myths about Russia, both the Liberal-Universalist and the Conservative-pessimist varieties. The former included the faith in the capacity of the Russian people to carry out a Western-style revolution and the create "the United States of Russia," the conviction that the Russian society was democratic by nature and oppressed by a retrograde and xenophobic government, and the belief that Russia's historic destiny was to follow the trail blazed by the Western countries, with the US in the lead. The Conservative-pessimist myths portrayed Russia as a country forever kept behind by its non-Western traditions and culture, linked the authoritarian nature of its political system to the peculiarities of its national character. The Liberal myths gained ground during the ascending phase of the "cycle of hopes and disappointments," the Conservative ones dominated during the descending phases.

Figure 14. Guiding Him.

[104] *Life* (May 10, 1917).
[105] *Judge* (September 8, 1917).
[106] *New York World*, November 9, 1917.

Meanwhile, the carriers of the Radical discourse created a different, though no less mythologized image of the Russian revolutionary "Other." Yet this was the only American discourse about Russia, in which it took on the role of a teacher and not of a student in what concerned the universal significance of its revolutionary message.

Both in 1905 and in 1917, the Americans "invented" romantic and demonic "mental images" of Russia on the basis of their ideology of progress and expansion, their own vision of the ideal political and social arrangements, a true revolution, the place of the US in the world, and its role in the process of its democratization and harmonization.

Throughout the entire 20th century, as the American society witnessed the events in the Russian Empire, USSR, or the post-Soviet Russia, it repeatedly oscillated between the universalistic euphoria and the myth of the "Immutable Rus," the enthusiasm about rapid westernization of Russia and the pessimism on the account of its "orientalism," and between the faith in the readiness of Russian civil society to break the grip of the rulers and in the liberals' capacity to lead the constructive process of modernization on the one hand, and deliberations about the immutability of the Russian national character on the other.

Americans experienced a feeling of discomfort, because it was impossible to denounce the evil in other countries, while the American society itself could easily become the object of a fierce critique and was in need of serious renewal (the metaphor of the "glass house"). Meanwhile, American reformism was clearly acquiring an international dimension. As a result, at the turn of the 20th century, the fight for freedom far beyond the US borders was already seen as an important tool for preserving democracy at home and as a peculiar mechanism for overcoming the national identity crisis.

Americans that awaited the liberalization of the Russian Empire in 1905 and hoped for its speedy modernization tended to exaggerate both the scale of the changes that took place in Russia and the degree of American influence in the matter. It must be noted, that Russian liberals and radicals did much to perpetuate this trend, as they kept coming to the United States for moral and material support and appealing to the Americans' messianic feelings and their faith in liberal universalism. By the turn of the 20th century, they and the American "friends of Russian freedom" had created a very particular image of the Russian revolutionary. It was for this reason that George Kennan, William Foulke, and Edmund Noble saw Leon Trotsky and Vladimir Lenin as impostors who had usurped the fruits of the battle fought by Liberals such as Pavel Miliukov and "moderate Socialists" – Sergei Stepniak-Kravchinsky, Ekaterina Breshko-Breshkovskaya, Nikolai Chaikovsky, Aleksei Alad'in, etc. In this sense, Americans got caught in their own "imagological trap".

During the First Russian Revolution, the eagerness to remake the Russian Empire into the image and the likeness of the United States had reached its peak and Russia became the object of the US world-reforming mission. The first American «crusade» for the democratization of Russia had provided the blueprint for the subsequent campaigns : for the liberalization of the Russian Empire in 1917,

of the Soviet Union during the Second World War, and of post-Soviet Russia after the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. As David Foglesong persuasively demonstrates in his book *The American Mission and the "Evil Empire",* the crusade for Russia's renewal also went on between these episodes of heightened activity, and this never-ending quest has strengthened the Americans' faith in the special destiny of their country to be the torchbearer of freedom and democracy for all the people of the world. These developments have given rise to two important issues that still remain relevant in our days: the right of humanitarian intervention and the expediency of imposing American ideals on those to whom the Americans wanted to bring «the blessings of freedom», regardless of their own wishes.

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Book Reviews

Thompson, Jenny, and Sherry Thompson. *The Kremlinologist: Llewellyn E Thompson, America's Man in Cold War Moscow.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2018. Paperback. Illustrated. $39.95.

The two daughters of the American ambassador to the Soviet Union, 1957-1962 and 1967-1969, have written a memorial biography of his career that covers much of the Cold War. Unlike most diplomats associated with that country, Llewellyen Thompson grew up on a ranch in Colorado and after brief attendance at the University of Colorado entered the foreign service in 1930, initially posted to Ceylon (Sri Lanka).

