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PREFACE

As far as is known, all languages have ways of expressing modality, i.e., notions of possibility, necessity, contingency, etc. But this pervasive phenomenon has so far been the object of little systematic linguistic analysis. In fact, investigators do not even agree on the scope of the term modality. Very roughly speaking, two kinds of modality have been distinguished, namely epistemic and deontic. The former involves the speaker's judgment as to the degree of certainty of an event or state of affairs being referred to. Deontic modality, on the other hand, has to do with such notions as obligation, permissability and necessity. However, as useful as this distinction is, little is known so far concerning the linguistic patterns which express those ideas. It is clear that the modality systems of a great many languages will need to be thoroughly scrutinized and compared before any conclusions can be drawn as to their place in 'universal grammar.'

The papers included in this volume of the Kansas Working Papers in Linguistics were written by graduate students at the University of Kansas for a seminar on modality taught by Professor Choon-Kyu Oh in the spring of 1979. They deal with a variety of topics bearing on modality and with a variety of languages and language families. It is our hope that these papers will stimulate comments from colleagues at other institutions.

The Editors

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THE TURKISH FUTURE MARKER

Feryal Yavaş

Abstract: The Turkish future marker has uses
which can adequately be analyzed under the
modal system of the language. This lends
support to the hypothesis that futurity is as
much a modal notion as a temporal one.

Introduction

There is growing linguistic evidence that indicates a close
affinity between future tense markers and modal categories. Linguists
report that in many languages future tense markers function as markers
of a variety of mood/modal related notions like volition, supposition,
intension, etc. (Lyons 1977:815-17, Ultan 1972:75-94). As early as
1931, Jespersen, pointing to the modal uses of will and shall, had
concluded that there was no future tense in English. More recently,
Binnick (1971, 1972) has given us a detailed account of will and
be going to, showing the presuppositional differences that govern the
use of these expressions and arguing for their quasi-modal function.
Lakoff (1972) has gone one step further by classifying will among the
modals of English; she considers will to be a modal that shows the
highest degree of certainty.

Ultan (1972:80) suggests that this affinity between future and
modal expressions is due to the element of uncertainty that is inherent
both in future events and in the application of modal categories. The
element of uncertainty as an inherent property of futurity is well
recognized by philosophers who observe that there are ontological
differences between the past and future. Gale (1968:103) writes:

> Since past events have become present, they
> have already won their ontological diplomas,
> unlike future events which still exist in a
> limbo of mere possibility.

The "openness" of the future as opposed to the "closedness" of
the past is reflected in the kind of knowledge we speakers of natural
languages possess and express in reporting future events. This know-
ledge is typically one of prediction with varying degrees of certainty.
Descriptions of future events are not definite assertions but modalized
utterances of presumption. Prediction is subsumed under this more general
modal notion of presumption.

Given the above view that futurity is more of a modal than a
temporal concept, it follows that the forms used to mark future in
languages are, in fact, markers of presumptive modality. As such, they
are employed in all contexts, regardless of the time reference, where
presumption is involved. Thus, the use of the so-called future tense
markers in utterances where futurity is not involved is in no way

"deviant" or "special" as some linguists believe (Hornstein 1977). On the contrary, it is predictable and explainable.

In this paper I will examine the non-future uses of the "future tense" marker in Turkish and show that Turkish presents additional support for the above hypothesis.

Non-future Uses of the Turkish Future Marker

The morpheme -(y)EJEK[1] is analyzed as the future tense marker in Turkish; thus bašla 'begin'; bašlayajak '(he/she/it) will begin'; gel 'come'; gelejeim 'I will come'. Yet there are certain contexts where -(y)EJEK is used despite the fact that the time reference is not future. Observe the following:

1. John - a   telefon et - me,   šimdi uyu - yor   ol - a'jak
      dat. telephone make - neg. now   sleep - prog. be
'Don't call John, he will be sleeping now.'

2. John šimdi kütüphane - de ol - a'jak
      now   library - loc. be
'John will be at the library now.'

3. John dün - kü   sɨnav - ɨ geč - miš   ol - a'jak
      yesterday - relative exam - acc. pass - perf. be

ki   yüz - ü   gül - üyor
complement face - pass smile - prog.
'John must have passed yesterday's exam, that is why he looks happy.'

4. -Dün   biri   san - a   telefon   et - ti
 yesterday someone you - dat. telephone make - past

-John ol - a'jak
    be

-'Someone called you yesterday.'

-'That will be John.'

