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On the cover: “Light in Darkest Russia” by Udo J. Keppler, 1903.

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Androgynous Coupling and the Engineering of Peace: A Cold-War Romance in Space

Andrew Jenks

In July 1975, the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project presented a unique opportunity and challenge for a group of space engineers. By designing a docking system for Soviet and American capsules, the engineers were well aware that their task went beyond the normal technical challenge of aerospace design and involved integrating political goals into their technological blueprints. In effect, their mission was to create a technological fix in the form of a docking mechanism that would link the superpower space systems (the Apollo and Soyuz capsules), and in so doing reduce superpower tensions and perhaps even avert Mutual Assured Destruction. This article examines the technopolitics of the Apollo-Soyuz mission and whether or not the docking design actually worked, both in the narrower technical sense (as a functional space-docking system) and for Détente's broader goal of making superpower relations more peaceful and mutually-beneficial.

The term "technological fix" was coined in the 1960s by the Director of Oakridge National Laboratories, Alvin Weinberg. The basic idea was hardly new. Modern faith in technology had produced a mania for technological fixes, a belief that, "solutions founded on technological innovation may be innately superior for addressing issues traditionally defined as social, political, or cultural."¹ The main attraction of the technological fix is that it promises to bypass the cultural and political challenges of changing behaviors and attitudes by shifting the problem to the supposedly objective realm of technical problem solving, and to the experts and engineers who supposedly have only technical rather than partisan goals. For example, advocates of nuclear power in the 1960s, like solar or wind power today, presented it as a solution to the economic and political dilemmas of fossil-fuel dependence. If it worked as planned, politicians would avoid the hard work of changing deeply entrenched behaviors of energy consumption, providing a cheap way to produce and consume power that would also protect the environment. It was a case of having your cake (energy independence and a cheap power source) and eating it too (blissfully tapping into the electric grid without destroying the environment).

ASTP was a technological fix designed to make superpower relations less

1. Sean Johnston, "Alvin Weinberg and the Promotion of the Technological Fix," *Technology and Culture* 59, no. 3 (2018): 621.



Figure 1: The Painting of the Apollo-Soyuz Docking Commissioned by NASA. All photos and illustrations in this article are from NASA and are in the public domain

dangerous and more secure, and it had the added benefit of advancing the cause of space exploration, thus killing two birds with one stone or, in the spirit of joining two different ways of looking at a similar problem, killing two rabbits all at once (as the Russians say). Up to that point, with the US mired in Vietnam and Soviet troops blasting away hopes of reforming communism in Czechoslovakia, little else seemed to be working to mitigate the literally explosive potential of superpower relations. Discussions among politicians and managers in the first Nixon presidency had resulted in various memoranda of agreement for collaboration with Brezhnev, which prepared the handoff (or perhaps a Hail Mary, to continue the American football analogy) of the political challenge of détente into the open arms of aerospace engineers.² The technical problem of collaboration was hashed out among Soviet and American engineers in 1970 discussions, who now occupied ground zero in the techno-politics of détente.

Negotiations focused first on a linkup between the Soviets and the nascent Skylab project at NASA (which would be launched in 1973 and 1974). But due to the existing designs of docking systems for both sides, the Soviets quickly rejected this idea as requiring joint construction of not just the docking mechanisms but of all other aspects of launch and capsule systems to permit the docking. This was because existing docking systems, as conceived by Soviet and American engineers, involved one spaceship (the male) penetrating the other (the female),

2. For more details on the political history of ASTP and space collaboration in general, see my book *Collaboration in Space and the Search for Peace on Earth* (London: Anthem Press, 2021).

and neither side had the will, time, or money to figure out who was going to penetrate and who was going to be penetrated, much less how to redesign existing systems to accommodate the penetrating/penetration (they were all men). As is often the case in technological fixes, the fix itself creates a whole new set of problems that make the “fix” seem more like a new problem in need of additional fixing. Such a redesign, from the Soviet point of view, would have meant supplying sensitive information about the design of their systems that might not be reciprocated by the American side. Moreover, the Soviet task seemed primarily to provide support services for the star attraction, that is, the new technology of the American Skylab. Besides, Brezhnev and Nixon both wanted a quick fix as well as a technological one, and linking up with Skylab was neither quick nor technologically simple. While the discussions were at first tense and marked by mutual suspicion, the more engineers and managers from both sides talked, the more relaxed the atmosphere became. As with the political principals and managers, the Soviet engineers appreciated the informality and openness of the American partners, as well as their hard-working, hard-partying spirit, and this facilitated an atmosphere of trust that encouraged the search for a design principle that would maintain parity and mutual respect.³

Still, the technical challenges were daunting, and bound to be made even more daunting because of the political demand for parity. “To realize a docking by means of identical mechanisms...was impossible,” noted the Soviet flight director Eliseev, because that meant designing and building everything from scratch. The only solution was to find a universal docking mechanism that would connect peripherally to the two existing systems (Apollo and Soyuz), and thus allow both sides to meet each other in space on their own terms and in their own space systems. It would take more than two years from 1970 to work out the design for the mechanism, during which the quest for parity would be challenged by the different nature of both systems. For example, the US used pure oxygen in space, while the Soviets used a mixture that was closer to air on Earth as a blend of oxygen and nitrogen. This meant that the different internal environments would mix during docking, depending on which crew was the visitor and which the host. The visitors would therefore have to enter the docking module and adapt to the air of the host. So if a neutral space between the two could be created – a kind of Switzerland in space -- it could provide for the transfer of one crew to the other system as the transferring crew adopted to the breathing system of the other. As the mission continued, each system would take turns adapting to the needs of the other, practicing survival in a foreign but friendly environment.⁴ The engineering challenge thus dovetailed with the socio-political challenge of providing an interface between two fundamentally different systems without one system dominating the other and imposing its will on the other, and the end result was that everyone survived. The outcome of not only the mission but also of

3. A. S. Eliseev, *Kaplia v more* (Moscow: Aviatsiia i kosmonavtika, 1998), 100-102.

4. A. S. Eliseev, *Kaplia v more* (Moscow: Aviatsiia i kosmonavtika, 1998), 103; on the engineering idea for this system for equalizing air systems, see the report from October 1973: ARAN, F. 1678, op. 1, ll. 67-68.

détente would hinge on the ability to maintain the appearance, if not reality, of technical parity, thereby placing engineering into the forefront of finding a way back from the brink of nuclear holocaust that engineers, of course, had also helped to design.

The Buddha of Docking

Vladimir Syromiatnikov, the lead docking engineering for the Soviet side, enthusiastically embraced the challenge of finding a politically and technically functional docking design. He is a remarkable and underappreciated figure in space history who garnered all the Soviet, Russian and international accolades that an aerospace engineer could receive: the Lenin Prize in 1975, the NASA Distinguished Public Service Medal, the prize in his name with the International Association for the Advancement of Safety, and many others. He taught himself English and then French, which he quickly mastered through collaborations with both NASA and the French space program.⁵ Until his death in 2006 from leukemia he continued to teach new generations of engineers in a number of institutes. He was an early and enthusiastic advocate of computer systems and technology, which made perfect sense, since the utopian ideas often associated with the early days of computer connectivity dovetailed with his notions about the deep importance, symbolically and physically, of the very act of docking, whether on Earth or in space. His mission was therefore far broader than ASTP and involved nothing less than creating a “school of docking,” as the famous Soviet space engineer Boris Chertok noted, with disciples who would carry on his socio-technical vision of a global space network that would link “the space systems of Russia, America and Europe” and, in so doing, provide bridges across cultures, languages, and ideologies.⁶

Born in 1933 in Archangel, Syromiatnikov was one year older than Yuri Gagarin. Like the first cohort of cosmonauts, he was a child of the horrors of WWII, experiencing the humiliation, suffering, and extreme privations of the Nazi invasion. The younger Syromiatnikov went to primary school in the Moscow Oblast’ city of Kaliningrad (now named after the rocket engineer and his future patron Korolev), which was a center for military industrial production, and in the late 1940s emerged as the hub of strategic rocket and space programs. The experiences of the war, combined with the romance of space exploration, drew him to aerospace engineering in the late Stalin years. After finishing school – where he excelled in both his studies as well as sports and chess -- he studied engineering at the famous Bauman Higher Technical Institute, and then in 1956 joined OKB-1 NII-88 – the center for the space and missile industry run by the

5. When working with American counterparts he refused the services of translators and insisted on speaking English, and he would double-check and correct all official NASA translations of his conversations into English, which often held up the official acceptance of meeting minutes. Interview with Caldwell Johnson, 12 May 1998, League City Texas, NASA Johnson Space Center Oral History Project, 54-55. https://historycollection.jsc.nasa.gov/JSCHistoryPortal/history/oral_histories/JohnsonCC/johnsoncc.htm

6. Vladimir Syromiatnikov, *100 Rasskazov o stykovke i o drugikh prikliucheniakh v kosmose i na zemle, Chast’ 1* (Moscow: Izd. “Logos”, 2003), 6.

father of Soviet rocketry, or Chief Engineer as he was known publicly until his death in 1966, Sergei Korolev. The young engineer worked in the strategically vital area of developing missile guidance systems and the development and deployment of payloads – satellites, dogs and people -- into orbit.⁷

Syromiatnikov's early inspiration in the Soviet military industrial complex, according to Chertok, was to achieve the strategic parity with the US and thus prevent a repeat of the horrors of invasion and mass death at the hands of the Nazis.⁸ It was common for those who came of age and studied in the immediate post-war period to devote themselves to technical fields – rocketry, telemetry, radar, nuclear technology, telecommunications, and computers. This was their way of capturing some of the glory of their elders who fought against Nazis. Too young to fight on the front lines of the war, and thus to enjoy the prestige and honor that came from active military service during the war, Syromiatnikov's generation compensated by developing strategically important technologies to fight the next battle in what soon would be called the Cold War.

With the dropping of the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the fresh memories of the horrors of war, Syromiatnikov's generation needed little motivation to excel in their studies, which they ultimately hoped would contribute to making the Soviet Union the economic, military, and technological equal of the United States. A testament to his talents and personality, Syromiatnikov began working almost immediately after Sputnik as a senior engineer in charge of producing durable objects for use in the vacuum of space. He was enthusiastic, curious, and optimistic, continuing his studies as a graduate student in the mechanical engineering department at Moscow State University in 1962, where he also worked with other professors and students to design and construct objects for the various missions of the Soviet space program. The dramatic successes of Sputnik and then of Gagarin's flight were both a confirmation of the success of the collective efforts of thousands of engineers and a promise of even greater things to come. In 1968 he defended his doctoral dissertation on the gauges that he had designed for long duration in space. Like many of his colleagues, he retained close links between theoretical and academic work and translating those ideas into reality; he thus forged close ties to the academic world until the end of his life, working in the classroom as an engineering and computer science professor (Professor of Technical Cybernetics at Moscow State University), in addition to a manager and designer in the Soviet and Russian space programs. In 1979 he became a Doctor of Technical Sciences and in 1989 achieved the highest academic title in the Soviet Union of "Professor."⁹

He was well liked, curious, good-natured, hard-working, creative and

7. "Vladimir Sergeevich Syromiatnikov: biofrafia i deiatel'nost'," http://yubik.net.ru/publ/59-1-0-10329?fbclid=IwAR1g55eDTnQMgx0KhA-Lmf_TWxqZPAJ_DvXaG1RJvEvOURMHZbTv1_pVNls

8. Syromiatnikov, *100 rasskazov Chast' 1*, 6.

9. "Vladimir Sergeevich Syromiatnikov: biografia i deiatel'nost'," http://yubik.net.ru/publ/59-1-0-10329?fbclid=IwAR1g55eDTnQMgx0KhA-Lmf_TWxqZPAJ_DvXaG1RJvEvOURMHZbTv1_pVNls

constantly aware of the connections between the technological and human worlds. He often carried a notepad in which he could sketch out design ideas where ever they might appear in his mind's eye. His American colleagues affectionately called him "Big Cheese" ("Syr" in Russian means cheese).¹⁰ Many have an enduring image of him riding the public trolley, intensely devouring some book – either technical or literary. He attempted to bridge what C.P. Snow in the West called the "Two Cultures" of humanities and sciences and what Soviets referred to as the divide between the lyricists and the engineers. As such, he hardly fit the profile of the narrowly educated Soviet engineer unable to see the broader connections between technology and society.¹¹ His favorite artist was the poet, actor, and singer Vladimir Vysotsky, whose lyrics and songs he knew by heart (he honored the legendary singer, actor and songwriter at his gravestone in 1980, along with the cosmonaut Georgii Grechko). He developed a long list of colleagues and friends in the secret and open worlds of Soviet engineering and academia, and then internationally (becoming the first Russian citizen in 1995 to become an acting member of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics as well as the International Academy of Astronautics). A personal talent for connecting with people was reflected in his professional engineering interest in designing mechanisms to link objects in space. Those objects, in turn, would join different cultures and political systems into heterogenous networks that would unite people to other humans, to different political systems and to the technological devices and artifacts that modern industrial civilization had produced. To use the term of the French philosopher and historian of technology Bruno Latour, the new society that he enabled through docking would be "technology made durable": an amalgam of human and non-human actors crossing the Cold War divide between the US and USSR.¹² Syromiatnikov later imagined himself as a Soviet Hermes, the divine trickster of ancient Greek mythology who was a protector of roads and travelers who could move freely between the divine and human worlds and transgress boundaries and barriers, just like the androgynous docking mechanisms he designed.¹³

Engineering for Safety

For Syromiatnikov, docking, whether at sea or in space, is always a moment

10. Patricia Sullivan, "Vladimir Syromiatnikov; Designed Docking System for Space Capsules," *Washington Post*, 1 October 2006, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/30/AR2006093001038.html>.

11. For the argument that the Soviet system produced narrowly educated engineers: Loren Graham, *The Ghost of the Executed Engineer: Technology and the Fall of the Soviet Union* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993).

12. Bruno Latour, "Technology Is Society Made Durable," *The Sociological Review* 38, no. 1 (May 1990): 103–31. Latour developed the concept of Actor Network Theory: Michel Callon, "Society in the making: the study of technology as a tool for sociological analysis", in Bijker, Wiebe E.; Hughes, Thomas P.; Pinch, Trevor, eds., *The social construction of technological systems: new directions in the sociology and history of technology* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1987), 83–103.

13. V. S. Syromiatnikov, *100 rasskazov o stykovke i o drugikh prikliucheniakh v kosmose i na zemle, Chast' 1, 20 let spustia* (Moscow: Logos, 2010), 212.

of heightened importance. As a technical accomplishment it requires a carefully planned, precise and choreographed maneuvering of immense objects. Getting it wrong can have disastrous and deadly consequences, but especially in space, with capsules the size of Mack Trucks moving at 25,000 miles per hour. In some ways the act of docking was similar to a mating ritual and act, and it certainly has invited such imagery. But the parallel breaks down if one considers the careful planning required for a successful docking. It lacks spontaneity and is realized through human steering and guidance systems far removed from the points of contact. Syromiatnikov also enjoyed docking as a test of his ability to calculate the trajectory of objects traveling thousands of miles an hour through various atmospheric layers and into the vacuum of space, and under the complex gravitational pulls of multiple celestial objects. Once completed, the act of docking connected humans across physical spaces, allowing for the exchange of much-needed supplies and human company. With the completion of the technical phases of docking that linked one physical system with another, docking then became cultural, linguistic, political, and social, as people from far away, and often living in isolation for long periods of time, suddenly were able to step across the threshold of their ship and into a different world.

For Syromiatnikov, the creative challenge of uniting two very different space systems, designed and built in completely different social and political contexts, was an almost religious experience of experiencing universal connectedness. The feeling was similar to the “overview effect” experienced by cosmonauts and astronauts viewing the earth from space. Making these connections physically possible transformed the docking engineer and planner into a potentially powerful agent of change. No wonder Syromiatnikov thought of himself as a modern-day Hermes. At one point he described his role as a theater director. “Cosmonautics became a specific art under the dome of the universe with millions of people as its audience.” He frequently referred to his docking technologies, and the new kinds of worlds their connections created, as instruments of “destiny.”¹⁴ He noted that individual space ships, like human beings, had limited utility; they had to be connected with each other to engage in meaningful work, a task he and his Soviet associates began to pursue with the success of the first Vostok missions.¹⁵ The moment of docking was pregnant with transformative possibility, marked by intense emotions, feelings of danger, hope, and the anticipation of new things to come. It made perfect sense, therefore, that political leaders in the original Nixon-Kosygin accords immediately identified docking as the logical starting point for the policy of détente. “Docking, by definition” as Syromiatnikov was fond of saying, “is already a form of cooperation.”¹⁶ In one of his many philosophical moments, Syromiatnikov connected his engineering to his grander vision of a new kind of world:

14. Vladimir Syromiatnikov, *100 Stories About Docking and Other Adventures in Space and On Earth* (Moscow: Universitetskaia kniga, 2005), 14, 18.

15. Syromiatnikov, *100 Stories*, 134-35.

16. Syromiatnikov, *100 Stories*, 13, 391.

It was just as the first space-rocket scientist K. Tsiolkovskii imagined: the more we penetrate the universe, the more mysterious and inexplicable the world becomes, governed by some unclear first organizing principle. Tsiolkovskii operated with terrestrial and heavenly categories, trying to connect them with the help of his multi-stage rockets. He deified humanity, its origin and intellect. He believed in humanity, in the ability of people to colonize the universe, starting with its own cradle – Earth. In order to continue this journey it was necessary to divorce ourselves of short-term motives and profit, to move away from politics, to transcend the borders that divide people on earth. Perhaps then Hermes would again move closer to people and fulfill his mission: to be a protector of shepherds and travelers, rocket engineers and cosmonauts, and also trade and profit. He will facilitate mutually advantageous international cooperation, to put it into stilted language.¹⁷

While docking had great potential cultural and political significance, it also reflected an aspect of engineering that had been conspicuously ignored in the early years of the space race and Cold War, that is, safety. The Cold War in the late 1940s had greatly increased the tolerance for risk-taking in politics and technology, dramatically raising the stakes of victory or defeat as both sides began to develop large arsenals of weapons of mass destruction. As scholars have noted, ideas about risks and safety were couched in the language of scientific objectivity but were themselves socially constructed, often in accordance with the desires of powerful economic and political interests.¹⁸ A high tolerance for risk taking and dangerous technology had produced the doctrine of mutual assured destruction and transformed strategic superpower parity into a game of chicken with weapons of mass destruction aimed at each other. The appetite for risk-taking, however, was not limitless and together with high-profile disasters and technological failures it could produce new regimes focused on risk-reduction and safety, as reflected in the new move toward arms control and limiting the testing of nuclear weapons after the Cuban Missile Crisis. An increasing awareness of the negative consequences of excessive risk, including the possibility of destroying the earth, the damage to the environment highlighted by Rachel Carson, the use of Agent Orange in Vietnam, the accidents that led to deaths in the both the US and Soviet space programs – all these things and more helped to generate a new focus on safety in the 1960s and 1970s.

ASTP emerged from an emerging global culture of safety in the 1960s. It marked a transition from a politics based on risk-taking to a politics focused on global and individual security. The “test” of the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project, for

17. V. S. Syromiatnikov, *100 rasskazov o stykovke i o drugikh prikliucheniakh v kosmose i na zemle, Chast' I, 20 let spustia* (Moscow: Logos, 2010), 216.

18. On the social construction of risk: Scott Sagan, *The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents and Nuclear Weapons* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993); Diane Vaughn, *The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture and Deviance at NASA* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1996)

example, was to save lives in space in the event of a catastrophic failure of a manned ship or station in orbit (and speaking more broadly, the saving of lives by preventing nuclear war between the US and USSR). Syromiatnikov claimed that his American colleagues, in part, had been inspired by the 1969 Hollywood movie, “Marooned,” featuring a blockbuster cast of Gene Hackman, Gregory Peck, and James Franciscus. It hit theaters as both sides were launching into negotiations in 1970 for the docking project that was to anchor detente.¹⁹ In the film a Soviet spacecraft comes to the rescue of a disabled American spacecraft in orbit. One astronaut has already died and the other two were drifting into unconsciousness. But the Soviet spacecraft was too small to accommodate the two astronauts and lacked oxygen for them. Fatally, it also lacked compatible mechanisms for docking with the American spacecraft. An American rescue vehicle finally arrived and the Soviet cosmonaut helped to rescue the two surviving astronauts. The movie highlighted the central problem of crewed space flight, namely, the extreme risk associated with having no backup safety and rescue system. Flipping the script of the movie and preventing death in space would require a universal docking mechanism that spaceships of any design could use to facilitate rescue.²⁰

ASTP was thus an important test case in the creation of both technical and political regimes of safety during the Cold War. In the interests of safety, both sides had to learn to adapt to the system of command and control of the other. The Soviet flight director noted that neither side had the right to take measures that would put the other side’s crew at risk. This guiding principle was central to the larger policies of détente, which were based on the notion that the actions taken by one side could put all lives at risk, and creating ever-more elaborate regimes of mutual dependence would in turn heighten a mutual appreciation of safety and security.²¹

Syromiatnikov was thus a new breed of engineer valued for his ability to make the Cold War, and space travel more generally, safer for its participants. He had the added advantage, unlike his American colleagues, of witnessing the horrors and insecurities of WWII, which had inspired the risky quest for parity in nuclear weaponry and rocketry, but paradoxically had also made the world a much more dangerous place in the process. From his privileged vantage point deep within the Soviet military-industrial complex, he had turned space engineering from a weapon of war and into an instrument of peace activism. Of course, the very act of docking was itself a risky procedure. “Docking is never a routine event!” he once wrote.²² But just as defense intellectuals could imagine that weapons of mass destruction could be “peacekeepers” and prevent war, the risks associated with docking could pay dividends – if the docking worked – by improving the chances that the superpowers could survive the disastrous consequences of their

19. Syromiatnikov, *100 Stories*, 378-79.

20. V. S. Syromiatnikov, *100 rasskazov o stykovke i o drugikh prikliucheniakh v kosmose i na zemle, Chast' 1, 20 let spustia* (Moscow: Logos, 2010), 220.

21. A. S. Eliseev, *Kaplia v more* (Moscow: Aviatsiia i kosmonavtika, 1998), 104-105.

22. Syromiatnikov, *100 Stories*, 375.

own ideological and military divisions.

Moscow to Houston: We Have a Docking Problem

Even before ASTP, both sides were separately working on a docking system that the Apollo-Soyuz test project would dub the “APAS” (*Androgynno-periferiyni agregat stykovki*, or androgynous peripheral assembly system for the American side). Its roots go back to the mid-1960s, when the Soviet engineers, led by Korolev and Syromiatnikov, were attempting to develop a new docking mechanism between different Soviet capsules in the 1960s. Prior to ASTP, the Soviets were using a “mama and papa” docking system (the colloquial reference among Soviet engineers for the “shtyr’-konus) that was obviously gendered and involved a passive and active partner. The Americans had used a similar design referred to more formally by NASA engineers (also all male) as “male-female.” These types of docking systems required the penetration of one capsule by the other, which would cause one side (given the male-dominated and macho engineering cultures on both sides) “to feel their position of humiliation,” in addition to the added burden of having to design both capsules to accommodate penetration.²³

The design idea for the mama-papa system, said Syromiatnikov, came from “the age-old principle of mating on Earth mastered by Mother Nature... two free-flying spacecraft, similar to buses in size and mass, would get coupled and then structurally engaged, and then would fly in this mode until separation.” Similar to their counterparts in the world of defense intellectuals in the US, the Soviet engineers often imagined their work in sexual terms.²⁴ Mating thus became a convenient shorthand for complex engineering couplings. Through the mid-1960s docking simulations were popular events among space managers, engineers, and politicians in the OKB-1 NII-88 facility, a kind of mechanical peep show. “Docking became a popular performance, something like an erotic show of a space character,” remembered Syromiatnikov. “Hold the stallion,” said one engineer, positioning the probe at the entrance of the cone.²⁵

Nonetheless, the Chief Engineer Korolev was frustrated by the limitations of the mama-papa docking systems. The Soviets in the early 1960s were moving from merely launching capsules into space to actually joining them together, like lego pieces, for projects involving longer term habitation and space colonization. He pushed Syromiatnikov to design a new kind of docking system, fundamentally different from the mama-papa system, that would create a pressurized tunnel between the two docked spaceships and not require the re-engineering of both

23. Natalya Serkova, *World Wide Gold*, e-flux, no. 93, 2018, <https://www.e-flux.com/journal/93/213267/world-wide-gold/>; Viktor Khokhlov, “Kuda khodiat mechtly: razmyshleniia v godovshchinu kosmicheskogo iubileia,” *Gefter*, March 23, 2015, <http://gefeter.ru/archive/14617>.

24. For the sexual images and language of strategic defense in the Pentagon: Caron Cohn, “Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals,” *Signs*, Vol. 12, No. 4 (1987): 687-71

25. Syromiatnikov, *100 Stories*, 164, 168-9, 177.

ships to accommodate the “mama-papa” penetration (one as the penetrator and the other as the receiver). Syromiatnikov had continued to work on that system even after Korolev died in 1966 and Gagarin’s death in 1968. “The docking system we designed and developed in 1968-70 had androgynous docking rings with a set of structural latches,” wrote Syromiatnikov, though they had not yet coined the term “androgynous” to describe that system. Those latches were designed to attach to both docking ships and produce a pressurized transfer tunnel once the capsules had connected to each other externally.²⁶

While both sides appeared to have been in various stages of producing docking systems based on the androgynous concept, the first meetings in 1970 between American and Soviet engineers on October 24 and 26 in Moscow -- referred to later as “Great October Revolution in the relationship between cosmonautics and astronautics” -- initially contemplated using the more conventional docking systems. The Americans thus first proposed “an Apollo-type receiving cone to be installed into the Soviet transfer tunnel,” which the American engineer Caldwell Johnson illustrated with slides of a Gemini capsule docking in which “the active part is placed on the nosecone... This is the classic conception of the male and female part.” The proposal, however, was a non-starter as the Soviets had no intention of being the passive partner. Said Syromiatnikov: “Our goal was to have a full-fledged and equal partnership on a joint project with such activities as engineering and design, followed by the development and testing of the new concept with actual docking in space, namely – APAS.”²⁷ Truth be told, the Americans were also dissatisfied with the design, and like the Soviets they had also been contemplating a new docking system. Caldwell Johnson, Syromiatnikov’s NASA counterpart, explained that their male-female system meant that the docking mechanism “occupies the very passageway that you want to open... and it should not be that way, because all kinds of things can go wrong. If you can’t get it out of there properly, then it’s no use to even have docked it... it’s like having everything in the doorway. Even after you connect, you can’t open the doors because you’ve got all this stuff in the way.” The Americans therefore came into the negotiations prepared to consider a new design approach after their male-female proposal clearly fell flat with the Soviet engineers.²⁸

Johnson then sketched out the desired attributes of a future system, which just so happened to reflect the new docking system that Syromiatnikov had already been designing for link ups between Soyuz and Salyut capsules in the Soviet space fleet for the past two years. “First,” said Johnson at the meeting, “the mechanism should be androgynous, that is, it could be grabbed onto from either side and would not have a male and female part.” During the docking either side could play the role

26. Syromiatnikov, *100 Stories*, 339-40, 379, 395.

27. Syromiatnikov, *100 Stories*, 339-40, 379, 395. Caldwell Johnson’s presentation in Moscow is contained in: Caldwell Johnson Presentation, Moscow, October 26, 1970, ARAN, f. 1678, o. 1, d. 108shch, ll. 43-53.

28. Interview with Caldwell Johnson, 1 April 1998, League City Texas, NASA Johnson Space Center Oral History Project, 22-23. https://historycollection.jsc.nasa.gov/JSCHistoryPortal/history/oral_histories/JohnsonCC/johnsoncc.htm

of active or passive partner, meaning that one would agree to be active and initiate docking maneuvers, and the other would agree to be passive and stay still, so that both sides could then grab each other; and either side could likewise be the active or passive partner in disengaging.²⁹ Years later Johnson recalled: “We had lucked out and had prepared ourselves for the very thing that they wanted to talk about when they got to it.” If the Soviets immediately understood the design principle that Johnson was proposing, precisely because they had already been working on it and would propose the same concept at the October meeting right after Johnson, they were a bit perplexed by the word “androgynous,” which appears misspelled in the Russian translation of the meeting transcription in the Academy of Sciences archive as “endogennyi” instead of “androgynnyi.”³⁰ The Soviet translator apparently did not understand the meaning of the word “androgynous” that Johnson had used. Syromiatnikov admitted as much, noting that Johnson right after the meeting “enlightened” him on the subject. As Johnson explained it in 1998, the idea of an “androgynous” mechanism had been bantered about in NASA conversations even before the meeting with Syromiatnikov. “...we used the term ‘androgynous,’ that is, no sex, no male, no female type of thing, which, see, the old probe and drogue was. So you couldn’t have two male spacecraft or two female spacecraft docked. So we wanted something that was neuter, either one. And so we devised this thing – it’s a hole with things around it that would get together this way instead of something going this way. We worked that thing.” The American side, like the Soviet side, was “stunned” by the convergence of design, politics, and engineering, and Johnson recalled they “had no idea this thing would move so fast...And I almost dropped my teeth, you know.”³¹

The simple idea, then, of an androgynous docking system was that two distinct systems could be docked without one having to be penetrated by the other. The “APAS” would have grabbing mechanisms attached to both objects to be docked, with a passageway created between them when they interlocked. The engineering and design of either object would not depend on the engineering and design of the object to which it would attach. Depending on the circumstance, one side could be the active partner (initiating the grabbing) and the other the passive partner in the docking (waiting for the embrace), but the roles could also be reversed. It was a hug in space. The design itself was both a clever solution to avoiding

29. Caldwell Johnson Presentation, Moscow, October 26, 1970, ARAN, f. 1678, o. 1, d. 108shch, ll. 43-53.

30. Interview with Caldwell Johnson, 1 April 1998, League City Texas, NASA Johnson Space Center Oral History Project, 24 https://historycollection.jsc.nasa.gov/JSCHistoryPortal/history/oral_histories/JohnsonCC/johnsoncc.htm; October 26 Caldwell Johnson Presentation, Moscow, October 26, 1970, ARAN, f. 1678, o. 1, d. 108shch, ll. 43-53. Syromiatnikov’s presentation that followed Johnson proposed the same concept as Johnson, though he did not yet call it “androgynous.” ARAN, F. 1678, o. 1, d. 108shch, ll. 54-62.

31. Interview with Caldwell Johnson, 1 April 1998, League City Texas, NASA Johnson Space Center Oral History Project, 24-25; 27 April 1999, 58. https://historycollection.jsc.nasa.gov/JSCHistoryPortal/history/oral_histories/JohnsonCC/johnsoncc.htm

re-engineering the capsules of both sides so that they could dock, and an attempt to disarm the idea of sexual domination in the Cold War implied by previous “mama-papa” docking designs. In this way the basic docking system design for ASTP had been agreed upon, along with a description that distinguished it from the previous generation of “mama-papa” docking technologies both sides had used. By mid-1971 the mechanism was officially dubbed “androgynous,” derived from the “androgynē” of Greek mythology. It was both functionally superior to the mama-papa design and also met the political demands of détente – a seamless blend, seemingly, of technology and politics.³² Syromiatnikov would spend the next four years working with his American colleagues to develop the new system and translate it into a physical reality that ultimately became a universal interface and docking mechanism for space linkups all the way to the present day.




Figure 2: Thomas Stafford, Vladimir Syromiatnikov (in the center), and Aleksei Eliseev pose for a mockup of the androgynous docking mechanism

Syromiatnikov did admit that the “mating of identical parts, such as fire hose flanges or railway couplers,” was not entirely novel. The design itself was a simple solution to a complex problem, like so many successful designs for functional objects and mechanisms. What made the approach unique was to apply it to the immensely more complex task of docking superpower rivals in space. “We were to connect two identical docking rings with a complex configuration, comprised of many different elements.”³³ Syromiatnikov himself became obsessed with the idea of androgynēity, having just learned it from his American colleague in the October 1970 meeting. He named his dog “Apasik” and after the Soviet

Union collapsed produced a line of vodka called Apasnaya, a play on the Russian word for dangerous “opasnaia,” and trademarked the term “Androgynovka” for his vodka line. He incorporated androgynēity into his daily conversation after the “October Revolution” meeting, regaling two poor American women at a Houston party after a day of working on APAS “about androgynous creatures and structures that, according to the myths of ancient Greece, were miracle workers.”³⁴ In his memoirs he described his thoughts after the October 1970 meeting:

32. Syromiatnikov, *100 Stories*, 418.

33. Vladimir Syromiatnikov, *100 Stories About Docking and Other Adventures in Space and On Earth* (Moscow: Universitetskaia kniga, 2005), 340.

34. Syromiatnikov, *100 Stories*, 400, 475.

...the first meeting gave a strong impetus to new androgynous ideas... One way or another, my thoughts were preoccupied with androgynous configurations. Why had the androgynous configuration become so attractive?...Why had these ideas obsessed designers and pushed them to create a fully androgynous apparatus? Why, after the ASTP, were we still attached to these ideas, did we maintain our belief in them and even advance them to a new level? All these are good questions, as the Americans like to say. Surely, along with the subjective fancy attraction, there were good reasons for such persistence, especially since it wasn't that easy to realize the androgynous concept in practice. APAS turned out to be a hard nut to crack for us, its 'parents.' Indeed, there had to be good reasons, or again, as the Americans like to say, one had to feel strongly enough to take this kind of a long and difficult road. Even more so, since in both countries well-developed docking mechanisms had already been built and tested in space by that time. Later [Caldwell] Johnson used to joke, suggesting absolutely different reasons for the unwillingness of engineers to use probe-and-cone, or male-female, configurations: none of the countries wanted to play a female role in space before the eyes of the world. Who knows, maybe there was something to this. Later continuing with the joke, we started saying that with androgens, both partners are on top.³⁵

These were ways of looking at engineering and its broader meaning that perhaps only a patriarchal culture could produce. (On the Soviet side all the engineers except one were male, which was true also of the American side.)³⁶ Vertical orientations during the Cold War were important in expressing dominance, and the aerospace age had produced many new ways to display domination over others from above: through spying cameras, rockets, satellites, lunar rovers, and flags on the moon. The goal of getting higher than the other side had fueled the space race and the quest for lunar bragging rights. The US seemed to win that battle for vertical superiority with the Apollo moon landings, but the Soviets countered with the successful Soviet moon missions beginning in September 1970. It was no accident that the Soviets felt prepared to work out a joint design for a docking project in October 1970, right after the Luna mission, since they now felt they had achieved the same vertical position over the Earth as the Americans. The successes of the Soviet Luna program, said an American space journalist in October 1970, "made it easier for the Russians to consider cooperation with the U.S."³⁷ The Soviets were also aware that their successes came just as the US was scaling back its ambitions in space, even as the US faced the humiliations of Vietnam and the energy crisis.³⁸ Meanwhile, the Soviets countered with the

35. Syromiatnikov, *100 Stories*, 395.

36. Syromiatnikov, *100 Stories*, 421-22.

37. "Space Cooperation?," *Christian Science Monitor*, 23 October 1970, p. 1.

38. Intercosmos report assessing scaled-back US ambitions in space and across the globe: ARAN, f. 1678, op. 1, d. 287, ll. 77-78.

Lunokhod 2 rover that landed on the Moon in January 1973, along with a Lenin bas-relief and Soviet coat of arms.

If the Cold War was fueled by the quest for vertical supremacy, having both sides join horizontally at the same altitude above Earth could just possibly end it, or so the engineers and politicians hoped. In the case of the ASTP, the two sides thus approached each other from the same altitude, replicating the meeting on the Elbe in World War II between Soviet and American allies and thereby establishing parity and reducing the focus on submission and domination. The horizontal coupling also marked the chronological dividing line between the earlier space race and the new era of space cooperation. This point was to be made explicitly in the 1973 Paris Air Show with a mock-up of the androgynous coupling. The plan for the joint exhibit – held outside of the country exhibits of the US and USSR in a spot exactly equidistant between the American and Soviet pavilions – was explicit that two capsules would be “situated horizontally in a docked position.”³⁹ APAS was thus a way to engineer parity and to reduce the quest for domination in the US/USSR relationship – although with one important caveat that threatened to reignite Cold War competitive instincts.

