

Chapter 6. A Thwarted Movement and Lincoln's Nomination

The thing [Lincoln's nomination] was well planned and boldly executed.

Edward Bates, *Diary*, May 19, 1860

The purchase of the German press at a great cost at a time of financial distress suggests that Lincoln believed that the Germans held the potential of a swing vote, at least in Illinois and perhaps even nationally. Publicly he denied that he was contemplating the presidency. In April 1859, Republican editors of Illinois suggested that Lincoln should become a candidate. Lincoln responded, however, that although he was flattered, he did not think himself fit for the presidency and that it was "best for our cause that no concerted effort . . . should be made."¹ Not making such considerations known publicly appears to have been a realistic way to proceed. According to Doris Kearns Goodwin, Lincoln was a master of timing. It was important not to reveal his intentions too early, so as to minimize the possibility of opponents mobilizing against him.² The Republican National Committee met in New York on December 21, 1859, to consider where to hold the convention. If the committee had been aware of Lincoln as a serious contender, the argument for Chicago would have been weakened and the argument for that city as a neutral location undermined. Norman Judd, representing Illinois as the Republican State Chairman, argued for Chicago, which was chosen over St. Louis by only a single vote!³

The St. Louis location would have given Edward Bates (1793–69), who was being put forward as a presidential candidate from Missouri, a strong impetus, but now Chicago put Lincoln in a clear advantage. Judd, who favored a quiet approach, continued to play a major role in the process that led to Lincoln's nomination. In a letter of April 2, 1860, to Trumbull, he outlined the cautious strategy to be followed.

Cannot a quiet combination between the delegates from New Jersey, Indiana and Illinois be brought about—including Pennsylvania[?]

United action by those delegates will probably control the convention. The movement for Lincoln has neutralized to some extent the Bates movement in our state. It will not do to make a fight for delegates distinctly Lincoln. But state pride will carry a resolution of instruction through our state convention. This suggestion has been made to Mr. L[incoln].⁴

Judd's plans depended on efforts without public fanfare. A meeting of the Republican State Central Committee had taken place in Bloomington on April 7, 1859. Joseph Medill recalled that the Republican State Central Committee met at the offices of the *Chicago Tribune* in the summer of 1859 and agreed on a strategy of having the papers in southern Illinois begin the Lincoln presidency movement, which was to be carried forward subsequently by the *Tribune*.⁵ Although Koerner was not present, he was well informed and reported: "Upon consultation with some of the members of the Republican State Central Committee and other leading Republicans, it was agreed that the best policy for the party in our state was to keep Lincoln in the background for the present, or at least not to push his claim to any extent." It was thought to be better to have other potential candidates compete with each other.⁶ The decisive delegations would have to be approached quietly and drawn away from Seward and Bates. The "quiet" alliance with the German-Americans was part of this broader, low-key strategy.

In February 1860, Lincoln was asked if he would support Bates for the presidency. Without simply refusing, Lincoln pointed out the difficulties that Bates would confront in his run for the nomination. One of them was that, because of his Know-Nothing background, he would probably not win the needed votes of German-Americans.⁷

In the critical days leading up to the convention, Judd did not ignore the concerns of German-Americans of Chicago. along with Charles H. Ray, he requested the establishment of a consulate in that city, "deeming it very important for the interests of our large German population." They asked Trumbull to get in touch with the Prussian ambassador, Baron von Gerolt, to consider appointing Otto V. Schrader, a Chicago banker, for the post of consul.⁸ This initiative, only a few days before the beginning of the convention, was part of an intense effort on many fronts to win Lincoln's nomination. Schrader undoubtedly commanded needed financial resources and political power.

The Illinois campaign to nominate Lincoln began in earnest on January 18, 1860, when Baker's *State Journal* announced favoring Lincoln as president. Baker's announcement certainly did not occur without previous consultation with Lincoln. As if by previous agreement, Joseph Medill and

Charles Ray, editors of Chicago's *Press and Tribune*, followed Baker's cue on February 16 and also endorsed Lincoln for the presidency.⁹ On May 10, the Illinois Republicans assembled in Decatur and instructed delegates to vote for Lincoln. Thus, Lincoln could represent Illinois as the state's favorite son. Lincoln spoke, and after stormy applause, George Schneider, who, according to Ida Tarbell, was an ardent "Seward man," turned to his neighbor and reluctantly conceded: "Seward has lost the Illinois delegation."¹⁰ At this point the proclamations for Lincoln might have been seen strictly as a local phenomenon, not of great significance beyond Illinois. For most German-Americans a Lincoln candidacy was not of great interest or excitement. Their favorite candidate was still Senator William H. Seward of New York.

Seward's perceived radicalism became a serious problem. Horace Greeley, the editor of the powerful *New York Daily Tribune*, refused to endorse the favorite of German Republicans. Though sympathetic to the German-Americans in labor issues and opposed to the Massachusetts Amendment, Greeley believed that Seward was too liberal to win the needed votes in the West, much less in the South. He began an aggressive campaign to nominate a conservative politician, such as Edward Bates of Missouri, who would be able to win votes in the West, and even possibly in the South. After Seward, Judge Bates became the most seriously considered candidate. This initiative could be seen as a kind of "fusion" that Lincoln in his letter to Canisius had cautioned about: It could be "letting down the Republican standard." But because the *Tribune* was the most powerful newspaper in the United States, Greeley's recommendation, appearing in February and subsequently, could not be taken lightly.¹¹ By raising questions about Seward and proposing Bates, Greeley provoked a national debate in which the German-American press and the Turners eventually participated.

The initiative for Bates, who had been associated with the Know-Nothings, shocked German-Americans all over the country out of their reserve. In his *Freie Presse von Indiana*, Theodor Hielscher (1822–1907), an ardent Turner and journalist, had proclaimed the evils of slavery and the just cause of the new Republican Party as early as 1856. In January 1860, he began an intensive campaign for German participation in all political activities leading to the nomination of the Republican presidential candidate. He took part in the convention of Center County (Indianapolis) and was selected to be a delegate to the state convention. He called on German-Americans to attend a mass meeting in the Turner Hall of Indianapolis. The Republican state convention took place on February 22. Hielscher attacked the newly emerging Bates movement. He was willing to admit the possibility that Bates was a good man, but the crisis required a man of "indomitable courage." On February 21, he contributed an article to the *Indianapolis Daily Journal* on

"Candidates for the Presidency." Because of the impact of his opposition to Bates on the events leading to the nomination in Chicago, Hielscher's article deserves to be quoted in full:

It has been reported (by what authority I do not know) that not a few Republican congressmen are urging the nomination of Mr. Bates of Missouri and Mr. Cameron of Pennsylvania. Now it strikes me if this rumor be true that our Congressmen had in the first place better mind their own business for which they are elected and not attempt to perform what the people can do themselves. And, further, it seems that there are a number of men in our party whom even the Lecompton swindle could not cure of their "conservatism." In 1848, during the revolution in Germany, there were also such men. Though others could see that the kings, dukes, and princes had formed a secret league in order to overthrow the popular will, those gentlemen boldly asserted that they were "unable" to see the signs of the gathering storm. Their confidence was boundless. And yet I remember having met one of these men, who could not see the "reaction," as it was called in 1848, fleeing before the bayonets of the soldiers in 1849, and all he had to say when I asked him whether he was now able to see the "reaction" was "Who would have thought it possible!"

So it is also in this country. Here we also have men who cannot see the signs of approaching storm. They are the same persons who, as soon as the storm comes, lose all their presence of mind, and with all their loud clamor and wailing, their inactivity and awkwardness are constantly blocking up the way for those that have courage enough to brave the tempest.

"A Conservative man!" "A Conservative Ticket." This is the continual cry of our do-nothing politicians. If the people would leave it entirely to them, I am confident they would nominate a ticket and make a platform for which even the slaveholders of Georgia could vote, and on which even they could stand.—Like the false prophets of old, they constantly will cry "Peace, peace," when there is war.—Though we actually are already engaged in the "irrepressible conflict," though southern papers (*Richmond Enquirer*) are already discussing the possibility of making the French emperor the protector (or master) of a southern confederacy, though southern assemblies are taking steps for disunion, though Mr. Buchanan sends to these disunions ARMS, which they are themselves unable to manufacture—though the infamous Lecompton swindle, by which

a free state is expected to have, and by which, moreover, that free state, though possessing the requisite number, is still kept out of the Union "until a census be taken (which means, in other words, "until the presidential election of 1860 is over" —though all these facts are before the land and the people, yet our "conservatives" are unable to see or to remember them. Their talk of nominating Mr. Bates or Mr. Cameron is proof of this.

Mr. Bates may be, personally, a very good man, and in his private life without taint or reproach. Mr. Cameron may be a very good man for the iron manufacturers of Pennsylvania. They both might, in ordinary times, do quite well; yet these are not ordinary times. When the slaveholders are talking of disunion in case a Republican president would be elected, it is not the time to look for "conservative" gentlemen to fill the presidential chair, or do our "conservative" friends believe they are able to carry a single southern state with the names of Bates or Cameron? I do not think even them to be sanguine in their hopes. The southern aristocracy cannot be won by concessions. The conflict between the two systems of labor must be carried out, and it is no man's power to allay it.

The *Richmond Enquirer* knows exceedingly well why it advises its readers to call for a foreign tyrant to uphold their peculiar system of labor, by which the capitalist owns the laborer himself, his wife and child, and is enabled by law to cheat him out of his wages. At the same time that paper silently concedes that the slave states cannot take care of themselves and that it is the North that prevents the Negroes from rising up against their masters, and, further, it becomes evident where the "Republican form of government," as carried out in the slave states, is tending to. It tends to aristocracy first, then to oligarchy, and then to monarchy. As they have neglected to transform slavery into servitude, which the United States constitution demanded of them, when that instrument declared Negroes to be "persons;" as they have refused to abolish the interstate slave trade, they are punished by seeing themselves compelled to abolish their "bill of rights." Free speech, liberty of the press, the right to assemble peacefully—all these must be abolished. ABC books and slates become formidable weapons in the hands of slaves; slaves are permitted to pray, but must not learn to read or write; the southern Bible teaches only "obedience to the master," but the words "the laborer is worthy of his hire," and "golden rule," are out of order down South.