The first paragraph sets the stage:

> A long, lean, graceful, and absurdly quiet man, Llewellyn E Thompson Jr. is and was a mystery. He was sociable and made friends easily, yet he was reserved and self-effacing. He gained respect from his subordinates but was never domineering. He was a ladies' man, but not a playboy. He joined and stayed in the Foreign Service both to feed his desire for adventure and from a deep sense of duty.

What follows is 587 pages of large page, small print elaborations on this theme, that includes many substantive endnotes and a large number of unindexed illustrations, mostly from the Thompson Family Archives (TFA), location of which is not disclosed. The result is a surprisingly professional book from two obviously dedicated but amateur writers (no previous publications). They had much guidance from well-known historians, diplomats, and analysts such as Bohlen, Foy Kohler, Jack Matlock, George Kennan,William Taubman, Raymond Garthoff, Sergei

Khrushchev, John Gaddis, and many others. The daughters missed no relevant sources from National Archives, presidential libraries, recorded oral testimonies and major secondary sources--and handled them superbly. A delay in publication of the book, was due to a long wait in vain for release of Freedom of Information Act material from the Central Intelligence Agency.

Thompson married late, in his 40's, to, from all accounts, was one of the best diplomatic accomplices, Jane Monroe, who brought a daughter from a previous marriage into the family and encouraged her and her new daughters to live freely in Moscow. Where else would you find tales of the escapades of young girls' adventures in the basement of the ambassadorial residence, Spaso House, where they found a secret pantry of supplies and, of course, raided it–or running past frustrated guards to join Russian children in games in the outside square and then to invite them in for refreshments. Jane clearly wowed Nikita Khrushchev, adding to Thompson's success as ambassador and resulting in repeated invitations to the Soviet leader's dacha outside Moscow, a high mark in peaceful co-existence.

Thompson's introduction to Russia occurred much earlier when assigned as second secretary to the Moscow embassy during World War II, essentially as caretaker of Spaso House when both it and the Kremlin were chief targets of German bombs and artillery and many of their usual tenants had moved to the East, out of range of German guns. His real debut to kremlinology, however, took place in Austria, when serving as American ambassador in Vienna during the negotiations of the Austrian State Treaty in 1955, for which he is rightfully given credit for achieving the dignified withdrawal of Soviet forces from its occupation zone, no doubt an important consideration for his promotion to the same position in Moscow in 1957, when Spaso House became a community center and guest house for peaceful coexistence, hosting among many pianist Van Cliburn and Vice President Richard Nixon for his "kitchen debate" with Nikita Khrushchev. Thompson was a strong supporter of the new cultural exchange programs that began and flourished during his tenure.

As the authors stress, their father's strong point was patience, which he demonstrated especially during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Back in Washington as a special advisor in the State Department on Soviet affairs, he added a powerful voice of moderation for the quarantine-blockade policy with those such as Dean Rusk, McGeorge Bundy, Robert McNamara, and others against a strongly advocated immediate military option. His winning the trust and respect of Soviet leaders, especially Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin, were crucial in this regard. He also advanced cooperative relations in the era of detente in the Johnson administration toward non-proliferation of nuclear missiles and SALT. Although unsuccessful in halting President Johnson's persistent policy of bombing the north during the Vietnam War, he succeeded through Dobrynin in obtaining pauses during Soviet visitors to Hanoi.

Thompson's life was cut short at age 67 by pancreatic cancer without having the opportunity to write his own book as did his close friend, Charles (Chip) Bohlen, who gave the eulogy at the service in the Washington Cathedral. Burial followed at his hometown of Las Animas in his beloved Western ranch country.

Jane would join him there on the same date seventeen years later. Their daughters certainly have filled the gap he left in those diplomatic years with a scholarly, informative, and well-written book, a must read for all students of the Cold War.

Norman Saul
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Laurence Bogoslaw, ed. *Russians on Trump: Press Coverage and Commentary*, Minneapolis, MN: Eastview Press, 2018, i. 402pp. Indices. $24.95, Paper.

Russians on Trump collects a variety of sources from Russian media: opinion pieces, reportage of events, interviews of well-placed officials among them. Mark Galeotti's foreword nicely encapsulates the logic of such a collection, arguing that Donald Trump is something of an empty vessel into which both Americans and Russians off-load our "hopes, prejudices and fantasies" (ii). As of this writing, questions as to Donald Trump's political and business connections in Russia retain a certain salience for may Americans. We may well wonder, then, what Russians think about the same sorts of questions. *Russians on Trump* addresses this issue roughly chronologically, beginning with items such as Trump's visits to Russia before his campaign, and concluding with Russian-American diplomacy as of late 2017. A source-book on this topic is as "relevant" as they come, and this collection carries both the inherent interest and the inevitable problems that obtain when discussing current events.

