

Chapter 5. Lincoln's Gamble for the German Immigrant Vote

In 1854, the wheel of history turned. A train of events that mobilized the antislavery North resulted in the formation of the Republican Party and ultimately provided Lincoln's generation with a challenge equal to or surpassing that of the founding fathers.

Doris Kearns Goodwin,
Team of Rivals: The Political Genius of Abraham Lincoln

After having been condemned to death by the Prussian authorities, George Schneider (1823–1905), a German journalist and veteran of the 1848 revolution, escaped from Germany. He took over Chicago's German paper, the *Illinois Staats-Zeitung*, and became a staunch opponent of the Kansas-Nebraska Act and its author, Senator Douglas.¹ In reaction to the introduction of that bill in Congress, on January 28, 1854, Schneider organized a protest against it, probably the very first in the entire country. On February 8 and 14, and March 16, 1854, Germans-Americans demonstrated again, but more vociferously. A Chicago paper noted: "The Germans in this city are nearly unanimous in their opposition to the measure. During the visit of the Legislature to Chicago last week, a committee of our German citizens waited upon Lieut. Gov. Koerner and placed in his charge a petition signed by several hundred against the repeal of the Missouri compromise, which he was requested to lay before the Legislature."²

For the German-Americans the issue was not only slavery. There was also an odious amendment to the Kansas-Nebraska bill, which reflected prejudice against immigrants. Voting privileges and holding office in the new territories was to be restricted to citizens, who also had to swear to support the constitution and "the provisions of this act."³ The *Weekly Chicago Democrat* declared: "The slave power and free foreign labor are antagonistic elements in the politics of the country. If the one prevails the other is overshadowed—they cannot flourish together."⁴

At a meeting on March 16 in South Market Hall, Alderman Francis A. Hofmann (later the Republican nominee for lieutenant governor), who had

been a Lutheran preacher in Germany, “electrified” his audience with his attack on Douglas. At first he spoke about the curse of slavery:

If the party is to rule us with an iron rod—if the party is to dictate measures, at which humanity shudders and against which justice cries out; then gentlemen, we had better break the chains which fetter us to that party, and tear asunder the ties which connect us with its leaders. We cannot, we will not sacrifice liberty to party interests, we cannot, we will not consent without a murmur, that the curse of slavery should blight one inch of that territory which is forever sacred to and set aside for liberty.

Then Hoffmann addressed the feature of the bill that discriminated against foreigners:

Foreigners are deprived of the privilege of voting. That Amendment, gentlemen, is the Devil’s cloven foot sticking out without covering. . . . What is the object of this amendment! To advance slavery, to prevent foreigners from settling in that country, and casting their vote in favor of free labor, and in opposition to that terrible system of making capital out of the blood of their fellow men.

The resolutions that followed this speech declared that the Germans had lost confidence in the Democratic Party and considered Douglas “an ambitious and dangerous demagogue” and “a blemish upon the honor the state of Illinois.”⁵ The excited crowd that had participated in this meeting then formed a procession and moved on Michigan Avenue, proceeding via Clark to Randolph, and finally arriving at the Court House square. Reaching their destination, the demonstrators hanged and burned an effigy of the senator, “amidst hisses, groans, and hurrahs of the largest number of people ever before assembled in the city on any public occasion.”⁶ This act of political defiance became controversial and resonated as such in the entire land. In New York, it was reported that “the great unanimity manifested by the German press and our fellow German fellow-citizens throughout the country, in opposition to the Nebraska scheme so inimical to their Democratic principles, to their cherished hopes and to the renown of their adopted country.”⁷ The intense outburst against Douglas signaled the beginnings of a portentous shift away from the Democratic Party.

It was also the time, according to Doris Kearns Goodwin, when the “wheel of history turned.” The Kansas-Nebraska Act “mobilized the

antislavery North,” with the resulting formation of the Republican Party, “providing Lincoln’s generation with a challenge equal to or surpassing that of the founding fathers.”⁸ Isaac N. Arnold (1815–84), a prominent lawyer and politician of Illinois and Lincoln’s friend, observed:

In 1854, events occurred, which brought into public action all the power and energy of Mr. Lincoln. The [struggle for the] repeal of the Missouri Compromise and the outrages in Kansas brought him again prominently before the people of Illinois, and from this time, he devoted himself to the conflict between freedom and slavery, until he was elevated to the presidency.⁹

When Lincoln visited Chicago on October 27, he came with recent experience in speaking out passionately against the Kansas-Nebraska Act. On September 12, he was in Bloomington, Illinois, where he had spoken to a German Anti-Nebraska meeting and could observe firsthand that German-Americans were in the forefront of the movement against the Douglas bill. The *Bloomington Pantagraph* reported that his speech was “clear and unanswerable, for it was a plain statement of facts, and of sound, strong argument. . . . he spoke the deep convictions of truth from a heart warmed with the love of his country and the love of freedom.”¹⁰ Lincoln won supporters in the German community on this occasion. When he returned during the Douglas debates, the procession to the speaker’s stand was “headed by an imposing array of German Republicans with an appropriate banner,” probably that of the Bloomington Turners.¹¹ Bloomington provided early evidence of a productive alliance between Lincoln and the German-American voters.

In Springfield, in October, Lincoln delivered, in the presence of Douglas, his “first great speech.” In it he conducted a vigorous attack on the move to extend slavery.

I hate it because [slavery] deprives our republican example of its just influence in the world—enables the enemies of free institutions, with plausibility, to taunt us as hypocrites—causes the real friends of freedom to doubt our sincerity, and especially because it forces so many really good men amongst ourselves into an open war with the very fundamental principles of civil liberty—critici[z]ing the Declaration of Independence, and insisting that there is no right principle of action but self-interest.¹²

After hearing Lincoln’s speech, William Herndon, Lincoln’s law partner, thought that it was “the profoundest . . . [speech] . . . that he had made in his


whole life.”¹³ Horace White commented in the *Chicago Journal* that it was “one of the world’s masterpieces of argumentative power and moral grandeur, which left Douglas’s edifice of ‘Popular Sovereignty’ a heap of ruins.” Lincoln then continued his passionately energized political campaign against the “Nebraska iniquity” in Peoria and, finally, in Chicago. Horace White had been instrumental in having his paper invite him to speak in that city, where he would help to sway potential voters for his bid in the Senate race and could expect “a crowd of from eight to ten or fifteen thousand.”¹⁴ On October 27, the *Journal* announced: “COME ONE, COME ALL! Hon. Abraham Lincoln, one of the greatest orators and debaters in the country, will address the people of Chicago on the subject of the Nebraska Bill this evening at North Market Hall.”¹⁵

Lincoln presumably repeated arguments of his Springfield speech.¹⁶ A photograph, originally taken on the occasion of this visit, came to public light for the first time in *McClure’s Magazine* in 1896, with an explanation of its connection to George Schneider.

Illustration: LINCOLN IN 1854--HITHERTO UNPUBLISHED.

From a photograph owned by Mr. George Schneider of Chicago, Illinois, former editor of the “Staats Zeitung,” the most influential anti-slavery German newspaper of the West. Mr. Schneider first met Mr. Lincoln in 1853, in Springfield. “He was already a man necessary to know,” says Mr. Schneider. In 1854 Mr. Lincoln was in Chicago, and Mr. Isaac N. Arnold invited Mr. Schneider to dine with Mr. Lincoln. After dinner, as the gentlemen were going down town, they stopped at an itinerant photograph gallery, and Mr. Lincoln had the above picture taken for Mr. Schneider.¹⁷

The author of this short text was probably Ida M. Tarbell, who was publishing her successful biography of Lincoln in *McClure’s Magazine* in a serialized form, starting in 1895. Schneider, who was seventy-three years old at this time, lent the picture for use by the *Magazine* and furnished the necessary information. The resulting text was probably based on an interview that Tarbell conducted with Schneider. Isaac N. Arnold, a witness of the photo session, member of the Free Soil Party and an opponent of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, was no longer alive to provide further details.¹⁸ This record of Schneider’s recollections is incomplete, and the published image has been the catalyst for speculations, contradictory assertions, and mystery.¹⁹ Because Lincoln’s encounter with Schneider and the subsequent photographing session occurred at a crucial point in the formation of the Republican Party, an effort to reconcile the various assertions and inferences has merit. The challenge is to disentangle the residues and missteps of fragile recollections.



George Schneider's photograph of Lincoln, originally taken in 1854 by Polycarp von Schneidau. Courtesy of the Chicago History Museum. Both Schneider and von Schneidau recognized in Lincoln as an ally in the fight against the provocative Kansas-Nebraska Act.

It has been generally assumed that the original daguerreotype had been the work of Polycarp von Schneidau (1812–59), who had a studio at 142 Lake

Street and a residence on 55 N. Wells Street. Schneider, with his press office at 49 N. Wells and residence at 52 N. Wells, was certainly an acquaintance who shared with von Schneidau political interests. An immigrant from Sweden, who had served the Swedish king as an officer in his country's navy, von Schneidau was appointed Swedish-Norwegian vice-consul in Chicago in 1852.²⁰ He had been active in political affairs and participated in a Tremont House meeting against the Kansas-Nebraska Act on July 5, 1854. At this meeting he heard prominent Kentucky politician Cassius M. Clay speak. A Col. E. R. Lewis, participant in this meeting (at Lake and Dearborn streets), the aim of which was the establishment of an anti-Kansas-Nebraska coalition, mentioned Consul von Schneidau as one of the participants.²¹ Thus, the photographer shared with Schneider and Arnold an interest in Lincoln as a leader of the movement against Douglas.

