Chapter 7. Lincoln’s Election

... in the late contest it may be well said that the voters of German extraction held the balance of power in Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Iowa. In each of these states they numbered tens of thousands, and on whatever side they were to throw the whole weight of their vote was sure to be the winning one.


The role of German-Americans, crucial in clearing a path for Lincoln’s dramatic nomination, became one of the factors in assuring his election. Whether their role was as crucial in the case of the election is debatable. Reporting immediately after Lincoln’s victory, Henry Villard observed that the German-Americans held the balance of power in key states and that their votes made the difference. His assessment was based on interviews and reports, not on a study of voting patterns and voting figures in the crucial states. Today, there are more resources available for an objective evaluation of that fateful election.

Koerner and Schurz were instrumental in the conduct of a successful campaign. Gustave Koerner, one of the most successful German politicians of the pre-1848 generation, campaigned actively to gain the German vote for Lincoln. Schurz campaigned vigorously in Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and New York. But there were many others. Like Schurz, Friedrich Hassaurek of Ohio spoke at the Chicago nomination and asserted that “the entire German element would receive Mr. Lincoln’s nomination as the harbinger of a certain victory.”¹ There was a concerted effort to reach German-Americans in communities outside the bigger cities.² In July 1860, Hassaurek spoke at Carlinville, Jacksonville, Arenzville, Petersburg, Springfield, and Decatur, Illinois. John P. Hatterscheidt and James H. Lane went from Kansas to Indiana to give speeches.³ Reinhold Solger campaigned in fourteen Indiana locations. He also made an impact in Ohio and New York, with much success, as John A. Andrew, governor of Massachusetts, attested:
It is enough to say that, through public addresses to large assemblages of Germans and Americans, in several states, and especially in the principal towns in the interior of New York in the fall of 1860, he may be considered as having done as much to secure the support of the Eastern Germans to the administration, as his friend and fellow patriot General Carl Schurz did for the western.  

Friedrich Kapp and Sigismund Kaufmann formulated a persuasive text to recommend Solger for a position in the Lincoln administration: “Dr. Solger,” they wrote, “is recognized by Germans as well as Americans as the standard-bearer of that intellectual agitation that has so completely changed the spirit of the German population in this country.” Kapp and Kaufmann worked closely to promote the cause of the Republican Party in New York. The New York Times reported that eight to nine hundred attended a gathering at which Kapp and Kaufmann addressed the topics of slavery, the Homestead Bill, and tariffs.

Meeting in Rochester, New York, the Turner delegates passed a resolution at their national meeting in which they urged everyone to vote for the candidates who did the most to fight against slavery and nativism. Douai was not content with the vagueness of this resolution. He proposed that any member voting for Douglas (and not for Lincoln) should be ejected from the Turner organization. According to Douai, such a vote would mean that the voting Turner acted against the constitution of the Turnverein. The proposal was defeated, 44 to 24. Whether Douai was serious about winning on his extreme proposal, his effort reflected how intent he was in pursuing his opposition to slavery and in the defense of German voting rights. The Belleviller Zeitung in Illinois took this issue seriously. When it learned of the vote, it seconded the view that any member of the Turner Union, aware of its principles, who still voted against the Republicans, was a disgrace and should be considered a traitor.

Neither Douai nor Schurz represented all German-Americans ideologically. Douai was a radical. Schurz was also a Forty-Eighter, but he was not a radical, not an abolitionist, nor a socialist. The extremism of the Know-Nothings provided a fruitful provocation for both sides. The strength of the counter-movement lay in its ability to connect highly diverse elements among the German-American population. They were united in a cause, and they were successful in reducing the field of contenders in Lincoln’s favor. The day before the election, Baker’s Illinois State Daily Journal made a special appeal to the German-Americans. The editor stressed that the fathers of this country included men of German birth, such as Steuben, who had fought in
Abraham Lincoln and the German Immigrants: Turners and Forty-Eighters

the Revolution for the cause of liberty.