One immediately wonders, *which* "Russians on Trump"? The volume includes a quite varied range of perspectives. There are Russians who celebrate Trump's victory in full-on "party mode." There are Russians who see the President as a weak tool of the fetid political "swamp" he promised to drain, and everything in-between. There is, however, one consistent thread that unites the chosen sources: the identified authors are largely members of the media commentariat, while none are sociologically comparable to the classes of individuals mostly responsible for electing Donald Trump in the first place. One Vladimir Frolov is the author of thirteen columns included in the volume, roughly eleven percent of the total. Frolov is a longtime political columnist for the *Moscow Times*. In that capacity, he has more in common with Lucian Kim, the current Moscow correspondent for *National Public Radio* and former *Moscow Times* columnist himself (according to his current NPR biography), than with an average attendant at a Trump rally or a Russian fan of Vladimir Zhirinovsky. So, the book contains many and varied opinions on Trump, but not a particularly wide variety of types of individuals who express those opinions.

From a different point of view, the book's tendency to sociological narrowness in source authorship has a real benefit: it illustrates that Russian media were and are no better than their American counterparts at explaining, much less predicting, the Trump Phenomenon. Galeotti says as much, when he observes that 21st century "truth" is less a function of authority than a "subjective commodity

traded, haggled over and asserted by everyone who wants to get in on the act," and so neither Russians nor Americans really have much solid ground from which to assess the Trump presidency (i, iv).

Galeotti's hesitance to make pronouncements was wise: in the short time since the book's publication, events have proven false any number of definite statements and predictions made by the authors therein. In a 26 December, 2016 column for *Republic.ru*, the aforementioned Frolov confidently predicts that moving the U.S. Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem "will lead to a new Arab-Israeli conflict, risking a "third intifada." Frolov further implies that even the Israelis themselves might not be entirely thrilled with such a decision (136). Four months later, Reuters reported that the U.S. would in fact be moving its embassy to Jerusalem, "a move that has delighted Israel and infuriated Palestinians" (Reuters, 7 May, 2018). So, Frolov's skepticism was shortly proved half-right at best; the forecast third intifada has yet to materialize.

The next day, the *New York Times* reported that the United States would be withdrawing from the Iran nuclear deal concluded during the Obama administration (*NYT*, 8 May, 2018). Unfortunately for Russian analysts, on 1 Feb, 2017, *Izvestiia* had reported that "Politicians and experts believe that Russia will be able to persuade the new head of the White House to keep Washington's signature on the [Iran nuclear deal]" (239).

American politicians and mainstream media "experts" have not been visibly better at predicting Donald Trump's policy goals, or their results. So, American readers of *Russians on Trump* will come away reassured (if that's the right word) that Russian analysts are just as in the dark as we are, as to what our mercurial 45th President will do or say next. As a thorough illustration of this collective nescience, the sources in *Russians on Trump* are excellent.

While some of the sources in this collection are originally English-language, most of them are translated from the original Russian. This makes the collection of real value for students, for whom current events are of genuine interest. From a faculty point of view, documents such as these are likely to lead to good discussions about Russian-American relations in history. Undergraduate students of American History, Russian History, and International Relations, will all benefit from these translations, as will members of the interested public, who may understandably wonder what "they" think about "us."

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Web address for Reuters reference: (https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-israel-diplomacy-jerusalem-explai/why-is-the-u-s-moving-its-embassy-to-jerusalem-idUSKBN1I811N)

Web address for NYT reference: (https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/world/middleeast/trump-iran-nuclear-deal.html)

Marvin Kalb, *The Year I Was Peter the Great: 1956, Khrushchev, Stalin's Ghost and a Young American in Russia*, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2017, xiv, 290pp. Index. $24.99. Cloth.

The year 1956 was not an ordinary one in the history of Russian-American relations and the Cold War in general. Marvin Kalb, the well-known news correspondent for CBS and NBC, provides a fascinating personal account of his year in the Soviet Union as a staff member for the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. This memoir mixes Kalb's personal reflections with the larger events of an eventful year.

Kalb reveals that he was reluctant to write a memoir. After a lifetime of reporting on events around the world, he did not seem to think his voice was worth hearing. Yet, he relented to his grandchildren who wanted the story to be told. The first chapters of the book look at Kalb's personal background. His parents were immigrants from Eastern Europe and his older brother, Bernard Kalb, was an up and coming journalist. Kalb recalled how he was conflicted about whether he should become an academic or a journalist. After completing his undergraduate studies in New York, he decided to pursue graduate work at Harvard in history with Richard Pipes and Michael Karpovich. He adopted the belief that journalists needed to have expertise in order to be credible. His plan was to get a PhD in Russian history in order to report more effectively on current Soviet affairs.

