"Why Can't I Find It?"
Mining Transparency in Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo

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Abstract:

This research focuses on foreign intervention in the mining sectors of Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), concentrating on the transparency of agreements and regulation, or lack thereof, contributing to the longevity of mining practices and the livelihoods of local citizens. The current state of public information regarding natural resource extraction in both countries creates questions about state motives and investors' economic incentive, with consequences of inequality, human rights offenses, and underdevelopment. Applying Immanuel Wallerstein's world-systems theory, I describe the economic rationale behind global involvement in the region's mining operations and identify potential power imbalances. I use commodity statistics, state documentation, and nongovernmental reports to analyze reporting trends on mining operations. Intergovernmental databases with development statistics also contribute to the research. In this study, I argue foreign intervention in underdeveloped, mineral rich countries does not have to be a purely exploitative relationship as emphasized by Wallerstein's theory, demonstrated through the implementation of international transparency initiatives. These programs, implemented for the benefit of the resource abundant countries like Zambia and the DRC, can increase the accountability of governments and investing companies related to mining activities. Complete reporting on natural resource extraction increases investment values and the development and productivity of the mining industry.

Introduction

Walking into an American mall on a Saturday afternoon, the typical scene greeting the eye involves busy shoppers interspersed with rows of electronic gadgets, sparkling jewelry, and newfangled appliances. With little thought to sourcing, construction, or ethical concerns, consumers buy into the latest fads and go about business as usual, assuming companies and governments deal with the go-between details honorably. However, the process is more complex. Exposed by the media, depicted in films, and protested by nonprofit organizations, the mining of natural resources used to make cherished products has become somewhat controversial recently, yet little is known about it to the average consumer.

The manufacturing of high-demand commodities uses raw materials extracted from specific resource abundant areas of the globe. The geographic region in Central Africa encompassing Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is home to many of the world's most valuable natural resources. As of 2015, the DRC owned an estimated

$24 trillion worth of mineral assets, primarily made up of gold, copper, diamond, coltan, and cobalt deposits ("DR Congo: UN Advises," 2011). Similarly, Zambia, while possessing other resources as well, specializes in copper extraction, holding some of the most productive reserves in the world ("Zambia: Exports," n.d.). Historically and into today, the extreme wealth of natural resources between the two countries entices investors on a global scale, leading to the potential for successful business partnerships, but also dangers of corrupt and manipulative systems of extraction. Prioritizing capitalist self-interests, multinational corporations (MNCs) risk exploiting these resources.

Demand for raw materials to engineer high-value products motivates international interest in resource-rich countries like Zambia and the DRC. Globalization and technological advances in mining and manufacturing during the early twentieth-century coincided with colonial rule in Africa. Colonial powers extracted raw materials from the continent to fulfill European capitalist motives, while also reconstructing the political spheres of African nations. Both countries won independence in the 1960s from European colonizers—Zambia from Britain and the DRC from Belgium—entering a tumultuous (and in the case of the DRC, bloody) period of economic and political adjustment (Sikamo, Mwanza, & Mweemba, 2016; "DR Congo: Chronology," 2009). During this time, in an attempt to regain economic stability and increase international recognition, Zambian and Congolese governments encouraged multinational corporations to engage in mining activities within national borders (Sikamo, Mwanza, & Mweemba, 2016; "DR Congo: Chronology," 2009). Thus began a new boom of foreign investment and involvement in the mining industry, leading to more indirect international infiltration into the economic and political structures of each country. In recent years, as these trends continue, so does resource extraction.

Despite obvious mineral extraction and the development of relationships between foreign companies and the states, a pattern has appeared across the industry: data and statistics about mining activity is incomplete, unbalanced, or completely absent. Gaps in data disclosure allow conflicts and inequalities in the mining sector to fester, enabling powerful companies and governments to exploit both resources and miners. In the DRC, resource smuggling and fraudulent reporting benefit political elites financially, while 71% of Congolese citizens live in extreme poverty ("Executive Summary, DRC," n.d.). Zambia, while not as politically turbulent, also maintains years' worth of gaps in mining statistics ("Commodity Trade Statistics Database," 2017). Speculation about foreign interests affecting the transparency of mining operations—meaning business contracts, revenues, or changes in ownership—raises ethical concerns and questions of legitimacy for investors and consumers. While Zambian and Congolese governments and mining companies see value in transparent reporting, strategic interests take precedence, subsequently dictating the type and amount of data available to the general public.