Since the Soviets would often claim that the original idea for APAS was theirs, the American endorsement of the Soviet design suggested to some that the Soviet Union had imposed its will on the American side. Johnson, Syromiatnikov’s American docking colleague, supported the Soviet claim of priority for the design even though he was aware that he would be criticized for “caving in” to the Soviets back in Houston, and that the American side had been contemplating something similar. He justified the decision as purely technical but understood the political subtext. “Even many years later,” noted Syromiatnikov about Johnson, “he often referred to this decision and tried to explain the reasons for making it.” It didn’t help that Syromiatnikov began comparing himself – he was left-handed -- to the Russian “Levsha” (which means lefty and someone adept at the most finely skilled craftsmanship). The Levsha was a mythical figure in the time of Tsar Nicholas I who could make a horseshoe for a flea and in doing so proved that Russian engineers were superior to their European counterparts. He said he used the term to make a boring story more interesting, and that he did not mean to imply that he was superior to his foreign colleague and good friend, though he admitted he had, “added a witty design decision to optimize the future mechanism that eventually ensured the real international interface.” Syromiatnikov also remembered that when his Soviet team came to Houston in the fall of 1973 to work on APAS, hordes of contractors and NASA engineers came visiting to view his docking design, “as if it was a Russian miracle.” It was an echo of the docking simulations/shows back at OKB-1 NII-88 in the 1960s. Later, at a press conference after the docking on July 17, 1975, Boris Petrov, head of the Soviet Intercosmos, responded to a Western reporter’s question about who invented the design. He answered that the design was primarily Soviet and mostly the idea of Syromiatnikov, who would be available at the next press conference to take

39. ARAN, f. 1678, op. 1, d. 294, ll. 25, 112

provide more details. When that conference occurred the next day, Syromiatnikov attempted to fudge his answer, but in a way that still made clear that he was the inventor: "I don't want to have another sleepless night, and therefore I will not say who personally designed the mechanism." Petrov immediately added: "The docking mechanism is the combined effort of specialists of two countries. It is an international child. And as an international child the child is androgynous." For the Americans it was some consolation that the Soviets ultimately adopted the American design for the latching parts of APAS. At any rate, Caldwell's willingness to let the Soviets claim priority for the androgynous design, despite the risks he took in doing so of making the Americans appear less clever than the Soviets, pleasantly surprised the Soviet side and helped to establish a friendly working environment, within a broader political context of detente, that was now tilting horizontally rather than vertically.⁴⁰

One point of dispute in particular set the tone for further collaboration after the docking agreement was made: the issue of whether or not the androgynous clasp rings would have three or four "fingers" to grab each other. The Americans proposed four and the Soviets three. Johnson said the Soviets were suspicious of the American side and believed that the Americans would never give-in to the Soviet three-finger design, but he surprised the Soviets. As Johnson remembered it, the Soviet side came into the meeting to discuss the number of fingers issue and immediately said to the Americans: "We've decided it's a good idea for you to do it our way." Everyone then laughed and Johnson then did something completely unexpected: He agreed. "...it is very interesting, to have somebody ask you to do something, and you say okay, then they don't know what the hell to do. They wanted to fight, I guess."⁴¹ Johnson's common sense, his willingness to take heat from some American colleagues and bosses, and his ability to leave his ego out of the collaboration played no small role in pushing the project forward. "You son of a bitch," he remembered some American colleagues saying after he gave in to Soviet demands. "You gave away. What did you give in to those bastards for?" But Johnson responded: "we want to get on with the program; we don't give a damn which way it is." It helped that both the Soviet and American engineers who worked together had immense respect for each other's technical capabilities. "The Russian team was first rate," remembered Johnson, who was mightily impressed by their engineering. "They were crackerjack engineers" and Syromiatnikov in

40. Syromiatnikov, *100 Stories*, 426-27, 454, 474; Transcript of ASTP mission communications, [Part 5 \(SR 61/2 - SR 83/1\)](#), [Part 6 \(SR 83/2 - SR 95/2\)](#), <https://history.nasa.gov/astp/gallery.html>. For Johnson's claim that the US first came up with the androgynous design: Interview with Caldwell Johnson, 1 April 1998, League City Texas, NASA Johnson Space Center Oral History Project, 25. https://historycollection.jsc.nasa.gov/JSCHistoryPortal/history/oral_histories/JohnsonCC/johnsoncc.htm In fact, as with many invention disputes, both sides seem to have come up with the design at more or less the same time as they headed into discussion for a joint docking project in October 1970.

41. Interview with Caldwell Johnson, 1 April 1998, League City Texas, NASA Johnson Space Center Oral History Project, 26-27. https://historycollection.jsc.nasa.gov/JSCHistoryPortal/history/oral_histories/JohnsonCC/johnsoncc.htm

particular was “brilliant.”⁴²

Johnson’s respect for the Soviet engineers was only reinforced when he saw the impoverished conditions in which the Soviet space program operated. “[E]verywhere you went, you could see that they made do with things that we wouldn’t make do with,” noted Johnson, marveling at the Soviet accomplishments. “Their labs had wooden oil floors. The plaster was cracked on the walls. There were light bulbs hanging down on a cord that you reached up and turned the switch. You know, all their equipment was kind of crummy, crummy stuff. Now they made up for it with industry. They worked hard and [were] very conscientious people...They didn’t spare themselves, you know. They were really dedicated.” He remembered that the NASA teams brought gifts of IBM Selectric typewriters to replace “these old mechanical clunkers” that the Soviet secretaries used. “And they just – they just marveled at it.” When the Soviet teams in the US first saw a Xerox machine, they were amazed. “Anybody just walks up and makes a copy?,” they asked, and one wondered why they didn’t just start copying dollar bills. “They were a great bunch, though.”⁴³

Interfaces and Foreplay

It is perhaps no accident that the Soviet side embraced the idea of APAS as an ideal techno-political design. It was a mechanical mirror of the idea of peaceful co-existence embraced by Khrushchev and Brezhnev in which the Soviets believed both sides could live in peace and interact with each other while still retaining their different socio-economic and political systems. In short, APAS was a technological manifestation of Soviet foreign policy, an example of “society made durable,” to use the terminology of Bruno Latour. That was very different from the American conception of containment or the increasingly popular conception of “convergence” in some intellectual circles in both the West and the Soviet Union of the 1960s and 1970s. Convergence connoted the blending of systemic attributes to create something fundamentally new. Androgynous coupling, meanwhile, created a hybrid system that preserved the unique attributes of the separate systems while connecting them to each other and making them mutually accessible. The spirit of hybridity, as embodied by APAS, also explicitly rejected the guiding US policy of containment, designed by the first US ambassador to the Soviet Union George Kennan, who envisioned Soviet capitulation and assimilation to the American system through a policy of pressuring the Soviets economically and politically, thereby exposing the weaknesses of the Soviet system and forcing them to relinquish their own supposedly dysfunctional ideology in favor of capitalist democracy. Clearly distinct from the ideas of convergence and containment, the

42. Interview with Caldwell Johnson, 1 April 1998, League City Texas, NASA Johnson Space Center Oral History Project, 26-27; 27 April 1999, 59-61. https://historycollection.jsc.nasa.gov/JSCHistoryPortal/history/oral_histories/JohnsonCC/johnsoncc.htm

43. Interview with Caldwell Johnson, 27 April 1999, League City Texas, NASA Johnson Space Center Oral History Project, 62-63. https://historycollection.jsc.nasa.gov/JSCHistoryPortal/history/oral_histories/JohnsonCC/johnsoncc.htm




Figure 3: A Drawing of the docking system

docking mechanism of APAS thus embraced the spirit of “peaceful coexistence” (*mirnoe sosushchestvovanie*). This idea later was realized through a policy of Détente with the French in 1966 and with the U.S. in the early 1970s.⁴⁴

Détente, like APAS, created interfaces (economic, technological, political, and cultural) that made both systems accessible to each other. Both sides recognized that to make this scheme work they needed to build a relationship of trust so that they would put aside the fear that mutual accessibility would lead to efforts by one side to sabotage the other side (through spying, theft of intellectual property, or other forms of political subterfuge). Central to the program of training leading up to the mission in July 1975 was thus a series of confidence building measures. Engineering working groups from both sides arranged joint meetings in both the Soviet Union and the United States. The technocratic spirit of problem-solving allowed both sides to meet in the supposedly neutral and non-ideological space of engineering. Feelings of mutual trust were to emerge from the progressive and joint solution of common problems in creating interfaces between the two distinct systems. The fact that the focus of collaboration was on the interface, and that there was minimal need to work together on fundamental capsule design issues, made it possible for country to produce its docking units on its own, “ensured by standardizing a minimal number of interfacing units,” allowing both sides “the freedom...to use their own methods, concepts, and components.” The experience

44. Brezhnev letter to Nixon, presented by the Soviet US Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin, August 5, 1971, Nixon Library and Archives, National Security Files, Henry A. Kissinger Office Files, NSC HAK, Country Files-Europe-U.S.S.R., Box 66.

of meeting to discuss progress, then retreating home to continue the docking system, and then returning again to report on progress, and finally docking, was immensely gratifying for the Soviet engineers. This was precisely the idea of détente as well – that neither side would impose its system on the other and both sides would recognize that there were multiple ways to approach the creation of a political and social system. The Soviet engineers, in particular developed a new vocabulary from their meetings with their American colleagues, starting with the very term “androgynous” that they used to name their docking design. The Soviet engineers, wrote Syromiatnikov, grew especially fond of the American word “interface...denoting inner, facing each other surfaces and other borders of two mediums.” Like the word docking, interfacing became an almost higher calling in the context of ASTP that meant making incompatible things – objects, people, ideologies and systems -- suddenly compatible. The Soviets began to see interfaces everywhere. The Soviet Academy of Sciences, for example, had nothing to do with the development of Soviet space technology, yet it was designated as the primary interface with NASA because the Soviet space industry existed within the secret world of the Soviet military-industrial complex. The Academy of Sciences thus became the docking mechanism that permitted NASA to connect with the Soviet space industry. The Paris Air Show in 1973 became a public interface to the previously secret Soviet space industry, as the Soviets displayed a mock-up of the APAS to the world. The Soviets also constructed a new testing site for ASTP, outside of the normal testing sites deep within the secret Soviet military industrial complex, that they viewed as a simple solution – a “neutral zone” just like APAS -- to the problem of connecting secret worlds to open ones (the site later became the center for all testing of Soviet international missions and thus went from being a temporary interface for ASTP to the formerly secret Soviet space industry to a permanent one – once again, an illustration of Latour’s idea of technology as “society made durable”).⁴⁵

Socializing before and especially after meetings was critical to trust building, as Soviet engineers were taken to Disney World and Disneyland – their interface with American culture -- during visits to Kennedy Space Center and at Rockwell facilities in Downey, California. Similarly, during their social interfaces on Soviet territory, American engineers were treated to the Russian traditions of hospitality (*gostepriimstvo*) which involved icebreakers with usually substantial quantities of food, drink and merriment. Cosmonauts were assigned the job of entertaining their colleagues: Aleksei Leonov, for example, was charged with taking the American crew hunting, while Vladimir Dzhanibekov, of the backup crew, was to host a party at his apartment.⁴⁶ At one banquet with his American colleagues, Syromiatnikov made a toast to APAS and their mission, playfully quoting Balzac: “Love begins with a touch.”⁴⁷ The parties sometimes had a homoerotic quality. At a bash at the hotel Rossiya in the fall of 1973, for Caldwell Johnson’s 50th birthday, the Soviets filled a 3-liter Samovar with vodka, took vodka in teacups,

45. Syromiatnikov, *100 Stories*, 429-30, 460-61, 532.

46. ARAN, f. 1678, op. 1, l. 14.

47. Syromiatnikov, *100 Stories*, 440.



Figure 4: The Soviets relax with Mickey Mouse at Disney World

and took pictures of each other holding long sausage.. “Our party was loud and completely male,” wrote Syromiatnikov. Soon after, the Soviet engineers – without their secretaries – went to Houston for more testing and drinking to rejoice, as Syromiatnikov put it, “his androgynous brothers.” There was a big party in Houston to honor the October Revolution in 1973 that included the American astronauts, as everyone drank from plastic cups and sang revolutionary songs. During a trip to Disneyland the middle-aged Soviet engineers “were just like teenagers.” It, too, was an all-male affair. The one Soviet female engineer, who designed the seal for the docking mechanism, was not allowed to travel to the US with her male colleagues, just as the secretaries of the Soviet engineers were forced to stay in the Soviet Union. At a dinner later that evening, looking out over the Pacific Ocean, Syromiatnikov made a toast in which he mentioned his trip five years earlier to the Pacific Ocean in the Soviet Far East and proposed a toast to “pacifists.” He had quite a bit of California wine and the best steak he had ever eaten, and before returning to the Soviet Union the Soviet engineers managed to squeeze in a trip to Vegas. Those experiences were among the personal benefits of interfacing with his American colleagues, along with the superior American toilet paper, which they brought back in large quantities to the Soviet Union in their suitcases. They also asked their American colleagues to bring them US toilet paper – another kind of interface with American culture -- for their visits to Soviet space facilities.⁴⁸

Administrators from both programs, and especially cosmonauts and astronauts, frequently visited each other’s facilities for training and technical meetings and each other’s homes and families for socializing. These pre-flight social and business exchanges provided opportunities for confidence building

48. Syromiatnikov, *100 Stories*, 479, 481, 484, 515.



Figure 5: Aleksei Leonov on downtime from training in the US visits with the Shoshone after a Wyoming hunting trip

and a kind of dry rehearsal for the exchanges during the flight that in turn were crucial for the success of détente by proving that mutual accessibility would not pose a security threat to either side. By all accounts, the business and social meetings proved successful in achieving this goal, though there was some concern on the American side about succumbing to the seductive pleasures of Russian hospitality. In order to build trust and to avoid the impression that one side might owe something to the other side, the visiting side always paid for its travel expenses – something that sometimes conflicted with the Soviet cultural tradition of taking responsibility as a host for the needs of the guest. The American side feared that accepting Soviet hospitality expenses would potentially compromise their independence from the Soviet system.

The Mating

Right before the launch of Apollo on July 15, 1975, President Ford broadcast a message to both mission controls and crews. His message was careful to maintain parity by noting the feats of Yuri Gagarin and John Glenn as the first men to orbit Earth, of both Goddard and Tsiolkovsky as the fathers of modern rocketry, and of Apollo 11 and the Soviet Luna missions as great advances in lunar science and human exploration.⁴⁹ Mutual and peaceful accessibility to each other's geographical and political space was central to the carefully choreographed program of activities for the nearly two days of docking. Over the course of the docking four exchanges were planned, beginning with a first visit by American crew members to the Soviet capsule, and then three other exchanges, with the Soviets getting the all-important first visit. During these interactions, a crew member from the capsule's country would always be present in both capsules.

Parity was to be achieved linguistically by having the crews speak in the native language of



Figure 6: President Ford gets a briefing on the technology before the mission

49. Transcript of ASTP mission communications, [Part 2 \(MC 17/1 - MC 38/3\)](https://history.nasa.gov/astp/gallery.html), <https://history.nasa.gov/astp/gallery.html>.

the people they were speaking to. The Soviet crew thus spoke English to the American crew, and the American crew Russian to the Soviet crew (and both jokingly used the portmanteau “Rouston,” for Russia and Houston). In this way the burden was on the native listener rather than the non-native talker to interpret words and act upon them. For example, Thomas Stafford in his thick Texas accent would use the Russian expression, “Kak po maslu,” (like cutting through butter) to Leonov as an acknowledgment, and Leonov would respond: “OK” in English.⁵⁰ The point of the language protocols was to minimize the extent to which misinterpretation by the listener, leading to mission failure, might threaten the political goals of détente, not to mention the lives of both crew members. Listening rather than talking was thus put into a position of primary importance. In addition, the language training made each side aware of its vulnerability and mutual dependence by forcing the non-native speaker to confront – in halting, thickly accented, and grammatically imperfect words -- the humbling challenge of communicating to a native speaker. Built into the program was an escape plan – or to put it in sexual terms, a withdrawal of consent for mating -- should either system be endangered by the technical difficulties of the androgynous coupling.

The linkup itself, as one would expect, had to be carefully choreographed from a technical point of view. Joining together two capsules weighing nearly 60 thousand tons and travelling thousands of miles an hour was a dangerous and complex affair. While the docking itself constituted a formidable technological triumph, the act of docking was also integrated into the political agenda of détente. The docking was thus to occur at the point in which the two capsules were flying over the two Germanys – whose division had itself been a byproduct of the Cold War and the inability of two former allies to determine the exact conditions of peace for post-war Europe, as well as the terms and conditions under which the German aggressor should admit defeat. The linkup thus provided a kind of fresh start or redo, a turning back of the clock to a time before the Cold War was even imagined as an outcome of the WWII. Not for nothing did the Soviets – though much less so the US side – refer to the handshake in the capsule as the “Elbe in space,” in reference to the handshake between US and Soviet forces on April 24, 1945.⁵¹ Seen from the perspective of that moment when the Cold War did not yet exist the ASTP represented a return to a temporal and geographical space in which an open-ended future existed and Germany itself had not been divided by a wall built to separate East from West. In actual fact, the docking did not take place over the Elbe but apparently over Spain, though the Soviets noted that it was somewhere between Spain and the Soviet Union in the first post-meeting press conference. Ultimately, the myth of the Elbe fly-over for the docking was so compelling that the facts about where the docking actually occurred got sucked into the black hole of historical amnesia. In an interview on the 35th anniversary of ASTP Leonov continued to insist that the docking occurred over the Elbe, adding

50. Syromiatnikov, *100 Stories*, 564; “‘Soyuz-Apollon’: nad El’boi,” *Vesti.ru*, 15 July 2010, <http://www.vesti.ru/article/2088534>

51. Viktor Khokhlov, “Kuda khodiat mechty: razmyshleniia v godovshchinu kosmicheskogo iubiliea,” *Gefter*, March 23, 2015, <http://gefter.ru/archive/14617>.



Figure 7: The Soviet and American crews: Thomas Stafford, Vance Brand, Deke Slayton, Alexsei Leonov, and Vladimir Kubasov

for dramatic effect: “Thirty years before [the docking] our fathers and grandfathers shook hands on the Elbe and thirty years later we shook hands over the Elbe!” The newspaper editors took their cue from Leonov and titled the article: “Soyuz-Apollo: over the Elbe.”⁵²

The Objects of Peace and the Exchange of Gifts

Both sides used the transport of items into space to commemorate the flight as an opportunity to express the goals of equalization. The list itself of items, hashed out through agreements and conversations between the two sides over a number of years, was itself designed to produce a hybrid inventory of symbols and ceremonial objects. Especially important was the symbolic space occupied by national flags. Ever since the placement of the US flag on the moon, the nationalization of space had been a key way for the US to express its imperial ambitions. That approach nonetheless offended many, as evidenced by the many letters sent to Nixon declaring that the planting of the flag was a violation of the spirit of internationalism and peace that should govern space exploration. In this instance, space was imagined as a process of double but equal colonization by the US and the USSR. The crews would thus exchange five flags with each other, including five small US flags (8” x 12”, measured in the US system of inches) to be exchanged for five small USSR flags (205mm. x 410mm, measured in the Soviet

52. Transcript of ASTP mission communications, [Part 5 \(SR 61/2 - SR 83/1\)](#), [Part 6 \(SR 83/2 - SR 95/2\)](#)

<https://history.nasa.gov/astp/gallery.html>; “ ‘Soyuz-Apollon’: nad El’boi,” *Vesti.ru*, 15 July 2010, <http://www.vesti.ru/article/2088534>

metric system). The flags “symbolized the contribution made by a great many people from all over the United States and the Soviet Union. Such contributions were essential to the first major joint venture by these two spacefaring countries.”⁵³

While celebrating the flight as a process of managed competitive colonialism – perhaps similar in some ways to the 1885 Berlin agreement between European powers that attempted to set ground rules for European imperialist takeovers of Africa – the two sides also imagined the docking as the expression a transnational project devoted to the advance of all humanity, in line with the increasing view of space exploration as a transnational enterprise. The Soviets would thus carry into space a United Nations Flag (3’ x 5’, and the biggest of the flags), that would then descend back to Earth on the Apollo capsule, “symbolizing our common goal of peacefully exploring space for the benefit of people all over the world and in recognition of the contribution to this and other cooperative space projects made by people from many nations.” An additional set of flags went into space but would not be exchanged in order “to symbolize [the role of each nation] in the first international flight.”⁵⁴

The two sides also carried separate pieces of commemorative plaques to be assembled jointly in space. The plaques, representing “two permanent symbols of the first international human spaceflight,” formed two individual medallions with crossed flags and docked spacecraft. While the commemorative plaques celebrated the spirit of international cooperation, other objects expressed the related spirit of ecological consciousness, which was itself a byproduct, in large part, of the view from space. The US offered white spruce seeds to the Soviets, who returned the favor with seeds of native trees, so as to create a “living and growing monument to the first cooperative human spaceflight.” The seeds celebrated the new space-age environmentalism, “the product of new scientific developments in forestry” that would “call attention to the new awareness of Earth brought by spaceflight. Perception of the planet from space heightens humankind’s appreciation of Earth’s natural beauty and our understanding that we all share responsibility for its preservation.” The principle of parity was maintained by selecting seeds from trees in Rhineland in the state of Michigan, which was determined to be most similar to the climate of Moscow.⁵⁵

There were more silver medallions presented to individual crew members and a certificate of docking from the International Aeronautical Federation (Federation Aéronautique Internationale-FAI), which had certified aerospace achievements since its formation in since 1905. The flight also paid homage to the politics of détente for which the entire project had been a test. There were six copies of the May 1972 Nixon-Kosygin Agreement, “concerning cooperation in

53. <https://history.nasa.gov/astp/documents/Objects%20Exchanged.pdf>

54. One large US flag, 3’ x 5’, and five small US flags, 8” x 12,” and one large USSR flag, 3’ x 6’, and five small USSR flags, 205mm. x 410mm. <https://history.nasa.gov/astp/documents/Objects%20Exchanged.pdf>

55. <https://history.nasa.gov/astp/documents/Objects%20Exchanged.pdf>; Transcript of ASTP mission communications, [Part 10 \(MC 148/2 - MC 166/1\)](#)
<https://history.nasa.gov/astp/gallery.html>.

the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes (three in English and three in Russian), by which both nations made a commitment to conduct not only the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project, but also a wide range of continuing cooperative activities in such fields as space meteorology, the study of the natural environment from space, the exploration of near-Earth space, the Moon, the planets, and space biology and medicine.”⁵⁶

While the idea of androgynous docking mechanism set the tone for a project that aimed to treat both sides in the same manner and to preserve the distinctiveness of both cultures and systems, there was one aspect of the symbolic program that pointed toward a joining together that would be not one or the other, but an amalgam of the two into something new. This was the test to produce a lead-gold alloy (three samples) in the electric furnace of the docking module. The project was a Soviet idea that originated with visions of space as an arena for industrial activity. Kubasov, Leonov’s Soviet ASTP crew, had gone down in space record books on October 11, 1969, as the first human to weld in space. The notion of building upon this feat and creating a blast furnace in space seemed somehow logical to the Soviet side, and the Americans indulged their crewmates, as all happy couples often do with their partners. Said the joint planning documents: “The uniform mixing of unlike materials in space created a new substance that symbolized the success people and nations found in putting aside their differences to work together in space. *The unusual environment of space acts as a catalyst through which both men and materials may combine to yield useful applications for the benefit of all.*”⁵⁷ As one Russian scholar has noted, the docking mechanism of ASTP was like the androgyne figure of the alchemical traditions of early and medieval Christianity. It involved, “the union of irreconcilable elements, the merging of opposites,” which “not only gives birth to the sought-after philosopher’s stone, but also helps to achieve universal wisdom and eternal intellectual enlightenment.”⁵⁸ Kubasov described the meaning of the welding experiment to global television audiences during the mission: “It seems to me that some time will pass, and mankind will have many new metals, many new alloys, with new qualities - we’ll be obtaining these materials in conditions which could never be created on the Earth, but which could be available only in space. And it seems to me, that the time will come when space will have whole plants, factories, for the production of new materials and new substances with new qualities, which could be obtained or made only in space.”⁵⁹




Figure 8: The Commemorative Plaques Joined During the Mission

56. <https://history.nasa.gov/astp/documents/Objects%20Exchanged.pdf>

57. <https://history.nasa.gov/astp/documents/Objects%20Exchanged.pdf>

58. Natalya Serkova, World Wide Gold, e-flux, no. 93 (2018) <https://www.e-flux.com/journal/93/213267/world-wide-gold/>

59. Transcript of ASTP mission communications, [Part 18 \(MC 272/1 - MC 285/2\)](#)

The Return to Zero-Sum Back on Earth

Despite the goal of equalizing power relations between the two sides, the game of one-upmanship continued through the years of contacts and joint development. These incidents, the subject of this essay's final section, provide important reminders about the limitations of technological fixes. The attitudes that produced the Cold War, it turns out, were unusually resistant to the amalgamating forces of blast furnaces in space.

There were many such incidents over critical but also seemingly trivial issues that represented, on the part of both sides, an instinctual and at times conscious resistance to the goal of escaping from the zero-sum politics of the Cold War. For example, both sides accused the other of having more dangerous and less secure technology. The Soviets noted the dangers associated with the American reliance on pure oxygen, which had already resulted in the incineration of the Apollo 1 crew in 1967. Meanwhile, the Soviet mission control director Mozzhorin took umbrage at American arrogance: "In the Apollo-Soyuz program the Americans openly expressed their lack of confidence and safety in the functioning of our space technology and systems and expressed the fear that this represented a serious threat to their astronauts during docking and the joint flight of the capsules. That opinion was widely disseminated in their press."⁶⁰ Their pride wounded by American disdain, the Soviets redoubled efforts to update their mission control and to prove to the American side that their technology was every bit as good as the American technology, perhaps even better. "In general, our mission control made a good impression on the Americans," wrote the Soviet mission control director, Mozzhorin, in his memoirs. "Yours is as good as ours," said NASA's Fletcher, as quoted by Mozzhorin, in defense against the claim among many Americans that the Soviet technology was inferior.⁶¹ The Soviet flight director Eliseev went further, bragging that, "functionally our mission control was no worse than the American mission control, and in terms of comfort exceeded it," including a better buffet, rest areas, and accommodations for guests. The Soviet leadership spared no expense in keeping the buffet well stocked with the best food, realizing that national pride and the traditions of Russian hospitality were at stake. "It might seem strange now," Eliseev wrote many years later, "but otherwise we would have been ashamed before the Americans."⁶²

60. N. A. Anfimov, ed., *Tak eto bylo...: Memuary Iu. A. Mozzhorina: Mozzhorin v vospominaniakh sovremennikov* (Moscow: OAO 'Mezhdunarodnaia programma obrazovaniia, 2000). <http://epizodsspace.airbase.ru/bibl/mozzorin/tak/06.html>, this is chapter 6. June 12, 2018.

61. "Istoriia TsUPa: Trud, radosti, mytarstva," *Nauka i zhizn'*, No. 8, 2005, http://epizodsspace.airbase.ru/bibl/n_i_j/2005/7/istoria-tsupa.html, downloaded June 11, 2018. Syromiatnikov disliked NASA's administrator Fletcher because of his disdain for Soviet technology and thought George Low, who respected Soviet technology, was far more qualified. Vladimir Syromiatnikov, *100 Stories*, 558.

62. "Istoriia TsUPa: Trud, radosti, mytarstva," *Nauka i zhizn'*, No. 8, 2005, http://epizodsspace.airbase.ru/bibl/n_i_j/2005/7/istoria-tsupa.html, downloaded June 11, 2018

Sometimes, the advantage of one side was equalized by the advantage of another. So while the Soviets were superior to the Americans in terms of ground control of the orbiting capsules, the Americans allowed their astronauts more manual control. Mozzhorin recalled another episode that illustrated the challenges of equalizing power relations between the two sides. To accommodate NASA observers, the Soviets built a three-story hotel next to their new mission control center for the flight where NASA observers could work during the mission. The rooms were outfitted “with nice imported furniture.” Mozzhorin had been charged with ensuring the Americans received all the information they required and in the most comfortable circumstances. And then Mozzhorin was contacted by the KGB and the Soviet Foreign Ministry, who informed him that “there was an order to observe the principle of parity” and that the Soviets had violated that order – not by failing to create living conditions for Americans equal to the Soviet side but because the Soviet arrangements for the Americans were far superior to those the Americans had provided to Soviet observers in Houston mission control. In Houston NASA had provided “spartan conditions” for the Soviet observers and engineers; there was no place for them to lie down in mission control and getting access to decent hotel rooms and food was difficult. The Americans had failed to match the Soviet provision of hospitality and so the Soviets closed the hotel for American observers (it was later turned into offices for Soviet space officials and engineers) and set out “domestically manufactured” Soviet chairs and couches for the American observers. Interestingly, the American side seemed to not take offense, “and to the very end our mutual work was not hindered in the least.”⁶³

The question for parity could often take a comical turn. Caldwell Johnson remembered that during one visit to Leningrad, which was notorious for having Giardia bacteria that causes severe intestinal infection, the American engineers suffered debilitating diarrhea. When they complained, their Soviet hosts said: “Nonsense. Nothing wrong with the water in Leningrad. You brought this [problem] with you.” Parity was achieved when Soviet engineers came to the US and stayed in a motel. The Soviets, remembered the docking engineer Johnson, “... were walking around barefoot and taking showers in the stalls, and they all came down with absolutely the worst cases of athlete’s foot you’ve ever seen. We’ve got a whole bunch of little viruses that the Russians don’t have any protection against.” When the Soviets complained, the Americans told them: “Nonsense. You brought it with you.” The NASA doctors did take pity on them and gave them a powerful ointment that “just smelled awful, and you could tell these guys a mile away.”⁶⁴

The stakes in maintaining parity rose considerably for the all-important and much-anticipated meeting of the two crews. As Eliseev remembered it, the Soviets constructed a joint plan of the mission that would make the first meeting between the two crews take place in the Soviet capsule, which he considered a

63. “Istoriia TsUPa: Trud, radosti, mytarstva,” *Nauka i zhizn’*, No. 8, 2005, http://epizodsspace.airbase.ru/bibl/n_i_j/2005/7/istoria-tsupa.html, downloaded June 11, 2018

64. Interview with Caldwell Johnson, 1 April 1998, League City Texas, NASA Johnson Space Center Oral History Project, 27-28.

coup. The American side had apparently not been paying close enough attention, and by the time they objected to the arrangement it was already too late to change the sequence of crew activities. The moment then arrived as the Soviet ship awaited its American guests. “Everyone had the feeling as if right before our eyes there was occurring a transition from dangerous confrontation to friendly collaboration.” Eliseev recalled that the embraces, joy, and sheer excitement of the moment overshadowed the reading of the comments completely, and that what remained was the memory of the exchange of flags and other commemorative items. It was only later, upon reviewing the video of the scene, that he noticed something he had not first seen: When the hatch opened, the American crew held back from entering the Soviet capsule and instead insisted on inviting the Soviet crew into the area of docking module, thus attempting to change the plan from a meeting in Soviet territory to the neutral territory of the APAS module between the two capsules. “The cosmonauts did not take the bait. Their patriotic feelings were no less developed than those of the Americans.”⁶⁵

The confusion of that moment is reflected also in the mission transcripts. Slayton and Stafford were clearly hesitating to enter the Soyuz capsule. A mission control operator then told them: “You’re supposed to go into the Soyuz.” Leonov reiterated after this: “Come in here and shake hands. Our viewers are here. Come here please.” It appears from the one grainy photo of the event – it is curious that a ceremony that had been so hotly anticipated was so poorly documented visually – that Stafford stayed in the module, thus refusing Leonov’s entreaties. In this photograph Leonov seems to have made sure that the handshake could not take place across the threshold of the Soyuz capsule entrance and thus thrust his arm and hand into the docking module where Stafford grabbed it and the picture was taken (shaking hands across a threshold of a door is strictly forbidden in Russian culture and a harbinger of very bad luck). Stafford then apparently entered the Soviet capsule, having maintained the handshake on the neutral territory of the APAS docking module. Just to make things even more confusing, the Soviets later claimed the handshake had taken place in their capsule. At any rate, the impression from the transcripts of that meeting is that confusion reigned despite all the planning and scripting, and that there was plenty of room to spin the events after the fact.⁶⁶ Leonov, a notorious story teller, embellished even more years later. He claimed that the meeting had actually occurred while the Soviet crew was out of communication with mission control, and when they got back into communication with mission control in Moscow, the operators on the ground instructed them to open the hatch and let the Americans in, to which Leonov said: “Why? They’re already here sitting with us!” A long and awkward moment of silence followed, according to Leonov, and finally mission control asked how the meeting went, and then everyone broke out in applause.⁶⁷

65. A. S. Eliseev, *Kaplia v more* (Moscow: Aviatsiia i kosmonavtika, 1998), 107-108.

66. Transcript of ASTP mission communications, [Part 5 \(SR 61/2 - SR 83/1\)](#), <https://history.nasa.gov/astp/gallery.html>.

67. “‘Soyuz-Apollon’: nad El’boi,” *Vesti.ru*, 15 July 2010, <http://www.vesti.ru/article/2088534>.



Figure 9: *The Handshake in Space*

The confusion continued as the two crews exchanged the gifts – awkward laughter, cameras in the wrong position, noise clicks from unknown sources of interference, dropped audio and video. And then they proceeded to eat the tubed and pouched dishes from both countries that included borscht, steak, turkey and cranberries, dark Russian bread, and many other items. For the first breaking of bread between the crews Leonov brought out tubes for his

American colleagues with labels from Soviet vodkas that read “Stolichnaia,” “Russkaia Vodka,” and “Staraja Vodka,” and then said they had to drink before eating. “It is a very big Russian tradition,” he added, claiming that for a moment the Americans actually believed he was serious. The tubes contained Borscht soup.⁶⁸



Figure 10: *Thomas Stafford and Deke Slayton hold the tubes of borscht with Soviet vodka labels*

The second day was filled with exchanges and meals in both capsules, as well as television events in which the cosmonauts and astronauts would make comments on the each other’s space food, and then conduct of a variety of experiments and more ceremonies. Over the course of the mission live television broadcasts from the docked capsules concentrated on the crews describing their meals and playing tour guide for global television audiences as they discussed the territories below

68. “‘Soyuz-Apollon’: nad El’boi,” *Vesti.ru*, 15 July 2010, <http://www.vesti.ru/article/2088534>.

them. After the second day the crews seemed to warm to the idea of sharing each other's space and relaxing in each other's company. Viewers witnessed men at work and play engaged in homosocial bonding and declaring how much they really liked being around each other. One of the most striking features of this socio-technical imaginary of global peace was the complete absence of women. It was an all-male world, designed and operated almost exclusively by men, with a supporting cast of women as secretaries unseen in the background, mediated by a mechanical androgyne.⁶⁹ Perhaps the Americans and the Soviets had achieved parity relative to each other, but they also joined together over the rest of the world in a position of vertical dominance, commenting upon and gazing down upon all the other nations who had not achieved their superior vantage point. Linked together by global relay stations, both the Soyuz and Apollo capsules travelled over the entire globe in just hours, tracking weather and transmissions and commenting upon the geographical domains over which they now flew – over and over again, armed with the vertical gaze as masters of the Earth. Perhaps, in the end, they could come together more like equals precisely because they shared a feeling of superiority over everyone else.

Parity was also difficult to maintain because of the technological and physical differences between the two capsules and space systems. "In the course of the whole project Apollo was the favorite," remembered Syromiatnikov. "It was bigger, heavier, and 'smarter' than its partner was, since at that time we were not able to provide the Soyuz with an onboard computer. During the flight, when performing joint operations, Apollo had to be much more active."⁷⁰ The Apollo capsule was visibly bigger than the Soviet capsule, and it had a crew of three, as opposed to the crew of two for the Soyuz.⁷¹ The mere fact that one word had to come before another in describing the mission automatically also violated the quest for parity. The Americans thus called the mission "Apollo-Soyuz" while the Soviets called it "Soyuz-Apollon." The emblem attempted to overcome this problem by putting the words Soyuz and Apollo on the edge of a circular patch.

The act of docking, despite the androgynous mechanism, also had to be choreographed to preserve equal relations. During the mission there were actually two docking procedures – a plan that was designed to maintain the all-important focus on parity. Among the planned events was the initial docking, followed by the exchanges of crews, and a later de-coupling and re-docking before the ending of the mission. For the first docking the Americans had played the active role of maneuvering the ship to join the coupling mechanism to the Soviet capsule, which played the passive role (though their capsule, as noted earlier, got to host the first crew exchange). In anthropomorphic terms, the Americans initiated the hug. Who would be the passive or active partner, as one might expect, became a matter of some dispute in the initial discussions. As Syromiatnikov noted: "The bigger

69. Transcript of ASTP mission communications, [Part 14 \(MC 208/4 - MC 224/1\), Part 15 \(MC 225/1 - MC 244/2\)](https://history.nasa.gov/astp/gallery.html), <https://history.nasa.gov/astp/gallery.html>.

70. Vladimir Syromiatnikov, *100 Stories About Docking and Other Adventures in Space and On Earth* (Moscow: Universitetskaia kniga, 2005), 394.

71. Syromiatnikov, *100 Stories*, 417.

the prestige factor, the less room there is for reason.”⁷² In the second coupling the roles were reversed as the Soviet capsule played the active role – the hugger initiator -- and the Apollo the passive role. The docking at first went according to plan as the Soviet capsule maneuvered its way to connect with the Apollo capsule. But then the Soviet side felt two forceful jolts from the American capsule, and it had become clear, to use Stafford’s favorite term, that the docking was not going “kak po maslu”. A moment of panic ensued, since the force of the impact could have been enough to cause a catastrophic failure, though the Soviet flight engineer noted that “the strength of [Soviet] construction saved the mission.” The Soviets realized that during the docking the American side had gone from being passive to active by incorrectly turning on side jet thrusters – a maneuver that was strictly forbidden in the instruction manual. After the flight the two sides discussed the incident and at first the American side categorically denied that its thrusters had been turned on, but an examination of the telemetry indicated that they had been turned on by mistake. “We left this incident on the conscience of the American side,” said the Soviet flight engineer Eliseev, although Syromiatnikov later remembered that the Soviet side was not entirely blameless. The incident itself impressed the Soviets, not only because of the possibly tragic consequences of the mistake, but also because it seemed to represent a blatant American violation of the principle of parity – planned or by mistake. They had gone into active mode without Soviet permission. To make matters worse, the American side denied, according to the Soviets, that they were even responsible for the incident until confronted with incontrovertible evidence from the telemetry data.⁷³ It was a reminder that the engineering of parity, like the goal of eliminating zero-sum politics from Soviet-American relations, could suffer catastrophic failure in a moment’s notice. The transcripts of the mission communications do not reveal any reactions or comments to the event, but the press did learn of a “hard docking” and asked a question the following day at a press conference about its cause and whether or not the cosmonauts had any reaction and were fearful or anxious at the time. The answer was no, they did not react verbally, and that Syromiatnikov would be getting together with his American colleagues later to discuss what had happened. More information would be made public as soon as it became available. And that was it.⁷⁴ Ultimately, both sides agreed to divert attention away from the incident in the interests of diminishing chances for post-flight controversies, and the unpermitted American thrust was forgotten.