During his graduate work, though, in late 1955, he was asked to go to Moscow to serve as a translator in the US Embassy. Most of his duties were to translate news reports coming into the embassy. Kalb spent a year in this position that changed his life. The title of the book comes from an encounter with Nikita Khrushchev where the Soviet leader referred to the towering Kalb as "Peter the Great" in reference to their similar heights. Much of Kalb's work while there was translating news items, but he also had a time to travel across the Soviet Union.

Some of the most revealing passages are when Kalb was away from Moscow, in Central Asia and other locations. Kalb is well versed in Russian history so he was able to contextualize nearly every thing he saw and experienced. His memoir reveals the Soviet Union as a complex place with many differing views of foreigners, Jews, Stalin, America, Khrushchev and many other topics.

In the end, this is valuable insight into the life of a young American diplomat in the heat of the Cold War era. His insights are informed very much by the long trajectory of Russian history. Kalb's account is long overdue. It seems that his view of the Soviet Union would have been more valuable if it had been published during the Cold War since it offers such a sophisticated view of the Soviet Union at that time. Regardless, Kalb's memoir is a valuable addition to the growing literature of more contemporary travelers in the Soviet Union and Russia.

William B. Whisenhunt
College of DuPage

Alexander Etkind,. *Roads Not Taken:An Intellectual Biography of William C. Bullitt*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2017. xiv+ 290 pp., Index. $24.95. Paper.

Writing a biography of such a person as William Bullitt is never easy. He was the first US Ambassador to Soviet Russia and an Ambassador to France; a man with an excellent knowledge of US politics who never held top offices in a Washington Administration; he participated in negotiations with Vladimir Lenin and Joseph Stalin, Winston Churchill and Charles de Gaulle; he knew US Presidents Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Delano Roosevelt well; he was friends with the greats of his time on both sides of the Atlantic; he cherished daring ambitions and possessed a magnetic personality; he loved life and knew how to live well.

Alexander Etkind, Professor at European University in Florence, a well-known literary scholar and historian of culture, offers his readers a provocative biography of his hero. It is written in a captivating and elegant style and based on Bullitt's personal papers held in Yale University, on his letters and memoirs, on his journalistic and literary works, as well as on memoirs and letters of his contemporaries. This biography was first published in Russian in 2015[1] and then in English in 2017.[2]

Unlike his predecessors,[3] Etkind strives to write a biography of Bullitt, who is an intellectual infatuated with the ideas of his time and overcoming their temptations, a person who combined the legacy of American liberalism and European cosmopolitism, a critical observer sometimes capable of predicting the course of events, but never gaining the recognition he deserved from either his country or its leaders.

The readers are offered a special genre of an intellectual biography, since Etkind is primarily interested in the history of ideas, in their specific embodiment in Bullitt's views, and in his own influence on those ideas' evolution. These ideas were many and different. It was Bullitt's own idea of the need to collaborate with non-communist socialists to fight the spread of Bolshevism in Europe; this idea formed the foundation of Washington Administrations' European policies after World War II [p. 26-28]. It was Bullitt's intellectual contribution to discussing the

[1] Alexander Etkind, *Mir mog byt' drugim. Uil'jam Bullit v popytkah izmenit' XX vek* (Moscow, Vremja, 2015).

[2] The English-language edition is more logically constructed, more academic in presentation of its material; it relies on a larger number of primary sources including collections of documents published relatively recently in Russia and documents from the Alexander Yakovlev Archive available on the Internet. Additionally, the author's alternative history versions still take him quite as far as they do in the Russian-language edition, yet they are construed in a more appropriate form.

[3] Beatrice Farnsworth, *William C. Bullitt and the Soviet Union* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967); Will Brownell and Richard Billings, *So Close to Greatness: The Biography of William Bullitt* (New York: Macmillan, 1988); Michael Casella-Blackburn, *The Donkey, the Carrot, and the Club: William C. Bullitt and Soviet-American Relations, 1917-1948* (Westport: Prager, 2004).

central issue of the inter-war era: is Bolshevism really capable of creating a new man? It was the mutual influence the ideas of Bullitt and George Frost Kennan, the author of the "Long Telegram" and a leading Cold War expert on Russia, had on the concept of containment of Communism. Etkind stresses that both were interested in the invariably expansionist nature of the Russian authorities, the rootedness of authoritarian traditions in the political culture and mass mindset linked with the Tatar-Mongol yoke and preserved unchanged under the Romanovs and under Stalin. In his book *The Great Globe Itself*, Bullitt completely ignored the tradition of resisting the authorities in the imperial Russia and in Soviet Russia [p. 229] as he adhered to a harsher variant of the containment doctrine, while Kennan later abandoned the thesis of an invariable Russian national character, paying attention to the evolution of the Soviet society.