What seems to be the common element for the appropriate use of these -(y)EJEK utterances is the following: the speaker is dislocated either in place, as in (1-2), or in time, as in (3-4). The speaker is not in a position to make a categorical assertion. However, on the basis of his knowledge, he presumes that the situation holds true (did hold true) at the moment of speech (prior to the moment of speech), and he expresses this by employing -(y)EJEK. Thus, such utterances involve epistemically qualified propositions and -(y)EJEK functions as an epistemic modal. That this is the case can be seen in the -mElI counterparts of these sentences. The verbal ending -mElI is the Turkish modal that corresponds to English must/should[2], i.e., it is the necessity operator in Turkish. Replacing -(y)EJEK with -mElI in (1-4) does not result in any significant change in

meaning. Compare (2) with (5).

5. John šimdi kütüphane - de ol - malɨ
      now   library - loc be
  'John must be at the library now.'

    The reader will notice a close parallelism between English and
Turkish. First, the future markers will and -(y)EjEK are used in contexts
were futurity is not involved. Secondly, these contexts seem to overlap
with those of the necessity operator so that the substitution of must
for will and of -mElI for -(y)EjEK yields only a slight change of meaning[3].

    In his attempt to give a unified account of English tenses,
Hornstein (1977) considers all non-future readings of will as "deviant,"
as coming from the underlying modal will as opposed to the "normal" uses
where will is the temporal future marker. In his view, the form will
is ambiguous between temporal and modal meaning.

    Following Hornstein's line of analysis, we can do the same for
Turkish. We can posit homophonous forms -(y)EjEK$_1$ 'future marker' and
-(y)EjEK$_2$ 'a modal'; but what would be achieved? Would we be any closer
to explaining why two totally unrelated languages like Turkish and English
present strikingly similar pictures with regard to their future marker?
On the contrary, I believe this line of analysis would distort the
picture by suggesting that what we find in English and Turkish is
merely accidental. That is, Hornstein's line of analysis would suggest
that these languages just happen to have homophonous forms for marking
future and presumptive modality. Evidence from a variety of languages
clearly indicates otherwise. The formal identity between the expressions
of future and presumptive modality in languages can only be explained by
recognizing their semantic affinity.

    To return to -(y)EjEK, the non-future uses of this suffix are
almost always ignored in the grammars of Turkish.[4] Underhill (1976:280),
for example, takes the peripherastic form -mIš ol+ajak (perfective
be+(y)EjEK) to be the marker of the "future perfect tense." This, of
course, is due to his analysis that -(y)EjEK marks futurity, and only
futurity, in Turkish. A quick glance at (3) would reveal that his
analysis is not viable. What marks future in utterances like (6) is
not -(y)EjEK, but the future time adverb.

6. John hafta - ya tez - in - i   bitir - miš ol - ajak
      week - dat. thesis - poss. - acc. finish
  'John will have finished his thesis (by) next week.'

In the absence of a future time adverb and/or a future context, the
event time is not interpreted to be in the future. In a neutral context,
(7) can only mean 'I presume that John has finished his thesis by now.'

7. John tez - in - i   bitir - miš ol - ajak
      thesis - poss. acc. finish

    There is an interesting difference between past and future adverbs

in the way they interact with <u>-mIš olaǰak</u>. Compare (8), (9), and (10).

8. John evlen - <u>miš olaǰak</u>
      get married
  'John will have gotten married (by now).'

9. John gečen sene evlen - <u>miš olaǰak</u>
     last year
  'John will have gotten married last year.'

10. John sene - ye evlen - <u>miš olaǰak</u>
      year - dat.
  'John will have gotten married (by) next year.'

'Last year' in (9) is understood to mark the time of the supposed event.
However, 'next year' in (10) is interpreted as a time by which the
marriage will have taken place. In other words, while the past adverbial
marks event time, the future adverbial marks a time subsequent to event
time at which the results of the event are observable. Let us call
this 'reference time.'
     It seems that in Turkish, time adverbials in sentence initial
position can only mark reference time. If 'last year' in (9) is preposed
to the initial position, the sentence becomes awkward; no such change is
observed when 'next year' of (10) undergoes preposing.

11. ?? Gečen sene John evlen - <u>miš olaǰak</u>
     last year   get married
  'Last year John will have gotten married.'

12. sene - ye John evlen - <u>miš olaǰak</u>
    year - dat.   get married
  '(By) next year John will have gotten married.'

