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The Crisis of 1816/17: Replacing Redemptioners with Passengers on the Atlantic

The aftermath of the 1816/17 migration of Germans to Philadelphia fundamentally re-shaped the future of migration between German Europe, indeed continental Europe, and the United States. It was this episode that brought an abrupt end to the redemptioner system of migration between the German states and North America, and which ultimately paved the way for competitive passenger systems of the 19th century. On the European side, the crisis produced legislation across the continent and its ports that excluded those unable to pay for their passage to America, effectively ending the supply of redemptioners themselves. On the American side, the crisis was followed by a number of contextual factors that damaged demand for redemptioner labour among any who still tried, within the confines of new legal structures, to reproduce the system. From 1818 onwards, the prospects of selling redemptioner labour in the United States were dubious. Economic conditions were deteriorating, and convoluted attempts at sale of redemptioner labour in territories where it was not a labour institution were problematic. The system that had been fundamental for German passage to America for three generations, was over. When German emigration began to re-emerge in the late 1820s, a succession of subsequent legal parameters were put in place in Atlantic ports that proved decisive in ensuring that paying passengers would be the only realistic option for ship owners from the 1820s onwards. This paper examines these factors, exploring for the first time the legislative endeavours across Europe in the dozen years after the crisis that transformed transit from its 18th century conventions to its 19th century model.

Legislation, 1817

The factors that caused the 1816–17 emigration crisis from German Europe are far better explored than the factors which ended that movement. Weather extremes, post-Napoleonic economic hardship, war-weariness, religious connections and recruiting activity have all been examined.¹ The reasons for the movement ending are sometimes less specific. The general lack of shipping in comparison to the volume of migrants, leading to failure and their destitute return home from around mid-1817, is sometimes cited.² The general expending of migratory energy by mid-1817 and improved harvests that year and the following are also mentioned. Some literature, however, mentions the enforcement of Dutch legislation in June 1817 as a significant factor. In fact, when examined in light of the migration flow, this legislation appears to be decisive. Faced with an escalating humanitarian crisis in Amsterdam, on 12 June 1817, Dutch authorities began to enforce legislation that required migrants to have a valid contract in hand, with a ‘reputable Dutch shipper’ if individuals were to gain entry at the border.³ The strength of the Dutch legislation was reinforced by Prussian legislation—covering the tract of land between the Netherlands and the emigration states of Baden and Württemberg—which denied south Germans transit through Prussian territory unless they had sufficient cash and official passports.⁴ Migrant testimony from mid-June attests to the enforcement of border rules, with 200 Gulden in cash required per adult creating a major blockage on the path to the Netherlands.⁵ From February to May 1817 there had been 1,290 declared departures for the USA on average each month from Württemberg. In June, at the mid-point of which the Dutch border closed to unorganised emigration, that number almost precisely halved, to 640.⁶ By July, departures had virtually ceased, numbering just 30.⁷ After that, the authorities stopped recording the event.

Reserves of emigrants and their abuse in Amsterdam

The timing of border legislation in mid-June 1817 thus appears to be the most immediate cause for the cessation of departures out of Baden and Württemberg, the two states which had provided the bulk of emigrants during the crisis.⁸ It was the beginning of the end of the crisis, and the system—redemptioner passage on credit—upon which the migration surge had been based.⁹ This legislation did not, however, solve the immediate problem of those who were still stranded in Amsterdam, who had largely expended their credit, and were in dire conditions. The worst abuses of the crisis, in terms of vessel overcrowding and under-provisioning were reserved for mid 1817

onwards, in cases such as the ships *Hope* and *April*, and were testament to the desperation of those who had become stranded, and the unscrupulous practices of those exploiting that desperation.