Many of you Germans participated in the struggle of '48. Though you failed in the effort, you did a noble work. You planted the seed that will grow and flourish and yet produce a plenteous harvest. . . The issue in this presidential campaign is simply this: SHALL FREEDOM OR SLAVERY PREVAIL IN OUR TERRITORIES? . . . It is for you and us to decide this issue. We must do it tomorrow.9

After Lincoln's election, Henry Villard (1835–1900), representing the New York Associated Press and the New York Herald in Springfield, provided a detailed analysis of the factors that contributed to Lincoln's success.*® According to Villard, the German-Americans of the Northwest were chiefly responsible. “Their ablest journals, their best speakers, their most prominent and popular men, reflected Republican views.” Who among these German campaigners could reasonably expect to be rewarded for their services with positions in the new administration? Villard’s report provided a list of individuals who made substantial contributions:

George Schneider, editor State Gazette [Staats-Zeitung], Chicago, Ill.
H. Boernstein, editor Advertiser [Anzeiger des Westens], St. Louis, Mo.
B. Domschke, editor Atlas, Milwaukee.
J. [L.] Mannfeld, Indiana Elector at Large.11
F. Hassaurek, Ohio Elector at Large.
Gustavus Koerner, ex-Lieutenant Governor of Illinois.
[Nicholas J.] Rusch, ex-Lieutenant Governor of Iowa.
[C]arl Schurz [Wisconsin lawyer, journalist, campaigner].

Villard claimed to have received this list “from one of the most eminent German citizens” in the state of Illinois. He did not divulge the identity of his source, but because the list, surprisingly, included Mannfeld of Indiana, it can be deduced that it was actually Gustave Koerner. Villard, who had resided in Belleville in 1855 to 1856, had close ties to the Koerners; Sophie Koerner, Gustave Koerner’s wife, was Henry Villard’s cousin. Koerner became Villard’s advisor during the first period of his stay in the United States. It is not difficult to imagine that Villard could receive information about Mansfield directly from the person who was best informed.

With one exception, all nine German-Americans on this list were prominent in efforts to nominate and elect Lincoln. Mannfeld, however, presents a mystery, at first. He was relatively unknown, even in German
circles. If it is a question of Indiana, one expects to see in Villard’s list the name of Hielscher, who had done so much to win that state for Lincoln. It is not easy to discover who Mannfeld was. Villard made this task even more difficult by mistakenly using an original German name, a name that Mannfeld had abandoned for Mansfield about ten years earlier.12

Born in Brunswick (Braunschweig) in 1803, Mansfield received a classical education in Göttingen and Heidelberg in astronomy and mathematics (in the latter field examined by the famous Professor Karl Friedrich Gauss), pursued an academic career, and for many years taught at Transylvania University in Lexington, Kentucky. Then, in 1850, he moved to Madison, in Jefferson County, Indiana, and became a legislator in the state assembly. When the Indiana Republican Convention nominated him to be its presidential elector at its convention, Mansfield declared this action to be proof that there was “no enmity between native and foreign born citizens” in the Republican Party.13 In 1860, during the days leading up to the election, he spoke in Indianapolis on the “Merits of the Dred Scott Decision.” He demonstrated clearly that the Supreme Court had erred in its arguments that Negroes were to be considered property and not entitled to the same rights as white men. Taking on the roles of professional lawyer and historian, Mansfield constructed close-knit arguments based on the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the views of the founding fathers. He showed how the Republicans represented a rejection of the Supreme Court positions, with which the Democratic Party was clearly identified. The Indianapolis Daily Journal referred to his lecture as a “masterpiece.”14 As an Indiana delegate to the Chicago convention, he probably worked closely with Koerner to turn his delegation from Bates to Lincoln. The southern counties of Indiana were of key importance in the 1860 election. Although it is impossible to say how effective Mansfield was in winning votes for Lincoln, he was rewarded in anticipation of his efforts by selection to the slate of electors from Indiana.15

In his Memoirs, Gustave Koerner reveals his close personal ties to Mansfield. The two had met when Koerner studied at Transylvania University. Koerner recalled that when Mansfield moved to Indiana, his home became the center of the “best society of Madison and the country round.”16 Koerner admired Mansfield and had reason to give prominence to his role in the election. Thus, there can be hardly any doubt about Koerner as “one of the most eminent German citizens” in Illinois, who served Villard as the unidentified source of his list of deserving German-Americans. By having informed Villard about the crucial role of these men in Lincoln’s nomination and election, Koerner evidently also paid homage to his mentor and influential friend.