     This difference in the behavior of past and future adverbials
should not be taken as an indication of the different functions of
-(y)EǰEK (i.e., modal vs. temporal), for the same facts are observed
with other modals. As with -(y)EǰEK, the peripherastic forms consisting
of the perfective -mIš plus the modal can be used both for past and
future reference. Moreover, the past and future adverbials present
the same difference with these forms i.e., past adverbs marking event
time, and future adverbials marking reference time. Compare (8-10) with
the following:

13. John evlen - <u>miš ol - mali</u>
      get married
  'John must have gotten married (by now).'

14. John on gün önǰe   evlen - <u>miš ol - mali</u>
      ten day before/ago
  'John must have gotten married ten days ago.'

15. John hafta - ya   evlen - <u>miš ol - malɨ</u>
      week - dat.
    '(Lit): John must have gotten married (by) next week.'

16. John evlen   - <u>miš ol - abil - ir</u>
      get married perf. be may/can aorist.
    'John may have gotten married (by now).'

17. John dün   evlen - <u>miš ol - abil - ir</u>
      yesterday
    'John may have gotten married yesterday.'

18. John yaz - a   evlen - <u>miš ol - abil - ir</u>
      summer - dat.
    '(Lit): John may have married (by) next summer.'

What we observe is a very consistent pattern for modals in Turkish. In this respect, Turkish differs from English, for in the latter <u>will have</u> can collocate with future adverbials but <u>may have</u> and <u>must have</u> collocate only with past adverbials, not future adverbials[5].
The use of <u>-(y)EJEK</u> as the presumptive marker in sentences with non-future reference is not limited to matrix clauses. Compare (19) with (20):

19. Mary John - un   šimdi ev   - de   ol - <u>du</u>   - un   - u
               gen. now   home - loc. be - <u>particip.</u> - poss. - acc.

    söyl - üyor
    say - prog.
    'Mary says that John is at home now.'

20. Mary John - un šimdi ev - de   ol - <u>aJa</u> - in - ɨ söyl - üyor
             gen. now home loc. be   poss. acc. say - prog
    'Mary says that John will be at home now.'

In Turkish, <u>that</u>-complements are genetive constructions. They require that the genitive suffix be attached to the subject NP and that the possessive suffix that agrees with the subject in number and person be suffixed to the participle. The participles are <u>-DIK</u> and <u>-(y)EJEK</u> and choice among them is, according to Turkish grammars, governed by tense: "The suffix <u>-(y)EJEK</u> is used when the tense of the corresponding simple sentence is future; the suffix <u>-DIg</u> is used in all other cases." (Underhill 1977:322). In the light of (20) we can see that statements like this are not accurate. The difference between (19) and (20) is clearly not one of time but one of presence vs. absence of presumptive modality.
    Now observe the modal <u>-Ebil</u> in the following:

21. Mary John - un   evlen   -miš   ol - <u>abil</u> - eJe - in - i   söyl - üyor
             gen. get married perf. be <u>may/can</u>   poss - acc. say - prog.
    'Mary says that John may have gotten married (by now).'

22. Mary John - un kɪrk yaš - ɪn - da ol - abil - eje - in - i söyl - üyor
              gen. forty year poss. loc. be may/can   gen. acc. say prog.
   'Mary says that John may be forty years old.'

The modal -Ebil is ambiguous between possibility, ability and permission readings. In utterances like (21) and (22), where the intended meaning is that of possibility, the use of -(y)EJEK as opposed to -DIK is obligatory. That is, whenever -Ebil is used as an epistemic modal, it is -(y)EJEK and not -DIK that occurs in the clause. To put it another way, the ambiguous -Ebil can be interpreted epistemically only when -(y)EJEK is present in the clause. This implies that there is an affinity between epistemic modality and -(y)EJEK, and it supports our claim that -(y)EJEK is not a simple temporal marker.

So far, we have looked at the use of -(y)EJEK in non-future contexts. Let us now consider another context where the analysis of -(y)EJEK as a mere future tense marker fails.

Observe the antecedent clause of the following indicative conditionals:

23. John uyu - r   - sa   čalɪš - abil - ir   - im
       sleep aorist conditional work may/can aorist 1 sg.
   'If John sleeps, I can work.'

24. John evlen   - ir   - se Mary čok sevin - ir
       get married aorist cond.   very be happy aorist
   'If John gets married, Mary will be very happy.'

25. John telefon   ed - er   - se   beš - de tekrar ara   - ma
       telephone make aorist condit. five loc. again look for infinitive

   - sɪn - i söyle
   poss. acc. say
   'If John calls, tell him to call back at five o'clock.'