There were also effects of the Dutch legislation further afield. Once Dutch ports became difficult to access without pre-arranged passage contracts or cash, migrants began to seek other alternatives. As Andrew Zonderman has pointed out, in the later 18th century, Hamburg had begun to engage in redemptioner trading and it was to this port that groups of Württembergers began to drift in order to seek available ships. On July 23, 1818, Hamburg authorities reacted by reiterating mandates first issued in 1792, and then 1795, that 'groups arriving here by land or water seeking emigration will not be admitted, but returned to the border'.¹⁰ For urban authorities in north European ports, the crisis of 1816/17 was a crisis of unsupported foreign aliens, and that crisis had caused authorities in principal departure ports to seal off entry for speculative emigration.

Such legislation was by no means novel. When flows of redemptioner traffic had originally begun to increase in the late 1730s, Dutch authorities had implemented a series of measures to ensure that unsponsored aliens did not arrive en-masse in the Netherlands. By 1738, arriving migrants had to provide the name of a merchant who would stand as surety for their stay in the Netherlands. Organising brokers of the redemptioner trade arranged for passes to be given out by the thousand at the border in order to comply with this rule.¹¹ The critical difference between 1816/17 and the peak of the redemptioner trade between the 1730s and 1760s was that the final episode was entirely ad-hoc, and lacked the organisational oversight of large scale commercial brokers. The persistent traders of the mid 18th century were gone, and with them, so had the maintenance (and enforcement) of transit structures. In 1816 and 1817, whilst some merchants and boatmen offered to bring passengers directly to a waiting vessel, many recruiters and Rhine river shippers simply offered to take people into the Netherlands, where they might then try their luck in seeking passage with any captain who would take them.¹² Some recruiters offered tickets for vessels in Amsterdam that didn't even exist.¹³ Because the border enforcement and legal framework of transit migration had atrophied in the intervening generations, this speculative approach 'worked' (at least for Rhine boatmen) until active measures were taken in June 1817. The precedent of renewed legislation and of the 1816/17 crisis experience then led to short-lived attempts at rejuvenating organised redemptioner passages. These were critically undermined by developments across the Atlantic.

Last Attempts

In 1818, the American economy entered a period of recession, as the post-war boom in import-export exchange with Europe, particularly Britain, swung to bust as a result of financial speculation.¹⁴ In well-developed regions such as Pennsylvania, which had absorbed the first waves of German emigrants in 1816 and 1817, and which were well-exposed to economic fluctuations, labour demand slowed. From 1818, whilst the sale of female house servants in Philadelphia persisted, the sale of redemptioners as rural labour in the back country had slowed.¹⁵ The sale of redemptioners beyond Pennsylvania became more common, and more complicated. Sales of German redemptioner contracts spread into the surrounding states of New York, Ohio, New Jersey and Maryland, but also spread as far afield as Virginia, North Carolina and Alabama territory.¹⁶ These sales were often the result of ‘soul driving’, wherein batches of labour contracts were bought at the harbourside and large groups driven into territories further afield to be sold at higher prices.¹⁷ On occasion, as was the case in frontier Ohio, a well-organised system of redemptioner use, organised around German immigrant entrepreneurs, worked.¹⁸ However, away from the well-developed customs of Pennsylvania, where redemptioner labour had long functioned as an informal economic institution, the selling of contracts often proved difficult. The German Society of Maryland was at pains to demonstrate that redemptioner labour had no formal legal basis, other than the financial debt owed by the passenger, which could be obviated through claims of insolvency at a debtors court.¹⁹ Whilst many emigrants lacked the legal representation to pursue such a course, some simply refused to honour contracts, and found that courts ruled in their favour, as happened with a group of 22 redemptioners when attempts were made to sell their labour in Tennessee, a state with little precedent for the model.²⁰

