## Gottfried Duden

# North American Democracy and the Work of de Tocqueville, *and* Duden's Confession on Account of his American Travel Report *of 1837*

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and the
# Work of de Tocqueville

On it,

## As a Sign of the Condition of

## Theoretical
## Politics

Along with

A Discussion of Chevalier's North American Letters,
Particularly concerning the true sources of the Bank Conflict
and the most recent failures in economic life

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[Outside Cover]

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**Bonn**

**Eduard Weber**

**1837**

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## Review of Contents

## Introduction

In my writings on North America, views and doctrines emerge that completely contradict previous political theories of schools and books, no matter how convincing they might seem to many readers. I had never expected that they would prevail immediately. They demand a consideration for which many have neither the time nor the leisure, even with the best will. Still, the applause was great enough to encourage me to further discussion on new occasions. And there has been no lack of such occasions. For example, how could I not advance my thoughts in the most recent struggles concerning slavery? The Bank? The tariff? But the strongest impulse was given to me by the book of Monsieur de Tocqueville on North American democracy.[1] This is because the praise heaped on this book showed me for certain how little my depiction had prevailed against political errors. Yes, I say it and repeat it out aloud that the great praise that book has received, not only in France but particularly in England and Germany, is a sad proof of the superficiality of political theory everywhere, that even substantial researchers can be misled by glittering details on the value of a totality that is too large to be grasped in a quick analysis.

Everyone understands that the very reputation of a work makes attacks on it all the easier. It is like an echo chamber in which even the weakest voice of complaint can hope to have some response. This situation, of course, often promotes impure motives such as envy and libel, or the vain attempt to make an appearance as an author. Yet it also no less promotes a proper effort for the truth, a powerful advocacy for attention to the matter itself, which is never enough stimulated. And so I may take the reputation of Tocqueville's work as a sign revealing the inadequate success of *my own* [2] instructional efforts, to serve as a basis for a *new* attempt. In fact, I consider it more a proof of *how easy it is to gain splendid fame among the political spokesmen of our time*, a splendid bait—not only to attract readers, but also to fix commentaries that would otherwise pass away like a *conversation over tea.*

One should not fall into the thought that I take pleasure in revealing the errors of another person, and one should believe my insistence that nothing is more unpleasant to me than to speak negatively of books by a well-meaning author rather than to praise them. The worth of a man is certainly not to be confused with a poor analysis, a silly novel or a boring sermon. On the contrary, we do distinguish carefully enough the good works from their composers in that we choose the former to be part of our continual companionship, while we think the latter to be intolerable whenever they might appear. For that very reason book critics should not rage as bitterly against the person of our author, as usually happens. Besides, a man is not always the

same. At one time he succeeds at what he fails completely at another time. With exception of a so-called mad genius, no one is more capable of seeing the true errors of his own book than the author himself. This is the basis for the fact that authorship itself in general needs the author's own spirit (so long as he is still mobile) most of all. The same reason should prevent criticism from rejecting the author when it rejects his book, in case humanity cannot prevail over the critic. On the other hand, I do not extend the commandment of human decency so far as to reveal none of the errors of books in order to spare the author pain. I assume of every healthy author enough spirit and enough *strength* of spirit neither to be intoxicated by praise for his production nor depressed by blame, however much he deserves the one or the other. In the end, what value is it for a being that has a brief dream, which we call life, in the course of its endless journey, that it makes a few correct or false dream combinations? In addition there is the fact that a perverse disposition strives too much against the light that is needed in our dark earthly doings that we should choose to spare it out of softness of heart.—Incidentally, I should be placated by the fact that Frenchmen believe themselves too elevated above Germans in politics to expect any instruction from them.[2] For that reason, I expect that Monsieur de Tocqueville will not hear the tiniest part of my critique.

I have already said that the reputation of his book may be used as a proof of the superficiality of our political theory, and because [3] of the practical significance of this proof I cannot avoid the following general verdict. In order not to tread too closely to the person of our author I declare in advance that although he has written a foundationless book on such a subject as American democracy, he remains a man of spirit, and I will attempt to comment on this statement with a few words.

Every person, whether of much or little understanding, who has been stimulated by much talking about a subject that he does not understand or command completely, falls all too easily into contradictions, what are called rhetorical flourishes and phrase-making, particularly if the subject is manifold and difficult. *Young* people, who grasp at rather than understand the world, are particularly subject to this peril, all the more the more lively they are, all the more they are inclined to subject everything rashly to their judgment. Suspending judgment is more in keeping with the *nature* of the phlegmatic individual. Lively persons must obtain this capacity through reflection alone. But the difference between a lively and a phlegmatic temperament extends beyond youth and distinguishes people of all ages. Indeed whole peoples are distinguished from one another in this respect. Think for a moment of Frenchmen and Englishmen. Lively people often grasp much that escapes the phlegmatic. On the other hand, it is only the latter that guard against

rash combinations through their temperament. Liveliness agrees more with first perception than with long thinking and brooding. It is obvious how much influence education and way of life have on both tendencies. Education can accustom the lively so much to the suspension of judgment that they end up like the phlegmatic, if not contradicted by other impulses. For every age and understanding there are always things that are hard to understand. And even if *temperament* cannot impel us to rash judgments, there are *other* impulses that are not prevented. One thinks particularly of the impulse of one's *profession*. People who are inclined by their *profession* from youth on to speak *a great deal*, particularly on difficult matters, will seldom protect themselves from the error of frivolous combinations. Among modern peoples we encounter this error most often among religious and political speakers. This is because it is unfortunately regarded as the best preparation for both professions to appear before the public at an early date. One also finds them among lawyers, particularly where the public, for example as jurors, participate in judgment. This is because the more difficult the material is, the more inclined are listeners drawn by lot from the masses to [4] aphoristic treatment, that is, a treatment that has less to do with the material than with the receptiveness of the listener. And since the effectiveness of aphorisms only reach as far as the ordinary attention of people, on the one side the discourse escapes the accusation of long-windedness or incomprehensibility, and on the other hand of contradictions, there still is a lot of both contained in it. Monsieur de Tocqueville is a lawyer, and I am convinced that the errors of his book derive from his profession if not his temperament. It seems to me, however, that the chief reason is that, along with the influence of the theories of school and fashion, the stormy applause for his earlier book on North America's prisons, together with direct demands, drew him on to his greater assignment.[3]

Whoever does not entirely trust my protest that I am only spreading a little light on matters of the highest practical significance can also add the small malicious pleasure I have at my fellow men for being able to excite a little regret over premature evaluation of the most difficult of materials, and finally there is the additional motive of making a new recommendation for *my* books on North America. This is particularly important now that an English newspaper (the London *Foreign Review*) sees them as almost outmoded alongside the disciples of Tocqueville. But the reader should not interpret my words as if I believed that the value of the works of de Tocqueville could not be discerned without my comments, that those who are partly capable will have no inclination to make a sharper analysis, and partly will have no desire to have the result published. In addition this little writing should not rest on the naked demonstration that Monsieur de Tocqueville has not come to the correct conclusion on North American democracy. As I said, I only desire to

use his book and reputation as a means to provide better access to my own *positive* expressions of how things *really* appear in North America. In truth, as things stand now, I still think it advisable that to learn North American democracy from a book, Tocqueville's is not to be left unread. For although it is inadequate concerning the basis of the political situation, and has many failings besides, it is still praiseworthy in that it touches its object from many sides and, beyond the lessons these pages impart, the reader is offered very useful stimulus to think about what he reads. With this I join the confession that the principal errors are rather protected from a less penetrating analysis by glittering aphorisms and striking remarks. [5]

## Part One

Now I ask for a hearing for the actual beginning of my critique.