When von Schneidau abandoned his photographic career, his studio was purchased by Samuel G. Alschuler, also a photographer in Chicago. The original daguerreotype of Lincoln became Alschuler's possession, but instead of preserving it, the new owner manipulated and transformed it into a new image. Alschuler was able to create an ambrotype and positioned the newspaper in Lincoln's hands in such a way that it now showed the *Press and Tribune* on its masthead. Since this paper came into existence only on July 1, 1858, it could not have been the same paper that Lincoln had in his hands in 1854. When Schneider made his copy of the photograph available for an anniversary publication of his *Staats-Zeitung*, he referred to it as a work of the photographer Alschuler. Perhaps because the title of the newspaper is hardly visible, Schneider made no effort to explain why Lincoln would be holding the *Press and Tribune*.²²

Alschuler's motivation for making the change is not difficult to surmise. He could support the cause of the new publication by connecting it to Lincoln, whom Joseph Medill (1823–99) and Charles H. Ray (1821–70), the publishers and editors of that paper, fervently promoted. Schneider would not have objected. But a mystery still remains: Which newspaper did Lincoln hold in the lost daguerreotype and why?

It would be reasonable to assume that Schneider, for whom the picture was reportedly made, would ask Lincoln to promote his own paper, the *Staats-Zeitung*. This assumption has appeared in several scholarly papers. Recently, however, Matthew Pinsker concluded that this assumption was probably false. He pointed to Schneider's recollections of May 29, 1900.²³ The Anti-Kansas-Nebraska veterans were celebrating then the anniversary of the Illinois Republican Party's origins, which had taken place at Bloomington. Ezra M. Prince reported

A treasured relic brought from Chicago by Mr. Geo[rge] Schneider was the picture of Lincoln taken in a Chicago restaurant in 1854. He was taking dinner with Mr. Schneider and while he was reading a copy of the *Chicago Democrat*, a photographer stepped in and asked permission to take Lincoln's picture and he consented. A copy of the photo was retained by Mr. Schneider and was viewed with deepest interest today.²⁴

Schneider's comments confirm that surviving photograph had an adventurous past, surviving a manipulation of the newspaper in Lincoln's hands. Although his narrative contradicts earlier information in some respects, it confirms that Schneider's meeting and a photographic session with Lincoln took place in 1854. The new piece of information, that the photographer stopped in at the restaurant, is not in the earlier sources, but still within the realm of the possible. It is very unlikely, however, that a daguerreotype could have been set up in those early days of the technological development at a restaurant. A lunch meeting and then a joint visit to the photographer's nearby studio, as reported in the earlier narrative of 1896, is more plausible, and the ideal time for available light would have been the early afternoon. A memory lapse of the elderly Schneider or a mistake in reporting his words by Ezra Prince might explain the apparent contradiction.

On this occasion Schneider remembered and explained the matter of the newspaper in Lincoln's hands. In the text it appears that Lincoln had been reading the paper, and it was a matter of convenience to take it for the photograph. Because Schneider was willing to forgo the possibility of promoting his own paper, his recollection may be accepted as accurate. It is also unlikely that Lincoln would pretend to read a German paper.

The *Weekly Chicago Democrat* and the *Chicago Daily Democrat* were newspapers published by John ("Long John") Wentworth, who represented his city's second district in Congress. Although at this time he still maintained ties to the Democratic Party, Wentworth, strongly urged by the German-Americans of his district, voted against the Kansas-Nebraska Act. When Senator Douglas first proposed this bill in Congress, Schneider quickly responded by convening a meeting in opposition. The resolutions of this gathering of January 29, 1854, were telegraphed to Wentworth in Washington. It is reported that Wentworth responded to the urgings of his constituents: "I see the boys are against the Nebraska Bill; I go with the boys!"²⁵ For Lincoln, who was in Chicago in a campaign against that law, Wentworth was a potential ally in this fight, and it made eminent sense to join forces with him. The photograph with Wentworth's *Democrat* was a strong political statement that both Lincoln and Schneider could stand behind.

The attempted reconstruction of the circumstances of the original daguerreotype cannot be entirely satisfactory, but a review of the various recollections presents a persuasive case for the record of *McClure's Magazine*, presumably supplied by Tarbell (1857–1944) a journalist and competent historian. Because of her program of interviewing those who had known Lincoln, she was, according to one scholar, a “pioneer scientific investigator” of Lincoln’s life.²⁶ She or her editor interviewed Schneider, and their text represents the fragile link to the original photograph. It suggests that Lincoln agreed to have the photograph taken for Schneider’s sake, and because of Lincoln’s friendly gesture toward Schneider, both Schneider and his daughter remembered it as a special treasure in the family’s possession.

Yet most revealing is Schneider’s own recollection that the newspaper in Lincoln’s hands was the *Chicago Democrat*, and not *the Press and Tribune* or the *Staats-Zeitung*. The strategic framing with this paper reflects a political statement. It was an early signal of Lincoln’s vigorous campaign to build a coalition against the Kansas-Nebraska Act. Schneider, von Schneidau, Arnold, and “Long John” Wentworth were to be partners in this new enterprise. Subsequent events confirm the gradual formation of a broad coalition under the umbrella of the Republican Party.

At this time Lincoln was still reluctant to join the call for a new party. He feared that such a party would be too closely linked to the abolitionists, who, in his view, would undermine the prospects of any election victory. For Lincoln the new movement required a careful balancing act. How could he win the conservative voters of his own Whig Party, who viewed foreigners as a threat and, at the same time, entice the foreign voters who felt threatened by those same conservatives? Arnold explained the challenge that Lincoln faced:

Perhaps the greatest difficulty was that of harmonizing the American Whigs with the foreign-born voters. Lincoln had the sagacity to make a simple and single issue, that of hostility to the extension of slavery, and prohibition in all the territories, and to fight the battle on that issue. Triumph upon this issue would be the triumph over slavery, and all else would follow.²⁷

Arnold wrote these reflections a long time after the quickly moving events that he and Schneider experienced firsthand in 1854. Schneider suggested to Arnold that he write about the *History of the Republican Party*, and Arnold considered it seriously. “It is an interesting subject & should cover its origin, record (what it has done), its leaders & its future. You and I were present at its birth, have personally known its leaders & to some extent aided in making its worth in history.”²⁸

In March 1856, a mob attacked Schneider's office because of his position opposing slavery. The mob, apparently intent on taking revenge on the insult to the Douglas effigy, burned Schneider in effigy. The attackers shouted that the "abolitionist" should be driven out of town. The mob was about to attack the newspaper man's office, when the local *Turnerverein* rallied in Schneider's defense. The Chicago Turners quickly dispersed the attackers.²⁹

Only a few days earlier, on February 22, a meeting of Illinois newspaper editors took place in Decatur to discuss a united front against the Kansas-Nebraska Act. Schneider had just joined the Republican Party. He and Dr. Charles H. Ray constituted a delegation from Chicago. Schneider wrote: "I entered the Decatur convention with a resolution in opposition to [the Know Nothing] movement, and I had resolved to fight with all my might and win or go down, and with me, perhaps, the new party." Schneider and Ray participated in the six-man committee on resolutions, Ray as chairman. Schneider proposed a resolution against the Know-Nothing limitations on the rights of naturalized citizens, but his proposal encountered a "storm of opposition." In "utter despair" Schneider proposed submitting it to Lincoln, who came to the conference as an observer. Schneider knew Lincoln well enough to assert confidently that his decision would be acceptable.

Lincoln appeared at the meeting and took a forceful stand: "Gentlemen, the resolution introduced by Mr. Schneider is nothing new. It is already contained in the Declaration of Independence, and you cannot form a new party on proscriptive principles."³⁰ The convention of editors proceeded to adopt the resolution

. . . that in regard to office we hold merit, not birthplace to be the test, deeming the rule of Tho[ma]s Jefferson—is he honest? Is he capable?—the only true rule; that we shall maintain the naturalization laws as they are, believing as we do, that we should welcome the exiles and emigrants from the Old World, to homes of enterprise and of freedom in the new.³¹

On this occasion Lincoln is reported to have also said that "we must state our position honestly and openly, and only through an unqualified proclamation can we count on support. The citizens who have adopted this country as their own have a right to demand this from us."³² As far as Schneider was concerned, Lincoln's declaration in 1856 at Decatur helped to establish the new Republican Party "on the most liberal democratic basis." Charles H. Ray of the *Chicago Tribune* saw the results in terms of a practical political victory. The Republicans could gain, he believed, 30,000 antislavery Germans in Illinois by resolving "that the party does not contemplate any

change of the naturalization laws.”³³ Because the Illinois political leaders, who met in Bloomington a few days later, adopted the Decatur platform for the “Anti-Nebraska Party” (soon to be called the Republican Party), Schneider was able to assert with confidence: “The new light which appeared at Decatur and Bloomington spread its rays over the whole of the United States . . . [and] marks one of the great epochs in the history of the country. . . .”³⁴

At this early stage in the history of the Republican Party, Lincoln’s appreciation of the interests of German-Americans is evident. On the other hand, Lincoln made an effort to placate the Know-Nothings in the Republican Party by opposing public funding for Catholic schools.³⁵

Before his participation in the Decatur convention, Lincoln had been essentially a man without a party. He had gradually abandoned the Whig Party, but for a time he had been reluctant to join the Abolitionist Republicans who had organized in Illinois earlier. That had changed by the time of that convention. The primary catalyst was the provocation of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, but the unjust treatment of immigrants became an additional political concern. Lincoln’s support for Schneider’s resolution signaled a clear pattern to combine his opposition to the extension of slavery with an opposition to the restriction of voting rights of naturalized citizens. The process of becoming a committed Republican went hand in hand with the realization that German-American votes were an essential component in electing John Frémont as the first Republican president.