And yet our friends talk of conservatism.—In this emergency, where the southern aristocracy, rather than submit to a president,

however constitutionally elected, but in favor of ceding the territories to free laborers from the North and the South, and not to the "drones of society," who would convert the virgin soil into "sedge patches that outshine the sun," in the emergency where he would be nobility of the southern states, instead of following the example of the North and submitting to the man whom the majority of the nation had chosen, threaten to call foreign soldiers against their countrymen in the free states, in this emergency there are still "conservatives!"

And will the nation follow the advice of these false prophets? I think not. We need not a conservative man, but we need one, like old Jackson, that would not be afraid of saying, "By the Eternal! I will put down treason wherever it shows its head!" and did put it down. We need a man ready for the emergency: a man of indomitable courage, one who has been tried and found true; a man against whom even our enemies cannot say anything derogatory to his character. Have we such a man? I should think so. Cassius M. Clay is such a man and Charles Sumner, whom they struck down in the National Capital, is another. Let us have Cassius M. Clay and Charles Sumner and trust to the Republican spirit in our ranks. We must have a ticket which is worth going into the contest for. We must have names to inspire us. Let us have such and the spirit will do what mere calculations never will reach.¹²

Hielscher's powerful polemic against the Bates candidacy appeared just one day before Indiana's Republican convention. At a time when Bates was reported to be Indiana's favorite, Hielscher spoke to the convention delegates to exclude him from consideration.¹³ Hielscher proposed a resolution to deny support to any candidate who "was not a good Republican in 1856." Although his resolution was tabled, he and the German-Americans he represented received credit for undermining the Bates candidacy. The Indiana delegates had no instructions to vote for Bates. "Majority sentiment among the Hoosiers was for Bates, but the Germans obstructed the selection of a unanimous delegation."¹⁴ The door was open for a significant alternative.

Hielscher's obstructionism caught the attention of Horace Greeley, and the editor of the *Tribune* was not happy. He did not refer to Hielscher properly by name; Hielscher was for him simply a Dutchman who, in Greeley's view, would make a "first-rate Know-Nothing."¹⁵ That designation hardly fit Hielscher's political stand, and the New York *Abendzeitung* considered it an insult that could cost a Republican candidate "some thousands of votes."¹⁶

Hielscher's position on Bates could get wide circulation among Indiana's German-American population by means of his *Freie Presse von Indiana*, but

his views also received sympathetic attention in the *Indiana Daily Journal*. At a meeting of Republicans on March 4, Hielscher asserted that almost 40,000 German votes were at stake.¹⁷ The courage that Hielscher expected from a future president was the spirit of the 1848 revolution. A native of Breslau, Hielscher had studied in Berlin and experienced the revolution in that city. When victims of the uprising were being mourned in the presence of Frederick William IV, King of Prussia, Hielscher boldly demanded that the king remove his hat "before these dead." It is reported that the king did just that. His experience in the revolution became a driving force in his American politics. In 1860, the national Turner Society awarded him a prize for his essay on the question "Whether the Union Was in Danger and What Consequence Its Dissolution Would Have in Political and Economic Terms?" The *Turn-Zeitung* published it.¹⁸

The urgency of the German-Americans to defeat Bates was not restricted to any one state. A meeting of German Republicans in Iowa also decisively rejected Bates as one who did not have the proper credentials for a Republican. He had not supported Frémont, but rather Fillmore and represented the hostile American Party's position on naturalization. The German-Americans proceeded to accuse Bates of proslavery positions and siding with Know-Nothings in 1856. Because the nomination of Bates would "imply a desertion from Republican principles," German-Americans would under no circumstances vote for him.¹⁹ The *Cincinnati Republikaner*, edited by August Willich, reprinted an article of the St. Louis *Westliche Post*, which summed up a consensus among German-Americans: If Bates were nominated, masses of German-Americans would abandon the Republican Party.²⁰ The issue of the Two-Year Amendment had acquired a demonic face; it was that of Bates, and it helped to unify the German Forty-Eighters and Turners in a single cause.

The German Republicans of New York wasted no time. On March 13, they met to assert basic principles that had been articulated at the Philadelphia national convention in 1856. The principles were clear in their opposition to the extension of slavery and in defense of the rights of immigrants. German-Americans could go hand in hand with the Republican Party only if the party nominated reliable representatives of those principles. Cincinnati Germans followed suit; August Becker, Frederick Hassaurek, George Lindeman, John B. Stallo, Gustav Tafel, and August Willich met in the Cincinnati Turner Hall and approved the Davenport resolutions on March 7. The assembly of these citizens demonstrated that German-Americans of varied backgrounds and persuasions could join forces on the issue at hand. Willich, for example, previously associated with Karl Marx, a socialist and abolitionist, criticized by Carl Schurz as an unrealistic radical, joined forces with Hassaurek, who later sided with conservative western delegates at the Chicago convention.

In Cincinnati, German protests against the Kansas-Nebraska Act began aggressively in 1854. Participants at that time included Stallo, who, along with Willich, has received scholarly attention as being among the first Hegelians in the United States.²¹ On April 9, the New York group met again and called for the formation of a German convention in advance of the Republican convention in Chicago. Among the prominent members of this central committee of German Republicans, Forty-Eighters and Turners were well represented; they included Friedrich Kapp, Sigismund Kaufmann, and Andreas Willmann.²² Their resolution asked each German Republican organization in the Union to select three delegates for the meeting to take place in Chicago for the purpose of submitting a draft for a platform to the national convention.²³

The call for a convention on a national basis at the last minute appeared to validate failed efforts by Douai and Kob for a national organization almost four years earlier. On the other hand, the call for an organized meeting stirred up controversy. Aware of the general fear caused by the formation of a German-American party, the Pittsburgh Turners asked to have the nature of the meeting moderated to an informal discussion by those who might attend the Chicago convention anyway. The editors of the *Turn-Zeitung* concurred with this cautious approach.²⁴ They feared the perception of a German voting block, and this is precisely what Horace Greeley took to task. He suspected an organized movement to promote German national interests. Probably mindful of the German opposition to Bates, he wrote, "He who votes in our election as an Irishman or German has no moral right to vote at all."²⁵

Many German-Americans were prepared to vote for Senator Seward of New York, clearly the front-runner in advance of the convention. Opposition to Seward intensified, however, in key states. After Seward's unsuccessful effort to gain the nomination, Thurlow Weed, Seward's political advisor, in a confidential letter, explained the reason for that failure. Delegates of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Indiana, and Connecticut let it be known that Seward could not win in their states.²⁶ Horace Greeley visited one convention delegation after another and repeated the same message: Seward "cannot carry New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Indiana, or Iowa . . ."²⁷ Seward's weakness, above all in states like Pennsylvania and Indiana, opened the door to others.

Bates was too conservative for German Republicans; Seward, the favorite of German-Americans, was too radical for most American voters in states like Indiana. Hielscher saw this predicament as a unique opportunity. He realized that Indiana played a pivotal role. His recommendations of alternate solutions reflected his search for an ideal candidate. In his article of February 10 he proposed for consideration Clay and Sumner. On March 15, his paper published a list of ten Republicans as potential nominees. In a

commentary concerning this list Hielscher noted that Chase, Clay, Frémont, Seward, and Lincoln were being given serious consideration, but as late as March he still maintained that the Germans of Indiana stood firmly behind Seward.²⁸ A need to consider alternatives to Seward became imperative toward the end of that month, however.

Lincoln's friends devised a strategy to make Lincoln a potential second choice with the delegates to the Republican Convention.²⁹ At the same time, Lincoln made a series of successful speeches in New York, Rhode Island, New Hampshire, and Connecticut.³⁰ Did Canisius or Schneider alert Hielscher and the *Turn-Zeitung* about the initiatives in Illinois? Having received substantial financial support from Lincoln to promote the Republican cause, Hielscher was obliged to promote him. Even before Lincoln could be considered as a serious contender, Hielscher wrote in *Die Freie Presse* that, because the Republicans had a significant number of good candidates for the presidency, there would be no need to turn to Bates or Douglas. Cassius Clay of Kentucky, for example, still appeared to be an attractive option. But now, on April 5, Hielscher reduced the field of candidates in a declaration as the front page, English-language editorial on "Success Is a Duty."

Let us have a ticket, we say, that can INSPIRE the masses. The spirit performs wonders. Let us have either Cassius Clay and Lincoln, or Lincoln and Fessenden, or Wade and Fessenden, or Seward and Cassius Clay, or Fremont and Chase. Let us have a Republican President, for success is a duty.³¹

Beside Clay, an equally remote prospect, Lincoln did not seem a likely candidate. Lincoln's name, seen in two combinations at the outset of the declaration, appeared as a nominee here, nevertheless, prominently outside Illinois.

Hielscher's tentative declaration for Lincoln may not have received national attention, but it did have resonance in the Turner community, of which Hielscher was an active member. "Up to the opening of the [Decatur] convention in May there was, in fact, no remarkable mention of Lincoln by the Eastern press."³² It was the beginning of a process that gradually acquired momentum. It took less than a week for the national paper of the Turners to follow Hielscher's lead. On April 10, 1860, the *Turn-Zeitung*, now published in Baltimore, narrowed the focus of realistic Republican candidates to Seward and Lincoln. The author, Wilhelm Rapp (1828–1907), took up the recent discussions among Republicans, specifically the idea that the Republicans could win only with a conservative candidate. Considering the position Bates had taken on the question of slavery, he argued that this was foolish and even

criminal. That position could not be reconciled with the Republican platform. If Douglas was nominated, Bates would be defeated. Rapp's editorial then calculated that in the event that Seward could not be nominated, Lincoln, not Bates, would be the most viable candidate.