The Message Gets Lost

Try as they might, both sides were often unable to communicate the central idea of parity that the mission was designed to convey, especially in the United States. In the US context, the dominant narrative was one of being “screwed” –

72. Syromiatnikov, *100 Stories*, 547.

73. A. S. Eliseev, *Kaplia v more* (Moscow: Aviatsiia i kosmonavtika, 1998), 110; Syromiatnikov, *100 Stories*, 575, 582.

74. Transcript of ASTP mission communications, [Part 11 \(SR 147/1 - SR 156/2\)](https://history.nasa.gov/astp/gallery.html), <https://history.nasa.gov/astp/gallery.html>.

quite literally -- by the Soviets. That story line began with the leadup to ASTP and in the years that followed, but was perhaps best illustrated in the December 1975 issue of *Playboy*. The magazine ran a story with accompanying images that expressed in graphic and explicit terms a common zero-sum view of American-Soviet relations that ultimately hastened the demise of detente. The article was part of a special section presented in the style of *National Geographic* magazine called *National Pornographic* (the “journal of the National Pornographic Society.”) The ASTP image is across from one page with an article titled, “Mysterious Insects Battle for Survival,” which shows a number of insects mounted on other insects during mating. The ASTP article is titled: “Historic Emission in Space.” It contains two distinct images: one of a mock-up of the capsules which is not even remotely close to the appearance of the Apollo and Soyuz capsules. The caption of their docking reads: “US crew sends message to Soviet craft: ‘Is it in yet?’” The other shows a naked man mounting a naked woman from behind and on top. The man is the Soviet Union, while the woman is the United States. The caption reads: “East meets West in the vast, weightless reaches of outer space. Soviet cosmonaut radios, ‘My bird has landed!’ while pretty U.S. astronaut muses aloud: ‘I wonder why this reminds me of the U.S. Soviet grain deal.’”⁷⁵

Of course, the article and associated images were intended to amuse, but they also reflected an increasingly anti-Soviet position that fueled opposition to detente and give rise to a renewed Cold War under Presidents Carter and Reagan. If Syromiatnikov had worked painstakingly to engineer the flight in a way that would remove the implication that one side, the male, was dominating the other, the female, that message was completely lost on much of the American public. In the *Playboy* issue, and in a good portion of the anti-Soviet press in the United States, ASTP was interpreted as a dangerous give-away of American technological superiority that also had put the US into a vulnerable position: in this case, the US had literally been taken from behind by the Soviets. The reference to the grain deal – a controversial taxpayer subsidized sale of US grain to the Soviets as part of detente that was widely panned as a give-away to the communist enemy – reinforced the connection between the flight and American humiliation. It was a stark reminder of the difficulty of changing political culture from a zero-sum mentality in the Cold War to a win-win proposition. Even more, the purposeful design of androgynous docking latches that would obviate the need for a “mama-papa” docking was completely ignored in favor of the narrative of domination and subordination – exactly the opposite of the intent. The *Playboy* article noted, deploying sophomoric sexual innuendo appropriate for the magazine’s audience: “The first coupling in outer space was a fitting climax to the joint venture undertaken by the United States and Red Russia. Commie space technicians successfully completed docking maneuvers by inserting their vehicle into the opening of the American module, although NASA officials had insisted that the Bolshevik vehicle be provided with a heat-resistant sheath (painted bright red, of course) – for the prevention of disease only. Inside the U. S. capsule, cosmonaut and astronaut

75. “Historic Emission in Space,” *Playboy*, December 22, 1975, 209.




Figure 11: The Soviet satirical magazine *Krokodil* in July 1975 clearly conveys the political challenge of engineering: the goal of the docking mechanism was to destroy the military spirit of the Cold War.

hostility contrasted to the much more welcoming atmosphere of 1972 and 1973. Reflecting the contrast in attitudes, one of the most popular magazine images of ASTP was in the Soviet satirical journal *Krokodil*.⁷⁷ Its July 1975 issue had a cover which showed the two capsules meeting together over earth. As the androgynous docking latches come together over Earth they squeezed the mid section and groin of a Trojan Warrior, who is forced to drop his sword. The warrior is labeled “Cold War.” The representations of the capsules clearly convey the androgynous docking mechanism in which neither side penetrates the other and in which the end result of the non-penetrating docking is peace. The contrast between the *Krokodil* and *Playboy* images says much about the very different public attitudes that framed the Cold War and echo the often bellicose and aggressive posture of the US in comparison to the Soviet Union.

The end of détente was asserted in space through Reagan’s 1983 Strategic Defense Initiative. While Nixon started his presidency with the idea of space collaboration, Reagan began his with remilitarization and a renewed attempt to shift from a horizontal and back toward a vertical orientation in American-Soviet relations. Gaining a position above your enemy, with a laser shield, would produce a kind of erectile dysfunction in the Soviet Union’s arsenal. In short, the

joined in a historic embrace that will be remembered as one giant *shtup* for mankind.”⁷⁶

The article diverged not at all from the standard conceptions in American culture of communism as invasive and aggressive in its violation of American space – first with the penetration of the vehicle and then of the sex act, which takes place in the American capsule. It was something that Syromiatnikov had noticed much more toward the end of his ASTP collaboration when he visited the United States in 1974. He noted the virulent anti-Soviet and anti-détente attitudes during his last visit to the US, which surprised and saddened him, especially in light of the popularity of détente back in the Soviet Union and how much the

76. “Historic Emission in Space,” *Playboy*, December 22, 1975, 209.

77. Syromiatnikov, *100 Stories*, 515; *Krokodil*, July 21, 1975.

engineering of androgyny could not transcend the patriarchal ideas that drove international relations. Cold War politics in the United States were broken in a way that technology was unable to fix.

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Saints and Soviets Again — Inventing the 'New Man' by American Capitalism and Soviet Socialism Revisited

Milan Zafirovski

The distrust of natural man as completely corrupted by original sin (is) an idea driven to the extreme in all Protestant dogmatics (and) with the purpose of producing a new artificial man--Max Scheler (1964 (1916), p. 16).

1 Introduction

Scholars have identified and emphasized certain specific forms and degrees of latent or potential convergence, commonality and partial equivalence between American capitalism and Soviet communism or more precisely socialism, along with their manifest and declared divergence, separation and opposition, as overarching contesting economic-social systems during the Cold War. In such accounts, these forms or degrees primarily include an economic convergence, commonality and partial or seeming equivalence between the two systems or countries during the postwar period. This shared property specifically consists in the sense of both economic-social systems converging on and even moving in tandem toward initially a shared industrial and subsequently post-industrial economy and society with its characteristic class structure and culture (Bell 1973; Bendix 1974; Dahrendorf 1959; Parsons¹ 1949; Wright and Martin 1987; for related later insights see Beck 2000; Block 1990; Esping-Andersen 2003; Goldberg 2001; Inglehart and Baker 2000; Lenski 1994).

Relatedly, such a shared property involves their convergence on and partial equivalence in rapid technical progress, high and sustained economic growth, increasing consumption and living standards, rising life expectancy, decreasing wealth and income inequality, as well as shared basic financial and

1. For example, Parsons (1949, pp. 333-4) suggests that 'capitalist and socialist industrialisms (are) tend variants of a single fundamental type, not as drastically distinct stages in a single process of dialectic evolution. The differences between capitalist and socialist societies, particularly with respect to stratification, are not as great as Marx and Engels thought. In both types there is a variety of potential sources of class conflict centering about the structure of the productive process.'

related constraints², and so on (Kuznets 1972; Sternberg 1951; for broader later observations see Deaton 2003; Dowrick and Quiggin 1997; Inklaar and Rao 2017; Jae et al. 2019; Piketty 2014; Ravallion 2018; Rodrik 2010; Slaughter 1997). For example, in a postwar account, both systems converged on reaching the ‘age of high mass-consumption’—with American capitalism preceding Soviet communism or socialism that was ‘technically ready for this stage’—as the highest and last of the ‘stages of economic growth’ (Rostow 1960; also, Field 2003; Foellmi and Zweimüller 2011; Matsuyama 2002; Wilmers 2017). In other accounts, their convergence also comprised converging on growing concentration and declining competition in the economy through monopolization and an oligopoly market structure as the shared ‘new industrial state’ (Galbraith 1967; Galbraith and Parker 2017).

In addition, some accounts suggest secondarily a certain degree of political convergence, commonality and equivalence between the two economic-social systems during the Cold War. This involves a secondary democratic convergence or commonality in the form of established full and enduring, so it seemed, democracy in American capitalism and emerging limited and transient democratization and liberalization in Soviet socialism starting post-Stalin and expanding during Gorbachev (Bockman and Eyal 2002; Habermas 2001; Murrell 1996). It especially includes a stronger convergence on and even partial equivalence between the two systems in the development and expansion of the welfare state, including that in the US since the New Deal or the Great Society period (Inglehart and Baker 2000; Piketty, Saez and Zucman 2018; Somers and Block 2005; for their healthcare systems see Beckfield, Olafsdottir, and Sosnaud 2013).

Especially, Sorokin in his work *Russia and the United States* posits and identifies certain social, including political, cultural and socio-psychological, similarities between the two societies, especially the first during its pre-revolutionary times and the second since the American Revolution and its independence. Historically, Sorokin (2006) suggests that the relations between Russia and the United States have been mostly ‘exceedingly warm, friendly, and co-operative’, with Russia (along with France) being among the ‘first foreign powers’ helping the United States as a ‘sovereign nation’. In sociological terms, Sorokin (2006) points to the ‘essential similarity’ between the two societies by virtue of both being ‘melting pots of diverse racial, ethnic, national, and cultural groups and peoples.’ Notably, Sorokin (2006) identifies an ‘important similarity’ between Russia and United States consisting in the ‘essentially democratic structure of their basic sociocultural institutions.’ In this connection, Sorokin (2006) recounts that the Russian political system from the ninth to the twentieth century was, as a whole, ‘virtually as democratic as the governmental regime of most European nations’, thus by implication being similar to that of the United States. In addition, Sorokin (2006) emphasizes that another ‘basic similarity’ between Russia and America pertains to the ‘psychology and mentality of the

2. Even the anti-communist crusader and US President Reagan while condemning via projection Puritan-style the Soviet Union as an ‘evil empire’ once reportedly admitted during a meeting with Gorbachev during the 1980s that both Americans and Russians share the same financial constraint—struggling to ‘pay their bills’.

two nations' in that both have absorbed the 'cultural values' of other societies like those of Latin America, Europe, Asia, and Africa, and finds the 'parallel of the 'universal soul' of the United States and Russia is 'rather striking'. On the basis of the preceding similarities, Sorokin (2006) concludes and predicts that in respect of 'ethical values' and other respects, 'no fundamental antagonism or irreconcilability' does and will exist between Russia and the United States.

Alternatively, other accounts suggest that American capitalism and Soviet socialism displayed political convergence, commonality and even equivalence in terms of coercion and repression of their populations to the point of both representing, even if in various degrees and ways, 'totalitarian' or authoritarian systems, which conservatism or the radical right, including McCarthyism and Reaganism or conservative populism, and Stalinism exemplify, respectively. (See Adorno 2001; Altemeyer 2007; Baudrillard 1994; Bauman 2001; Blee and Creasap 2010; Bourdieu 1998; Bourdieu and Haacke 1995; Dahrendorf 1979; Gross, Medvetz, and Russell 2011; Habermas 2001; Jacobs and Dirlam 2016; Lipset 1955; MacLean 2018; Plotke 2002; Pontikes, Negro, and Rao 2010; Pryor 2002; Rydgren 2007; Schutz 2001; for broader historical insights on fascism and populism also, Berezin 2019.) Relatedly, some observers propose that the two systems converged on or even shared equivalent methods of systematic ideological indoctrination of their citizens through various instruments of propaganda, although its content was different and even opposite (Adorno 2001; Altemeyer 2007; Mann 1970; Merton 1968; Myrdal 1953; for related observations see Bénabou and Tirole 2006).

Further, some accounts depict American capitalism and Soviet socialism as featuring a convergence, commonality and even equivalence in respect of nationalism; militarism, imperialism and aggressive war, compounded with authoritarianism within society (Altemeyer³ 2007; Bonikowski and DiMaggio 2016). In these accounts, they converge in this respect in that both appear and act as highly militaristic and imperialist systems ('evil' empires) by massive military-industrial complexes in a frantic arms race ('defense spending') and subjugating or controlling other societies through multiple offensive wars or military interventions during the Cold War, with the invasions and occupations of Vietnam and Afghanistan as just the respective most notorious exemplars

3. Altemeyer (2007, p. 50) implies such equivalence in that he observes 'both sides (the United States and the Soviet Union) invaded neighbors to control their international allegiance, lied to their own people and to the world, made disarmament proposals for public relations purposes on the world stage, and so on. And when their government did such things, the authoritarian followers in both countries tended to believe and support them more than others did.' Further, Altemeyer (2007, 246-7) suggests that present societies, especially American society, 'produce millions of highly authoritarian personalities as a matter of course, enough to stage the Nuremberg Rallies over and over and over again. Turning a blind eye to this could someday point guns at all our heads, and the fingers on the triggers will belong to right-wing authoritarians. We ignore this at our peril.' This evidently anticipates the rise of the Tea Party and Trumpism as species of right-wing authoritarianism, simply neo-fascism, in America.

among many (Dell and Querubin 2018; Dube, Kaplan, and Naidu⁴ 2011; Kentor and Boswell 2003; Munch 2001; Savelsberg and King 2005). In turn, in other accounts, the two shared the inhibition on the use of nuclear weapons by resisting the temptation to use them in their various wars even in the face of crushing and humiliating defeats, as in Vietnam and Afghanistan, respectively, thus avoiding the MAD (mutually assured destruction) outcome (Schelling 2006; also, Gibson 2011; Habermas 2001).

Lastly, other accounts suggest that these two systems manifested certain forms or degrees of cultural convergence, commonality and partly equivalence. This especially comprises their converging on and sharing what Merton (1968) calls the ‘ethos of science’ and consequently scientific-technological progress--with the Soviet launching of Sputnik acting as an inspiration or rather agent provocateur, alarm and panic trigger for the US government to finally appreciate and support science and scientific knowledge as societal power--and the ‘educational revolution’, notably the expansion of higher education (Ginzberg and Solow 1974; for related broader insights see Bloome, Dyer, and Zhou 2018; Habermas 2001; Schofer and Meyer 2005). Thus, a crucial aspect of their cultural convergence was the emergence of Mannheim’s science-based and broader intelligentsia and thus a scientific community, more broadly growingly educated populations, notably college graduates and post-graduates, in both social systems, as in other contemporary societies (Gauchat 2012; Schofer and Meyer 2005; Wejnert 2005).

However, during and despite the all-encompassing and potentially self-destructive Cold War, American capitalism and Soviet socialism exhibited another salient convergence or shared common the psychology and mentality of the two nations ality and even partial equivalence that most historical and current accounts of these social systems and times overlook or downplay and insufficiently theorize and analyze, despite some intimations or implications (Dahl 1985; Faris 1961; Kelley 1984; Meyer 1967; Schutz 2001; Tiryakian 1981; Wallerstein and Zukin 1989). This is their convergence on and commonality and indeed partial equivalence in what can be described following early sociologist Max Scheler as the compulsory and compulsive invention of a ‘new man’, *homo novus* in Pareto’s words⁵ in the substantive sense of a novel human type (and not

4. Dube et al. (2011, p. 1377) find that ‘antidemocratic political transitions have often been instigated, planned, and even partially executed from abroad, most notably by the US and the former Soviet Union during the Cold War. (e.g.) 24 country leaders were installed by the CIA and 16 by the KGB since the end of World War II. In the US, covert operations designed to overthrow foreign governments were usually first approved by the director of the CIA and then subsequently by the president of the US.’

5. In terms of what he terms ‘class-circulation’ involving the ‘circulation of individuals’ between upper and lower strata, Pareto (1963, pp. 1427, 1839) characterizes the “new man” as ‘the upstart, the parvenu’, citing the expression *homo novus* from Mommsen. Marshall (1961, pp. 163, 348) conceives a ‘new man’ exclusively in terms of economic activity and innovation such as ‘his energy and flexibility, his industry and care for small details’ in ‘bold and tireless enterprise’, being ‘in his element’ by ‘his quick resolutions and dexterous contrivances, and perhaps also a little by his natural recklessness.” Tocqueville (1945) apparently having in mind America observes that ‘among democratic nations it often happens that an officer has no property but his pay and no distinction but that of

literally a new man).

Specifically, both American capitalism or its main ideological rationalization and political ally, conservatism and Soviet socialism converge on and partially are equivalent in inventing coercively and compulsively what Scheler denotes in the opening citation a ‘new artificial man’ and thus implies that such an attempt at invention can only produce an artifice or mechanical construct. Conversely, by inventing the ‘new artificial man’ both systems aim to eliminate and in that sense to de-invent or deconstruct in a compulsory and compulsive way too, in Scheler’s (1964) words, ‘natural man’⁶, although they define and denounce the latter in their own distinct ways. On this account, the ‘new artificial man’ becomes through double external and internal compulsion the prime economic agent and generally social actor, briefly a role model in both American capitalism or conservatism and Soviet socialism. The two systems may ostensibly differ from and declaratively oppose and battle each other in multiple and even most respects, including their core economic, political and cultural elements, but they come close together in, as Scheler puts it, ‘producing a new artificial man’ as their shared human ideal expressing what Sorokin (2006) denotes the ‘psychology and mentality’ of the United States and Russia.

The general traits of the ‘new artificial man’ that both American capitalism/conservatism and Soviet socialism aim to invent and disseminate are, as Scheler implies, purity, perfection, immutability and universality. In brief, both produce and propagate a pure, perfect, immutable and universal ‘man’, in Sorokin’s (2006) words, the ‘universal soul’ of the United States and Russia. Consequently, American capitalism and Soviet socialism manifest a convergence on and partial equivalence in the invention and diffusion of the ‘new’ human type that, as supposedly pure, perfect, immutable and universal supersedes impure, imperfect, transient and particular ‘flesh and blood’ humans as they both find them in the real life (Bowles 1998; Gray and Silbey 2014; MacKenzie and Millo 2003; Stenhouse

military honors; consequently, as often as his duties change, his fortune changes and he becomes, as it were, a new man.’ In turn, Laski (1936) proposes that ‘Machiavelli’s prince might well stand as the portrait of the new man of his age.’ To preempt feminist and related objections, one understands throughout the essay the ‘new man’ or *homo novus* in gender neutral or inclusive terms to include both genders by analogy to ‘mankind’ understood to include ‘humankind’—i.e., as the new human ideal or type, not literally a new man, as feminism and similar, in Simmel’s words, ideology of ‘social hatred’ would construe and reject with disgust this concept.

6. Sombart (1928) also refers to Puritanism’s ‘transformation of the natural man in a rational man’ but apparently understands the latter in the sense of ‘economic man’ rather than what Parsons (1967, p. 57) terms ‘men of the humanistic Renaissance’ and by implication of the rationalistic Enlightenment, notably of science, as in essence the opposites of his ‘Puritans’. In this connection, Rettig and Pasamanick (1961, p. 22) comment that the ‘relationship between social class and the severity of judgment on generic moral issues (so cultural conservatism) is curvilinear, reaching a peak in the lower middle class and descending in the adjacent strata. (e.g.) Ascetic Protestantism (i.e.) Calvinism in the 16th century and Puritanism in the 17th century (were) movements of the lower middle class. (For Sombart), the lower middle class must be morally rigorous because otherwise it would jeopardize its own existence. (Its) moral rigidity also serves the function of expressing resentment against the higher classes.’

2012). In this regard, they converge on human and cultural purism, moral absolutism or perfectionism, immutability and universalism across and regardless of social space and time versus societal relativism and historical specificity (for related observations see Cooney and Burt 2008; Jouet 2017; Munch 2001).

As a corollary and specification, the ‘new artificial man’ explicitly in American capitalism or conservatism and by implication in Soviet socialism is essentially a species of saint in opposition to sinner as a ‘fallen man’, as Scheler implies in the opening citation for Protestant capitalist societies in response to Weber’s Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism thesis. In this regard, the two social systems and ideologies converge on the compulsory and compulsive reinvention and reproduction of saints or the life of sainthood, although they define them in their own distinct ways, in the economy and society, inventing and reproducing them out of sinners or imperfect humans and lives that they find to exist and numerically prevail in reality (Campbell and Schoenfeld 2013; Cooney and Burt 2008; Gorski 2003; Smilde 2005).

To that extent, American capitalism and Soviet socialism appear as the convergent and partly equivalent systems of the demographic prevalence and indeed economic-societal domination of presumed saints and the life of sainthood and the forcible extinction or subjection of sinners and ‘unholy’ or imperfect life. In brief, saints in certain forms predominate and their opposites are destined or forced to become an extinct or rarified species in both systems, linking the two despite their other differences. Hence, sainthood is the essence and primary defining and identifying element of the reinvented and diffused ‘new artificial man’ in American capitalism and Soviet socialism alike as they define and coercively enforce it in their own ways. As Scheler implies, the supposition and compulsory imposition (or compulsive self-imposition) of human sainthood, and conversely the observed fact that most humans evidently are not saints (or ‘angels’) who hence only exist as a fiction in an ‘imaginary community’ à la Durkheim, precisely render the American Protestant and Soviet socialist ‘new man’ (*homo soveticus*) into an artificial creature, so an artifice (for related insights see Cooney and Burt 2008; Fischer and Mattson 2009; Somers 1998).

This paper is to the writer’s best knowledge probably the first explicit endeavor to identify, argue, elaborate and specify the convergence of American capitalism/conservatism and Soviet socialism on the coercive (and obsessive) invention and diffusion of the ‘new artificial man’ that each defined, enforced and generalized in their distinct ways⁷. Therefore, the paper aims to contribute to the historical and comparative sociology of capitalism/conservatism and communism/socialism and their respective American and Soviet models. This is a potentially important contribution historically and comparatively because most previous accounts miss or downplay the fact or possibility that the two otherwise hostile social systems and ideologies during and in spite of the Cold War generally converged on and shared in the project, process and outcome

7. For example, Dahl (1985, p. 96) refers to the ‘New Soviet Man’ but does not analyze the latter in relation to the American counterpart and thus does not posit their convergence or commonality.

of the compulsory and compulsive invention and dissemination of the 'new artificial man' as a novel human idea, with some particular variations. The paper is especially continuous with and builds on Scheler's original insights about the Protestant design of 'producing a new artificial man' but goes beyond them by specifically applying them to American Calvinist capitalism/conservatism as an exemplary application and especially expanding them to Soviet socialism that his framework does not comprise yet. It also elaborates and expands on earlier related observations, specifically Sorokin's observation of the similar 'psychology and mentality' and indeed the 'universal soul' of the United States and Russia and those that American capitalism and Soviet and other socialism shared moralistic and repressive 'Puritanism' in religious and non-religious meanings, respectively (Faris 1961; Kelley 1984; Meyer 1967; Tiryakian 1981; Wallerstein and Zukin 1989).

The paper proposes, investigates and demonstrates their convergence on this 'new man' project, process and outcome. Especially, it estimates whether and to what degree American capitalism/conservatism and Soviet socialism have succeeded to reinvent, disseminate and reproduce the 'new man' as characterized—or failed to do so and in which extent. For that purpose, the paper constructs a qualitative 'new man' index composed of certain components such as the indicators and proxies of this supposed human model. It also calculates quantitative 'new man' indexes for American capitalism/conservatism or the US and Soviet socialism or its descendant and proxy, contemporary Russia, as well as for other comparable societies such as OECD countries for comparison and contrast. To wit, high positive quantitative indexes would indicate the success in this process of inventing and diffusing the 'new man', and conversely. The main empirical result is that both social systems or countries have failed to reinvent and propagate the 'new man' to the effect of sharing a clear and complete failure. Thus, their 'new man' indexes are substantially low, specifically that of the US being the single and of Russia the third lowest among contemporary societies, and indeed negative, thus indicating such a shared failure.

The remainder of the paper continues as follows. Section 2 argues and demonstrates the convergence of American capitalism/conservatism and Soviet communism or socialism on the compulsory invention of the 'new man' and elaborates and specifies the main characteristics of the latter. Section 3 constructs a 'new man' index comprising certain indicators and proxies of the latter as its components. Section 4 presents the results of an empirical analysis, such as numerical 'new man' indexes for American capitalism and Soviet socialism, or the US and Russia, respectively. Section 5 engages in a discussion in light of the empirical results. Section 6 concludes and draws theoretical implications and directions for further research.

2 Convergence On Inventing The 'New Man'

American capitalism or conservatism and Soviet socialism display their convergence on the conception and compulsory invention and production of the 'new man', Pareto's *homo novus* exalted as the supposed pure, perfect,

immutable and universal human type, simply a universal ideal. This amounts to their converging on conceiving, inventing and producing a ‘new artificial man’ so long as the attempted invention of a human type typically produces an artifice, as Scheler implies, and in that sense approximates a process of ideological fabrication or an act of simulation (as observed for America overall in Baudrillard 1999). This shared fabrication of the ‘new artificial man’ connects with or parallels the tendency of both systems to engage in the ideological manufacturing or political simulation of ‘democracy’ and ‘freedom’ even if defining the latter in their own respective theocratic and communist or rather socialist ways and relatedly in the “politics of dissimulation” especially during McCarthyism/Reaganism and Stalinism, respectively (Bourdieu 1998; Habermas 2001; Gross et al. 2011; Jacobs and Dirlam 2016; Pontikes et al. 2010; for broader remarks see Correll et al. 2017). The two systems claimed both to have invented the ‘new man’ and to have produced the ‘true and only’ democracy and freedom, thus having the ‘best’ people and being the ‘most democratic’ and ‘freest’ alike—simply, ‘the best’, as Reagan et al. explicitly proclaimed and their Soviet counterparts implied (Baudrillard 1999; Beck 2000; Jouet 2017).

Conversely, both social systems and ideologies strongly distrust, devalue and seek to eliminate what Scheler calls ‘natural man’ regarded as the distant antecedent, antithesis and enemy of the ‘new artificial man’. They therefore attempt to discredit, eradicate or subdue and in that sense de-invent or deconstruct real-life impure and imperfect ‘flesh and blood’ human agents in society (Gray and Silbey 2014; MacKenzie and Millo 2003; Stenhouse 2012). Thus, they identify and fear actual ‘natural man’ as the aberration from and nemesis of their own ‘new man’ ideal and essentially incongruous with both American capitalism or conservatism (as opposed to liberalism⁸) and Soviet socialism. This suggests that the two converge on abolishing human spontaneity and reality and thus spontaneous, real-life social interactions in favor of, as Scheler implies, artificial humans, artifices, compulsory actions and simulations (also, Adorno 2001; Arendt 1951; Merton 1968). Both American capitalism/conservatism and Soviet socialism endow and celebrate the ‘new artificial man’ with the qualities of purity, perfection, immutability and universality in opposition to the inverse traits of ‘natural man’, notably impurity and imperfection. Simply, for both systems this is a pure, perfect, immutable and universal ‘man’ as a supreme human ideal to supersede ‘natural man’ as the condemned opposite.

Consequently, by virtue of the above qualities the ‘new artificial man’ represents or approximate a kind of saint, an embodiment of sainthood in both American capitalism/conservatism and Soviet socialism. In this regard,

8. Lynd (1993, p. 1595) comments that ‘American liberalism is forever announcing its impending fulfillment in a new continent, a new man, a new deal, a new frontier, or a new covenant. But the liberal vision of a commonwealth of equal citizens is pasted over the continuing hierarchical relation between employer and employee.’ If so, this implies that the ‘new man’ of American liberalism, while not explicitly defined, fundamentally differs from that of conservatism that instead envisions a commonwealth of unequal citizens and even from capitalism that continues the ‘hierarchical relation between employer and employee.’

both systems converge on recreating saints from humans and enacting a life of sainthood out of the real life in the economy and society overall, thus what Weber (1976) calls, especially with regard to Calvinism and its Anglo-American extension Puritanism, ‘sanctification’ of economic and all social life (also, Brink 2014; Gorski 2003; Hartz⁹ 1963; Smilde 2005; White 2006). The ‘new artificial man’ in American capitalism/conservatism and Soviet socialism alike is primarily a species of saint so long as most humans in Scheler’s implicit view naturally and factually are not saints or angels as perfect emanations of super- and non-human attributes (Cooney and Burt 2008; Fischer and Mattson 2009; Somers 1998). Alternatively, the ‘new man’ in both social systems and ideologies is an ‘artificial’ creature primarily because of being or claiming to be a saint and pursuing or approaching a life of sainthood via ‘sanctification’ of all life, which is what Scheler implies and Weber (1976) denotes an ‘impossible contradiction’ for most real-life humans, thus a sort of ‘impossibility theorem’ for the latter.

Accordingly, American capitalism/conservatism and Soviet communism/socialism share the tendency to reinvent and transform by coercion and indoctrination humans as they find them in existence into the ‘new artificial man’ by reinventing and transforming them into saints placed in a different reality or conceivable future. In this sense, these social systems construct and reside in an alternate world that ultimately turns out to be a fiction so long as most real-life human beings are not and cannot be made super- and non-human saints. For instance, this is what their shared and failed alcohol Prohibition as an exercise in compulsion demonstrated, as did their other temperance wars on ‘private immorality’, including the ‘war on drugs’ especially in American conservatism since Reaganism (Kelley 1984; also, Campbell and Schoenfeld 2013; Cooney and Burt 2008; Mueller 2013; Thaler 2018).

The general substance, core of the ‘new artificial man’ and thus of the saint is similar in American capitalism/conservatism and Soviet socialism, although not identical. In both systems and ideologies, the ‘new artificial man’ as the saint is a purist or perfectionist, which makes them converge on what Keynes (1936) would call human-actor purism (although not on his notion of ‘financial purism’). Specifically, the ‘new artificial man’ qua the saint is in American capitalism or conservatism, as Scheler implies, a Protestant-dogmatic, more precisely Calvinist, purist—simply, a Puritan or Puritanical subject (Adorno 2001; Faris 1961; Jouet

9. Hartz (1963, p. 369) actually claims that ‘fragmentation would detach Puritanism from the European past, would elevate it to the rank of a national absolute, (yet) in secular terms): the movement of Locke from the Old World (‘the depravations of Europe’) to the New, not quite the movement of Calvin.’ This claim oddly denies or overlooks that Puritanism established a ‘coercive theocracy’ in colonial America after Calvin’s model in Geneva (the ‘Holy Commonwealth’, ‘Christian Sparta’) and thus perpetuated the ‘European past’ and transmitted the ‘depravations of Europe’ to the ‘New’ world and generally represented the ‘most totalitarian’ species of Calvinism (as showed in Kaufman 2008; Munch 2001; Stivers 1994; Zaret 1989). On this account, such claims are either historical errors or attempts at rationalization and rehabilitation of Puritanism and thus what Weber (1976, p. 37) diagnoses as its ‘unexampled tyranny’ exercised through the ‘theocracy of New England.’

2017; Kelley 1984; Mueller 2009; Munch 2001; Scitovsky 1972; Wagner 1997). In Soviet and related socialism, the equivalent or analogue is a non-Protestant and generally nonreligious purist or puritan, aside from some religious connotations or exceptions, as in communist but still Orthodox Christian Russia, as well as Catholic Poland and Cuba within the former Warsaw pact and beyond (Faris 1961; Kelley 1984; Sorokin 2006; Tiryakian 1981; Wallerstein and Zukin 1989).

As a corollary, the ‘new artificial man’ assumes in American capitalism/conservatism the shape of a Calvinist saint, Puritan, evangelical crusader, Christian angel and the like. In this regard, this novel human creature is an emanation of what Schumpeter (1991) calls *homo religiosus* deemed an exemplar of irrational *homines* and an antithesis of *homo economicus* (also, Iannaccone¹⁰ 1998). The American *homo religiosus* arises in declarative disgust of—but probably, given what Weber (1976) refers to as the Puritan ‘pure hypocrisy’ of ‘Americanism’, secret admiration and intense envy for—and revolt against, in Schumpeter’s words, *homo eroticus* à la Freud, yet in a Weberian elective affinity and intimate relationship with *homo economicus* within Calvinist or evangelical capitalism. In turn, the ‘new artificial man’ in Soviet and similar socialism takes on the form of a non-materialistic, non-individualistic, non-egoistic and public-spirited person such as a socialist personality type and in that sense a ‘saint’ or ‘angel’ in these nonreligious terms¹¹ but seemingly equivalent or similar to the original ‘Christian man’ ideal, as Pareto implies, and also Sorokin (2006) in reference to the Russian Orthodox Church. By analogy, this creature is an incarnation of what following Schumpeter can be tentatively termed *homo collectivus*, more precisely, *homo soveticus* with Puritan-like hypocrisy or insincerity (Zinoviev¹²

10. Like most rational choice theorists as well as religionists, Iannaccone (1998, 1492) takes on the mantle of a prophet by prophesizing that the ‘economics of religion will eventually bury two myths—that of *homo economicus* as a cold creature with neither need nor capacity for piety, and that of *homo religiosus* as a benighted throwback to pre-rational times.’ But most rational choice theorists as well as ‘libertarian’ economists prove to be what Samuelson (1983) referring to Hayek’s prophecy of the welfare state as the ‘road to serfdom’ deems false prophets.

11. Mises (1951) predicts that the ‘new man of Socialism will be free from base self-seeking; he will be morally infinitely above the man of the frightful age of private property and from a profound knowledge of the coherency of things and from a noble perception of duty he will devote all his powers to the general welfare.’ However, he seems too blinded by his vehement and dogmatic anti-socialism—by lumping together Scandinavian social democracy and the US New Deal with Russian communism—to realize that his picture of the ‘new man of Socialism’ is essentially identical to that of the American and other ‘new Christian man’. Instead, this is what Pareto (2000, p. 53) suggests by noting the ‘resemblance’ of socialism with Christianity, including ‘its resemblance to the Protestant Reformation.’ Pareto (2000, p. 54) elaborates on this resemblance by observing the rise of ‘similar anticipations’ of the future among socialists and the millenarian Christians. In addition, he notes that ‘Catholics, Protestants and socialists, they all feel more or less carried by the religious wave’ as well as that ‘many people imagine that they can effectively combat socialism by combating (Marx’s) theories, just as others believed it possible to combat Christianity effectively by pointing out the scientific errors of the Bible’ (Pareto 2000, pp. 90, 99).

12. Zinoviev [1985, p. 53] states that the Soviet Man ‘would be glad to be [sincere],

1985), in contradiction to individualistic *homo economicus* and largely, but not invariably, to *homo religiousus* while being in complicated, ambiguous relations to *homo eroticus*.

In passing, the ‘new man’ that Nazism invented is a saint or purist in the sense of the ‘pure’ Catholic, Lutheran and other Christian, moralistic and conservative German belonging to the wider family of authoritarian conservatism or rightism through Hitler’s promised ‘broad coalition of the right’ (Bourdieu and Haacke 1995; Ferguson and Voth 2008; Mann 2004; Satyanath Voigtländer, and Voth 2017). The new Nazi and generally ‘Fascist man’ (Esping-Andersen 1990) is hence an emanation of *homo religiousus* in conjunction with *homo economicus*—given Nazism’s preservation of capitalism, notably large-scale private industry and alliance with major capitalists a la Krupp et al. and the stock market—and opposition to (mixed with glorification for) *homo eroticus*, thus being closer to that of American Puritanical conservatism than to that of Soviet socialism¹³. In this connection, Sorokin (2006) suggests that Nazism was more brutal than Soviet socialism and pre-socialist Russia remarking that the ‘traditional policy’ of the Russian government toward subject populations has been ‘extraordinarily fair and generous’ and the ‘number of victims’ of the Russian Revolution is ‘negligible’ compared to the ‘tens of millions of persons,’ largely foreigners, suffering extermination by the Nazis.

In addition, the ‘new Islamic man’ that Islamism creates due to being a saint-puritan and holy warrior qua jihadist and thus another emanation of *homo religiousus* is essentially equivalent to the Calvinist saint, Puritan or evangelical crusader—who is basically a Christian jihadist imposing a Biblical equivalent of Sharia law, as in the US ‘Bible Belt’—in American religious conservatism (Edgell, Gerteis and Hartmann 2006; Juergensmeyer 2003; Mueller 2009; Turner 2002). This is consistent with the functional equivalence between Islam and Calvinism/Puritanism in terms of theocracy and religious revolution and war, along with the doctrine of predestination, as Weber (1968) classically shows in his comparative sociology of religion.

but he can't, because he considers that he is always sincere in one respect or another. So if he is ready to change one sincerity into another from one minute to the next, this isn't a sign of insincerity.’

13. Kirkpatrick (1937, p. 652) remarks that the Nazi ‘attitude toward sex is a mixture of Puritanism, glorification of vital forces and a vague desire to reconcile a moralist attitude toward illegitimacy with exigencies of population politics.’ Merton (1939, p. 437) observes that *Puritanism’s* New England Primer ‘finds its analogue in the various Nazi primers (viz.) the displacement of aggression against a convenient out-group (especially in periods of economic strain (plus) the impugning of out-group morality (and other) myths and tactics of nativist movements before and since.’ Woodard (1938, p. 645) states that Puritanism and modern Fascism share the ‘masochistic ecstasy of pain (or) moral masochism’. Fromm (1941, p. 96) suggests that ‘Luther and Calvin psychologically prepared (new) man for the role which he had to assume in modern society: of feeling his own self to be insignificant and of being ready to subordinate his life exclusively for purposes which were not his own. Once man was ready to become nothing but the means for the glory of a God who represented neither justice nor love, he was sufficiently prepared to accept the role of a servant to the economic machine—and eventually a “Fuhrer”.’