In this paper, I explore foreign intervention regarding mining operations in Zambia and the DRC, analyzing whether the actions of international transparency initiatives correspond with Immanuel Wallerstein's theoretical idea of relationships between the developed world and its less developed counterparts. The study examines public information involving natural resource extraction and relationships of state governments, international investors, and non-governmental organizations. Wallerstein's world-systems theory conceptualizes the economic rationale behind global involvement in regional mining operations and analyzes foreign intervention in evolving markets. In accordance with the theoretical framework, problems within the mining sector can be attributed to developmental power imbalances. I apply the theory to mines in Zambia and the DRC, two mineral-rich countries with different economic and political environments. The study analyzes mining regulation and public records to identify data gaps and incentivize participation in accountability initiatives. Involvement in transparency programs could improve the value of investments and accountability of the whole mining industry.

I argue foreign intervention in underdeveloped, mineral rich countries does not have to be a purely exploitative relationship, as shown by the implementation of international transparency initiatives. At the onset, I present the economic, social, and political effects of multinational investment in mining natural resources. Next, I introduce world-systems theory and the concept of development in core-periphery relationships, with application to foreign intervention in extracting mineral wealth from Zambia and the DRC. The methods section underlines data collection of mining activities between the two countries and provides analysis of transparency initiatives. Next, I relate world-systems theory to resource extraction in Zambia and the DRC and postulate further to prove a non-exploitative core-periphery relationship is possible. Lastly, I highlight the significance of international accountability programs within the mining industry and show the importance of state and public support to the success of such initiatives.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Economic Effects of Extractive Investments

Within the scope of economics, governments push investor-friendly policies designed to entice foreign involvement through tax incentives and reductions in regulation. Since the structural adjustment period of the 1980s, foreign investments have become economically appealing to many African economies. The privatization of natural resources places more control in the hands of large international firms, therefore limiting the state's ability to monitor resource ownership and management trends. For example, with the emergence of neoliberal economic policies, foreign influence over the Zambian national economy has weakened national stability and bargaining power (Larmer, 2005, pp. 43-44). Global institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank encourage privatization as leverage for debt assistance and financial support (Lungu, 2008, p. 408). To take advantage of foreign capital and maintain economic stability, African states often rely upon natural resource wealth to boost international investment. The privatization of previously state-owned entities plays into the strategy, choosing to privilege outside investors over domestic interests. A public record of investments and contracts adds legitimacy to the industry and could justify continued negotiations between states and external actors.

Based on economic principles, multinational corporations build investments from strategic agreements with intentions of profitability and market expansion. Multinational corporations (MNCs) implement plans to extract resources at the expense of weak national governments, thanks to free market expansion. Within strategic investment agreements, operating countries grant deductions and exemptions to companies who then routinely avoid paying corporate taxes, on the grounds of maintaining these investments for contracted periods of time (Lungu, 2008, p. 407). As profitability comes first, MNCs do not hesitate to interfere in domestic issues or political conflicts to protect shareholder interests, even under the risk of damaging the operating country (Saleem, 2002, pp. 112-113). Large MNCs control power structures and mining securities, creating exploitative systems of resource extraction. Consequentially, by not prioritizing long-term African resource security, multinational investments could jeopardize the stability of African economies. The companies' conflicts of interest could threaten national authority and sustainable economic growth. States can take significant steps towards mitigating companies' conflicts of interest by releasing clear public records of all mining transactions.

The role of the state as the primary driver of political and economic forces becomes increasingly muddied due to the upswing of commercial relationships with foreign companies, according to social scientists. Weakened political institutions coupled with a strong multinational presence do not create a stable view of people-centered sustainable development. The crippling economic effects of the resource curse can be linked to structural shortcomings in bureaucratic institutions (Idemudia, 2009, p. 19). For example, overwhelmingly dependent on oil, Nigeria's economic history demonstrates the state is not equipped with the management capabilities necessary for efficient industry regulation and reform (Idemudia, 2009, pp. 17 and 3). African economies have become substantially dictated by outside interests rather than domestic needs, potentially contributing to an increased lack of stability within national power structures. The complexity of resource relations requires a strong state presence in the face of manipulative interference in order to maintain a sense of national sovereignty and legitimacy.

