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## PREFACE

As far as is known, all languages have ways of expressing modality, i.e., notions of possibility, necessity, contingency, etc. But this pervasive phenomenon has so far been the object of little systematic linguistic analysis. In fact, investigators do not even agree on the scope of the term modality. Very roughly speaking, two kinds of modality have been distinguished, namely epistemic and deontic. The former involves the speaker's judgment as to the degree of certainty of an event or state of affairs being referred to. Deontic modality, on the other hand, has to do with such notions as obligation, permissibility and necessity. However, as useful as this distinction is, little is known so far concerning the linguistic patterns which express those ideas. It is clear that the modality systems of a great many languages will need to be thoroughly scrutinized and compared before any conclusions can be drawn as to their place in 'universal grammar.'

The papers included in this volume of the Kansas Working Papers in Linguistics were written by graduate students at the University of Kansas for a seminar on modality taught by Professor Choon-Kyu Oh in the spring of 1979. They deal with a variety of topics bearing on modality and with a variety of languages and language families. It is our hope that these papers will stimulate comments from colleagues at other institutions.

The Editors

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## MODALITY IN ALSATIAN

Marguerite A. Hessini

Abstract: This descriptive study focuses on the special verbal category of Alsatian modal auxiliaries with distinct syntactic characteristics. They include: [kenə] (can), [mesdə] (would like to), [velə] (want to), [därfə] (be allowed to), [solə] (ought to/must), and [mɪ:n] (must). These modals specify the speaker's point of view in regard to the reported event. They are able to express several levels of probability regarding the event's potential fulfillment. They form two subcategories depending on the presence or absence of an external source of authority imposed on the agent. The deontic and epistemic meanings of Alsatian modals support Horn's (1972) hypothesis that the latter two meanings are semantically related.

### Introduction

The present study on modality pertains to Alsatian, a German dialect of Alemannic origin, spoken in the province of Alsace in Eastern France. Alsatian comprises a variety of closely related, mutually intelligible dialects. My corpus is limited to examples of the dialect variety spoken in Strasbourg, the provincial capital, of which I am a native.

As Alsatian is basically a spoken dialect whose closest written expression is standard German, but which has no standardized written form of its own, I am using a broad phonetic transcription for my examples. For clarification, a few observations seem appropriate. Alsatian stops are voiceless, lenis in word initial and medial positions, fortis in word final position. I will represent the former by [b, d, g] and the latter by [p, t, k]. The approximant [r] is a uvular trill or a uvular fricative, the latter adjacent to a voiceless consonant or



word-finally after a vowel. I am using the symbol [ɘ] to designate a front rounded vowel that is lower than [ü] but higher than [ö].

Alsatian has incorporated numerous French borrowings in its lexicon, but the syntactic structures closely parallel those of standard German.

### The Verbal Category of Modals

Function. Modality may be conceived of as a broad notion including modal adverbial expressions (it is possible, it is probable...), mood, modal infinitives (I have to...), and modal auxiliaries (Brinkman, 1962). The present study focuses on the special verbal category of modal auxiliaries whose function is to "express a relation of the event to reality" (Bouma, 1973). This may be expressed by the formula:

$$S \rightarrow X M Y$$

in which X plus Y specify the event, and M stands for a finite modal which specifies the attitude of the speaker in regard to the reported event, or what Brinkman (1962) labels more broadly as "Satzintention".

Alsatian Modals. Alsatian has six modals which form a distinct verbal category with specific syntactic characteristics. Their broad basic meanings within the domain of social customs may be described as follows:

[kenə]	:	ability, opportunity
*[meʃdə]	:	inclination, desire
[velə]	:	intent, want
[därfə]	:	permission, right
[solə]	:	duty, obligation
[mɪ:n]	:	compulsion, absolute obligation

\*[meʃdə] is used only in the subjunctive (see chart p.49).

Syntactic Characteristics. Modals in Alsatian are used with a dependent verb which is in the infinitive, and thus they function like auxiliaries.

- (1a) mr mɪ:n bli:və  
(lpl=sbj must stay)  
'we must stay'
- (1b) mr sɪn gəblivə  
(lpl=sbj be=aux stay=pp  
'we have stayed=we stayed'
- (2a) dü kɔnʃ räʃt hɔn  
(2sg=sbj can right have)  
'you (sg. informal) may be right'

- (2b) dü heš räšt ghet  
 (2sg=sbj have=aux right have=PP)  
 'you were right=you have been right'

Under certain conditions the dependent infinitive may be omitted from modal expressions (i) when the goal is explicitly stated in the sentence:

- (3) iš məs ha:m (ge:n)  
 (1sg=sbj must home (go))  
 'I must go home'
- (4) də šorš kən elsäsiš (redə)  
 (the George can Alsatian (speak))  
 'George knows (how to speak) Alsatian'

(ii) when the context would make the infinitive repetitious or unnecessary:

- (5) A: mə:š šun ge:n?  
 (must=you (sg. informal) already go)  
 'do you have to go already?'
- B: jə, iš mə:s  
 (yes, 1sg=sbj must)  
 'yes, I must go'

(iii) when the idea of 'to do' is present:

- (6a) mr kenə s mɔxə 'we can do it'  
 (1pl=sbj can 3sg=neut=DO do)
- (6b) mr kenə(s) 'we can do it'

A dependent infinitive used with a modal verb can never be preceded by [tsə] 'to' which is customary with most other verbs:<sup>1</sup>

- (7a) ər mešt hile  
 (3=masc=sg=sbj would-like-to cry)  
 'he would like to cry'
- (7b) ər fəŋt-ən tse hile  
 (3=masc=sg=sbj starts to cry)  
 'he starts to cry=he is starting to cry'
- (8a) ər kent gšejt sɪn  
 (3=masc=sg=sbj can=pres. subj intelligent be)  
 'he might be intelligent'

- (8b) ər bilt-siš-in gšejt tsə sm  
 (3=masc=sg=sbj imagines-himself intelligent to be)  
 'he believes (pictures himself) to be intelligent'

2. Modals do not take the 3rd person singular marker [-t] in the present indicative, but do take the 2nd person singular marker [-s]:

- (9a) iš sol lä:və 'I am supposed to live'  
 (9b) dū solš lä:və 'you are ...'  
 (9c) ər sol lä:və 'he...'  
 (10a) iš lä:p 'I live=I am living'  
 (10b) dū lä:pš 'you...'  
 (10c) ər lä:pt 'he...'