Characteristics Of The 'New Man'

As noted, the 'new artificial man' of American capitalism/conservatism is a Calvinist saint, Puritan, evangelical crusader and generally Christian angel, thus the epitome of *homo religiousus*, in opposition and 'holy' war against *homo eroticus* but in an affinity and alliance with *homo economicus* within a Weberian Protestant ethic and capitalist spirit framework. In turn, the 'new artificial man' in Soviet socialism is a non-materialistic, non-individualistic, non-egoistic and public-spirited person, thus an exemplar of *homo collectivus* in the form of *homo soveticus* (Soviet man), aiming to supersede individualistic bourgeois *homo economicus* as well as to some degree *homo religiousus* while standing in ambivalent relations to *homo eroticus* (Smirnov 1980; for a criticism see Zinoviev 1985).

First, both the American and Soviet 'new artificial man' is a saint, although of different kinds. The American capitalist or conservative 'new artificial man' is a Calvinist saint, pursuing the life of sainthood after the model and image of original saints in Calvinism since Calvin in 16th century France, albeit most US Calvinists and religious Americans overall do not seem aware that their master was a French born, raised and educated near Paris¹⁴, as well as the French-speaking Swiss town of Geneva (Benedict 2002; Brint 2014; Gorski 2003). Similarly, the Soviet or Russian 'new artificial man' is a saint but of a non-Calvinist and so nonreligious kind, aiming at the life of secular sainthood explicitly or implicitly after the ideal and vision of primitive and modern communism or rather socialism, hence the new, 'socialist type of personality' as a product of the 'revolutionary transition to a new form of society'¹⁵ (Smirnov 1980).

Consequently, the American 'new artificial man' by being a saint is a consistent and ultimate ascetic, a human incarnation of what Weber (1976) identifies and emphasizes as intense and permanent Calvinist asceticism (also, Akerlof 2007; Young 2009). Such a human creature is the face of, in J. S. Mill's words, humanity 'abnegated' through 'Christian self-denial' as the essence and substance of Calvinist asceticism, including by implication masochism mixed with sadism (Adorno 2001; Altemeyer 2007; Fromm 1941). Reportedly, Calvinism is not just an overwhelming and coercive external force ('out there') in a 'sick society, but also within', thus inside the American and similar, especially Anglo-Saxon, ascetic 'new man' (Stenhouse 2012). In a similar vein, the Soviet

14. On a lighter note, given their 'blissful ignorance' of other societies, regions and cultures, most Texan and other Southern Calvinists or 'born again' evangelicals upon hearing that Jean (not John) Calvin was born, raised and educated near Paris (Nayon) might think of Paris, Texas, if not that Paris, France received its famous name after it (Davis 2010).

15. Smirnov (1980, p. 10) states that the 'emergence in the USSR and other socialist countries of a new type of personality is a fact of outstanding historical importance, acknowledged throughout the world by both the friends and enemies of communism. The shaping and development of this new type of personality is a result of the revolutionary transition to a new form of society, of the building of socialism and communism (i.e.) the socialist type of personality.'

'new artificial man' is an ascetic, although of a non-Calvinist, nonreligious variety and perhaps in a lesser degree or less disciplined way than the American Calvinist counterpart, specifically an emanation of primitive and modern communist or socialist asceticism. Likewise, this is the facet of 'abnegated' humanity through, as Pareto suggests, 'Christian-style self-denial' or its non-Christian variation manifesting communist or socialist asceticism by possessing 'outstanding moral and ideological qualities' (Smirnov 1980). And just as Calvinism in America, socialism is both a prevailing and coercive external force in a pathological society and within humans, so inside the 'new Soviet (ascetic) Man' (Dahl 1985; Smirnov 1980).

A particularly salient and indeed perpetual aspect of such Calvinist asceticism via abnegation or self-denial consists of what Scheler denotes 'unchastity', creating the 'external espionage system' against it, as well as 'drinking, vice and luxury of all sorts' in America and other Protestant countries. Scheler therefore apparently refers to the criminalization of pre- and extra-marital 'unchastity' through adultery and fornication laws and the prohibition of prostitution leading to what contemporaries Sombart and Mencken as well as Taine earlier diagnose as 'prudery' in America¹⁶ (as well as England) since its Calvinist colonial beginning through present days (Adamczyk and Hayes. 2012; Davis 2010; Gorski 2003)..

In addition, Scheler presciently thereby predicts alcohol Prohibition in America that was driven by Calvinist asceticism through evangelical temperance movements and wars, as well as its vestiges during Reaganism—for example, the increased legal drinking age from 18 to 21, the highest in the West and among all OECD countries--and in what Merton (1968) calls 'dry' states in the South. Moreover, he therefore implicitly predicts Reagan's Puritanical 'war on drugs' causing an unparalleled explosion of the prison population through mass incarceration of drug users as moral offenders (Campbell and Schoenfeld 2013; Cooney and Burt 2008; Mueller 2009). As a result, the American 'new artificial man' is a model of chastity and non-drinking as well as of no-drug use, an invariably and supremely chaste and anti-alcohol human creature whose principle of action or credo is, as Weber (1976), Sombart (1928) and other scholars note, Calvinist asceticism's injunction--'work is good; sex is evil' (Stenhouse 2012).

In addition, a manifest, though less persistent, dimension of communist or rather socialist asceticism is 'unchastity', also resulting in an 'external espionage system' against it, just as, at least temporarily, 'drinking, vice and luxury of all sorts', in the Soviet Union and to a lesser extent other countries, including China and Cuba, under socialism (Tiryakian¹⁷ 1981; Wallerstein and Zukin 1989).

16. Scheler's contemporary Sombart (1928, p. 62) observes that in Protestant 'Anglo-Saxon peoples chastity degenerated into prudery. And Puritanism has certainly done much to develop in English and in U.S. states of New England this false modesty and the hypocrisy in sexual matters, which have persisted to this day.' Mencken (2006, p. 232) detects the 'somewhat diffident prudery of the 40's (in the 19th century) and the astoundingly ferocious and uncompromising vice-crusading of today', namely the 1910-20s in America. Similarly, Taine (1885, p. 238) reports that in late 19th-century England Protestant 'religious prudery often leads to hypocrisy.'

17. Tiryakian (1981, p. 1049) observes that the 'persistent affinity' between Puritanism

Thus, just as America and other Protestant countries, the Soviet Union induced by socialist asceticism enacted the prohibition of prostitution permanently since its founding and even its own alcohol prohibition transiently during the 1980s apparently inspired by or emulating religion-driven American Prohibition. To that extent, almost like the American counterpart, the Soviet 'new artificial man' is an example of chastity, a chaste human, although in a somewhat lesser degree or less disciplined way, whose precept of conduct or motto is socialist asceticism's Calvinist-style stipulation 'work is good; sex is shame' in the sense of 'private immorality' (Kelley 1984).

Second and as a corollary, both the American and Soviet 'new artificial man' is essentially an unfree human actor, although in different forms or degrees. Thus, the American 'new artificial man' is a Calvinist unfree human creature. This trait of the 'new artificial man' is consistent with Calvinism as the religious system of unfreedom, even in Weber's (1976) words, the 'most absolutely unbearable church control' of individuals and thus suppression of their freedom through 'Biblical theocracy' as 'Divinely ordained', as well as with Calvin's predestination dogma that by its 'extreme inhumanity' axiomatically denies human free will or freedom of choice (also, Brink 2014; Friedman 2011). That this new human creature is in essence unfree by being denied freedom of choice is what also J. S. Mill suggests observing that the 'Calvinistic theory' stipulates 'You have no choice; thus you must do, and no otherwise.' Hence, Calvinism proclaims to the American 'new artificial man' directly or via Calvinist evangelicalism: 'do what you're told and you'll be all right; don't dig too deep into yourself' (Stenhouse 2012, p. 151).

Accordingly, the American 'new artificial man' by being deprived of the freedom of choice endures and indeed endorses and perpetuates the 'most absolutely unbearable church control' of individuals by Calvinist 'Biblical theocracy,' simply what Weber (1976) terms 'Bibliocracy', such as the reportedly proto-totalitarian 'Bible Belt' in the US South that lasted for several ante- and post-bellum centuries with no end in sight and instead reviving, intensifying and expanding to the rest of conservative America during current times (Bauman 1997; Mueller 2009). For example, this novel creature submitted or resigned to alcohol Prohibition with its various replays and vestiges, including the dramatically increased legal drinking age and 'dry' states in this region and beyond, and its sequel the Reagan 'war on drugs' (let alone the prohibition of prostitution) in America as if they were Divine commandments rather than, as Pareto (1963, 2000) describes them, instances of the US government's compulsory 'enforcement of morality by law' driven by Calvinist, notably Puritan, 'religious and sectarian sentiments'.

More broadly, this 'new artificial man' because of the Calvinist denial of freedom of choice is invented and conditioned to be a fundamentally anti-revolutionary and in that sense anti-change conservative human actor for whom no second American revolution will or should ever happen despite the actual potential or hypothetical possibility for the approximation of the conditions

and revolution is a 'phenomenon observable in a wide range of political revolutions, from the English revolution of the 17th century to the Chinese and Cuban ones of (the 20th century).'

causing the first (on anti-revolutionary neo-Calvinism see Van der Kroef 1948). In this regard, this is a fundamentally unfree 'man' because of the incapacity to imagine, let alone create, a different future of society caused by, as J. S. Mill implies, the 'Calvinistic theory' suppressing all human capacities and free actions in favor of blind obedience to what he calls the 'alleged will of God'. Counterfactually, such a conservative 'new artificial man' would have perpetuated the condition and structure of society, or just stopped acting, prior to the American revolution and the Civil War--feudalism or colonial rule and slavery as the 'will of God' (Blanchard 2007; Manent 1998).

The preceding also holds for the Soviet 'new artificial man', with proper modifications. The Soviet 'new artificial man' as the socialist type of personality is essentially an unfree human consistent with state socialism as the nonreligious system of unfreedom and control, although perhaps less intense, disciplined, strident and enduring than Calvinism and its theocracy and generally religion-driven regimes or movements (Friedland 2001; Juergensmeyer 2003). This applies to the extent that, like Calvinism, state socialism denies free will or freedom of choice to individuals and command 'you must do, and no otherwise', although on different, nonreligious and thus somewhat less stringent or 'sacred' grounds. It follows that the Soviet 'new artificial man' due to having no freedom of choice withstands and even supports and sustains repressive communist-party rule by resulting from and rejoicing the 'building of socialism' (Smirnov 1980), although for a much shorter time (around 70 years) than does the American counterpart (instead doing this perpetually) and even contributing to and witnessing its eventual end (Baudrillard 1994; Habermas 2001). For instance, like the American counterpart, this new human creature submitted or resigned to the Soviet version of alcohol Prohibition at least temporarily, as well as to the long restriction on foreign travel, the prohibition of prostitution and other restrictions of political and personal freedoms as if they were 'objective laws' of state socialism rather than exercises of arbitrary state power analogous to the US government's imposition of puritanical morality by law

Generally, like the first, the Soviet 'new artificial man' is produced to be a fundamentally anti-revolutionary and thus anti-change conservative human actor not making or expecting a second revolution but instead persisting in the 'building of socialism' in spite of the actual or potential approximation of the conditions leading to the first, with the difference that a kind of quasi- or peaceful anti-Soviet revolution still occurred to end socialism and make the Soviet Union a disunion (Habermas 2001). In this sense, like the American counterpart, the Soviet human type is a fundamentally unfree 'man' with no genuine convictions—reproducing Soviet Russia as a 'society of chameleons'¹⁸--because of the incapacity, at least for some time, to imagine and create a different future of society due to communism

18. Zinoviev (1985, p. 74) depicts the Soviet Man as follows: 'I haven't got any convictions. If a man has convictions it is a sign that he is not intellectually mature (and) more often convictions have no effect on people's behavior. They merely beautify vanity, relieve unclear consciences and cover up stupidity. indeterminacy, fluidity, mutability, block- and multi-think are peculiarities of Soviet society (as) a society of chameleons.'

or rather socialism, like Calvinism, devaluating most human capacities and free actions in favor of its supposed 'laws' (Zinoviev 1985).

As a consequence or correlate of their denied freedom of choice, both the American and Soviet 'new artificial man' is a sinless human, living what Calvinism imposes and socialism implies as, in Weber's (1976) words, a life 'free of sin', thus out of coercive necessity rather (or more) than free choice, albeit in different forms or degrees. Especially, the American 'new man' is a Calvinist sinless human being invented and conditioned to be and live a life totally and unconditionally 'free of sin', as Calvinism defines it and J. S. Mill, Weber, Scheler, Pareto, Sombart and other scholars classically imply. This fully accords with Calvinism's injunction that, as J. S. Mill puts it, 'whatever is not a duty, is a sin'. More broadly, it is consistent with what Scheler identifies as Calvinism's (Protestant dogmatics) 'extreme distrust of natural man as completely corrupted by original sin'. In this sense, the American 'new artificial man' not only is or leads a sinless human being or life but also is forced or resigns to somehow expiate and indeed in some situations to punish severely and cruelly¹⁹ by association other humans for 'original sin' by, as Pareto²⁰ notes, tormenting oneself and others, although 'natural man' perpetrated it (Graafland 2014; Rawls 2010).

On this account, such a tendency to tormenting oneself and others for present and past transgressions reveals what sociologists and social psychologists call a compounded 'sadistic-masochistic' and generally authoritarian personality structure that typifies conservatism and Calvinist Puritanism (Adorno 2001; Altemeyer 2007; Calhoun 1925; Fromm 1941; Miller, Slomczynski, and Kohn 1987; Woodard 1937). It follows that the American 'new artificial man' has an intense and perpetual dual obsession with current sin and vice and with 'original sin' and seeks proscription and eradication of the first and masochistic self-punishment (or alternatively self-absolution) and severe, even if delayed, sadistic punishment of others by association for the second (Mueller 2013; Wagner 1997).

The above applies to the Soviet 'new artificial man' as well, with appropriate qualifications. Like the American counterpart, the Soviet 'new artificial man' is a sinless human but of a non-Calvinist and nonreligious variety also reproduced to

19. Ross (1912, p. 489) remarks that the Calvinist 'doctrine of election in its crude form would accentuate the tendency to cruelty in Calvinism.' To that extent, this implies that the American Calvinist sinless 'new man' is largely a cruel human type, but the producers of the latter do not state or acknowledge cruelty, so the paper does not consider such an attribute; this also applies to the Soviet counterpart.

20. Pareto (2000, p. 107) observes that 'certain men experience great delight in tormenting themselves and others', invoking the Scotch Presbyterian clergy's code that 'all the natural affections, all the pleasures of society, all the pastimes, all the gay instincts of the human heart were so many sins.' Pareto (2000, p. 107) adds that 'long before, the monks had carried this kind of (Protestant) insanity to the utmost limit', citing the observation that 'pleasure and crime were synonyms in the monastic (and Puritan) idiom' and concluding that 'they still are to our modern ascetics.' Calhoun (1925, p. 53) describes the 'natural Puritanism of a 'pain economy' and thus implies Puritan sadism-masochism. MacCracken (1927, p. 368) registers that the 'older Puritanism of conduct (was) intolerant.' More broadly, Finney (1927, p. 208) identifies the 'swinging pendulums in history—as from Puritanism to Bohemianism and back again'.

live a life 'free of sin' as the 'building of socialism' (Smirnov 1980) redefines it, although in a lesser degree or less disciplined manner than the first. This accords with socialism's explicit or implicit Calvinist-like declaration that 'whatever is not a duty, is a sin' in its nonreligious redefinition, aside from its earlier religious definitions, such as those of the Orthodox Christian Church in socialist and even more pre-revolutionary (and probably post-socialist) Russia, as Sorokin implies (along with Catholicism Poland or Cuba). At this juncture, Sorokin (2006) suggests that the Russian Orthodox Church in its 'spirit and philosophy' holds an 'intermediate position between Roman Catholicism and Protestantism', especially that the principle of Caesarism as dictatorial rule has definitely 'far less authentic expression in the Russian ecclesiastical system than in Roman Catholicism or Calvinism'.

Unlike the American counterpart, however, the Soviet 'new artificial man' only strives to become or lead a sinless human being or life and is neither forced nor resigns to atone and punish others for 'original sin' because of being of a non-Calvinist, nonreligious type, barring some religious exceptions as noted above and especially Sorokin (2006) emphasizes by the religiously based 'psychology and mentality', indeed 'universal soul' of Russia, just as of the United States. Due to the absence of 'original sin', this human type probably shows lower degrees of sadism and masochism by instead possessing 'outstanding' ethical and other qualities (Smirnov 1980), at least of those religiously induced, as well as less endurance, consistency, conviction and trust (Zinoviev²¹ 1985) than the American counterpart, as its effective euthanasia shows through the peaceful death of Soviet and similar socialism (Baudrillard 1994; Habermas 2001).

Third and consequently, both the American and Soviet 'new artificial man' is a puritan, although in different forms, meanings or degrees. Specifically, the American capitalist/conservative 'new artificial man' is a Puritan in the form and sense of a specifically Anglo-Saxon Calvinist purist or saint. Therefore, the aforesaid of the Calvinist saint defining this 'new artificial man' holds for the Puritan in particular, with some additional extensions and accentuations consistent with that Puritanism is the American-English extension and intensification, notably the most 'totalitarian' or repressive and moralistic species, of French Calvinism occasionally going beyond the latter, for example, by the prohibition of alcohol and sex cum 'fornication' that even Calvin permitted or tolerated (Kaufman 2008; Munch 2001; Stivers 1994). Hence, the American 'new artificial man' is specifically a Calvinist Puritan, and not any puritan or purist that exists in various shapes and shades in other Christian branches and virtually all religions, especially Islam paralleling Calvinism/Puritanism, as well as ideologies, including communism and socialism.

As a consequence, this new human type represents, or is conditioned to be, a 'pure man' in moral and religious terms or 'purified' from any such impurities, compatible with Puritanism and Puritans claiming to be the only 'pure' church/morality and humans. In this sense, the American 'new artificial man' becomes

21. Zinoviev (1985, p. 202) cites the Soviet Man: 'Do not trust anyone. Remember, the more you trust, the more cynically they will deceive you.'

the Puritan model of purity or purification in matters of morality and religion (Gunther 2014; Wagner 1997). And such a 'new man attains purity or rather is subjected to compulsory purification almost invariably through the imposition and generalization of Puritan morality and to some degree religion by overt or subtle coercion, including mass imprisonment and potentially (e.g., for drug and sexual offenses) widespread death sentences and executions.

As a result, the American 'new artificial man' while constructed as a perfect Puritan and supremely pure human faces in reality the strongest prospect of being imprisoned for moral impurities (e.g., alcohol and drug uses, prostitution) and even sentenced to death and executed among Western and adjacent societies such as OECD countries (Becky and Western 2004; Jacobs, Carmichael, and Kent 2005). For instance, Pareto²² (1963) observes in the United States 'a mass of hypocritical laws for the enforcement of morality' which he characterizes as 'replicas of laws of the European Middle Ages', thus referring to Prohibition and predicting its sequels like the 'war on drugs' and the resulting explosion of the prison population and the potential application of the death penalty (e.g., for drug trade in the federal law). In extension, the American 'new artificial man' remains a Puritanical human type even after the demise or official disestablishment of Puritanism during the early 19th century and its succession by mostly Puritan-inspired evangelicalism (Barro and McCleary 2005; Munch 2001). This means remaining substantively a Calvinist Puritan, save in form or name. For example, 'Puritanical' evangelicals, allied with other religious groups, including orthodox Catholics, within the theocratic Christian Right, reportedly continue to oppose the right to abortion, as well as scientific progress and liberal democracy, in modern America (Mueller 2009; also, Bénabou, Ticchi and Vindigni 2015; Domhoff 2013; Keister 2008).

Likewise, the Soviet 'new artificial man' is a puritan, albeit of a non-Calvinist and generally nonreligious variety²³ (Faris 1961; Kelley 1984) in the form of possessing 'outstanding' moral qualities resulting from the 'building of socialism' (Smirnov 1980). Accordingly, the above about the Soviet kind of saint or ascetic applies to this variety of puritan or purist, with some additions and specifications. This is consistent with that Soviet and to a lesser degree other communism developed and functioned as a nonreligious variation or emulation of moral puritanism or purism, even manifesting some similarities with specifically religious, Calvinist Puritanism (Tiryakian 1981; Wallerstein and Zukin 1989).

In a way, the Soviet 'new artificial man' is a puritan without Puritanism and more broadly religion, abstracting from some possible puritanical or

22. Pareto thus implies that the American 'new artificial man' is in fact a 'hypocritical' human, as does Weber (1976, p. 52) by referring to the 'pure hypocrisy' of Puritan-rooted 'Americanism', but since the inventors of this human type do not propose or admit this trait, the present paper does not consider it.

23. Faris (1961, p. 4) remarks that 'Marx's successors in modern Russia conspicuously emphasize many of the (Puritan) personal values and with no credit acknowledgment to Puritanism or a Protestant ethic.' Also, Kelley (1984, p. 701) observes that 'emphatic condemnations, in the Yankee mode, of private immorality (come) from the (Soviet) authorities.'

ascetic influences of the Russian Christian Orthodox Church (or Catholicism in Poland during socialism and Cuba) that Sorokin (2006) implies by noting its ‘intermediate position between Roman Catholicism and Protestantism’. Like the American counterpart, this human type consequently is (conditioned to be) a ‘pure man’ morally and ideologically or ‘purified’ from any impurities in this regard consistent with the claim of communism or socialism and communists to be a ‘pure’ morality/ideology and ‘outstanding’ persons of a nonreligious kind (Smirnov 1980). Thus, just as the first, the second becomes the model of purity or purification in the domain of morality and by contrast also in ideology instead of religion. Likewise, the Soviet ‘new artificial man’ reaches purity or is subjected to purification typically through the coercive imposition and generalization—although perhaps in a less severe, consistent or disciplined manner—of socialist ‘outstanding’ moral qualities, as of ideology, including mass imprisonment and executions especially during the early phases of socialism, though in Sorokin’s (2006) account ‘negligible’ compared to Nazism. For illustration, for this human type ‘outstanding’ moral qualities includes the prohibitions of prostitution, some forms of sex and drugs enduringly and of alcohol temporarily, just as does all of these for the American Puritan counterpart perpetually. Still, unlike the latter following the official demise of Puritanism, the Soviet, including Russian, ‘new artificial man’ mainly ceases to be a puritanical human type and instead almost turns into an opposite after the disintegration of socialism.

Especially, both the American and Soviet ‘new artificial man’ is a puritan by condemning, opposing or avoiding sensual pleasures, although in different ways or degrees. In essence, both types have what Veblen may call the ‘trained incapacity’ for enjoying especially sensual pleasures or rather conditioned capacity for experiencing non-pleasures. Thus, early analysts observe that the Puritan ‘American is not predisposed to pleasure’²⁴ and alternatively predisposed to non-pleasure and obsessed with sin, vice and immoral conduct overall, albeit primarily those of others (Bénabou et al. 2015; Mueller 2009; Scitovsky 1972; Wagner 1997). Above all, the American ‘new man’ is a Puritan or Puritanical by being disinclined to pleasures of sexual kind—as a way of proving oneself the ‘regenerate man’²⁵ qua ‘born again’—which Scheler implies by noting that Protestant countries create the ‘external espionage system against unchastity’, along with ‘drinking, vice and luxury of all sorts’, that is without precedent in ‘Catholic lands.’ Though perhaps in a lesser degree or less disciplined way than the American type, the Soviet ‘new artificial man’ still is largely undisposed or unconditioned to sensual pleasures, including those of sexual nature. It is no

24. Ross (1907, p. 387) elaborates that in the US ‘anyone who is an avowed independent in matters of religion may be assured of popular execration. The American is not predisposed to pleasure A few books may be observed in his home, of which the most noticeable are the Bible and sectarian literature. The chief evils are attendance at the theater or the dance and participation in games of cards or of chance (as) reprehensible amusements. The reading of novels is classed as trifling, and sometimes as even dangerous to the moral tone.’

25. Generally, Ross (1912, p. 443) states that the ‘Puritan asserted himself in matters spiritual and temporal (as) the regenerate man.’

wonder that both the American and Soviet ‘new artificial man’ condemn, avoid or are deprived of prostitution which American conservatism and Soviet socialism prohibit and invariably punish, although the former does more severely consistent with the Puritan Draconian severity of punishment for sexual sins that it construes as grave crimes. At least this striking commonality illustrates that the American and Soviet ‘new artificial man’ is or conditioned and forced to be a puritan, albeit a Calvinist, religious Puritan in the first case and a socialist, nonreligious purist in the second.

As a corollary, both the American and Soviet ‘new artificial man’ is a virtuous angel, even if in different shapes, meanings or degrees, through the shared ‘politics of virtue’ (Kelley²⁶ 1984). As self-evident, the American ‘new artificial man’ is a Christian, more precisely evangelical and conservative, virtuous angel through the ‘politics of virtue’ of conservatism or the ‘right-wing’ (Kelley 1984). Therefore, the American *homo novus* possesses and displays all the well-known attributes of a Christian/evangelical and conservative angel. For illustration, this new human type practices chastity and follows Puritans’ precept that ‘work is good, sex is evil’, including prostitution must be criminalized, only (as Pareto implies) drinks water and scrupulously, at least publicly, condemns and avoids alcohol, does not take drugs and generally does not indulge in any sensual pleasures and sins that the US Puritanical government proscribes and punishes as grave crimes (Mueller 2009; Scitovsky 1972; Stenhouse 2012). Accordingly, the American ‘new artificial man’ either zealously subscribes or passively resigns to Puritanism’s and consequently the US coercive and moralistic government’s equation of sensual pleasures with sins and these with crimes that it typically punishes with Puritan Draconian severity through mass incarceration, torture, indefinite detention, widespread death sentences and executions and other acts of religion-driven penal repression to the point of ‘holy’ state ‘political terror’ with ‘no limit to oppression’ (Besley and Persson 2009; Mencken²⁷ 1982).

This is what makes this human type a complete angel and thus a moralistic virtuoso, namely by not only behaving as such but also approving or resigning to state repression and terror such as temperance wars, from Puritan witch-trials to evangelical Prohibition to the conservative war on drugs, and consequent mass imprisonment to coerce those who do not act so into acting as angels and virtuosi (Brubaker 2015; Symonds and Pudsey 2006). Moreover, the American ‘new artificial man’ is willing and ready to sacrifice oneself and others to the higher cause of the regeneration and universalization of the Christian/evangelical angel/virtuoso. This occurs by confessing to one’s secretly committed and indeed contemplated sins and vices as ‘crimes’ (coming out of the ‘closet’) during a ‘life

26. Kelley (1984, p. 701) remarks that in the Soviet Union ‘though Puritanism is not ordinarily termed a Russian trait, the politics of virtue is pervasive, like the desire for order and authority. It is not simply the attribute of the right-wing (as in the US)’.

27. Mencken (1982) apparently referring to the US moralistic cum Puritanical government states that the ‘worst government is the most moral. One composed of cynics is often very tolerant and humane. But when fanatics are on top there is no limit to oppression’, which obviously applies to what he first terms the Southern ‘Bible Belt’ ruled by Puritan-inspired (Baptist-Methodist) ‘barbarism’ and to evangelical America overall.

of sin' and by monitoring and reporting those of neighbors and family members to government authorities through Puritan and conservative vigilantism (for related vigilantism in the US South see Beck, Tolnay, and Bailey 2016; Jacobs et al. 2005). Such monitoring is what Scheler precisely identifies or predicts by pointing to the 'external espionage system against unchastity, drinking, vice and luxury of all sorts' that Protestant countries, including America, invariably create as a form or aspect of an intrusive and repressive police state committing religion-driven political terror to the point of, as Pareto envisions, killing 'in the name of the divine master' (also, Juergensmeyer 2003).

Furthermore, as Scheler intimates, this human type not only publicly denounces and avoids present sins and vices but also expiates and make all other humans expiate by association for 'original sin' that 'natural man' supposedly perpetrated (Graafland 2014). In this regard, the American 'new artificial man' displays an angel-style disgust for and obsession with both actual sin and vice and narrated 'original sin' and in that sense becomes or acts as a perfect Christian/evangelical angel, notably a Puritan-style moralistic and religious virtuoso (Symonds and Pudsey 2006. As a result, the American *homo novus* is a 'regenerate man' in the sense of Calvinism/Puritanism and 'born again' in the meaning of Puritanical evangelicalism—simply, a reconstructed, reborn angel/virtuoso out of 'natural man' and sin (Ross 1912; also, Madsen 2009).

The Soviet 'new artificial man' is also an angel and moralistic virtuoso but of a non-Christian, nonreligious variety, excluding some vestiges of Russian Orthodox Christianity in socialism that, as seen, Sorokin (2006) implies and indeed advocates. As also evident, this is an alternate socialist angel and virtuoso. Hence, *homo soveticus* has all the traits of a socialist angel/virtuoso, as Pareto implicitly identifies them, suggesting the 'resemblance' of socialism with Christianity, including both the Russian Orthodox Church, as Sorokin (2006) suggests, and the Protestant Reformation, and to that extent with the attributes of the Christian, specifically Puritan, counterpart (also, Faris 1961; Kelley 1984; Meyer 1967). For instance, like the latter, the Soviet human type mostly practices chastity and follows the puritan precept that 'work is good, sex is immoral', including the prohibition of prostitution, only drinks alcohol in moderation (as opposed to the old or stereotypical 'Russian man'), does not take drugs and overall does not indulge in any pleasures that the socialist coercive government prohibits and sanctions as criminal or immoral offenses, thus displaying 'outstanding moral and ideological qualities'. Just as the first, the second enthusiastically approves of or passively acquiesces to socialism's own puritan and hence the Soviet moralistic government's equivalence of some sensual pleasures such as sex or prostitution and drugs with criminal offenses that it usually sanctions, albeit perhaps with lesser severity or discipline, by imprisonment, executions and other acts of ideology-driven penal repression or ideological state terror.

Moreover, like the American counterpart, the Soviet 'new artificial man' shows the willingness and readiness to sacrifice oneself and others to the higher cause of the creation and generalization of the socialist angel and the 'building of socialism' by confessing to one's secret committed sin- and thought-crimes

and by being vigilant and reporting those of neighbors and family members to the government. By contrast and definition, this second human types does not atone for and does not make others expiate for 'original sin' that does not exist as a notion in the Soviet ideal of an angel and moralistic virtuoso, excluding the vestiges of Russian Orthodox Christianity in Sorokin's framework. Like the American counterpart, the Soviet 'new artificial man' shows an angel-like disgust for and obsession with actual sin and vice, especially sex or prostitution and drugs, although in a lesser degree or less disciplined manner, but not obsessing with 'original sin' (with some Russian Orthodox Christian exceptions a la Sorokin), and thus appearing as an incomplete angel and moralistic virtuoso from the Christian, notably Puritan, viewpoint. As a corollary, like the American counterpart, *homo soveticus* is a 'regenerate man' but in the sense of socialist puritanism and so 'born again' from the stance of the puritanical communist state, a constructed, reborn angel/virtuoso out of the Russian 'old man' (but still conditioned by the Russian Orthodox Church according to Sorokin) and 'private immorality' (Kelley 1984).

Finally and as an aggregate consequence of the preceding traits, historically and comparatively, the 'new artificial man' of both American capitalism/conservatism and of Soviet socialism is according to these inventors an exceptional, unique, superior and indeed universal human type—simply, a 'superman' and 'master' embodying what Michels (1968) denotes the 'master-caste'. Thus, the American 'new man' as a Puritan-style moralistic virtuoso is a novel, exceptional, unique and superior human species in social time and space, the only and true 'superman' in all history and society²⁸. This superior human type therefore embodies and reveals 'American exceptionalism, uniqueness and superiority', including 'manifest destiny' as the divine 'mission' to rule or dominate other societies, in all spaces and times (Jouet 2017; Munch 2001; Savelsberg and King 2005).

Especially, the American 'new man' is designed and invented to be an exceptional, unique, superior and universal human type in relation to and sharp distinction from that of the 'old Europe', specifically liberal, secular ('godless'),

28. Ross (1912, p. 442) regards the 'modern doctrine of the superman as the expression of a modern Puritanism', remarking that 'we (Americans) do not think of man as the ruin of a noble building, to use Calvin's phrase. We think of him as a building in process of completion. We put perfection not in the past, but in the future'. Also, Weber (1946, p. 308) refers to 'economic supermen' during the 'age of the Puritans'. At this juncture, **Fromm** (1941, p. 254) refers to the "idealistic" position, 'which is represented by Max Weber's analysis, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. He holds that new religious ideas are responsible for the development of a new type of economic behaviour and a new spirit of culture, although he emphasizes that this behaviour is never exclusively determined by religious doctrines.' Also, MacDonald (1965, p. 375) comments that 'Weber was specifically attacking Marx's view that the capitalist, armed with new techniques and driven by rational acquisitiveness, had swept away the old traditional methods and attitudes, and had imposed on society his own ethos or geist as well as the specific capitalist mode of production.' This, for Weber, was not a realistic picture of the process of capitalist development. A more typical sequence, occurring even within Weber's lifetime, was one in which the new man broke into a completely adapted traditional environment in which the mode of production was specifically capitalist. Moreover, the new man was not armed with a new invention, capable of revolutionizing the industry, but with a new spirit.'

rationalistic and welfare-capitalist ('socialist') Western Europe (Jouet 2017; Lipset 1996). This holds even if the first human type appears as far from being historically and comparatively new but as essentially a reinvention and reincarnation of the primeval, pure apostolic Christian man of Biblical times and spaces, including parts of Western or Southern Europe, that Puritanism attempted to recreate—simply, a reinvented apostle (Barnett 1999; Davis 2010; Mullan 1995; Stark 1964; Walden 2012). Thus, according to the designers and inventors, the first type is novel, vigorous, rising, morally pure and practical, thus superior and adjusted, while the second being old, weak, declining, decadent and artistic (in the pejorative sense of impractical), so inferior and outdated (Emerson and Hartman 2006; Lipset 1996).

For the creators, the American 'new man' is radically different from and profoundly exceptional and superior to all other human types and specimens in social history and across societies—except for the Christian apostles of Biblical times—but especially is designed to be an exact opposite and transcendence of the 'old man' of Western Europe, from France and Italy to Germany (with some qualifications with regard to the 'new German' in Nazism) to Scandinavia. In this regard, the first is the antithesis of and supposedly superior to both the old 'Renaissance man' and the old 'Enlightenment man' embodying artistic-humanistic and rationalistic-secular human types and defining early modern Western Europe (Davis and Robinson 2009; Habermas 2001; Mueller 2009). In brief, the American Puritan-rooted *homo novus* is the anti-Renaissance (as Pareto implies²⁹) and counter-Enlightenment 'man' and in that sense an anti-artistic (morally 'pure'), anti-secular ('godly') and anti-rational, including anti-scientific³⁰, 'superman' superior to the decadent and weak 'old man' of Western Europe. This antithesis parallels the sociological contradiction between the substantively theocratic or religiously overdetermined 'American regime'³¹

29. Pareto (2000, p. 47) states that the 'Renaissance only too soon was halted by the Protestant Reformation' in Northern Europe and in extension England and colonial Puritan America.

30. Pareto (1963, p. 1429) classically observes around a century ago that 'in the United States of America one witnesses the rise of no end of strange and wholly unscientific religions such as Christian Science that are utterly at war with any sort of scientific thinking.' A century later, almost nothing substantively changes, as this country, especially the South qua the 'Bible Belt', continues to experience the rise and even to be the world epicenter of 'strange and wholly unscientific religions such as Christian Science that are utterly at war with any sort of scientific thinking,' ranging from creationism, 'intelligent design' and 'godly' prohibition of stem-cell research through the 'flat earth' to 'holy' opposition to climate science (Nordhaus 2019). This makes the 'Bible Belt' and evangelical America overall appear as the probably darkest, i.e., the most irrational and superstitious, as well as illiberal and repressive, region in the Western world and beyond, along with Islamic theocracies, thus evoking and partly replicating the Christian Dark Middle Ages in Europe (Mueller 2009).

31. Perhaps the most bizarre or visible proof or syndrome that religious conservatism has remade America a 'theocratic regime' is that US Presidents and all other political rulers officially and publicly pledge alliance to the Bible, and not just to the Constitution, during their inauguration, which is striking in several aspects. First, by pledging alliance to the Bible, they overtly or covertly enforce its commandments as Biblical law, including the

through the 'Religious Right alliance' between the capitalist rich and the religious poor versus scientific progress and liberal democracy and the 'Western European regime' of liberalization, pluralism and secularization (Bénabou et al. 2015; Mueller 2009; Munch 2001).