Within the context of changing European law, these conditions were important. Because the reinstatement of European port laws effectively closed speculative redemptioner debarkations from mid-1817 onwards, once the well of available passengers in port had finally dried up, attempts to get credit-based passengers on to vessels required significant sponsorship, in order to cover transit conditions. However, the changing market and legal contexts in the U.S. often rendered these more organised attempts ruinous. In 1819, 385 Württembergers travelled from Antwerp to Philadelphia under a credit arrangement with private investors. They refused to sign indentures, rendering their promissory notes worthless. The creditors lost 4,000 dollars and were ruined.²¹ This was one case among many. Investors like Ludwig Gall from Trier on the Moselle, and Ferdinand Ernst, the former owner of a large estate near Hannover, had paid the passages of 15 and 94 people, respectively,

also in 1819. Upon arrival in Philadelphia, Gall's prospective servants found themselves surrounded by a group of German Americans who told them they were "free as the air," because their contracts possessed no validity under U.S. law.²² Gall was forced to return to Germany.

Further disasters occurred during attempts to sell redemptioner labour in New Orleans in 1820 and 1821. Compounding these difficulties were expensive new legislative requirements created by the U.S. passenger Act of 1819. A direct reaction of the destitution and public burden that vessels such as the *Hope* had caused, the legislation was designed to improve sanitary conditions and limit abuses of arriving migrants. Passed on 2nd March, 1819, the Act stipulated that a ship must not carry more than 2 passengers per 5 tonnes burthen. The passenger laws also stipulated the level of provisions that a vessel had to carry, with captains fined the amount of \$3 per passenger per day—payable to the passenger—for the duration of time that any passenger was placed on ration.²³ Whilst U.S. enforcement of the law was not necessarily stringent, its conditions would soon become an important element in European shipping strategies.

For European ship brokers, the incentive to carry redemptioner labour after 1817 had disappeared. Organised attempts to provision ships and pay captains to transport migrants became a high risk strategy, because the sale of redemptioner labour in the U.S. was a dubious prospect, and the moneys fronted per passenger to get them across borders and on to ships might not be recovered.

The New Legal Form of Migration

The next time European emigration began to surge, further tightening of laws ensured that there would be no opportunity to carry passengers on credit at all. The legal steps taken in 1817, 1818 and 1819 set a precedent for successive legislative measures across Europe over the next dozen years which further tightened access to major ports to those with the ability to pay for their emigration at the point of departure. One by one, all major border crossings and ports providing German migrants with access to the Atlantic erected significant monetary and ticketing stipulations regarding through-migration and port access. Once this became the case, for recruiters and shippers, there was no further incentive to construct credit-based contract systems for German emigrants. If legal parameters made sure that only paying customers could begin the migration process, the onus for business became the sale of valid tickets in the hinterland, at or near the point of departure - a critical model in 19th century emigrant shipping. Indentured labour did not, of course, disappear as a supply mechanism in some areas of the U.S. and

among other ethnic groups, particularly east Asian labour into California, but for German migrants and European shippers, a dozen years of legislation that followed the shock of 1816-17 would determine the shape and practice of new passenger transit for the coming century.

Once the post war economic and ecological shocks of the 1816/17 period had receded, the demand for emigration slowed for much of the next decade. However, in 1828, migration again suddenly arose from south west German states, notably Württemberg, where successive heavy harvests had initially allowed the peasant economy to recover, but subsequently created low price levels that led to high numbers of farm insolvencies.²⁴ The revolutionary foment of 1830 and further economic difficulty then accelerated emigration into a distinct movement, becoming a surge from multiple German regions in 1832. Authorities in states across Europe reacted immediately with a raft of measures that combined and tightened the key elements of exclusive legislation enacted in 1817 and 1818, creating highly stringent criteria for would-be migrants who intended to access the United States.

The Legal form of New Migration

In 1828, at the first sign of renewed movement, officials in the Netherlands instated a new, stringent law, requiring a fully paid ticket for the entire Atlantic passage, in hand, at the Dutch border, alongside a passport and a certificate from the Dutch consul within the migrants' home territory.²⁵ The requirement of a paid ticket was a significant moment in the history of the European migrant business. It became a standard stipulation in all major continental ports, and meant that brokers had to have agents and ticketing offices placed within migrant communities and regions in order to retail tickets and organise the attendant official paperwork. In future, the organisation and capture of emigrant business would require emigrant brokerages as formal businesses, stationed at nodal points in the migration route.