Etkind primarily considers Bullitt in the context of Soviet-US relations, since the "Russian theme" is a thread that runs through Bullitt's entire life.

As was typical of many left-wing Americans, Bullitt went through a period of fascination with the Russian revolution and socialist ideas after World War I. Subsequently, it transformed into utter disappointment following Bullitt's acquaintance with the reality of the Soviet system. Etkind offers a detailed description of Bullitt travelling to Russia in 1919 upon instructions of Edward House to hold talks with Vladimir Lenin and the Bolsheviks. In exchange for diplomatic recognition at the Versailles Conference, the latter ultimately promised to renounce control over the larger part of the Russian Empire concentrating their power in Moscow, Petrograd, and adjacent European territories. That was not to pass. Etkind rightly remarks that the "Russian trail" can be found in Bullitt's novel *It's Not Done* both in the main hero quoting Nikolai Nekrasov and in the title itself referring to the popular novel *What is to Be Done?* by Chernyshevsky. Etkind expands those Russian-American literary crossings by dwelling on unresolved problems of love, sex, and marriage in the post-war world of modernism that arrived in the United States as well [p. 61].

However, Bullitt's ties with Soviet Russia lay primarily in his serving as the first US Ambassador to the USSR following its diplomatic recognition in 1933. Bullitt arrived in Moscow in 1934 during the short Soviet-American "honeymoon"; he was inspired by the idea of his new "Russian mission." He put George Kennan and Charles Bohlen on the Embassy staff giving their careers a powerful impetus. Bullitt was bitterly disappointed in the Soviet Union, and Etkind pays special attention to his attempts to "sober up" Roosevelt, who still believed that the USSR was building a democratic society of its own kind. Finally, the President recalled Bullitt from Moscow in 1936 accusing him of the cooling off in the USSR-US relations. Bullitt left being certain that Bolshevism was a kind of global religion. This idea echoed previously formulated ideas of Nikolay Berdyaev and later musings of American "fellow travelers" disillusioned in the Soviet power. Together with the sharp criticism of the Soviet totalitarianism this conviction led Bullitt to his belief in the "eternal Russia" so typical of the Cold War period. As he wrote, "Russia has always been a police state… Scratch a communist and you will find a Russian" [p. 173].

Etkind surrounds Bullitt with individual and collective portraits. There was Edward House, President Woodrow Wilson's right-hand man during World War I, the author of the utopian novel *Philip Dru, Administrator* combining Nietzschean philosophy with socialism; there was President Woodrow Wilson himself, the focus of Etkind's particular attention, a politician and a person seen through the prism of joint psychoanalytical study by Bullitt and Sigmund Freud; there was President Roosevelt who sent Bullitt as the US ambassador first to the USSR and then to pre-war France; there was Walter Lippman, one of the creators of the Progressive movement's intellectual program in the US, the founder of the *New Republic* magazine, the executive director of the expert council Inquiry; there was George Creel, the head of the Committee for Public Information during World War I; there was George Kennan, Bullitt's student of sorts in the art of international relations, who had an insider experience of life in Moscow as a member of Bullitt's Embassy staff; there was eccentric Louise Bryant, a left-wing journalist who traveled to the revolutionary Russia, a proponent of free love, the wife of John Reed, Bullitt's second wife; and there is Reed himself, Bullitt's idol, who had played an important role in the development of his identity; there was Mikhail Bulgakov, one of Bullitt's closest friends in Russia, who depicted the American in his *The Master and Margarita* in the character of Woland; there was Sigmund Freud together with whom Bullitt wrote the first ever psychobiography of a contemporary and the first psychoanalytical study of politics; and there were many of Bullitt's famous contemporaries: Americans, Germans, the French, the English, Russians.

Among collective images, there were typical educated American women of the high society and, first of all, members of the "Gatsby generation." Following Kennan, Etkind counts Bullitt himself among this generation and instead of "lost" in the war, as Ernest Hemingway called them, Etkind calls them "electrified" by it.

Ultimately, Etkind's book turns into a story not only of Bullitt, but of his time, of the mores of certain classes and social groups, of Americans and Europeans with different views and desires.

The book's central character is William Bullitt the visionary, a person with particularly keen insights, whether we are talking future experts on Russia such as Kennan and Bohlen, or future creators of the unified Europe, such as Jean Monnett, or whether we are talking assessing the prospects of relations with the Bolsheviks and Soviet Russia and forecasting the way the situation will develop in Europe on the eve of World War II and after it. In some things Bullitt, indeed, proved to be right. For instance, when he wrote in May 1938 that after Spain, Czechoslovakia would be the next victim of Nazi Germany, that France would fall under the German onslaught, that Japan would win battles for China, but lose the war, and the US would end up rebuilding Europe in the post-war world [p. 180]. However, Bullitt was clearly mistaken when he stated in 1936 that Nazi Germany "for many years" would not be ready to attack Poland and the Soviet Union and in 1937 that the prospect of a Japanese attack on the United States was nonsense" [2 p. 174, 195]. At the same time, even if many of Bullitt's plans and projects had

become reality, they would have hardly effected any radical changes to the course of history in the 20th century. This is the aspect that does not merit a serious critical reflection from Etkind; he prefers to follow his hero in thrall to his charm.