On the heels of the Decatur conference, the prominent Illinois opponents of the Kansas-Nebraska Act followed with a conference at Bloomington on May 28. Schneider and Lincoln were again active participants in protecting the rights of German-Americans. Joseph Medill, reporting at the time for the *Chicago Tribune*, was able to record only parts of what was later called Lincoln’s lost speech. “I did make a few paragraphs of what Lincoln said in his the first eight or ten minutes, but I became so absorbed in his magnetic oratory that I forgot myself and ceased to take notes; and joined with the convention in cheering and stamping, and clapping to the end of his speech.”³⁶ On this occasion the Republican Party of Illinois was born. Both George Schneider and Friedrich Hecker were nominated as delegates-at-large to the first national convention of the Republican Party in Philadelphia and as presidential electors.³⁷

On September 8, 1856, Lincoln addressed a request to Charles Ray in Chicago for fifty copies of Schneider’s *Staats-Zeitung*, a paper favorable to Frémont. He was evidently prepared to have all these papers distributed to the German-American communities of Illinois. What was so special about these issues of the Chicago paper? No copies have survived, but it is safe to assume that they reported on the Decatur convention and Lincoln’s support

for the voting rights of naturalized citizens.

In his letter of September 8, Lincoln also expressed concern to Ray about the misfortune that befell Friedrich Hecker's property. On August 12, a fire had destroyed Hecker's residence near Belleville. Hecker suspected that he was a victim of politically motivated arson. Because of his fame as a revolutionary leader and as a presidential elector, his services were needed to win over the German-American community for Frémont. To make certain that, despite his misfortune, Hecker would be active in the campaign, Lincoln sought financial aid from Ray and his friends. This letter, which came to light only recently, deserves to be quoted in full.

[September 8, 1856]

[To: Charles Ray]

My Dear Sir:

Have fifty copies, of the [G]erman Fremont paper sent regularly, in one bundle, to Jabez Capps, Mount Pulaski, Logan Co. Ills. Herewith is his letter to me.

Another matter. Owing to Mr. Hecker's house having been burned, we can not get him out to address our [G]erman friends. This is a bad draw-back. It would be no more than just for us to raise him a thousand dollars in this emergency. Can we not do it? See our friends about it. I can find one hundred dollars towards it. Such a sum no doubt would greatly relieve him, and enable him to take the field again. We can not spare his services.

Yours as ever,

A. Lincoln³⁸

Both "matters," the requests for copies of the German newspaper and for supporting Hecker for the sake of the revolutionary hero's vital services, anticipated the much more concerted drive about three years later to win the votes of Lincoln's "German friends."

In a subsequent letter to Ray, dated only five days later, September 13, 1856, Lincoln expressed the need to act urgently about the fifty copies of the Frémont paper [i.e., *Staats-Zeitung*]. At the same time, he referred to a previous request for an additional 100 copies of the paper to be sent to a different address, to William H. Hanna in Bloomington. Even at this early stage in the emergence of the Republican Party, Lincoln was convinced that the German vote could make a crucial difference. He was willing to invest in the purchase of newspapers, to have them distributed, and to promote the speaking tours for a German revolutionary. The distribution of Schneider's *Staats-Zeitung* appears to have been a rehearsal for Lincoln's more efficient

engagement of Dr. Theodore Canisius to reach and influence voters in a campaign of national significance.

In this second letter to Ray, Lincoln also expressed worries about the German vote: "Last evening I was scared a little by being told that the enemy [is] getting the [G]erman[s] away from us at Chicago. Is there any truth in that?" Lincoln was undoubtedly aware that Douglas owned a Chicago German newspaper, the *National Demokrat*.³⁹ The political fight between the two rival candidates for the German-American votes had become a war of newspapers. The prize for victory in that war reached beyond Illinois. The *Detroit Free Press* observed: "Nothing has been more evident for a long time than the fact that the main dependence of the Black Republicans in all the states where they have an existence is on the German vote."⁴⁰

Lincoln had concluded a Chicago speech against Douglas with an argument based on the Declaration of Independence. Douglas undermined its fundamental concept, equality. Lincoln said: "That is the electric cord in that Declaration that links the hearts of patriotic and liberty-loving men together ..." Lincoln continued by arguing that Douglas refused to recognize the Germans as a people connected with that spirit. What arguments did Douglas employ? The kind of arguments that kings used to enslave. Lincoln demanded to know where the exceptions to the Declaration of Independence would stop. "If one man says it does not mean a [N]egro, why not another say it does not mean some other man?" In saying this, Lincoln was repeating almost word for word the convictions he had expressed to his friend Joshua Speed three years earlier: "As a nation, we began by declaring that '*all men are created equal*.'" He added: "When Know-Nothings get control, it will read '*all men are created equal, except negroes, and foreigners, and [C]atholics*.'"⁴¹

Chicago was an important battleground. During the Lincoln-Douglas debates Lincoln became seriously concerned, once again, about the voting patterns favoring Democrats in southern Illinois. His concerns this time focused on Madison County, an area near St. Louis with a large concentration of German-Americans. Joseph Gillespie had warned Lincoln that in Madison County he could not depend on the Germans, except in the city of Highland. Lincoln hoped to prevent the defection of "Americans," but, at the same time, he did not want to alienate the German-Americans. Believing that Koerner could do something, on July 25, 1858, Lincoln addressed a letter to him about the critical situation: "I write this mostly because I learn we are in great danger in Madison [County]. It is said that half the Americans are going for Douglas; and that slam will ruin us if not counteracted. . . . Can not you, Canisius, and some other influential Germans set a plan on foot that shall gain us accession from the Germans, and see that, at the election, none are cheated in their ballots?"⁴²

Lincoln was referring to Dr. Theodore Canisius (1826–85), publisher of the *Freie Presse* in Alton, Madison County, as a potential helper. The geographic position of Madison County made Lincoln's request urgent. On August 6, Lincoln wrote to Koerner again, reporting to him about a pamphlet being prepared with his Springfield speech of July 17, to be complemented with its translation into German. He envisioned seven thousand copies. At the same time, he expressed concern about voters turning out for Douglas there: "Every place seems to be coming quite up to my expectation, except Madison."⁴³

Lincoln's request apparently failed to achieve an adequate response. Lincoln lost the Senate race, in no small way due to the strength of the Democrats in southern Illinois, referred to commonly as "Egypt." Because of his failure in the Senate race, he became convinced that he must correct past errors or lapses. He was determined to return to Canisius to help win the German-American vote. He realized that a German press in the hands of an intensely dedicated Republican could be an instrument of political success, in Illinois, if not nationally.

The famous debates and contest against Senator Douglas ended in defeat for Lincoln. On January 5, 1859, the Illinois State Assembly convened to vote on the next senator to represent the state. Although the Republicans prevailed in the popular vote, 125,430 for the Republicans to 121,609 for the Democrats, the decisive vote took place in the state assembly, and there the vote was reversed. The Democrats retained control of the legislature and could elect Douglas, 54 to 46.⁴⁴ The bitter defeat turned out to be a prelude to a dramatic comeback in which the dispute about the voting rights of naturalized citizens played a crucial role.

Gustave Koerner (1809–96), who had served his state as lieutenant governor of Illinois in 1853–54, could not help but take notice of the political turmoil in the neighboring state of Iowa. He had to consider its causes and consequences. Koerner belonged to the refugees of an earlier era, having escaped from the German police in 1833 and establishing himself as a successful lawyer and state Supreme Court judge in Illinois.⁴⁵ In 1857 he believed that Lincoln "was still too much on the old conservative order, an excellent man, but no match to such impudent Jesuits & sophists as Douglas."⁴⁶ The debates changed his mind. It was he who brought the issue of the Massachusetts voting restrictions to Lincoln's attention. Koerner wanted the Republican State Central Committee in Illinois to take a strong stance against the amendment. He stated that the German papers were threatening to give up on the Republicans. He saw the loss of the German-American vote as the possible consequence.⁴⁷

With an uproar in Iowa and elsewhere about the restriction of voting rights

of naturalized citizens, an entirely new situation arose. German-Americans were threatening to leave the Republican Party. Numerous ominous articles about the Massachusetts Amendment appeared. Lincoln and the Republicans of Illinois could no longer afford to ignore their implications. What was a missed opportunity in the presidential race of 1856 and the Senate race of 1858 became a necessity in 1859. It was also an opportunity. Koerner urged the Republican State Central Committee to pass a "strong resolution disavowing" the Massachusetts restriction of voting rights. Lincoln wrote to Koerner on April 11 that he had discussed that proposal with the committee, but it needed further discussion.

Reaching home last night, I found your letter of [April] 4th [1859]. The meeting of the Central Committee was at Bloomington, and not here. I was there attending court, and, in common with several other outsiders, one of whom was Judge [Lyman] Trumbull, was in conference with the committee, to some extent. [Norman] Judd privately mentioned the subject, of which you write, to me, and requested me to prepare a resolution, which I did. When I brought in the resolution and read it to the committee, and others present, in an informal way, Judge Trumbull suggested that it would be better to select some act of our adversaries, rather of our own friends, upon which to base a protest against any distinction between native and naturalized citizens, as to the right of suffrage.⁴⁸

Lyman Trumbull (1813–96), United States senator for the years 1855–73, played a central role in these discussions. From Lincoln's report to Koerner it is clear that Trumbull had strong reservations about a Republican resolution. He was reluctant to force Republicans to defend themselves on this issue; the Republicans of Massachusetts, after all, were chiefly responsible for the unfortunate amendment.