Like Hielscher, Wilhelm Rapp came from a revolutionary background. Rapp had been a student at the University of Tübingen. As early as 1846, his poems reflect his spirit of rebellion and struggle for greater freedom. Having taken part in the Baden uprising, he was forced to flee to Switzerland. When he returned secretly to Germany, he was arrested and imprisoned. After his release, he came to the United States, joined the Turners, and soon became chairman of the national Turner Union. He took over the editorship of the *Turn-Zeitung*. His speeches and editorials displayed an intensive interest in "social, political, and religious reform." During his chairmanship, this intense focus on reform reached a climax in the Turner Union's conference in Buffalo on September 24–27, 1855, when the Turners made the opposition to the extension of slavery a primary goal of their program.³³ It was the first of a series of Turner actions moving closer to the newly established Republican Party.

Rapp took up his residence in Baltimore and also edited the *Baltimore Wecker*.³⁴ Unlike Hielscher, he had to contend with the extremely hostile environment of a southern state. In a letter to his father he described these conditions.

Despite these problems, I continued to remain in Baltimore because I enjoyed the challenge, and rightly so, to serve as an outpost of the Freedom Party [Republican] in Maryland, that "lost post in the struggle for freedom." It is true that initially the slaveholders party, the so-called Democratic Party allowed me to do as I wished for it was tightly controlled by the Know-Nothing Party which was then superior in strength and numbers in Baltimore. However, along with the greater political campaigns came persecutions, and my life was in grave danger several times, particularly during the great presidential election campaign of last autumn. . . . Better times arrived for me last year on November 6th as Lincoln emerged victorious from the election campaign and, despite the shameless terrorism of the slaveholders and their puppets, received an enormous number of votes that surpassed all expectations.³⁵

For Rapp, Seward was still the ideal candidate. Hielscher had probably given up on Seward, who was thought too liberal by many Indiana Republicans. Rapp's and Hielscher's attention turned to Lincoln, and one might suspect Canisius, an Illinois Turner, to have been active in promoting

Lincoln. The similarity of their views suggests that occasionally they discussed and shared them. In an editorial of April 10, Rapp proceeded to attack Bates, but he also wrote about Lincoln.

If they want to take Seward out of the running, then Lincoln is the logical choice. He has already survived a life-and-death battle with the "Little Giant" and emerged victorious from that heroic struggle, garnering more votes for his party in Illinois than Douglas did. Douglas owed his reelection to the Senate only to the inequitable division of the electoral districts. With a standard-bearer such as Seward or Lincoln the possibility of victory for the Republican Party remains, even against Douglas.³⁶

After only a minimal delay, Rapp's favorable view of Lincoln's potential served as a catalyst. It received attention in Springfield and Chicago. The *Daily Illinois State Journal* of April 30 published this news with the title "The *Turn-Zeitung* out for Abraham Lincoln." A couple of days later, on May 2, the *Chicago Press & Tribune* published the same article under the title "Mr. Lincoln and the Germans." The titles, the identical introductory statement, and same translation of the article deviated from the guarded formulation of the German article.

The Baltimore *Turn-Zeitung*. The central organ of the German Turner Bund of the United States, which society consists of more than 20,000 members, came out last week in a long and emphatic editorial in favor of Abraham Lincoln for the presidency, believing him to be the strongest candidate the Republican Party could bring forward. The *Turn-Zeitung* predicates its preference for Mr. Lincoln on the ground that he is the safest and most available man in the Republican Party and that with him we can whip the Democrats, even if S[tephen] A. Douglas should be the Charleston nominee. We translate the following from the article:

Will Douglas be nominated by the Democrats, it is then the imperative duty, not only on the ground of honor, but also of availability, for the Republicans to assemble around a man for whom the better part of the people can be excited to enthusiasm. Will we, on the score of expediency pass Seward by, then will Mr. Lincoln be *the* man, as a matter of course. He has already fought a battle for life and death with the "little Giant" and came out of the Titan fight as victor because he conquered for his party in Illinois more

votes than Douglas for his; and Douglas has only to thank the unjust apportionment of the state for his re-election to the Senate of the United States. *Under a standard-bearer like him the Republican Party would be certain of victory*, even against Mr. Douglas, and at all events, it would be shielded against the reproach of dishonest defeat. In the worst event, our party could but retreat with flying colors from the battlefield, and obtain, after a lapse of four years, in accordance with the sentence of 1860 which will lay the destinies of this Union into the hands of the great Northwest, a certain victory.³⁷

Because the Springfield and Chicago papers exaggerated by reporting an emphatic position in favor of Abraham Lincoln, this news item is especially significant. It shows that the German opposition to Bates was not just negation; it could also function in a constructive way. Lincoln's friends were encouraged to see that their favorite had serious support outside Illinois. The short excerpt from the *Turn-Zeitung* became a rhetorical tool to promote Lincoln's nomination. Although the original German text was perhaps only a single editor's opinion, that of Rapp's, the celebration of Lincoln was assumed to have influenced some twenty thousand Turners. This was an exaggeration. At the July 30–August 2, 1860, meeting of the Turner Union in Rochester, New York, the number of active members in the 73 clubs was only 7,080.³⁸

Baker, who had proposed Lincoln for the presidency in January, insisted that the "people of Illinois [were] justified in their determination to place the name of their distinguished citizen" for the highest office. Baker was well prepared, at the same time, to see the importance of a German contribution. On April 4, his paper reported a sweeping success of the Republicans in the city's election, due in no small part to the German-Americans, who deserved "a full share of the glory." On the following day Baker elaborated.

[The German-Americans] are embarking with the Republicans, not for the time being, but *for the war*. They are putting an end to the corrupt dynasty at Washington, which would place slavery on an equal footing with liberty all over the country . . . we are glad to learn that they are almost to a man, in favor of "Old Abe Lincoln" as the Republican candidate for the presidency. In him they find not only an embodiment of the great free labor idea of the day, but a very pioneer of the cause.³⁹

To contend that the German-Americans "to a man" were for Lincoln was certainly an exaggeration. News of Lincoln's candidacy had not even reached most of them. Canisius, nevertheless, could have been the source of such

confident assurances. These words appeared to echo thoughts that Canisius had expressed to Trumbull about a war against Lecompton and Dred Scott. Baker and Canisius evidently worked together closely. Although no copies of the *Staats-Anzeiger* have survived to confirm this, they probably carried parallel sentiments. Since Baker's article was the first to appear, before the report in the *Tribune*, it is safe to assume that he solicited the translation from the original. The most obvious source for the acquisition of the *Turn-Zeitung* article in an English translation was Canisius (the style of the translation makes it evident that it was prepared by a native German). Canisius emerged as a major player in the Turner network, which included Hielscher in Indiana and Rapp in Maryland. It appears that Lincoln's engagement of Canisius had set a series of events into motion.

Canisius continued to make use of his good contact to Baker's *Journal* to emphasize his role in making its impact felt. He wrote during the election campaign:

The letter which Mr. Lincoln, the present standard-bearer of the Republican Party, addressed to me a year ago (on the 17th day of May, 1859) in regard to the Massachusetts Amendment and the fusion of all the opposition elements, is now circulated by the press throughout the land and has become quite an important document for the coming campaign as showing to the nation the opinions held by Mr. Lincoln in regard to these measures. I find the letter now circulating the papers not to be a true copy of the original, originally published in the *State Journal*, on May 18th, 1859. It is, I presume, a re-translation from a German translation, which I published on the day before Mr. Lincoln's nomination at Chicago. As I would like to see the letter published in the exact language of the writer, you will oblige me by re-publishing the enclosed true copy.⁴⁰

Canisius was keenly aware of the role he needed to play in supporting Lincoln. He was Lincoln's agent for the German vote, and he could count on Baker to use his paper in that effort. Canisius advertised his paper in Baker's *Journal*. The ad announced that the *Staats-Anzeiger* "is published at the home [*sic*] of Abraham Lincoln and is devoted to the advancement of the Republican Party and its standard-bearer, Abraham Lincoln. The paper is published at Springfield, every Saturday morning." Single copies could be obtained for \$ 0.75.⁴¹ Baker's *Journal*, on the other hand, appreciated the contributions of Canisius's paper when, on the occasion of Lincoln's election, it thanked for the German contributions in the Springfield area: "The Republicans of Sangamon [County] are greatly indebted for their victory to the gallantry

of the service of the [*Staats-*]Anzeiger, the German Republican organ of this city."⁴²

On the basis of an exhaustive study, Herriott concluded that Lincoln's letter to Canisius became a "primary fact, and perhaps the major fact, in the production of that favorable state of mind among the liberty-loving, progressive Germans" to join the Republican ranks and "instantly to applaud" Lincoln's nomination.⁴³ Burlingame reports that Canisius was one of the members of the team under the leadership of David Davis at the convention in Chicago. Davis rented the entire third floor of Chicago's elegant Tremont Hotel, where he and his aides could entertain doubtful delegates lavishly with cigars, whiskey, wine, and brandy, as the accounts show.⁴⁴ Frank Blair, Horace Greeley, and John Defrees, representing the Bates movement, also established headquarters in the Tremont Hotel.⁴⁵ Major players assembled and prepared to fight for the highest possible stakes.

Canisius was proud of the role he had played. For four years, he wrote to Lincoln in 1861, "I have labored continually for your interest, as innumerable articles in my paper, and the correspondences, which I have written for the leading German papers, will show. No German has succeeded better to make you a favorite with our countrymen than I have."⁴⁶ After 1861 Canisius served as consul in Vienna, but, because of a diplomatic indiscretion, Secretary of State Seward relieved him of his position. Lincoln, however, reinstated him. The president was clearly aware of his debt to Canisius.⁴⁷

Gustave Koerner, who played a key role in Lincoln's nomination, probably knew better than anyone else about the nature of the battle. He was aware of the challenges that Seward and Bates posed and had a chance to observe firsthand how Canisius worked for the same cause. His letter to President Lincoln resulted in the appointment of Canisius as consul in Vienna.

It really strikes me that something should be done for those who have been honestly and honorably at work for your success, which they considered the success of our principles. The Schurz[es], Hassaure[k]s, Blows, [and] Bernays have received high and distinguished offices, the very men whom Doctor Canisius had to fight to the very death at Chicago, when they used every effort to defeat you. I am not aware that a single one of the many Germans, who have been recognized by your administration, was in your favor at Chicago. Now this does seem strange, and it ought to be remedied to a very small extent at least. May I not hope that Dr. Canisius will succeed?⁴⁸

With this letter Koerner confirms that Canisius was part of the Davis

team at the Tremont Hotel. He had "fought to the very death at Chicago." Koerner was recalling the intense scramble to win delegates, in which he and the entire Davis team were engaged.