Hence Etkind's passion for constructing various alternative histories. He explains it by the fact that most of Bullitt's visionary ideas failed to become reality. Ultimately, the question of "what if" become a major thread throughout the narrative.

What if Woodrow Wilson had accepted Bullitt's plan Lenin had agreed to? Etkind rightly notes that this plan had Wilson's own logic of decolonization to it. Yet the idea of avoiding the establishment of the Soviet Union, Stalin's terror, the emergence of Nazi Germany, World War II, and the Holocaust through implementing the scheme developed during the 1919 talks appears far-fetched [p. 239]. A combination of internal and international political factors, including the confrontation of the Reds and the Whites in 1919 that ran too deep cannot be ignored. Subsequently, it would certainly destroy any arrangements achieved. Incidentally, Etkind himself notes it.

What if Roosevelt had agreed to Bullitt's idea of the US steering a more active and flexible foreign political course in Europe before the war and drawing Nazi Germany into negotiations? Etkind believes it would have prevented the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact [p. 185]. What if the US President had listened to Bullitt's advice and "America had acted in real time, arming France, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Finland in order to maintain the balance of power in Europe"? Etkind thinks it possible that "the war would not have happened, or it would have remained local" [p. 240]. The proposed scheme does not take into account the profoundly isolationist sentiments in the US. After all, the "American century" had not begun yet, and it was Japan that was perceived as the principal threat to the US and it was in regard to Japan that the US was diplomatically active counting, among other things, on the Soviet aid.

What if, instead of Harry Hopkins, one of the most influential persons of the Roosevelt era and a Soviet Russia sympathizer, it had been Bullitt acting as the US President's authorized representative in international affairs during World War II, which Bullitt very much wanted? Then an alternative history "ex adverso" is presented, "Securing the gigantic transfer of arms and equipment to the USSR Lend-Lease, Hopkins' shuttle diplomacy helped the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain win the war. The same strategy also led to the Yalta Conference, Soviet control over Eastern Europe, the bloody revolution in China, and the Cold War" [p. 204]. Thus, following Bullitt, Etkind inadvertently overestimates the role of the US and downplays the role of the Soviet Union in the outcome of World War II and ignores the contribution of various actors to the post-war development.

The principal question of the book is whether the world history of the 20th century could have really changed had Roosevelt and Wilson listened to Bullitt's advice and had not lost the world having won the war. Despite all qualifications and reservations, Etkind leads the readers to answering this question in the affirmative [p. 233].

In my opinion, in this intellectual biography, the talented and creative literary scholar takes the upper hand over the historian. This is manifested in the enthralling mixture of fictional and real-life persons; in the increased attention to literary texts and to analyzing their influence on political behavior (the latter is in itself a very valuable observation); this is also manifested in ignoring the seminal works of professional historians that are crucial for the subject of the book.[4] On the one hand, it prevented Etkind from offering arguments in support of a series of fascinating ideas (for instance, the impact Wilson and House's Southern roots had on their perception of World War I [p. 9]), while on the other hand, it resulted in constructing rather speculative schemes and sometimes in mistaken statements.

Here is but one example. Presenting Bullitt as the first US expert on Russian and Eastern European socialism, [p. XIII], Etkind ignores the contribution of such "gentlemen-socialists" as Arthur Bullard and William English Walling. They are not featured in the book at all. It is all the more strange since both Americans had gone through the same cycle of hopes (pinned on socialism) and disappointment (following the results of the Russian socialist experiment of 1917) as Bullitt did. Additionally, Bullard was considered an expert on Russian affairs and in July 1917 – June 1918 he was in Russia both as a correspondent of the *New Republic* and as an authorized representative of Colonel Edward House and George Creel; he was preparing a propaganda campaign against the separate peace with Germany. Upon his return, Bullard wrote the well-known book *The Russian Pendulum. Autocracy-Democracy-Bolshevism* (1919). William English Walling described his disillusionment with Soviet Russia and his new understanding of socialism in this book *The ABC of Russian Bolshevism – According to the Bolshevist* (1920).