Further discussions were needed, and Lincoln left it to Trumbull and Koerner (Trumbull would be in Belleville) to develop an effective strategy for the protest "against any distinction between native and naturalized citizens, as to the right of suffrage." Trumbull was well informed to outline a solution to Koerner.

Trumbull knew Canisius well. Although discussions were secret and did not leave a trail of public documentation, the results are clear. Koerner and Trumbull undoubtedly agreed on a proposal to use Canisius as the primary resource to establish a reliable German-American paper for the Republican Party. Both Trumbull and Canisius resided in Alton. Because Senator Trumbull was in Washington for lengthy periods, he and Canisius

maintained a correspondence about their common political interests, which was to draw the German-Americans away from the Democrats and vote for the Republican Party.⁴⁹

Born in Allendorf, a small town in Westphalia, Theodore Canisius studied medicine and was active in the revolution of 1848–49. After his arrival in St. Louis in 1850, he applied for citizenship, which he acquired five years later.⁵⁰ He completed his medical studies at Dr. Hope's Medical College in St. Louis.⁵¹ He moved to Madison County in Illinois but abandoned medicine in favor of journalism and politics. His career as a newspaper publisher and editor began in earnest in 1857.

In a letter of December 8, 1857, Canisius proudly announced to Senator Trumbull that the first issue of the *Alton Freie Presse* would appear in two weeks. Canisius declared that this paper was to counteract the influence of Alton's other German paper, the *Beobachter*, which had a close Democratic Party affiliation. He proceeded to criticize the Democrats as dull and, in contrast, the Republicans as people animated by a "high sprit of self-confidence and hope of success." For Canisius a lot depended on his own role in influencing German voters in Illinois, especially in Madison County, through his paper.⁵²

Canisius's absolute dedication to the Republican political success reflected the spirit of his revolutionary past. He saw "wonderful progress" toward victories for the Republican Party, and he described the efforts as a war: "anti-Lecompton and anti-Dred Scott." He repeated the German desire to have Congress pass a "Homestead Bill," which, as Canisius reported, a meeting of about 400 Germans had demanded. But he warned that there should be no compromise with the Douglas camp. The Republican organization had to remain "pure." Only without compromises was it possible to assure victory. Canisius saw evidence of progress in recent elections that favored Republican candidates.⁵³

An active member of the Turners, Canisius reported to Trumbull that he gave a lecture in Alton's Turner Hall on the "Origin of Slavery and Progress of the Same in the United States."⁵⁴ In 1858 he represented the *Turnverein* of Alton at the national conference of the organization in Indianapolis. There he probably made contact with another Turner named Theodor Hielscher, an Indianapolis resident who played a significant role in subsequent political events.⁵⁵

In January 1858, Canisius had extended the reach of his paper, initially published only for Alton, to Springfield, for which he expected to add local news; he claimed that this was a good way to overcome the influence of a German Democratic paper in that city and asked Trumbull to help him with contacts there. A few weeks later he reported that he was editing both papers—in February, issues of the *Freie Presse* appeared in Alton and Springfield—

but complained bitterly about costs.⁵⁶ Although it appears that Trumbull supported Canisius with encouragement, contacts, and even finances, whatever financial support Trumbull might have given is not known. At any rate, it was not enough. In May Canisius appeared to be very close to giving up. He had to support his family, even as he saw the “retreat” unfortunate to contemplate. He described his financial situation. The circulation of his paper stood at 700, but he could rely only on 600 paid subscriptions. Advertising was worth nothing. He showed the expenses of production at \$2,500, and that left him with a deficit of \$1,000. Canisius hoped that Trumbull could help to save the paper, and, at the same time, he insisted that the paper was making a difference.

In February 1859, Canisius moved from Alton to Springfield. According to information Trumbull received from Alton, “circumstances of a rather delicate nature” caused Canisius to make this move.⁵⁷ In Springfield, he resided with his family, his wife Emma and his children Eugene and Edes.⁵⁸ He became active in the Republican politics of the city and Sangamon County. A group of over fifty citizens published a newspaper ad to recommend him for the post of city clerk.⁵⁹ For the city election of March 1859 he defined the position of German-Americans. He argued that if the Democratic Party wished to conduct its battle on the platform of national politics, the Republicans were prepared to respond. The love of liberty and their “hatred of doctrines and acts tending to subdue and crush the spirit of universal freedom,” and the “opposition to the barbarous institution of slavery” represented the legacy of the Germans. Canisius then referred to the Massachusetts encroachment on “the rights of a portion of citizens guaranteed to them by the Constitution.” His article prepared the stage for the issues that concerned Lincoln and his friends.

The conclusion of his article also reflected tensions between the two political parties in terms of religion and nationality. Canisius stressed in his final words that the Democratic ticket had too much of the Irish spirit (“infused with an excess of Hibernianism”). Although Lincoln did not approve of limiting the rights of any category of citizens, he is reported to have had reservations about Catholic positions in politics. William H. Herndon, his law partner, declared: “He had no prejudices against any class, preferring the Germans to any of the foreign element, yet tolerating—as I never could—even the Irish.”⁶⁰ Even if Lincoln was reluctant to express it, his party tended to side with the Protestant Germans against the Catholic Irish.

Koerner, Trumbull, and Lincoln probably held discussions about how to react to the Massachusetts Amendment and, at the same time, how to support Canisius in an effort to win the German-Americans to the Republican cause.

As in Iowa, Illinois Republican leaders had to communicate to the German-American community that they condemned any restrictions of their voting rights. Closely connected to this plan had to be the financial arrangements necessary to save the German press to serve the same cause. On May 12, the *Daily Illinois State Journal* reported that Massachusetts had voted to adopt the "odious" amendment. As early as March 25, when the amendment was first proposed, the paper had declared: "It must be killed, or Republicanism in all the northwestern and not a few eastern states is needlessly and imminently imperiled." After the adoption of the amendment, the Republicans of Springfield met to discuss a resolution to protest "against any such law, at all times and everywhere; and that we now and here send out to the world these great principles: namely, Liberty and Equality to all American citizens, whether foreign-born or native; and Freedom and Justice to the races or races of mankind." Herndon, Lincoln's law partner, supported the resolution forcefully: "This law," he said, "is wrong and unjust—once an American citizen always so. . . . I go the full length of justice to all men—equality among all American *citizens*, and freedom to the race of man."⁶¹

Lincoln used this occasion to take an unambiguous stand. He did so through Canisius. Edward D. Baker, editor of the *Daily Illinois State Journal* and related to Lincoln since 1855 by marriage to his niece, Julia Edwards, had a strong personal interest in promoting Lincoln's views. Baker published Lincoln's letter to Canisius. Introducing the letter, Canisius explained that Lincoln's views corresponded precisely to the beliefs of the German-Americans:

I have received today [Springfield, May 17] a letter from Hon. Abraham Lincoln in regard to the "Massachusetts Amendment" and the proposed "fusion" of the Republican Party with other opposition elements in 1860. This letter of one of the gallant champions of our state is in accordance with the views of the whole German population, supporting the Republican Party, and also with the views of the entire German Republican press. It therefore would afford me pleasure if you would give it publicity through your widely circulated journal.

Lincoln's letter to Canisius followed:

Dear Sir: Your note asking, in behalf of yourself and other German citizens, whether I am for or against the constitutional provision in regard to naturalized citizens, lately adopted by Massachusetts; and whether I am for or against a fusion of the Republicans, and other opposition elements, for the canvass of 1860, is received.

Springfield, May 17, 1859

Dr. Theodore Canisius
Dear Sir,

You were asking, in behalf of yourself and other German citizens, whether I am for ^{the} ~~the~~ constitutional provisions in regard to naturalized citizens, lately adopted by Massachusetts, and whether I am for or against a fusion of the republican and other opposition elements, for the campaign of 1860 in person.

Massachusetts is a sovereign and independent state, and it is no privilege of mine to order her for what she does. Still, if from what she has done, an inference is sought to be drawn as to what I would do, if my, wretched impotence, speak out - I say then, that as I am a denizen of the Massachusetts province, I am against its adoption in Illinois, or in any other place, when I have a right to oppose its introduction in the spirit of our institution to aim at the center of men, I am opposed to whatever tends to degrade them. I have some little notion,

for communicating the offensive contents of the paper, and I should be strangely inconsistent if I could favor my project for curtailing the printing rights of white men, even though born in different lands, and speaking different languages from myself.

As to the matter of fusion, I am for it, if it can be had on republican grounds; and I am not for it on any other terms. A fusion on any other terms, would be as foolish as unprincipled. It would bow the whole North, while the common enemy would still carry the whole North. The question of men is a different one. There are good patriotic men, and able statesmen in the South whom I would cheerfully support, if they would not place themselves on republican grounds. But I am again letting over their political pretensions a hair's breadth.

I have written this hastily, but I believe it answers your questions substantially.

Yours truly,
Abraham Lincoln

Lincoln's widely publicized letter to Canisius. Courtesy of the Chicago History Museum. Following only days after his purchase of a German printing press for Canisius, Lincoln spoke out against a potential infringement affecting voting rights of German-Americans.