3. Modals remain single in the present subjunctive like the auxiliaries [hən] 'to have', [sɪn] 'to be' and [dɛ:n] 'to do' (the latter only when used as an auxiliary). Other verbs usually form the subjunctive with the present subjunctive of the verb [dɛ:n] 'to do', which then functions as an auxiliary:<sup>2</sup>

	<u>modals</u>		<u>subjunctive:</u>	
(11a)	kenə 'can'	ər kent		'he could'
(11b)	velə 'want'	ər vot		'he would like to'

auxiliaries:

(12a)	hən 'have'	ər hāt		'he would have'
(12b)	sɪn 'be'	ər vā:r		'he would be'

other verbs

[dät] (pres. subj. of [dɛ:n] + inf. of the verb:

(13a)	ge:n 'go'	ər dät ge:n		'he would go'
(13b)	glä:və 'believe'	ər dät s glä:və		'he would believe it'
(13c)	dɛ:n 'do'	ər dät s dɛ:n		'he would do it'

4. A double infinitive construction is found in a compound tense<sup>3</sup> when a modal verb is used with a complementary infinitive. The modal verb functions, then, as an alternate past participle identical in form to the infinitive. This is clearly illustrated when the main verb is omitted, but understood, and the past participle of the modal auxiliary is used:

- (14a) iš hɒps mɒxə kenə  
 (1=sg=sbj have=aux do can)  
 'I was able to do it'

- (14b) iš hɔps gəkent  
(1=sg=sbj have=aux can=pp)  
'I was able to do it'
- (15a) mr hɔn furt ge:n mɪ:n  
(1=pl=sbj have=aux away go must)  
'We had to leave'
- (15b) mr hɔn furt gəmɪ:nt  
(1=pl=sbj have=aux away must=pp)  
'We had to leave'

The double infinitive occurs only when the complementary infinitive is expressed, whereas the alternate past participle is used only when the complementary infinitive is implied.<sup>4</sup>

The future tense with a modal verb also yields a double infinitive construction:

- (16a) əs vurt kumə kənə  
(3=neut=sg=sbj fut. aux come can)  
'she (informal) will (probably) be able to come'
- (16b) əs vurt kumə  
'she will (probably) come'

The preceding sentences (1a through 16b) clearly indicate that the modals in Alsatian are a separate verbal category as illustrated by their distinct syntactic characteristics.

The Verb [brüšə] Used As A Modal. There is an additional verb [brüšə] 'need to' which is usually substituted for [mɪ:n] 'must' in the negative, and thus functions as a modal within that limited context. However, it does not share the characteristics of the other modals which form a distinct verbal category. [brüšə] takes a [-t] in the 3rd person singular in the present indicative, and requires [tsə] when preceding an infinitive:

- (17a) əs brüst nɪt tsə hɪlə  
(3=neut=sg=sbj need not to cry)  
'she (informal) must not cry'  
'she doesn't have to cry'

[brüšə] is also used as a non-modal:

- (17b) əs brüst nə nɪt  
'she doesn't need him'



### Semantic Characteristics

Modals Involving An External Source of Authority. The modals in Alsatian may be specified as relative to the speaker's point of view and to whether or not the agent in a sentence is submitted to some exterior influence with which the speaker concurs. Thus [mɪ:n], [solə], and [därfə] are modals that involve a source external to the agent that affects the event.

- (18a) dü därfš ro:də  
 (2=sg=sbj may guess)  
 'you may guess'

Someone gives the permission to the agent; if it is not the speaker, then the latter concurs:

- (18b) dü solš ro:də  
 'you should guess' (the suggestion implied in Alsatian is much stronger than that of English 'should')

Someone strongly suggests the obligation to the agent; if it is not the speaker, then the latter concurs.

- (18c) dü mə:š ro:də  
 'you must guess'

Someone absolutely compels the agent. If it is not the speaker, then the latter concurs with him.

### Modals Involving an Internal Source of Authority.

1. In the case of the modals [kenə], [mešdə], [velə], the agent is the carrier of the ability, the desire, the will; the source of the event lies with the agent, and the speaker confirms it.

- (19a) dü kans<sup>v</sup> gla:və  
 'you can believe'

The agent has the ability to believe, and the speaker confirms this.

- (19b) dü meštš gla:və  
 'you would like to believe'

The agent has the desire to believe, and the speaker confirms this.

- (19c) dü vit gla:və  
 'you want to believe'

The agent has the will to believe, and the speaker confirms this.

2. It seems that in the case of [kenə], [mesdə], and [velə], there is a clear tie between the subject and the predicate. This is further underscored by the fact that, on the syntactic level, only these modals can take a real object, whereas [därfə], [solə], and [mɪ:n], which involve an external authority, cannot.

- (20) iʃ kən elsäsis  
'I know Alsatian - I can speak Alsatian'
- (21) iʃ mešt nə nit  
'I don't like to have him - I wouldn't want him'
- (22) iʃ vɪl ken šnäğə  
'I don't want any snails'

Range of Probability Expressed by Alsatian Modals. The degree of probability regarding the potential fulfillment of an event is another dimension expressed by Alsatian modals. The two subcategories mentioned earlier each have a range of three levels (see 18a, b, c and 19a, b, c), from great uncertainty to strong probability, from mere suggestion to strong compulsion. The use of the subjunctive further allows expansion of the range of varying degrees of probability:

- (23) ər məs švä:r šɸə  
(mɪ:n:pres.ind.)  
'he must work hard'
- (24) ər sol švä:r šɸə  
(solə:pres.ind.)  
'he must work hard=he is expected to work hard'
- (25) ər sot švä:r šɸə  
(solə:pres.subj.)  
'he is supposed to work hard=he should...'
- (26) ər mist švä:r šɸə  
(mɪ:n:pres.subj.)  
'he would have to work hard'

In (23) the agent is under absolute obligation to comply. In (24) the agent is under strong obligation to comply, but has a choice available. In (25) the agent is under strong obligation to comply, but according to the speaker's point of view, most likely doesn't or won't comply, either by choosing not to or by being unable to. In (26) the agent is under a strong hypothetical obligation to comply, but according to the speaker's point of view, he doesn't, and the chances are extremely slight that he will do so in the future. As illustrated in (25) and (26), the subjunctive carries a negative connotation not conveyed by the indicative.

Negation of Modals

Negation Expressed Through Standard Oppositions.