However, the above does not mean that Alexander Etkind's book does not deserve the attention of professional researchers and of the general audience interested in the history of the 20th century. First, this book, that is hard to put down, focuses the readers' attention on various ways of the events' development; it also shapes a multidimensional perception of history. Second, Etkind's book leads us to understand alternative approaches to studying international relations in general and Soviet-American relations in particular; it leads the readers to use research practices of social constructivists who emphasize the role of communication between various international actors (be they people or states) in creating a new reality. Finally, William Bullitt is an important and iconic person, someone who

[4] See, for example, Thomas R. Maddux, *Years of Estrangement: American Relations with the Soviet Union, 1933-1941* (Tallahassee: University Presses of Florida, 1980); David S. Foglesong, *America's Secret War against Bolshevism: U.S. Intervention in the Russian Civil War, 1917-1920* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1995); Donald E. Davis and Eugene P. Trani, *The First Cold War: The Legacy of Woodrow Wilson in U.S.-Soviet Relations* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press. 2002); Norman E. Saul, *War and Revolution: The United States and Russia, 1914–1921* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001); Norman E. Saul, *Friends or Foes? The United States and Soviet Russia, 1921-1941* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006); Boris M. Shpotov, *Amerikanskii Biznes i Sovetskii Sojuz, 1920-1930 gody: labirinty ekonomicheskogo sotrudnichestva* (Moscow: LIBROCOM, 2013).

was in the thick of events and intellectual debates of his time. Etkind succeeds in creating an original portrayal of his hero embedding him in a complex context of intertwined ideas. Many of them could in themselves become subjects of individual studies and foundations for new explanatory schemes. Ultimately, few people would argue against the notion that the person who met and was friends with the greats of his time, who attempted to influence of course of the 20th century history during its turning points, who saved Paris from destruction, who was the prototype of Bulgakov's Woland merits another book offering a new reading of his life.

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Field Notes

This issue's field notes will feature some past events and some future events. We hope the information is useful to all. Please feel free to spread it around.

1. ANNOUNCEMENT! The *Journal of Russian American Studies* (*JRAS*) is thrilled to announce that during the calendar year 2018, our website had more than 4,000 downloads of material. Those are downloads—not simply visits. This is a healthy rate of downloads for a journal of our age and interest group.

   We are thankful for our readers, our contributors, and our editorial board. We are especially thankful for the support from the University of Kansas, most especially Marianne Reed and Pam LeRow, for their assistance in formatting and posting each issue.

2. The Russian State University for the Humanities and the Institute of World History at the Russian Academy of Sciences sponsored a conference in Moscow called "Turning Points in Ending the Cold War from Western and Eastern Perspectives, 1989-2019" on March 26-27, 2019. The pdf of the conference program is here.

See Cold War Program at: https://doi.org/10.17161/jras.v3i1.9796

3. Held on April 3, 2019 at the Kennan Institute in Washington, DC

Soviet and American Correspondence During the Cold War

This event is co-sponsored by the
Cold War International History Project.

Scholars have long assumed that there was little contact between Soviet and American civilians during the Truman-Stalin era, a time more associated with the dawn of the Cold War, McCarthyism in America, and the anti-western Zhdanovshchina in the Soviet Union. And yet, during this tumultuous time, American and Soviet women were in regular, intimate contact. Between 1944 and 1955, they exchanged over 500 letters, attempting to safeguard peace and advance mutual understanding by becoming pen-pals. Alexis Peri will present her research on how individual women confronted the complexities of ideology and policy through these letters, and how they negotiated personal, political, national, and international issues even as they became embroiled in Cold War politics.

Speaker
Alexis Peri, Assistant Professor, Boston University

Discussant
Christine Worobec, Professor Emerita, Northern Illinois University

4. The Wisconsin Historical Society in Madison is well-known for having a collection of personal papers related to folks who have Russian-American connections. An recent MA graduate from REECAS of the University of Wisconsin at Madison, Nicholas Seay, has been working with this material in a new way. The link below tells of what he has been doing.

https://creeca.wisc.edu/2019/03/the-wisconsin-russia-connection-more-than-just-cold-winters/

5. The 51st Annual Convention of the Association for Slavic, East European and Eurasian Studies (ASEEES) will meet in San Francisco in November 2019. There are several panels and roundtables that have been accepted to the program that are related to Russian-American studies. We have listed them here. The specific days and times have not been determined. See aseees.org for a program later in the summer.