Additional Effects of Multinational Mining

As previously mentioned, the lack of transparent regulatory frameworks in the mining sector provokes cycles of resource exploitation and social inequalities, according to social scientists. The state and multinational corporations engage in negotiations containing tax breaks and business concessions to incentivize foreign investment, despite the threat of long-term economic degradation. Both parties can undertake responsibility to create and release clear, structured agreements, laying out the details of continued mining projects, particularly in the cases of conflict minerals. Proposals such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) encourage national governments and international corporations to voluntarily commit information about extractive involvement to boost business repute and political legitimacy (Le Billon, 2006, p. 98). With international platforms, civil society groups can push law reform towards initiatives such as EITI to better gauge government expenditures and accountability related to foreign intervention (Lungu, 2008, p. 412) Corrupt mining agreements between state entities and multinational corporations run the risk of inciting ethnic conflict and militant activity, further incentivizing governments to provide complete reporting (Kemp, Owen, Gotzmann, & Bond, 2011, p. 105). With the high concentration of mining activities in the Central African Copperbelt, a lack of transparent regulation can potentially hurt the credibility of international companies and the state. Based on research into social responsibility standards, engagement in policy reforms could increase the accountability of the industry and boost local standards of living. Such research could illuminate problematic patterns within the mining sector and subsequent solutions to improve sustainability.

Company-community relations create the potential for advocacy and social change in the mining industry. With opposing cultural dynamics at play, multinational corporations and affected communities work through various social conflicts and ethnic differences. Facing financial and legal issues, local communities become more assertive with natural resource management. Advocates protest for labor rights and environmental conservation, but often run into strong corporate bureaucracy seeking to silence opposition (Talla, 2010, p. 113). Company-community conflict heightens with management negligence and institutional repression of local protests, especially regarding indigenous lands (Kemp et al., 2011, p. 95). Advocacy is a social tool with the potential to activate transparent regulatory structures within the mining sector. Research into such structural benefits could also support communities affected by foreign mining investments.

Corporate citizenship initiatives have become a trend within the sphere of economics, stemming from grassroots advocacy movements and collective action protests. Participating in constructive development work or engagement projects benefits MNCs, improving community relations and adding legitimacy to investments. For example, the Canadian government has prompted national mining companies to engage in efforts to broaden corporate accountability initiatives and improve human rights records in conflict zones (Le Billon, 2006, p. 106). Other international mining companies have also laid out frameworks for community feedback structures to air mining grievances, with goals to increase local dialogue and resolve disputes (Kemp et al., 2011, p. 94). Current trends in corporate action show a potential for change within the extractive sector, but also emphasize structural imbalances of the capitalist system. The desire for profit runs the risk of dominating social responsibility and consequently continuing a cycle of exploitation at the expense of local livelihoods.

World-Systems: A Critique of Inequality

Within the realm of social science, world-systems theory seeks to clarify social and economic power differentials between countries in varying stages of development. Immanuel Wallerstein (2004) analyzes history and economic markets to highlight inequalities between strong and weak states. Based on the theory, the relationship of the “core” to the “periphery” can appear patronizing, as core states attempt to control the social and economic success of less developed nations. The core, having been developed longer and more substantially, provides a model for the periphery to encourage growth, but also takes advantage of the periphery's lack of development by exhausting peripheral resources. (Wallerstein, 2004, p. 10). World-systems theory critiques the exploitative power relations of the world, predominantly seen in core states (Babones, 2014, p. 5). Such power imbalances can be common in post-colonial African governments and markets. Peripheral states depend upon core states for support, linking peripheral economic and political success to more developed nations. World-systems theory explains exploitative trends in economic relationships between African nations and the West.

More developed states assert expertise, gleaned from years of political and economic shifts in the world-system, upon the less-developed peripheral nations and can subsequently dictate the outcomes of essential domestic elements, such as land, labor, and capital. Foreign economic involvement intensifies the inequalities of core-periphery relationships. Systemic inequalities can be deeply rooted in a colonial past of exploitation and oppression. Western Europe colonized much of what is known as the "Third World," leaving behind a state of underdevelopment explaining current social turmoil (Chirot & Hall, 1982, p. 83). Furthermore, international influence can obstruct development, as the addition of foreign capital into a developing economy could cause potential market manipulation and a corrupt redistribution of wealth and power (Wellhofer, 1995, p. 504). Multinational corporations play a leading role in the exploitative relationships between the core and periphery, extracting benefits from peripheral resources and withdrawing to the core with the profits. As world-systems theory maintains, the global market often supports the economic goals of multinational companies, gaining strength from powerful capitalist-centered nations. Holding MNCs accountable through transparent reporting could create a more equal economic system of exchange, thus lessening chances of social and political tensions in underdeveloped states.