As a guarantee of this effort I wish above all that the readers consider the *object* of Tocqueville's opinions, and my attack on them, *in their own terms* (that is, independently of the statements on both sides). This object, apart from all phrases concerning democracy, aristocracy and monarchy, is nothing other than the *human drive* in the United States of America. It might seem a strange demand to try to imagine an object independently that he has first come to know *through* a particular book in order to use it to criticize that book. But fortunately that is simply an illusion. No country's human drive is so alien to an educated European that he does not have some idea of it without further information; at least this is the case with the drive of families that are as closely related to him as the white residents of North America. And I ask nothing more than that the listener be more clearly aware of a certain something in the content of his first introduction that is presumed of every report, but that no report can omit without it immediately appearing to be erroneous and to be rejected. Let us take as an example that a book appeared that sought to explain the intense drive of America by reporting that human bodies there had wings. To be sure *such* a statement would be enough for everyone to bring the criticism to an end. But what if this information dealt with strange anomalies of the *spirit* instead of the same anomalies of the *body*? Would the same introduction accomplish anything less? If, for example, it would be said of the same people that they *loved* the Union because it was based on their moral sense and because they clearly understand its positive results, and then we are told that they continually seek to weaken and destroy the Union? Shouldn't these statements warn us of something apart from all travel reports?—Now I demand precisely of the listener that he should not believe anything that is inconsistent with human nature. This is because my criticism will rest primarily on that. Then we will show the direct

contradictions of our author, that is not only contradictory attributes that he so often gives to the same objects, but rather passages where he [6] asserts something where he has already literally said the opposite. Finally, my criticism will indicate the many false introductions, confusions and convolutions of phrases so as to prepare the reader for the final question, which is what he has learned from the book, what specific points of light have come to him on North American drive that are new truths.

Immediately after these last words I will state that I am rather concerned with undertaking such a severe attack and genuinely fear that the dominant public opinion in favor of the writings of Tocqueville presents itself to me time and again as a wall. For that reason others should not be disturbed that in order to make a breach in that wall I begin with an unmethodical stroke in the middle of this book and expose the essential contradictions to all eyes at once.

Let us open the first volume to the fifth chapter and read (p. 161 of the Paris edition, pp. 152–53 of the Brussels edition, p. 133 of Rüder's translation[4])[i] where it says:

> I am incidentally convinced that no nation is more inclined to fall under the yoke of administrative centralization than one that is democratic in its social condition. Several causes are at work here, especially that the continual effort of the nation works to concentrate all governmental power, specifically in the hands of the sole power that immediately represents the people, since aside from the people [should be the sovereignty of the people] one sees only a mass of equal individuals.[5]

This sentence only appears to be intensified by the statements on p. 86, PE, 69–70, BE (at the end of chapter 3), where it says that democratic peoples love equality more than freedom,[6] a doctrine that, incidentally, is hard to shift from an abstract, ailing France to a healthier situation, and does not apply at all to the ancient Teutons.[ii] But now I ask you to see how the same author speaks in the tenth chapter of the second volume, pp. 389, 399ff., PE, (pp. 441, 452, 455, BE; pp. 285, 292, 294, RT). On page 389, PE, he says, the Democratic Party, *which always opposes all enhancement of federal power* (*puissance fédérale*), *there also works consistently against what is called*

[i] Henceforth the fourth Paris edition will be indicated as PE, Brussels as BE and Rüder's German translation as RT.

[ii] Montesquieu also has the phrase "love of democracy and love of equality." But if this should be true, then the word "equality" should be taken entirely differently than his countrymen take it. [Montesquieu, *L'esprit des lois*, Book V, chapter 3: "*L'amour de la république, dans une démocratie, est celui de la démocratie; l'amour de la démocratie est celui de l'égalité.*"—"The love of the republic in a democracy is that of democracy; the love of democracy is that of equality." SR]

*the "gouvernement central,"* [7] etc. It continues in this vein to the end of this passage, which is chiefly dedicated to showing that the central power is continuously being diminished in the United States *because the continual effort of the Democrats opposes it.*[7] In addition, Jackson, who became president through the Democrats, has conformed to this drive to some extent. It is to be inferred from this that he was both opposed to the Bank and denied that the Union has any right to pursue national undertakings. In short the Democrats are for the independence of the individual states and opposed to federal power.

Is a more obvious contradiction possible? And such a contradiction may be found precisely in his sketch of the essential movement of general American life.

Not to torment long over the question how our author got such a notion, I will present two other passages that speak no less against the solidity of his views.

In the first volume, chapter 5, p. 128, PE (117, BE; 107, RT), he says that in county courts (the true superior authority over the administrative officials of the community) there is no prosecutorial officer.[8] The good reason for this is that a prosecutor without agents in the individual communities is of no use, but with such agents it becomes the most fearsome of all powers. And our author has forgotten this sentence in the stream of his own words, so that in the note on page 149, PE, 137 BE (RT, pp. 122, 123) he says precisely the opposite.[9] There, among the points criticizing American administration is the assertion that a prosecutorial agent is lacking for administrative violations, although one could be appointed *without injuring liberty.*

Hopefully with this even the most intense devotee of the book might have some doubt whether the intense praises given it to date arise from an intense scrutiny. So to reinforce his doubt I invite him to look at the relationship of vol. 1, p. 45 to p. 72, PE (pp. 23 and p. 52, BE) and of vol. 1, p. 49 to vol. 2, p. 369, PE (p. 27, vol. 1, to vol. 2, p. 419, BE). Accompany me in this examination for just a brief time to convince yourself that Monsieur de Tocqueville has not produced such a work as the journalists believe.

The first chapter concerns the country in its *physical* nature and may find its criticism in the geographic portrayals of other authors. I turn at once to the second chapter, where our author seeks to portray the *kernel* of the present political situation. I will not refer to the [8] contradictory statements on pp. 42 and 43, PE (p. 20, BE), according to which the intellectual life of an individual derives from impressions received in the cradle, without referring to the talents of parents and grandparents.[10] Especially since our author does not remain so true to them that one could see him as a naked adherent to the dreams of Helvétius of the equality of all talents, a conviction long vanished in theory but still alive both in France and elsewhere.[11] If I wished to

concentrate entirely on criticizing the *method*, or the rules, that our author used to discover the characteristics of peoples, I would come to the conclusion that his generalities contribute so little to understanding the essential characteristics of a people, a state or corporation led by individual people that, instead of chattering away about customs, prejudices, passions, ideas or mores, he would do better to press deeper into human nature and reach to the final impulse (the source of all efforts and interests). In this way he would achieve a dynamic of development that, because it depends on *internal qualities*, would not depend on windy *external influences* presumed by our author's methods. I have discussed this sufficiently elsewhere. Since it is only necessary to examine *results* that our author believes to have won on *his* true path of research, I do not need to mention more than belongs to his results. Yet I cannot leave his remarkable confusion unmentioned.

Our author desires, as mentioned, to rely on an analogy between *individuals* and *social* development, and in doing this he falls into the large error of forgetting that the analogy between childhood of an individual person and the childhood of a society *only exists if* the society consists of members (adults) in the lowest stage of development, as if they had come directly from the hand of the creator without any traditions. Our author truly believes that it is simply a question of the date of association, of unification. So *to him* the society is exactly as childish and comparable to the situation of a genuine child, with all members the offspring of already *cultivated* peoples, as if they were savages. For that reason, he says on p. 43, PE (p. 21, BE; p. 34, RT),[12] that America is the sole country in which one may observe the natural and peaceful development of a human society and the influence of first beginnings on the future, where one may pursue *what is called national character from its first kernels forward*. This assertion appears all the more absurd if compared with what is heard from our author himself *immediately afterwards*, [9] which is *that the first colonists brought with them rather sharp marks of a national character produced by civilization*.

Because things of this sort will often strike the attentive reader, he will have to have some medicine against the swindle in advance. I have to announce that among the cloud-images presented above that our author has used for the construction of his book, there is one that pops up like a tricky imp and appears to mock his efforts.