In an editorial Joseph Medill, who had declared for Lincoln only a few weeks before, stressed that Lincoln would be most capable of winning in the swing states, such as Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. Baker published Medill's article in his Springfield paper.⁴⁹ These papers and the *Turn-Zeitung's* lengthy editorial of April 10 prepared the gradual shift away from Bates and Seward to Lincoln, the dark horse.

The shift from Bates became especially evident in the *Indianapolis Daily Journal*, which printed Hielscher's editorials. On April 19, the paper announced its support for Judge John McLean of Ohio for president. Next to McLean it added, however, the name of Abraham Lincoln, and asserted that next to Judge McLean Lincoln presented "the best combination of qualities as candidate and officer." In reaction, an anonymous letter from Springfield (from Canisius?) to the *Daily Journal* expressed approval of this shift from Bates to McLean. "Of course, Lincoln is decidedly the first choice of Illinois. Next to him is Judge McLean. Bates would be acceptable but for the well known fact that he would receive reluctant support from Germans, now an important element in Republicanism."⁵⁰ The *Indianapolis Daily Journal* received and published a similar opinion from a reader in Rushville, Indiana: "Candidates are numerous. Two or three only are much talked of this part of the state. C. M. Clay and Abe Lincoln are undoubtedly uppermost in the thoughts of Republicans . . . The impression that Bates is obnoxious to the German Republicans is an incubus upon him here."⁵¹

At the same time, following the lead of the German Republicans of New York, the *Turn-Zeitung* published its own appeal to the Turners to select their delegates, three from each state, for a meeting in Chicago. The authors believed that the election of 1860 represented a turning point. Delegates to the conference would defend the principles of the Declaration of Independence, take a stand against slavery, value the equality of all citizens, and take a position against privilege. The platform and the presidential nominee had to conform to these principles. The document addressed the central issues confronting the German-Americans and their responsibilities in dealing with them. Adolf Douai's hand is clearly evident in the urgency of the appeal. Douai had campaigned in 1856, and he did not want to relive the disappointment of a near victory; he had learned lessons from that defeat. The text confronts the need for a disciplined political organization, a legacy of Friedrich Ludwig Jahn, the founding father of the Turners. The text deals with the problem of "blind adherence to a party," an obvious reference to German-Americans who were still inclined to trust the old Democratic Party.

That had to change. The journals that still promoted the Democratic cause had to be brought into the Republican fold. These were practical steps that looked beyond the convention to the crucial election (see Appendix J).

As it turned out, the "Appeal" represented clearly the more radical, eastern position, and the desire to organize and become an active German force was not necessarily shared by other German-Americans in western states, not even among all Turners. German-Americans in the eastern states expressed frustration because they lacked access to the American political centers of power. In the western states, American politicians were quick to recognize the voting potential of the relatively more numerous citizens with German backgrounds. This difference was reflected in political attitudes. A split became obvious in Chicago.

The eastern appeal resulted in a series of meetings of German-Americans at the *Deutsches Haus* in Chicago. The meetings began one day before the official start of the Republican convention. There have been conflicting interpretations of its significance. Reliable, objective firsthand accounts are lacking. The St. Louis *Anzeiger des Westens* reported extensively, but its point of view reflects a one-sided bias and hostility to the eastern organizers of the German convention. James Bergquist has challenged Herriott's detailed presentation about the German meetings in Chicago, above all because Herriott probably overstated the influence of the meeting, understated the conflicts within it, and lacked evidence for the participation of individual German-Americans. There is justification for these criticisms, but the wealth of information Herriott provided about scattered reports, events, and participants should not be discounted entirely. The conflicting interpretations diverge fundamentally with the question of whether German initiatives really influenced the outcome of the Chicago convention.⁵²

At first the German meetings, which started on Monday, May 14, at the *Deutsches Haus*, did not appear to have exerted a direct influence on the convention; newspaper reports were reserved about the proceedings. Only a few persons (one report noted thirty-two) appeared at the initial meeting on Monday afternoon.⁵³ Karl Bernays, a delegate of the Republican Party in Missouri and an editor of the *Anzeiger des Westens* in St. Louis, was glad that no American journalists were present at the stormy meetings, which he considered scandalous. "All hell broke loose," he reported, as the delegates fought over procedural issues.⁵⁴ The heated debates split the delegates into two camps: the radical eastern camp with Douai, Kapp, Stengel, and the representatives of the journals *Pionier* and *New Yorker Demokrat*. On the western, conservative side were Bernays, Butz, Hammer, Hassaurek, Hatterscheidt, Kreismann, Münch, Schneider, and Vogel, who saw the radicalism of the East the dangerous element, and they did not consider a German convention a good

idea at all. The East demanded the explicit rejection of the Massachusetts Amendment and expected to justify that on the basis of the Declaration of Independence. It regretted that the heroic John Brown was being lumped together with the Kansas Border Ruffians.⁵⁵ Any reference to John Brown as a hero would have frightened and alienated delegates in Chicago. The West was only prepared to tolerate only a moderate statement concerning the equality of rights among all citizens. The mutual hostility between East and West was not new to many German-American participants; most of them, as Turner members, had experienced it in the split that occurred earlier between the corresponding geographical divisions within the Turner Union.⁵⁶

The party of the East lacked official representation at the Republican Convention. The state of New York had no German-American delegate at all; Sigismund Kaufmann had the honor of being selected as an alternate, but he probably did not take part in the Chicago meetings. The West operated with the advantage that it had won numerous privileged positions in the state delegations. The *Anzeiger* proudly declared that there were eight German-American delegates from Missouri. This was a distinct advantage in favor of moderation.⁵⁷

At the conclusion of the first day of the German convention, following chaotic shouting and insults, representatives of the two opposing sides were asked to draft a set of compromise resolutions. Caspar Butz of Chicago, also a refugee of the revolution and an active Turner, was chosen to represent the West. Adolf Douai looked after the interests of the East. Their negotiations had to focus on the most pressing issue, a common German position on the "odious" Massachusetts Amendment. It appears that a New York journalist was reporting on this gathering, after all, but he was willing to put the most positive face on it, calling it an informal meeting at which the "best feeling prevailed." According to this report, the meeting showed a consensus on the position against the Massachusetts Amendment and the consideration of the major candidates except Bates.⁵⁸

Apart from the meeting at the *Deutsches Haus*, an assembly of thirteen German delegates to the Republican convention met in the May Hotel on Tuesday morning. Koerner served as chair, Bernays, as secretary. In addition, the participating members of the meeting included Carl Schurz (Wisconsin), George Schneider (Illinois), Friedrich Münch (Missouri), B. Bruns (Missouri), Arnold Krekel (Missouri), Friedrich Hassaurek (Ohio), Conrad Broadbeck (Ohio), A. H. Wagerner (Minnesota), J. G. Peterson (Michigan), and Michael Plessner (Michigan). In stark contrast to the confrontational conditions at the *Deutsches Haus* on the previous day, this smaller circle conducted peaceful and productive deliberations. This group consisted of participants who had access to the American delegates of the convention. Writing for the *Anzeiger*

des Westens, Friedrich Münch, reported on the results:

The most important thing that took place for Germans in Chicago and the source of all the successes was the assembly of all German delegates in the May Hotel on the morning of the first day of the convention. A more unanimous gathering of Germans never has taken place before and probably never shall again. It was everyone's opinion that we should apply all of our influence to achieve as liberal a statement on immigrants in the platform as possible. A proposal was drafted, discussed and adopted.⁵⁹

The resulting proposal was moderate. It avoided a reference to Massachusetts, and it declared opposition to a lengthening of the naturalization period and change in the voting rights in federal or state law. On the basis of this preliminary consensus, attention turned to participation in the platform committee. The members of the meeting expressed confidence that they would be selected to serve on that body: Karl Bernays (Missouri), John P. Hatterscheidt (Kansas), Gustave Koerner (Illinois), and Carl Schurz (Wisconsin).⁶⁰ Their confidence was fully justified. A strong German-American representation made a difference. Carl Schurz later recalled that he had played a substantial role in formulating the plank on immigration.⁶¹ Others on the committee, as, for example, John A. Kasson of Iowa, could be counted on to support the German position. Horace Greeley, a member of the platform committee, recalled that Kasson's role was effective in reconciling differences and securing the "largest liberty of sentiment consistent with the fidelity to Republican principles."⁶²

Kasson, who had a record of alliance with the German-Americans in Iowa, proposed the formation of a subcommittee to draft the platform text. The subcommittee then took shape with Kasson himself, Horace Greeley, Carl Schurz, Austin Blair, William T. Otto, and William Jessup. Otto, an Indiana delegate, related to the German physician of the American Revolution, Dr. Bodo Otto, presumably also supported the plank sought by the German-Americans.⁶³ The committee worked late into the night. Kasson was left alone to finish a draft, which he presented at nine in the morning. The platform committee approved Kasson's text by a unanimous vote.⁶⁴ The segment of greatest interest to the German-Americans gave no occasion for disappointment.