According to world-systems theorists, the core strips the periphery of resources and establishes standards to protect self-interests. Stronger countries are thus able to dictate advantageous trade terms. On the other hand, weak states are unable to fight dominant powers and could lose important aspects of domestic production like labor and capital to the core. The core can assert exploitative power through labor and property regulation, subsequently damaging peripheral economic goals (Wallerstein, 2004, p. 46). Poor economic growth in peripheral nations shows the disproportionate correlation between production and compensation in developing countries. (Wellhofer, 1995, p. 504). International mining companies invested in the Central African Copperbelt epitomize powerful core interests in peripheral environments. World-systems theory illustrates resource and labor exploitation in developing countries.

Within the scope of economics, world-systems theory critiques capitalism. Achieving profitability is the primary objective of capitalist initiatives. In placing profit as the first priority, the concept of unequal exchange characterizes core-periphery relations, described in a theoretical context as the movement of capital from weak regions to strong regions, regardless of the risks of inequality. In the capitalist economy, core nations move means of production to locations of the lowest cost, usually the less developed sectors of the periphery (Wallerstein, 2004, pp. 26-27). International institutions like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund establish development programs to encourage economic investments supporting the capitalist interests of the core (Gowan, 2004, p. 492). An internationally-instigated push towards the privatization of natural resources complements capitalist goals for maximizing profit. Thus, world-systems theory criticizes the economic strategies the core employs for extraction purposes and the consequent exploitation of the periphery. Transparency initiatives could provide a solution to economic discrepancies between the two poles.

DATA AND METHODS

While researching, I utilized official reports from governmental agencies in Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Within the data, I searched for investment patterns and efforts towards transparency through formal documentation of mining projects and agreements between companies and the state. I accessed several governmental databases for each country to find mining news and statistics, such as the Zambia Chamber of Mines and the Ministère des Mines of the DRC. While I primarily used African-sourced documents, I also accessed Section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act from the United States National Archives. I used the part of the document focusing on the transparency of multinational mineral extraction in African regions including the countries of Zambia and the DRC. By using official government reports, I can monitor state response to mining projects and assess the level of public disclosure of mining activities.

To round out the data, I accessed reports and primary data from non-governmental and inter-governmental organizations as well. I utilized the African Power Mining Projects archive, an initiative seeking to provide objective public disclosure of mining projects across the African continent. The files include critical extractive information about forty-seven mines in various regions of Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The data shows significant trends in relation to factors such as private or state ownership, commodity, and amount produced for export. I also utilized studies on mining performance and production from the World Bank to gauge the success of development programs. Non-state affiliated, development-centered organizations like the United Nations and the World Bank collect reliable date through reputable studies, and I found multiple reports on mining activities from these organizations.

To analyze qualitative research, I utilized thematic coding as a principle means of analysis. I read the literature, highlighted potential points of importance, and created data files to store for later application. As many of the Congolese archival sources were only available in French, I created corresponding files in English to prevent potential linguistic confusion. I laid the Zambian and Congolese mining contracts side-by-side to compare the strategic clauses employed by both parties. Thanks to the thematic codes, I discovered the vernacular of the mining industry. I also identified common trends of proactivity regarding company acknowledgment and response to the challenge of sustainability. The patterns I found within the data illustrate the logic of using thematic coding as the primary form of analysis.

Faced with quantitative data, I used a method of summary statistics to narrow down the findings. For example, to analyze the statistics from the African Power Mining Projects database, I organized the information into a specific spreadsheet more relevant to the DRC and Zambia. While the previous report was vast, containing data for over four hundred mines, I restricted the spreadsheet to forty-seven mines, a number more conducive for analysis. I then utilized maps of both countries to create a visual basis of mine concentration. With a smaller number of mines to analyze, I can spot production patterns and differences between the mines in respect to geographic locations. Furthermore, using a strategy of summary statistics for all of the quantitative data, I can more specifically identify comparative trends between Zambia and the DRC.

ANALYSIS

External interests threaten national sovereignty over mineral reserves and the potential for economic wealth, simply by the sheer number of foreign investors. Foreign ownership dwarfs domestically owned companies in the mining sectors of Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Of the forty-seven prominent mines analyzed across the geographic area of both countries, multinational companies own and operate forty, with a majority, if not all of the shares in each mine ("African Mines Project Database," 2010). Mine privatization contributes to this trend, as foreign bidders take precedence during mining negotiations, effectively limiting ownership opportunities by more localized Zambian or Congolese companies (Serlemitsos & Fusco, p. 25). Thus, smaller, nationally-based companies are largely unable to compete for influence and ownership. Privatization, through limiting power to the state and redistributing it to multinational players with capitalist motivations, could increase the risks of domestic problems, such as unemployment and labor inequalities. In a Wallerstein world, MNCs represent influential international actors playing a controlling role in a potentially exploitative relationship between the powerful corporate world and the less powerful mines.