Overall, by virtue of such exceptionality, uniqueness and especially superiority the 'new man' of American capitalism/conservatism is a 'superman' and hence a 'master' of other 'men' and human types, thus an embodiment of the 'master-caste', according to these creators. In Schumpeter's terms, this is a 'superman' and 'master' Puritan-style *homo religiousus* existing and acting in a merger or alliance and affinity with *homo economics* ('work is good') within Calvinist capitalism and in disgust of and warfare against *homo eroticus* ('sex is

persecution or exclusion of 'infidels' from political power and process, and thus effectively establish or sustain evangelical theocracy as a proto-totalitarian system in America. It is no wonder that non-religious or secular Presidents and other politicians (aside from few exceptions) are an extinct species, indeed an impossibility theorem, in America in which the 'godly' monopolize the right to pursue and hold political power and oppress and exclude the 'godless'. Second, by pledging alliance to the Bible, US Presidents and other political leaders blatantly violate the Constitutional stipulation against the 'establishment of religion'. Prima facie, such a ritual is precisely an act of the establishment or promotion of religion and thus a clear violation of the Constitution and the separation of church and state. Third and as a corollary, such a ritual violates the rule of law and indeed perpetrates and sustains lawlessness exposing conservatism's 'law and order' slogan as duplicitous. Arguably, such a blatant violation of the Constitution can only produce or maintain lawlessness at all levels, federal, state and local. Fourth, despite blatantly violating the Constitutional prohibition of the 'establishment of religion' and the legal separation of church and state, most Americans indoctrinated by religious conservatism regard US Presidents' pledging alliance to the Bible as normal and even desirable, a facet of superior American exceptionalism versus 'godless' Western Europe. This suggests that such a ritual renders or sustains America as the polar opposite of a rational 'sane' society, so that what Keynes denotes religious 'madmen in authority' make all others, notably the conservative rank-and-file, mad or blind, so long as failing to see that pledging alliance to the Bible by US Presidents amounts to the 'establishment of religion' and violates the Constitution is a symptom of societal madness or blindness. Fifth, historically, the Presidential and universal ritual of pledging alliance to the Bible shows that America under religious conservatism has not advanced beyond Puritanism and its Calvinist Biblical theocracy or simply Bibliocracy (Weber's word) and thus what Hume diagnoses as the Puritan 'madness with religious ecstasies' and Pareto detects as puritanical, moralistic 'insanity'. In this sense, not only the atavistic, ultra-conservative and evangelical South but virtually all of America appears as the 'Bible Belt'. Sixth and comparatively, by virtue of such a ritual, America under religious conservatism appears as equivalent to Iran and other Islamic theocracies. Thus, just as their US counterparts solemnly hold and promise to follow the Bible, Iranian Presidents and all political officials ritually pledge alliance to the Koran and thus enforce the latter's commandments and establish Islamic theocracy. In this respect, conservative religious 'American exceptionalism' actually becomes an equivalence or convergence with Islamic theocracies rather than being exceptional or greatly different in relation to the latter. Conversely, due the above ritual, America under religious conservatism reasserts itself with nationalist pride and joy as the polar opposite to the 'secularization regime' of Western Europe. To that extent, conservative religious 'American exceptionalism' manifests itself as an aberration or deviant case from Western civilization, while manifesting an equivalence with the Islamic and other non-Western world, making America a post- Western, third-world society in these terms, as especially the post-2016 period shows.

evil') and more broadly versus what can be termed the hedonic man of sensual pleasure- and in that sense happiness-seeking (Frey and Stutzer 2010; Mencken³² 1982; Phelps 2013).

Like the American counterpart, the 'new artificial man' of Soviet socialism is according to the creator a novel, exceptional, unique, superior and universal or general human in social time and space (Smirnov³³ 1980), the sole and genuine 'superman' in all history and society, with proper qualifications. Consequently, this second human type embodies and shows a Soviet form of 'exceptionalism, uniqueness and superiority' in space and time, including a non-religious proxy of 'manifest destiny' through the ideological mission to rule or control adjacent countries. Particularly, the Soviet 'new man' is for the inventor an exceptional, unique and superior human by comparison to and distinction from the capitalist or bourgeois 'old man' and more broadly that of class-divided society, including feudalism and slavery, by being the 'alternative to the bourgeois and every other kind of society based on exploitation' (Smirnov 1980). On the other hand, *homo soveticus* represents a reincarnation of the pure, uncorrupted primitive 'communist man' of prehistorical times and (as Pareto implies), to some degree, of the early 'Christian man', specifically that, as for Sorokin, conditioned by the Russian Orthodox Church. As with the American counterpart's creators, the socialist inventor produces this human type as novel, vigorous, rising, morally pure and practical, so superior to the second as old, weak, declining, decadent and, as Pareto puts it, with 'almost morbid' sensibility and sentimentality.

While greatly differing from and being supposedly unique and superior to all other human types and examples in history and society—except for that of primitive communism--the Soviet 'new man' is especially created to be an antithesis and substitution of the bourgeois 'old man' of capitalism, (Smirnov 1980) as well as to some extent of religion, with some variations, such as vestiges of the Russian Christian Orthodox Church (Sorokin 2006). In this sense, such a human type is fundamentally an anti-capitalist, anti-bourgeois and largely (but not invariably, as for Sorokin) anti-religious 'man', hence substantively an obverse of the American counterpart, while being formally identical as a novel, exceptional, superior species in these terms. Almost exactly like the American counterpart, the Soviet 'new man' is due to this supposed exceptionality, uniqueness and superiority a 'superman' and thus a 'master' of other 'men' and human species embodying the 'master-caste', although this claim to mastery is somewhat less overt, disciplined or pronounced than in the American counterpart. Using Schumpeter's terms, this is a 'superman' and 'master' *homo non-religiousus* (mainly) that is partly merged with *homo economicus* (at least in the sense of 'work is good' still) but in complicated or ambivalent relations with *homo eroticus* ('sex is shameful') and

32. Mencken (1982, p. 624-5) states that *Puritanism* is the 'haunting fear that someone, somewhere, may be happy', adding 'Show me a Puritan and I'll show you a (SOB).'

33. Smirnov (1980, p. 11) claims that the 'history of Soviet man as a socialist type of person despite his individuality and even uniqueness, contains certain essential features of a general nature that relate to the solution of the complex social problems involved in the formation of a new type of man in all countries of the world.'

generally the ‘hedonic man’, aside from some religious exceptions noted above (e.g., Christian Orthodox vestiges in Russia, as well as Catholic elements in Cuba and Poland, during socialism).

In passing, the ‘new artificial man’ American capitalism/conservatism and Soviet socialism as a ‘superman’ and especially a ‘master’ human type who embodies Michels’ ‘master-caste’ seemingly resemble to some extent the ‘new German man’ as the ‘master race’ in Nazism and more broadly traditional conservatism in Germany. Recall that Nazism presented itself as the ‘new conservatism’ and represented the extreme segment of ‘authoritarian rightism’, just as neo-Nazism is part of the conservative movement or the radical right today (Berezin 2019; Colantone and Stanig 2019; Mann 2004; Rydgren 2007). Notably, the claim to being a ‘master’ human type and the attempt at what Weber (1968) denotes Calvinist-type ‘mastery of the world’, including other societies, appear especially explicit, persistent and pronounced in the concept of the ‘new man’ of American capitalism/conservatism in Reagan’s ‘we are the best’ style and to that extent seem to evoke the notion of a ‘master race’ of Nazism (Bonikowski and DiMaggio 2016; Bourdieu³⁴ 1998; Munch 2001; Savelsberg and King 2005). If the latter is a ‘fantastic notion’, as the US President F. D. Roosevelt decried it, the same designation applies to the concept of the ‘new man’ of American capitalism/conservatism perpetually and to some degree of Soviet socialism transiently, as a ‘superman’ and ‘master’ or an emanation of the ‘master-caste’ (Dahl 1985). And the word ‘fantastic’ anticipates the destiny—namely, what Weber would call the ‘adverse fate’--of both the American and Soviet ‘new artificial man’, as elaborated next by constructing and calculating corresponding indexes for the US and Russia and thus by implication American capitalism/conservatism and Soviet socialism, respectively.

3. A ‘New Man’ Index and its Components

This section constructs a substantive index of the ‘new man’ in the American and Soviet version as the aggregate measure of such a shared ideal or perfect human type (not literally a new man). The ‘new man’ index comprises as its components a certain number of indicators and proxies of this human construct. Specifically, the index is the aggregate of the following indicators and proxies of the American and Soviet ‘new man’.

(1) Low imprisonment. This is a shared indicator or proxy of both the American and Soviet ‘new man’. As a saint, sinless creature, puritan, simply angel, the American and Soviet ‘new man’ does not commit crime and sin and therefore is not imprisoned and otherwise punished by the state as their political inventor or reproducer. Consequently, low and indeed no imprisonment would

34. Bourdieu (1998, p. 35) implies this by stating that ‘it is characteristic of conservative revolutions, that in Germany in the 1930s, those of Thatcher, Reagan (etc.) that they present restorations as revolutions. If this conservative revolution can deceive people, this is because it seems to retain nothing of the old Black Forest pastoral of the conservative revolutionaries (fascists) of the 1930s; it is dressed up in all the signs of modernity.’

indicate and typify the American and Soviet ‘new man’ or the state inventors of this convergent construct. It follows that American capitalism/conservatism such as conservative America and Soviet socialism or its descendant, post-socialist Russia should have low and indeed minimal prison population rates. Further, since the American and Soviet ‘new man’ is in historical and comparative terms an exceptional and superior human type, simply a ‘superman’, both systems or states should feature indeed the lowest prison population rates in history and across societies such as OECD countries. To estimate whether this expectation is correct, prison population rates (per 100,000 population) are available for the US and other OECD countries as well as for Russia in 2019 (see Table 1S). The source of cross-national prison population rates is the International Centre for Prison Studies. If the US and Russia indeed really have the lowest prison population rates among contemporary societies, this will validate the construction of the American and Soviet or Russian ‘new man’ as a crimeless and sinless angel and thus vindicate the constructors. Conversely, if the two turn out to have the highest prison population rates, this will invalidate their shared construct and fail to vindicate the constructors. Such prison population rates will reflect either actual crimes and sins that ‘new man’ commits or the suspicion of the latter as potentially committing them—especially because of ‘original sin’ for the American ‘new man’--thus in both cases invalidating the construct and not vindicating the constructors, with that distrust of humans generating the US ‘less crime, more punishment’ outcome (Cooney and Burt 2008).

(2) No death sentences and executions. This is another common indicator or proxy of the American and Soviet ‘new man’. Even more than regarding crime and sin generally, both the American and Soviet ‘new man’ as a saint/angel does not commit murder and hence is not sentenced to death and executed by their inventor, the state. Especially, as a Puritan saint and Christian angel, the American ‘new man’ does not and pronounce ‘thou shall not kill’ and therefore is not subject to punishment by death by the human-inventing state to which this religious commandment conceivably also applies. In consequence, rare and indeed no death sentences and executions would identify and define both the American and Soviet ‘new man’, especially the first, or their state inventors, all supposedly being bound by the non-killing stipulation in religious or nonreligious formulations (Mueller³⁵ 2009). This signifies that American capitalism or conservative America and Soviet socialism or post-socialist Russia should have low and indeed minimal or zero numbers of death sentences and executions. Furthermore, both systems, especially the first given the ‘shall not kill’ religious injunction, should display the lowest

35. Mueller (2009, p. 394) also suggests this by observing that the ‘US stands out as a dramatic outlier (in) the homicide rate. Attending church regularly and believing that God is very important to their lives does not appear to make Americans less likely to murder one another than people in other rich countries but quite the reverse. One reason for the high homicide rates in the US is, of course, the Constitution Second Amendment, which makes it easier for Americans to acquire guns than in most other developed countries. This does not save the hypothesis that religion makes people behave morally, however, because a religious person who believes that God forbids killing should presumably not use a gun to kill his neighbor just because he owns one.’

numbers of death sentences and executions in history and among contemporary societies such as OECD countries in light of the American and Soviet ‘new man’ being historically and comparatively an exceptional and superior human-angel. In the aim of estimating such an expectation, numbers of ‘recorded executions, recorded death sentences and people known to be under sentence of death’ are available for the US and other OECD countries and for Russia at the end of 2019 (see Table 2S). The source of these data is Amnesty International Global Report, Death Sentences and Executions. As before, if the US and Russia actually have zero or the lowest numbers of death sentences and executions among OECD countries, this will reaffirm the invention of the American and Soviet or Russian ‘new man’ as a non-killing angel and thus the inventors. Conversely, if they show to actually have the highest numbers of death sentences and executions among these countries, this will contradict the invention and inventors. As with prison population rates, death sentences and executions contradict the invention and inventors by expressing actual murderous acts by the ‘new man’ or the distrust of the latter through the state sentencing to death and executing innocent people, as witnessed chronically in conservative America, including the evangelical South (the ‘Bible Belt’), judging by DNA and other post facto evidence (as the Innocence Project documents).

(3) No political terror. This is a related shared indicator or proxy of the American and Soviet ‘new man’. Like in the previous cases, by virtue of being a saint/angel, both the American and Soviet ‘new man’ does not commit any other offenses, including acts of terrorism or violence, and thus does not deserve to be or is not subjected to ‘political terror’ by the state through committing multiple systematic violations of human rights such as disappearance, indefinite detention, police brutality and murders, torture and others, along with mass imprisonment and widespread death sentences or executions that are politically motivated. Especially, the American ‘new man’ as a Puritan saint and Christian angel who follows the Biblical double-edged sword warning does not commit any violent offenses and so does not suffer from state ‘political terror’ as a provoked or unprovoked violent response for which this admonition conceivably also holds. As a result, what would indicate and characterize the American and Soviet ‘new man’ alike, more precisely their state inventors, is no political terror since they all act according to the non-violence precept, including the double-edged sword admonition in the first case. This presumably translates into American capitalism and Soviet socialism having low and indeed minimal levels of ‘political terror’. Moreover, given that the American and Soviet ‘new man’ is an exceptional and superior human-angel historically and comparatively, conservative America and post-communist Russia should evince the lowest levels of ‘political terror’ over their populations in history and especially among contemporary societies such as OECD countries. To check this expectation, ‘political terror’ estimates are available for the US and other OECD countries and for Russia in 2018 (see Table 3S). The source of such estimates is the Political Terror Scale (i.e., Amnesty International’s or Human Rights Watch’s larger scores) that has five levels with an ascending intensity, defining political terror as ‘state-sanctioned killings, torture,

disappearances and political imprisonment' (Gibney et al. 2019). The validation of the invented American and Russian 'new man' as a non-violent angel and so of the inventors will occur if the US and Russia possess the lowest levels of 'political terror' among OECD countries. On the other hand, their invalidation will happen if the two in fact manifest the comparatively high levels of 'political terror' among these countries. As with prison population rates and death sentences and executions, high levels of 'political terror' invalidate the invented human type and inventors in that they respond to actual violence by or distrust the 'new man' as capable of committing such acts by the state terrorizing innocent people by association, for example, associating them with 'original sin' that their ancestors supposedly committed in the American religious case.

(4) No death penalty for drug offenses. This is an additional common indicator or proxy of the American and Soviet 'new man' that evidently relates to and specifies the lack of death sentences and executions as well as of 'political terror'. By being a sinless, puritan, human angel, the American and Soviet 'new man' does not use or trade in drugs, specifically those that the state in both American capitalism and Soviet socialism arbitrarily criminalizes as illicit and punishes their production, possession, consumption and trading, thus not being subjected to the death penalty for drug offenses. Above all, the American 'new man' as a sinless Puritan or evangelical and Christian angel never commits these and related sins, including prostitution and others, that the US Puritanical government redefines and severely punishes as grave crimes by coercively imposing its own type of morality, as neither does to some extent the Soviet 'new man' whose state is similarly moralistic and coercive in this respect. Accordingly, the absence of the effective and even symbolic application of the death penalty for drug offenses indicates and identifies the American and Soviet 'new man' alike or their inventors. As a result, American capitalism/conservatism and Soviet socialism should evince no actual or symbolic application of the death penalty for drug offenses. Moreover, both systems should be the only ones to have this feature in history and among contemporary societies given that the American and Soviet 'new man' is an exceptional and superior sinless human. To see how correct this expectation is, the information on the death penalty for drug offenses is available for the US, other OECD countries and Russia in 2019 (see Table 4S). The source of this information is the International Harm Reduction Association that also states that the 'imposition of a death sentence following conviction for a drug offence (not involving intentional killing) in proceedings which fail to meet international standards of fairness compounds the violations of the rights of the individual to life, to a fair trial, and to be free from torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.' If the US and Russia indeed are the only ones to not apply the death penalty for drug offenses among contemporary societies, this will validate the constructed American and Soviet or Russian 'new man' as a sinless angel not taking and trading in drugs and vindicate the constructors. Inversely, if they prove to engage instead in the effective or symbolic application the death penalty for drug offenses, this will invalidate their angelic construct and contradict the constructors. As before, such an application of the death penalty

will manifest either actual drug offenses committed by or the distrust of the 'new man' as willing to commit them (due to 'original sin' in the American case), as through potential executions of innocent 'offenders', thus failing to validate the construct and to vindicate the constructors in both scenarios.

(5) No share of drug offenders of total prisoners. This is yet another shared indicator or proxy of the American and Soviet 'new man' relating to and specifying low imprisonment, as well as no death penalty for drug offenses. Because the American and Soviet 'new man' as a sinless puritan does not produce, consume and distribute drugs that their state inventor prohibits and punishes drug offenders with imprisonment at least, they form small and indeed no part of total prisoners. As a consequence, the low and indeed zero share of drug and related sinful offenders of total prisoners would help detect and define the American and Soviet 'new man' alike or their state inventors. This yields the expectation that American capitalism/conservatism and Soviet socialism should have such low and even zero shares of drug offenders of the prisoner population. Moreover, because the American and Soviet 'new man' is historically and comparatively an exceptional and superior sinless puritan, especially the first, these opposite systems should have indeed the lowest shares in history and especially among contemporary societies such as OECD countries. To verify such expectations, estimates for the share of drug offenders of the total prison population are available for the US, other OECD countries and Russia in 2019-2020 (see Table 5S). These estimates derive from the US figure (around 20% at the prisoner rate of 655) in a proportionate manner (a rate half lower yield an estimate of 10% and so on). The source of the US share of drug offenders of the total prison population in 2020 is the Prison Policy Initiative that also reports that this share is 44 percent of federal prisoners. As previously, if the US and Russia indeed have the lowest shares of drug offenders of the total prison population, this will reaffirm the American and Soviet 'new man' and the inventors, and conversely, their highest or high share will be disconfirming evidence in this respect. As with the death penalty for drug offenses, imprisonment for such offenses can express either effective or possible sinful acts of the 'new man' and thus disconfirm this invention and its inventors in any scenario.

(6) Strong civic peace. This is an additional common indicator or proxy of the American and Soviet 'new man' that especially relates to low imprisonment and the absence of death sentences and executions and of political terror. Both the American and Soviet 'new man' by virtue of being a saint/angel is a peaceful human type and therefore helps establish and sustain strong civic peace in society. Consequently, peacefulness and strong civic peace in society would indicate and feature the American and Soviet 'new man' and their inventors, respectively. Therefore, American capitalism or conservative America and Soviet socialism or Russia should exhibit strong and even maximal civic peace. Furthermore, both systems or countries should attain and sustain the strongest civic peace among contemporary societies like OECD countries since the American and Soviet 'new man' is historically and comparatively an exceptional and superior human-saint, thus the most peaceful 'superman.' For the sake of verifying such expectations,

peace, more precisely peace disturbance, indexes are available for the US, other OECD countries and Russia during 2020 (see Table 6S). The source of such indexes is the Institute for Economics and Peace characterizing the Global Peace Index as a measure of the 'state of peace using three thematic domains: the level of Societal Safety and Security; the extent of Ongoing Domestic and International Conflict; and the degree of Militarisation.' If the US and Russia indeed evince among the lowest peace disturbance indexes, this will validate the American and Soviet 'new man' and the inventors, and conversely, if they turn out to instead have the highest or comparatively high indexes, they will be invalidating in this regard. Strong (weak) civic peace in the US and Russia almost invariably reflects the peacefulness (lack thereof) of the American and Soviet 'new man', respectively.

(7) Low gun ownership. This is a further shared indicator or at least ideal and proxy of the American and especially Soviet 'new man' particularly relating to strong civic peace, as well as low imprisonment and the lack of death sentences and executions and of political terror. As a saint/angel, notably a peaceful 'superman', the American and Soviet 'new man' does not need and want to own guns for the sake of personal defense from, let alone attacks on, other humans, except for unrelated sporting purposes (hunting, fishing, etc.). Especially, despite the supposed constitutional right to 'bear arms', capitalism's mass production and conservatism's celebration of universal gun ownership, the American 'new man' does not really necessitate and desire them for defense ('stand your ground') by being the supreme Christian saint/angel--who knows well the double-edged sword' from reading the Bible--and thus the most peaceful 'superman', just as the physically strongest human ever, and because the US conservative police-warfare state will provide total protection from aggressors. It follows that low gun ownership characterize both the American and Soviet 'new man' so long as the latter is a genuine saint/angel in the sense of a peaceful 'superman' who projecting own attributes also regards other humans as equivalents who do not need, want or use guns for their defense, apart from sporting activities. As a result, American capitalism or conservative America and Soviet socialism or Russia should manifest low gun ownership so long as they invent the American and Soviet 'new man' as a peace-loving saint/angel within society. Since the American and Soviet 'new man' is a superior human, including the most peaceful 'superman,' in time and space, both systems or countries should have the lowest gun ownership at least for the manifest or latent purpose of self-defense (vs. hunting) among OECD countries. In order to check this expectation, gun ownership rates are available for the US and other OECD countries during 2007 (the latest year for which data are available for most of them) and Russia in 2017 (see Table 7S). The source of gun ownership rates for the US and other OECD countries is the Small Arms Survey and for Russia GunPolicy.org, by providing average rates of civilian gun ownership, such as guns owned per 100 people. If the US and Russia indeed have among the lowest gun ownership rates, they will vindicate the American and Soviet 'new man' and the constructors, and vice versa, their highest or comparatively high rates will be negating evidence in this respect. Low gun ownership will invariably mirror the peacefulness of the American and Soviet

'new man' as the most peaceful 'superman', and conversely, such high ownership mirroring the opposite trait.

(8) No murders by firearms. This common indicator or ideal and proxy of the American and Soviet 'new man' evidently derives from low gun ownership and also relates with strong civic peace, low imprisonment, the absence of death sentences and executions and of political terror. As indicated, the American and Soviet 'new man' as a saint/angel does not and will not kill other human beings and hence does not commit murders by firearms, also because not needing and wanting them to possess for self-defense (and by definition attack. Especially, the American 'new man' as a supreme Christian saint/angel follows the Biblical commandment that one 'should not kill' other humans, not committing murders by firearms as indeed unnecessary for such angels in terms of defense, while expecting others to also refrain from doing so by projecting own attributes onto them. As a consequence, low murders by firearms typify both the American and Soviet 'new man' as a non-killing, human-loving angel. This generates the expectation that American capitalism or conservative America and Soviet socialism or Russia should have no or low murders by firearms. Moreover, they should display the lowest murders by firearms among all societies since the American and Soviet 'new man' is a superior human, the most peaceful 'superman' in terms of non-killing. To examine such an expectation, murders by arms rates are available for the US, other OECD countries and Russia in 2017 or latest year (see Table 8S). The source of these data is DATAUNODC for the US and other OECD countries and GunPolicy.org for Russia supplying homicide rates by firearms per 100,000 population. Low homicide rates by firearms will invariably reflect the peacefulness of the American and Soviet 'new man' as the paradigmatic peaceful 'superman', and vice versa, such high rates reflecting the opposite attribute.

Taken together, the American and Soviet 'new man' qualitative index is the aggregate of the following components: 1 low imprisonment, 2 no death sentences and executions, 3 no political terror, 4 no death penalty for drug offenses, 5 no share of drug offenders of total prisoners, 6. strong civic peace, 7 low gun ownership and 8 no murders by firearms (See Table 1 and Figure 1).

4 Results

The ensuing presents the results of an exploratory substantive empirical analysis such as quantitative 'new man' aggregate indexes for the US, other Western and comparable societies such as OECD countries, as well as Russia. (An appendix gives the results of preliminary statistical analyses involving a correlation matrix and a confirmatory factor analysis.)

Table 2 reports 'new man' quantitative aggregate indexes, along with their components, for the US, other OECD countries and Russia. For uniformity, these indexes and their components are standardized coefficients such as standard scores expressed in standard deviations from the mean. Such indexes are hence the aggregate or average of 8 components such as the above indicators and proxies transformed into standard scores. Index calculation proceeds by first standardizing the indicators and proxies (Columns x1-x8), then aggregating them as standard

scores (Column 'Total'), dividing the aggregate by 8 and multiplying it by -1 to obtain the correct sign of the index (Column 'Index') and lastly multiplying the result by 100 for convenience (Column 'Index * 100').

Table 2 (in Columns x1-x8) gives the 8 indicators and proxies of the 'new man' index as standard scores, so standard deviations from the mean. Focusing on the US and Russia and comparing them with OECD countries, these scores show the following. First, the US prison population rate as a standard score (x1) shows that it is 4.46 standard deviations above the mean and thus almost 4.5 times higher than the OECD average. Also, Russia's prison population rate indicates that it is 1.7 standard deviations above the mean and so nearly 2 times higher than the OECD average. Taken together, the US has the highest prison population rate (655 per 100,000) among all OECD countries and Russia the third highest (341) if included in the latter, following Turkey (with 344). By comparison and sharp contrast, Iceland's and Japan's prison population rates as standard scores (-.98, -.96, respectively) are around 1 standard deviation below and thus equivalently lower than the OECD average and so on. In absolute numbers, the US prison population rate turns out to be around 18 times higher than that of Iceland (37), that of Russia just over 9 times higher and so on. To that extent, this result patently invalidates the concept of the American and Soviet 'new man', especially the first, as the crimeless/sinless angel who is thus hardly ever imprisoned, and hence contradicts their inventors, US capitalism/conservatism and Russian socialism, respectively.

Second, the US's number of death sentences and executions as a standard score (x2) statistically signifies that it is 5.91 standard deviations above the mean and hence nearly 6 times higher than the OECD average. In substantive terms, this expresses the fact that the US features by far the highest number of death sentences and executions (2638) among OECD countries (followed by large distance by Japan with 126 and South Korea with 61) and is even the only Western country to apply capital punishment at all. On the other hand, Russia's standard score statistically indicates that its number is .18 standard deviations below the mean and so correspondingly lower than the OECD average and substantively that it does not actually apply the death penalty in common with most OECD countries but in contrast to the US. In this regard, the result flagrantly violates the construct of the American 'new man' as a Christian angel always acting according to the 'shall not kill' Biblical injunction--assuming that capital punishment applies to actual killings rather than to innocent persons as one often witnesses in the US penal system--and discredits the constructor, US capitalism or religious conservatism. By contrast, the opposite apparently holds for the constructed the Soviet or rather post-Soviet Russian 'new man' and the respective constructor, not considering the frequent application of the death penalty during socialism for which data are unavailable.

Third, the US's other 'political terror' standard score (x3) shows that it is 1.43 standard deviations above the mean and thus almost 1.5 times higher than the OECD average. Similarly, Russia's score indicates that it is 2.44 standard deviations above the mean and so nearly 2.5 times higher than the OECD average.

Together, the US has the fourth highest other 'political terror' level (3) among all OECD countries, after Israel, Mexico, Turkey (all having 4), and Russia the single highest (4), along with these three cases, if included. In absolute numbers the US's level is exactly twice the OECD average (1.5), and Russia's just over 2.5 times higher. If so, the result evidently negates the invention of the American and Soviet 'new man' as a nonviolent angel who never commits terrorism and so is not subjected to state terror--assuming that the latter responds to the former rather than operating independently according to its own logic, as often witnessed in both systems--and thus compromises the respective inventors, US capitalism or conservatism and Russian socialism.

Fourth, as a variation on death sentences and executions overall, the US's death penalty for drug offenses score (x4) statistically means that it is 4.13 standard deviations above the mean and thus just over 4 times higher than the OECD average. Substantively, this reflects the fact the US is the only Western society and even OECD country (together with South Korea) to provide for the application--even if 'symbolic' but constantly threatened to be effective--of the death penalty for drug and thus non-violent criminal or sinful offenses. In turn, Russia's score statistically conveys that it is .24 standard deviations below the mean and so analogously lower than the OECD average but substantively suggests this country does not in fact provide for the effective or symbolic application of the death penalty for drug offenses like most OECD countries and unlike the US. On this account, the result again patently invalidates the invented American 'new man' as a Christian sinless angel never committing drug-sins and so not potentially subject to the death penalty for drug offenses, thus discrediting the constructor, US capitalism or religious conservatism. By contrast, the opposite may apply to the constructed Soviet or rather post-Soviet Russian 'new man' and the respective constructor, not taking account of socialism's probable application of the death penalty for drug offenses for which data are unavailable.

Fifth and replicating prison population rates, the US's share of drug offenders of total prisoners as a standard score (x5) shows that it is 4.46 standard deviations above the mean and so nearly 4.5 times higher than the OECD average. Similarly, Russia's share indicates that it is 1.7 standard deviations above the mean and thus almost twice the OECD average. Altogether, the US has the highest actual share of drug offenders of total prisoners (19.86) among all OECD countries and Russia is estimated to have the third highest (10.34) if counted among them after Turkey (with an estimate of 10.43). In comparison and stark contrast, reflecting their prison population rates, Iceland's and Japan's estimated shares of drug offenders of total prisoners (standard scores -.98, -.96, respectively) are about 1 standard deviation below and so correspondingly lower than the OECD average estimate and so forth. Hence, absolutely, the US actual share of drug offenders of total prisoners is about 18 times higher than the estimate for Iceland (1.12), while Russia's estimated share being 9 times larger and so forth. In this light, the result evidently invalidates the created American and Soviet 'new man', particularly the first as a Christian sinless angel who neither commits drug sins-as-crimes nor is imprisoned for such offences, thus discrediting their creators, US capitalism or

conservatism and Russian socialism, respectively.

Sixth and related to the first three results, the US's peace index negative as a standard score (x6) shows that it is 1.32 standard deviations above the mean and thus 1.3 times higher than the OECD average of civic peace disruption. Also, Russia's peace index negative indicates that it is 2.87 standard deviations above the mean and so nearly three times the OECD peace disruption average. Together, the US has the fourth highest peace index negative in absolute terms (2.31) among all OECD countries--and indeed the highest within the Western world--while Russia having the single highest (3.05) if placed among them. By comparison and strong contrast, for example, Iceland's peace index negative as a standard score is 1.26 standard deviation below and so equivalently lower than the OECD average and so on. In absolute terms, the US's peace index negative is just over two times (2.17) higher than that of Iceland (1.08), Russia's nearly 3 (2.8) times larger and so forth. Accordingly, the above result obviously invalidates the manufactured American and Soviet or post-Soviet Russian 'new man' as a peaceful Christian and communist or other angel, respectively, who sustains and never disrupts civic peace in society, and hence compromises their respective manufactures, US capitalism or conservatism and Russian socialism.

Seventh and connected with civic peace disruption, the US's gun ownership rate as a standard score (x7) shows that it is 4.19 standard deviations above the mean and so just over 4 times higher than the OECD average. In turn, Russia's gun ownership rate indicates that it is .37 standard deviations below the mean and so almost .4 times lower than the OECD average. Taken together, the US has the single highest gun ownership rate (88.8 guns per 100 persons) among Western societies and even all OECD countries, while that of Russia (12.3) being at the lower or middle range. Especially, in absolute numbers, the US's gun ownership rate is nearly 5 (4.77) times higher than the OECD average (18.6). This result clearly invalidates the produced American 'new man' insofar as the latter is a Christian angel who does not need and use guns for self-defense from, let alone offence against, other humans, aside from sporting activities, and hence discredits the producer, US capitalism or conservatism. By contrast, the result unexpectedly has opposite implications for the Soviet or post-Soviet Russian 'new man' and the producer, Russian socialism.

Lastly and as a corollary of gun ownership, the US's murders by firearms rate as a standard score (x8) shows that it is .95 standard deviations above the mean and thus equivalently higher than the OECD average. Russia's firearm homicide rate indicates that it is just .03 standard deviations above the mean and so analogously higher than the OECD average. Altogether, the US has the single highest murders by firearms rate among Western societies and the second highest (3.4 per 100,000 population) among all OECD countries, only after that of Mexico (16.5), while Russia's rate is largely in the middle. Notably, in absolute numbers, the US's rate is just over 4 (4.19) times higher than the OECD average (.81), while that of Russia (.9) is slightly more than 10 (11.1) percent larger. Consequently, the above result patently invalidates primarily the reinvented American 'new man' as a Christian angel who does not kill other humans for whatever reasons by

firearms as otherwise redundant and secondarily the Soviet or post-Soviet Russian 'new man' with similar traits, and thus discredits their respective inventors, US capitalism or conservatism and Russian socialism.

Overall, the US ranks substantially above the OECD average on what are the negatives (i.e., negative reciprocals or inverses) of all the 8 indicators and proxies of the American 'new man', ranging from mass imprisonment, widespread death sentences and executions, severe other 'political terror', the application of the death penalty for drug offenses and the large share of drug offenders of total prisoners to weak civic peace, pervasive gun ownership and high murders by firearms rates. To that extent, all these results patently and strongly invalidate the creation of the American 'new man' and hence discredit the creator, US capitalism or conservatism. In turn, Russia ranks significantly above the OECD average on 4 negatives of the 8 indicators and proxies of the Soviet or post-Soviet Russian 'new man', such as wide imprisonment, severe other 'political terror', the large share of drug offenders of total prisoners and weak civic peace, while ranking marginally above the mean on 1 negative, high murders by firearms rates, and slightly below the mean on the other 3 negatives. On this account, the results at least partially invalidate the construct of the Soviet or post-Soviet Russian 'new man' and thus compromise the constructor, Russian socialism or post-socialism. Evidently, the results so far provide primarily invalidating and discrediting suggestive evidence against the realism or viability of the American 'new man' as a Puritan saint and secondarily versus that of the Soviet or post-Soviet Russian 'new man' as a communist or post-communist puritan.

As a corollary, Table 2 (in Columns Total, Index and Index * 100) provides 'new man' aggregate indexes for the US, other OECD countries and Russia. First, aggregating the 'new man' negative or inverse indicators and proxies standardized into standard scores generates equivalent total scores ('Total') for these countries. Then dividing these totals by the number of indicators yields 'new man' aggregate indexes in standard scores as averages of 8 components, which are multiplied by -1 to obtain their proper, positive sign reflecting the concept of the 'new man' as a positive construct whose high indexes express and validate it, and conversely. Lastly, these aggregate indexes are further multiplied by 100 (Index * 100) for convenience. Concentrating on the US and Russia in comparison with other OECD countries reveals the following.

First, the US has the single lowest--and indeed the largest negative--aggregate 'new man' index (-335.64 when multiplied by 100) among Western and comparable societies and even all OECD countries. This index hence reflects and summarizes the US's lowest rankings on most (5) of the 'new man' indicators and proxies by ranking the highest on the equal number of their negatives and, overall, substantially above the OECD average on all of them. Specifically, the US's index indicates that its 'new man' degree lies 3.36 standard deviations below the mean and thus is over 3 times lower than the OECD average. To that extent, the index dramatically invalidates the reinvented American 'new man' as a superior human type among all societies and discredits the inventors and their claim to the universal superiority of their invention. Counterfactually, if their invention were

a universally superior 'man', the US's index should have been instead the largest positive value such as the same or similar number of standard deviations above the mean and thus equivalently higher than the OECD average, but is actually the highest with a negative sign indicating the exact opposite.

Second, Russia has the third lowest or third highest negative aggregate 'new man' index (-99.55 when multiplied by 100) if counted among OECD countries, only after that of the US as well as of Mexico (-120.5). Its index therefore expresses and condenses Russia's lowest rankings on some (2) of the 'new man' indicators and proxies by ranking the highest on the same number of their negatives as well as significantly or marginally above the OECD average on others (3). For illustration, Russia's index suggests that its 'new man' degree is .99 standard deviations below the mean and hence correspondingly lower than the OECD average. On this account, the index mostly invalidates the constructed Soviet (or post-Soviet Russian) 'new man' as a superior human and compromises the creators so long as they claim universal superiority for their construct. Counterfactually, if their construct were a superior 'man', Russia's index instead of actually being the third lowest and negative casting doubt on that claim should have been a large positive value such as the above or other number of standard deviations above the mean and thus correspondingly higher than the OECD average.

Third, by comparison and sharp contrast, for example, Japan has the single highest and positive aggregate 'new man' index that is .59 standard deviations above the mean and hence around .6 times higher than the OECD average. Next, the Netherlands, Denmark and Iceland have the second, third and fourth highest indexes by being .5, .48 and .47 standard deviations, respectively, above the mean and thus .5 or so times higher than the OECD average, and so on. Thus, compared with these and indeed most other OECD countries (30), the US's and Russia's aggregate 'new man' indexes are not just quantitatively lower, if there were positive, but different and opposite in quality or substantively by being negative and large ones. Alternatively, the US and Russia are the only cases with negative 'new man' indexes, along with just 5 other OECD countries (Chile -14.03, Korea -34.21, Israel -63.69, Turkey -97.51 and Mexico -120.5). This result dramatically casts doubt on the American primarily and Soviet 'new man' secondarily as a superior human type and thus contradicts their producers' claims to universal superiority for their product across all societies.

In general, 'new man' aggregate indexes patently invalidate the concepts and projects of the American and Soviet 'new man' as a superior human among all societies and discredit their inventors and their claim to superiority for their inventions. Especially, the US's by far lowest and negative index flagrantly violates the concept and project of the American 'new man' as a Puritan 'superman' across all social space and time and compromises its creators and their superiority claim for their supposedly exceptional creation.