1. In Alsatian the negation of modals may be expressed through the following oppositions:

a. mI:n : it is necessary that...

$$\square \text{ furt ge:n } (\check{s}) \equiv \sim \diamond \sim \text{ furt ge:n } (\check{s})$$

(\check{s}) = \check{s}ors\check{s} (George)

(27) d<sub>a</sub>-šors<sub>š</sub> m<sub>e</sub>:s furt ge:n  
(the-George must away go)  
'George must leave'

b. nIt ken<sub>e</sub>/nIt därf<sub>e</sub> : it is not possible that.. ≡ it is necessary that...not...

$$\sim \diamond \equiv \square \sim \text{ furt ge:n } (\check{s})$$

(28a) d<sub>a</sub>-šors<sub>š</sub> k<sub>o</sub>n nIt furt ge:n  
(can not)

'George may not leave' (=it is not the case that George may leave)

(28b) d<sub>a</sub>-šors<sub>š</sub> därf nIt furt ge:n  
(is not permitted to)

'George may not leave' (= it is necessary that George not leave')

c. ken<sub>e</sub>/dürf<sub>e</sub> : it is possible that ... ≡ it is not necessary that... not...

$$\diamond \text{ furt ge:n } (\check{s}) \equiv \sim \square \sim \text{ furt ge:n } (\check{s})$$

(29a) d<sub>a</sub>-šors<sub>š</sub> k<sub>o</sub>n furt ge:n

(29b) d<sub>a</sub>-šors<sub>š</sub> därf furt ge:n  
'George may leave'


d. nIt brüš<sub>e</sub> : it is not necessary that... ≡ it is possible that... not...

$$\diamond \sim \equiv \sim \square \text{ furt ge:n } (\check{s})$$


(30) d<sub>a</sub>-šors<sub>š</sub> brüšt nIt furt ts<sub>e</sub> ge:n  
'George doesn't have to leave'

2. These basic relationships between the modals in Alsatian may be illustrated schematically as follows, taking the "logisches Quadrat" (square of opposition) cited by Blumenthal (1976) as a model, with the following root meanings of the modals:

A - obligatorisch 'necessary'  
 E - verboten 'forbidden'  
 I - erlaubt 'permitted'  
 O - fakultativ 'optional'



Referring to the Alsatian examples (27 to 30) given under sections a, b, c, and d, we obtain the following:



#### Alternate Forms.

1. The use of the negative as pertaining to Alsatian modals needs to be specified further. The negation of [m<sub>i</sub>:n] (a): [nit m<sub>i</sub>:n] may replace [nit brüšə] (d) as illustrated below.

(31a) ər mɛ:s nit švä:r šɔfə

(31b) ər brüst nit švä:r tʂə šɔfə  
 (3 = masc=sg=sg=sg must not hard work)  
   need             to  
 'he doesn't have to work hard'

(32a) dü m<sub>i</sub>:štš nit br<sub>i</sub>:lə

(32b) dü br<sub>i</sub>štš nit tʂəbr<sub>i</sub>:lə  
 (2=sg=sg=sg must=pres.subj not shout)  
   (need=pres.subj to)  
 'you wouldn't have to shout'

- (33a) si mɪ:n nɪt ɪmər snägə hɔn
- (33b) si brüsə nɪt ɪmər šnägə tsə hɔn  
 (3=pl=sbj must not always snails have  
 (need to)  
 'it is not necessary, that they always have snails (for food)'
- (34a) um nɪt šɔfə tsəmɪ:n, het ər siš grɔŋk gšdelt
- (34b) um nɪt šɔfə tsə brüşə, het ər siš grɔŋk gšdelt  
 (for not work to must, has he himself sick acted)  
 'in order not to have to work, he acted sick'

In all of the preceding examples, the negation refers to the modal, and thus [mɛ:s nɪt] p has the meaning of  $\sim \square$  p.

2. There are other instances, when [nɪt mɪ:n] may replace [nɪt dārfə] (b) or [nɪt kenə] (b):

- (35a) dū mɛ:s dɪs nɪt mɔxə, so eps mɔxt mɪ nɪt  
 (2=sg=sbj must this not do, such something does not one)  
 'you must not do that, one doesn't do such a thing'
- (35b) dū dārfš dɪs nɪt mɔxə, so eps mɔxt mɪ nɪt
- (35c) dū kanš dɪs nɪt mɔxə, so eps mɔxt mɪ nɪt  
 'you may not do that, one doesn't do such a thing'
- (36a) dɪs mɛ:s nɪt vo:r sɪn  
 (this must not not true be)  
 'this is certainly not true=this is most likely not true'
- (36b) dɪs kɔn nɪt vo:r sɪn
- (36c) dɪs dārf nɪt vo:r sɪn  
 'this cannot be true'
- (37a) ər mɛ:s nɪt grɔnk sɪn  
 (3=masc=sg=sbj must not sick be)  
 'it is imperative that he not be sick'  
 (a second reading would be: 'he is probably sick', but 37b and 37c would not paraphrase that meaning)
- (37b) ər kɔn nɪt grɔnk sɪn
- (37c) ər dārf nɪt grɔnk sɪn  
 'it is necessary that he not be sick'
- (38a) dū mɛ:š nɪt drüriš sɪn  
 (2=sg=sbj must not sad be)  
 'you must not be sad'

(38b) *dü kanš nıt drüriš sın*

(38c) *dü därfš nıt drüriš sın*  
'it is necessary that you not be sad'

In all of these cases the negation seems to refer to the predicate rather than to the modal, and may be schematized as follows:  $\square \sim P$  : it is necessary that... not p. As illustrated above, each sentence containing [nıt mı:n] may be paraphrased using (b) [nıt kenə]/[nıt därfə], the two latter modals implying a lesser degree of compulsion than when [nıt mı:n] is used. Furthermore, whenever the subject is 2nd. pers. singular [dũ], the sentence has the character of a negative imperative rather than of a statement. In that case it implies from the speaker's point of view that the subject is in a position to comply with the prohibition, which would explain why this type of sentence, in which [nıt mı:n] may optionally replace [nıt kenə]/ [nıt därfə], is only used in the present tense and never in a question form:

(39) \**mə:s du nıt drüriš sın?*

3. The use of alternate negative forms is restricted, however, as there are instances in which only [nıt mı:n] may be used, and others when only [nıt brüşə] is appropriate:

(40) *vän iš nıt vɔ:rdə hăt mı:n, văr iš šun lɔŋ tha:m*  
(if I not wait have=pres.subj. must, be=pres.subj. I already long at-home)  
'if I hadn't been compelled to wait, I would have been home long ago'

(41) *mə:s nıt ɔm drejə vidər šɔfə?*  
(must=you not at 3 again work)  
'don't you have to work again at three?'

Examples (40) and (41) imply a strong obligation imposed on the subject by an external authority. Examples (42) and (43) on the contrary, imply the absence of an obligation which has been assumed by the subject:

(42) *iš hɔp də gɔntsə dɔ: niks mɔxə brüşə*  
(1=sg=sbj have=aux the whole day nothing do need)  
'I didn't have to do anything the whole day long - I needn't do anything...'