In considering the prominence of German journalists in Villard’s list, it is useful to recall an observation by the first name on the list. George Schneider,
Abraham Lincoln and the German Immigrants: Turners and Forty-Eighters

whom Lincoln later appointed consul in Denmark, stressed that the

... revolution of 1848 and 1849 in Germany for the unification of the Fatherland and the failure of this great effort sent thousands of the best men of Germany—men of culture and strong will-power—to this country, who were placed at the head of the best newspapers printed in the German language. From New York to the Great West, their influence was felt at once, and a great revival began among them. The principal places of this new uprising in thought and action were New York, Philadelphia, Chicago, and St. Louis. All the principal papers in these cities opposed at once the extension of slavery in the new Territories, and, in fact, slavery itself. Our state was in advance of all of them and nearly every paper published in the German language in the state opposed the Nebraska bill.17

Schneider’s role as editor in Chicago was crucial. Villard added:

The majority of the Germans of the Northwest, unlike that of their countrymen in the Atlantic cities, contributed to the success of the Republican Party. Nor is this stubborn fact to be wondered at. Their ablest journals, their best speakers, their most prominent and popular men reflected Republican views. They worked with the peculiar zeal, earnestness and indefatigableness with which the German mind is wont to make propaganda for its convictions; and hence the result—namely, an overwhelming majority among their compatriots for Lincoln and Hamlin.18

If the role of the German newspapers is thought to be significant, the Herald reporter’s list appears to be arbitrary when considering how many prominent journalists were omitted, such as Canisius and Butz of Illinois, Olshausen of Iowa, Bernays and Münch of Missouri, Hielscher of Indiana, Kob of Kansas, Hassaurek and Mueller of Ohio, Kapp and Raster of New York, Rapp of Maryland, etc. The list is long. Even if Villard emphasized the German-Americans of the upper Midwest, it should be noted that men like Kapp of New York and Rapp of Maryland contributed substantially to the debates that set the stage for German participation in the events in Chicago. The political power that the Illinois Germans possessed was a product of a development from East to West. It is easy to overlook the Kansas-Nebraska Act, which led to an unprecedented national crisis. The results resonated in the elections of 1856 and 1860. Political leaders of the Northwest—American or German-American—could not ignore the rest of the nation. Their actions
were in one sense a product of the politics of East and West.

According to a count made by the German paper in Cleveland in the summer of 1860, thirty papers endorsed the Democratic candidate. Seventy-six were behind Lincoln. At about the same time, to demonstrate the strong support that Lincoln enjoyed among German-Americans, Canisius published the titles of sixty-eight German papers that supported Lincoln's election (see Appendix N). At a time when politicians lacked options to reach voters, newspapers played a prominent role. The shift to the relatively new Republican Party by the German papers was dramatic. Koerner recognized this in his memoirs: "And Medill and Ray of the Chicago Tribune and George Schneider of the Illinois Staats-Zeitung, the leading Republican papers of the Northwest, all recruited from the Democratic Party, contributed largely to the victory of the Republicans."

Lincoln undoubtedly took notice of Villard's article. As Villard expected, most persons he named received appointments in the new administration. Lincoln rewarded Hassaurek with the ambassadorship to Ecuador and appointed Koerner the ambassador to Spain. Koerner succeeded Schurz, who returned to the states for military service. Lincoln recommended Mansfield as consul in Le Havre, France. When Seward, his secretary of state, was filling ministerial posts with Americans, Lincoln asked, "... and what about our [G]erman friends?"

Villard's list gave indirect recognition to the role of the Turners by featuring Sigismund Kaufmann, the founder of the New York Turner Society and first leader of the national Turner Union. He was one of the cofounders of the Republican Party in New York. During his brief stay in New York, enroute to Washington for the inauguration in 1861, Lincoln met Kaufmann at a reception hosted by the New York Electoral College and asserted his knowledge of German by claiming to "know that Kaufmann means merchant." According to an unconfirmed report, Lincoln then added that his knowledge of the language extended even to the meaning of the word Schneider, which he knew to be tailor (information he could have acquired from his Chicago friend George Schneider). Finally, Lincoln asked Kaufmann: "Am I not a good German scholar?"

How good a scholar of the German language was Lincoln? Perhaps the conversation with Kaufmann was an effort to retrieve at least a residue from a half-hearted attempt in the distant past. Lincoln's inclination to show off his German knowledge probably had its basis in German lessons in the winter of 1849–50, soon after the revolutions in Germany and Hungary. His Springfield dentist, Dr. Amos Willard French and Lincoln "joined a club of a dozen gentlemen of Springfield" to study German in his office. In an interview, Dr. French remembered these study sessions.
A professor of languages came along here from Philadelphia, and we got up a class for him. I don't remember anything we learned at that time. Lincoln told so many stories that we laughed at them instead of studying the lesson, I am afraid. No, I don't think he made a very apt scholar, though he probably learned as much as any of the rest of us.  