Mining companies investing in Zambia and the DRC, in conjunction with state governments, engage in established initiatives to increase transparent regulation and to address economic discrepancies. However, these initiatives have not been headed by national governments, but by outside institutions seeking to hold the industries accountable. For example, the United Nations General Assembly backed the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), which attempts, through state regulatory requirements, to hold the diamond industry accountable regarding the influx of conflict diamonds into the legitimate trade (*The Role of Diamonds*, 2002). Mining contracts between the Congolese diamond mining company, La Societé Minière de Bakwanga (MIBA), and de Beers Centenary reference a commitment to the certification system in business negotiations, showing adherence to the principles of an established regulatory framework such as the KCPS (*Protocole d'Accord*, 2005). Similarly, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, established in 2003 as the flagship global transparency standard, has incentivized the governments of both Zambia and the DRC to release information about expenditures and any relationships with mining companies to the public ("The EITI Standard 2016," 2016). Efforts toward established regulatory frameworks for transparency, such as the EITI, mostly originate outside the state. Thus, international transparency initiatives attempt to hold both Zambia and the DRC, along with multinational investors, accountable.

Critics could suggest states may actively choose to disregard intervening pressure to implement government transparency programs, citing such decisions could threaten national interests. In the same way multinational companies do not want to release data with potentially negative consequences, states might desire to take a protectionist stance against external inference in national regulatory standards, particularly regarding mining. For example, in conflict-ridden countries such as the DRC, to release information detrimental to particular ethnic factions carries the potential to instigate tensions seemingly much greater than publishing revenue numbers (Kemp et al, 2011, p. 105). Furthermore, foreign direct investment inflows account for $1.7 billion worth of both the Congolese and Zambian GDP ("General Profile: DRC," 2015; "General Profile: Zambia," 2015). Consequently, foreign economic power invested in the mining sector of Zambia and the DRC could overshadow the states' commitment to ethical business practices and transparent industries. This tendency increases the importance of international pressure for transparency. To accommodate states' refusal to provide details on mining revenue and activity would reiterate the exploitative core-periphery relationship world-systems theory proposes.

International transparency legislation challenges world-systems' description of manipulative core-periphery interactions. A Wallerstein view would expect transparency initiatives to pursue self-interests while taking advantage of Zambian and Congolese mining actors seeking to comply with the implemented criteria for reporting. Yet, programs act only to increase data accessibility to the public. In 2015, the Ministère des Mines of the DRC, in adherence with EITI standards, released 126 mining contracts and official documents to the public through the ResourceContracts.org database (Okenda, Pedersen, Toledano, & Young, 2017). The Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment and Natural Resource Governance Institute began this initiative in 2015, supported by the World Bank and United Kingdom's Department for International Development. The program promotes a platform of "general data accessibility for all" and aims to accommodate corporate, media, and governmental goals for due diligence in reporting ("OpenLandContracts.org," n.d.). While focusing on transparency issues within the DRC, this international initiative and other likeminded programs do not seek to exploit the host countries Wallerstein would label "peripheral." As the database's mantra states, the objectives of such programs are purely to educate and raise awareness of statistical discrepancies.

Skeptics of this interpretation might question the motives of inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) seeking to promote transparency of mining operations. The risk of an institution playing the role of savior and claiming technological or infrastructural superiority to teach less developed countries would fit with Wallerstein's key theoretical components of core-based exploitation. Also, as MNCs act with self-interests in mind, both in regard to reporting and tangible mineral extraction, a similar skepticism of NGOs' objectives for releasing information is valid. For example, as of 2017, over ninety global financial institutions actively support EITI's mining revenue disclosure platform, leading to potential postulations of the organization's monetary conflicts of interest ("Investors' Statement on Transparency," 2015). Similarly, non-governmental organizations often carry the burden of taking a top-down understanding of development situations into projects, consequentially becoming more of a hindrance than a help to underdeveloped countries ("The Status of Human Rights," n.d.). While recognizing the possibility of an occasional outlier, non-governmental organizations involved in mining transparency prioritize ethical interests and logic to advocate for public disclosure. Tangible statistics and evidence of governmental and investor cooperation in these programs prove the validity of such a cause.