Notice that the time reference of these antecedent clauses is future (otherwise we would have -(I)yor for 'present' and -DI for 'past': cf. uyu-r-sa 'if he/she sleeps', uyu-yor-sa 'if he/she is sleeping', and uyu-du-ysa 'if he/she slept'), yet we do not find -(y)EJEK. If -(y)EJEK were a simple future tense marker, one would expect it to occur in these clauses.

The absence of -(y)EJEK in (23-25) does not, however, mean that it never occurs in antecedent clauses. Compare (26-27) with (23-24):

26. John uyu - yajak - sa čalɪš - abil - ir - im
       sleep   cond. work   may/can aorist 1 sg.
   'If John is going to sleep I can work.'

27. John evlen - ejek - se Mary čok sevin - ir
       get married   cond.   very be happy aorist
   'If John is going to get married, Mary will be very happy.'

In an antecedent clause, -(y)EJEK implies that the future event is a

result of a present decision, intention, plan, cause, etc. The main
clause is dependent, so to speak, on this present decision etc. and
not on the future event. For example, (27) can be paraphrased as
'If John has the intention of getting married (or has decided to get
married), Mary will be happy.' In other words, Mary will be happy
if it turns out that John has such an intention. In (24), on the
other hand, Mary's happiness is dependent on the actualization of
John's marriage.

It is true that there are cases where the element of intention,
decision, etc. is implied even in the absence of -(y)EJEK. Consider
the following:

28. Araba - n   - ɨ   sat   - ar   - sa - n   ben   al - ɨr   - ɨm
    car   poss. - acc.   sell - aorist - cond. 2 sg.   I   buy - aorist - 1 sg.
    'If you sell your car, I'll buy it.'

29. Araba - n - ɨ sat - ar - sa - n ban - a   haber ver
                             I   dat. news give
    'If you sell your car, let me know.'

The only possible interpretation of (28) is 'If and when you
decide to sell your car, I'll buy it.' Unlike (28), (29) is ambiguous,
it could mean either 'I want to be informed if and when my addressee
sells his car' (i.e., after the selling takes place) or 'I want to be
informed if and when he decides to sell his car.'
There is, however, a crucial difference as to the moment of
decision between (28 - 29) and their counterparts with -(y)EJEK.

30. Araba - n - ɨ   sat - aJak - sa - n ben al - ɨr   - ɨm
      car   poss. acc.   sell   cond 2sg.   I buy aorist - 1 sg.
    'If you are going to sell your car, I'll buy it.'

31. ??Araba - n - ɨ   sat - aJak - sa - n   ban - a   haber ver
      car   poss. acc. sell   cond 2 sg.   I   dat.   news give
    'If you are going to sell your car, let me know.'

In (30 - 31), it is no longer if and when my addressee decides to sell his
car, but rather if he presently has the intention/decision to do that.
I believe (31) is awkward because the consequent clause suggests the
opposite of the antecedent clause, i.e., the consequent clause presupposes
that the addressee is not in a position to tell 'now' whether or not
he has such an intention, but the antecedent clause implies that he is.
Once we change the consequent clause and make it compatible with the
assumptions of the antecedent, (31) becomes perfectly natural.

32. Araba - n - ɨ   sat - aJak - sa - n, söyle
                            say
    'If you are going to sell your car, tell (me).'

The naturalness of (32) as opposed to (31) indicates that -(y)EJEK in
antecedent clauses marks the present intention, decision, etc. of the

future action.

The above hypothesis predicts that, when the verb in the antecedent clause denotes a mental and/or psychological state, -(y)EǰEK would not be appropriate. Normally, no conscious exercise or effort is required for achievement of such states and, therefore, they cannot be planned, programmed or decided upon. The following unacceptable sentences show that this is precisely what we find:

33. ??John Mary - i   sev - eǰek - se   evlen   - ir
                    acc. like   cond. get married aorist
    'If John is going to like Mary, he'll marry (her).'

34. ??John Mary - i   tanɨ   - yaǰak - sa   iš - e   al - ɨr
                      acc. recognize   cond. work dat. take aorist
    'If John is going to recognize Mary, he'll hire (her).'

   Now, consider the following sentences:

35. araba - m - ɨ   sat - aǰak - sa - m   sen al - ɨr   - mɨ   - sɨn?
    car poss. acc. sell   - cond - 1 sg. you buy - aorist - ques. - 2 sg.
    'If I am to sell my car, will you buy (it)?'

36. sɨnav - a   gir - eǰek - se   - m   san - a   haber ver - ir   - im
    exam - dat. enter   cond. - 1 sg. you - dat. news give - aorist 1 sg.
    'If I am to take the exam, I'll let you know.'