During the late 1820s, the French port of Le Havre also emerged as viable outlet for south west German migrants to the New World. The port was the major continental entrepôt for American cotton, and ran a regular trade between New Orleans, New York and France. As the French textile industry developed in Alsace, empty cotton wagons returning to port became a favourable trail for German emigrants in the neighbouring Palatinate, Baden and Württemberg. As emigration accelerated, the potential problem of destitute migrants becoming stranded in France began to worry the French Minister of the Interior. In 1830, he sent circulars to consuls in regions of out-migration stipulating that U.S.-bound migrants needed a visa from the

French consul, which could only be obtained if the applicant possessed 200 Florins (fl).²⁶ In 1836 this was amount was doubled to 400, and 200 for children, and, on top of cash, border entry also mandated possession of a ticket in-hand, as with Dutch legislation.²⁷

In 1832 Bremen followed the same pattern. The 1832 'Conditions for Passengers to the United States of America' stipulated that 'only passengers who have their passage money in cash, and have paid ticket deposits . . . will be accepted,' whilst those not meeting these criteria would be 'immediately sent back to their homeland'.²⁸ The amount of cash was stated as 244 Florins per emigrating adult, and 100fl per child, meaning that a family of 4 would need 688fl in cash to enter the port, a sum of money that, left in reserve after all transit costs from home to harbour, excluded all but the most solvent potential migrants.²⁹ These sums were notably higher than actual ticket prices, typically 70–80fl, and would thus meet the post-1817 assurance that migrants would not become public charges in the port. In 1832, Hamburg once again re-iterated its legislation banning migrant from entering the city in groups, a strategy which was designed to reduce transiting individuals to a trickle.

Future Directions

The implementation of post-1817 laws served different strategic purposes for the ports in which they were enacted. For ports such as Hamburg, which had a flourishing trade with Britain, they were designed only as exclusive measures, with no great interest existing in emigration. Similarly in the Netherlands, where trade was concentrated on domestic connections with the East Indies, the laws were exclusive measures against a trade in which there was little local interest.³⁰ The French laws were a symbol of both restriction and indifference. However, whilst some maintained their policies as purely exclusive measures, others recognised what the new requirements represented. If migrants entering ports were solvent, with cash and tickets in hand, they represented a tremendous business opportunity. As Torsten Feys has demonstrated, it was in those port cities that combined efforts to exclude insolvent migrants, whilst cultivating the business of solvent, paying customers, that a new boom in migrant shipping arose, determining the routing and structure of the European passenger trade, and of the German American immigrant.³¹ The exemplar of this tactic was the city of Bremen. It was followed by Antwerp, and, eventually, Hamburg.

The Bremen laws of 1832 were focused not only on vessel regulation, but famously provided regulation for the entire passenger trade.³² Consciously modelled after the 1819 U.S. Passenger Act, the *bremische* laws held shippers

to the condition of 2 passengers per 5 tons, with sufficient, free provisions in food and water to last 90 days at sea.³³ This was comfortable redundancy on an average voyage time of 60 days. Recognising that emigration was a growing trade, and that the city's new deep water dock at Bremerhaven had proven immediately popular with migrants from 1830, the legislation was designed to give the port a competitive edge in the growing trade. Moreover, in order to organise the transit, paperwork and financial readiness of potential migrants, the city authorities were the first to comprehend the advantage and logic of placing emigration brokerages at significant points in the German interior. By 1832 brokerages for *bremische* shippers were already open in Frankfurt, Darmstadt, Gießen, Mosbach am Neckar, Karlsruhe and Stuttgart, with early advertising and co-ordination spearheaded by the broker Carl Traub and merchant shipper C.L. Wenk.³⁴ The subsequent success of Bremen in the German migrant trade need not be told here, but it is important to note that where Bremen's lead in passenger care was followed, most notably Antwerp in the later 1840s, and in Hamburg through the private endeavours of the Hamburg Amerika Line [HAPAG] from 1847, large flows of emigration were subsequently directed. The example of HAPAG was especially important. By-passing the city's still-out-dated laws which did not care for migrants, HAPAG's guaranteed superior treatment, whilst adopting the pre-paid ticketing model—organized through rural brokerages—marked the point at which state legislation emanating from 1817 had fully evolved into private market practice shaping emigration commerce.³⁵ Put another way, the market had adopted legal parameters as best practice, and used those parameters to pursue business.