Massachusetts is a sovereign and independent state; and it is no privilege of mine to scold her for what she does. Still, if from what she has done, an inference is sought to be drawn as to what I would do, I may, without impropriety, speak out. I say then, that, as I understood the Massachusetts provision, I am against its adoption in Illinois, or in any other place, where I have a right to oppose it. Understanding the spirit of our institutions to aim at the *elevation* of men, I am opposed to whatever tends to *degrade* them. I have some little notoriety for commiserating the oppressed condition of the Negro; and I should be strangely inconsistent if I could favor any project for curtailing the existing rights of white men, even though born in different lands, and speaking different languages from myself.

Lincoln also responded to a question about expanding the base of the Republican Party.

As to the matter of fusion, I am for it, if it can be had on Republican grounds; and I am not for it on any other terms. A fusion on any other terms, would be as foolish as unprincipled. It would lose the whole North, while the common enemy would still carry the whole South. The question of men is a different one. There are good patriotic men, and able statesmen, in the South whom I would cheerfully support, if they would now place themselves on Republican ground. But I am against letting down the Republican standard a hair's breadth. I have written this hastily, but I believe it answers your questions substantially.⁶²

Contrary to his disclaimer, Lincoln's letter was part of a carefully crafted political strategy to regain the confidence of German-Americans in the Republican Party. Baker commented on the letter: "We are glad Mr. Lincoln has written this letter. It is plain, straightforward and directly to the point. It contains not one word too much, neither does it omit anything of importance."⁶³ The publication of Lincoln's letter in Springfield was followed by a second publication. The *Chicago Press and Daily Tribune* printed the text on May 21 and gave credit to the Springfield paper. It established a pattern of relying on Baker's paper, and that pattern strengthened Lincoln's political position, especially during the events leading to the Chicago convention in 1860. Lincoln believed that the initiative against the amendment was necessary because it endangered the future of the Republican Party. In a letter to Indiana Congressman Schuyler Colfax, he wrote: "Massachusetts Republicans should have looked beyond their noses; and then they could not

have failed to see that tilting against foreigners would ruin us in the whole North-West."⁶⁴

The Springfield's *Daily Illinois State Journal* also published Lyman Trumbull's letter addressed to "Theodore Canisius, Charles Hermann, and Others." Like Lincoln's, Trumbull's strong position makes his involvement in supporting Canisius understandable. He wrote:

I have, therefore, no hesitation in answering your inquiries in regard to the recent amendment of the Massachusetts constitution, excluding persons hereafter naturalized, for two years thereafter, from the right of suffrage. Such a provision creates an unjust discrimination between citizens, violates the great principle of equal rights, and is in the very teeth of the Republican Creed.⁶⁵

During the Lincoln-Douglas debates, Canisius had declared that "Mr. Lincoln is pretty sure to win," but he added that Madison County had to go Republican.⁶⁶ A constant theme in these letters was the crucial role of *Freie Presse* in promoting the Republican Party. Canisius claimed to have gained a good reputation throughout the state; his articles were reprinted not only in Illinois but also elsewhere in the country. In 1859, perhaps encouraged by Trumbull and Koerner, Canisius moved to Springfield. Lincoln reacted to Canisius's plea for help. Based on the bitter experience of the failed Senate race, Lincoln clearly recognized the advantages of supporting Canisius and a renewed effort to win German votes in Madison County and elsewhere. He decided to invest, and the aid allowed Canisius to revive his paper with a new identity, as the *Illinois Staats-Anzeiger* (State Advertiser). Lincoln agreed to purchase the available printing press with German type, which he then sold secretly to Canisius. Lincoln purchased the press from John M. Burkhardt, an early German settler in Springfield. The legal document stated: "Canisius will publish the newspaper for the Republican Party until the presidential election of 1860," when the press will become his property. The agreement of May 30, 1859, stipulated only that the press would support the Republican cause.⁶⁷ The address of Canisius's print shop was the "east side of Fifth Street, between Jefferson Street and the Public Square."⁶⁸ Lincoln's office was only a few feet away at 6th and Adams, bordering the public square. With an obliging printing press at his disposal, Lincoln was now in an ideal position to reach and win over the German-American voters.

Lincoln's efforts to raise money for the project involved addressing the State Republican Committee, whose chairman was Norman Judd. He had asked Judd for financial aid to support Canisius. Judd refused to help and advised Lincoln, moreover, not to continue his efforts to help Canisius, which

would involve "a large amount of money." Judd confided:

I cannot get money for that purpose and especially so large an amount—I cannot presume to act in that matter of the newspaper without direction of the [State Republican] Committee—I am watched more than in other times and must be guarded about taking responsibility as this world is awful[ly] jealous and given to slander and detraction—I can say to you in confidence what you [should already] know[,] that Canisius is a leech. He sucked more blood from you at Springfield and from the Comm[ittee] than the whole establishment was worth.—You can get no guarantee that if you make the first expenditure there will not be afterwards continued calls. . . .⁶⁹

Canisius needed a lot of money, and Judd knew that he had gotten some from Lincoln previously, but he needed still more. Judd was unwilling to participate in what he saw as a hopeless cause. Lincoln was prepared to overlook the apparent weaknesses in Canisius's character and his lack of skills in handling his finances. For him the potential results made the risk worth taking. Lincoln's political aims in making this substantial investment becomes clear when seen in the context of the letter to Canisius and its subsequent dissemination. Following the Douglas debates, Lincoln himself was in serious financial trouble. He confided to Norman Judd that he was "absolutely without money now for even household purposes."⁷⁰ The financial sacrifice was ostensibly for the sake of the Republican Party. The contract about the press required that the paper should "not depart from the Philadelphia and Illinois Republican platforms." If Canisius served the interests of the Republican Party until the presidential election of 1860, he could eventually become the sole owner of the press. It was a generous offer that coincided perfectly with Canisius's business interests and his political beliefs.⁷¹ Canisius was certainly not a participant for financial gain. He was a committed Republican, who gave up a medical practice to be totally engaged in politics. He joined the Turners undoubtedly for political reasons. Lincoln later rewarded Canisius with a consular position in Vienna. Canisius's biography of Lincoln reflects an author genuinely convinced of the greatness of his subject. For him Lincoln was the ideal leader of the Republicans and thereby best for all German-Americans.⁷²

How could Lincoln manage to help Canisius? The state committee of the Republican Party refused to accommodate. Initially, Canisius needed at the very least \$400.⁷³ Inadvertently, Carl Sandburg provided the explanation for the expensive project at a time when Lincoln lacked personal resources.

According to Sandburg, Lincoln was asked by a caller to use his influence in a certain legal quarter; for this he was offered \$500. According to Sandburg's biography of Lincoln, William Herndon recalls a situation in which Lincoln acquired a significant sum of money for the purpose of supporting a German printing press.

I heard him refuse the \$500.00 over and over again. I went out and left them together. I suppose Lincoln got tired of refusing, for he finally took the money; but he never offered any of it to me; and it was noticeable that whenever he took money in this way, he never seemed to consider it his own or mine. In this case he gave the money to the Germans in the town, who wanted to buy themselves a press. A few days after, he said to me in the coolest way, "Herndon, I gave the Germans \$250 of yours the other day." "I am glad you did, Mr. Lincoln," I answered. Of course I could not say I was glad he took it.⁷⁴

Because Sandburg did not provide a date or a specific source for this text, it might be vulnerable as a reliable report. The text is absent from Herndon's famous biography of Lincoln.⁷⁵ The authenticity of this narrative can be confirmed, however, by an interview that C[aroline] H. Dall conducted in Springfield with Herndon.⁷⁶ The *Atlantic Monthly* provides the evidence that Sandburg recreated the record of 1867 faithfully. Only the introductory question to Herndon and the beginning of his response are missing in Sandburg's text. Dall had asked Herndon: "Did Mr. Lincoln *never* do an unfair thing?"⁷⁷ "I cannot say he *never* did," Herndon responded, "for I remember one or two rare instances. One morning a gentleman came here and asked him to use his legal influence in a certain quarter, where Lincoln again and again assured him he had no power." Then Sandburg reproduced the rest of the Herndon interview with Dall word for word.

Although Sandburg did not connect this anecdote to the 1859 purchase and contract of the printing press, it is difficult to avoid this evident connection. The offer of \$500 enabled Lincoln to help Canisius acquire a printing press.

On April 4, 1859, accounting records show that Lincoln received \$497.50 from Ketchum, Howe and Company. Morris Ketchum was an executive of the Illinois Central Railroad, for which Lincoln performed legal services. Lincoln deposited this amount and withdrew it on the same day.⁷⁸ In that same month, probably in the latter part of April, according to Herriott, Lincoln was a special guest of the Illinois Central Railroad for a journey to Iowa, and he traveled in an exclusive train compartment. He attended

court hearings in Galena for the company, which was engaged in establishing railroad connections to Dubuque and other points in eastern Iowa. It is reported that Lincoln resided in the "swank" Julien House in Dubuque.⁷⁹ The generous offer of \$500 to Lincoln may have been part of the Illinois Central's efforts to expand its reach to the West.