Despite Dr. French's pessimistic view, it seems that Lincoln did not give up in his efforts to learn German. Luman Burr, a deputy clerk of McLean County in Bloomington observed Lincoln studying German at one of the Circuit Court offices. During this encounter, probably in 1857, Lincoln displayed his fascination with German words. He told Burr: "Here is a curious thing: the Germans have no word for thimble; they call it finger hat (Fingerhut). And they have no word for glove; they call it hand shoe (Handschuh)."  

Although Lincoln's stature as a scholar of German was questionable, his efforts to become proficient may have been instructive, nevertheless, in a political sense. It was probably then that he first learned from his German teacher directly about the Forty-Eighter experience and its relevance to current events in the United States.  

After becoming president, Lincoln offered Kaufmann the ambassadorship in Italy, but Kaufmann declined. Kaufmann continued to be active in the Republican Party, in 1870 as a candidate for lieutenant governor of New York. He was the director of the German Savings Bank, police commissioner, president of the German Society of New York, member of the emigration commission, and director of the Hebrew Orphan Asylum. He held Lincoln in especially high regard for the Emancipation Proclamation. He said:

The proclamation of Abraham Lincoln freeing the slaves was the greatest victory for the federal cause of the War. It shed no drop of blood; it cost no treasure. Where graves are the monuments of Grant's victories, millions of free men are the trophies Lincoln won.

In the same article Villard made his most provocative claim about the crucial role of the German-Americans: "In Ohio, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, and Wisconsin, native Republicans now openly acknowledge that their victory was, if not wholly, at least to a great extent, due to the large accessions they received in the most hotly contested sections from the German ranks." Villard wrote with supreme confidence. To evaluate his bold assertion it is important to remember who the Herald reporter was. Despite the fact that the Herald's editor, James Gordon Bennett, opposed Lincoln, he tolerated
Villard's sympathetic reports of the president-elect. They were printed without censorship.\textsuperscript{30}

As noted in the introduction, Villard was not French, as one might one first suspect because of his name. His original name until emigration was Hilgard. He was born in Speyer, Germany, and, before coming to the United States in 1853, he studied briefly at the universities of Munich and Würzburg. Although he was very young during the revolution, his sympathies for its causes are reflected in his efforts to organize for German immigrants a Kansas settlement company, which was to become a “vanguard of liberty and to fight for free soil.” His efforts to raise funds for this venture failed, however, and he realized, after consulting Friedrich Kapp, that his scheme was ill conceived. His effort to publish the Racine \textit{Volksblatt} in Wisconsin as an instrument to win voters for the Republican cause also failed. He reported on the Lincoln-Douglas debates for the conservative New York \textit{New Yorker Staats-Zeitung}. In the meantime, he learned English. Within just seven years after his arrival in the United States he received assignments to report on events of national significance for the New York Associated Press and for the \textit{New York Herald}.

Lincoln was impressed and granted Villard frequent interviews. The president-elect included him in the party that accompanied him on the historic journey from Springfield to Washington.\textsuperscript{31} He introduced Villard to his young secretary, John G. Nicolay, who shared with Villard a German background. Nicolay (originally Nicolai), was born in Essingen near Landau in the Palatinate, not far from Zweibrücken, Villard's home town. Nicolay had left Germany as a five-year-old child, but the common background probably enhanced Villard's access to the secretary and to Lincoln and thus lent his reports a greater degree of reliability.\textsuperscript{32} Villard was well informed. That national pride and identification with the German-Americans was certainly a factor in the prominence Villard accorded to the German Republicans cannot be overlooked. Does that disqualify him as an interpreter of the events leading to Lincoln's election? Motivated by his German background, did he exaggerate the influence of his countrymen? To answer such questions it may be instructive to consider how Villard's evaluation of the election compares to Lincoln's pre-election calculations. After the election Villard observed:

\ldots in the late contest it may be well said that the voters of German extraction held the balance of power in Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Iowa. In each of these states they numbered tens of thousands, and on whatever side they were to throw the whole weight of their vote was sure to be the winning one.\textsuperscript{33}
Abraham Lincoln and the German Immigrants: Turners and Forty-Eighters

What Villard claimed was not essentially different from what Lincoln calculated before the election, when he observed that Massachusetts politicians were incapable of looking past their noses. They did not understand that “tilting against foreigners” could ruin the Republican chances in the whole Northwest.34