Historiographically, the enforcement of post-1817 German migrant legislation is often questioned.³⁶ It is unclear how stringently borders were enforced, and there is evidence of clandestine smuggling which allowed individuals and families to circumvent rules and necessary paperwork, especially for Le Havre.³⁷ However, it was clearly in the interests of ship owners, and port cities themselves, that the rules were generally observed. In-land brokerages ensured guaranteed paying custom for shippers, and individuals reaching ports with cash reserves represented an excellent market for local services, a situation heavily capitalised upon in Bremen. In simple business terms, it made far greater sense for the industry to operate on the right side of the law rather than the wrong side of it. It is perhaps not at all coincidental that German immigration to America from around 1830 to 1845 is historically classed as the 'middle-class' generation of immigrants, constituted of small landowning classes of the South West, and the individual adult emigrant from the North West, who later remitted funds for his family.³⁸ In short, it was a generation that necessarily had the means to pay for

migration, a product of the changed environment produced by the aftermath of 1817. Empirical data in the case-study village of Ölbronn, discussed later in this volume by Konstantin Huber, shows how sharp the contrast became.³⁹ Beyond this generation, remittances and assisted emigration (especially in the crisis era of 1846–54) rapidly re-opened opportunities for emigration among poorer elements of society, which had otherwise closed with the redemptioner system.

One of the most critical legacies of the 1816–17 crisis was thus to fundamentally transform the way in which German immigrants reached America. The humanitarian crisis in the Netherlands in the middle of 1817 inspired a series of legislative measures over the next decade and half that not only ended the 18th century model of transportation, but determined the lines within which 19th century passage would operate. The problem of thousands of destitute migrants in Amsterdam in 1817 caused a re-iteration of old laws that were designed to prevent the ad-hoc arrangement of speculative passage on credit. Deteriorating relations between the Netherlands and Prussia, through which access to the Low Countries was gained, caused Prussia to instigate cash border stipulations that would become a fundamental element in European cross-border transit over the following years. The destitution with which the highly exploited migrants of late 1817 and 1818 reached the U.S. caused the American government to regulate the immigrant trade for the first time in 1819, drafting legislation that would soon provide a standard for competitive shipping. The economic fall-out of the post-war era then made convoluted attempts to continue redemptioner sales unprofitable. Even when conditions in the U.S. recovered, there was no incentive to re-create any complex, credit-based trade, because when migration re-emerged between 1828 and 1832, European ports quickly reacted by tightening laws that ensured migrants would be solvent, fare-paying customers. These laws were a boon to ports such as Bremen that grasped the commercial opportunities of the changed trade. Ironically, it was here, on the European side, in Bremen and Bremerhaven, that the U.S passenger Act of 1819 had its greatest impact, by setting the bar in a 'race to the top' in shipping standards.⁴⁰ The answer to why the German redemptioner trade ended, is that transit laws across Europe from 1817 onward made it very difficult for the insolvent to reach ports, and American conditions in 1818–19 made it a ruinous commercial risk to help them do so.