If Lincoln lacked funds when he acquired a printing press for Canisius, an offer of money from the Illinois Central might appear like a practical way to deal with a delicate political problem. Lincoln had generously awarded a press to the Germans in Springfield. It is reasonable to expect a time before he signed the secret contract with Canisius at the end of May 1859.⁸⁰

Connecting the Herndon interview of 1867 with the Canisius contract for a German printing press raises questions. Herndon thought that he took the money against his own better judgment. Did Herndon consider the money offered a bribe? He stated that Lincoln's resistance to taking the offered money was based on his inability to do what was expected of him, to exert influence in a quarter where "he had no power." Herndon's assertion that he was *not* glad that Lincoln took the money implies that the law partner had definite reservations about Lincoln's accepting the \$500.

Could Herndon also blame Lincoln for disposing of Herndon's share without consultation? In this case the answer is very clear: The lack of consultation definitely violated a principle that Herndon elsewhere reported in Lincoln's own words: "I make it a practice never to use any man's money without his consent first obtained."⁸¹

Herndon's anecdote was a response to Caroline H. Dall's question whether Lincoln had "ever done an unfair thing." His remarks imply at least two issues of concern: first, that Lincoln accepted money when it was not entirely proper to do so, and second, that he rushed to use it hastily without consultation. Both uncharacteristic actions show that acquiring the money and giving it to the Germans were matters of personal importance to Lincoln. The contract with Canisius referred to a service for the Republican Party, but Lincoln's personal stake made it expedient to keep the entire transaction secret.

To make public a business deal that made Canisius simply a promotional agent, essentially for profit, would have been counterproductive. Any news about this financial arrangement or its funding source could have undermined the entire initiative. There was, in addition, the consideration that Lincoln could communicate his support to the German-American community without estranging the conservative wing of his party, the remnants of the Know-Nothings. The new arrangement responded to Trumbull's concern that the Republicans should not have to defend a stand that might estrange certain Republican factions.⁸² Part of such calculations was the need to keep

Lincoln's political ambitions out of the public view. According to Herndon, "Lincoln was one of the most secretive men that ever lived. . . . Lincoln never told mortal man his purposes and plans—never."⁸³

The publication of Lincoln's letter to Canisius and Lincoln's financial support for a German newspaper must be seen as part of a single strategic decision. Lincoln was determined to articulate his position on the Massachusetts issue and thereby influence the German vote. He believed that in Illinois the winning of the German-American vote was the key to success. At the same time, he gradually elevated their voting rights concerns to a nationwide level. No copy of the Illinois *Staats-Anzeiger* from the 1850s is known to have survived. On the other hand, there is much evidence of correspondence addressed to that newspaper on the amendment question. Lincoln himself attempted to spread the word about the *Staats-Anzeiger*. He sent a copy to a German acquaintance, Frederick C. W. Koehnle: "By this mail I send you a specimen copy of the new [G]erman paper started here. I think you could not do a more efficient service than to get it a few subscribers, if possible. I have sent a copy to Capps at Pulaski."⁸⁴ Lincoln probably made sure that many politicians in the state legislature would subscribe to this paper, which they could receive free of charge, at the expense of the state. The records of the Illinois State Archives show that Canisius received a payment of \$404 for 552 copies distributed to state senators and representatives.⁸⁵ These papers presumably found their way into the hands of the German-Americans who lived in the communities of the state representatives.

Had Lincoln been thinking early on about his own potential as a presidential candidate? Harry E. Pratt, the scholar who explored Lincoln's finances most exhaustively, noted that Lincoln was willing to "gamble on his chances of being nominated for the presidency as early as the spring of 1859." He attributed the portentous "gamble" on nothing less than to the purchase of the German language newspaper.⁸⁶ To understand fully how Lincoln integrated that purchase into a series of political steps, it is necessary to see it intimately linked to the letter he addressed to Canisius about the Massachusetts Amendment. Informing German-Americans of his support and, at the same time, engaging in secret and morally vulnerable maneuvers to win German friends suggest that Lincoln's actions were deeply motivated and not just the ordinary deeds of a loyal party member. Such risk-laden actions reflect more than simply a commitment to the Republican Party. To reveal his personal ambitions to the general public was, at this stage, out of the question, but to make cautious moves to win the political allegiance of German-American voters appears, in retrospect, as the calculation of a realistic politician.

After the failed senatorial election Lincoln confided his thoughts about

his defeat to Herndon. George Alfred Townsend, who recorded his interview with Herndon, called it "the most remarkable episode" in his conversation. Lincoln reportedly said: "This defeat will make me president."⁸⁷ Again, in response to his defeat, Lincoln commented: "Douglas has taken this trick, but the game is not played out."⁸⁸ Even if the offhand remarks cannot be taken as a serious plan, they should not be discounted entirely. Lincoln's strong interest in the presidency appears most evident in reports on a meeting of Republican leaders about the same time. Discussion at that meeting turned to the imminent election of 1860. In response to the question about the person to consider for the presidency, Lincoln surprised his colleagues with the suggestion of making him the candidate: "Why don't you run me?" he said. "I can be nominated, I can be elected, and I can run the government." Such remarks could have been made so freely only to good friends who knew that they had to be kept secret.⁸⁹ On the other hand, there is overwhelming evidence of Lincoln's protestations in public against the idea of the presidency. The difference between private ambitions and public protestations need not be thought of as a contradiction. It made perfect sense for an astute politician in the role of a dark horse to remain silent until the last possible moment. If it is true that Lincoln expressed private thoughts about his candidacy as early as January 1859, it should not be surprising to discover more specific considerations and actions just a few months later.

Michael Burlingame observed that after his defeat in January 1859 Lincoln began acting like a presidential candidate, despite his claims to the contrary.⁹⁰ The acquisition of the German printing press to create a solid alliance with the German-American voters reflected his belief that those voters could make a difference and that to win their votes it was important to act aggressively. Investment in the press was not an isolated incident; it took place in carefully planned coordination with the public letter to Canisius, in which Lincoln vigorously defended the voting rights of German-Americans.

F. I. Herriott, who conducted extensive research on the impact of that letter to Canisius, has shown that it generated a virtual storm of editorials and articles in German papers nationwide. If Herriott had known that this letter was part of a secret strategy that included the purchase of a German press and Lincoln's eye on the presidency, he might have elaborated on the importance of Lincoln's initiative. After the focus on the Republican presidential candidates narrowed in 1860, the German position in the national debates emerged in greater clarity and significance. Canisius made sure that Lincoln's letter continued to be printed and reprinted in German papers throughout the country.⁹¹

Notes

¹ Zucker, *The Forty-Eighters: Political Refugees of the German Revolution of 1848*, 339–40; Paul Selby, “George Schneider,” *Illinois State Historical Society, Papers in Illinois History and Transactions* (1906): 329–31. Jacob E. Mueller, *Chicago und sein Deutschtum* (Cleveland: German-American Biographical Publ. Co., 1901–02), 109–12.

² Quoting the *Chicago Democratic Press* of February 20, Paul Selby, “Lincoln and German Patriotism,” *Deutsch-Amerikanische Geschichtsblätter* 13 (1913): 514.

³ F. I. Herriott, “The Germans of Chicago and Stephen A. Douglas in 1854,” *Deutsch-Amerikanische Geschichtsblätter* 12 (1912): 390–7. The Chicago Congressman John Wentworth opposed the restriction of foreigner rights, and he was successful in getting this amendment eliminated from the final bill. Don E. Fehrenbacher, *Chicago Giant: A Biography of “Long John” Wentworth* (Madison, Wisconsin: The American Research Center, 1957), 129.

⁴ June 14, 1856.

⁵ Herriott, “The Germans of Chicago and Stephen A. Douglas in 1854,” 394–79.

⁶ Bergquist, “The Political Attitudes,” 144, quoting the *Chicago Tribune*, March 18, 1854.

⁷ Reported about a meeting of the “American and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society.” Selby, “Lincoln and German Patriotism,” 510–35, 515. Cf. Herriott, “The Germans of Chicago and Stephen A. Douglas in 1854,” 381–404, 399.

⁸ Doris Kearns Goodwin, *Team of Rivals: The Political Genius of Abraham Lincoln* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005), 160.

⁹ Isaac N. Arnold, *The History of Abraham Lincoln and the Overthrow of Slavery* (Chicago: Clarke & Co., 1866), 89.

¹⁰ Paul M. Angle, ed., *New Letters and Papers of Lincoln* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1930), 134.

¹¹ *Daily Illinois State Journal*, September 7, 1858. The Turner Society of Bloomington was founded in April 1855. William Adams, *The Turners in Bloomington* (Normal, Illinois: William H. Adams, 1998), 3.

¹² Michael Burlingame, *Abraham Lincoln: A Life* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), I, 379–87. Lincoln is said to have delivered the same speech in Peoria. Cf. Basler, ed. *Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln*, 2:255.

¹³ Burlingame, *Abraham Lincoln: A Life*, 1:387.

¹⁴ David C. Mearns, *The Lincoln Papers* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1848), 1:189–90.

¹⁵ *Daily Journal*, October 27, 1854, 3.

¹⁶ Chicago’s *Daily Journal* reproduced only short fragments from his speech. Basler, ed. *Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln*, 2:283–84.

¹⁷ The daguerreotype with the same text was also published in Ida M. Tarbell, *The Early Life of Abraham Lincoln* (New York: McClure, 1896), 12.

¹⁸ A strong supporter of Lincoln, Arnold later served in Congress and was given credit for a crucial role in the legislation for emancipation. James A. Rawley, “Isaac Newton Arnold, Lincoln’s Friend and Biographer,” *Journal of the Abraham Lincoln Association* 19 (1998): 39–56.