International non-governmental organizations challenge multinationals' selective release of data about mining activities. NGO and IGO-initiated programs seek to hold multinational corporations accountable through regulation of mineral extraction. As both actors are parts of the developed core, the battle between the two takes pressure off the relationship between core and periphery, shifting the tension to the core. Since the implementation of EITI standards in 2008 and subsequent reports on tax policy in Zambia, the Zambian Mining Code has reintroduced corporate income tax and decreased royalty rates, creating a more equitable mining sector (Baxter et al. 2016). The EITI, a product of the Norway-based EITI Association, has goals to strengthen and keep governments accountable in the extractive sector ("Governance of the EITI," n.d.). By challenging potentially exploitative foreign interests in Central African mining, international efforts for transparency illustrate a commitment to addressing problematic power imbalances in the industry. Wallerstein's theory maintains capitalist interests will insure core dominance at the expense of developing economies, but these "core versus core" interactions between MNCs and NGOs introduce another non-exploitative relationship, beneficial to developing countries.

Even if transparency programs originate outside the realms of the state, the consequential outcomes of such initiatives can be beneficial and encouraging to localized efforts for mining transparency. With multinational economic interests dictating state policy and publicity, small-scale initiatives can collaborate with externally based transparency programs for a mutually beneficial relationship. For example, the Carter Center, based in the United States, partners with an independent research association, Moabi DRC, to work with various civil society groups, governments, and private organizations to document mining activities in rural regions of the DRC. The project has accumulated over 800 reports in the Congo Mines database ("Virtual Information Portal," n.d.). In Zambia, the Publish What You Pay coalition, or PWYP (also active in the DRC), unites fourteen Zambian civil society organizations to supplement EITI records and initiate collective action against discrepancies in reporting ("Publish What You Pay," n.d.). The relationships between internationally based organizations such as the Carter Center and PWYP show cooperative methods of dealing with shortfalls in transparency. Working in accordance with small-scale projects to address accountability problems within the mining sector, NGOs and IGOs can use advanced platforms to highlight industry issues and local grievances.

Advocates for maintaining state credibility could argue against the state's responsibility for initiating national transparency proposals if other reputable legislation was adequate. Post-privatization, individual investors own many of the mines between Zambia and the DRC, reducing state ownership. Thus, advocates raise a viable question of the nation's need to regulate the industry with state resources, financial or otherwise. Since legislative changes in 1995, Zambia's Mining Code has limited governmental intervention to a regulatory role rather than participatory to coincide with the changes in state to private ownership (Ndulo, 2013). The Democratic Republic of Congo took a similar position in 2008, citing financial feasibility in relation to liberalization in the mining sector as reasoning for moving to a more regulatory position in the industry (Journal Officiel de la République Démocratique du Congo, 2008). Yet, while both countries have chosen indirect roles in the extractive sector, mining activities and revenue directly impact national governments and citizens. Thus, the states have a responsibility to produce transparent data about national and corporate agreements. With this argument in mind, state-initiated transparency efforts are just as necessary as externally initiated regulatory frameworks.

MNCs and the governments of investing nations have undergone pressure for public disclosure of mining activities, enough to create requirements for mineral importation and mining agreements. The push for transparency shows a value of public disclosure is not limited to local citizens. Section 1504 of the American legislation commonly referred to as the Dodd-Frank Act lays out explicit clauses of "public availability of information" for American companies to comply with when negotiating mining contracts, requiring complete disclosure of financials, time, and logistics of the project per annum (*Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform,* p. 847). Without these records, discrepancies in reporting can allow for potential economic damage. For example, the current Mining Code in the Democratic Republic of Congo allowed for a loss of 1.36 billion U.S. dollars between 2010 and 2012, due to a lack of reporting between Canadian Banro Corporation and the Congolese president. (Müller-Koné, 2015, p. 156). Global pressure to release mining documents creates an accountability structure with the potential to uncover and rectify financial losses. These disclosures paired with formal state regulation of mineral extraction would improve the nature and efficiency of mining investments.