5 Discussion

The preceding results permit the following discussion and inferences or impressions. First, in light of these results, both the American and Soviet 'new

man' seem to experience a kind of adverse fate in contemporary society. More precisely, the act of inventing of such a human type by such inventors as American capitalism/conservatism and Soviet socialism seems to end in or move toward a clear and complete failure. Especially, reinventing the American 'new man' as a Puritan saint, Christian angel and 'superman' in all space and time looks or qualifies as a dismal and total failure in view of the above results, notably the US's incomparably lowest aggregate 'new man' index or conversely its highest and generally high rankings on most of the negatives of the latter's components, such as mass imprisonment, widespread death sentences and executions, severe other 'political terror', the application of the death penalty for drug offenses, the large share of drug offenders of total prisoners, weak civic peace, pervasive gun ownership, and high murders by firearms rates. This holds, although seemingly to a lesser extent, for inventing the Soviet or post-Soviet Russian 'new man' as a communist or post-communist angel, puritan and superhuman, given Russia's third lowest index or conversely its highest and otherwise high rankings on some of the latter's negative components such as wide imprisonment, severe other 'political terror', the large share of drug offenders of total prisoners and weak civic peace. In view of these strongly disconfirming results, the American and Soviet 'new man' share the same adverse destiny, just as sharing many common attributes as a convergent human type, and in that sense are fallen angels and failed 'brothers in arms' manifesting the abysmal failure of reinvention of humans by their ambitious and pretentious inventors. In short, these results confirm that both the American and Soviet 'new man' are failed or spurious inventions by incompetent or overzealous inventors.

It is not only their strikingly low and large negative 'new man' aggregate indexes that in themselves indicate the patent and whole failure of reinventing the American and Soviet 'new man'. Also, comparing their indexes with those of comparable Western and other societies such as OECD countries reveals the magnitude and severity of the failure of such convergent human reinvention in comparative terms. Thus, the US features the single lowest, more precisely the largest negative, 'new man' aggregate index not only among Western societies but also all OECD countries, along with Russia. This is clear and strong sign that the project of reinventing the American 'new man' not only seems to fail but most superbly or spectacularly so compared to other comparable societies, notably the Western world. Similarly, but to a lesser extent, Russia features the third lowest, or third largest negative, 'new man' aggregate index if counted among OECD countries, thus lower only after those of the US and Mexico. Analogously, this is also a clear and strong signal that the blueprint of inventing the Soviet 'new man' has been a near-complete failure as that of the American variant by comparison to these countries, especially the Western world.

Moreover, the fact that the US and Russia are the only societies, together with merely five other OECD countries, with negative aggregate indexes indicate the extent to which their shared reinventing of the 'new man' fails in this comparative broader setting. Furthermore, their negative and large indexes substantively suggest that not only these societies fail to reinvent such a new human type but that

the unintended and indeed perverse outcome ('latent function') of their attempted reinvention of humans is an exact opposite—a negative of the American and Soviet 'new man.' This simply means that most real-life, flesh and blood Americans and Russians turn out to deviate from and act opposite to the reinvented American and Soviet 'new man', respectively. At this juncture, the problem for the latter and their putative creators is not only that the US and Russia share the lowest 'new man' aggregate indexes which, if they positive, may just contradict the claim that this human type is superior across societies and time alike. An even more serious problem is that their indexes are negative and large ones and to that extent negate the very concept and existence of this type and suggest the inverse or reversal of the American and Soviet 'new man' in the form of actual non-Puritan, non-angelic Americans and non-puritan, non-communist Russians.

Hence, it is a perverse or highly ironic result that the US and Russia as the respective creators of the American and Soviet 'new man' belong to those few (7) OECD countries that effectively negate this construct by their negative aggregate indexes. In this connection, it appears as if American capitalism or conservatism and Soviet socialism only attempted to reinvent but did not implement the concept of the 'new man' instead leaving the implementation to other societies, except for these five OECD countries with negative indexes as well. This may or may not express and evoke Weber's Puritan-rooted 'pure hypocrisy' of 'Americanism' and is analogue in Soviet socialism, but it is evident that neither of these two systems or countries implements the concept of the American and Soviet 'new man', respectively, but instead unwittingly leads to the opposite as their shared perverse effect judging by their negative indexes. Especially, the US's by far largest negative index implies that the real-life 'American character' may well be—or is construed and punished by ruling conservatism and evangelical theocracy—as a complete antithesis of and in rebellion against the American 'new man' as a Puritan saint or Christian angel. This also applies, albeit perhaps to a lesser extent in view of the lower negative index, to the actual 'Russian soul' in relation, specifically in opposition to the Soviet 'new man' as a communist puritan.

Finally, in a perverse turn of fate or ironic twist, the 'new man' which American capitalism/conservatism and Soviet socialism aim to invent is more likely to appear in societies outside the US and Russia than in the latter judging by their aggregate indexes. For example, considering their positive and five highest aggregate indexes, Japan, the Netherlands, Denmark, Iceland and Ireland are more likely to comprise the 'new man' especially as a peaceful human type than the US and Russia as the claimed inventors. This remarkable finding only reaffirms that their shared attempt to reinvent and generalize the American and Soviet 'new man' turns out to be a dismal failure compared to these other societies. Alternatively, it suggests that the latter are closer or have more potential to realize the ideal of the 'new man' as such a human type than the former. Thus, aside from Japan, Western Europe overall appears by its indexes the most fertile or likely social space in the 'new man' can develop and act especially as a non-violent human type.

The preceding reopens the question of whether the very existence of these parameters attests to the tendency that the image of a citizen of the future global

world is developing and spreading in the public mind³⁶. In that emerging world, political differences and ideological contradictions (i.e., -isms such as capitalism, socialism, communism, conservatism, liberalism) may well finally be superseded or relegated into irrelevance. (In passing, this is the world citizen and integral society that Pitirim Sorokin envisioned through primarily selfless love as in his view the only social force capable of overcoming lies, violence, and crime inherent in current society.)

6 Conclusion

In essence, the inventing of the ‘new man’ as a novel perfect human type by American capitalism or rather conservatism and Soviet communism or more exactly socialism is at least a doubly dubious endeavor—first, utopian, second, totalitarian. First, the inventing the American and Soviet ‘new man’ alike proves to be a utopian endeavor. More precisely, so long as normal realistic utopias can exist and even become eventually realities, it is an extremely utopian and thus deeply unrealistic and futile attempt that is predestined to fail dismally facing social reality. Judging by the empirical results, the adverse fate of both the American and Soviet ‘new man’ in the sense of the abject failure of their respective inventors, American capitalism/conservatism and Soviet socialism confirms Scheler’s early observations noted above.

More specifically, this failure completely reaffirms that Calvinist-Puritan Protestantism due to its extreme ‘distrust of natural man as completely corrupted by original sin’ purports and indeed produces ‘a new artificial man’ and in that sense a utopian, unrealistic human type as the presumed opposite. At this point, the reinvention of the American ‘new man’ evidently epitomizes and perpetuates this Protestant production of ‘a new artificial man’ driven by the intense moral suspicion of ‘natural man’ and inspired by the theological dogma of human corruption by ‘original sin’ (Stenhouse³⁷ 2012). By contrast, the inventing the Soviet ‘new man’ has non-religious driving forces such as communist moral purism but shares utopian overtones with its Protestant counterpart by also essentially involving the ‘production of a new artificial man’ from pre-Soviet capitalist ‘natural man’, minus ‘original sin’ (Dahl³⁸ 1985). Taken together, the invention of the American and Soviet ‘new man’ is hence the creation of a utopian and in that sense fantastic human type as the shared ideal of American capitalism/

36. I credit an anonymous reviewer for these remarks.

37. Stenhouse (2012, p. 150) observes that the ‘struggle of the natural man against that inhuman crystalline vision of the total depravity of the flesh and the rigid holiness of the elect’ in Calvinism.

38. Dahl (1985, p. 95) remarks that the ‘hope for human regeneration through changes in political, economic, and social structures exerts a magical power on the utopian imagination. Forecasts of a new human being produced by structural changes have been made (from) liberals like Mill, as well as communists, socialists, fascists, and Nazis. Yet these forecasts seem to be regularly discredited by Experience.’ Dahl omits or downplays, however, that such ‘forecasts of a new human being’ is what also American capitalists or conservatives have made since Puritans through ‘born again’ evangelicals and that these forecasts are ‘regularly discredited’ by social experience in America.

conservatism and Russian socialism, respectively, which consequently exposes the two as representing or approximating unrealistic or extreme utopias in respect of their concepts of economic agent and social actor.

Hence, what this paper discusses and elaborates is just a mental social construct of a new man that is essentially utopian and to that extent fantastic or fictional, barring its successful coercive construction in and imposition on society, making what is initially a utopia ultimately a reality, which may warrant the admonition ‘beware utopias, they may come true!’³⁹ Thus, this mental construct seems a ‘fantastic notion’ in the sense of US President F. D. Roosevelt used the expression with reference to the supposed ‘master race’ in Nazism. Moreover, the ‘new man’ construct, especially its perpetual American (versus transient Soviet) variant, may well turn out to be as destructive, including self-destructive in the sense of mutually assured destruction through aggressive wars, as the Nazi notion of the ‘master race’ proved to be for Germany. This is a construct that probably develops whenever and wherever old social structures collapse and society, namely the ruling class, aims to create and consolidate the new social order through various means, including coercive and ideological ones. Then, as both American capitalism and Soviet socialism establish and solidify themselves on the ashes of the ancient system, they in their own unique ways may construct and seek to substantiate the ideal of a new man. Yet, almost invariably a large distance exists between a new ideal and its implementation that typically fails or lags behind, as both American capitalism and Soviet socialism show even if in different degrees and ways. (Further, an ideal may become a perversion in reality, as with the Nazi ideology of the ‘master race’ that led to the extermination of all groups not fitting into that category.)

Second and related, the inventing of both the American and Soviet ‘new man’ turns out to be a totalitarian and generally authoritarian, anti-liberal and coercive endeavor. More specifically, the creation of the American ‘new man’ is a theocratic, thus proto-totalitarian, and generally religiously overdetermined project and process in the form of Puritan or evangelical theocracy and more broadly Calvinist coercion and repression. This generally supports J. S. Mill observing that Calvinism declares ‘You have no choice; thus you must do, and no otherwise’ and later observations to that effect (Stenhouse 2012). It specifically confirms Scheler’s observation of the invariant creation of an ‘external espionage system against unchastity, drinking, vice and luxury of all sorts’ in Protestant countries, especially by implication America.

In addition, it reaffirms Pareto noting in the United States ‘a mass of hypocritical laws for the enforcement of morality’ as no more than ‘replicas of laws of the European Middle Ages’. Further, this corroborates the description of American Puritanism and its theocracy as the ‘most totalitarian’ variation of Calvinism and thus Protestantism, as well as of American evangelicalism (the ‘Bible Belt’) as the ‘proto-totalitarian’ elimination of individual liberty and thus liberal democracy (Bauman 1997; Mueller 2009). Lastly, it relates to the

39. I credit an anonymous reviewer for these remarks.

characterization of the ‘American regime’ as substantively (though not formally) theocratic through the Religious Right alliance between capitalist and religious lower classes against science and liberal democracy, while functioning in contrast and opposition to the Western European secular regime (Bénabou et al. 2015; Domhoff 2013; Keister 2008). On the other hand, the creation of the Soviet ‘new man’ is nonreligious totalitarian or authoritarian blueprint and process confirming earlier observations. Thus, this is a puritan or purist project and process in the communist meaning by analogy to the first as Puritan or Puritanical in the sense of Calvinist Puritanism or evangelicalism, both being inherently or eventually becoming totalitarian projects and processes. Conversely, the totalitarian core of inventing the American and Soviet ‘new man’ is typically puritan or purist in socialism and Puritan or Puritanical in American conservatism. Hence, the productions of both the American and Soviet ‘new man’ share generally in an authoritarian, anti-liberal or illiberal, coercive and repressive design and activity disregarding and eliminating freedom of choice and individual liberty, thus ruling out or reversing liberal democracy (Habermas 2001; Mueller 2009).

Further and as a corollary, the inventing of both the American and Soviet ‘new man’ starts and enfolds as a God- or master-like ignorant and arrogant endeavors. Thus, the conservative and religious inventors of the American ‘new man’ claim to be Divinely chosen agents and thus having Divine rights to produce a substitute to ‘natural man’ and act as masters (due to being of the ‘elect’) over other humans (Emerson et al. 2006; Lindsay 2008). In doing so they are induced by religious and other ‘blissful ignorance’ with regard to the knowledge of human actors or social processes and thus typically act with arrogance in producing the American ‘new man’ (Nordhaus 2019; Wacquant 2002). Similarly but not identically, the communist and nonreligious inventors of the Soviet ‘new man’ claim a higher ideological mandate to produce a substitute to pre-Soviet ‘natural man’ and to act as masters over other humans, while in doing so being actuated by some degree of ignorance of human actors or social processes and so acting with arrogance. Taken together, the inventors of both the American and Soviet ‘new man’ think and act as if the history and society of America and Russia and indeed of the humanity and world began with them and had the mission to accomplish this production of a new human type.

As a corollary of all the above, the inventing and imposing, as well as spreading to other societies, of both the American and Soviet ‘new man’ starts with grand declaration and pretensions but ends in the low destination of dismal failure and discredit, destruction and infamy (Altemeyer 2007; Dell and Querubin 2018; Dube et al. 2011). Thus, the shared extreme utopianism, theocratic or nonreligious totalitarianism and religious and other ignorance/arrogance predestine this process of reinvention of humans and their social actions and processes to fail abjectly and in that sense inevitably doom it. This yields the corresponding prediction that any persistent attempts in this regard, as they especially persist in American conservatism, are doomed to the same destiny in the future as they suffer today judging by the results of the empirical analysis. This provides and suggests a direction for future research so long as such efforts persist and likely to perdure

further in Puritanical American conservatism—given what Hume classically diagnoses as the ‘unreasonable obstinacy’ of Puritanism--as well as its ‘brother in arms’ against liberal democracy, Islamic fundamentalism, in view of the fact that Soviet socialism is dead. Accordingly, given the demise of the latter, future research will likely identify and concentrate on the continuous, indeed permanent production and ‘revolution’ of the ‘new man’ primarily in American conservatism within the Western world and in Islamic fundamentalism and other religious extremism (e.g., Polish and other illiberal Catholicism) in non-Western settings.

Appendix

This appendix reports the results of preliminary statistical analyses such as correlation matrix and a confirmatory factor analysis. First, Table 10S gives the inter-item correlation matrix for ‘new man’ variables. Generally, it shows that these variables almost entirely correlate positively with each. Specifically, of the total of 28 correlations, 26 are positive (92.86%) and so only 2 being negative ones. To that extent, the overwhelmingly positive correlations between the variables generally suggest that they possess internal validity.

Notably, most positive correlations between the 8 variables are strong to moderate. Specifically, out of 26 positive correlations 17 are of high to moderate strength (around and above .4) and only 9 weaker. (Conversely, the two negative correlations are very weak and indeed the weakest of all.) For example, correlations are especially strong to moderate between the prison population rate (x1) on one hand and on the other death sentences and executions (x2), other ‘political terror’ (x3), share of drug and related offenders of total prisoners (by default) (x5), peace index negative (x6) and gun ownership rate (x7). In addition, death sentences and executions correlate strongly to moderately (also) with the death penalty for drug offenses (x4), share of drug and related offenders of total prisoners and gun ownership rate. Further, other ‘political terror’ has strong to moderate correlations (also) with share of drug and related offenders of total prisoners, peace index negative and murders by firearms rate (x8), and so on. On this account, the mostly strong to moderate intercorrelations between the variables particularly evidence their relatively high internal validity. Overall, the reliability estimate for the index is relatively high in standardized terms in which numerical indexes for OECD countries are calculated (Cronbach’s Alpha based on standardized items = .85). Recall that the index is the average of 8 indicators and proxies and hence its overall high reliability reflects the equivalent internal validity of its components.

Second, Table 11S contains the results from a confirmatory factor/principal component analysis of ‘new man’ variables. Its section ‘Total Variance Explained’ suggests that underlying factors or principal components 1 and 2 explain (by their Eigenvalues higher than 1) just over 75 percent of the combined variance of the observed 8 variables, while components 3-8 explaining the rest and thus a relatively small amount (see also the scree plot in Figure 1S). Therefore, these two components can help retrieve most of the content of the observed variables, while discarding the other six (whose Eigenvalues are under 1).

Next, section ‘Component Matrix’ indicates that, except for two, almost all

of the observed variables 'load on' principal component 1 judging by 'factor loadings' as standardized coefficients in the regression of these variables on underlying factors, thus expressing the effects of the second on the first. For instance, the prison population rate (x1), death sentences and executions (x2), other 'political terror' (x3), the death penalty for drug offenses (x4), share of drug and related offenders of total prisoners (x5) and peace index negative (x6) all load on principal component 1, while only gun ownership rate (x7) and murders by firearms rate (x8) loading on principal component 2. Accordingly, principal component 1 can be substantively identified or meaningfully interpreted as the definitely negative of the concept of the 'new man'. By contrast, it is more difficult to identify or interpret principal component 2 that instead appears as an indefinite mixture of the concept of the 'new man' (by negative gun ownership effects) and its negative (by positive murders by firearms rate effects). Statistically, the reliability coefficient for principal component 1 is of similar magnitude as the reliability statistic for the index ($\theta = 0.87$), while that for principal component 2 is appreciably lower ($\theta = 0.52$).

To that extent, the above generates a one-factor model of the 8 observed variables in substantive sociological terms so long as principal component 2 is substantively equivalent to principal component 1 and hence gun ownership rate and murders by firearms rate are considered to load on the latter (which Figure 2S illustrates). In formal statistical terms, it yields a two-factor model of these variables (which Figure 3S represents). In sum, the results a confirmatory factor analysis confirm that the 8 observed variables express or measure the same underlying factor such as the 'new man' concept, more precisely its negative or inverse, and that this latent variable exerts largely strong and significant effects (by 'factor loadings') on these indicators.

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'New Man' Aggregate Index =
 x1 low or no imprisonment + x2 rare or no death sentences and executions + x3 no or weak political terror + x4 no death penalty for drug offenses + x5 no or small share of drug offenders of total prisoners + x6 high civic peace + x7 no or low gun ownership + x8 no or low murders by firearms

Figure 1: Components of the 'New Man' Aggregate Index




Figure 2: 'New Man' Aggregate Indexes, OECD Countries

Table 1. Indicators And Proxies Of The 'New Man'

- 1 Low imprisonment
- 2 No death sentences and executions.
- 3 No or weak political terror
- 4 No death penalty for drug offenses
- 5 No share of drug offenders of total prisoners
- 6 Strong civic peace
- 7 Low gun ownership
- 8 No murders by firearms

Table 2. 'New Man' Indicators And Aggregate Indexes, OECD Countries

| Country | x1* | x2* | x3* | x4* | x5* | x6* | x7* | x8* | Total** | Index*** | Index * 100 |
|----------------|------|------|------|------|------|-------|-------|------|---------|----------|-------------|
| Australia | .18 | -.18 | .41 | -.24 | .18 | -.61 | -.21 | -.26 | -8.99 | .09 | 8.99 |
| Austria | -.47 | -.18 | -.60 | -.24 | -.47 | -.85 | .71 | -.26 | -29.41 | .29 | 29.41 |
| Belgium | -.47 | -.18 | -.60 | -.24 | -.47 | -.38 | -.08 | -.11 | -31.61 | .32 | 31.61 |
| Canada | -.37 | -.18 | -.60 | -.24 | -.37 | -.80 | .74 | -.08 | -23.58 | .24 | 23.58 |
| Chile | .53 | -.18 | .41 | -.24 | .53 | .26 | -.46 | .25 | 14.03 | -.14 | -14.03 |
| Czech Republic | .40 | -.18 | -.60 | -.24 | .40 | -.72 | -.13 | -.26 | -16.49 | .16 | 16.49 |
| Denmark | -.68 | -.18 | -.60 | -.24 | -.68 | -.83 | -.39 | -.22 | -47.74 | .48 | 47.74 |
| Estonia | .30 | -.18 | -.60 | -.24 | .30 | .00 | -.55 | -.30 | -15.88 | .16 | 15.88 |
| Finland | -.84 | -.18 | -.60 | -.24 | -.84 | -.58 | 1.60 | -.22 | -23.71 | .24 | 23.71 |
| France | -.39 | -.18 | -.60 | -.24 | -.39 | .53 | .76 | -.15 | -8.30 | .08 | 8.30 |
| Germany | -.63 | -.18 | -.60 | -.24 | -.63 | -.39 | .71 | -.26 | -27.72 | .28 | 27.72 |
| Greece | -.37 | -.18 | .41 | -.24 | -.37 | .42 | .24 | -.19 | -3.50 | .04 | 3.50 |
| Hungary | .16 | -.18 | .41 | -.24 | .16 | -.25 | -.77 | -.26 | -11.98 | .12 | 11.98 |
| Iceland | -.98 | -.18 | -.60 | -.24 | -.98 | -1.26 | .71 | -.19 | -46.50 | .47 | 46.50 |
| Ireland | -.66 | -.18 | -.60 | -.24 | -.66 | -.64 | -.59 | -.15 | -46.28 | .46 | 46.28 |
| Israel | .75 | -.18 | 2.44 | -.24 | .76 | 2.30 | -.67 | -.08 | 63.69 | -.64 | -63.69 |
| Italy | -.52 | -.18 | .41 | -.24 | -.51 | .02 | -.39 | -.19 | -19.80 | .20 | 19.80 |
| Japan | -.96 | .11 | -.60 | -.24 | -.96 | -.67 | -1.06 | -.30 | -58.55 | .59 | 58.55 |
| Korea | -.37 | -.04 | .41 | 4.13 | -.37 | .32 | -1.03 | -.30 | 34.21 | -.34 | -34.21 |
| Latvia | .27 | -.18 | -.60 | -.24 | .27 | .04 | .03 | -.19 | -7.33 | .07 | 7.33 |
| Lithuania | .64 | -.18 | -.60 | -.24 | .64 | .06 | -1.06 | -.15 | -11.14 | .11 | 11.14 |
| Luxembourg | -.38 | -.18 | -.60 | -.24 | -.38 | -.38 | -.19 | -.22 | -32.22 | .32 | 32.22 |
| Mexico | .08 | -.18 | 2.44 | -.24 | .08 | 1.87 | -.21 | 5.78 | 120.50 | -1.21 | -120.50 |
| Netherlands | -.75 | -.18 | -.60 | -.24 | -.75 | -.32 | -.87 | -.26 | -49.57 | .50 | 49.57 |
| New Zealand | .45 | -.18 | -.60 | -.24 | .44 | -1.01 | .25 | -.22 | -13.88 | .14 | 13.88 |

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----------------|------|------|------|------|------|-------|------|--------|-------|---------|
| Norway | -18 | -60 | -24 | -78 | -38 | .77 | -.26 | -30.65 | .31 | 30.65 |
| Poland | -18 | .41 | -24 | .36 | -.05 | -1.02 | -.30 | -8.14 | .08 | 8.14 |
| Portugal | -18 | -.60 | -24 | -.34 | -.90 | -.59 | -.22 | -42.67 | .43 | 42.67 |
| Slovak Republic | -18 | -.60 | -24 | .38 | -.23 | -.61 | -.19 | -15.91 | .16 | 15.91 |
| Slovenia | -18 | -.60 | -24 | -.70 | -.65 | -.30 | -.30 | -45.73 | .46 | 45.73 |
| Spain | -18 | .41 | -24 | -.22 | .07 | -.48 | -.26 | -13.78 | .14 | 13.78 |
| Sweden | -18 | -.60 | -24 | -.77 | -.42 | .78 | -.15 | -29.27 | .29 | 29.27 |
| Switzerland | -18 | -.60 | -24 | -.60 | -.66 | 1.62 | -.22 | -18.45 | .18 | 18.45 |
| Turkey | -18 | 2.44 | -24 | 1.72 | 2.68 | -.36 | .00 | 97.51 | -.98 | -97.51 |
| United Kingdom | -18 | -.60 | -24 | -.13 | .19 | -.73 | -.30 | -26.35 | .26 | 26.35 |
| United States | 5.91 | 1.43 | 4.13 | 4.46 | 1.32 | 4.19 | .95 | 335.64 | -3.36 | -335.64 |
| Russia | -18 | 2.44 | -24 | 1.70 | 2.87 | -.37 | .03 | 99.55 | -1.00 | -99.55 |

* standard score (standard deviations from the mean)

** sum of x1-x8

*** Total/8 * -1

x1 prison population rate

x2 death sentences and executions

x3 other political terror

x4 the death penalty for drug offenses

x5 share of drug offenders of total prisoners

x6 peace index negative

x7 gun ownership rate

x8 murders by firearms rate

Table 3. Ranking by 'New Man' Aggregate Indexes, OECD Countries

| Rank | Country | Index x 100 |
|------|-----------------|-------------|
| 1. | Japan | 58.55 |
| 2. | Netherlands | 49.57 |
| 3. | Denmark | 47.74 |
| 4. | Iceland | 46.50 |
| 5. | Ireland | 46.28 |
| 6. | Slovenia | 45.73 |
| 7. | Portugal | 42.67 |
| 8. | Luxembourg | 32.22 |
| 9. | Belgium | 31.61 |
| 10. | Norway | 30.65 |
| 11. | Austria | 29.41 |
| 12. | Sweden | 29.27 |
| 13. | Germany | 27.72 |
| 14. | United Kingdom | 26.35 |
| 15. | Finland | 23.71 |
| 16. | Canada | 23.58 |
| 17. | Italy | 19.80 |
| 18. | Switzerland | 18.45 |
| 19. | Czech Republic | 16.49 |
| 20. | Slovak Republic | 15.91 |
| 21. | Estonia | 15.88 |
| 22. | New Zealand | 13.88 |
| 23. | Spain | 13.78 |
| 24. | Hungary | 11.98 |
| 25. | Lithuania | 11.14 |
| 26. | Australia | 8.99 |
| 27. | France | 8.30 |
| 28. | Poland | 8.14 |
| 29. | Latvia | 7.33 |
| 30. | Greece | 3.50 |
| 31. | Chile | -14.03 |
| 32. | Korea | -34.21 |
| 33. | Israel | -63.69 |
| 34. | Turkey | -97.51 |
| 35. | Russia | -99.55 |
| 36. | Mexico | -120.50 |
| 37. | United States | -335.64 |

Table 1S. Prison Population Rates Per 100,000 persons, OECD Countries, 2019

| Country | Rate |
|--------------------|-------|
| Australia | 169 |
| Austria | 95 |
| Belgium | 95 |
| Canada | 107 |
| Chile | 209 |
| Czech Republic | 194 |
| Denmark | 71 |
| Estonia | 182 |
| Finland | 53 |
| France | 104 |
| Germany | 77 |
| Greece | 106 |
| Hungary | 167 |
| Iceland | 37 |
| Ireland | 74 |
| Israel | 234 |
| Italy | 90 |
| Japan | 39 |
| Korea, South | 106 |
| Latvia | 179 |
| Lithuania | 221 |
| Luxembourg | 105 |
| Mexico | 158 |
| Netherlands | 63 |
| New Zealand | 199 |
| Norway | 60 |
| Poland | 189 |
| Portugal | 110 |
| Slovak Republic | 192 |
| Slovenia | 69 |
| Spain | 124 |
| Sweden | 61 |
| Switzerland | 80 |
| Turkey | 344 |
| United Kingdom | 134 |
| United States | 655 |
| OECD Average | 143.1 |
| Russian Federation | 341 |

Source: International Centre For *Prison* Studies, The World Prison Brief
https://www.prisonstudies.org/highest-to-lowest/prison_population_rate?field_region_taxonomy_tid=All

Table 2S. Death Sentences and Executions, OECD Countries, 2019

| Country | Numbers* |
|--------------------|----------|
| Australia | 0 |
| Austria | 0 |
| Belgium | 0 |
| Canada | 0 |
| Chile | 0 |
| Czech Republic | 0 |
| Denmark | 0 |
| Estonia | 0 |
| Finland | 0 |
| France | 0 |
| Germany | 0 |
| Greece | 0 |
| Hungary | 0 |
| Iceland | 0 |
| Ireland | 0 |
| Israel | 0 |
| Italy | 0 |
| Japan | 126 |
| Korea, South | 61 |
| Latvia | 0 |
| Lithuania | 0 |
| Luxembourg | 0 |
| Mexico | 0 |
| Netherlands | 0 |
| New Zealand | 0 |
| Norway | 0 |
| Poland | 0 |
| Portugal | 0 |
| Slovak Republic | 0 |
| Slovenia | 0 |
| Spain | 0 |
| Sweden | 0 |
| Switzerland | 0 |
| Turkey | 0 |
| United Kingdom | 0 |
| United States | 2638 |
| OECD Average | N/A |
| Russian Federation | 0 |

Source: Amnesty International Global Report, Death Sentences And Executions 2019 <https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/ACT5018472020ENGLISH.PDF>

* include 'recorded executions, recorded death sentences and people known to be under sentence of death at the end of 2019.'

the Russian Federation 'continued to observe moratoriums on executions.'

Table 3S. Political Terror Scale Levels, OECD Countries, 2018 Or Nearest Year

| Country | Level |
|--------------------|-------|
| Australia | 2 |
| Austria | 1 |
| Belgium | 1 |
| Canada | 1 |
| Chile | 2 |
| Czech Republic | 1 |
| Denmark | 1 |
| Estonia | 1 |
| Finland | 1 |
| France | 1 |
| Germany | 1 |
| Greece | 2 |
| Hungary | 2 |
| Iceland | 1 |
| Ireland | 1 |
| Israel | 4 |
| Italy | 2 |
| Japan | 1 |
| Korea, South | 2 |
| Latvia | 1 |
| Lithuania | 1 |
| Luxembourg | 1 |
| Mexico | 4 |
| Netherlands | 1 |
| New Zealand | 1 |
| Norway | 1 |
| Poland | 2 |
| Portugal | 1 |
| Slovak Republic | 1 |
| Slovenia | 1 |
| Spain | 2 |
| Sweden | 1 |
| Switzerland | 1 |
| Turkey | 4 |
| United Kingdom | 1 |
| United States | 3 |
| OECD Average | 1.5 |
| Russian Federation | 4 |

Source: The Political Terror Scale <http://www.politicalterrorsscale.org/Data/Download.html> Larger scores from Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch

Gibney, Mark, Linda Cornett, Reed Wood, Peter Haschke, Daniel Arnon, Attilio Pisanò, and Gray Barrett. 2019. The Political Terror Scale 1976-2018.

Date Retrieved, from the Political Terror Scale website: <http://www.politicalterror-scale.org>.

'The "terror" in the PTS refers to state-sanctioned killings, torture, disappearances and political imprisonment that the Political Terror Scale measures.'

Political Terror Scale Levels

Level

Interpretation

1

Countries under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their views, and torture is rare or exceptional. Political murders are extremely rare.

2

There is a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity. However, few persons are affected, torture and beatings are exceptional. Political murder is rare.

3

There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment. Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention, with or without a trial, for political views is accepted.

4

Civil and political rights violations have expanded to large numbers of the population. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life. In spite of its generality, on this level terror affects those who interest themselves in politics or ideas.

5

Terror has expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals.

Table 4S. Death Penalty For Drug Offenses, OECD Countries, 2019

| Country | Death Penalty | Score |
|-----------------|---------------|-------|
| Australia | N | 0 |
| Austria | N | 0 |
| Belgium | N | 0 |
| Canada | N | 0 |
| Chile | N | 0 |
| Czech Republic | N | 0 |
| Denmark | N | 0 |
| Estonia | N | 0 |
| Finland | N | 0 |
| France | N | 0 |
| Germany | N | 0 |
| Greece | N | 0 |
| Hungary | N | 0 |
| Iceland | N | 0 |
| Ireland | N | 0 |
| Israel | N | 0 |
| Italy | N | 0 |
| Japan | N | 0 |
| Korea, South* | Y | 1 |
| Latvia | N | 0 |
| Lithuania | N | 0 |
| Luxembourg | N | 0 |
| Mexico | N | 0 |
| Netherlands | N | 0 |
| New Zealand | N | 0 |
| Norway | N | 0 |
| Poland | N | 0 |
| Portugal | N | 0 |
| Slovak Republic | N | 0 |
| Slovenia | N | 0 |
| Spain | N | 0 |
| Sweden | N | 0 |

| | | |
|--------------------|-----|-----|
| Switzerland | N | 0 |
| Turkey | N | 0 |
| United Kingdom | N | 0 |
| United States* | Y | 1 |
| OECD Average | N/A | N/A |
| Russian Federation | N | 0 |

Source: Harm Reduction International, Gen Sander, Giada Girelli and Adrià Cots Fernández, *The Death Penalty for Drug Offences: Global Overview 2019* https://www.hri.global/files/2020/02/28/HRI_DeathPenaltyReport2019.pdf

According to Harm Reduction International, the 'legal analysis reflects the principle in international law that the imposition of a death sentence following conviction for a drug offence (not involving intentional killing) in proceedings which fail to meet international standards of fairness compounds the violations of the rights of the individual to life, to a fair trial, and to be free from torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment' (p.).

* Symbolic Application according to Harm Reduction International.

Harm Reduction International reports: 'While President Donald Trump continues suggesting that the death penalty should be expanded to drug offences, analyses of death sentences and executions in the past 40 years reveal that reliance on this measure in the country is in fact shrinking' (p. 39).

Death Penalty Score N = 0, Y = 1

Table 5S. Share Of Drug And Related Offenders Of Total Prisoners, Estimates, OECD Countries, 2019

| Country | Prisoner Rate | US/Prisoner Rate | % of Drug Offenders (estimate) |
|----------------|---------------|------------------|--------------------------------|
| Australia | 169 | 3.88 | 5.12 |
| Austria | 95 | 6.89 | 2.88 |
| Belgium | 95 | 6.89 | 2.88 |
| Canada | 107 | 6.12 | 3.24 |
| Chile | 209 | 3.13 | 6.34 |
| Czech Republic | 194 | 3.38 | 5.88 |
| Denmark | 71 | 9.23 | 2.15 |
| Estonia | 182 | 3.60 | 5.52 |
| Finland | 53 | 12.36 | 1.61 |
| France | 104 | 6.30 | 3.15 |
| Germany | 77 | 8.51 | 2.33 |
| Greece | 106 | 6.18 | 3.21 |
| Hungary | 167 | 3.92 | 5.06 |
| Iceland | 37 | 17.70 | 1.12 |
| Ireland | 74 | 8.85 | 2.24 |
| Israel | 234 | 2.80 | 7.10 |
| Italy | 90 | 7.28 | 2.73 |
| Japan | 39 | 16.79 | 1.18 |
| Korea, South | 106 | 6.18 | 3.21 |
| Latvia | 179 | 3.66 | 5.43 |
| Lithuania | 221 | 2.96 | 6.70 |
| Luxembourg | 105 | 6.24 | 3.18 |
| Mexico | 158 | 4.15 | 4.79 |
| Netherlands | 63 | 10.40 | 1.91 |
| New Zealand | 199 | 3.29 | 6.03 |

| | | | |
|--------------------|--------|-------|-------|
| Norway | 60 | 10.92 | 1.82 |
| Poland | 189 | 3.47 | 5.73 |
| Portugal | 110 | 5.95 | 3.34 |
| Slovak Republic | 192 | 3.41 | 5.82 |
| Slovenia | 69 | 9.49 | 2.09 |
| Spain | 124 | 5.28 | 3.76 |
| Sweden | 61 | 10.74 | 1.85 |
| Switzerland | 80 | 8.19 | 2.43 |
| Turkey | 344 | 1.90 | 10.43 |
| United Kingdom | 134 | 4.89 | 4.06 |
| United States | 655 | 1.00 | 19.86 |
| OECD Average | 143.11 | 6.55 | 4.34 |
| Russian Federation | 341 | 1.92 | 10.34 |

Source: The Prison Policy Initiative, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2020 <https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2020.html>

The Prison Policy Initiative reports that in the US 'police, prosecutors, and judges continue to punish people harshly for nothing more than drug possession. Drug offenses still account for the incarceration of almost half a million people, and nonviolent drug convictions remain a [defining feature of the federal prison system](#). Police still make over 1 million drug possession arrests each year, many of which lead to prison sentences. Drug arrests continue to give residents of over-policed communities [criminal records](#), hurting their employment prospects and increasing the likelihood of longer sentences for any future offenses.'

The Prison Policy Initiative estimates that in the US in 2020 there are 450,180 people incarcerated for drug offenses out of 2,267,000, i.e., 'almost 2.3 million people in 1,833 state prisons, 110 federal prisons, 1,772 juvenile correctional facilities, 3,134 local jails, 218 immigration detention facilities, and 80 Indian Country jails as well as in military prisons, civil commitment centers, state psychiatric hospitals, and prisons in the U.S. territories (at the staggering rate of 698 per 100,000 residents.'

US Drug Offenders as % of total prisoners $450,180/2,267,000 = 19.86\%$ Drug Offenders as % of Federal prisoners $100,000/226,000 = 44.25\%$

% of Drug Offenders (estimate) = $19.86/(655/\text{Prisoner Rate})$

Table 6S. Global Peace Index, OECD Countries, 2020

| Country | Index Negative |
|--------------------|----------------|
| Australia | 1.39 |
| Austria | 1.28 |
| Belgium | 1.50 |
| Canada | 1.30 |
| Chile | 1.80 |
| Czech Republic | 1.34 |
| Denmark | 1.28 |
| Estonia | 1.68 |
| Finland | 1.40 |
| France | 1.93 |
| Germany | 1.49 |
| Greece | 1.88 |
| Hungary | 1.56 |
| Iceland | 1.08 |
| Ireland | 1.38 |
| Israel | 2.78 |
| Italy | 1.69 |
| Japan | 1.36 |
| Korea, South | 1.83 |
| Latvia | 1.70 |
| Lithuania | 1.71 |
| Luxembourg | 1.50 |
| Mexico | 2.57 |
| Netherlands | 1.53 |
| New Zealand | 1.20 |
| Norway | 1.50 |
| Poland | 1.66 |
| Portugal | 1.25 |
| Slovak Republic | 1.57 |
| Slovenia | 1.37 |
| Spain | 1.71 |
| Sweden | 1.48 |
| Switzerland | 1.37 |
| Turkey | 2.96 |
| United Kingdom | 1.77 |
| United States | 2.31 |
| OECD Average | 1.64 |
| Russian Federation | 3.05 |

Source: Global Peace Index 2020, Institute for Economics and Peace http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2020/06/GPI_2020_web.pdf

The Global Peace Index 'measures the state of peace across three domains: the level of Societal Safety and Security; the extent of Ongoing Domestic and International Conflict; and the degree of Militarisation.'