No statistical records exist for 1860 to demonstrate precisely how German-Americans voted. Lincoln needed 152 electoral votes to win the election. In his history of the German language press in America, Carl Wittke wrote that “controversy over how decisive the German vote was in determining the outcome probably will never be settled.”35 The above-mentioned northwestern states made up 43 electoral votes, and if Lincoln lacked victory in these, he would have had only 137, not enough to win. Donnal V. Smith calculated the approximate numbers of foreign voters in the crucial states. It turns out, however, that only in Illinois was that margin significant: the margin there was 11,956 and the estimated number of foreign voters 68,000. In his calculations Smith neglected to take into account that the foreign voters included Catholics and the Irish, who tended to vote for Democrats.36

Joseph Schafer took to task the faulty calculations of the German voting patterns. He showed that in specific areas, most notably Wisconsin, the estimate of votes for Lincoln cast by German-Americans could be vastly distorted and greatly exaggerated. He showed that in many cases German-Americans did not vote for Lincoln but for Douglas. Schafer concluded that to assign overwhelming influence to the foreign-born was wrong. Lincoln, he believed, was elected through an “upsurge of moral enthusiasm and determination on the part of the distinctly American folk.”37

Jay Monaghan presented arguments that, at least in Illinois, the German vote was decisive. He showed that roughly 8 percent of the population was German-American and that Lincoln won the state by the margin of only 3 percent. Even if only half of the German-Americans voted for the Republican Party, they were definitely needed for victory.38 James M. Bergquist presented the most exhaustive study of the German voting patterns in Illinois. Because of Lincoln’s concern about winning over Germans in Madison County, the chapter on the patterns of voting in southern Illinois offers helpful statistics. Bergquist’s figures show that in 1854, as a result of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, the Democrats suffered their most significant defeat. They won only about 15 percent of the vote, but the party rebounded in 1858 to slightly above 50 percent. In 1860, however, the Democrats fell back to about 48 percent. Bergquist suggested that the Democratic decline from 1858 to 1860 was probably due to the German voters. He concluded that the
. . . decisiveness of the Germans' voting power rests also in the historical fact that the politicians of 1860 perceived that the political tendencies of many Germans were still in doubt; realizing that the fluctuation of only a part of the immigrant vote might be critical, they framed specific appeals and a special campaign for the Germans' benefit. The "crucial" nature of the German vote, then, rests upon the calculations and the strategy of the politicians of the time, as well as upon the mere number of the German voters.\(^\text{39}\)

Bergquist pointed out that Lincoln had about 12,000 more votes than did Douglas (172,000 to 160,000); at the same time, he estimated the total German-American vote to be 23,000 for Lincoln and 15,000 for Douglas. Because the German vote could not be taken for granted, the Republicans had "mounted a special campaign to reach them, and adjusted the party platform in the immigrants' favor."\(^\text{40}\) Thus, the German votes for Lincoln emerge as a significant factor, if not in every sense decisive.

Richard H. Steckel's study has shown that the Republican Party was most vulnerable along the border with the southern states. The party sent its most effective campaigners into the border precincts of Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio.\(^\text{41}\) Studies that examine patterns of German-American voting precinct by precinct would be needed.

In the previous election of 1856 the Democrats won in Pennsylvania. In 1860, Lincoln received 189,156 votes more than did the next candidate. This was a dramatic shift. The contention that the German-American influence made the difference has been challenged. It has been said, with justification, that the German-Americans did not vote as a block (the percentage of German Democratic journals to Republican ones was about forty). In Pennsylvania Lincoln's majority was too great to allow the German vote to be a decisive factor. Pennsylvania is clearly a special case. The Republican Party was on record to protect its industry with tariffs, but the Democratic position seemed weak. Lincoln's record of support for protection of Pennsylvania's industry appeared more persuasive to the voters. The role of the German vote was certainly not decisive in this state.\(^\text{42}\)

If it is not possible to prove the German-American role with statistics conclusively, it is perhaps most reasonable to suggest that a general trend became evident, and although this trend was most evident in German-American communities, the shift in favor of Republicans transcended the distinctions between Americans and German-Americans. Schafer's perception of an "upsurge" for Lincoln may be the ground for general agreement. There is then no reason to see the German factor and the upsurge as being mutually exclusive. The German-Americans were effective participants in the upsurge.
A comparison between the surprising near-victory of the infant Republican Party with John Frémont in 1856 and Lincoln's success in 1860 shows that in the latter election the Republicans were able to turn defeats in key states into victories, in Pennsylvania, Indiana, and Illinois.