As legislation such as the Dodd-Frank Act suggests, regulatory efforts to publicize mining activity is in the best interests of the investing multinational companies. Legally obligated to provide risk assessment for investors, MNCs must provide public records of business transactions. To balance responsibility, Zambian and Congolese governments could argue the necessity for more corporate involvement in reporting, subsequently shifting some obligation to mining companies. For example, of the five companies invested in the nine largest mines in Zambia, three have published reports available to the public, and all three companies are based outside of Zambia, showing a lack of domestic reporting ("African Mining Project Database," 2010). Also, based on a 2015 statement of support to EITI, ninety-three international investing companies recognize the value of transparent reporting in the extractives sector ("Investors' Statement on Transparency," 2015). With the legal and corporate requirements at hand, companies should push for transparency within the sector. Declarations such as the aforementioned set a corporate standard for other companies to strive towards. Collaborative efforts between MNCs and national governments to increase transparency could increase the scope and productivity of such programs.

Taking part in transparency initiatives such as EITI increases the international credibility of states, inviting continued investments. Mining companies hope for a favorable, risk-averse financial environment for investors. Operating in fifty-two countries around the world, EITI compliance offers a globally recognized standard for transparency, incentivizing countries and companies to become affiliated with the program. The program has increased reporting on mining activities, seeing marked progress in participation. In the seven years since the DRC committed to EITI membership, the number of reporting companies in the extractive sector (oil, gas, and mining) has increased 450%, from 26 companies to 118, leading to higher reported revenues as well ("Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative," n.d.). EITI holds multinational corporations accountable by essentially peer pressuring competitors into releasing mining statistics and matching the data with numbers released by state governments to uncover financial discrepancies ("Frequently Asked Questions," n.d.). Well-established transparency initiatives, often originating in core states, possess the leverage to keep multinational corporations accountable to investors and the host countries. As emphasized by EITI's success, non-governmental organizations can prove beneficial to peripheral nations through the implementation of effective mining disclosures.

DISCUSSION

Accountability in the Mining Sector

Multinational investment in the extractive industries in Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo instigates a cycle of resource exploitation used mainly for the benefit of investment companies in already developed nations. MNCs originate from developed capitalist countries and are better equipped to infiltrate and manipulate markets rich in natural resources. With the privatization of mines in both countries, the regulatory role of the state becomes convoluted and less defined, thus giving more control to mining corporations. As foreign companies statistically dominate mine ownership in both countries, mineral exploitation can be threatening to domestic livelihoods. The movement of capital and resources from the periphery to the core is a characteristic of Wallerstein's world-systems theory. Consistent with world-systems theory, movement of mineral wealth from the peripheral economies to core-dominated, international markets leaves the economies of countries like Zambia and the DRC dependent upon investing companies. Without significant state involvement in the regulation and surveillance of the industry, mining companies can continue the cycle of resource exploitation.

The protocol for disclosing information about mining activities in both countries also follows a trend of core-periphery relationships within world-systems theory: the mimicry of the core's economic strategies by periphery states. Actors outside the physical borders and regulatory trajectory of the state instigate the majority of legislation geared towards producing transparency of mining operations through inter-governmental platforms like the United Nations and World Bank or through independent research think-tanks. Mining companies, typically located in developed countries, are legally compelled to release statistical reports, and therefore must instigate programs reporting on mining activities as well. As world-systems theory also critiques capitalism, the reports of mining companies also reflect capitalist objectives of profit and market expansion first, before focusing on the needs and development of local communities. Representing the core, these developed organizations are supposed to provide models of transparency initiatives for mineral-rich states like Zambia and the DRC to replicate. MNCs and other reporting organizations instigate the already established protocol for public disclosure in these states and expect compliance.

The mining sector's privatized structure grants companies direct control of mining activities but leaves regulatory responsibilities to the state. Amid highly concentrated foreign involvement in the industry, an orchestrated effort for operational transparency by Zambian and Congolese governments would build state accountability. Several significant programs focused on promoting the availability and accessibility of public mining data have engineered the support of both states but originate outside national borders and jurisdiction. While cooperating with initiatives like EITI, neither state shows a clear intention of creating a nationally established push towards regulatory programs designed for transparency. The lack of economic statistics, historical records, and reports available to interested consumers on archival and government websites introduces postulations of state passivity on the topic of mining reporting. With current international critiques of the political policies and competencies of both countries, but particularly the DRC, initiatives to fully disclose mining activities and address problems in the industry would increase credibility in international eyes and improve the sustainability of the mining sector. Subsequently, more complete reporting could improve the success rates of research and development initiatives in the regions.