* estimated values from comparable countries: Luxembourg from Belgium
Higher index, lesser peace

Table 7S. Average Rate Of Civilian Gun Ownership, Guns Per 100 People

| Country | Rate |
|--------------------|------|
| Australia | 15.0 |
| Austria | 30.4 |
| Belgium | 17.2 |
| Canada | 30.8 |
| Chile | 10.7 |
| Czech Republic | 16.3 |
| Denmark | 12. |
| Estonia | 9.2 |
| Finland | 45.3 |
| France | 31.2 |
| Germany | 30.3 |
| Greece | 22.5 |
| Hungary | 5.5 |
| Iceland | 30.3 |
| Ireland | 8.6 |
| Israel | 7.3 |
| Italy | 11.9 |
| Japan | .6 |
| Korea, South | 1.1 |
| Latvia | 19. |
| Lithuania | .7 |
| Luxembourg | 15.3 |
| Mexico | 15. |
| Netherlands | 3.9 |
| New Zealand | 22.6 |
| Norway | 31.3 |
| Poland | 1.3 |
| Portugal | 8.5 |
| Slovak Republic | 8.3 |
| Slovenia | 13.5 |
| Spain | 10.4 |
| Sweden | 31.6 |
| Switzerland | 45.7 |
| Turkey | 12.5 |
| United Kingdom | 6.2 |
| United States | 88.8 |
| OECD Average | 18.6 |
| Russian Federation | 12.3 |

Source: The Small Arms Survey 2007: Guns And The City [Http://Www.Smallarmssurvey.Org/Fileadmin/Docs/A-Yearbook/2007/En/Small-Arms-Survey-2007-Chapter-02-Annexe-4-En.Pdf](http://www.Smallarmssurvey.Org/Fileadmin/Docs/A-Yearbook/2007/En/Small-Arms-Survey-2007-Chapter-02-Annexe-4-En.Pdf)

* The estimated rate of private gun ownership (both licit and illicit) per 100 people in 2017. Source: GunPolicy.org <https://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region/russia>

Table 8S. Homicide Rate By Firearms Per 100,000 Population, 2017

| Country | Rate |
|----------------------|------|
| Australia | .1 |
| Austria | .1 |
| Belgium | .5 |
| Canada | .6 |
| Chile | 1.5 |
| Czech Republic | .1 |
| Denmark | .2 |
| Estonia | 0 |
| Finland | .2 |
| France | .4 |
| Germany | .1 |
| Greece | .3 |
| Hungary | .1 |
| Iceland | .3 |
| Ireland | .4 |
| Israel | .6 |
| Italy | .3 |
| Japan | 0 |
| Korea, South | 0 |
| Latvia | .3 |
| Lithuania | .4 |
| Luxembourg | .2 |
| Mexico | 16.5 |
| Netherlands | .1 |
| New Zealand | .2 |
| Norway | .1 |
| Poland | 0 |
| Portugal | .2 |
| Slovak Republic | .3 |
| Slovenia | 0 |
| Spain | .1 |
| Sweden | .4 |
| Switzerland | .2 |
| Turkey | .8 |
| United Kingdom* | 0 |
| United States | 3.4 |
| OECD Average | .81 |
| Russian Federation** | .9 |

Source: DATAUNODC <https://Dataunodc.Un.Org/Data/Homicide/Homicide%20rate%20by%20mechanisms>

* England and Wales

** the annual rate of firearm homicide per 100,000 population in 2013.

Source: GunPolicy.org <https://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region/russia>

Table 9S. Descriptive Statistics For 'New Man' Variables

| | N | Minimum | Maximum | Mean | Std. Deviation |
|---------------------------------|----|---------|---------|---------|----------------|
| prison population rate | 37 | 37 | 655 | 148.46 | 113.501 |
| death sentences and executions | 37 | 0 | 2638 | 76.35 | 433.428 |
| other political terror | 37 | 1 | 4 | 1.59 | .985 |
| death penalty for drug offenses | 37 | 0 | 1 | .05 | .229 |
| share of drug offenders | 37 | 1.12 | 19.86 | 4.5005 | 3.44185 |
| peace index negative | 37 | 1.08 | 3.05 | 1.6786 | .47720 |
| gun ownership rate | 37 | .60 | 88.80 | 18.4622 | 16.78090 |
| murders by firearms rate | 37 | .00 | 16.50 | .8081 | 2.71686 |

Table 10S. Inter-Item Correlation Matrix For 'New Man' Variables

| | X1 | X2 | X3 | X4 | X5 | X6 | X7 | X8 |
|---------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| prison population rate | 1.000 | | | | | | | |
| death sentences and executions | .745 | 1.000 | | | | | | |
| other political terror | .605 | .238 | 1.000 | | | | | |
| death penalty for drug offenses | .495 | .712 | .223 | 1.000 | | | | |
| share of drug offenders | 1.000 | .745 | .605 | .495 | 1.000 | | | |
| peace index negative | .626 | .218 | .902 | .198 | .626 | 1.000 | | |
| gun ownership rate | .365 | .696 | -.015 | .383 | .365 | -.019 | 1.000 | |
| murders by firearms rate | .192 | .158 | .496 | .080 | .192 | .404 | .102 | 1.000 |

Total correlations = 28 Positive correlations = 26 (92.86%) Negative correlations = 2 (7.14%)
 Reliability Statistics Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items N of Items
 .854 8

Table 11S. Results from Factor/Principal Component Analysis Of 'New Man' Variables

| Total Variance Explained | | |
|--|---------------------|----------------------------|
| Component | Total | |
| 1 | 4.183 | |
| 2 | 1.835 | |
| Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. | | |
| Component Matrix | | |
| | Initial Eigenvalues | Extraction Sums of Squared |
| | % of Variance | % of Variance |
| | Cumulative % | Cumulative % |
| 1 | 52.281 | 52.281 |
| 2 | 22.932 | 75.213 |

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Component Matrix

| | Component | |
|--|-------------|--------------|
| | 1 | 2 |
| Zscore(prison population rate) | .934 | -.031 |
| Zscore(death sentences and executions) | .803 | -.531 |
| Zscore(other political terror) | .719 | .625 |
| Zscore(death penalty for drug offenses) | .631 | -.429 |
| Zscore(share of drug offenders) | .934 | -.031 |
| Zscore(peace index negative) | .712 | .615 |
| Zscore(gun ownership rate) | .471 | -.639 |
| Zscore(murders by firearms rate) | .386 | .436 |
| Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. | | |

a. 2 components extracted

Reliability coefficient (theta) for principal component 1 = 0.87

Reliability coefficient (theta) for principal component 2 = 0.52




Figure S1. Scree Plot For Principal Component Analysis Of ‘New Man’ Variables

| Factor/Principal Component | Factor Loading | Observed Variable (Effect Of Factors) |
|----------------------------|----------------|---|
| 1 | →→→→→ .934 | x1 (prison population rate) |
| | →→→→→ .803 | x2 (death sentences and executions) |
| | →→→→→ .719 | x3 (other political terror) |
| | →→→→→ .631 | x4 (death penalty for drug offenses) |
| | →→→→→ .934 | x5 (share of drug offenders of total prisoners) |
| | →→→→→ .712 | x4 (civic peace negative) |
| | →→→→→ .471 | x7 (gun ownership rate) |
| | →→→→→ .386 | x8 (murders by firearms rate) |

Figure S2. One-Factor Substantive Model For Observed ‘New Man’ Variables
Note: →→→→→ indicates left-to-right effects

| Factor/Principal Component | Factor Loading | Observed Variable (Effect Of Factors) | |
|----------------------------|----------------|---|-------------------------------|
| 1 | →→→→ .934 | x1 (prison population rate) | |
| | →→→→ .803 | x2 (death sentences and executions) | |
| | →→→→ .719 | x3 (other political terror) | |
| | →→→→ .631 | x4 (death penalty for drug offenses) | |
| | →→→→ .934 | x5 (share of drug offenders of total prisoners) | |
| | →→→→ .712 | x4 (civic peace negative) | |
| | 2 | →→→→ -.639 | x7 (gun ownership rate) |
| | | →→→→ .436 | x8 (murders by firearms rate) |

Figure S3. Two-Factor Statistical Model For Observed ‘New Man’ Variables
 Note: →→→→ indicates left-to-right effects

About the Author

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Through Curious and Foreign Eyes: Grigorii Machtet Chronicles the Kansas Frontier, 1872-1873

Norman Saul

One of the many newsworthy incidents during the settling of Kansas involved the death by a gunshot of a Russian subject near the town of Seneca in November 1872. The event, like so many similar ones, might have passed quietly into oblivion except that the details were recorded by a companion on the scene. This man, Grigorii Machtet, on the way to becoming a popular author in a great age of Russian literature, described what he saw during his year-long residence and travels in Kansas for an audience in Russia.

Machtet's writings covered a wide range of personal experiences abroad and at home, emphasizing his observations of people he met. Some were autobiographical and descriptive while others were novels, short stories, and morality lessons. After his death in 1901, they were noteworthy enough to be compiled in twelve volumes published in Russian in Kiev and, a few years later in a St. Petersburg edition.¹ Most of volume two of these collections cover his adventures in Kansas.

Machtet was born in 1852 in Lutsk, a major city in the province of Volynia, then part of the Russian empire and formerly within the Kingdom of Poland-Lithuania. Although he was the son of a schoolteacher of Ukrainian-Polish nobility, he wrote mainly in Russian and was properly included in the ranks of the Russian intelligentsia. Machtet then studied at the Nezhinski lyceum (high school) then at a provincial academy in Kamentz-Podolski in the 1860's during

1. This article was originally published in the summer 1994 issue of *Kansas History*. It has been republished with permission. G. A. Machtet, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii G. A. Machteta* [Selections of the Works of G. A. Machtet], 12 vols. (Kiev: B. F. Fuks, 1902) and Machtet, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, 12 vols. (St. Petersburg: Prosveshchenie, 1911-12); the American stories were also published separately as *Po belyi svetu (ocherki amerikanskoj zhizhni)* [Around the Wide World: Sketches of American Life] (Moscow: Bonch-Bruевич, 1889), all available in the University of Illinois Library, Urbana-Champaign. The author is indebted to the opportunity to use the facilities of the Russian Research Laboratory and the resources of the university library during the summer of 1993.

For a translation of about half of Machtet's writings about Kansas, see Olga Peters Hasty and Suzanne Fusso, *America through Russian Eyes, 1874-1926* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988, 16-82. Alexander Nikoliukin, *A Russian Discovery of America* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1986), 320-36, contains Machtet's description of New York and the Russian community there.

the height of liberal reforms in Russia, but was soon expelled for radical activities. He was nonetheless able to take a special examination in Kiev to become a schoolteacher in Mogilevsk.²

During this relatively free period in Russian history, the universities and schools around Kiev were hotbeds of student movements and radical activism. The socialist-populist ideas of Alexander Herzen, Vissarion Belinsky, Mikhael Bakunin, and Nicholas Chernyshevsky provided the inspiration for this revolutionary generation. These students tended to identify with groups and circles that often would have a distinct viewpoint.

At the high school in Ukraine, Machtet came under the influence of one of his teachers, Alexander Romanko-Romanovskii and his wife, Olga Razumovskaia, and he was introduced to the basic tenets of Russian populism that idealized the communal life of the Russian peasant village. He soon developed an attachment to the Kiev circle of the Debogorii-Mokrievich family (two brothers and a cousin), which was especially interested in opportunities abroad with a focus on the United States.³

Information about America was quite plentiful in Russia at that time because of the liberal reform era of the reign of Alexander II and the enduring popularity of American writers such as Washington Irving, James Fenimore Cooper, and Harriet Beecher Stowe, whose works were issued in several Russian-language editions. The United States also attracted Russian attention due to American friendship toward Russia during the Crimean War, the historical coincidence of slave and serf emancipations and the bitter struggle between North and South, with the sensational and much publicized Russian naval visits to New York and San Francisco in 1863 that demonstrated Russian support for the Union cause.

Several Russians, notably Aleksandr Lakier and Eduard Tsimmerman, had already written for the Russian public about their travels in America. Tsimmerman, a Moscow merchant, may have had the most influence upon Russian perceptions of the American frontier because he traveled into Nebraska in 1857 and again in 1869, and emphasized the growth and development that had taken place between his visits. Additionally, a popular account by a British observer, William Hepworth Dixon, also appeared in Russian and was extensively reviewed in Russian periodicals.⁴ All of this spurred a curiosity about the United

2. T. G. Machtet-Iurkevich (Machtet's daughter), introduction, *Izbrannoe G. A. Machteta* [Publications of G. A. Machtet]; "Machtet, Grigorii Aleksandrovich," *Istoricheskii Vestnik* [Historical Herald] 22 (October 1901) 383; Iaroslav Mandat, "Neistvestnaia avtobiografika G. A. Machtet" [An Unknown Autobiography of G. A. Machtet], *Ceskoslovenska Rusistka* 12 (1967) 34-36. The latter includes a letter of Machtet to the Czech literary historian and translator Augustin Vrzal.

3. V. K. Debogorii-Mokrievich, *Vospominania* [Memoirs] (Paris: J. Allemane, 1894) 16-17; Avrahm Yarmolinsky, *A Russian's American Dream: A Memoir on William Frey* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1965) 27-29.

4. Tsimmerman, *Puteshestvie po Amerike v 1869-70* [Travels around America in 1869-70] (Moscow: Grachev, 1871); Lakier, *Puteshestvie po severo-amerikanskim shtatam kanada i ostrov kuba* [Travels around North America, Canada, and Island of Cuba] 2 vols. (St. Petersburg: Vul'f, 1859); an edited version of the latter in English is by Arnold Schrier. *A Russian Looks at America: The Journal of Aleksandr Borisovich Lakier*

States drawing special attention to the outcome of the Civil War, the Homestead Act, land grants to railroads, an attempt to impeach a president, and the freedom and opportunity for immigration and settlement.

The members of the Debogorii-Mokrievich circle were also familiar with Chernyshevsky's and Herzen's sympathetic portraits of America and Bakunin account of his journey through the country in 1860 on his way from Siberian exile to Western Europe. And they were not alone in seeing the United States as a land of opportunity for an unrestricted political life and for social and economic experimentation. Machtet's group was so much infatuated with the New World that its members dubbed themselves "Amerikantsy," the Americans, and began to save money for a trip across the Atlantic.⁵

Another motivation for refuge in America at this time was the wide publicity in 1870 given to Sergei Nechaev's plot to murder a member of his terrorist Moscow student circle in order to bond them closer together, a famous episode of Russian revolutionary history immortalized by Fedor Dostoyevsky in *The Possessed* that had appeared in serial form in 1871. The "Amerikansky" wanted to escape the demoralization produced by the Russian environment that, in their eyes, contributed to this deed and to the repression that was growing in Russia. According to Vladimir Debogorii-Mokrievich, they also sought additional protection that American citizenship might give them upon returning to Russia.⁶

Three members of the circle in Kiev departed for America in the summer of 1872; the Debogorii-Mokrievich brothers also left: one had gone on earlier to join the Oneida Community in New York, one if the best-known utopian socialist settlements in America while the other only reached Zurich, a major center of Russian dissident exiles. Besides the twenty-year old Machtet, who took the name of George Mansted upon arrival, were the teacher Roman'ko-Romanovskii and Ivan Rechitskii, a former government clerk. They first spent several weeks in the rather turbulent Russian community in New York, which included socialists and Christians, Jews and gentiles, and Poles and Ukrainians, as well as Russians. Then they set off for west, apparently having received financial support, as they subsequently referred to themselves as the "Western Branch of the New York Russian Circle for Mutual Aid."⁷

Exactly why Machtet and his associates chose Kansas as their destination is not known, but from the beginning they were intent on finding the best place to establish an agricultural commune, and most likely were aware of the precedent set by Tsimmerman in investigating the Great Plains and by a fellow socialist of Baltic German origin, Vladimir Geins (Heinz), who, after departure from Russia, took the name of Wilhelm Frei (Free), soon anglicized to William Frey. In January 1871, after seeking advice from the Oneida Community and a short participation

(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1979). Other Russians writing about America before the Civil War include Adam Gurowski, Ivan Golovin, and Dmitri Zhurowskii. For more information, see Norman Saul, *Distant Friends: The United States and Russia, 1763-1867* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1991).

5. Debogorii-Mokrievich, 7-10.

6. *Ibid.*, 10-11; Mandat, 35.

7. Yarmolinsky, 37-39.

in Alexander Longley's Reunion Community in Jasper County, Missouri, near the Kansas border, Frey and his wife and an American socialist, Stephen Briggs, bought former Osage Indian land in southern Kansas for a communal farm four miles east of Cedar Vale and called it the Progressive Communist Community. Under Frey's leadership it was known for vegetarianism and for having its own printing press that published a regular pamphlet, the *Progressive Communist*.⁸

Another factor in selecting Kansas may have been the publicity surrounding the journey in the West of Grand Duke Alexis in quest of buffalo hunting thrills in early 1872. After a long trip by train through Nebraska and Wyoming and a stop in Denver, the party returned through Kansas with stops in Topeka and Lawrence.⁹ Or--Machtet and his companions may simply have headed west and ran out of money in St. Joseph, Missouri and found work at a nursery, across the Missouri River in Kansas.

The Russian visitors did not go directly to the Frey's south Kansas commune—or to better-known Kansas towns—but came to the northeast corner of the state. There, in early summer, they found employment at the Doniphan County Nursery at Brenner Station south of Troy on the Atchison and Nebraska Railroad, the main factor in determining their location being the presence there of Russian-speaking "John Moshiskey" [likely in Russian Ivan Moshinsky] who had emigrated from Russia in 1868 and after working in a nursery in Illinois had established a partnership in the nursery in Kansas though Machtet does not cite the name in any of his writings.¹⁰

While working at the nursery, Machtet—or Mansted—began taking notes for a series of impressionistic "travel pictures" describing the frontier scene, informing his Russian readers that the American plains did not at all resemble the Ukrainian steppe:

8. *Ibid.*, 21-23; Frey to Alexander Longley, April 19, 1871, William Frey papers, box 1, folder3, Manuscript division, New York Public Library; "Our Past," *Progressive Communist* 2 (February 1875). Frey had also reports on America for the Russian public. See V. K. Geins, "Prezidentskaia kampaniia v Amerike: poiavlenie tret'ei partii" [The Presidential Election in America: The Appearance of a Third Party], *Otechestvennaia Zapiskaia* [Fatherland Notes] 230 (February) 415-53. This, perhaps the most popular of the several "fat" journals was the leader in exposing Russians to American life and society.

9. For an interesting tongue-in-cheek account of the grand duke's reception in Topeka by D. R. Anthony, a well-known newspaper publisher, *Leavenworth Daily Times*, January 24, 1872. For a full account of this episode, see Lee A. Farrow, *Alexis in America: a Russian Grand Duke's Tour 1871-72*, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2014).

10. "John Moshiskey" as sited in *Portrait and Biographical Album of Marshall County, Kansas* (Chicago: Chapman Bros. 1889) 179, apparently having relocated on west to Marysville by the 1880s. He is described as "a Russian gentleman of superior education, who has been very successful in his present enterprise," the Marysville Nursery with more than a hundred thousand trees on 360 acres. In an earlier advertisement for the Doniphan County Nursery, Stapleton, Moshiskey & Co. the location is described as at Rock Creek schoolhouse near Brenner Station, Doniphan County Republican (Troy), August 10, 1872. Regarding the Russian name there are several variants: Mushinskii, Moshinskii, Moshenskii, Mashinskii, and Moshchenskii. See Morton Benson, comp. *Dictionary of Russian Personal Names* Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1969), 86.

It has nothing in common with our silent, monotonous, flat, smooth, treeless steppe. It is all hills and valleys, crisscrossed by a multitude of streams and ravines that are often parched in summer but noisy and full of water in the spring, when their banks are covered with oaks, white and black walnuts, sycamores, and prickly shrubs . . . At sunset the streams and ravines are enveloped in thick fog that dissolves in the morning into clouds across the vast blue sky. That is why the Indians--the sons of the Great Spirit of the wilderness, who roamed these places long before the coming the paleface--called this land Kansas, that is, "smoking stream."¹¹

He also described the violent history of Kansas, emphasizing the role of John Brown (and even translated one of the verses of the popular song into Russian), but stressed that all was tranquil and productive in Kansas now. Machtet was especially impressed with the transformation of the prairie from its Indian culture to immigrant settlement and described in detail the breaking of the soil for the first time. Curiously, he and his colleagues played a direct role in that transformation since their job at the nursery was planting hedgerows of Osage orange (Machtet complained about losing blood from the thorns).¹²

Keen to speak American English as well as to learn about Kansas society, Machtet attended town and rural meetings and conversed with farmers around Troy. Interestingly, within Machtet's Russian text, particular terms or idioms that struck him as unique were left in the original, phonetically spelled English, thus providing clues to 1870s Kansas speech patterns. He was also adept at sketching people. A leading character in his first stories was "Uncle Jack," a bachelor farmer who regularly attended these meetings, some of which were probably held at the Rock Creek schoolhouse, near the Doniphan County Nursery. "Uncle Jack's" persistence in speaking out in a booming voice and having a definite viewpoint on every issue, perhaps an early and persisting Kansas trait, impressed Machtet who faithfully recorded the debates he heard over "herd lowa (law)" over "fence lowa" and over school bond issues. He also emphasized Jack's unselfish hospitality to friend and foe alike. As Machtet described:

When I lived in northern Kansas, I had an acquaintance there, or rather a sincere friend--a farmer, an excellent worker, whose real name I, like all his neighbors, never knew. Like everyone else, I called him "Uncle Jack," and when I spoke of him in

11. Machtet, "preriia i pionery", [Prairie and Pioneers], *Polnoe sobranie* (Kiev ed.) 2: 5-11; This translation is from Hasty and Fusso, *America through Russian Eyes*, 20 (quoted by permission of Yale University Press, which retains the copyright).

12. The prickly Osage orange, introduced from Texas and Arkansas, was very popular for hedgerows and producing durable fence posts. "The Osage Orange as a Timber Tree," *Kansas Daily Commonwealth* (Topeka), November 16, 1872. The article, however, recommended cedar because it added beauty, thus promoting another characteristic feature to the Kansas landscape.

the third person, I, as others, always added the epithet “fat.” Uncle Jack was not married and it seemed he did not understand why people got married. He was already graying but was fresh and sprightly, and he loved to joke and laugh; I never saw him sad. He adored his pony, Jenny, and he loved his setter, Palmerston, but more than anything, even more than anything, even more than his “green prairie,” for which he “would lay down his soul,” Uncle Jack loved all kind of meetings, debates, speeches, and so forth. Although an excellent husbandman, he was always short of cash, and no one ever knew for sure what Fat Uncle Jack did with all those sums that so often fell to him from the sale of this or that. They knew only that Uncle Jack was somehow inordinately interested in schools, that not a single schoolboy or school-miss passed by his farm without nibbling on something; that out of nowhere boots and new trousers would appear on some John or Charlie and pretty new ribbons on some pretty Betsy, Rosie, or Kate. They also knew that when lightning burned a neighboring farmer’s house and killed his ox, Uncle Jack talked to him about something for a long time, after which, the farmer, a poor man with a large family, began to build a new house and bought another ox.

Not one meeting, not one gathering seldom passed without him and his Palmerston, who always snored during heated debates and who sometimes awakened from his dreams when people began to argue too hotly, and would set up a furious barking, throwing Uncle Jack into considerable embarrassment and indignation. If a single meeting would take place without him, someone would go to his farm to find out what was wrong with him.¹³

One debate that Machtet describes concerned whether travel or the study of science were the best means of education. After much animated discussion a conclusion was reached that both were equally important, but the study of science should ideally precede travel. Russian readers must have been impressed by the interest in and promotion of education among ordinary Kansas citizens.

Uncle Jack took Machtet with him to another meeting in Troy that made a special impression on him. The Methodist and Presbyterian churches had been quarreling about religion, so they held an all-day meeting at the school auditorium. Two respective preachers were invited to lead the debate. Machtet observed:

13. Machtet, Kiev ed. 2:29-37; English translation from Hasty and Fusso, 35-36. Though Machtet does not identify Uncle Jack, he is probably John McDaniel identified by the Kansas census of 1870 as a single, 81-year old farmer living near Rock Creek school with a higher than average property value (\$8,000). 1870 census, Kansas, Doniphan County, Wayne Township.

The preachers came in with their books, notes, pencils, and so forth, and the debates began. But what debates! I was expecting something serious, authoritative. And suddenly a whole slew of mutual gibes of the most venomous and caustic sort. What things they said! The words “my dear brother” were always on their lips; but then there flowed such comparisons, such inferences, such analogies, that finally it got hot for both of them, and sweat streamed from them. They argued for a long time; then even argued for a second day. Finally they became hoarse, and both decided that each of them was right in their descriptions of the other. They did not try to refute the other’s positions, but each sought to represent the other to the public in the most ludicrous, stupid, and unattractive light. And the public had a field day—they simply “split their sides laughing.” The public listened and they laughed, and in the end each preacher remained convinced that he was the one who was right. There were no new converts after the debate.¹⁴

Uncle Jack, who was at first miffed that the crowd had not allowed that Palmerston into the meeting laughed until he cried—until, as he told Machtet, his sides split.

In another story, “Spirits and Souls,” which does not have a specific locale in Kansas but was probably either Doniphan or Marshall County, Machtet describes mystical life on the prairie in wonderfully piquant Russian. He meets a Farmer Wilson, “a stout, kind-hearted soul,” in a beer saloon, and the two proceed to argue about whether there are spirits, a conversation inspired by the arrival in town of an attractive blonde medium. Machtet is then invited to join a wagon load of young people for a gay ride across the prairie to Farmer Davis’ home. The farmhouse, guests and the surprising effects of the “happening” are reported in dramatic detail, but the atheistic Russian was still not convinced of the existence of mystical beings.¹⁵

Another colorful picture that Machtet provided was of fighting a fall prairie grass fire. His Russian readers would have appreciated the community spirit and organization featured in the event. Also of interest is his lengthy narrative, in somewhat gory detail, of the murder of a farm family of German origin. He described the alarm of local citizens, the spread of rumors, the mobilization of a posse, and the capture of an alleged villain who, until the crowd finally became convinced of his innocence, was threatened with hanging. They then atoned for their mistake by taking him home, lighting his fire, and cooking his supper. Machtet seemed overly convinced of the effectiveness of this form of frontier

14. Hasty and Fusso, 37.

15. Machtet, “Spirity i dukhi” *Nedelia* (The Week) 8 (January 6, 1875) 15-22. Although both Wilson and Davis are common names, both appear on the plat map of Doniphan County in 1882 as farmers near Troy. Machtet also recounted in detail his disdain for an encounter with a spiritualist in New York. Nikoliukin, *A Russian Discovery*, 333-34.

justice.¹⁶

As the wintry winds began to blow across the Plains by November 1872, hedgerow planting was necessarily suspended. Moshishkey and his partner took pity on their itinerant Russian workers, who had been joined by this time by Ivan Linev, a trained agronomist, and gave them a winter job clearing and improving land about 120 miles west, near Marysville, for another nursery.¹⁷ Preceded by Moshishkey and provided a wagon, a team of horses, and tools, the four Russians set off in mid-November. Machtet reflected on the people they met on the road: "Farmers of the West are good-souled but yet brave and decisive."¹⁸ He then recorded the sad event that occurred on their journey.

After passing through Seneca, the group stopped along Wild Cat Creek for lunch. While there Rechitskii pulled out an old revolver that he had recently purchased and attempted to shoot a bird across the stream, but the weapon failed to discharge. He then with obvious carelessness tried to unload it, but it went off, the bullet striking his companion, Roman'ko-Romanovskii, or "Room", as he was called in Kansas, in the rib section. Machtet, Linev, and the distraught Rechetskii tried to care for their companion, who they first thought was not seriously wounded. Once the severity of his condition became clear, Machtet had to restrain Rechitskii from also shooting himself. With the help nearby woodcutters, who had heard their cries of distress, they bundled the now unconscious "Room" onto the wagon and race off to Seneca. He was dead by the time they reached town.¹⁹

For Machtet, this was only the beginning of another quite moving story on the road in Kansas. He and his companions were temporarily arrested and they began to ponder an indefinite Siberia-like exile in the American West. But justice moved fast and, in this case, honorably. A coroner's inquest was held that day before a hastily assembled jury who, mainly from the testimony of Machtet, exonerated Rechitskii of any crime. The townspeople then extended their sympathy and friendship to the visitors, took up a collection for a handsome coffin for the deceased, attended the funeral in mass the next day and insisted on serving them meals. As the *Seneca Weekly Courier* boasted, Room "received the attention due from a civilized community."²⁰

Whether these displaced socialists eventually would have turned the Marysville nursery into a Russian commune will never be known. Perhaps with the state of the land with its primitive dugout shelter was too discouraging.

16. Hasty and Fusso, 39-44.

17. Moshishkey's Blue Valley Nursery is advertised as located on Frank Schmidt's farm on the edge of Marysville. *Marshall County News*, October 26, 1872.

18. Machtet, "Pred amerikanskim sudom," *Nedelia* (June 1, 1875), 721-23.

19. Ibid. 724-29; "Sad accident," *Seneca Weekly Courier*, November 15, 1872. The account in the *Kansas Daily Commonwealth* (Topeka) for the same date, Room [sic] was trying to take the revolver away Rechitskii, a version that was remembered several years later in the *Illustrated Doniphan County* (Troy: Weekly Kansas Chief, 1916) 380 (chronicle of events).

20. November 15, 1872. This is the only mention of the event in the local paper and a search of town records (which are minimal for this period) failed to turn up any record of burial place or court proceedings.

Rechitskii saddened by the way it turned out and feeling duty bound to return his friend's effects to his widow in Ukraine left for home soon after his arrival in Marysville. There, ironically, he immediately was arrested in a crackdown on populists and, perhaps still affected by his Kansas experience, committed suicide in transit to a labor camp in Siberia. Linev wandered on to another part of the United States, then he also returned to Russia to face arrest and a long term of exile.

Machtet, however, remained for the winter months with Moshishkey in a boarding house in Marysville, where he seemed to have forsaken his original work assignment but continued his stories about life there and the variety of people he met, such as David Wolff, a "Russian" shopkeeper who was really Jewish (and born in Poland); Harry Sullivan, the Irish owner of the boarding house; Bluepoint, the postmaster and editor of a newspaper; and Frank Schmidt, a noted local politician; and schoolteachers Mr. and Mrs. Williams.²¹ Machtet, "Gorozhane prerii" [Townsppeople of the Prairie], (Kiev ed.) 2: 69-87. Most of the names can be collaborated by the *Marshall County News*. For example, "Professor Williams, principal of our schools, informs us that he has a large number of pupils and that he is succeeding admirably." October 5, 1872.²¹

In his articles about life in Marysville Machtet emphasized the high educational and cultural levels of frontier society, stressing to his Russian readers the ample sophistication he found on the American Great Plains. With Bluepoint, who was educated at an eastern university, he carried on discussions in Latin, debating about the correct pronunciation of words.²² With others he debated issues relating to Goethe, Hugo, Bentham, and Spencer. Machtet claimed to be well-acquainted with the whole town, especially owing to friendships with Williams and his wife who had recently arrived from New York, and joined them for a three-day church revival meeting in Blue Valley, a neighboring village.

Now the valley teemed with people, wagons, and horses from all around. The white tops of the wagons made it look like so much like a military camp dotted with tents, that if your eyes were not dazzled by the plethora of multi-colored bows, ribbons, and plumes pinned on all the misses and missuses and if the squealing and laughter of the children weren't so resounding in the distance, you would hardly venture to enter here without first checking your constant companion—your revolver—without making sure that this was not an enemy camp!²³

21. Machtet, "Gorozhane prerii" [Townsppeople of the Prairie], (Kiev ed.) 2: 69-87. Most of the names can be collaborated by the *Marshall County News*. For example, "Professor Williams, principal of our schools, informs us that he has a large number of pupils and that he is succeeding admirably." October 5, 1872.

22. Machtet, (Kiev ed.) 2, 80-81.

23. Hasty and Fusso, 48-49.

To improve his English and to meet more new people, he attended an evening class taught by Williams and stressed the role of public education in American life. “‘Schools, schools, schools’ is the motto of America.”²⁴ Machtet also painted in detail the struggle between cattlemen and farmers, the displacement of Indians and their culture, the high esteem and value of land (“land is the best savings bank”), the rivalry between towns for business and to be the county seat, the routine live of both town and country.

After spending about three months in and around Marysville, Machtet set off in February 1873 to visit Frey’s commune to the south. Although the route cannot be determined precisely, it certainly took him through part of the scenic Flint Hills of Kansas:

The farther south we went the more deserted the area became and the fewer farms and hamlets we encountered along the road; the waves of the hilly prairie spread like an endless yellow-green carpet [it was early February] merging far in the distance with the clear-blue sky on which there was not a single blemish, not a single little cloud, only the bright but as yet weakly warming sun. A light haze of fog, betraying the presence of gurgling prairie streams billowed around the base of hills. . . . Wild herds wandered about the virgin meadows and valleys; at the approach the train the animals lifted their tails and scattered in all directions, bellowing loudly; the prairie rabbit sprang like a rubber ball thrown by strong arm and flocks of prairie fowl flew hither and thither, flapping their heavy wings. Evening stole up quietly, imperceptibly, tinging the railroad cars and the prairie and sky with a bright-pink light; the sun so bright and blinding earlier but now safe for the eyes, hung on the horizon like an enormous red-hot disc, slowly receding and yielding its place to the pale moon and the diamond-like stars.²⁵

On the long trip across the state Machtet was impressed by the scenery, comfort of the ride, absence of classes and compartments in the cars, and that the train would slow down to pick up passengers along the tracts. At one point the train stopped, and the conductor announced the bridge ahead was weakened by rains and advised passengers to get off and walk across—but none did. The food in the dining car was good and cheap, which Machtet thought was fortunate since none was available at the small-town depots:

24. “V Amerikanskoi shkole” (In an American School), *Nedelia* 8 (December 8, 1875): 1796-1797.

25. Hasty and Fusso translation, 61-62. Most of this north-south journey would have taken place aboard the Kansas & Texas (KATY) or the Leavenworth, Lawrence, and Galveston railroads (LL&G). Since we know that Machtet left the train at Independence, just off the main line of the LL&G, this is most likely the route taken by him.

Stations do not even exist here, unless you would give the name to the small telegraph booths, plastered with advertisements and signs of all possible colors and contents as the following: “Wives! Unless you wish to see your husbands emaciated, you should buy them the ‘Famous Anti-Leanness Elicir’ from my inventor husband, a druggist from Chicago! A precious gift for wives!” Or the following: “Grant’s socks! All Republicans truly loyal to the Union will surely want to acquire the very same socks that President Grant wears. Inexpensive and comfortable!”²⁶

This “handbill America” conjures up a different picture than the neat and tidy scenes usually depicted in Hollywood westerns.

By early February Machtet reached Independence, thirty miles from his destination near Cedar Vale, where he stayed for a few days at the Caldwell House. There he had an opportunity to witness the local agitation over the “Pomeroy Scandal.” Samuel C. Pomeroy, the senior senator from Kansas, seemed to be on his way to re-election by the Kansas legislature when the state senator from Wilson County (Independence), Colonel A. M. York exposed Pomeroy’s attempt to buy his vote in the state legislature for \$7,000.²⁷ Independence was especially shaken by the uproar that ensued around both men, and both men, and Machtet thus found himself in the middle of one of Kansas’ most celebrated political events.²⁸ He caught the excitement in another story.

Newspapers were greedily devoured by readers. A whole horde of people massed at the railroad station, awaiting the train that was to bring letters and newspapers from Tupika (Topeka). Little groups of people were everywhere . . . gestures, shouts, among which the most distinctly and frequently uttered words were Goddamn; seven thousand; Mr. York; Mr. Pomeroy; bribe; and hang him. The news was so astounding and spread so rapidly that in a few hours a great number of farmers’ wagons were already crowding the streets of the town. The farmers, strapping and silent, with their inevitable pipes and energetic “goddamns” darted around listening and asking questions in the stores and hotels.²⁹

26. *Obshchina Freia* [Frey’s Commune] (Kiev ed.) 2: 150-52; and in *Nedelia* 8 (August 4, 1875); translation from Hasty and Fusso, 63.

27. For many years the senators in a state were elected to office by the state legislature, thus ensuring the party dominating the legislature also elected the senators, leading to a number of abuses. This was changed to the current popular election in 1913.

28. Pomeroy was an ardent abolitionist from Massachusetts, who had come to Kansas to advocate statehood (free state) for Kansas, and after his subsequent defeat, would return there.

29. Hasty and Fusso, 64; verified by the *South Kansas Tribune* (Independence) February 5 and 12, 1872. Machtet may have been making a play on Russian words at

After observing the commotion in Independence Machtet walked the remaining thirty miles to Cedar Vale, leaving behind his luggage at the hotel to be picked up later. He painted a vivid “prayerth” picture of the rolling hills and valleys, the buffalo tracks he crossed, and the people he met. At a farmhouse set off the road the Russian was invited in for lunch and plied for the latest political news from Independence and his views on railroad monopolies, farmers’ clubs, and the prices of farmland up north. Lunch consisted of pork, dried buffalo meat, beans, potatoes, fried eggs, and tea. Machtet offered fifty cents, but the farmer objected to payment; they finally settled on thirty cents.