These legislative measures, between 1817 and 1832, not only prevented the re-occurrences of the redemptioner trade, but had far reaching consequences for the system of international migration from continental Europe. They determined the socio-economic makeup of the next generation of German immigrants into the United States. Those that followed predecessors from

1817 were far more likely to be farmers than disenfranchised tradesmen and labourers, who had typically made use of the credit-based redemptioner system.⁴¹ As the networks of migration between the German states and U.S. bloomed, most migrants were those that had capital assets to sell. This was less the case for North West German migrants, departing from 1832 onwards, but even here, solvency was necessary. The consequences of this selectivity upon German settlement patterns in the United States remains an important and largely untested line of enquiry.⁴²

Of critical significance to wider European emigration was the logistical arrangement of emigration that the new laws necessitated. Emigrant brokerages and agencies were required in hubs of outmigration to ensure that emigrants could make it to port and provide custom for those outfitting ships. This meant, typically, the pre-sale of tickets for the entirety of the ocean passage, which could be used to obviate border stipulations, as well as the arrangement of requisite passport and consular paperwork. A major commercial industry of migration management and advertising was thus inaugurated. Whilst individual agents operating on behalf of brokerages continued to proliferate, as they had in the redemptioner era, their activity was necessarily tied back to shipping industry via the co-ordinating brokerage, which acted as the intermediary between the two. This became the critical structural feature of the commerce of migration across the continent, spreading from the German lands to central and eastern Europe.⁴³

The crisis of 1816–17 is an episode that has proved a fertile ground for the study of various factors in German-American migration—the organisation and civic management of contemporary German rulers, the role of adaptability to climate pressure, the role of recruiters in migration, the parallel conditions between European and American economies in the years beyond Napoleon, and the experience of ship owners during a boom period of crisis migration.⁴⁴ It also provides coherent explanations for the transformation of German and continental transit systems from the 18th century model to the 19th, and provides a historical reference point for how international management of migration systems has evolved and occurred in the past. As such, it continues to be a fascinating moment in German-American history from which we can continue to learn useful lessons, not only about historic system change, but for similarly crucial moments in the history of mobility, up to the present day.

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Notes

¹ The most recent work on climatic conditions can be found in Stefan Brönniman, Daniel Krämer, *Tambora und das Jahr ohne Sommer 1816: Klima, Mensch und Gesellschaft* (Bern: Geographica Bernensia, 2016) (published in English as *Tambora and 'the year without a summer' of 1816: a Perspective on Earth and Human Systems Science*); also Rüdiger Glaser, Iso Himmelsbach and Annette Bösmeier, 'Climate of migration? How climate triggered migration from southwest Germany to North America during the 19th century,' *Clim. Past* 13 (2017): 1573-92; on war-weariness and post war difficulty, Mack Walker, *Germany and the Emigration, 1816–1885* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1964), esp. 2-4; more recently Hans Jürgen Grabbe 'The Phasing out of 18th-Century Patterns of German Migration to the United States after 1817,' *American Studies Journal* [online] 62 (2017); on religious connections see multiple essays by Eberhard Fritz, including recently Eberhard Fritz 'Religiöse Rebellen im grenzhahen Dorf' in *Der Enzkreis, Historisches und Aktuelles* (Ostfildern: Thorbecke, 2016), 179-205; on recruiting activity, see the detailed investigation by Hans Jürgen Grabbe, *Vor der großen Flut: Die europäische Migration in die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika, 1783–1820* (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2001), 268-77, also James Boyd, 'The Rhine Exodus of 1816/17 within the Developing German Atlantic World,' *The Historical Journal* 59.1 (2016): 109-13.

² Walker, *Emigration* Chapter 1.

³ SSee reproduction of Dutch legislation in Günter Moltmann, *Aufbruch nach Amerika : Friedrich List und die Auswanderung aus Baden und Württemberg 1816/17, Dokumentation einer sozialen Bewegung* (Tübingen: Wunderlich, 1979), 213-14.

⁴ Walker, *Emigration* 36

⁵ See Letter to Johann Georg Rapp from Leonhard Wörner, who had set out from Württemberg with a large party on June 12, 1817, only to be stopped in Oberwesel, Prussian territory near the Netherlands border, reproduced in Karl J. Arndt, *George Rapp's Harmony Society: 1787–1847* Philadelphia, PA, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1965, 190.