(43) *dü hătš ajədliš niks sa:və brüşə*  
(2=sg=sbj have=pres.subj. strictly-speaking nothing say need)  
'Actually you didn't have to say anything'

It may perhaps be possible to conclude here that when [nɪt mɪ:n] is used exclusively, there is a real obligation that exists and that is external to the agent, whereas when [nɪt brüšə] is used exclusively, the obligation is merely assumed by the agent.

Negation and Modal Subcategories. The division between the two categories of modals, those that depend on an outside source of authority ([därfə], [solə], [mɪ:n]), and those that don't ([kenə], [mešdə], [vele]), remains the same in the negative:

- (44) iš hɔp ken huŋər, iš kɔn nox niks əsə  
(l=sg=sbj have no hunger, l=sg=sbj can yet nothing eat)  
'I am not hungry, I can't eat anything yet'
- (45) iš hɔp ken huŋər, iš mešt nox niks əsə  
'..., I would like not to eat anything yet'
- (46) iš hɔp ken huŋər, iš vil nox niks əsə  
'..., I don't want to eat anything yet'
- (47) iš hɔp ken huŋər, iš darf nox niks əsə  
'..., I may not yet eat anything'
- (48) iš hɔp ken huŋər, iš sol nox niks əsə  
'..., I (strongly) should not yet eat anything'
- (49) iš hɔp ken huŋər, iš məs nox niks əsə  
'..., I must not eat anything yet'

Examples (47), (48), and (49) indicate a reference to an external authority, which is not the case in examples (44), (45), and (46).

Negation Expressed Through Adverbial Expressions. Negation may not be expressed solely through the negation of a modal, but may be conveyed through an adverbial expression, which may be either a clear negation such as [nɪ:] 'never', [unme:jliš] 'impossible', or a limiting expression such as [kɪm] 'hardly', [numə] 'only', [s ɪš kɪm me:jliš] 'it is hardly possible', [unvoršinliš] 'unprobable', [venikšdəns] 'at least', [hekšdəns] 'at the most' ...

- (50a) dü məš venikšdəns sɪvətsɪš frɔŋgə do dəfɪr bətsɔ:lə  
'you must at-least 70 francs there for-it pay)  
'you must pay at least 70F for that'
- (50b) \*dü brüš venikšdəns sɪvətsɪš frɔŋgə do dəfɪr bətsɔ:lə
- (51a) dü məš hekšdəns sɪvətsɪš frɔŋgə do dəfɪr bətsɔ:lə  
'you must pay at the most 70F for that'

- (51b) *dü brüš hekšdəns sɪvətsiʃ frəŋgə do dəfir bətsɔ:lə*  
 'you must (need) pay at the most 70F for that'

The implicit negative in [hekšdəns] 'not more than' has a wider scope than the modals, while that of [venikšdəns] has a narrower scope. (51a) and (51b) may be paraphrased as follows:

- (51c) *dü brüš nɪt me: ɔls sɪvətsiʃ frəŋgə do dəfir bətsɔ:l*  
 'you must not pay more than 70f for that'

and translated as 'it is not necessary for you to pay more than 70f for that' or 'you must pay at the most 70F for that'. (50a) may be paraphrased as follows:

- (50c) *dü məš me: ɔls sɪvətsiʃ frəŋgə do dəfir bətsɔ:lə*  
 'you must pay more than 70F for that'

and translated as 'it is necessary for you not to pay any less than 70F' or 'you must pay no less than 70F'. [hekšdəns] 'at the most'  $x(x \gg)$  marks the maximum, but [venikšdəns] 'at the last' indicates that  $x(x \leq)$  is minimum which in Alsatian is incompatible with [brušə] 'need' (50b), which in this context may be used to express sufficiency but not necessity.

- [venikšdəns] 'at least' (50b):  
 \*  $\neg < \$70$   
 \*  $\geq \$70$

- [hekšdəns] 'at the most' - [nɪt me: ɔls] 'not more than'  
 (51a and 51b):  
 $\neg > \$70$   
 $\leq \$70$

External and Internal Negation. External and internal negation are possible in Alsatian with possibility expressions such as [s kɔn sɪn] 'it is possible', and [s iʃ me:jliʃ] 'it is possible':

- (52a) *s kɔn sɪn, dɔs s-gredəl grɔŋk iʃ*  
 (it can be, that the-Gredel sick is)  
 'it may be that Gredel is sick'

$$\diamond \text{ grɔŋk } (G) \equiv \sim \square \sim \text{ grɔŋk } (G)$$

i. internal negation:

- (52b) *s kɔn sɪn, dɔs s-gredəl nɪt grɔŋk iʃ*  
 'it is possible that Gredel is not sick'

$$\diamond \sim \text{ grɔŋk } (G) \equiv \sim \square \text{ grɔŋk } (G)$$



## ii. external negation:

- (52c) s kǝn nɪt sɪn, dǝs s-gredǝl grǝŋk iš  
'it is not possible, that Gredel be sick'

$$\sim \diamond grǝŋk (G) \equiv \square \sim grǝŋk (G)$$

## iii. internal-external negation:

- (52d) s kǝn nɪt sɪn, dǝs s-gredǝl nɪt grǝŋk iš  
'it is not possible, that Gredel not be sick'

$$\sim \diamond \sim grǝŋk (G) \equiv \square grǝŋk (G)$$

- (53a) s iš me:jliš dǝs ǝs siš frajt ɪn vǝdǝrǝ umštǝndǝ tǝsɪn  
(it is possible that she (informal) herself be-happy in  
other circumstances to be (=be with child))  
'it is possible that she is happy to be pregnant'
- (53b) s iš me:jliš dǝs ǝs siš nɪt frajt ɪn vǝdǝrǝ umštǝndǝ tǝsɪn  
'it is possible that she is not happy to be pregnant'
- (53c) s iš nɪt me:jliš dǝs ǝs siš frajt ɪn vǝdǝrǝ umštǝndǝ tǝsɪn  
'it is not possible that she is happy to be pregnant'
- (53d) s iš nɪt me:jliš dǝs ǝs siš nɪt frajt ɪn vǝdǝrǝ umštǝndǝ  
tǝsɪn  
'it isn't possible that she is not happy to be pregnant'

External and internal negation are possible also with an expression such as [s mǝ:s sɪn] 'it must be the case,' provided that the negative form is either [s kǝn nɪt sɪn] or [s dǝrf nɪt sɪn] 'it can/may not be' within the context below:

- (54a) s mǝ:s sɪn, dǝs s majdǝlǝ drǝriš iš  
(it must be, that the girl-dim sad is)  
'it must be the case that the little girl is sad'
- (54b) s mǝ:s sɪn, dǝs s majdǝlǝ nɪt drǝriš iš  
'it must be the case, that the little girl is not sad'
- (54c) s kǝn nɪt sɪn, dǝs s majdǝlǝ drǝriš iš  
'it is impossible that the little girl is sad'
- (54d) s kǝn nɪt sɪn, dǝs s majdǝlǝ nɪt drǝriš iš  
'it is impossible, that the little girl not be sad'  
(= she must be sad)

Epistemic and Deontic Meanings of Alsatian Modals

Relationship Between Root Meaning and Epistemic Meaning. This section pertains only to the modals [därfə] 'be permitted to', [solə] 'should', [mɪ:n] 'must', which imply an external source of authority. Modals in Alsatian support Horn's (1972) hypothesis that there is a systematic connection between the root meaning and the epistemic meaning of modals, the latter being based on the speaker's knowledge, and that the two meanings are related semantic concepts. While the Alsatian syntactic modals may be ambiguous between epistemic and root meanings, they are so in a systematic way as the following sentences illustrate:

- (55a) dü dārftš rä:št hɔn<sup>5</sup>  
 (you may=pres. subj right have)  
 'you may be right'
- (55b) dü dārfs ə glas hɔn  
 (you may an ice-cream have)  
 'you may have an ice-cream'
- (56a) sini švešdər sol še:n sɪn, hɔv ɪš ghe:rt  
 (his sister must pretty be, have I heard)  
 'his sister must/is supposed to be pretty, I've heard'
- (56b) ə hotäs sol še:n sɪn, um ɪn däre ũsstelun ɔrvajt tsə greje  
 (a hostess must pretty be, for in that fair work to get)  
 'in order to get a job at that fair, a hostess has to be pretty'
- (57a) d no:xbərə mɛs ɪrə mɔn fərhawə, mɪ he:rt nə brɪ:lə  
 (the neighbor (fem.) must her husband beatup, one hears him yell)  
 'the neighbor must be beating up her husband, one hears him yell'
- (57b) d no:xbərə mɛs ɪrə mɔn fərhawə, šunš dād ər nɪt ufšte:n  
 (the neighbor (fem.) must her husband beat-up, otherwise, aux-do-pres. subj he not get-up)  
 'the neighbor must beat up her husband, otherwise he wouldn't get up'

[därfə] in (55a) indicates possibility, in (55b) permission. [solə] in (56a) indicates probability/assumption, in (56b) weak requirement/obligation (there may be an exception to the rule regarding physical appearance when hiring a hostess for the fair). [mɪ:n] in (57a) indicates certainty, in (57b) strong obligation/requirement. Thus these modals are ambiguous between epistemic and root meaning, as [därfə] may fluctuate between the meaning of possibility and that of permission, [solə] between probability and obligation, and [mɪ:n] between certainty and requirement. Yet there

is consistency in that possibility is matched by permission, and probability and certainty are matched by weak or strong obligation.

Concepts of Modality Occurring in Alsatian. The various notions of modality occurring in Alsatian are conveyed through the following modals.

1. Ability. Only [kenə] in its root meaning is used to express either physical or mental ability.

- (58a) dr-šors̃ kən-s mɔxə (physical)  
(the-George can-it do)  
'George can do it'
- (58b) dr-šors̃ kən-s nit mɔxə (physical)  
(not)  
'George can't do it'
- (58c) kən-s dr-šors̃ (nit) mɔxə? (physical)  
'can ('t) George do it?'
- (59) s-gredəl kən dits̃ (mental)  
(the-Gredel can German)  
'Marguerite knows German'
- (60) (fut): m ə-jo:r vurd ər gʊ:t ɛŋliʃ kənə (mental)  
(in-a a-year will he well English know)  
'Within a year he will know English well'  
(certainly or probably)
- (61) (past): vi iʃ gla:n bɪn gsɪn, hɔv iʃ elsäsiʃ  
{ gekent } (mental)  
{ kenə redə }  
(when I small have been, have I Alsatian known/know speak)  
'when I was small, I knew (how to speak) Alsatian'
- (62) (pres. subj): kentš dū so eps lɪpfə? (physical)  
(can-pres. subj you such something lift-up)  
'could you lift that?'
- (63) (pres. subj): dū kentš mɪ ɔm gšɪr hɛlfə (physical)  
(you can-pres. subj me at-the dishes help)  
'you could help me with the dishes'
- (64) (past subj): häts̃ dū so eps gla:və kənə? (mental)  
(have-pres. subj-aux you such something believe can)  
'could you have believed that?'

When the subjunctive is used, there is either an indication of serious doubt from the speaker's point of view ((62, 64): 'I'm not so sure...') or a degree of politeness (63) not indicated by the indicative.<sup>6</sup>

2. Permission. Both [kenə] and [därfə] in their root meaning may be used, with [kenə] paraphrasing the permission sense of [därfə].

- (65) mr {därfə} ge:n  
          {kenə}  
          'we are permitted to go'
- (66) {därfə} (nit) mit kumə?  
      {kəns}  
      'are you (not) permitted to come along?'
- (67) (fut): mr värə nit furt {därfə} bli:və  
                                  {kenə}  
          (we fut. aux not away may stay)  
          'we won't be allowed to stay away'
- (68) (past): mr hən nit fül därfə sin  
          (we have not lazy be-permitted be)  
          'we were not allowed to be lazy'
- (69) (pres. subj): {därfə} hašiš rawxə?  
                      {kents}  
          (may=pres. subj=you grass smoke)  
          'might you smoke grass?' (more doubt involved than if  
          indicative were used)
- (70) (past subj): hät də güšt štigə därfə le:rə?  
          (have=pres. subj the Gustave embroider be-permitted learn)  
          'could Gustave have been permitted to learn to embroider'

As in the examples referring to ability, the use of the subjunctive indicates a certain amount of doubt from the speaker's point of view, or some polite suggestion.

3. Obligation. Both [mɪ:n] (absolute obligation/requirement) and [solə] (obligation, but the agent has a choice available as to whether or not to comply) are used with [nit brüse] and [nit därfə] as possible negatives as indicated in the Negation section. The root meaning of [solə] corresponds roughly to English 'should' as defined by Boyd and Thorn (1969:66), stating "that somebody or something makes a demand". In Alsatian that demand seems to be stronger than that conveyed by 'should'.