Frey’s Cedar Vale commune, which formally was named “the Progressive Community” by its first constitution but was also known as “the Progressive Communist Community” (and in late 1875 Frey formed a separate “Investigating Community”), had been in existence for two years when Machtet arrived. Although small and isolated, it managed to secure some public success and attention, thanks to money from the Geins family in Russia and to Frey’s active correspondence.³⁰ Frey had actually shared the founding role with an American, Dr. Stephen S. Briggs, who Machtet describes as tall, impressive, handsome man, a dilettante who advocated vegetarianism as well as communalism.³¹ By 1873 Frey also had become a health food addict and the community was becoming known as much for its dietary code as for its social and political ideals. Adding to the peculiarity of this little society was J. G. Truman, a lapsed seminarian from Wisconsin who, according to Machtet, described himself as “a crank, a spiritualist, and a nudist.” The latter, although probably not practiced in the Kansas winter, would have made him an even greater problem for the community, since Machtet describes him as portly, ugly, pockmarked, and cantankerous.³²

Strange personalities, extremist views, and the mixture of Russian and American backgrounds led to constant squabbling within the commune, even a verbal battle and estrangement between Frey and his wife (later reconciled). Frey’s papers, however, indicate that the cause of the argument was most likely was his wife’s love interest in Machtet. This may explain why Machtet, highly critical of this particular social experiment, stayed only eight months before setting off on his return journey to Russia. His romantic involvement may also have affected his descriptions. Mary Frey is “a woman of quite exceptional intellect . . . oppressed by this sort of community [and] . . . endured it against her will, behaving unusual tact,” while her husband is depicted as stubborn, obstinate and having a mind lacking in “creativity and power of analysis.”³³

Retrospectively, Machtet’s criticism of the little Kansas-Russian community

Kansas’ expense, since tupik in Russian means “dead end.”

30. Yarmolinsky, 21; Allen, 48-57. While drawing on Machtet’s description in his works published in 1901, Yarmolinsky questions its accuracy due to its publication many years later, but in fact it was first published first in *Nedelia* in 1875, soon after Machtet’s return to Russia.

31. Machtet, (Kiev ed.) 2, 158-61.

32. *Ibid.* Truman to Frey, August 28, 1872, NYPL, Frey Papers, box 1, file 5.

33. Hasty and Fusso translation, 69-70.

grew. After Frey's death in 1889, Machtet observed that many such groups in America were made up of "benign egoists for whom people, society, homeland are nothing and personal, peace, their own tastes, habits, and views are everything."³⁴

Frey's Kansas commune lasted several more years, into 1879, reaching its zenith in 1875 with the acquisition of a printing press and the publication of a journal, the *Progressive Communist*, a monthly newsletter that recorded its activities and inventory of its possessions. The commune then consisted of only a few people: Mary Frey as president, Truman as secretary, William Frey, treasurer, Briggs, manager of orchards and gardens, William Frey, agriculture, and Mary Frey also housekeeper. They owned collectively 320 acres, but only 40 were fenced and only 24 plowed; the property included a one acre vineyard, a three-acre orchard, a one-story box house, with a one story and a half addition, a yoke of oxen, two cows, three calves, one wagon, and a printing press with type.³⁵ Not mentioned was a substantial library that included the works of Hume, Macauley, Gibbons, Josephus, Abbott, Mill, and Spencer that Frey later donated to the Cedar Vale public library.³⁶ It is not known if any local people read them; they appear not to have survived.³⁷

Despite Machtet's negative views of the Frey's enterprise, it continued to attract a number of visitors, most notably Nikolai Chaikovsky (1850-1926), later a well-known socialist and a leader of the Socialist Revolutionary Party during the 1917 revolution and the civil war that followed; Alexander Malikov, a "God-man" (Christian pacifist) who became a disciple of Leo Tolstoy; and Fedor Kamensky, a noted sculptor, a few of whose works are exhibited at the Russian Museum in St. Petersburg and eleven others from 1875 to 1878.³⁸ In general, these Russians left no imprint in the state, and only vague memories at Cedar Vale, while the large numbers of settlers from Russia-Ukrainian-Dutch and Swiss Mennonites and Catholic and Lutheran Volga-Germans—who left a lasting impact upon the state.

After the formal closure of the Kansas commune in 1879, Frey pursued

34. *Ibid.*, 71. First published as "Russkaia sem'ia v Kanzase" [a Russian Family in Kansas] in *Nedelia* 8 (August 4, 1875), then more critically in 1889; the latter was included in the collected works of 1902, which is the one cited by Hasty and Fusso, 59.

35. *Progressive Communist* 1 (January 1875), 8.

36. *Chatauqua County Times* (Sedan), January 10, 1879. The author has benefitted from the vast newspaper holdings of the Kansas History Research Center in Topeka but regrets the decision to destroy the originals as a space saving measure in favor of the use of poor microfilm copies. See also William E. Connelley, comp., *History of Kansas Newspapers* (Topeka: Kansas State Historical Society, 1916).

37. Author's visit to Cedar Vale, 1992. A historical marker is on the site of the commune but no buildings survive. Shortly before his death in 1904, Malikov recalled his experiences in the commune. A. Faresov, "Odin iz semidesiatniki" [One of the 70's People], *Vestnik Evropy* [Herald of Europe] 39 (September, 1904) 225-60. Chaikovsky, interviewed in 1919, recalled that an oil well was later drilled in the commune's front yard. "Hit Oil in Kansas," *Topeka State Journal*, May 17, 1919. The miserable end of the Russian community in Kansas is also recounted in interviews with former members by reporter for the *New York Sun*, subsequently quoted in "Russians in the United States," *Missouri Republican* (St Louis), October 9, 1879.

38. These may have been motivated by reading Machtet's articles published in Russia in *Nedelia* in 1875.

his communal beliefs at the mainly Jewish New Odessa colony in Oregon and elsewhere.³⁹ Increasingly he came under the influence of August Comte's positivism and carried on a widely publicized correspondence with Leo Tolstoy earning the famous author's respect. Vladimir Geins, alias William Frey died in London in 1889, ten years after his departure from Kansas, while his wife and partner in the commune lived on for several more years in New York.⁴⁰

The comparatively young Machtet, still not cured of his "Americanism," returned to Russia and settled in St. Petersburg. There he was able to publish his articles about America in the progressive periodical *Nedelia* and in major newspapers during the still generally open and free political atmosphere of the 1870s. His colorful and descriptive stories about his travels are reminiscent of Mark Twain's brief notes about his visit to Russia in 1867 (*The Innocents Abroad*), and they are lighter and more colloquial and interesting than most publications of that period. But Machtet, perhaps because of these writings, was soon arrested in the repression that followed the 1874 "to the people movement" to stir the peasants to revolt. After a year of hardship in the Peter and Paul Fortress in St. Petersburg, he was first confined to exile in the Arkhangelsk region in the north of Russia and then for a time in Siberia. There he married Elena Medvedeva, who bore his child, but soon died of tuberculosis.⁴¹

During his years of exile, he continued to write—two popular novels, more autobiographical stories, and a sharp criticism of Russian and Ukrainian anti-semitism. George Kennan of *Siberia and the Exile System* fame, met Machtet during his survey of political prisoners in 1885-86 and considered him "one of rising novelists of Russia."⁴² In 1889, Machtet was allowed to return to Moscow and then to Ukraine where he worked as a government clerk. He was finally able to go to St. Petersburg in 1900, but a year later, at age 49, he died while convalescing at Yalta. Anton Chekhov was among the illustrious fellow writers attending his funeral.⁴³

As a young man, Machtet tended to romanticize his portraits of Kansas but was hardly superficial. He was, nevertheless, critical of some aspects of this frontier society, especially its superficial and fluidity, violence, weird spirituality and internal contradictions. Unlike most other observers of America, but typical of other Russians of this period, he studied rural life was amazed at the development of small communities, and marveled at the ease by which he lived and worked alongside the local people. He was impressed especially by the

39. Yarmolinsky, 87-90, but has the commune collapsing in the spring of 1879. Contemporary newspapers are more exact. "Progressive Community is about dissolved. They have sold out and are in a squabble among themselves, and there is no telling how it will end." *Chautauqua Journal* (Sedan), September 18, 1879.

40. *Ibid*, 125-35; Allen, 55-58.

41. Faresov, 243.

42. Kennan to William Dudley Foulke, February 15, 1888, Foulke Papers, box 3, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.

43. A. V. Goltsev, "Obituary," in *Russkoe Vedomosti* [Russian News], October 10, 1901, preserved in George Kennan Papers, box 111, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.

friendliness, curiosity, openness, optimism, and quest for education. Machtet thus responded to and nourished Russian favorable opinion about the United States that prevailed in the nineteenth century and that persisted through periods of hostility and confrontation to the present. And he did this with considerable sacrifice and cost to himself.

About the Author

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Book Reviews

David Moon. *The American Steppes: The Unexpected Russian Roots of Great Plains Agriculture, 1870s-1930s*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020. xl, 431 pp. Index. \$120, Hardback.

In *The American Steppes*, David Moon—a leading scholar of the history of grasslands internationally—makes an unimpeachable case that transfers of organisms, ideas, and practices from Russia crucially shaped the Great Plains of the United States from the 1870s through the 1930s. The main contention here is easy enough to follow: settlers from Russia brought with them seeds, weeds, agricultural techniques, and approaches to soil science that became staples of the American experience. Such a claim is significant in and of itself because it overthrows stereotypes of a backward peasant Russia and reveals surprising connections in the ecological manipulations undertaken in places very far from each other. An even more impressive achievement, however, comes from the thoroughness with which Moon executes his study. Not content to draw a general outline of the transfers that he noticed, he tracked down letters, correspondence, and many other materials in numerous archives and libraries and spent much time in both grasslands to gain a deep appreciation of these places. The payoff is an incredibly rich account of transnational interactions in farming and science.

Moon is a Russian historian by training—and indeed one of the most prolific investigators of the environmental history of imperial Russia—but the book he produced here offers its most pointed intervention to historians of the United States, who have largely missed or marginalized the influence of the Russian steppes on the Great Plains. He so effectively shows the Russian impact on the Great Plains that one suspects that his contribution will quickly become common knowledge for scholars, who will be aghast at the idea that this connection might have ever been overlooked. Here his skills as a non-US historian were especially important. Clearly, one of the reasons that his discovery is surprising is that few scholars of US history read the languages and work in the regions necessary for this type of transnational history, nor find themselves comfortable trading in the historiographical expertise that Moon so fluidly does. For Russian historians, and especially environmental historians of Russia, the book also extends our

understanding of the influence of innovative approaches to and conceptions of the natural world beyond the territories we study.

The book contains two parts. The first focuses on contexts of migration and settlement patterns, limitations on interactions, and the avenues that allowed transfers to occur. Moon discusses how residents on the steppe—mostly Mennonites—traveled around the world to places like Kansas, where they put their know-how to work by ploughing up the plains and cultivating grains. Negative attitudes toward Russia first as an undeveloped and autocratic country and later as a communist menace presented obstacles to the transfers that Moon highlights, but widespread recognition of the similarities between the two environments, scientific exchange among agronomists and pedologists, and the presence of a population that had immigrated from the steppes built the bridges that enabled Russian influence to come to the United States.

In the second part of the book, Moon examines specific entities that traveled from the steppes to the plains: varieties of wheat, theoretical frameworks for soil science, the planting of shelterbelts to counter erosion, and an unwelcome icon of Great Plains culture—tumbleweed. Despite competition on the international grain market between the two countries, the arrival of Mennonite immigrants to the American plains in the late nineteenth century facilitated the import of Eurasian varieties of wheat and other cereals that became fixtures of agriculture in the region. The story of soil science speaks most directly to the profundity of Russian knowledge. Russian scientist Vasilii Dokuchaev and his progenitors espoused theories of soil genesis as a process of interaction among bedrock, vegetation, climate, and topography and developed a classification system with immense practical utility. Most significantly, American scientists belatedly recognized the fertility of the black earth, or chernozem, soil that occupied much of the plains and the steppes and began to apply this understanding to efforts to assist plain's agriculture. Rows of trees and other vegetation to limit erosion and moisten the microclimate of fields was another plains adaptation that first emerged in Russia. Finally, species transfer did not only offer a boon for American agriculture but also disrupted it. An infamous invasive species that became a scourge of plains farmers—tumbleweed—originated on the steppe.

Everything presented in *The American Steppes* compels a revised understanding of the environmental history of the Great Plains and the Russian contribution to global agriculture. I would have welcomed some more analysis of the environmental consequences of the transfers that Moon describes—a topic he masterfully details in his previous book on Russian grasslands—but the approach and argument did not require such an elaboration. To sum, this rich history of transnational exchange demonstrates the depths of unexpected connections awaiting scholars who opt to investigate them.

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David M. Griffiths. *No Collusion! Catherine the Great and American Independence*. Edited by George E. Munro. Bloomington, Indiana, Slavica Publishers, 2020. – xv, 717 p.

This book can be seen through two important optics. It is a memorial to a deceased professor erected by his former student, the work unfinished by the author, but completed and published posthumously. One can only imagine how much energy and devotion it needed to get the manuscript cut and edited, to write a careful preface explaining what exactly has been done to the text, and to convince a publisher that such a book is worth publication. George E. Munro deserves much credit for this work that will significantly change our vision of not only the history of Russian-American relations, but also of Professor David M. Griffiths' (1938–2014) legacy as a scholar of the field.

The book is the result of lifelong research, as the history of Russia and America during the reign of Catherine the Great was the theme of David M. Griffiths' MA and PhD dissertations many decades ago and continued to be his study theme ever since. During his lifetime, he published several articles on the theme of the Russian policies toward the American War for Independence, but now we see that those were merely small parts of a huge manuscript on the topic. The resulting monograph is based on the wealth of the archival and published sources and deals with all of his previous historical research, but it also confronts the myths about Catherine II's policy prevailing in both the Russian and American traditions. Did Catherine refuse to send her troops to America because she sympathized with the colonists? Did she sign the Declaration of Armed Neutrality to support them? Was she consistent in her policies? Did Americans want to understand Russian policies or were they content with constructing its interpretation to lift the spirit of the patriots? All of these – and many other – questions are answered in the new book.

This is a major contribution into the field of the history of U.S. – Russian relations in the 18th century, substantially expanding and, sometimes, overturning the analysis of classic books by Nicholas Bolkhovitinov and Norman E. Saul. No doubt it will be used as a basic text for those teaching and studying the early stages of the U.S.-Russian relations and Catherine II's foreign policy.

The monograph consists of sixteen chapters divided into three parts, the first one being an analysis of the Russian side of the international equation in the era of the American Revolution, the second dealing with the American attitudes toward Russia and the beginning of Francis Dana's mission to St. Petersburg, while the third is devoted to the change in the Catherine's attitudes towards the international situation and its consequences for the American republic. The book bears the signs of the unfinished manuscript. Despite the cuts made by George E. Munro, it is sometimes excessively detailed, and sometimes repetitive, with the same ideas appearing in many chapters. However, it may help a student of the period better understand the main ideas that the author desired to deliver in the monograph.

Griffiths argues that the Russian policy toward the American colonies and nascent United States was determined by Catherine's positive attitude toward England, and at the same time, her negative assessment of George III and Lord

North's government policies; it changed with her foreign policy's head Nikita Panin's changing attitudes toward England's participation in his Northern System.

The author devotes a large portion of his book to the main paradoxes of the Russian attitudes toward America, including Catherine's tolerance of the American republican principles. One could find that Griffiths published an article about Catherine as a republican empress back in 1973, and that article uses more concise language for explaining the monarchical republicanism of the 18th century that was not yet counter-posed to monarchy, so Catherine could indeed call herself "a republican." In this book, however, the Russian Empress' change of attitude toward republicanism is duly linked to the news of the French Revolution in the late 1780s, that retrospectively forced her to reevaluate the meaning of the American War for Independence. Since 1789, it became for her an American revolution.

The book is written mostly as an exercise in traditional diplomatic history that has fallen out of focus for new generations of historians. Thus, the domestic discussions in Russia about the meaning of the American War for Independence are almost absent from the pages of the book (with only very brief mention of Alexander Radishchev on the last pages). The author claims that Catherine II began changing her perception of the American War for Independence only after the French Revolution had started. That seems to be a convincing argument. However, some other Russians did watch American events with much deeper hopes or apprehensions, and with better understanding of the significance of the event, - but they did not make it on the pages of the book. However, looking at the other side of the Atlantic, the author addresses the meaning of the quick change in the American perception of Russia in 1779, when domestic policy begins playing the decisive role. American attitudes to Russia were determined first by the British negative perception of Russia as a barbaric country plus British hopes that Russian soldiers would take part in suppressing the rebellion, but when it became clear that Catherine refused to send her troops to American soil, and especially since Declaration of Armed Neutrality, Americans turned to interpreting Russian policy as pro-American. Thus, in discussing the American side of the relations the author applies an approach close to the constructivist methodology.

The "No collusion!" title did strike me at first as a bit too topical, derived from the recent debates about Russian meddling into American affairs in the 21st century. However, upon reading the book, I found that one of the main conclusions made by Professor Griffiths was indeed about the absence of collusion or meddling from Catherine's side. The title finally did not look too artificial.

Historians and sociologists of history frequently discover half-ready manuscripts in the archives of the past generations' scholars. Sometimes, they are still relevant, but in many cases they are obsolete due to the development of the research. In this case, the book is not a matter of history's past, but is destined to produce an impact on our understanding of the early period of Russian-American relations.

Amanda Brickell Bellows, *American Slavery and Russian Serfdom in the Post-Emancipation Imagination*, Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2020, xiii. 304pp. Index. \$29.95, Paper.

During the past decade, Russia and the United States marked the 150th anniversary of the abolition of serfdom (1861) and the abolition of slavery (1864), respectively. Although these institutions of unfree labor were abolished within mere years of one another and continue to have lasting influences on the social imaginaries of both societies, very few scholars in any field have concerned themselves with direct comparisons of Russian serfdom and American slavery. With the notable exception of Peter Kolchin's landmark book *Unfree Labor: American Slavery and Russian Serfdom* (1987), most scholarly volumes have focused on only one of the two institutions. Within the discipline of history, however, the emergence of dynamic fields such as postcolonial studies and global history have spurred innovative inquiries into "comparative emancipations" and "post-emancipation studies" all over the world. Moreover, although originally the domain of historians, studies of serfdom and slavery have more recently been undertaken by a wave of literary scholars. Similar to Dale E. Peterson's *Up from Bondage: The Literatures of Russian and African American Soul* (2000) and Marcus S. Lee's *Slavery, Philosophy and American Literature, 1830-1860* (2005), Amanda Brickell Bellows's *American Slavery and Russian Serfdom in the Post-Emancipation Imagination* both builds upon and contributes to these new, interdisciplinary directions in the study of systems of bondage and their post-emancipation aftermaths.

Bellows' book analyzes similarities and differences in how cultural production in Imperial Russia and the United States of America depicted serfdom and slavery from the mid-19th century onward. The key word in this study is "imagination." Bellows uses this term to denote the varying and competing ways in which different segments of Russian and American society "disputed the meaning of emancipation and advanced particular visions of abolition in writing and art that alternatively ignored, celebrated, or critiqued the reforms" of the post-emancipation era (222). Unlike literary scholars who have recently tackled the comparison of serfdom and slavery, Bellows does not rely primarily on literary novels to make her analysis. Rather, her meticulously researched study draws on a wide array of historical artifacts of cultural production, including historical fiction, illustrated periodicals, lithographs, advertisements, and oil paintings. Ultimately, Bellows argues that, in addition to the well-researched issues of class divisions, labor relations, gendered policymaking, and racial tensions, sites of cultural production also "influenced the absorption of formerly bonded populations through analogous processes of mass communication" that affected public opinion (4).

A definite strength of the book is its thematic and chronological organization, which relates in fascinating detail the changes which images of serfdom, peasants, slavery and freedpeople underwent from the eve of emancipation up to the onset of World War I. Chapter one chronicles the pre-emancipation fight to agitate for abolition through the creation of empathetic and humanizing literary depictions of emotionally complex Russian *narod* and black folk. The plays and short stories

of writers such as Aleksei Pisemskii and Louisa May Alcott “helped audiences envision a post-emancipation era in which the former dynamics between owners and bonded laborers were but a distant memory” (43). However, as chapter two details, this radical literary impulse was already being challenged in both societies by popular but nostalgic historical fiction published in the years immediately following emancipation. These works misrepresented serfdom and slavery as “essential” and “beneficial” social systems under which laborers had “received ample support from their landlords,” with whom they also shared “fond, brotherly relations” (55, 62). The subsequent three chapters follow the continuing battle over the collective memory of these institutions of bondage and the evolving understandings of national identity that were promulgated in more visual fields of cultural production. In both Russia and America, illustrated periodicals and lithographs “disparaged peasants and African Americans” far more often than they “criticized members of the Russian nobility” (102). However, by the dawn of the 20th century, oil paintings and advertisements in America “did not depict black culture as representative of American national culture,” while Russian artists and merchants seemed mostly to acknowledge that “peasants’ traditions and institutions were essential to national development” (140, 184). The final chapter and brief epilogue interrogate the “efficacy in using fiction” and other sites of cultural production to make an impact on the process of assimilating new subjects or citizens in the post-emancipation era (206).

As a minor flaw, the book does not discuss the author’s driving aim in comparing post-emancipation imaginaries of serfdom and slavery. Bellows merely states that, through this comparison, “we glean useful information not apparent from the separate study of each country” (3). But what is the object of this usefulness? Will it be useful to recognizing the boundaries of emancipation in the construction of post-bondage societies, as Cooper, Holt and Scott once suggested in their book *Beyond Slavery* (2000)? Or will it be useful in gaining a better understanding of processes of citizenship, belonging and assimilation as broader categories of social phenomenon?

Another minor imperfection is that, while the writing is more than engaging, at times the analyses drawn from the comparisons are too quick to elide nuanced similarities between the cases. For example, Bellows argues that American urban and commercial aesthetics boasted “eclectic sources” of nationalist inspiration, as opposed to Imperial Russia’s hegemonic “Style Russe” (161). Yet this ignores the fact that ancient Greece and Egypt were part and parcel of the European enlightenment’s legacy of classical, Greco-Roman education, of which the American founders consciously strove to be a part. Recognition of this would make the choice of names for the literary figures Uncle Remus and Uncle Julius take on a new and interesting light in Bellows’ analysis, for example.

One subtle yet useful thing that can be gleaned from a direct comparison of slavery and serfdom is the extent to which some of their most important similarities and differences reflect both American and Russian questions of civilizational belonging vis-à-vis Western Europe, on the one hand, and the desirability and

feasibility of “absorbing” former serfs and slaves into that narrative of civilizational belonging, on the other. Consideration of the comparison from that perspective may shed light on at least one major difference that Bellows observes late in the book: that there was not widespread “mob violence” against former serfs as there was against formerly enslaved people in the United States (213). Bellows mostly attributes this difference to the fact that freedpeople were a minority in the United States, the question bears further examination.

Overall, this book is a welcome and fascinating new entry into the comparative study of emancipations, generally, and the direct comparison of American slavery and Russian serfdom, specifically. While easily assignable to undergraduate students on a chapter-by-chapter basis, in its entirety the book undoubtedly speaks to history, literary and cultural scholars of all levels.

Christy Monet
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Elizabeth Atwood. *The Liberation of Marguerite Harrison: America's First Female Foreign Intelligence Agent*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2020. 288pp. plus illustrations, notes, bibliography and index. Hardback \$ 32.95.

Marguerite Harrison was a product of the upper-class life of Victorian era Baltimore, but the middle part of her life was one of adventure, travel, and intrigue. Elizabeth Atwood has published the first biography of a fascinating woman who broke many social and cultural norms while maintaining her status in Baltimore's high society. She was the daughter of a shipping magnate who seemed to be moving through a fairly conventional life until her husband died suddenly in 1915. For the next decade or so, she would spy for the United States in postwar Germany, be caught and imprisoned twice for spying for the United States in Soviet Russia in the early 1920s, travel through Asia and the Middle East more than once, write several books and many articles about her adventures, and help make one of the world's first documentary films. Atwood's biography asserts that Harrison was a liberated woman even though her own views of feminism were ambiguous.

This study chronicles Harrison's life from birth to death in a relatively short space. The first third of the book covers Harrison's early life until the death of her husband, Thomas Harrison, in 1915. Atwood relies on new information about Harrison from US and Soviet/Russian archives about her work in early Soviet Russia during her two spying and prison experiences in the early 1920s. The author also relies heavily on Harrison's autobiography, *There's Always Tomorrow*, written in the mid-1930s while she sparingly uses the subject's firsthand account of her first Russian adventure, *Marooned in Moscow* and does not mention at all Harrison's second book on her Russian adventures, *More Tales from a Russian Prison*. While parts of both books are reproduced in her newspaper articles and

in her autobiography, both books add a lot of depth about Harrison's views of Russia and Russians. These are some of the most fascinating parts of Harrison's works that are not addressed in much depth in this study.

The later part of the book addresses her adventures with Merian C. Cooper into Persia to make a film and perhaps spy further for the United States and her later life. Atwood's thesis is that Harrison was a spy for the United States not only in Germany and Soviet Russia, but also in the Middle East. However, Atwood's study poses many questions that are speculative, but are not necessarily confirmed. While the possibilities of what Harrison's motivations and life are really compelling, much of this is just speculation.

While a full biography of Harrison is long overdue and Atwood's study is a welcome addition to the literature on spies and Russian-American relations, it is missing an analysis of some of Harrison's most interesting views on Russia during her two trips.

William B. Whisenhunt
College of DuPage

Field Notes

Field Note #1

PAGES FROM HISTORY

Norman Saul

--In early November 1933, William Allen White had just returned from the Soviet Union to write several articles in the national press to support President Franklin Roosevelt's initiative to open diplomatic relations with that country after a long period of non- recognition following the November 1917 Bolshevik revolution. This would result in the signing of the "recognition treaty" in Washington on November 9, 1933, a major step in Roosevelt's new foreign policy.

Dean L. N. Flint of the School of Journalism at the University of Kansas asked White if he would come and discuss this subject with some high school students, resulting in the following exchange of letters in the William Allen White Papers at the Library of Congress (C203).

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November 4, 1933

My Dear Flint,

I have your note and the dates and hours you suggested are all right. The only thing is I don't like your audience. It would expect too formal and serious an address. What I would like to do is to talk to a group of fifty or one hundred students and faculty people quite informally and let them ask questions for an hour after a short talk. And this high school group isn't up to intelligent questions and would want to get away and get down to the Fraternity and Sorority houses and wouldn't be interested in me and what I had to say. This is not a flat turn down. It is just a suggestion that some other time and some other group would be a lot happier for us all.

Sincerely Yours,
WAW

Reply:

November 7, 1933

Mr W. A. White

Emporia, Kansas

Dear Mr. White:

We have a plan that I think will work to everybody's satisfaction: Let us put you on the program for a brief talk before the High School Conference about 11:30 Friday, November 17. W. A. Bailey of the Kansas City Kansan is to speak at one of the sessions and we can use him for the lead-off at the 11:00 o'clock hour.

At noon we will have a luncheon at the Union Building to which only our own students, member of our faculty and perhaps twenty-five other faculty members to whom we pass the word, and the high school teachers, will be admitted. We will keep it down under 100. After this luncheon, we can hold a question and answer session.

This set-up has the advantage that it gives the high school student delegates a chance to see you. Believe it or not, they really want to see you and hear you speak. They will never forget it. It also takes care of the heart to heart session all of us are so eager to have you. . . .

If this plan doesn't work O. K., don't hesitate to upset the whole thing. We will construct something better. But I ought to know by Friday when preliminary program announcements must be sent out.

Sincerely Yours,

L. N. Flint

Field Note #2

This year the Harriman Institute, which is the oldest and leading U.S. academic institution in Russian, Eurasian and East European Studies, is celebrating its 75th anniversary.

First is the exhibition that opened in September at Harriman. It will be available virtually after 15 September. It is called *People, Books, and Archives in Pictures, 1903 - 1921: Resources for Russian/Soviet, East European and Eurasian Studies on the Heights*

Curated by Edward Kasinec and & Robert H. Davis, Jr., with Erica Stefano
<https://harriman.columbia.edu/event/exhibit-harriman-institute-at-75/>

Exhibit Information

Columbia University Libraries has collected Slavic and East European language materials since at least 1903. This exhibition and its companion publication of essays in the journal Slavic & East European Information Resources (forthcoming in December) provide an overview of the developmental

history of collecting on Morningside Heights through vignettes of historical personalities and print and archival collecting milestones over the past 115 years.

Field Note #3

Association of Slavic, Eurasian, and East European Studies (ASEEES) Annual Convention in New Orleans, LA on November 18-21, 2021 and virtually on December 1-3, 2021. Program highlights related to Russian-American relations:

In-person, in New Orleans, November 18-21, 2021:

November 18:

Soviet Music on the World Stage

<https://tinyurl.com/yed4qkc3>

Thu, November 18, 2:30 to 4:15pm CST (2:30 to 4:15pm CST), Hilton New Orleans Riverside, Floor: 1st Floor, Grand Salon 7

Revolt, Diplomacy, and Religion: Russian-American Relations in the 19th and 20th Centuries

<https://tinyurl.com/ydofcqm>

Thu, November 18, 5:00 to 6:45pm CST (5:00 to 6:45pm CST), Hilton New Orleans Riverside, Floor: 1st Floor, Grand Salon 22

“Let’s get together!” Cultural, Economic and People’s Diplomacy in the Cold War

<https://tinyurl.com/yj94or9w>

Thu, November 18, 5:00 to 6:45pm CST (5:00 to 6:45pm CST), Hilton New Orleans Riverside, Floor: 3rd Floor, St. James Ballroom

November 19:

Serfdom in Fact and Fiction

<https://tinyurl.com/yhgqtn3a>

Fri, November 19, 8:00 to 9:45am CST (8:00 to 9:45am CST), Hilton New Orleans Riverside, Floor: 1st Floor, Grand Salon 22

Gray Zones: Central Asians as Mediators of Projections of Racial and Gender Identity

<https://tinyurl.com/yj8j8y7u>

Fri, November 19, 10:30am to 12:15pm CST (10:30am to 12:15pm CST), Hilton New Orleans Riverside, Floor: 1st Floor, Grand Salon 10

Did the Carpatho-Rusyns Really Love the Russians?: The Meanings of the Russophile Movement in Carpathian Rus’

<https://tinyurl.com/yzlxwjbn>

Fri, November 19, 1:00 to 2:45pm CST (1:00 to 2:45pm CST), Hilton New

Orleans Riverside, Floor: 2nd Floor, Churchill B2

Shores and Seas in Russian History

<https://tinyurl.com/ydlucsqq>**Fri, November 19, 1:00 to 2:45pm CST (1:00 to 2:45pm CST), Hilton New Orleans Riverside, Floor: 1st Floor, Grand Salon 22****November 20:**

Creating Russian Diasporic Worlds in California

<https://tinyurl.com/yf4293ha>**Sat, November 20, 8:00 to 9:45am CST (8:00 to 9:45am CST), Hilton New Orleans Riverside, Floor: 3rd, Camp**

Revisiting the Dead House: Late Nineteenth-Century Prison Literature

<https://tinyurl.com/yjv9ga9u>**Sat, November 20, 10:30am to 12:15pm CST (10:30am to 12:15pm CST), Hilton New Orleans Riverside, Floor: 3rd Floor, Parish**

Reciprocal Receptions from Homer to Navalny: Western Antiquity through Russian 'ochi' and Russians through Western Eyes

<https://tinyurl.com/yh7k2nz5>**Sat, November 20, 10:30am to 12:15pm CST (10:30am to 12:15pm CST), Hilton New Orleans Riverside, Floor: 3rd Floor, Royal**

Collective Memory as a Factor of US-Soviet/Post-Soviet Relations

<https://tinyurl.com/yf8g3378>**Sat, November 20, 2:00 to 3:45pm CST (2:00 to 3:45pm CST), Hilton New Orleans Riverside, Floor: 1st Floor, Grand Salon 9**

Contemporary Intersection/s of Russian and US Feminisms: Transnational Feminist Projects within the Framework of a Global Critique of Authoritarianism and Traditionalism

<https://tinyurl.com/ydsww6fu>**Sat, November 20, 2:00 to 3:45pm CST (2:00 to 3:45pm CST), Hilton New Orleans Riverside, Floor: 2nd Floor, Churchill A2**

On Both Sides of the Iron Curtain: Literature, Academia, and Politics

<https://tinyurl.com/yzto8tfy>**Sat, November 20, 4:30 to 6:15pm CST (4:30 to 6:15pm CST), Hilton New Orleans Riverside, Floor: 3rd Floor, Commerce**

The Present and Future of Russian Higher Education

<https://tinyurl.com/yg6jrxcc>

Sat, November 20, 4:30 to 6:15pm CST (4:30 to 6:15pm CST), Hilton New Orleans Riverside, Floor: 1st Floor, Grand Salon 15

Virtual Conference, December 1-3, 2021

December 1:

Soviet Music on the World Stage

<https://tinyurl.com/yj8ugpz8>

Thu, November 18, 2:30 to 4:15pm CST (2:30 to 4:15pm CST), Hilton New Orleans Riverside, Floor: 1st Floor, Grand Salon 7

Translation as Intersection II: Translating Intersectionality and Interdisciplinarity

<https://tinyurl.com/yjf3sv3p>

Wed, December 1, 10:00 to 11:45am CST (10:00 to 11:45am CST), Virtual Convention, VR29

Cultural Diplomacy: Soviet Internationalism after World War II in Europe and the Developing World

<https://tinyurl.com/yhkoxlzo>

Wed, December 1, 10:00 to 11:45 CST (10:00 to 11:45am CST), Virtual Convention, VR 13

Making Contact: Russian Interactions with the West in the Nineteenth Century and in the Early Soviet Period

<https://tinyurl.com/yh38yvhf>

Wed, December 1, 12:00 to 1:45pm CST (12:00 to 1:45pm CST), Virtual Convention, VR 8

December 2:

Radio Moscow, Decolonization, and the Cold War

<https://tinyurl.com/yjxas6tx>

Thu, December 2, 8:00 to 9:45am CST (8:00 to 9:45am CST), Virtual Convention, VR25

Constructing and Deconstructing the Images of Soviet and American Enemies in Cinematic Cold War

<https://tinyurl.com/ygaolfz4>

Thu, December 2, 8:00 to 9:45am CST (8:00 to 9:45am CST), Virtual Convention, VR 5

Propaganda and Truth Regimes in Contested Times

<https://tinyurl.com/yfxeggvg>

Thu, December 2, 8:00 to 9:45am CST (8:00 to 9:45am CST), Virtual Convention, VR 8

Transcultural Encounters in Soviet Animation II: Reception and Adaptation

<https://tinyurl.com/yghcc9rv>

Thu, December 2, 8:00 to 9:45am CST (8:00 to 9:45am CST), Virtual Convention, VR 22

Inside the Publishing House: Formal Rules, Informal Connections, and Creative Agency in Late-Soviet Publishing

<https://tinyurl.com/yzazpzc7>

Thu, December 2, 10:00 to 11:45am CST (10:00 to 11:45am CST), Virtual Convention, VR 16

Art Exhibitions as Weapons of the Cold War

<https://tinyurl.com/ydkxatx4>

Thu, December 2, 12:00 to 1:45pm CST (12:00 to 1:45pm CST), Virtual Convention, VR 4

Great Collectors of Slavica and East Europeana along the East Coast (USA)

<https://tinyurl.com/yza3tgwx>

Thu, December 2, 12:00 to 1:45pm CST (12:00 to 1:45pm CST), Virtual Convention, VR 14

Soviet Space after the Space Age: Science, Technology, and Ideology in the Long 1970s

<https://tinyurl.com/yeb96vnu>

Thu, December 2, 4:00 to 5:45pm CST (4:00 to 5:45pm CST), Virtual Convention, VR 24

Inter-Medial Histories: Book, Film, Poem, Portrait

<https://tinyurl.com/ygxubktz>

Thu, December 2, 4:00 to 5:45pm CST (4:00 to 5:45pm CST), Virtual Convention, VR 6

December 3:

Transcultural Encounters in Soviet Animation I: Disney, the Fleischer Brothers, and the UPA

<https://tinyurl.com/yfst8dal>

Fri, December 3, 8:00 to 9:45am CST (8:00 to 9:45am CST), Virtual Convention, VR 13

The Use of Russian Jewishness in American Writing

<https://tinyurl.com/yefb55tt>

Fri, December 3, 8:00 to 9:45am CST (8:00 to 9:45am CST), Virtual Convention, VR 16

Soviet Languages of Internationalism

<https://tinyurl.com/ye59wptq>

Fri, December 3, 12:00 to 1:45pm CST (12:00 to 1:45pm CST), Virtual Convention, VR 11

Transnational Cinematic Collaborations: Konchalovsky, Szabó, and Grlić

<https://tinyurl.com/yjun6t6b>

Fri, December 3, 12:00 to 1:45pm CST (12:00 to 1:45pm CST), Virtual Convention, VR 2

Great Collectors of Slavica and East Europeana at University Libraries in Canada, California, and the Midwest (USA)

<https://tinyurl.com/yz5q37tk>

Fri, December 3, 2:00 to 3:45pm CST (2:00 to 3:45pm CST), Virtual Convention, VR 5

Transfers and Intermediaries Between East and West: Transnational Agriculture, Trade, and Linguistics in the 20th Century

<https://tinyurl.com/ydo4cz4y>

Fri, December 3, 2:00 to 3:45pm CST (2:00 to 3:45pm CST), Virtual Convention, VR 13