⁶ Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart [HSAS] E146 Bü 1783 num. 15-20.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Baden authorities recorded 16,321 America-bound emigrants Jan-May 1817, Württemberg 6,000 from Jan-July. HSAS E146 Bu1783; Generallandesarchiv Karlsruhe (GLK) E236 2871.

⁹ It is estimated that 48 percent of passages in 1816/17 were subject to redemptioner contracts (2,800 contracts in all), whilst the number who had travelled hoping to gain a redemptioner contract was undoubtedly far higher. See Grabbe, *Flut* 335.

¹⁰ Staatsarchiv Bremen [SB] 2-P.8.B.8.a/Bd.1 Teil 1, leaf 60.

¹¹ See Marianne Woceck, *Trade in Strangers: The Beginnings of Mass-Migration to North America* (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 1999), 63-4.

¹² Among the more reputable merchants were Antwerp Merchants Heinrich Dirks and C.F. Loewers, see Boyd, '1816' 112, also Gerhard P. Bassler, 'Auswanderungsfreiheit und Auswandererfürsorge in Württemberg 1815–1855: Zur Geschichte der südwestdeutschen Massenwanderung nach Nordamerika,' *Zeitschrift für Württembergische Landesgeschichte* 33 (1974): 129-34.

¹³ See the case of Richard Rodolphe and J.J. Hartsnick in *Pennsylvania Gazette* 26.01.1818.

¹⁴ On massive post-war trade growth, see James Belich, *Replenishing the Earth: The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Anglo-World, 1783–1939* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); for a breakdown of trade patterns before and after the wars, Grabbe, *Flut* 106-16.

¹⁵ Grabbe, 'Phasing'.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Grabbe, *Flut* 344-7.

¹⁸ Martin Baum, a first-generation German from Alsace who settled in Cincinnati ‘some-time around 1800’, was among the most prominent merchant figures in the city from 1807 to 1831, and ‘in his numerous undertakings he needed reliable labourers, and brought many German redemptioners to Cincinnati, whom he treated well’. Baum founded the first iron foundry in the region, and introduced sailboats to the Ohio and Mississippi in favour of flat and keel boats. Other German merchants were hugely successful in the region, including railroad entrepreneur Johann Jacob Weiler, who arrived in 1818 and died in 1881 as the ‘rich- est man in central Ohio’. See *Der Deutsche Pionier* 10 (1878): 44; Albert Bernard Faust, *The German Element in the United States*, 2nd ed. (New York, NY: 1927), 422, 424-25.

¹⁹ See efforts by Christian Mayer, of the German Society of Maryland, discussed in Klaus Wust, *Pioneers in service: the German Society of Maryland, 1783-1981* (Baltimore: The German Society of Maryland, 1981), 6-7. This precedent had already been established for Pennsylvania by its supreme court in 1797, Grabbe, *Flut*, 287, 337.

²⁰ Grabbe, ‘Phasing’ 12-13, also other similar examples in Grabbe, *Flut* 363-34.

²¹ Grabbe, ‘Phasing’, 16.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ SB 2-P.8.B.8.a/Bd.1 Teil 2.

²⁴ Farm insolvencies in Württemberg hit a decade peak of 2,660 in 1828; in the subsequent 2 years, emigration grew by 167 percent, from 1,361 individuals to 3,642, thereafter exceeding 7,000 in 1832. On insolvency levels, see G. Seybold, *Württembergs Industrie und Außenhandel von Ende der napoleonischen Kriege bis zum Deutschen Zollverein* (Stuttgart: Kolhammer, 1974), 35; on emigration volumes Wolfgang von Hippel, *Auswanderung aus Südwest-deutschland: Studien zur Württembergischen Auswanderung und Auswanderungspolitik im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert* (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1984), 138.