Advocacy for Proactive Regulatory Reforms

The national governments of Zambia and the DRC should proactively monitor reporting on mining activities. While the state's role in the industry has shifted to more of a regulatory nature, neither nation has instigated governmental policies to keep multinational corporations in check through transparent legislation about mining operations. Independent researchers and NGOs recognize the potential for corporate, capitalist influences of multinational companies upon mining legislation and resource extraction. The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative incentivizes many countries worldwide, including Zambia and the DRC, to annually release data regarding foreign investment in the mining sector ("Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Institute," 2016). The reports highlight tax code and legal agreements between state governments and mining companies in order to analyze mine ownership but have historically run into obstacles to full disclosure ("Rapport annuel d'avancement," 2015). By researching mine ownership, an internationally prominent program such as EITI requires the state to scrutinize the practices of mining companies. Non-governmental publication of industry research and statistics should motivate state governments to investigate potential regulatory loopholes and shady business agreements in the mining industry.

Investors and consumers should hold multinational corporations accountable for operations in Zambia and the DRC, demanding the release of mining contracts and company decisions for public scrutiny. With social pressure from shareholders, companies may see value in releasing clear mining data. Thus, motivating civil society to pressure MNCs to release potentially incriminating data about mining operations would advance consistent standards for transparency. External interests drive corporate action and social policy in these countries more than domestic concerns (Amuwo, 2009). Similarly, while this research shows trends of production from internationally originated transparency initiatives like EITI, the programs tend to prioritize and praise Western goals for accountability, even if inapplicable to many African societies (Idemundia, 2009). A demand for MNC accountability ought to come from the shareholders the companies seek to impress. Transparent data accompanies a smart investment and MNCs should recognize the value of releasing all data to the public. Consequently, the companies may instigate development or change the trajectory of mining projects to further satisfy consumers.

Regardless of economic benefits stemming from MNC investments, Zambia and the DRC should recognize the value of transparent reporting and choose to prioritize the publishing of complete mining data. If this study's argument is valid and the release of information about mining activities constitutes a battleground between corporate interests and non-governmental agendas, the states develop mining policies to balance both arguments. As foreign companies own forty of the forty-seven major mines between the two countries, Zambia and the DRC could appear shackled to multinational interests rather than domestic needs, based on state revenue and export statistics ("African Power Mines Project Database," 2010). The nations also depend upon the aid and research of non-governmental organizations but are able to maintain sovereign control due to a wealth of natural resources and expectant investors seeking profit, as evident by the trends leading to foreign mine ownership within the borders of Zambia and the DRC (Le Billon, 2006, pp. 95-96). Transparent reporting should become a normative practice within the mining sectors of both countries to showcase national control despite the involvement of foreign actors, like multinational mining companies. The credibility of the state, in respect to local populations and the world, would increase, as would mining sustainability and development.

CONCLUSION

Foreign interests influence Zambian and Congolese economies, dictating mineral extraction through mine ownership and attempting to control the publication of mining data. However, international interests do not necessarily have to take an exploitative stance as Immanuel Wallerstein's theory suggests. The transferal of power and mine ownership from the state to multinational companies has permitted resource exploitation, and NGOs and IGOs informally regulate the industry by creating standards for publishing otherwise missing data. By way of establishing transparency initiatives to make mining revenue and data accessible to the public eye, these external actors seek to benefit the mining sector, the workers, and the host countries through clear reporting. Investors and consumers in the developed world also benefit from comprehensive data and can push to hold multinational corporations and governments accountable through advocating for transparent mining reports. The mining industry in Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo, while struggling to maintain economic, social, and political credibility, can take steps to address issues in the industry through efforts to increase transparent reporting across the sector.

Furthermore, a subsequent study could investigate the effects of transparency programs upon local development and the frequency of mining reforms. With an increase in transparent data available to investors, consumers, and miners, an accompanying change in the environment can be expected. The research could take a case study approach, analyzing the communities surrounding specific mines or within particularly mineral-dense regions. On-the-ground interviews and news reports from local miners and families would illustrate whether specific developmental changes within communities occurred over time due to the implementation of a specific transparency standard such as EITI. Regarding the current study, research into the tangible effects of transparency programs could further incentivize countries and companies to engage in such initiatives. Similarly, if the Zambian and Congolese governments recognized a correlation between community development and mining transparency, state support for clear reporting could increase and subsequently benefit the industry. With collaborations for research and development between NGOs, state governments, and MNCs, mining in the Central African Copperbelt could improve, from the bottom-up. Then, as shoppers worldwide peruse aisles lined with glittering gadgets, they could have confidence in the integrity of the products, stemming from transparent, accessible information about sourcing and production. With this result, even Wallerstein could add an exception to his rules.

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