. . . the Republican Party is opposed to any change in our naturalization laws, or any state legislation by which the rights of citizenship hitherto accorded by emigrants from foreign lands shall

be abridged or impaired; and in favor of giving a full and efficient protection to the rights of all classes of citizens, whether native or naturalized, both at home and abroad.⁶⁵

This passage and another one regarding the homestead law subsequently became known as the "Dutch Planks," which Know-Nothing adherents opposed.⁶⁶ When Bernays reported on this success, he was certain of having participated in a historic event. "The German members of the platform committee celebrated a proud triumph today," he wrote. "With this act, the Republican Party has thoroughly purged itself of all accusations of nativism."⁶⁷

At the same time, German-Americans continued their debates at the *Deutsches Haus* on the afternoon of May 15 and then again on May 16. These discussions finally produced a set of resolutions. Perhaps the most hotly debated issue concerned Bates, whom the Missouri representatives had been instructed to nominate. Although the German members of that delegation, Friedrich Münch, Karl Bernays, and Adam Hammer, might have had reservations about their nominee, they had obvious reasons to resist the efforts of the *Deutsches Haus* caucus to eliminate him from serious consideration. Münch attributed the final resolution of the conflicting views to negotiations between the western and eastern factions. He wrote that "the whole thing went its way tolerably and did not degenerate into a riot [was due to] Mr. Butz of Chicago, who made an agreement with Mr. Douai."⁶⁸ Although the radical faction did not realize all of its demands, Wilhelm Kopp gave credit to his eastern adversaries for agreement on fundamental goals, such as the support only for the presidential candidates who qualified as a loyal Republican and the rejection of all Know-Nothing aspirations. The German convention concluded with the formulation of five resolutions. The last one presented the majority view on the Bates controversy:

We pledge ourselves to support any aspirant for the presidency and vice-presidency who stands on this platform and has never opposed the Republican platform of 1856, nor has ever been identified with the spirit of the Massachusetts Amendment.⁶⁹

Instructions were given to print and distribute the resolutions among the delegates.⁷⁰ The New York papers, probably based on Henry Villard's correspondence, reported on this concluding action and effort to influence the Republican Convention:

In the German Republican Convention today, resolutions were almost unanimously adopted to support only true Republican

candidates, and to leave the party if any compromise man or Know-Nothing should be nominated. The Missouri delegates tried to defend their position as supporters of Mr. BATES, but met with no encouragement whatever. Among the most earnest opponents of Mr. BATES are Dr. A. DOUAI, of Boston, and Mr. CARL SCHURZ, of Wisconsin.⁷¹

Although neither side in the East-West confrontations could claim a clear victory, German participants, in general, could be satisfied with the results. They prevailed in the matter of voting rights, and the emphatic position to prevent the nomination of Bates could have contributed to the dramatic developments within the Indiana and Pennsylvania delegations. Most reports on what had been accomplished reflect approval.⁷² To say that the German caucus was instrumental in shaping any outcome in the Republican convention is highly debatable, but the pressure the German assembly could exert by means of its resolutions, reported by the major papers in New York, and common political demands cannot be discounted. Bernays came away with a sense of victory for German-Americans as a whole, eastern and western. The joint participation of Butz and Douai and the subsequent resolution eliminating Bates set the stage for leaders like Schurz and Koerner to be forceful in representing the views of German-Americans. Despite the divisions within the German-American ranks, Bernays could be positive in his assessment: "In this convention the Germans have won a position, have achieved a weight, have attracted attention to their views, which no foreign element has ever won in any country in the world."⁷³ When the formal voting on resolutions began on the second day of the national convention, on May 17, German-Americans had clearly articulated their political positions.

On the floor of the convention, Schurz successfully defended the so-called "Dutch Planks" and prevailed in his debate with Pennsylvania delegate David Wilmot, who attempted to relegate the issue to individual states.⁷⁴ In his speech to the convention Schurz stressed the ability of the German-Americans to deliver the needed votes. He declared 300,000 German votes secure, but estimated the potential voting power of the Germans to reach 600,000.⁷⁵

Although the German-American efforts to prevail on the issue of voting rights appeared to be successful on the convention floor, it was not a foregone conclusion that the fierce opposition to Bates could prevent the Missouri lawyer from becoming a serious contender for the presidency. The crucial testing ground in Chicago took place in the deliberations of the Indiana and Pennsylvania delegations, which represented the pivotal states. The experience of the 1856 election impressed on Republicans that to win

states such as Pennsylvania, Indiana, and Illinois, which the Democrats had won, was absolutely necessary. The front runner, Senator Seward, was not popular in these particular states, and the Republicans in Chicago faced the uncomfortable prospect of defeat for Seward in the general election.

Was it possible, at this late stage, to launch a challenge? Even Horace Greeley, who had proposed Bates and hoped for Seward's defeat, admitted his uncertainty about whether Seward could be stopped. The reports he sent to his *New York Daily Tribune* from Chicago complained about a lack of any coordinated opposition.⁷⁶ The three key states presented a chaotic picture. Illinois was safe for Lincoln, but Pennsylvania was firmly committed to Senator Simon Cameron. Although Indiana did not come to Chicago with specific instructions, it appeared at first to favor Edward Bates. During the subsequent days, the most dramatic and decisive decisions of the convention took place behind closed doors in secret meetings of the Indiana and Pennsylvania delegations.

Lincoln's friends and managers faced two urgent tasks at the outset of the convention: stopping Bates and loosening Simon Cameron's hold on Pennsylvania. Acutely aware of Indiana's importance, Lincoln began courting the delegation early, before the Chicago Convention. On May 1, he wrote to a friend in Ohio, "It is represented to me that Indiana might not be difficult to get." Then he wrote about one of the Indiana delegates, "I believe you personally know C. M. Allen of Vincennes, Indiana. He is a delegate and has notified me that the entire Indiana delegation will be in Chicago the same day you come, Saturday, the 12th." Lincoln wrote to Allen, "Our friend Dubois and Judge David Davis of Bloomington, one or both will meet you at Chicago, on the 12th." Lincoln also contacted an acquaintance on the Ohio delegation and explained that there were efforts under way to gain the support of the Indiana delegation. Aware that other states had their own candidates, Lincoln was satisfied that, even if he was not the first choice, there appeared to be no objections to him as a candidate.⁷⁷ To win over the Indiana delegation was clearly the most pressing task of Lincoln's friends in Chicago.

The effort to win Indiana might have involved promises. According to William H. Herndon, Lincoln's law partner, Judge Davis assured Congressman Caleb B. Smith of a cabinet position. Was there a "bargain" for Smith's aid in winning over Indiana to Lincoln? Although the evidence points to concrete commitments for Smith, he himself denied that "promises from anyone authorized to speak for Mr. Lincoln" were made. According to William T. Otto, one of the Indiana delegates, there was really no effort to promote Smith because, after the delegates considered the available options, "all were for Lincoln." Lincoln, at any rate, was grateful for the role that Smith had performed. He wrote: "I am indeed, much indebted to Indiana; and, as many

friends tell me, much to you personally." Smith's appointment as secretary of the interior, is further confirmation of indebtedness on Lincoln's part.⁷⁸ When the *Indiana Daily Journal* learned about a potential cabinet post for Smith, it welcomed the news with a cheer reminiscent of the wild applause when Smith seconded Lincoln's nomination, while recalling his role in striking "down the hopes of Mr. Bates in that convention."⁷⁹

Subsequent events suggest, nevertheless, that other factors were in play in Indiana's shift to Lincoln. On Monday, May 14, an informal vote of the Indiana delegation showed that Seward and Chase had received one vote each, Judge John McLean of Ohio received four or five, and the rest were divided between Bates and Lincoln, ten each.⁸⁰ On Tuesday, two long sessions followed, and an informal ballot taken at the end indicated that Lincoln had a majority, but conflicting reports showed that delegates were still undecided between Lincoln and Bates. The correspondent of the *Indianapolis Daily Journal* reported:

There is a decided effort for Mr. Bates, and I think it is stronger than anybody at home could have suspected. This afternoon a circular was issued, signed by a committee of Bates's friends, setting arguments for his nomination, and signed by F. P. Blair, Jr., Horace Greeley, James B. Eads, John Defrees, Ja[me]s H. Van Allen, and one or two others. It certainly collects a very strong set of arguments for him, but it cannot alter one indispensable fact, that the foreign vote is indisposed to accept him.⁸¹

The *Journal* recognized that the opposition to Bates was significant and came from the "foreign vote" (that is, the German vote). Hielscher had made that abundantly clear. On Wednesday, the 16th, Lincoln still appeared to be in the majority. On Thursday, a report by Gustave Koerner provides a vivid picture of developments on the day before the first ballots were to be cast.

I immediately dispatched to counteract the [Bates] movement. I heard the last part of Blair's speech. He was followed by Fred [Friedrich] Muench, who promised the vote of Missouri for Bates, and Judge [Arnold] Krekel closed in a rather able speech for Bates.

I now asked leave to speak for Lincoln. The courthouse was crowded with many other delegates [and] with citizens of Chicago. The moment I named Lincoln the cheers almost shook the courthouse. I [disproved] the idea that Bates could carry Missouri, [and I] said that, outside of St. Louis and a few German settlements represented by Krekel and Muench, no Republican presidential candidate could

get a vote; that the state was for Douglas, and that these same gentlemen, led by my friend Blair, had made Missouri a Douglas state two years before, and had opposed Lincoln in his race for the Senate; that I was astonished that my German friends from Missouri talked of supporting Bates, who in 1856 had presided over a Whig national convention at Baltimore, which nominated Fillmore and Donelson, after they had been nominated by the Know-Nothings; that Bates in the municipal elections of St. Louis had several times supported the Know-Nothing ticket; that I would tell this meeting in all candor that if Bates was nominated, the German Republicans in the other states would never vote for him; I for one would not, and I would advise my countrymen to the same effect.