²⁵ Torsten Feys, *The Battle for the Migrants: The Introduction of Steam Shipping on the North Atlantic and Its Impact on the European Exodus* (St. Johns, Newfoundland: International Maritime Economic History Association, 2013), 15.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p.17.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, *Anzeigebblatt Unterrheinkreis* 57, 1836, in Generallandesarchiv Karlsruhe, [GLK] Beständ 236, num. 8973, S.8.

²⁸ SB 2-P.8.B.8.a/Bd.1 Teil 2.

²⁹ Cash sums quoted in *Bremen Anzeigebblatt* 54, 1832 see GLK Beständ 236, num. 8973, S.8.

³⁰ Feys, *Migrants* 16.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 14.

³² Dirk Hoerder, ‘The Traffic of Emigration via Bremen/Bremerhaven: Merchants’ Interests, Protective Legislation and Migrants’ Experiences,’ *The Journal of American Ethnic History* 13.1 (1993): 68-101.

³³ SB 2-P.8.B.8.a/Bd.1 Teil 2.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ Agent activity of HAPAG brokers was well documented in Mecklenburg, a newly ascendant source of emigrants, from the early 1850s, helping to consolidate business for the new firm. Files of early agents and ticketing are included in Mecklenburg Landeshauptarchiv Schwerin (MLHAS) Domanialamt Boizenburg, 2.22-10.1, Nr 9d.

³⁶ Feys, *Migrants* 17, 38-9.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p.17.

³⁸ On the North West and the also the ‘middle-class’ character of migrants in this period, Walther Kamphoefner, *The Westfalians, From Germany to Missouri* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987).

³⁹ According to Württemberg state records, the average wealth of migrants during 1817 (which includes migrants to both America and the European East) was 65.5 Gulden per per-

son. The measure is imperfect as it includes children accompanying adults, and multiple destinations, but is the best indicative figure of the period. Existing probate records for a sample of 11 adult departures from Ölbronn for North America between 1829 and 1848 shows an average of 1,716 Gulden per person, with only 1 individual, a farm labourer worth 71 Gulden, falling into previously typical patterns. It is likely the emigration of this individual was paid for by his employer, who also emigrated the same year. A more complete sample could offer different data, however it is noteworthy that among this sample, the farm labourer was the outlier. See HSAS E146 Bü1783 Gemeindarchiv Ölbronn (GA) 9133 Inventuren u. Theilungen (IT)1146-7; GO9133 IT/1151-4;GO9133 IT/1156-8.

⁴⁰ During the first half of the 19th century, this was in stark contrast to British passenger transit, the regulations for which were constantly tightened and loosened, and rarely heeded.

⁴¹ In the 18th century, as well as in the emigration surge of 1816/17, typically 70-75 percent of migrants were of trades and labouring backgrounds. Meaning that peasant farmers (numerically the most significant of the population) were drastically under-represented. Data for Württemberg communities in the period 1828-45 show that peasant farmers were drawn in representative volumes for the first time, with tradesmen receding comparatively. On 18th century migration type, von Hippel, *Auswanderung* 52 and its mirror in 1816/17 Boyd, 'Exodus,' 114. See examples of communities for 1828-45 period in James Boyd, "The Role of Rural Textile Production in South-West German Emigration: Württemberg Communities in the Early Nineteenth Century," *Textile History* 46:1 (2015): 38.

⁴² As it does for departed communities, as raised by Wockeck earlier in this volume.

⁴³ See generally Michael Just, *Ost- und südeuropäische Amerikawanderung 1881-1914. Transitprobleme in Deutschland und Aufnahme in den Vereinigten Staaten* (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1988); also Tara Zahra *The Great Departure: Mass Migration from Eastern Europe and the Making of the Free World* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2016), 23-65.

⁴⁴ See inter alia Brönniman and Krämer, *1816*; Grabbe, *Flut*; Moltmann, *Aufbruch*.