How did this occur? Without ignoring other states, Lincoln and his German-American friends paid particular attention to campaigning in those states and consciously sought the help of German-Americans to gain momentum. It is well known that Schurz and Hassaurek campaigned intensively. In Indiana, Republicans appealed to the national headquarters for funds. David Davis, Lincoln's political manager, asked Thurlow Weed and the Republican National Committee for funds to support German speakers. "The first order of German speakers are needed in Indiana." When this money was exhausted, Defrees wrote in desperation to Weed: "The amount sent by the National Committee ($2,000) has been exhausted in the payment of Carl Schurz and other speakers and on a few German Republican papers. Could you not influence the Committee to send a few thousand more?" It was thought that victory depended on the German vote. Lincoln put special emphasis on winning in Indiana. He wrote on September 20 to Edwin D. Morgan, the chairman of the Republican National Committee: "If I might advise, I would say, bend all your energies upon Indiana now."

Kansas also participated; John P. Hatterscheidt, the German Turner and legislator from Leavenworth, was recruited to campaign in southern Indiana. In September, he lectured in Indianapolis; in November, in the days preceding the election, he and Hielscher spoke to a crowd in German. M. W. Delahay wrote to Lincoln on February 22, 1861, that Hatterscheidt contributed "important services upon the stump in southern Indiana." The chairman of the Republican Central Committee of Indiana wrote that he "rendered most able and efficient service to the party in Indiana. He visited some of the strongest Democratic districts in the state, and at great personal sacrifice labored for several weeks with great success among our German friends." Mansfield, who represented an older generation of German immigrants, presumably campaigned effectively in southern Indiana, where he lived. The concerted effort to win over German-Americans in the remote areas outside the major cities such as the southern parts of Indiana and Illinois was an essential part of a successful strategy.

The German Forty-Eighters and Turners helped to create the "upsurge of moral enthusiasm and determination" for a distinctively American cause. Their revolutionary zeal contributed to a powerful shift in the northwestern states. For example, the city records of five German wards in Cincinnati reflect this trend.
In 1855, there was a Democratic majority of 3,074 votes in five wards.

In 1860, the Republicans in those same wards showed a majority of 1,730.

The basis for such a trend in Cincinnati was the network of German Forty-Eighters and Turners. A shift of the German population from Democrats to Republicans can also be observed in the comparison of lists of newspapers of 1856 and 1860. A list compiled in New York by Herman Raster of the Abendzeitung showed eleven identifying with the Democratic Party and nine with the Republican Party. After the Forty-Eighters arrived, the number of German newspapers increased dramatically. Before 1850, the German papers favoring the Democrats were in the majority; in 1860, the relationship was reversed.

Friedrich Kapp observed that in 1856 only about half of the German Forty-Eighters voted for the Republican Party, but in 1860 two-thirds went to the polls for Lincoln. Die Freie Presse reported Germans in Indiana “Crossing Over to the Republican Camp.”

From all sides there are news reports that the Germans in great numbers are crossing over to the Republican camp. We have prophesized this for some time, and we also know that our compatriots would not rush into this decision. We know of the German love for freedom as well as for the familiar. We also know that it would be very difficult for many a decent and honest German to leave a party with which he had been associated for many years and with which he had fought many battles.

A similar report described a “Stampede in Southern Indiana.”

The old German daily newspaper, Volksbote of Evansville, Indiana, which has been Democratic in politics from its first issue, has hoisted the names of Lincoln and Hamlin, and is doing battle valiantly for the Republican cause. The Volksbote was Anti-Lecompton during the pendency of that issue and has now separated itself entirely from the unclean party which it has served so long. The result of its movement has been a tremendous stampede of German voters in Southern Indiana and the Wabash counties of Illinois to the Republican ranks.

Even if such articles contained exaggerations to influence the course of
events, the existence of a trend is supported by a variety of sources. When Carl Schurz visited Indiana in March, he noted that "the German vote is coming over to our side with increasing numbers, and I have little doubt that we will carry Indiana in the election." It is important to consider the shift that took place in the key state of Indiana. The German newspapers of that state had supported the Democrats in the 1856 election. In 1860, all except the Volksblatt of Indianapolis, backed the Republicans. Carl Schurz was one of the six members of the executive committee responsible for organizing the presidential campaign and for winning over the German-American vote. He was not reluctant to take credit for having done so. He wrote:

My primary task—my specialty—lay in addressing German-born voters in our common mother tongue. This mission took me to Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania and New York. I not only visited great cities, but small towns and villages, and occasionally remote farming areas. I often found my audience gathered in school houses, large barns, and occasionally outdoors.