Blair replied, but with much less vigor than he had thrown into his first speech. Browning spoke from a Whig standpoint: that Lincoln had been a Whig, which ought to satisfy the Pennsylvanians and those Indianans who held still to some of the Whig principles. On the other hand, Lincoln had always opposed Native Americanism. This would secure him the foreign Republican vote all over the country. He wound up with a most beautiful and eloquent eulogy on Lincoln, which electrified the meeting. The delegates then held a secret session, and we soon learned that Indiana would go for Lincoln at the start, and that a large majority of the Pennsylvanians had agreed to vote for him for their second choice.⁸²

What Koerner told the Indiana delegation was persuasive, but it could not have appeared entirely new. If he claimed that the Germans would not vote Republican with Bates as a candidate, he could rely on the firmness of the resolutions from the *Deutsches Haus*. His words also echoed much that Hielscher's speeches and articles had repeatedly emphasized. Within the Indiana delegation there was a strong contingent of German-Americans: Theodor Hielscher (Indianapolis), Dr. Conradin Homburg (Indianapolis), John Mansfield (Madison), P. A. Hackelmann (Rushville), Louis Bollmann (Bloomington), and Albert Lange (Terre Haute). William T. Otto (New Albany), a Lincoln supporter of German ancestry, may be considered to have been part of this group. Mansfield, Koerner's former teacher and friend, certainly had numerous reasons to support the movement for Lincoln.⁸³ This group of German-Americans could have been effective in defeating Bates and winning the day for Lincoln. Bates himself confirmed the success of this combined effort. In his diary, he reflected about this turn of events. He felt that the decision against him occurred to "please the Germans unreasonably." He wrote, "The thing was well planned and boldly executed. A few Germans—

Schu[r]z of Wi[sconsin] and Koerner of Ill[inoi]s with their truculent boldness, scared the timid men of Ind[iana] into submission. Koerner went before the Ind[iana] delegation and assured them that if Bates were nominated the *Germans* would bolt!"⁸⁴ This admission by Bates, the person most affected by the turn of events, described the outcome most succinctly. John D. Defrees, the editor of the *Daily Evening Atlas* of Indianapolis and chair of the Indiana State Republican Committee, confirmed the defeat of the Bates movement: "We Bates men of Indiana concluded that the only way to beat Seward was to go for Lincoln as a unit."⁸⁵

There is no doubt that John D. Defrees (1810–82) could speak with authority. He was, after all, one of the leading "Bates men." Although Greeley is generally thought to have been the main force behind the Bates movement, at an early stage Defrees founded a newspaper in Indiana with the clear intention of promoting the candidacy of Edward Bates. The declared goal of the *Daily Evening Atlas*, established on August 22, 1859, was to support a united front to oppose and defeat the Democratic Party, but its second issue carried an earlier interview with Bates and the suggestion that he should be considered for the presidency. From the beginning until its dissolution on March 12, 1860, the paper promoted Bates at every opportunity. The Bates diary for July 1859 reveals that Defrees was part of a design by Schuyler Colfax of Indiana, and Charles A. Dana of the *New York Daily Tribune* to propose Bates as a presidential candidate to challenge Seward.

[Samuel] Bowles, I believe, is in full concert with Tribune of N[ew] York, and Colfax, Defre[es] and other party leaders in the North West to bring me out as a candidate of the Republicans. They are all afraid of Seward—they have personal objections doubtless, but their main ground is their full conviction that with Mr. S[eward] for their candidate defeat is inevitable.⁸⁶

Defrees knew that his mission had a national significance. He wrote: "It may be possible to elect a Republican president without the vote of this state [Indiana], but with it, that result is rendered certain. This at once shows the importance of the elections of next year."⁸⁷ In Indianapolis he had to contend with Hielscher's and the German-Americans' opposition to Bates. The limited appeal of his paper caused its failure weeks before the Republican convention. Defrees carried his fight to Chicago, where he had a formidable obstacle in the person of Koerner, and within the Indiana delegation, he had to contend with Hielscher.

Defrees was forced to abandon Bates, and his conservative political philosophy guided him to turn not to Seward, but with a total commitment

to Lincoln. This was a decisive shift in the nomination process. After gaining the unified vote of the Indiana delegation, he and Henry S. Lane, Indiana's candidate for governor, visited the Pennsylvania delegation and argued for Lincoln. A. K. McClure, a Pennsylvania delegate, described the Indiana leaders' effort to influence his state's vote.

With Lane was John D. Defrees, chairman of his state committee, who had been called to that position because he was regarded as best fitted to lead in the desperate contest before him. . . . Lane and Defrees were positive in the assertion that the nomination of Seward would lose the governorship in Indiana. Curtin [the nominee for governor in Pennsylvania] and I were equally positive in declaring that the nomination of Seward would defeat Curtin in Pennsylvania.⁸⁸

The movement for Lincoln, which began in earnest with the pivotal state of Indiana, made itself felt in the Pennsylvania delegation and eventually clinched its crucial votes. Lincoln rewarded Defrees for his support with a position as head of the government printing office. As in the case of Bates and Seward, Lincoln was prepared to include former rivals in his administration.

With the votes of Illinois and Indiana secure, and those of Pennsylvania likely, the Illinois team for Lincoln could argue from a position of strength, while reaching out to show that its candidate could win states in which Seward might fail. Charles Zimmermann asserted, "The firmness of the Indiana delegation was acknowledged on all sides at Chicago to have been the primary cause of the nomination of Lincoln."⁸⁹ Don E. Fehrenbacher agreed, "Perhaps the turning point of the whole convention was the decision of the Indiana delegation, which had no candidate of its own, to vote for Lincoln on the first ballot." He added, "This commitment, a magnificent gain in itself, also influenced the Pennsylvania delegates. . . ."⁹⁰

Indiana's abandonment of Bates began to turn the tide for Lincoln. Horace Greeley, who had been a driving force behind the Bates movement, confirmed the accuracy of this assessment:

There is no doubt but that the unanimity of the Indiana delegation for Lincoln was the cause of his nomination. If Indiana had divided or given her strength to any other candidate, it is absolutely certain that no concentration could have been made on Lincoln, for it was only the united efforts of the Indiana and Illinois men that secured the cooperation of Pennsylvania and some New England states at the last hour. The firmness and unanimity of Indiana, which had no candidate to interfere with a disinterested choice, nothing to induce

her to adhere to any man from personal motives, and no purpose but to produce a result which would command the widest approval, was acknowledged on all hands at Chicago to be the primary and potential cause of Lincoln's nomination.⁹¹

As important as Indiana was, it is easy to overlook the influence of other states. Lincoln supporters had courted Virginia as early as May 15. On the next day, Judge David Davis followed. After Indiana's decisive vote, Henry S. Lane of Indiana pleaded with the Virginia delegation to support Lincoln. The first ballot also yielded fourteen votes from Virginia.⁹²

The cooperation of the Pennsylvania delegation was essential. Its deliberations during the eventful Thursday were part of the process that enabled Lincoln to challenge Seward. The instructions for that state had been to vote for Cameron as a unit, but on Wednesday debates had raged about a second and third choice for the eventuality of a second and third ballot. Judge McLean became a second choice, and in a contest between Bates and Lincoln for third place, Lincoln prevailed. Even on the evening of Koerner's speech, Pennsylvania delegates were unable to agree on a unified vote beyond Cameron. Deliberations continued late into the night and into the following morning. Koerner thought that Pennsylvania had acted immediately after his speech, but he was mistaken.

Only after the first balloting took place on the following day, Friday, May 18, with Illinois and Indiana casting ballots for Lincoln—when the Cameron initiative had failed to get support from other states—only then, during the second ballot, did the Pennsylvania delegation decide to give its fifty-two votes as a unit to Lincoln.⁹³ Although confirmation is impossible, Davis and Ray probably suggested that Cameron would get a cabinet post, and that might have made the difference. But that late action brought Pennsylvania in line with the neighboring states and persuaded Ohio to provide the needed decisive votes in the third ballot.⁹⁴

Numerous contingent factors were in play in the process that led to Lincoln's nomination. At crucial points in the beginning of that process the aggressive German-American movement to defeat the Bates nomination opened the path for the initiatives of Lincoln's managers to win key states such as Pennsylvania and Ohio in a series of "well planned and boldly executed" maneuvers.⁹⁵ These remarkable, unforeseen, and last-minute successes brought about Seward's surprising defeat and Lincoln's unexpected nomination for the presidency.

Notes

¹ Burlingame, *Abraham Lincoln*, 1:558 and 874.

² Goodwin, *Team of Rivals: The Political Genius of Abraham Lincoln*, 212.

³ *Ibid.*, 228–29.

⁴ Judd's letter of April 2, 1860, to Trumbull is in the papers of Lyman Trumbull at the Library of Congress. Luthin, *The First Lincoln Campaign*, 79. Reinhard H. Luthin, "Indiana and Lincoln's Rise to the Presidency," *Indiana Magazine of History* 36 (1942): 387.

⁵ H. I. Cleveland, "Booming the Republican President: A Talk with Abraham Lincoln's Friend Joseph Medill," *Saturday Evening Post*, 172 (August 5, 1899): 84–85. Cf. Jeffrey Justin Anderson, "Joseph Medill: How One Man Influenced the Republican Presidential Nomination of 1860" (Master's thesis, Roosevelt University, 2011), 47.

⁶ Ecelbarger, *The Great Comeback*, 38–39; Koerner, *Memoirs*, 2:80.

⁷ Harris, *Lincoln's Rise to the Presidency*, 159–60.

⁸ Letter of May 11, 1860 from Judd and Ray to Trumbull in the papers of Lyman Trumbull at the Library of Congress. The recommendation probably did not produce results. It appears that consular duties continued to be handled by Gustavus Adolphus Claussenius, who was a representative of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in Chicago. Enno Eimers, *Preußen und die USA: 1850 bis 1867* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2004), 36. The *Illinois State Business Directory* for 1860 lists Schrader as a banker in Cook County.

⁹ "Throughout January Medill kept Lincoln's name before his readers." Luthin, *The First Lincoln Campaign*, 76–77. As early as November 9, 1859, The *Daily Illinois State Journal* reported that the Illinois' *Olney Times* had announced support for Lincoln.

¹⁰ Tarbell, *The Life of Abraham Lincoln*, 340.

¹¹ Ralph Ray Fahrney, *Horace Greeley and the Tribune in the Civil War* (Cedar Rapids, Iowa: Torch Press, 1936), 33. Cf. *New York Daily Tribune*, February 20, 1860. Jeter Allen Isely, *Horace Greeley and the Republican Party: A Study of the New York Tribune* (Princeton: University Press, 1947), 269. Herriott, "The Germans of Iowa and the 'Two-Year' Amendment of Massachusetts," 241.

¹² The full text of Hielscher's article appeared on the front page of the *Indianapolis Daily Journal*. Parts are also quoted in "The Conference in the *Deutsches Haus* Chicago," 117–18. See the biographical dictionary in Zucker, *The Forty-Eighters*, 304. Cassius M. Clay (1810–1903), a former member of the Kentucky state assembly and journalist and an outspoken opponent of slavery in a slave state. Charles Sumner (1811–74), senator from Massachusetts, spoke on "The Crime against Kansas" when he was struck down with a cane in the Senate chamber.