¹⁹ The original photograph was made by Johan Carl Frederic Polycarpus von Schneidau, but Samuel Alschuler, who had purchased Schneidau’s studio, manipulated the original daguerreotype. The resulting ambrotype now shows the *Chicago Press and Tribune* in Lincoln’s hands. Cf. Lloyd Ostendorf, *Lincoln in Photographs: A Complete Album* (Dayton, Ohio: Rockywood, 1998), 18–19.

²⁰ New York Times, June 9, 1852. <http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=F20A17FE3B55177493CBA9178DD85F468584F9> Von Schneidau’s naval career effectively ended with his marriage to a Jewish woman, and he emigrated to the United States in 1842. Ernst W. Olson, *History of the Swedes of Illinois* (Chicago: Engberg-Holmberg, 1908), 193–96.

²¹ Von Schneidau's name appears as Consul Schreidau. Other participants were: Cassius Clay, Dr. Egan, J. Young Scammon, Attorney McIlroy, P. M. Scripps, Iver Lawson, Andrew Nelson, J. H. Kedzie, R. K. Swift, P. Almini, N. Peterson, P. Hussander, Charles J. Sundell, and Dr. Gibbs. "Birth of the G.O.P." *Chicago Tribune*, September 30, 1894. Nils William Olson, "Abraham Lincoln's Photographer," <http://www.kb.se/dokument/Aktuellt/audiovisuellt/N%C3%A5gra%20hyll%28nings%29centimeter/217-222OlssonAbrahamLincoln.pdf>. I am grateful to George Jones for precise information about von Schneidau.

²² ". . . aus jenen Tagen [1854] stammt das beifolgende treffliche Bild Abraham Lincolns, das der deutsche Photograph Allschüler [*sic*] aufgenommen hat und das uns von Herrn Schneider für die Jubiläumsnummer freundlich zur Verfügung gestellt worden ist." (" . . . the fine picture shown here, made by the photographer Allschüler [*sic*], which Mr. Schneider has made available to us, originated in those days [of 1854]." FB) *Jubiläumsausgabe zum 50-jährigen Bestehen der Illinois Staats-Zeitung*, April 21, 1898, section 2.

²³ Pinsker also suggests the possibility that Lincoln had visited Chicago earlier. Clara Schneider Berger, George Schneider's daughter, who presented Schneider's photograph to the Chicago Historical Society in January 1825, remembered that the photograph "was taken in the presence of my father August 9th, 1854. Lincoln and he had dined together, walking down Lake St. a photographer recognized them and invited both of them to have their pictures taken and this one was the first copy." As long as no independent confirmation for a Lincoln stay in Chicago for August 9, 1854, exists, this date must remain speculative. Cf. Matthew Pinsker, "Not Always Such a Whig: Abraham Lincoln's Partisan Realignment in the 1850s," *Journal of the Abraham Lincoln Association* 29 (2009): 27–46. Pinsker's article displays the copy that the Lincoln Presidential Library in Springfield acquired in 2006. The image in this case is reversed. For another copy in a private collection see R. Bruce Duncan, "The Day Lincoln Lied" [about Polycarp von Schneidau], *The Daguerreian Annual* (2005): 85–90. Charles Hamilton and Lloyd Ostendorf, *Lincoln in Photographs* (Dayton, Ohio: Morningside, 1985), 18–19.

²⁴ Ezra M. Prince, ed., "Commemorative of the Convention of May 29, 1856," *Transactions of the McLean County Historical Society* 3 (1900): 12.

²⁵ A. T. Andreas, *History of Chicago* (Chicago: Andreas, 1884), 390; *Jubiläumsausgabe zum 50-jährigen Bestehen der Illinois Staats-Zeitung*, April 21, 1898, 7; Wilhelm Rapp Papers at the Newberry Library in Chicago.

²⁶ Judith A. Rice, "Ida M. Tarbell: A Progressive Look at Lincoln," *Journal of the Abraham Lincoln Association* 19 (1998): 57–72; Benjamin P. Thomas, *Portrait for Posterity: Lincoln and His Biographers* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1947), 201. References to Schneider in Tarbell's book on Lincoln suggest that she might have received information directly from Schneider. Ida M. Tarbell, *The Life of Abraham Lincoln* (New York: Doubleday, 1909), 1:290 and 340.

²⁷ Isaac N. Arnold, *The Life of Abraham Lincoln* (Chicago: Jansen, McClung & Co., 1885), 125. The danger of losing the votes of the Know-Nothings was real. Cf. David Levine, "The Vital Element of the Republican Party: Antislavery, Nativism, and Abraham Lincoln," *Journal of the Civil War Era* 1 (2011): 481–503, especially note 63.

²⁸ Arnold hoped to receive \$1,000 for the publication of a book of 100 to 200 pages. There is no record of completion. Arnold's letter of November 28, 1879. Chicago Historical Society, Schneider file, 323 XD.

²⁹ *Weekly Chicago Democrat*, March 15, 1856. Bergquist, "The Political Attitudes," 196.

³⁰ George Schneider, "Address [on Lincoln at the 1856 Illinois State Republican Convention]," in Ezra M. Prince, "Convention of May 29, 1856," *Transactions of the McLean County Historical Society* 3 (1900): 87–91. Selby, "Lincoln and German Patriotism," 517. Bergquist, "The Political Attitudes," 200.

Cf. James M. Bergquist, "The Forty-Eighters: Catalysts of German-American Politics," in Frank Trommler and Elliott Shore, eds., *The German-American Encounter: Conflict and Co-*

operation between Two Cultures, 1800–2000 (New York: Berghahn Books, 2001), 28; A. E. Zucker, 338–9. Schneider insisted that the editors agree on a “moderate anti-Know-Nothing plank.” Otto R. Kyle, *Abraham Lincoln in Decatur* (New York: Vantage, 1957), 72.

³¹ Kyle, *Abraham Lincoln in Decatur*, 141

³² Theodor Canisius, *Abraham Lincoln: Historisches Charakterbild* (Vienna: Reisser, 1867), 214–15. The English quotation of Lincoln’s statement is a translation from the German text of Canisius.

³³ Bergquist, “The Political Attitudes,” 206. Quoting from the same source, Burlingame reads 20,000 in Ray’s letter to Trumbull, March 21, 1856. Cf. Burlingame, *Abraham Lincoln: A Life*, I, 412. A reliable biography of Charles H. Ray is still lacking. A biography of Ray by Jay Monaghan, *The Man Who Elected Lincoln* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956), fails to treat this important topic in depth.

³⁴ Selby, “Lincoln and German Patriotism,” 518.

³⁵ Burlingame, *Abraham Lincoln: A Life*, 1:413.

³⁶ Tarbell, *The Life of Abraham Lincoln*, 295.

³⁷ Burlingame, *Abraham Lincoln: A Life*, 1:413–17. Andreas, *History of Chicago*, 389–91. Prince, “Convention of May 29, 1856,” 58–59.

³⁸ Wayne C. Temple, “The Linguistic Lincolns: A New Lincoln Letter,” *Lincoln Herald* 94 (1994): 108–14. Sabine Freitag, *Friedrich Hecker: Two Lives for Liberty* (St. Louis: Mercantile Library, 2006), 174–77.

³⁹ Roy P. Basler, ed., *Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln. Supplement* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood, 1953), 27–28. The Douglas paper is known to have appeared in 1855 and 1856. Whether it survived to 1858 is not known. Bergquist, “The Political Attitudes,” 190–91.

⁴⁰ April 17, 1859. Zucker, *The Forty-Eighters*, 129, cf. 135.

⁴¹ July 10, 1859. Basler, ed. *Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln*, 2:499–500. Cf. Basler, II, 323.

⁴² Lincoln’s letters of July 25, 1858. Basler, ed. *Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln*, 2: 523–24.

⁴³ Basler, ed. *Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln: Second Supplement 1848–1865* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1953), 15–16. Harry E. Pratt, *The Personal Finances of Abraham Lincoln* (Springfield: Abraham Lincoln Assoc., 1943), 104–5.

⁴⁴ Harris, *Lincoln’s Rise to the Presidency*, 147.

⁴⁵ Everts B. Green, “Gustave Koerner,” in Don Heinrich Tolzmann, ed. *Illinois’ German Heritage* (Milford, Ohio: Little Miami, 2005), 93–105.

⁴⁶ Koerner’s letter to Lyman Trumbull, dated Belleville, July 4, 1857, in the papers of Lyman Trumbull at the Library of Congress.

⁴⁷ Basler, ed. *Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln*, 3:376–77.

⁴⁸ April 11, 1859. Basler, ed. *Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln*, 3:376–77.

⁴⁹ On Trumbull and the Germans of Illinois see Bergquist, “Political Attitudes,” 160–61. Cf. Appendix G.

⁵⁰ Records of Canisius’s applying for citizenship in St. Louis and receiving it in Madison County are available in the Illinois Regional Archives Depository at Morris Library of Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, Illinois.

⁵¹ Although a street is named after Canisius in Allendorf, documentary evidence about his revolutionary activities in Allendorf and Arnsberg is lacking. Friedrich Schütte, *Westfalen in Amerika* (Münster: Landwirtschaftsverlag, 2009), 170–73; A. E. Zucker, “Dr. Theodore Canisius, Friend of Lincoln,” *American-German Review* (1950):13–15 and 38; Carl Wittke, *Refugees of Revolution: The German Forty-Eighters in America* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1952), 283–84. Canisius’s birth reported on a Web site for Allendorf, as August 2, 1826, but his naturalization application of December 5, 1850, at the district court in St.