A. "Cold War Citizen Diplomacy"

Discussant: Lyubov Ginzburg, Independent Scholar
Chair: Jennifer Hudson, U of Texas at Dallas
The Belief in Soviet-American Musical Encounters During the Cold War
Meri Herrala, U of Helsinki (Finland);
Official, Professional, and Personal: Finnish-Soviet Artistic Networks in Context
Simo Mikkonen, U of Jyväskylä (Finland);

Global Citizens Defy Star Wars: How Spacebridges Promoted Star Peace
Jennifer Hudson, U of Texas at Dallas;

B. "Revolution from Abroad and Internal Dissension: Émigré Anti-Communism and the Cold War"

Chair: Jennifer Hudson, U of Texas at Dallas
Discussant: Laurie Manchester, Arizona State U
Soviet Emigres and Old Russian Socialists during the Cold War: Hopes and Disappointments
Alexey Antoshin, Ural Federal U (Russia);
Judgment in Moscow? Returning Dissenters and the Struggle for Political Authority in Moscow and Kiev, 1987-1991.
Manfred Zeller, Bremen U;
Emigre Anti-Communism meets American Philanthropy: The Ford Foundation's East European Fund, 1950-1955
Benjamin Tromly, U of Puget Sound

C. "Religious dimension of Russian-American imagology: from the Tsarist Empire to Putin's Russia"

Chair: Lee Farrow, Auburn U at Montgomery
Discussant: William Whisenhunt, College of DuPage
How did religion frame American perception of the Late Tsarist Empire
Victoria Zhuravleva, Russian State U for the Humanities (Russia);
Religious aspect of the Soviet dissident movement in representations of the US media
Nadezhda Azhghikina, Lomonosov Moscow State U (Russia), PEN Moscow;
Mastering the American style: religious motives in the modern Russian political rhetoric
Aleksandr Okun, Samara U (Russia);

D. ""Believing in Peace and Freedom: Soviet Citizens and Foreign Friends during the Cold War""

Roundtable Member: Alexis Peri, Boston U
Roundtable Member: David Foglesong, Rutgers, The State U of New Jersey
Roundtable Member: Christine Varga-Harris, Illinois State U
Roundtable Member: Matthias Neumann, U of East Anglia (UK)
Chair: Choi Chatterjee, California State U, Los Angeles

E. "American Belief (or not) in the Bolshevik Revolution"

Chair: Norman Saul, U of Kansas
Roundtable Member: Lee Farrow, Auburn U at Montgomery
Roundtable Member: Matt Miller, U of Northwestern-St. Paul
Roundtable Member: Lyubov Ginzburg, Independent Scholar

Roundtable Member: William Whisenhunt, College of DuPage

F. "The New Cold War and the Magnitsky Act"

Chair: Choi Chatterjee, California State University, Los Angeles
Roundtable Member: Mitchell A. Orenstein, University of Pennsylvania
Roundtable Member: Barbara Brigitte Walker, University of Nevada, Reno
Roundtable Member: Denise J. Youngblood, University of Vermont
Roundtable Member: Victoria I. Zhuravleva, Russian State University for the Humanities

6. Special Issue of *Russkii sbornik* in honor of Bruce W. Menning

Bruce W. Menning (Adjunct Professor of History and Russian and East European Studies, University of Kansas) reports that in the Russian tradition the publisher Modest Kolerov has devoted *Russkii sbornik,* no. 26 (2018), to a commemoration of Menning's 75th birthday. Begun in 2004, *Russkii sbornik* can be categorized as an *almanakh*-style publication with a research focus on Russian history and a penchant for longer articles that often view the Russian past from an international perspective. The editorial board is fittingly international in composition, including Menning, and individual issues often bear a thematic character.

In Menning's view, no. 26 is less notable for its focus on him than for two other significant reasons. The first is *Russkii sbornik's* capacity to find common ground for scholarly exchange and cooperation during an especially troubled period in international relations. As eyewitness to the Cold War and as participant in several versions of academic exchanges between the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia, Menning was an early and enduring convert to the importance of persistent scholarly contact and dialog within the bilateral academic community. With Menning's same dedication to the shared academic cause and with his same devotion to the importance of Russian history, 27 scholars, balanced between 13 Russian and 14 international contributors, present the results of their research in a collection of essays organized around the unifying theme, "Russia and War." With a keen knowledge of international military historiography on Russia, member of the editorial board Oleg Airapetov bore primary responsibility for initiating the undertaking and recruiting its contributors.

This subject matter is the second factor worthy of remark. The burden of Menning's scholarship has related to two overarching themes in Russian and Soviet history: the causes and consequences of military change; and the relationship between society and the military. The thematic emphasis in *Russkii sbornik,* no. 26, corresponds exactly with these research interests. The very name *Russkii sbornik* resonates with ties to Tsarist, Soviet, and Russian military history. Although 27 scholars represent only a minor cross section of Russian national and global interest in all facets of the Russian military past, the nature of the assemblage, together with its focus and academic weight, is indicative of a disciplinary subset that is coming into its own. The irony is that—despite the volume's 13:14 Russian to non-Russian ratio—rising Russian interest now easily outstrips diminishing international interest. This shifting balance is something new, and perhaps it is the way things should be.