- (71a) mr mɪ:n ɔm a:nə dort sin  
          (we must at=the one=o'clock there be)  
          'we must be there at one'

Both internal and external negation may apply.

(71b) mr mɪ:n ɔm a:nse nɪt dort sɪn

(71c) mr mɪ:n nɪt ɔm a:nse dort sɪn  
'we must not be there at one'

[solə] may be substituted for [mɪ:n] in the above sentences, indicating then a lesser degree of requirement. (The agent may possibly either be unable or unwilling to comply).

In their root meaning [mɪ:n] and [solə] may be used in all tenses and also in the question form.

(72a) (past) heš<sup>ʋ</sup> šva:r<sup>ʋ</sup> šɔfə<sup>ʋ</sup> mɪ:n? 'did you have to work hard'  
(72b) heš<sup>ʋ</sup> šva:r<sup>ʋ</sup> mɪ:n šɔfə? (have-you hard work must/must work)

The flexible word order of [šɔfə] and [mɪ:n] allows one to emphasize either the obligation in (72a) or the work in (72b).

(73) (fut) iš<sup>ʋ</sup> wur dɪs fərtiš<sup>ʋ</sup> mɔxə mɪ:n  
(I fut-aux this finish do must)  
'I will have to finish this'

It seems that the negation of the root meaning of [mɪ:n] and [solə] is done respectively with [nɪt brüšə] and [nɪt dārfə] unless the negations [nɪt mɪ:n] and [nɪt solə] are used.

(74a) dū mɔ:š<sup>ʋ</sup> šlo:fə  
'you must sleep'

(74b) dū bruš<sup>ʋ</sup> nɪt tšə šlo:fə  
'you don't have to sleep'

(75a) mr solə unsri ma:nuŋ sa:və  
(we must our opinion say)  
'we are supposed to tell our opinion'

(75b) { mr dārfə unsri ma:nuŋ nɪt sa:və

(75c) { mr dārfə nɪt unsri ma:nuŋ sa:və  
'we must not tell our opinion'

The use of the subjunctive again conveys a lesser degree of obligation, and involves a certain amount of doubt or uncertainty.

(76) (pres. subj): iš<sup>ʋ</sup> mɪ:st miš<sup>ʋ</sup> drumbɪ:rə, vān iš<sup>ʋ</sup> nɪt šɔfə<sup>ʋ</sup> mɪ:st  
(I must=pres.subj myself err, if I not work must=pres.subj)  
'I would be mistaken, if I didn't have to work'

(77) (past subj): dū häts<sup>ʋ</sup> niks sa:və solə  
(you have=pres.subj nothing say should)  
'you shouldn't have said anything'

4. Possibility. To indicate possibility both [kenə] and [därfə] are used in their epistemic sense, the latter modal in the subjunctive only.

(78) dū kōns rā:st hōn 'you may be right'  
(you may right have)

(79) s kōn sīn, dōs d rā:st hēs  
'it may be, that you are right'

Both internal and external negation seem possible:

(80a) s kōn sīn, dōs d nīt rā:st hēs  
'it is possible that you may not be right'

(80b) s kōn nīt sīn, dōs d rā:st hēs  
'it can not be that you are right'

When external negation is used (80b) the meaning is 'it must not be the case that'.

Only present indicative and subjunctive may be used with epistemic [kenə]. When the subjunctive is used a greater degree of doubt is conveyed. The subjunctive of [därfə] paraphrases the subjunctive meaning of [kenə] with no difference in meaning. Interrogative forms are possible:

(81) {kent } ēr so ɔlt sīn?  
{därft}  
{can=pres.subj he so old be)  
{may  
'can he possibly be so old?'

(82) hät so-eps mē:jliš kenə sīn?  
(have=past subj=aux such-something possible can be)  
'could something like that have been possible?'

Only embedded verbs can take the past or future tense.

(83) s iš mē:jliš dōs ēr grōnk iš gsīn  
(it is possible that he sick is been)  
'it is possible that he was sick'

(84) s iš mē:jliš dōs ēr grōnk väre vurd  
(became fut. aux)  
'it is possible that he will be sick'

5. Probability/Supposition/Assumption

a. To express probability the future auxiliary [vā:rə], an adverbial expression such as [vorš̥inliš̥] 'probably', or both may be used.

(85a) dū vurš̥ rā:št̥ hən  
(you fut. aux right have)  
'you are probably right'

(85b) dū heš̥ vorš̥inliš̥ rā:št̥  
(you have probably right)  
'you are probably right'

(85c) dū vurš̥ vorš̥inliš̥ rāšt̥ hən  
'you are probably right'

In (85c) there seems to be a greater commitment on the part of the speaker to assert the probability of the proposition. It may be noted here that the future auxiliary carries the meaning of probability rather than that of futurity. To express a future event which, in the mind of the speaker, is certain to occur, Alsatian generally uses the present tense with a time adverb indicating futurity such as [morjə] 'tomorrow', [ivermorjə] 'the day after tomorrow', [hito:və] 'tonight', [im ə jo:r] 'in a year', and so on. An alternative is to use the future auxiliary [vā:rə] with the infinitive of the main verb (see chart p. 30).

(86a) ər kunt morjə  
'he will come tomorrow'

(86b) ər vurt morjə kumə  
'he will come tomorrow' or 'he probably comes tomorrow'

(86b) is ambiguous as it could convey either probability or futurity. To specify that futurity is meant, an adverbial expression such as [gənts siš̥ər] 'entirely certain' or [unbəd̥ingt] 'without fail' may be added to a sentence having the future auxiliary.

(86c) ər vurt gənts siš̥ər morjə kumə  
'he will certainly/most likely come tomorrow'

Without such an adverbial expression the difference between (86a) and (86b) lies in the degree of certainty, the latter implying some degree of doubt.

b. To express supposition, assumption, and related probability, [mɪ:n] and [solə] may be used in the various tenses, in the declarative and negative forms, but not, it seems, in the question form.

- (87) ər sol ninənintsiš<sup>˘</sup> jo:r ɔlt sɪn  
 (he must 99 years old be)  
 'he is said to be 99 years old'
- (88) si mɪ:n fol sɪn, um sofi:l grɔmbo:l tse mɔxə  
 (they must drunk be, to so-much din to do)  
 'they must be drunk to make such a din'
- (89) si hɔn fol mɪ:n sɪn, um so eps tse mɔxə  
 (they have drunk must be, to such something to do)  
 'they must have been drunk to do such a thing'
- (90) dū{mɪ:štš<sup>˘</sup>} nit vol sɪn  
       {sotš<sup>˘</sup>}  
 (you must-pres.subj not drunk be)  
 'you presumably shouldn't be drunk' (but you are)
- (91) dū häts<sup>˘</sup> nit ɪm vɪrtshüs soðə bli:və  
 (you have-pres.subj not in-the pub must-subj stay)  
 'you should not have stayed in the pub'

6. Necessity/Conclusion. To express necessity, conclusion, only [mɪ:n] 'must' in its epistemic sense is used, and the modal cannot be negated nor take an interrogative form.