In order to give his structure a solid foundation, our author places at the pinnacle of his teachings with great emphasis the motto: every characteristic of North American life can be explained by the first appearance (*point de départ*) of an offspring of Europe in the new continent. There is no single *opinion*, no single *custom*, no single *law*, not even any *occurrence* that is not easily explained from this. Then there follows a short sketch of the emigrants

and their efforts—*until the separation of the colonies from the Mother Country*, in which the term "first departure" (*point de départ*) is inferred to mean *a very long period of time*. But no reader will understand this under the expression "*point de départ*." For that very reason anyone would have to feel an inclination against this fundamental motto. This can only change into a passive acceptance when, aside from the strange exaggeration, it expresses a piece of old news that has never been seriously doubted. The whole world knows that the roots of human activity in the present have to be sought in the past, and for that reason it is no secret that the characteristics of North American life *after* their separation from the Mother Country have a connection with what history of the period *before that separation*. Still, no level-headed researcher would dare to assert that *all* sides of the present, indeed all *events*, can be easily traced back to their roots.

But I pass on this in order to speak about the sketch itself and its connections with the present. The fact that Monsieur de Tocqueville presents it in such a way, how he views the individual parts of the history of colonization, is natural; and since people have different eyes, one must be calm about any variation from the sketches made in earlier books. But since this tolerance always has its limits, I demand that the reader test how far this tolerance actually reaches, and whether everything is to be justified that belongs in the realm of logic, independent of history?

In order not to accept his fundamental motto without contradiction [10] and to permit the words he uses, *point de départ*, to be used for a moment, our author seeks to see the *very first colonists* in such unique colors as to lift them up above all other residents of earth as a phenomenon from whom something utterly strange, indeed marvelous, is to be expected. But now I wish that you should see to what extent it succeeds, and how logic, anthropology and the very certainty of history relate to his statements.

After it is said on pp. 51 and 52, PE (pp. 30 and 32, BE; pp. 46, RT)[13] that the colonists of New England confounded their religious fanaticism with the most absolute democratic theories, it is still noted on pp. 60 and 61, PE (pp. 39 and 40, BE; p. 46, RT) to be an extremely *singular phenomenon* that their legislation, specifically that of Connecticut in 1650, derived from the Old Testament insofar as blasphemy, magic, adultery and rape are threatened with death.[14] Our author's astonishment expresses itself in his own words: "Nothing was *more singular*, nothing *more instructive*, than this legislation." I confess that I simply marvel at *him*, how a phenomenon can appear to him as utterly singular and peculiar to America that he himself (p. 51 and 52, PE; p. 30, BE) has been provided an entirely sufficient *European* cause in Puritanism (a peculiar combination of religious and political fanaticism). And just as much for this offense against logic and anthropology, I marvel at his lack

of knowledge of history that he should discover in America something as an extremely instructive earthly rarity that was found, and in part is still to be found, in Europe in every Christian land. What jurist does not know that precisely the Old and New Testaments had the greatest influence on the laws of Europe, far beyond the seventeenth century? The *German* jurist has proof enough of this in his *Carolina* (the penal code appearing under Emperor Charles V), without touching the laws of the pope and the usage of courts.[15] Although the same practices, with no smaller penalties, may be found, our author seeks to portray these phenomena common to all Christian peoples as unique to Americans, and that despite his own poorly prepared remarks of p. 45, PE (p, 23, BE; p. 35, RT) on the relationship of the Americans with the British.[16]

But what follows is more than stimulation to wonderment. Our author closes his amazement with those laws of New England with the phrase: "So they transferred the laws of a raw, half-civilized people [the Jews - GD] into the midst of an enlightened society of mild customs [the [11] Americans of 1650]."[17] And the same author swoops down on the same people two pages later (p. 63, PE; p. 42, BE; p. 48, RT)—after he reports how, among other things, swearing, lying, drinking, smoking, even kissing, were not only threatened with the most severe penalties, but actually carried out.—To explain such phenomena he declares that these tyrannical, bizarre laws were passed by the free agreement of the colonists, not imposed by force, because their *mores* were even *more severe* and Puritanical than the laws.[18]

How should one comment on such an author's trick? It would be easy to reply to our author against his repeated violation of logic, remarking that in the seventeenth century, not to mention the era of the Hussites, it was exactly the same way in Europe, under both Protestants and the Catholics, that both ecclesiastical and secular legislators proceeded zealously against swearing, drinking and tobacco. Truly it is puzzling enough when our author actually calls the emigrants of the seventeenth century enlightened. And this impression is only increased by the details of their legislation. But the statement that the same details flow from the nature and mores of the emigrants brings discomfort to the point where the reader is compelled to open contradiction: such people were neither enlightened nor gentle in mores. *Monsieur de Tocqueville* will not push our discomfort any further, however, so that suddenly he enters our thoughts and concedes victory to the truth by saying that their mores were even more severe than their laws.

Yet this leap only applies to mores, so that it does not also mean that his praise of *enlightenment* has been withdrawn. This is especially so, since we are now living in a time of enlightenment that appears totally suitable to the worst possible mores. Indeed our author distinguishes the area of mores

and religion from that of thinking and understanding in a manner far stricter than had the hierarchy of the Middle Ages. And since he attributes those signs of barbarism in laws to *mores and religion*, for him the area of *understanding* remains unsullied. I desire that one concede to him that the area of understanding, so radically separated from the area of mores and religion, is the only true home of freedom and politics, and so on. But *from this* it also follows that there is also legislation *distinct* from the area of politics to which those barbarian laws belong. And from that it follows that there is a *theory*, an *art*, an *understanding* of that (particularly to protect against barbarian laws), which belongs less to the area [12] of politics than to the understanding *itself*.

One should test this carefully. With this I do not intend to place in sequence satires but rather solely our author's expressions. It is true that on page 70, PE (p. 51, BE) he appears to place the category in question under religion, as if it is a religious dogma of the Americans to hold politics to be for the understanding alone.[19] But what he says shortly before shows completely that he is not expressing his own views. On page 69, PE (p. 49 and 50, BE, p. 56, RT) it says specifically:

> Anglo-American civilization is the product of two distinct elements that otherwise are in conflict, but that tolerate one another marvelously in America. They are: the spirit of religion and the spirit of liberty. The founders of New England were both passionate sectarians and exalted innovators. Bound in the most narrow bands of certain religious convictions they were *free* from *all political* prejudices. Hence two different but harmonizing drives of which traces are found everywhere in their mores as well as in their laws.[iii] [Further on the following page it says] hence it happens that the American shows a longsuffering but also voluntary obedience in the moral world (*dans le monde moral*), while in the other world, the *political* (hence identical with the *intellectual*), there is independence, defiance of experience and jealousy against authority.[20]

If I wished to expose to the reader the value of Tocqueville's reasoning, I would only have to introduce him to the imp already mentioned, who certainly grins at us in the previous categorization. And this imp is nothing other than the Proteus that our author loves to lead around by the simple name of

[iii] This new opposition of mores and laws might surprise the reader after the statement that at least the *barbaric* laws are suited to their mores. But I assure the reader that if he is offended by such things, he will get through this work with a fully battered head. He only needs to understand that we are speaking here of laws that have nothing to do with mores. A thorough examination of the book's chain would utterly overburden the reader if one recalled all the contradictions at every link. For example, how would it heighten the desire for further examination if I simply cited vol. 2, p. 408, PE (p. 461, BE), where it is said of the majority of religion in the United States that it is *republican* and entirely *committed to individual conviction*? Or vol. 2, p. 365, PE (p. 415, BE; p. 267 and 268, RT), where there is talk of the great *variability* of religious opinions?

"mores" (*les mœurs*). But open the second volume to pages 208 and 242, PE (pp. 241, 278, [13] BE; pp. 159, 183, RT) to recognize better the imp's tricky nature.[21] There is found a definition expressly intended for the entire book that mores are to be understood as what *the Ancients* understood it to be, the entire moral and *intellectual* condition of a people (p. 208, PE, and p. 241, BE), or, all the moral and intellectual dispositions that a person brings to the social situation (p. 242, PE and p. 278, BE).[22] I suspect that many will be all too overcome by feelings of surprise, and for that reason I will leave the reader to himself so that he may rub his eyes and collect himself enough so he may judge whether the spook that has popped up is from himself and myself, or whether it actually leaps out of Monsieur de Tocqueville's book.