To appreciate the German factor in Lincoln's nomination and election, it is important to distinguish stages. The radical German-Americans, inspired to be active in politics by the lessons of a failed revolution, had to contend at first with the Know-Nothing movement against immigrants. That movement had to compete with the crisis provoked by the Kansas-Nebraska Act. That crisis assigned a new potential for radical action among immigrants. The radicals, usually members of Turner societies, had the advantage of experience in organizing for political goals. The Forty-Eighters and Turners spoke out against slavery; they were thus natural allies of the newly born Republican Party, which was eager to win them as voting partners. The Republican Party had only to abandon its association with the Know-Nothings. The next challenge appeared in the form of the Bates movement. The emphatic rejection of an alliance with southern politicians, such as Bates, narrowed the field of candidates. Canisius then opened a path for Lincoln's nomination at an early stage by showing to German-Americans that the Illinois politician defended their rights. When Lincoln recognized the intrinsic unfairness of the Two-Year Amendment, he quickly grasped the opportunity to make his position known through the German press. The declaration in his letter to Canisius articulated fundamental principles. Outside Illinois, however, there were equally effective initiatives in Indiana newspapers by Hielscher and Rapp in the national Turn-Zeitung. Despite their status as recent immigrants, the German Forty-Eighters and Turners set into motion a powerful "upsurge of moral enthusiasm and determination" for Lincoln.
Notes

3 On Hatterscheidt see note 405 below. On Lane in Dearborn and Lawrenceburg, in southeastern Indiana, see the Indianapolis Daily Journal, September 17, 1860; Ian Michael Spurgeon, Man of Douglas; Man of Lincoln: The Political Odyssey of James Henry Lane (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2008), 171 and Albert Castel, Civil War Kansas: Reaping the Whirlwind (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1997), 35. On Lane’s presence in Indianapolis see Die Freie Presse von Indiana, September 13, 1860. Another German campaign speaker in Indiana was Albert Lange. Zimmermann, 405.
5 Hinners, 156. As a result of this effort, Solger was appointed assistant registrar of the Treasury Department.
6 On October 12, 1860, the New York Daily Tribune reported on another meeting of the German Republicans at which Turner Aaron Frank presided. Speakers were Nicholas Rusch of Iowa, Adolph Douai, and Friedrich Kapp.
7 Metzner, Jahrbücher der Deutsch-Amerikanischen Turnerei, 2:59–60. The Turn-Zeitung of August 7, 1860, reported on this effort by Douai during the national convention of the Turners in Rochester. The final decision was to recommend that Turners vote for the candidate who adhered to the Turnverein platform most closely.
8 Belleviller Zeitung, August 16. Cf. a follow-up article of August 3. The author of the article and editor, Franz Grimm, wrote that he was acquainted with the conservative positions of most Turners during the revolution. At that time he was president of the North-German Turner Union in Leipzig. On October 4, 1860, days before the election, he wrote in defense of the younger German immigrants, referred to disparagingly as “Red Republicans.” “These ‘Forty-Eighters’ struggled to free their beloved fatherland from a bondage and tyranny worse than that which once oppressed the American colonists and drove them to rebellion and war. These ‘Forty-Eighters’ used their best efforts, by word and pen . . . to obtain for their country those very blessings of freedom, free speech, free press, universal suffrage, etc., which the heroes of the American Revolution and the American people were fortunate enough to attain for themselves.”
10 New York Herald, December 9, 1860. See Appendix O.
11 To identify Mannfeld it is necessary to realize that Villard was using an original German name. In America, Johann Lutz Mannfeld changed his name to John L. Mansfield.
Abraham Lincoln and the German Immigrants: Turners and Forty-Eighters

Record of the University of Illinois and the Biographical Directory of the Indiana General Assembly. Lincoln recommended Mansfield for a consular position in Havre (which, however, he did not receive). Basler, ed., Collectred Works of Abraham Lincoln, 4:312. Mansfield played a prominent role in the Civil War, rising to the rank of general. On his appointment as elector for Indiana see Die Freie Presse von Indiana, March 1, 1860. Mansfield participated in the Jefferson County Republican Convention. Indianapolis Daily Journal, February 8, 1860.

15 Jefferson County shows a slight increase in the votes for the Republican Party from 1856 to 1860. In 1856, the Democrats had 1,936 to the 2,314 of the Republicans. In 1860, the Democrat vote was 1,146 to 2,661 for the Republicans. Burnham, Presidential Ballots, 400.