Louis shows 1828 as his date of birth. In response to "malignant personal attacks," six physicians of Springfield published a statement confirming that Canisius was in the possession of a legitimate medical diploma. *Daily Illinois State Journal*, April 12, 1859.

⁵² Canisius's letters of December 8, 1857 and January 15, 1858 to Trumbull. Papers of Lyman Trumbull at the Library of Congress. Appendix G.

⁵³ Canisius's letter of April 12, 1858 to Trumbull. Appendix G.

⁵⁴ Canisius's letter of January 15, 1858 to Trumbull. Appendix G.

⁵⁵ Metzner, *Jahrbücher der Deutsch-Amerikanischen Turnerei*, 2:166, 264–65 and 3:39.

⁵⁶ *Daily Illinois State Journal*, February 2 and 5, 1858.

⁵⁷ Bergquist's source for this information is a letter of February 18, 1858 by Dr. Leopold de Lew to Trumbull. Bergquist, "The Political Attitudes," 290–91.

⁵⁸ Census records of Sangamon County, July 19, 1860.

⁵⁹ *Daily Illinois State Journal*, March 16, 1860.

⁶⁰ Reinhard H. Luthin, *The Real Abraham Lincoln* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1960), 121. Cf. *New York Daily Tribune*, February 15, 1867. Also in George Alfred Townsend, *The Real Life: Abraham Lincoln. A Talk with Mr. Herndon* (New York: Bible House, 1867).

⁶¹ *Daily Illinois State Journal*, May 12, 13, and 17, 1859.

⁶² Canisius eventually published this letter in his *Illinois Staats-Anzeiger* (from which it was reprinted in other German papers). Canisius wrote that the document was being "circulated by the press throughout the land," and had become important "for the coming campaign, as showing to the nation the opinions held by Mr. Lincoln." See Herriott, "The Premises," 218 ff.

⁶³ *Ibid.*

⁶⁴ July 6, 1859. Basler, ed. *Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln*, 3:390–91.

⁶⁵ Herriott, "The Premises," 220–21.

⁶⁶ Letter of July 18, 1858 to Trumbull.

⁶⁷ Paul M. Angle, ed. *New Letters and Papers of Lincoln* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1930), 204–7; Basler, ed. *Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln*, 3:380–84. Karl J. R. Arndt and May E. Olson, *Die deutschsprachige Press der Amerikas* (Munich: Verlag Dokumentation, 1976), 1:105–8.

⁶⁸ Wayne C. Temple, "The Linguistic Lincolns: A New Lincoln Letter," *Lincoln Herald* 94 (1994): 111.

⁶⁹ Judd to Lincoln, Friday, May 13, 1859. The Abraham Lincoln Papers at the Library of Congress, transcribed and annotated by the Lincoln Studies Center, Knox College, Galesburg, Illinois. <http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/malquery.html> It is not known when Lincoln wrote to Judd, but it must have been before he solved the problem of acquiring the needed funds. It is conceivable that Canisius made several requests for funds, first to acquire the press and then to cover previous debts or future expenses.

⁷⁰ To pay his debts Lincoln had to focus on his law practice. In an effort to explain why he was declining invitations to speak, he was pleading poverty. Michael Burlingame, *Abraham Lincoln: A Life* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 1:559–65. Albert J. Beveridge, *Abraham Lincoln* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1928), 4:335. Basler, ed., *Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln*, III, 337.

⁷¹ After 1861 Canisius served as consul in Vienna. He held other consular posts in Bristol and the Samoan Islands, but died in poverty in Chicago. A. E. Zucker, "Dr. Theodore Canisius, Friend of Lincoln," *American-German Review* (1950): 13–15 and 38.

⁷² Canisius represented Alton and Jerseyville in New Jersey at the national Turner meeting of August 30 to September 2, 1858. Metzner, 2:264; Theodore Canisius, *Abraham Lincoln* (Vienna: Reitzer, 1867).

⁷³ Pratt provides the figure of \$400. He states that Lincoln made the purchase of the press *through* his friend Jacob Bunn, but he does not state that Bunn provided the money, as

the more recent illustrated 1970 Reader's Digest edition of Sandburg's *Prairie Years and War Years* mistakenly asserts. Cf. 115. Pratt, *The Personal Finances of Abraham Lincoln*, 112. An additional \$100 may have been for other publishing expenses that Canisius asked for. Angle, *New Letters and Papers of Lincoln*, 205.

⁷⁴ Carl Sandburg, *Abraham Lincoln: The Prairie Years* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1926), 2:35–36. The anecdote appears in the context of a discussion of Lincoln's finances. Sandburg does not note the obvious connection of this anecdote with the secret agreement Lincoln made with Canisius. Sandburg describes that arrangement, on p. 184.

⁷⁵ Douglas L. Wilson and Rodney O. Davis eds., *Herndon's Lincoln* (William H. Herndon and Jesse W. Weik) [Chicago: University of Chicago Press 2006]. Cf. Emanuel Hertz, *The Hidden Lincoln from the Letters and Papers of William H. Herndon* (New York: Viking, 1938).

⁷⁶ C. H. Dall, "Pioneering," *Atlantic Monthly* 19 (1867): 403–16, especially 413. David Donald describes Dall's visit at Herndon's house in Springfield. *Lincoln's Herndon* (New York: Knopf, 1948), 221–23 and 234–35.

⁷⁷ Dall explains why she asked this question: ". . . for I heard stories in Illinois that made me think it was possible that even *he* had not been immaculate,—some rumor of an ex-governor guilty of enormous frauds upon the revenue, whose retainer he had accepted." Dall, "Pioneering," 413.

⁷⁸ Pratt, *The Personal Finances of Abraham Lincoln*, 168 and 179.

⁷⁹ F. I. Herriott, "Iowa and the First Nomination of Abraham Lincoln," *Annals of Iowa*, 3rd Series, 9 (1911): 220.

⁸⁰ At the end of Lincoln's contract with Canisius there is a note: "May 30. 1859. Jacob Bunn bought the press, types &c. of John Burkhardt, for me, and with my money A. LINCOLN." Basler, ed. *Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln*, 3:383.

⁸¹ Hertz, *The Hidden Lincoln*, 212.

⁸² After the Republican nominating convention resolved to protect the rights of naturalized citizens, Trumbull regretted that the plank adopted might drive away the "Americans." Bergquist, "The Political Attitudes," 307.

⁸³ Hertz, *The Hidden Lincoln from the Letters and Papers of William H. Herndon*, 256.

⁸⁴ See letter of July 11, 1859, to Koehnle, assistant in the circuit clerk's office in Lincoln, Illinois. Basler, ed. *Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln*, 3:391.

⁸⁵ A number of members of the 1861 Illinois General Assembly subscribed to the *Staats-Anzeiger* at state expense, as legislators were allowed. On February 23, 1861, the state auditor issued warrant #9297 (for \$312) to Theodore Canisius for 312 copies of *Staats-Anzeiger* for members of the state Senate; #9309 (for \$92) to Theodore Canisius for 240 copies of the *Staats-Anzeiger* for the House." According to James Cornelius of the Lincoln Library in Springfield, the basis of this information is in the Illinois State Archives, in the State Auditor files, warrants. Copies of the receipts signed by Canisius have been published in Sunderine (Wilson) Temple and Wayne C. Temple, *Abraham Lincoln and Illinois' Fifth Capitol* (Mahomet, Illinois: Mahaven, 2006), 278.

⁸⁶ Pratt, *The Personal Finances of Abraham Lincoln*, 112.

⁸⁷ Townsend, *The Real Life: Abraham Lincoln*, 10. Also in *New York Daily Tribune*, February 15, 1867. Cf. Reinhard H. Luthin, "Lincoln Appeals to German American Voters," *The German-American Review* 25 (1959): 4–6 and 15.

⁸⁸ Charles S. Zane, "Lincoln as I Knew Him," *Sunset Magazine* 29 (Oct. 1912): 430–38. Quoted by Michael Burlingame, *The Inner World of Abraham Lincoln* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1997), 247 and 263.

⁸⁹ The strategy session with David Davis, Henry Whitney, John M. Palmer, Leonard Swett, Jesse Fell, and Ozzias M. Hatch took place, according to Ecelbarger, in the Springfield capital building on January 6, 1859. Gary Ecelbarger, *The Great Comeback: How Abraham Lincoln Beat the Odds to Win the 1860 Republican Nomination* (New York: St. Martin's Press,

2008), 15 and 246. Baringer relies on reminiscences given by Davis to Ferdinand C. Iglehart in a newspaper article called "With Lincoln." Lincoln Collection at Brown University. Burlingame, *The Inner World of Abraham Lincoln*, 249–50. Cf. Emanuel Hertz, ed. *Lincoln Talks: A Biography in Anecdote* (New York: Viking Press, 1939), 164–5.

⁹⁰ Burlingame, *The Inner World of Abraham Lincoln*, 249. Cf. Eric Foner, who believes that Lincoln began to think about himself as a contender only in the fall of 1859. Eric Foner, *The Fiery Trial: Abraham Lincoln and American Slavery* (New York: Norton, 2010), 136.

⁹¹ Herriott, "The Premises," 218 ff. The suggestion that Lincoln's motives for the purchase of a German press were motivated as a response to a Bates candidacy is clearly false. The Bates movement did not begin until late 1859. Marvin R. Cain, "Edward Bates and the Decision of 1860," *Mid-America: An Historical Quarterly* 44 (1962): 111 and 116.