¹³ Charles Zimmermann, "The Origins and Rise of the Republican Party in Indiana from 1854 to 1860," *Indiana Magazine of History* 13 (1917): 256–69 and 349–412, especially 390.

¹⁴ Luthin cites the *Fort Wayne Sentinel* of February 25, 1860, and a letter of A. H. Davidson to Thompson of February 24, 1860, in the Thompson Papers as his sources. *The First Lincoln Campaign*, 64. Bruce Levine, *The Spirit of 1848: German Immigrants, Labor Conflict, and the Coming of the Civil War* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1992), 246. George Theodore Probst, *The Germans in Indianapolis (1840–1918)* (Indianapolis: German-American Center, 1989), 45. See also Hielscher's report on the Indiana Republican convention in *Die Freie Presse von Indiana*, February 23 and March 2, 1860.

¹⁵ *New York Daily Tribune*, February 27, 1860.

¹⁶ *New York Daily Tribune*, February 29, 1860. A reader of the *Indianapolis Daily Journal* also joined in. He criticized Greeley in an article on "Greeley's Algebra and Theology."

¹⁷ Zimmermann, 363.

¹⁸ "Ist die Union in Gefahr und welche Folge hätte die Auflösung der Union in politischer und ökonomischer Hinsicht?" Metzner, 2:39, published in the *Turn-Zeitung*, July 31, 1860.

¹⁹ *Der Demokrat* of Davenport, March 6, 1860, quoted by Herriott, "The Conference in the *Deutsches Haus* Chicago," May 14–15, 1860, 139–45. The *Turn-Zeitung* of April 24 came out with a vigorous attack on Bates ("Herr Bates als Republikaner"). *Die Freie Presse von Indiana* reported the on the resolutions of the German Republicans of Davenport against the candidacy of Edward Bates on March 22, 1860. Randall wrote about the significance of the German opposition to Bates: "If, therefore, Seward failed of nomination, it would be unwise for the Republican convention to hazard German-American resentment by naming Bates. On the other hand, because of Lincoln's liberal and well known record toward the foreign born, his selection would not only be acceptable but would add real strength. In narrowing the list of available men this was a most significant factor." James Garfield Randall, *Lincoln the President* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1945), 2:165.

²⁰ *Cincinnati Republikaner*, March 8, 1860.

²¹ Herriott, "The Conference in the *Deutsches Haus* Chicago," 145. Bergquist, "The Forty-Eighters," 148. There is much literature on Willich, who is given credit for founding the Milwaukee Turnverein in 1853. Chester Verne Easum, *The Americanization of Carl Schurz* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1929), 66–67; Loyd D. Easton, *Hegel's First American Followers: The Ohio Hegelians: John B. Stallo, Peter Kaufmann, Moncure Conway, and August Willich, with Key Writings* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1966); Christine Lattek, *Revolutionary Refugees: German Socialism in Britain, 1840–1860* (London: Routledge, 2006); Mischa Honeck, *We Are the Revolutionists: German-Speaking Immigrants & American Abolitionists after 1848* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2011), 71–103; Bruce Levine, "Community Divided: German Immigrants, Social Class, and Political Conflict in Antebellum Cincinnati," in Henry D. Shapiro and Jonathan D. Sarna, eds., *Ethnic Diversity and Civic Identity: Patterns of Conflict and Cohesion in Cincinnati since 1820* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1992), 77.

²² Although Andreas Willmann, a veteran Forty-Eighter, is the only person who signed the initial appeal from New York, it can be assumed that Sigismund Kaufmann and Friedrich Kapp participated to make it possible. They were both later rewarded for their efforts in the Republican campaign by selection as electors. Cf. Hinners, 134–35, 146, etc. The second appeal by the New York German Republicans was also signed by the president, Andreas Willmann, but the names of three members of a special committee were added: G. Metternich, Tzschirnerr, and Wm. M. Wermerskirch. Metternich was one of the most prominent revolutionaries and a member of the New York Turners. *Die Freie Presse von Indiana* published the appeal in its April 26, 1860, issue. Wermerskirch served under Carl Schurz in the Civil War, and, as a police captain in Washington, arrested one of the conspirators involved in the assassination of Abraham Lincoln.

²³ The delegates listed by Herriott for the Chicago convention from New York state were Wm. Kopp, Ph. H. Bender, I. C. Deumplemen (Diemlepleman), H. Bursch, Jacob Webber, Dr. A. Maier (Majer). The attendants were Dr. A. Mayer, Professors Rudolph Dulon, Johannes Gambs, C. Peissner, Frederick Kapp, H. Vortriede, and A. Wiesner. Herriott, "The Conference in the *Deutsches Haus* Chicago," 144–45 and 160–61. See the *Turn-Zeitung* report of March 20, 1860.

²⁴ *Ibid.* *Turn-Zeitung*, March 27. The editors of the *Turn-Zeitung* were fearful of a scandal. They expected attacks from the western Turners (specifically from St. Louis) against the East and hoped that the Turners in the West would send Hillgaertner as delegate instead of Bernays.

²⁵ Herriott, "The Conference in the *Deutsches Haus* Chicago," 149.

²⁶ Glyndon G. Van Deusen, "Thurlow Weed's Analysis of William H. Seward's Defeat in the Republican Convention of 1860," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 34, No. 1 (June 1947): 101–4.

²⁷ Goodwin, 241–42

²⁸ *Die Freie Presse von Indiana*, March 22, 1860.

²⁹ Allan Nevins, *The Emergence of Lincoln* (New York: Scribner, 1951), 240. Reinhard H.

Luthin, "Indiana and Lincoln's Rise to the Presidency," *Indiana Magazine of History* 36 (1942): 387.

³⁰ Luthin, *The First Lincoln Campaign*, 21 and 78–83.

³¹ *Die Freie Presse von Indiana*, April 5, 1860. William Pitt Fessenden (1806–69), Maine senator, and Benjamin F. Wade (1800–78), Ohio senator, were prominent in the anti-slavery movement. Annemarie Springer quotes the following statement by Hielscher from the March 1 issue of the same paper. "Wir brauchen einen Charakter, einen Mann von Kern und Schrott, der den Stall von Korruption ausräumen wird und der den südlichen Aristokraten einen unbeugsamen Nacken zu zeigen versteht. Deshalb hoffen wir, die besten Resultate von Lincoln zu gewinnen. Was Sklaverei betrifft, repräsentiert er ohne Zweifel die Stellung welche die Republikanische Partei in der Philadelphia Parteiplattform adoptiert hat." "Indiana German-American Newspapers of the 1850s: Debating Slavery and the Future of the Union," 19–20 (unpublished article at the Indiana University German-American collection in Indianapolis). This statement for Lincoln would be a significant early support, but close examination of the *Die Freie Presse von Indiana* failed to locate the quotation in the issue indicated.

³² Tarbell, *The Life of Abraham Lincoln*, 341.

³³ Metzner, *Jahrbücher der Deutsch-Amerikanischen Turnerei*, 202–6. Heinrich Metzner, *Geschichte des Turner-Bundes* (Indianapolis: Zukunft, 1874), 28.

³⁴ Zucker, *The Forty-Eighters*, 328–29. Cf. Eitel Wolf Dobert, *Deutsche Demokraten in Amerika* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1958), 171.

³⁵ Excerpt from Rapp's letter dated June 30, 1861, to his father. Translated by Judith Arnold. Newberry Library, Midwest MS, Rapp, Box 1, Folder 16. See Appendix H. Rapp's early poems are to be found in Box 2, Folder 27. Rapp's letter goes on to describe the dramatic days following the secession. A mob threatened to hang him, and he barely escaped in a priest's garb as his printing office was being destroyed.

³⁶ See the entire original German editorial and its translation in Appendix I.

³⁷ *Daily Illinois State Journal*, April 30, 1860. Cf. Luthin, *The First Lincoln Campaign*, 84. The May 7 article of the *Peoria Transcript*, quoted by Herriott, was simply a copy of the *Chicago Press & Tribune* of May 2. The *Peoria* paper exaggerated the numbers even more by increasing the reported number of Turner members from 20,000 to 50,000. Herriott, who did not have access to the *Turn-Zeitung*, attributed considerable significance to its pronouncements in favor of Lincoln and estimated its origins at the beginning May. In his view, the article refuted the common assumption that Lincoln was unknown. See the original German text of Rapp's article in the *Turn-Zeitung* under the title "Der zudringliche Bates-Humbug" in Appendix I. Cf. William Baringer, *Lincoln's Rise to Power* Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1937), 190. Like Herriott, Baringer did not have access to the *Turn-Zeitung*.

³⁸ Metzner, *Jahrbücher der Deutsch-Amerikanischen Turnerei*, 2:264–65.

³⁹ *Daily Illinois State Journal*, April 4 and 5, 1860.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, June 20, 1860. The German translation of Lincoln's letter also appeared in Hielscher's *Freie Presse* on May 31, 1860.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, June 21, 1860. On June 29, Canisius supplied the *Journal* with the list of German papers and indicated the party affiliation.

⁴² *Daily Illinois State Journal*, November 10, 1860.

⁴³ Herriott, "The Premises," 184.

⁴⁴ Burlingame, 1:602. On Davis see Willard L. King, *Lincoln's Manager: David Davis* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1960), 127–42. Pratt, 109–10.

⁴⁵ Reinhard Luthin, "Organizing the Republican Party in the "Border-Slave" Regions: Edward Bates's Presidential Candidacy in 1860," *Missouri Historical Review* (1944): 138–61, especially 157–58.

⁴⁶ Arndt and Olson, 108.

⁴⁷ Zucker, "Dr. Theodore Canisius, Friend of Lincoln," 13–15 and 38. Carman and Lu-

thin overlooked Zucker's article. Cf. Harry J. Carman and Reinhard H. Luthin, *Lincoln and the Patronage* (Gloucester, Massachusetts: Peter Smith, 1964), 103 and 127.