17 Selby, "Lincoln and German Patriotism," 516.

18 New York Herald, December 9, 1860.

19 Carl Wittke, The German Language Press in America (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1957), 146. Selby writes in 1913 that "a careful estimate has placed the number of papers in this class in the country at eighty-eight—nearly, if not quite, all of which had been previously Democratic—but of which all but eight espoused the cause of the Republican Party." Selby, "Lincoln an German Patriotism," 516-17. Other lists of German newspapers support the evidence for a general trend away from the Democratic Party. James M. Bergquist, "The German-American Press," in Sally M. Miller, ed., The Ethnic Press in the United States (New York: Greenwood, 1987), 138-39.


23 See Appendix C.

24 Isaac Markens, Abraham Lincoln and the Jews (New York: Markens, 1909), 32-33. Available on the Internet. The New York Tribune report of February 20, 1861, refers only to the first segment of the exchange with Kaufmann. Markens does not give any other source for the rest of the conversation, which, nevertheless, has a degree of plausibility because of Lincoln's friendship with Schneider.


26 Walter B. Stevens, A Reporter's Lincoln (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998), 91 and 263.

27 Markens, 32.

28 Cf. Appendix C. In 1870, Kaufmann was the candidate of the Republican Party for lieutenant governor of New York, when the New York Sun raised questions about his religion and nationality. The paper suggested that the intention behind his nomination was to get German votes and "the question has been raised whether he is a Teuton [member of a Germanic tribe] or a Hebrew?" The Republican Party, in the view of the Sun editor, "erred in nominating Kaufmann for the purpose of attracting the German vote." The questions raised about his Jewish religion probably undermined his campaign. He lost the election. Morris U. Schappes, A Documentary History of the Jews in the United States (1654-1875) (New York: Schocken Books, 1971), 539-42. I. B. Bailin, "Sigismund Kaufmann, Abolitionist: How a German '48er became a Brooklyn political leader," Jewish Currents 15 (1961): 20-22. "Mr. Sig. Kaufmann is a German by nationality and a Jew by religion." "The Word 'Jew.'" The Israelite, October 7, 1870. Jeffrey Gurock asked: "[C]an this leader of the determinedly anti-religious Turnverein still be counted as a Jew?" Interviewed by the periodical The Israelite on October 7, 1870,


31 Villard gained considerable prominence as a journalist in the Civil War. He played a role, moreover, as a financier. An impressive monument is a reminder of his accomplishment in making the completion of the Northern Pacific Railroad a reality. Albert Faust, *The German Element in the United States* (New York: Steuben Society, 1927), 2:373–74.


33 *New York Herald*, December 9, 1860.


35 Wittke, 146.


45 *Indianapolis Daily Journal*, September 20 and November 1, 1860.

46 Hatterscheidt was seeking a position in Antwerp, said to be near his native home in
Abraham Lincoln and the German Immigrants: Turners and Forty-Eighers

Germany. Lincoln recommended him for that post on April 1, 1861. Basler, ed., *Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln*, 4:312. See also the file in the National Archives and Records Administration entitled Hatterscheidt, John P. Applications and Recommendation for Public Office, 1797–1901; Administration of Lincoln-Johnson, 1861–1869; Entry A1 760; Box 30. Hatterscheidt served as consul in Moscow from 1861 to 1865. See the United States Consular Records for Moscow; Entry UD 592; vol. 3; records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Record Group 84. Nothing further after 1865 is known about Hatterscheidt's life. A son of the same name survived him in Cincinnati.

47 Thornbrough, 94.
51 Kapp, 319.
53 *Daily Illinois State Journal*, June 11, 1860. The Journal reported on July 15 that the Staats-Zeitung of Indianapolis, formerly a Democratic paper, also came out for Lincoln.
54 Schurz wrote to his wife from South Bend on March 9, 1860. *Speeches, Correspondence and Political Papers of Carl Schurz*, ed. by Frederic Bancroft (New York: Putnam's Sons, 1913), 1:111. And again on July 29, he wrote from Belleville that "Germans are coming to our side by hundreds and thousands. If things go everywhere as they did in Egypt [i.e., southern Illinois], where there were scarcely any Republican votes cast in 1856, Lincoln's election is inevitable." 121.
55 "Reports from the counties in which there was a considerable German population indicated a steady change to the Republicans." Zimmermann, 405. For the evidence of a subtle shift in Illinois see Bergquist, "The Political Attitudes," 320–4.