I must pursue my stated purpose, and to win support from my arguments I am concerned that our author's further arguments do not suddenly appear too narrow. For that reason I must take care to ward off the imp, and to some degree to imitate the ghost-flags. It is notorious that their art consists in not driving the ghosts entirely away, but rather in reducing them to a smaller area, since what has been conjured up cannot be conjured away. That is entirely how it is for me with our author's mores-spook. I have to determine to turn them away *for the moment*, knowing well that it will keep its footing somewhere. It will remain on the page, where it passes under my eyes in black on white, and I cannot help it if I cannot entirely shut my eyes on that book. Until then, however, not only can I wipe it away with open eyes, but I can struggle with yet another phantom, which is the fiction that the definition has no strength before the fact and does not effect the first volume.

In truth it appears to me that it is only with the use of this fiction that further critique of our author's remarkable dichotomy is permissible, so that I continue in the following manner.

It is too bad that something in us strives against such a simple division of the impulses of life, something that we tend to attribute to anthropology, not to the part of anthropology elevated above all of history, but rather with that applying to the *general* history of the development of people and peoples. And it is all the worse in that it struggles against the *special* history of the *North Americans*.

Just to remain with anthropology for the moment, to whom does it not appear contradictory to hold one and the same person to be utterly clear and free from all political prejudices, while he is utterly unclear, unfree and fanatic in his religion (and mores)? How is one and the same person [14] to be able to examine everything that applies to his everyday life through a *voluntary* self-control of that penetrating intelligence (*efforts de l'intelligence*) that has freed him from *all* political prejudices, only to subject himself like a pious lamb to the eternal rule of a strict, untested faith? There are no examples of an *eternal*

governance of an untested faith; at least we cannot see it as a *healthy* phenomenon of life without denying healthy life any progressive development of its own. This would take the place of a changing perception of a higher nature and of the divinity, and we may be silent about it being combined with high political insight, an insight that has its roots in the same pure conception of the relationships of man to the universe and to his fellow men, in the presence of which every *religious* fanaticism must vanish.

Yet our author sees it as unnecessary to press more deeply into anthropology than the expressions "customs, prejudices, religion, liberty, ideas, enlightenment" and the like, reach. Those are his elements, as mentioned, by which he advances with elegant ability (admittedly occasionally with the aid of the *miraculous*) to the highest results on human efforts, or at least believes himself to have advanced. For that reason criticism is dispensed from the need to defend anthropology against him, and so we may move to history without delay, where he believes he finds a wealth of support for his doctrine.

In order to prove the *enlightenment* of the first colonists, our author asserts, as the reader will recall, that *religion and mores* have nothing to do with enlightenment, in other words, that *politics* is the sole field for enlightenment and understanding. And since he bans *bad* laws to the realm of *religion and mores*, the field of *understanding* is left above suspicion. But in order to progress, the strength of understanding and the height of enlightenment must be proved to be *positive*, and it seems to Monsieur de Tocqueville to be enough to point to the following historical points that he sees to be decisive signs of liberation from all political prejudices: *first*, the participation of the people in political business; *second*, the free approval of taxes; *third*, the responsibility of officials; *fourth*, individual liberty, and *fifth*, jury courts (p. 64, PE; p. 43, BE; p. 52, RT).[23]

It is truly painful to read the phrases with which these points are celebrated as products of profound wisdom, since dry historians see the same in Germanic development many previous centuries ago. Who does not know how the old Germans handled public business in their forests? [15] Whoever doubts it in the least may look at chapters 11 and 12 of Tacitus on the Germans. Who has never heard about the May Assembly that continued long into the Middle Ages? Who does not know that the jury trial arises from the Germanic forests? Doesn't the chief author on British Law (Blackstone, Book 4, chapter 33), a good hundred years ago, say that this important guarantee of public and personal liberty was owed to the *Saxons*? Hence if such political institutions are owed to the highest human wisdom, then it was possessed as well by the Old Saxons in Germania as by the Puritans in North America.— One may spare the effort to draw the arguments against the singular wisdom of the first colonists, since the book itself provides material enough. On page

45, PE (p. 23, BE; p. 35, RT) the same fighter for the exclusive insight of the Americans says that at the time of the first emigration from Britain communal liberty already existed there, that fruitful germ of free institutions, as he calls it.[24] Hence the principle of popular sovereignty was also already in the bosom of the monarchy of the Tudors, so that *in principle* the spiritual life of the Britons was held to be the *root* of the characteristics of the American colonists.—Incidentally, the reader may not wonder too much that the author of this passage, where it is a question of the Americans being totally original *in politics*, completely ignores where he is to prove their originality in religion (and mores). He would rather lead me to his demonstration of how he proceeds to show his dogma of *political* originality.

On page 58, 59 and following, PE (p. 38, 39 and 44, BE; p. 45, RT), he says:

> Already the first emigrants conducted themselves as if completely independent from England, practicing rights of sovereignty *every moment*, and from 1641 on popular sovereignty was being praised by the general assembly of *Rhode Island*, insofar as *Massachusetts* in 1650 broke with the traditional practice of placing the name of the king at the head of court orders.[25]

Is it not absurd not to recall that it is in those same years that Cromwell called forth precisely the same phenomena in Britain? Either our author distorts history on purpose or out of excessive haste, to show the Britons emigrated to America as singular beings, and by that means to show contemporary North Americans as a separate people from the other Europeans, from the beginning.

Whoever wishes to convince himself even more of the nature of this obsession may look at page 72, PE (p. 52, BE; p. 64, RT). After presenting his sentence, "North American life [16] may be derived from so-called elements that have nothing in common with Europe, specifically Puritanical fanaticism and the sublime doctrine of liberty," our author also speaks of some things *on the side* that, because the emigrants were not entirely able to part with them, exercised a small influence *outside* these main elements. Hence he distinguishes customs and ideas that were (internally, essentially) *proper* to the emigrants, from other customs and ideas that were purely *dependent*, derived from their *education* and *national tradition*, and he places them under the rubric of "English origins," to make the distinction quite sharp, in opposition to the rubric entitled "*Puritanical* origins."[26]

Is it not a strange phenomenon that in our own time our author can regard everything that we conceive of as nationality and heritage to be mere matters on the side? And this opposes an unstable religious direction which itself is conceded explicitly, as on pages 45 and 56, PE (pp. 23, 35, BE; pp.

35, 43, RT) to derive from nationality and heritage, and which never existed more crassly in North America than in Europe, not just in Britain but also, under different names, on the Continent. It is hard to determine whether the offenses against logic and anthropology, or those against history, are worse, if one compares where our author applies his proverb on the original sovereignty of the Americans. On page 59, PE (p. 37, BE; p. 43, RT)[27] he actually wants to teach us that the states of New England were always left to govern themselves, while every page of the history of the governors of these states declares that they were *named* or *confirmed* by the kings of England, of governors who acted successfully innumerable times as agents of the Crown against the will of the colonists, as was particularly the case with the *last* governor of Massachusetts (called the wellspring of democracy), *Hutchinson* by name. Hence why the appeal to the *true* history that the same author makes on page 90, PE (p. 75, BE; p. 80, RT), saying that popular sovereignty had to *hide* itself until separation from England?[28]

I repeat, there are similar contradictions against *subordinate* sentences to be found everywhere in the book. So, for example, on page 51, PE (p. 29, BE; p. 39, RT) the colonists of New England in no way sought *material* goods when they left their fatherland, but rather they pursued the triumph of an idea.[29] But on page 70, PE (p. 50, BE; p. 56, RT) it says that these people pursued material goods with the same zeal as with spiritual, particular religious. Further, on page 46, PE (p. 24, BE; p. 35, RT), the proof is [17] given for the assertion that *all* the colonies in America possessed the germ of democracy: None of them had any idea of the sovereignty of one over another because they were *poor and unfortunate*. Poverty and misfortune are the best of all guarantees of equality, and only misfortune and poverty had determined their emigration. Despite this, on page 51 (29, BE; P. 39, RT) it says *precisely* of the colonists in *New England*,[30] which is continuously (as on pp. 37, 43, 49, 56, BE; p. 59 ff., PE) treated as the *original seat* of democracy, precisely because of the *equality* of its residents, that they by no means emigrated due to *need* or *poverty*.[31] It is only that I need the space too much to show the incoherence of sentences that could be presented as fundamental, nor can I touch every offence against history, such as page 66, PE (p. 45 and 46, BE; p. 54, RT), where it is said on behalf of the exclusive wisdom of the Americans, that they were the first whose laws cared for the poor, since poor dues had long since existed in England (under Queen Elizabeth).[32] Nor have I dealt with the nakedness of every phrase that appears as *traits* (*d'esprit*—"of the spirit"). Only in the present second chapter, which should serve as the basis of all the rest, can something of the sort be pointed out. On page 65, PE (pp. 44, 45, BE; p. 52 and 53, RT) it says literally:

> In *Europe* the political organism began *above* and gradually spread down; in *America* this happened in reverse: there the communes first came into existence, then the counties, then the states and finally the Union. Thus communal independence—where the principle of life of American liberty still resides—is the first foundation of the whole.[33]

These expressions contain nothing but obvious truths and false novelties. Everyone knows that the states did not *suddenly* appear on the colonization of the new peoples. The states beyond the Alleghenies still arise as the old did, since the process of our colonization does not go any differently. Just as Europe was not occupied in any other way (at least not by the Germans) than America, and the *political organism of whole peoples*, perhaps in the largest part of Europe was earlier groupings that could be called communes (which our author declares to be impossible, p. 81, BE [p. 85, RT]):[34] hence the antithesis above is impossible to justify. There has always been a supreme power in Europe as there was in North America, and here there was as little lack of free room for the rise of communes from below as there. However different the interests of the individual settlers appear, the number of cities that arose from above (that is, through foundation by higher state authorities), [18] is very small when compared with all the communes that arose from below. If our author's perception is already incorrect, it is even more so insofar as it embraces the thought that the rise of communities took place somewhere *outside* the general state association. In Europe as in America, the highest state authority first took notice of people and their groups once they were there. It is alone true that every white man, in North America as in Europe, who contributed to the erection of a community knew full well that it arose *within* the general political association. And one simply cannot say because of the *later* influence of this association in Europe on the communities that they *originated* from the top down. But it is just as incorrect to hold that in the case of the *American* communities, the political protection *under which* they arose was a *nullity*. Who does not know that the federal authority is irreplaceable precisely to American colonists on the frontier of culture in the West? I refer only to the most recent Indian wars and the chain of small forts against them. Who does not know how irreplaceable the protection of England was for the first emigrants, not just against the Indians, but also against the French, the Spaniards and the Dutch? It is true that the colonizing families continually complained of the *lack* of protection. But no one should be misled to believe that it was *completely* lacking. It cannot be denied that politicians bound by school theories worked against the colonists as well. But the power of politicians must be distinguished from the power of their objects, the states and the federation. Unconcerned about their will, the states and federation *compelled* the officials to take protective measures. And so it is very easy to say that the

politicians injured the colonists more than they helped them, and that yet the power of the whole provided the individual colonists with irreplaceable protection.

In order to pursue further this thread of the book, or rather what is offered as a thread, I first ask the reader to make a general review of the contents of the second chapter. I confess that to me it has the appearance of a confused storage house where our author has heaped together a mass of material, good and bad, indeed completely incoherent, colorfully thrown together, in order to be able to find there whatever he wants that he might need for his later experiments at construction. What he declares to be essential is that the New England colonists brought with them Puritanism and the spirit of liberty. He seeks to characterize Puritanism in such a way that religion consists of everything that does not occupy the area of politics, as the deity itself rules himself and protects against all speculation or novelty. He expressly counts *mores* [19] as part of this protected realm, establishing its area with the words "*monde moral*" in opposition to the "*monde politique* "(as mingled with the intellectual area)(which, as said, directly conflicts with the definition of *mœurs* in the second volume). Another definition or limitation of his political area is not to be found in the second chapter, and I must ask the reader to be quiet for a moment about the contradiction. For his words "spirit of freedom," there is a further aspect, which is that he understands it as the *drive for popular sovereignty*, and he takes this as meaning the same as the *democratic direction.* He then explains it from the (external and internal) *equality* of individual colonists. I will not repeat how poorly it goes with the *further* derivation of this equality, since it was abandoned precisely by his prototypes of democracy, the New Englanders. We want to see how long the derivative continues.

## Part Two

With the *third* chapter our author sets about using his storehouse for actual building, but he also starts out with a remark about his method that throws him even more into contradiction. He uses here the expression "*social condition*" (*état social*)[35] for the first time, not casually but to indicate an autonomous object that he invites his reader to observe in the most careful way. He uses it, as said, in opposition to the words "*political* condition," as already on p. 45, PE (p. 22, BE; p. 35, RT).[36] But that is the sole detailed specification, and the reader who is still straining to achieve clear definition encounters on page 105, PE (p. 92, BE; p. 91, RT) a definition of *social* interests, which bring his confusion to the extreme. Because those interests, because of sharp characterization, are opposed to *communal* interests; and in the second volume, page 1, there even appears the expression "*société*

*politique*."[37] I will abstain from trying to resolve these difficulties, since I see even greater ones in the very first use of the words "social condition" (*état social*). Specifically the chapter begins with the advice that, to get to know the laws and mores of a society (under which one seeks to understand the ideas that guide the whole), one must undertake to study its *social condition*. For this [20] condition is the first cause of most laws, customs and ideas guiding the whole. According to this, one would think of a social condition above everything *independent* of laws, customs and mores; and our author presumes that such an independent condition has also genuinely existed among the people of which we are speaking, the North Americans. The reader might attempt to follow this advice. Even with every effort of imagination, I have not successfully been able to imagine a *social* condition without laws, customs and mores. And since one cannot hold in particular that which is unthinkable in general, the *application* of the theorem will fail in every case. If someone with more hope for a positive result than I had should undertake the labor, he should be aware that the book itself has blocked the way to the application of the theorem to the North Americans through an earlier passage. It is reported by our author on pages 44 and 45, PE (pp. 21, 22, BE; pp. 34, 35, RT) that the first colonists already showed signs of having *brought with them* clear marks of a national character in religion, mores, usages and customs that had the *closest* connection with their current condition!!![38]

Yet it is important for criticizing the work to read the degree to which our author has succeeded in his abstraction, and how he believes to have first recognized the *democratic direction* of North Americans. This despite the fact that he appeared to us to have already recognized this direction earlier, no more and no less precisely, for example pages 45 and 46, PE (pp. 23 and 24, BE; p. 35, RT): it appears to be the result of his study of the social condition, which he treats as a very fruitful discovery.[39] This is because he sees his abstract social condition precisely as the first generator of mores and customs (p. 75, PE; p. 55, BE, p. 66, RT)—which to *ordinary* eyes might appear to be a blank slate, a *tabula rasa*—giving it the rather palpable quality of being *éminement démocratique* ["eminently democratic"], an original dowry.[40] In this he claims to have found the true egg from which everything currently in North America may easily be derived. It is just too bad that a few pages earlier (for example, p. 46, PE; p. 24, BE; pp. 35, 36, RT) the same democratic quality is declared exactly as old as mores and customs, and hence that the continued fruitfulness of the egg is seen as exactly as fruitful as its mother, the abstract social condition. But what is most disturbing is the once-more hidden grinning of the imp, who cites to us page 242 of the second volume (p. 278 of the Brussels edition), where it is clear that he is born *before* the social condition. [21]

Joined to this balderdash is a marvelous play with the word "democratic," which alone demonstrates how splendidly our author has commandeered the word on which the entire book is written. Just listen! On page 74, PE (p. 55, BE; p. 66, RT) the social condition generates and dominates mores.[41] Further it says on page 75, PE (p. 56, BE) that this social condition is *extremely democratic*. Everyone would quietly derive from this that mores must be so as well. I beg your pardon, dear reader, it does not work that way. Since on pages 87 and 88, PE (pp. 69 and 70, BE; pp. 77, 78, RT) it says once again:

> Such an extremely democratic condition works *just as well* for *liberty* (which means the same as popular sovereignty) as for *despotism*;—for *equality* exists both when *all* have rights as when *no one* has rights, *and because equality* is more the goal of the democratic direction than *liberty. For that reason something more* must enter in—in order that the highly democratic nature of a people should not produce the despotism of an individual but rather liberty or popular sovereignty. And this something more would also be the true cause why the North Americans have *fortunately escaped* from despotism (*que les Anglo-Americains ont été assez heureux pour échapper au pouvoir absolu*).[42]

And what has to be added? Literally translated: "The conditions, the heritage, and above all else the mores." (P. 88, PE; p. 71, BE; p. 79, RT) Yes, above all else mores, and my commentary to that is: precisely what, according to the previous citation says belongs to the *état eminement démocratique*, which is in keeping with our author's logic as well as his historical citations !!![43]

One encounters a similar bit of nonsense in the second volume (p. 242 f., PE; p. 278 f., BE). There it says:

> It is true that the Anglo-Americans brought equality of conditions with them into the New World; the difference between nobility and bourgeois never existed there; there was also neither prejudice of birth nor prejudice of professions. Hence the social condition was so democratic that democracy could *easily* establish her reign. Only [our author continues] precisely the same obtained in *South* America, which could not tolerate democracy.[44]

And without suspecting contradiction in this, he proceeds to the sentence, "that something additional has to be joined to a democratic nature, which is *mores* (*les mœurs*)." Here is the true, unimpeachable home of the sly imp, who not only mocks our author for having made the conditions mentioned above, particularly *prejudices of birth and profession*, part of the accidental [22] external conditions, as part of the area of mores, although on the same page he has already placed that area above *all intellectual and moral dispositions*.

I have no doubt that the small effort needed to look back at the citations mentioned so far will be enough for everyone to reach a general sentence on the book. It is only because the object itself, independent from our author's

ideas, is important enough for the civilized world that I wish, as said, to perform more than a negative service to the public that the correct conclusions are not to be found in Monsieur de Tocqueville, but insofar as his errors extend to the main concerns of American life, to briefly note the *true* situation. For that reason, we return to following the thread.

## Part Three

We have seen how our author has tried to derive the current state of the society of North America from an abstract social condition, and how, after he opposed his abstraction of an extremely democratic character that is a primal quality, he treated mores and insights (*lumières*) as fully different, to come to the later concluding sentence: "The democratic social condition alone could lead as easily to a despotism as to democracy, and the *fortunate* outcome is entirely attributable to mores." As much as the reader will be able to follow this reasoning, after this turn he will hardly be able to suppress his curiosity and look closer, which is to say, he will search more closely the significance of those few letters, "mores." But it is precisely here that our author leaves him in the lurch, as it seems, out of a pure zeal to deduce the fortunate development of that word "mores" into popular sovereignty even further. It is only in the *second* volume that the riddle is solved with the appearance of the imp; there the reader discovers that nothing less than the *entire moral and intellectual condition* of the Americans is the source of their freedom and popular sovereignty. And as if this circle is not yet wide enough for him to explain it, he adds in the *circumstances* and *lumières* (which emerge as additions to mores). But let us keep the spook away for a moment. [23] After so many dubious passages up to now, it is a consolation to readers finally to find something before them that our author offers as a place of rest, a harbor. In fact he has succeeded in transforming the result of his deduction through a *small addition* into connecting tissue, a kind of ganglion, from which he draws as many new threads as he feels he needs. To be precise, he adds to the word "popular sovereignty" the term "principle," and he takes it to mean the same as saying that the Americans have succeeded (in the manner presented) in achieving popular sovereignty, or, the *principle* of popular sovereignty. But it is precisely that which forces me to a remark that can do more than any other for the correct evaluation of North American life than all others. I begin by encouraging the reader, before he goes along with our author's derivations, to test the *meaning* of the expression "popular sovereignty" as well as the associated expression "principle of popular sovereignty." Although the book does not have a hint on this, it seems to me to be not an unjust query, since deduction is not about *words*, but about perceptions and concepts. Unfortunately, it is

very common to encounter words possessing *no* concepts, but that is not why I make this preparatory demand. It is certainly not to be denied that a concept exists in some heads for which the words "*principle* of popular sovereignty" work. *The question is only this*, whether this principle and all conceptions of it are just a thought-thing (a pure fancy) or a real existing something. And the same question goes together precisely (to concentrate on the individual case) with that of whether such a principle exists in the North American people, or more exactly, whether it exists in the majority of heads.

If opinion asked whether the entire government (everything that belongs to the concept of state power and state organism) was for the people, was there for the well-being of the people, it would be hard to find an American who would not agree. But if one sought something more than the sentence, "Everything for the people!" but actually saying, "Everything through the people!" it would look differently. It is obvious that the latter sentence is a result of school theories on the best form of government, and it also presumes of everyone who does not seek only a naked slogan or password an *acquaintance* with this theory. But now no one wishes to believe in the miracle that one learns this sort of thing in North America by oneself. I truly have a positive opinion of Americans, that is, of the mass of the people. The specific opinion that their majority not only functions better than the majority of any other people, [24] but also has better insight. But nothing can be more incorrect as to think this to be an insight that can simply be derived from continuing reflections in ripe adulthood upon the highest political theorems. In general Americans show more insight in dealings in private life than Europeans. One also finds in them rather generally as much *political* knowledge as can be achieved without intense concentration in reflection, for example, acquaintance with the *formalities* of their *communal*, *state* and *federal* institutions, which to be sure is very much contrary to the situation in Europe. But I warn once again that one should not overdraw this conclusion and allow oneself to be misled into the delusion that this wisdom hangs over everyone in midair, like an inspiring deity. Let the reader consider that it can only dwell on earth in individual human heads, and that even in America heads *adequate* to that do not sprout from the soil. Consider as well, to counter all *exaggerated* notions of the *historical preparation* of human germs in the new land, that most of the British (as well as German) immigrants of the *most recent* time become just as good Americans as the natives. I admit that this does not appear to be the case with *French* immigrants.

Further, the same direction that prevents the mass of Americans from long reflection on politics also protects them from manifold theoretical distractions. And if one or another of our political theories involves fanaticism, which history and its contemporary fruits must willingly accommodate to all

experiments of so-called reformers, without speaking of the acquired rights toward the whole community, of this the majority of North American people are completely free.

So much for the preparation for my statement that popular sovereignty has indeed arisen in North America, but it did not arise through a Something that one could call a principle. This is because here public life follows a fixed principle as little as private undertakings, since here, *precisely because it proceeds democratically*, no other impulses are decisive except those that prevail in the heads of the majority. Therefore, whoever wishes to explain the American condition is deriving something from a phantom. Obviously the political institutions in North America correspond to the theoretical demand "that the people shall rule themselves" more than anywhere in Europe. But this phenomenon does not derive from any theoretical demand. Not because the masses, without whose will and [25] powers it would not be possible, knew of any theory, but actually only negatively, it has achieved liberty through the loss of its ruler (the king of England). The liberty of the North Americans, that is, their independence from themselves, no longer operates with a positive principle, as they did at their first arising, their separation from Britain. Impulses entirely different from a so-called democratic principle led to this separation. It was precisely the great error of the British government that it persuaded itself and convinced others that the ferment was produced only by such a principle. This is because the most powerful demagogues could do nothing more than use what they found available in the people, especially the theory that recognized no rights at all for a hereditary prince, so that the leaders could do little with the Americans except for the directly contrary reason that "the King has forfeited his rights."