- (92a) ər mə:s tha:m sɪn, s li:št<sup>˘</sup> iš ɔn  
 (he must at-home be, the light is on)  
 'he must be home, the light is on'
- (92b) ər mə:s nit tha:m sɪn, s iš ləs fɪnšdər  
 (he must not be home, it is all dark)  
 'he must not be home, everything is dark'
- (93) s majðələ mə:s grɔnk sɪn, s het gebroxə  
 'the little girl must be sick, she vomited'
- (94) s mə:s rä:jə, s vɔkst niks mə:  
 (it must rain, there grows nothing more)  
 'it is necessary that it rains, nothing grows anymore'

While the modal in this sense can only be in the present tense, either indicative or subjunctive, the event denoted by the main verb may be in the past.

- (95) ər mə:s tha:m sɪn gsɪn, iš hɔb nə redə he:rə  
 (he must at=home be be=PP, I have him talk hear)  
 'he must have been at home, I heard him talk'

When the subjunctive is used, there is always a counter-factual meaning.



- (96) er mi:st tha:m sɪn gsɪn  
'it would have been necessary that he be home (but he wasn't)'
- (97) er mi:st do:t sɪn, um s-mül nɪmi uf tʂə mɔxə  
(he must=pres.subj dead be, for the mouth no=more open to do)  
'he would have to be dead not to open his mouth anymore'

## 7. Volition

a. Alsatian has two modals [velə] and [mešdə] (the latter used only in the subjunctive) which in their root meaning express either want or intent (indicative) or inclination (subjunctive).

- (98) iš<sup>v</sup> vil višə vɔs d mɔxš<sup>v</sup>  
'I want (to) know, what you are doing'
- (99) vit eps sa:və?  
(want=you something say)  
'do you want to say anything?'
- (100) mɪr velə nɪks dəfun višə  
(we want nothing from-it know)  
'we don't want to know anything about it'
- (101) iš<sup>v</sup> {mešt } rə:j hɔn  
          {vot }  
'I would like to have peace'
- (102) {votš<sup>v</sup> } nit mitkumə?  
          {meštš }  
'wouldn't you like to come along?'

[velə] in the subjunctive paraphrases [mešdə], but with a slightly stronger degree of volition. [velə] is distinct from other modals considered so far, in that the event denoted by the main verb lies in the future; the time point referred to by the modal is always prior to that referred to by main verb. Thus there is often a notion of futurity inherently involved in the use of [velə] by the mere fact that the potential realization of the event often falls in the future. Futurity, however, does not seem essential to the meaning of [velə] and [mešdə].

- (103) er sɔ:t ɛr vil siš s lä:və nämə  
(he says he wants himself the life take)  
'he says he wants to kill himself' (volition)
- (104) er sɔ:t ɛr vurt siš s lä:və nämə  
(fut.aux)  
'he says he is going to kill himself' (future)

[velə] may be used in all tenses, in declarative, negative and question forms.

- (105) (past) heš nɪt švɪmə velə?  
(have=you not swim want)  
'didn't you want to swim?'
- (106) (fut) mɪ vərə švɪmə velə  
(we fut.aux swim want)  
'we will (probably) want to swim'
- (107) (fut) dū vurš švɪmə kənə velə  
(you fut.aux swim can want)  
'you will want to be able to swim'
- (108) (past subj) häts nɪt švɪmə velə?  
(have=pres.subj not swim want)  
'wouldn't you have liked to swim?'

b. Whenever [velə] is used with the main verb in a perfective tense, there is ambiguity in the meaning conveyed.

- (109) ər vil gäsə hɔn  
(he wants eat=PP have)  
'he wants others to eat' or:  
'he claims to have eaten'

Either the subject of the main verb is understood to be different from that of [velə] ('he wants the food to be eaten by someone') and [velə] is then used in its root meaning, or there is only one subject for both [velə] and the main verb ('he claims to have eaten') and then [velə] is used in its epistemic meaning (IV.B.7.c.). This seems to be consistent with the observation made earlier (IV.B.7.a.) that the root meaning of [velə] is based on information that comes from the future. Therefore [velə] in its root meaning is incompatible with a main verb in the past. Although (109) uses the perfective [gäsə hɔn] 'have eaten' the meaning conveyed refers to the future 'he wants others to eat' and not 'he wants others to have eaten'.

c. [velə] in its epistemic meaning seems to convey an assertion which the speaker questions.

- (110) ər vil gšejt sɪn. un dəbi: kɔn ər nɪt uf drej tse:lə  
(he wants smart be, and by-that can he not up-to 3 count)  
'he claims to be intelligent, yet he can't count up to three' (=yet he is really utterly dumb)
- (112) si velə fi:l gält hɔn, un dəbi: vo:nə sə ɪm ə lox  
(they want much money have, and by-that live they in a hole)  
'they claim to have a lot of money, yet they live in a very shabby place'

- (113) *dü vɪt ɪn ʊm̩ärikɔ: gəlä:pt hɔm, un kɔnʂ ken vɔrt äŋlisʔ*  
 (you want in America live=PP have=aux, and you=can not=  
 a word English)  
 'you claim having lived in America, and you don't know one  
 word of English?'

In the preceding examples, the second clause is not necessary to convey the speaker's doubt; non-linguistic devices such as gestures, intonation may do as well. It seems then that in the case of epistemic [velə], while the speaker asserts the existence of the subject's volition, he also seriously questions, if not rejects, the reality of the object of the subject's volition. That latter dimension does not occur with any of the other modals.

d. There are a few rare instances, when [velə] may mark an imperative demand and then comes close to the meaning of English 'will'. The example I have is an indirect speech act in which the imperative implies a threat directed toward the listener, and is syntactically a question.

- (114) *vɪt sofort ha:m kumə?*  
 (intend-you immediately home come)  
 'you better come home right away (or else)'

When, instead of [velə], Alsatian uses [vã:rə] the future auxiliary corresponding to English 'will', the meaning conveyed is simply a question regarding the subject's intention about the future event expressed by the main verb, and no longer carries any threat.

- (115) *vurʂ sofort ha:m kumə?*  
 (fut. aux=you immediately home come)  
 'will you come home right away?'  
 'you probably come home right away?'