When the speaker and the grammatical subject of the antecedent clause are the same person, as in (35 - 36), the use of -(y)EǰEK often implies a quasi-imperative situation in which the speaker is under the command or order of another individual. It is understood that the decision is being made by someone other than the speaker himself. Given our hypothesis for -(y)EǰEK and the semantics of conditionals, it should not be surprising that we get a quasi-imperative interpretation. If -(y)EǰEK indeed marks present intention/decision, as I claim it does, then the decision maker in these utterances can not possibly be the speaker himself. If the speaker is the decision maker, his use of a conditional construction would violate Gricean maxims governing conversation; in particular, the maxim of quantity which states that one should make his contribution as informative as is required. Whether or not we should analyze the quasi-imperative reading of such utterances as conversational implicatures, resulting from the interplay of what is said and the rules of conversation, is beyond the scope of this paper. It should be pointed out, however, that the imperative interpretation of -(y)EǰEK utterances is not restricted to the conditionals. Like English will, -(y)EǰEK is frequently used to give orders or commands.

37. šimdi do:ru yata - a   gid - eǰek - sin
    now straight bed - dat. go   2 sg.
    'Now you will go straight to bed.'

38. ders   - in - i bitir - meden   bu oda - dan čik - mɨ - yaǰak - sɨn
    lesson - poss - acc finish before this room - abl. leave - neg   2 sg.
    'You will not leave this room before you finish your lesson.'

Turning back to conditionals and antecedent clauses, the likelihood of the fulfillment of a condition is perceived to be greater when -(y)EJEK is present than when the aorist morpheme is used. Of course, this is only natural in the light of what is said above. We can say that the fulfillment of a condition expressed in an antecedent clause containing the aorist morpheme is assumed to be merely possible, but in an antecedent clause containing -(y)EJEK, it is assumed to be probable.

Conditional sentences proved once again that -(y)EJEK is not a mere future marker. Futurity in the antecedent clause is not marked by -(y)EJEK. When -(y)EJEK is used, it indicates notions like intention, plan, etc. In the literature, it has been observed that, typically, epistemic modals do not occur in antecedent clauses where other modalities are allowed. The reason for this might be that, since antecedent clauses themselves involve epistemic modality, it would be redundant to employ another epistemic modal operator. In English, for example, may and must are interpreted deontically, marking permission and obligation, respectively, when they occur in if-clauses. The same is true for Turkish. Given this, we now find, once again, a parallelism between -(y)EJEK and other epistemic modals. If a future marker is one type of epistemic modality marker, as we have assumed, then it is predictable that future markers would not be allowed in antecedent clauses; or if allowed, they would show some other semantic function. As we have seen, when -(y)EJEK occurs in an antecedent clause, it expresses intention, decision, etc., which are not strictly epistemic concepts.

Conclusion

Even in a relatively well-studied language like Turkish, there are areas which still require a much more thorough examination. The semantics of the verbal suffix -(y)EJEK is one such area. In this short paper I have tried to show that this suffix has a function in the modal system of the language in addition to its function in the tense system. The modal function of -(y)EJEK has been totally ignored in the literature. I have shown that the atemporal, modal function of this suffix is similar to that of the atemporal function of the future marker of an unrelated language like English. This similarity can not be accidental, and should be assessed in the light of the hypothesis that futurity is as much a modal notion as a temporal one.

Footnotes

1. The capital letters stand for morphophonemic representations

   E: /e, a/   D: /t, d/
   I: /i, ɨ/   K: /k, Ø/

2. Actually, like English must, should, -mElI is ambiguous between epistemic and deontic readings:

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eg. Ahmet šimdi ev - de    ol - malɨ
         now  home - loc. be
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(a) It is necessary that John is at home now (epis).
(b) John is obliged to be at home now (deontic).

With stative verbs, the epistemic reading is more likely; the same is true with perfective and progressive aspect.

3. In both languages, the use of the future marker implies stronger presumption than the necessity operator. Yet, there seem to be differences in the interchangeability of the future marker with the modal in the two languages. It appears that in English, if the assumption is based only on circumstantial evidence, will can not be used. This is not so in Turkish. Sentence (3) demonstrates this difference in that will can not replace must in the English translation.

4. Underhill (1976), Lewis (1975), and Swift (1963) do not even mention such uses of -(y)EJEK and the grammars written by Turkish linguists often spare not more than a sentence or so for these.

5. Hornstein (1977) uses these facts related to the adverbial collocations of modals as arguments for positing two wills. He argues that the fact that will have but not must have or may have can collocate with future adverbials proves that the will of will have is not a modal.

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