Strangely enough, at another point in his book (vol. 2, p. 251, PE; p. 287, BE) our author himself confesses that it is less essential for democracy that it be ruled *through* the people as it is that what happens is for the wellbeing of the people. At the same point he concedes that it is impossible for every people to govern itself, strictly understood, and that every society must transfer its business to individual persons. And he also does not find it essential whether the head of executive power is elected for four years or for a longer period. He even declares the *heritability* of this position as compatible with democracy. Such thoughts should have justly caused him a few misgivings about whether there is a militant doctrine (*dogme*, as he expresses it)[45] that does not simply exist, but *rules*. In this sequence he probably could have come to the realization that the majority in North America is unanimous that the government is only there for the wellbeing of the people (a sentence that is not hostile to monarchy), but that concerning the *effectiveness* of the highest authorities, the constant unanimity did not reach further than a dislike for a

king, *derived from England*, together with a desire to create a great federation. North American legislation rests on the popular spirit *insofar* as it relies on theoreticians (statesmen) who are ever more dependent on the people over the long run. Our author remarks (vol. 1, p. 73, PE; p. 54, BE) himself that a people (a democracy) alters the civil laws the least, since it has too little knowledge and relies too much on jurists. Here he was on the track of the truth, which he unfortunately lost all too rapidly. This track would quickly have led him to the ideas in my *Europe* [26] *and Germany*, etc. Since I must refer to this work at length, I insert here a passage word for word. In vol. 1, on page 172, it says:

> Insofar as one comes to consider the conditions for the good life, the prospects in America are as dark as in Europe. Wherever efforts are needed for the common good that *exceed* common sense, there prevail the results of the common weaknesses of modern culture [the products of reflection]. That is especially the case with justice. In most of the branches of civil and criminal legislation, where common sense can accomplish little, the views and theories of jurists and statesmen rule almost as unrestrainedly as in Europe.[46]

Through similar and further passages I sought to work against the prejudice from which all previous opinions printed in Europe about the Americans' situation. It is the same prejudice of Monsieur de Tocqueville, who deals with the products of reflection in the higher classes and is blind to the almost instinctual life of the masses, which is where the true source condition of the present as well as of the past is to be glimpsed. Our general political wisdom, not just our political fanaticism, is still deeply immersed in the error that the *essence* of popular development is in the *higher* classes. And there rests the generally-accepted madness to steer and alter the same development through theories and legislation at pleasure, as well as the no-less general inclination to place too much weight in examining the Americans' condition on legislation and particularly on that part of legislation that is solely or primarily subject to legists. That is further the reason why precisely our politicians (not just the enemies of popular sovereignty) who have come to America feel rather uncomfortable and complain about disappointments. A government such as the North American is not a government of theories, and for that reason a strict theoretician encounters much that appears *anarchical* to him. As much as the *general forms* of political life (whose coherence, as was said, derives not from the great majority but from statesmen) might please him, he will find innumerable things to criticize in individual movements of life within it. And (what would strengthen him in his displeasure even more) *American* politicians would agree with his criticism in the bottom of their hearts. In this they *can* distinguish themselves from Europeans only through a certain tolerance,

since their theories are no other than those of shared with modern schools. Our author has a suspicion, indeed, that there is something in the people that is not to be controlled or modeled through reflection and legislation. But how far [27] it reaches is shown by his confused talk about "mores," with which words he perhaps is darkly thinking about the instinct-like strivings of the masses, but he is doing it so darkly that his definition in the second volume leads him completely away from this. For how should one who classified the *general* moral and intellectual condition of the peoples as a *uniform element* and, instead of entering into closer investigation by attributing an *intellectual equality* to the *American* people, recognize the opposition of classes living almost by instinct in opposition *to the reflecting* classes?

## Part Four

With this I have arrived inevitably at a critique of our author's portrayal of equality in America and his derivations from it. It is obvious that he was misled to his faith in an almost total equality by the circumstance that the *highest* and *lowest* levels are lacking in the United States, that on the one side there are no princes and on the other no beggars. But for that reason treating the inequalities in the classes *between* as insignificant is all the more irresponsible because it is precisely *they* who have become all-important for politics. In both parts of the world it is precisely in them that the chief elements are to be sought that produce the great split of the people into what is called the democratic and aristocratic directions. Listen to me more closely. In regard to the scale of this great split, human society in North America is surely more equal than the fact that they lack princes and beggars. But for that reason not everything is in any sense even.

I am writing in the first instance for Germans, so I now choose to use primarily Germany for comparison. In Germany the princes have been as elevated as they are through the life of the people as it is currently expressed, with its roots (that is, without laws or compulsion), so that political influence has fallen to them as if by itself. But what speaks in the people on behalf of the rest of the nobility is far less effective and simply bestows on them an *expectation* of rank in the society that can only be made real through personal qualities. Still, it is more than can be won through mere money, which is revealed most clearly in diplomas of nobility, for which the people can discover no other basis but wealth. [28] In this the attempt to reject the sole right of history to create nobility has failed completely. The fact that even the most naked diploma improves with age, and that the families with letters of nobility nudge ever nearer to the historical nobility explains how generosity with diplomas of nobility has helped to fill in the gap between the nobility and the

bourgeoisie. How, then, should popular opinion—which must rise intellectually along with the intellectual advancement of the people—regard bourgeois with a series of honorable ancestors reaching back two or three hundred years (of which there are many in Germany, particularly on the Lower Rhine) as ranking behind nobles whose family tree only reaches back one generation to dependence on court servants? It is precisely this, and that among the bourgeoisie itself there is a distinction of rank (often already through birth), so that the distinction between the *highest* and lowest is far more than in the nobility. This confirms that from time to time the *inner* qualities of persons of bourgeois origins rise high above the ordinary nobility, as we have experienced and continue to experience, for example, with Washington and Franklin in America and with famous poets, artists and scholars in Europe.

If it really is so in *Germany*, then no one should cause himself to be misled into believing about *North America* that there *is absolutely nothing* of what one might call the prejudice of birth. There as well, as among wild beasts, the world (independently of law and politics) places some weight on ancestry, and the school theories that education does everything has obliterated this as little as has the political language the claim of equality. Just as in the *beginning* of colonization eyes turned by preference to the sons of those families known and distinguished in the old homeland rather than others, so later one always finds sons of fathers who distinguished themselves on the *new* continent given an advantage in popular opinion. To that extent there is no difference than in those parts of Europe where there is no *legal* distinction between classes. It is only that *that* distinction which European legislators draw (for example the Prussians) between honorable and non-honorable persons is less visible in North America (with the exception of Negroes and Mulattos). But it would be utterly wrong to believe that it is totally lacking. And in order to lead to clear concepts on this and its significance for politics, I must recall once more the splitting of the people into democrats and aristocrats. Precisely because the same split expresses itself clearly enough in North America *without* princes, and since in Europe the princes must depend on it (one or the other part), without a fully developed *third* party [29] of estimable strength being capable of formation, the inequalities on which it is founded are the *most significant* for politics. And since the politician can overlook this as little as in Europe, I call it irresponsible that our author opposes belief on such causes through his report on the supposed equality of North Americans. Here the accusation of a contradiction rises up to a high degree, diminishing his book more than anything else. The same author who declares an equality in the *first* volume which, if it really existed, would make a split into democrats and aristocrats quite impossible, speaks in the *second* volume, p. 435 and following, especially p. 441, BE (p. 383 ff. and 389, PE) of a Democratic

Party that continually opposes the federal power and has weakened it over time to the point of complete powerlessness. How unclear the spirit of party appears to him is shown more by the chapter on it (vol. 2, chapter 3).[47] Its criticism naturally belongs there. But I hope that I am not expected to attack *all* of his contradictions, and I would prefer that I be allowed to refer to my *Travel Report* and both volumes of my *Europe and Germany*. For that reason I now take up once more the threads of my review of the misunderstood inequalities.

Just as in Europe all classes between princes and beggars are divided under the two large rubrics of "honorific" and "non-honorific," an analogous division prevails over the whole North American population, although it is expressed less crudely in the forms of discourse. Even if the practice of a trade does not exclude one from the honorable class, still not every craftsman belongs to the honorable. And even if the general use of "*Herr*" (*sir* and *gentleman*), and that the food of day laborers is served at the same table with the gentlefolk, and although the fact that there is only one order of service in steamboats on the eastern coast appears to vouch *against* inequality, still the ranking of *inns* speaks much more decisively for it. I personally have often observed that people have been rejected from inns simply on the basis of external appearance, without any attempt on their parts to protest about equal rights, as would be the case with similar incidents in Europe. I also assure that on the very same steamboats where there is no distinction of rank, stricter control is exercised over the appearance of travelers than is the case with European transportation. It does not matter that the distinction is weaker in thinly settled stretches, since it is no different in Europe. The analogy must exist *necessarily*, since the *inequalities* [30] from which the *European* distinction arises analogously in North America.