## V. Conclusion

Much remains to be investigated about modality in Alsatian, and the preceding observations are merely a preliminary attempt to describe some of its aspects. In general, the modals seem to express pre-emptiveness to a certain extent. When the modals [mɪ:n], [solə], [dãrfə] are used, the speaker views the event as being dependent on some external authority. When [kenə], [mesdə], [velə] are used, the speaker views the agent as the initiator of the event. Within each category there are points along a probability continuum which may be expanded through the use of the subjective.

Force	Source of Authority	
	Internal	External
great uncertainty slight possibility	[kenə]	[darfə]
intermediate	[mešdə]	[solə]
strong probability or compulsion	[velə]	[mɪ:n]

When the modal is in the subjunctive rather than in the indicative mood, an additional counter-factual dimension is added, which increases the degree of doubt conveyed (see footnote 6).

Alsatian modals support Horn's hypothesis of a semantic connection between root modality and epistemic modality. Alsatian epistemic modals stand in contrast to the factual in that they involve the speaker's point of view, and are capable of expressing various kinds of relation to reality.

There are other semantic questions which would need to be considered in a more comprehensive study. How does the speaker view modality, how does he choose one particular modal in a particular mood rather than another, and what is the relationship between modality and aspect? These are but a few areas of possible investigation.

#### Footnotes

1 The verb [ge:n] 'to go' is modal-like in this respect:

- i) mr ge:n švfe  
'we are going to work'

which then indicates also imminence.

2 A few very common verbs have two alternate forms, a simple verb form and the construction with [dä:d] which may be used interchangeably.

- [visə] 'to know'  
ii) iš vist ken üsvä:j  
iš dä:d ken üsvä:j visə  
'I wouldn't know any way out'

- [ge:n] 'to go'  
iii) s gäng əm nit ums gält  
s dä:d əm nit ums gält ge:n  
(it would go him not about money)  
'it wouldn't be a matter of money according to him'

[kumə] 'to come'

- iv) vān ər kumə kent, kām ər sofort  
 vān ər kumə kent, dād ər sofort kumə  
 'if he could come he would come right away'

3 By compound tense is meant any tense involving an auxiliary and a main verb, such as a perfective tense.

4 The double infinitive construction is not restricted to modals; it may occur with a very few verbs such as [hɛ:rə] 'hear' and [sā:n] 'see':

- v) iš hɔb sə rɔ:fə hɛ:rə  
 (I have them call hear)  
 'I heard them call'

- vi) iš hɔb nə hilə sā:n  
 (I have him cry see)  
 'I saw him cry'

5 Only in the subjunctive can [därfə] have an epistemic reading in Alsatian. However [därfə] in the subjunctive may also have the root meaning of permission:

- vii) dū dārftš ɔ glas hɔn vān d šlugə kentš  
 'you would be permitted to have an ice-cream, if you could swallow'

6 This study doesn't deal with an investigation of the relationship between subjunctive and modality, which would be necessary for a comprehensive analysis of modality. The following observations seem pertinent, however. According to Bouma (1973),

Subjunctive and modality contrast in that the former focuses on the fact that the event stands in no designated relation to reality, whereas in the latter the focus is on a particular relation.

When the subjunctive is used with epistemic modals, the speaker asserts the lack of reality of a certain modality; thus the event is doubly removed, first by the subjunctive and second by the use of the modal. In conditional sentences, in which in Alsatian the subjunctive is used, the speaker asserts a particular modal relation of the event to reality as counter-factual.

- viii) vān ər kumə vot, sot ər d rais mɔxə kenə  
 (if he come want=pres.subj, must=pres.subj he the trip make can)  
 'if he wanted to come, he should be able to make the trip'  
 (both the intention of the agent and the event are negated:  
 the agent won't come, he doesn't want to)

7 Example (106) illustrates the stackability of Alsatian modals, a common phenomenon in that dialect. Stackability of Alsatian modals would need a thorough investigation, but is beyond the limits of this paper. The following examples are simply to illustrate further the concept.

- ix) *dü vurš dort svimə kenə mi:n*  
 (you fut=aux there swim can must)  
 'you will have to be able to swim there'
- x) *s kent sɪn, dɔs dü gla:və kenə velə mestš*  
 'it could be possible, that you would like to want to be able to believe'  
 (it can=subj be, that you believe can want would-like=2=sg)
- xi) *ər kent rä:št hən*  
 'it might be possible that he is right'
- xii) *ər mist rä:št kenə hən*  
 'he would have to be able to be right' (but isn't)
- xiii) *vən ər eps sa:və vot, sot ər rä:št kenə hən*  
 'if he wanted to say something, he should be able to be right'

In both (xii) and (xiii) [kenə] no longer retains the epistemic meaning of (xi). It seems then, that in Alsatian, when modals are stacked, only the highest in the phrase-structure tree may be epistemic.

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CHART OF ALSATIAN MODELS

	Singular			Plural		
	iš (1)	dü (2)	ar, es, si (3)	mr (1) ur (2) si (3)		
present:	<u>kena</u> (ability, be able, can) <u>därfä</u> (permission, be allowed to, may) <u>mu:n</u> (must, have to, necessity) <u>velä</u> (desire, want to, wish) <u>solä</u> (obligation, be supposed to, shall)	konš därfš me:š vül solš heš	kon därf me:s vül sol het	kenä därfä mu:n velä solä hon		
past:	aux: hon + P.P. P.P.: gekent gedärfä gemu:n gevellt gsolt	hob				
future:	aux: <u>väre+infinit.</u>	vurš	vurt	vära		
pres. subj.	kenä därfä mu:n velä solä *mešä (to like to, inclination)	kentš därfš mu:šš votš solš meštš	kent därf mu:st vot sol mešt	kenä därfä mu:sda vöda soda mešda		
past subj.	aux: hon + P.P.	hät	hät	häda		
present:	<u>brüş</u> (need to)	brüş	brüšt	brüša		
pres. subj.:	<u>briš</u>	brišš	briš	brišä		

\*Except for [mešä], modals in Alsatian occur in all tenses.



MODALITY IN ALSATIAN  
Abbreviations and Symbols Used:

1	1st. person
2	2nd. person
3	3rd. person
aux	auxiliary
dim	diminutive
DO	direct object
fem	feminine
fut	future
ind	indicative
inf	infinitive
masc	masculine
neut	neutral
pl	plural
pp	past participle
pres	present
sbj	subject
sg	singular
subj	subjunctive
	it is necessary that
	it is possible that
~	negation
p	proposition