⁴⁸ Koerner to Lincoln, June 13, 1861. The Abraham Lincoln Papers in the Library of Congress. Transcribed and annotated by the Lincoln Studies Center, Knox College, Galesburg, Illinois. Hassaurek became minister to Ecuador. Henry T. Blow, a St. Louis businessman and politician, was appointed minister to Venezuela in 1861. Bernays became consul in Zürich. The text of Koerner's letter is available at <http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/malquerry.html>

⁴⁹ *Chicago Press and Tribune*, February 16, 1860; *Daily Illinois State Journal*, February 21, 1860.

⁵⁰ *Indianapolis Daily Journal*, April 19 and May 11, 1860.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, May 9, 1860.

⁵² Bergquist, "The Political Attitudes," 300. James M. Bergquist, "The Forty-Eighters and the Republican Convention of 1860," in Charlotte L. Brancaforte, ed. *The German Forty-Eighters in the United States* (New York: Peter Lang, 1989), 147.

⁵³ Bergquist, "The Forty-Eighters," 147. Cf. the report of May 15, 6:00 p.m. by Karl Ludwig Bernays in the *Anzeiger des Westens*. Steven Rowan, ed. *Germans for a Free Missouri* (Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1983), 108.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ See Appendix K.

⁵⁶ Annette R. Hofmann, *The American Turner Movement: A History from Its Beginnings to 2000* (Indianapolis: Max Kade German-American Center and Indiana German Heritage Society, 2001), 84.

⁵⁷ *Anzeiger des Westens*, April 26, 1860. The St. Louis paper pointed out that out of the entire number of New York delegates only a single German-American, Kaufmann, was chosen and that the East argued impudently to cover up its impotence.

⁵⁸ Bergquist, "The Forty-Eighters," 147–8 and 186. The *New York Daily Tribune* and the *New York Herald*, both of May 15, reported on the "Meeting of Germans at Chicago" of the previous day, providing the same text, ignoring all signs of the dissension: "An informal gathering, without any organization whatever, of the German Republicans from different states took place today, to consult about the manner and how it was best to secure the largest support on the part of foreign-born citizens for the nominee of the Chicago Convention. – The resolution arrived at was to endeavor to obtain from the Republican National Convention a plank in their platform recognizing perfect equality and protection to all citizens at home and abroad, and declaring against any extension of the present term of naturalization, and against any discrimination between native and adopted citizens, as to their qualifications as voters. There was no convention, and the idea of holding one during the sitting of the National Convention seemed to meet with no favor. – Chase, Seward, Lincoln, and Wade were the presidential preferences of the gentlemen present. – The best feeling prevailed, and all present appeared animated with the desire to do everything to secure a Republican victory in November." The reporter, whose text was made available to the New York papers, may have been Henry Villard.

⁵⁹ Rowan, *Germans for a Free Missouri*, 117.

⁶⁰ Bergquist, "The Forty-Eighters," 149.

⁶¹ Carl Schurz, *Lebenserinnerungen* (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1907), 2:137.

⁶² *New York Daily Tribune*, May 25, 1860. Cf. Herriott, "The Germans of Iowa and the 'Two-Year' Amendment of Massachusetts," 226–31.

⁶³ Luthin, *The First Lincoln Campaign*, 142 and 148.

⁶⁴ Benjamin F. Gue, *History of Iowa from the Earliest Times to the Beginning of the Twentieth Century* (New York: Century History, 1903), iv.

⁶⁵ *Chicago Press and Tribune*, May 18, 1860. Or, see also http://www.cpr.org/Museum/Ephemera/Republican_Platform_1860.html

⁶⁶ Friedrich Kapp, *Aus und über Amerika: Thatsachen und Erlebnisse* (Berlin: Springer, 1876), 320.

Abraham Lincoln and the German Immigrants: Turners and Forty-Eighters

⁶⁷ Rowan, *Germans for a Free Missouri*, 111.

⁶⁸ Rowan, *Germans for a Free Missouri*, 117. Douai boasted in his autobiography that he had "insisted on carrying through a unanimously approved platform by the thirty or more Forty-Eighters and presented it to the national convention as the condition under which the Germans would support the ticket. Carl Schurz—even against his will—would support the ticket and fight for these conditions in the convention, and he was smart enough to keep his promise." Justine Davis Randers-Pherson, *Adolf Douai (1819–1888): The Turbulent Life of a German Forty-Eighter in the Homeland and in the United States* (New York: Peter Lang, 2000), 241.

⁶⁹ Herriott, "The Conference in the *Deutsches Haus* Chicago," 189.

⁷⁰ *Indianapolis Daily Journal*, May 17, 1860.

⁷¹ *New York Times*, May 16, 1860. The same report, again probably originating with Villard, also appeared in the *New York Herald* on May 17, 1860. It is possible that Villard was supplying news to the Associated Press of New York at this time.

⁷² See Appendix M and Bergquist, "The Forty-Eighters," 155.

⁷³ Rowan, *Germans for a Free Missouri*, 111–2. Cf. Appendix M.

⁷⁴ See the note to Appendix L.

⁷⁵ *Chicago Press and Tribune*, May 18, 1860. Cf. Hans L. Trefousse, *Carl Schurz: A Biography* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1998), 85.

⁷⁶ *New York Daily Tribune*, May 15, 16, 17, 18, and 19. As late as May 18, Greeley telegraphed that "the opposition will not be able to concentrate upon any other candidate and that Mr. Seward will probably be nominated."

⁷⁷ Charles Roll, "Indiana's Part in the Nomination of Abraham Lincoln for President in 1860," *Indiana Magazine of History* 25 (1929): 5–6. Reinhard H. Luthin, "Indiana and Lincoln's Rise to the Presidency," *Indiana Magazine of History* 38 (1942): 391–93.

⁷⁸ Luthin, *The First Lincoln Campaign*, 142. Luthin, "Indiana and Lincoln's Rise to the Presidency," 391–93, 396. Lincoln appointed Smith secretary of the interior in 1861.

⁷⁹ *Indianapolis Daily Journal*, November 21, 1860.

⁸⁰ Roll, "Indiana's Part in the Nomination of Abraham Lincoln for President in 1860," 6–7.

⁸¹ The Indiana correspondent signed his article with S. *Indianapolis Daily Journal*, May 16, 1860.

⁸² Thomas J. McCormack, ed. *Memoirs of Gustave Koerner, 1809–1896* (Cedar Rapids, Iowa: Torch Press, 1909), 2:88–9. Doris Kearns Goodwin, 242.

⁸³ William A. Fritsch, "Die Deutschen Indianas im Kriege für die Union," *Indiana Magazine of History* 9 (1911): 68. Luthin, *The First Lincoln Campaign*, 142 and 148. On Mansfield see notes nos. 12 and 14 on page 154.

⁸⁴ Bergquist, "The Political Attitudes," 305–6 and 308. Howard K. Beale, ed., *The Diary of Edward Bates 1859–1866* (New York: De Capo, 1971), 129–31.

⁸⁵ Roll, 8–11. "[The Bates movement] failed primarily because Bates was too tainted with Know-Nothingism to suit the Germans, too conservative to be acceptable to the radical Republicans, and too closely linked to Frank Blair's Free Democracy to please the Old Line Whigs." Luthin, "The Republican Party in the 'Border-Slave' Regions," 161.

⁸⁶ Beale, ed. *The Diary of Edward Bates*, 37. Francis P. Blair was one of the first to promote Bates for president, as indicated in the Bates diary for April 1860. Luthin, *The First Lincoln Campaign*, 55.

⁸⁷ *Daily Evening Atlas* of Indianapolis, November 25, 1860.

⁸⁸ A. K. McClure, *Abraham Lincoln & Men of War-Times* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1997), 33.

⁸⁹ Zimmermann, 394. Cf. *Indianapolis Daily Journal*, May 25, 1860. According to Zimmermann, the Republicans realized that Indiana could not be won without the German

vote. Ibid., 394. Indiana committed twenty-six votes to Lincoln on the first ballot. The New England states New Hampshire and Maine combined with Indiana and Illinois to challenge Seward at the very outset of the balloting.

⁹⁰ Don E. Fehrenbacher, *Prelude to Greatness: Lincoln in the 1850s* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962), 157.

⁹¹ Quoted from the *New York Daily Tribune* by the *Indianapolis Daily Journal*, May 25, 1860. In a report of the *New York Daily Tribune* Greeley also wrote on May 22: "Mr. Bates lost the nomination primarily because of the Indiana delegation, which was friendly to him when chosen, went over early in the canvas at Chicago, to Lincoln, and Pennsylvania, by a vote of 60 for Lincoln to 45 for Bates, soon after indicated the former as her ultimate choice."

⁹² Richard Lowe, "The Republican Party in Ante-Bellum Virginia," *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography* 81 (1973): 275–77.

⁹³ Frank B. Carpenter, "How Lincoln Was Nominated?" [Focus on Pennsylvania] *Century Magazine* 24 (1882): 853–59. Cf. Appendix L and M. Cf. Ecelbarger, *The Great Comeback*, 213–14. Michael S. Green, *Lincoln and the Election of 1860* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2011), 57–58. Sandburg, *The Prairie Years*, 2:342. Pennsylvania acted in consultation with New Jersey. Thomas Dudley, "The Inside Facts of Lincoln's Nomination," *Century Magazine* 40 (July 1890): 477–79. Monaghan, *The Man Who Elected Lincoln* [Charles Ray], 168.

⁹⁴ At this critical moment, Medill is said to have told David Carter, the chair of the Ohio delegation: "If you can take Ohio to Lincoln, Chase can have anything he wants." Carter responded, according to Medill, by making the desired announcement: "I rise, Mr. Chairman, to announce the change of four votes to Ohio from Mr. Chase to Mr. Lincoln." H. I. Cleveland, "Booming the First Republican President," *Saturday Evening Post* 172 (August 5, 1899): 84–86. Ecelbarger and others have questioned whether such an exchange could have taken place. Ecelbarger, *The Great Comeback*, 123 and 265, note 22.

⁹⁵ Beale, ed., *The Diary of Edward Bates*, 129–31.