It requires no great effort to grasp that those inequalities that originate in talents and education cannot be as entirely lacking as our author seeks to portray. And if my naked counter-argument does not suffice, I only need to rely on the anthropology of the reader, which would not be ready to accept that those educated for crafts in America are intellectually equal to those educated for the sciences and for political offices (not to mention physicians and theologians). To be sure it is not simply their *inner* education that stamps them as honorable. A certain exterior belongs to this, and also money. But that is the same in both worlds. Whoever cannot buy a proper coat can appear in so-called good society as little in America as he could in Europe. It is only the fact that it is easier to get a good coat in America that makes admission among the honorable easier. And this entry is made even easier by the fact that there are no negative prejudices against the crafts. But that is not everything: whoever adds to this the prejudices of birth forgets that even in (Western) Europe

to be sure social distinctions are at work, but that the general distinction into honorable and non-honorable no longer matter.

What is said above should not be understood to mean that I equate the expressions "aristocrats and democrats" to the expressions "honorable and not honorable." I simply intend to categorize the area in general where the roots of the political split are to be sought. And to approach closer to clarity, I add that aristocrats everywhere are to be found especially among the honorable persons, but by no means all honorable persons are aristocrats. In the same way, most democrats are among the non-honorable, but the two are still not the same. To reach more precise perceptions, one should note more sharply the role that intellectual inequality plays in the political split. To be in the estate of the honorable requires a certain education, but by no means the degree of education that determines *that* intellectual inequality. It is only such a higher education that could distinguish men into aristocrats and democrats that produces aristocratic tendencies. And among these tendencies the most general source is *to strive to live according to reflection* (*Europe and Germany*, vol. 1, pp. 133, 134). The first effect of rising education, everywhere and always, is a certain resistance to the impressions of the moment, a striving to exercise a certain control over these impressions. The higher true education is, so much the better are [31] the ideas, rules, principles (or whatever one wishes to call them) by which he seeks to control that same control. It is precisely this higher education that is always especially to be sought among the *honorable* people, and even if they were hitherto never very often to be found among them, they were still far rarer among the *lower* classes.

Now I challenge every reader to say whether the difference among people indicated here is not to be tested before all others if one is speaking of inequality, in which the political splits are founded, in order to achieve some measure of maintainable concepts of the words "aristocrats and democrats" so flippantly used. One can set aside references to material goods if political forms demand it. But one can only deny the impulses of higher insight under the pressure of an overwhelming necessity, and concession by agreement is unthinkable in that case. It is on this that I build my assertion that the eternal root of political division is the same in Europe as it is in America, since on both continents there is the same higher education, an education that can make even the princes of our time more into aristocrats than all advantages in rank, power and wealth. As often as it might be found advisable by them to use the democrats against the aristocrats, the final wish of true education must ever remain to protect the biddings of insight against the impulses of the moment. In other words, as often as a prince might wish to work against the aristocrats, higher education will always cause him to draw close to them,

presuming that this education is among the aristocrats, which at *our stage of development* is as little to be doubted as that it should be lacking in all princes.

Since we are concerned with the situation in North America, so I recall the large number of institutions of higher learning there. According to a recent manual for travelers through the United States by *Bromme*,[48] there are supposed to be *seventy-nine* of them. And concerning the proportion of students to the population, in the *eastern* states (what is called New England) this comes to one student per 1118 inhabitants, in the middle states one per 1844, and in the southern states one per 2612, in the west one per 3516. As a comparison, the European proportions are as follows: in England one per 1132, in Prussia one per 1470, in Sweden and Norway one per 1732, in the Netherlands one per 1979, in Switzerland one per 2655, in Denmark one per 3342, in Naples and Sicily one per 3590, in Austria one per 3760, and in *France* one per 5140, which last proportion barely exceeds the young state of Missouri (with one per 5503). But what is primarily to be observed is that the proportion of the entire population of the Union with the total number of [32] students, which comes to about 2000 persons per student, sounds positive when compared to the cultivated western half of Europe. The number of all students in the United States amounts to between six thousand and seven thousand, and Monsieur de Tocqueville attributes more equality to such a land than his own France, which has hardly as many students in a country with *twice* the population. In the same manual there is an interesting note about the founding of a new university in the western parts of the state of New York, for which $200,000 has been donated from the new little town of Buffalo (with about 8000 inhabitants), and individuals gave $15,000, perhaps a third of their entire wealth. The author of this declares with justice, "and they still have doubts about the progress of higher education in North America?!" With this, how is one to comment on Tocqueville's assertion "that there is no learned class in North America." Then what European country is he comparing America with? Even on the Ohio and the Mississippi the relationship of scholars to the population is greater than in France, including the capital city of Paris.

But the Americans in another way are not nearly so equal as Monsieur de Tocqueville believes. Especially, inequality in capacity for many state offices is there, precisely as in Europe, and it does not jibe completely with the previous point. In all Christian peoples the manner of education and the condition of legislation combine so that higher education can to some degree be independent from knowledge of the laws, specifically from that knowledge of laws that pertain to the administration of many offices. In Europe the legislators promote this situation more and more, and some have managed to create such confusion that it is precisely higher education that is

least capable of dealing with it if it is not compelled. In America as well civil legislation is antiquarian-chaotic enough to conserve the closer study of the law as a professional matter for a caste. And for that reason it is on one continent as on another that alongside higher education, elevating the capacity for state offices as a second intellectual inequality and source of aristocratic interests.

Thirdly, belief in equality of *external* goods is no less incorrect. To be sure, affluence in North America is not confronted with poverty on a *European* scale. It is just that inequality of wealth continues to be of the sort that it exercises a marked influence on the distinction into honorable and non-honorable people, and an even more remarkable distinction into aristocrats and democrats. The artisan and farmer do harvest a rich enjoyment of life in exchange for intense effort. But it brings him to a wealth that would promote him to the class of the honorable, [33] in the majority of cases, only late in life or not at all. And despite the general forward motion in external position, there are accidents and illnesses in America as well that always must hinder, so that not *all* become rich. On the other hand, the wealth of many is so great that they stand out without the contrast of European poverty. That is the case in the interior as well as on the coasts, although the coastal cities present the most examples, such as New York, where hundreds of families live that are supposed to have millions. Most recently the *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung* made the almost incredible report that last year a lot of a street of that town that had burned down was sold for the enormous price of $50,000 for 25 feet of frontage and 70–80 foot depth.

Fourthly, one adds inequality through *political* service and other *distinctions*, such as through discoveries and inventions in the sciences and arts, together with the general surviving reputation of the fathers visited on their descendents. Finally there are the differences in attitude and interests deriving from *age*, and the *influence of women* arising from the new culture (women increasingly approach equality the more men become more feminine). So it is easily shown that even if it appears more democratic in North America than in Europe, aristocrats are by no means lacking, nor could they be lacking. And to counter our author for once in his striving for spirited sayings, I declare that America does not appear more democratic because it lacks aristocrats, but *because the democrats there are much more aristocratic than in any country in Europe*. Yes, furthermore, if one must warn not to confuse North American *aristocrats* for European aristocrats, it is doubly and often warned not to see North American *democrats* as European democrats, neither in the English nor the French form. This is because in North America, there is no mob confronting the aristocrats, since no class is condemned to eternal poverty, and because there physical labor is disdained by the offspring of the most noble

families as little as by the old Roman patricians, the gap is not as large as in Europe. Because it is much easier to achieve the rank of the higher classes in North America than in Europe, for that reason the tension is not as perilous as in France or England. This is a result that severely opposes the opinion promoted by Tocqueville's report that things develop in North America with less fineness. All that is lacking is the grand tone that is restricted to our princely courts, but not the tone of true higher education.

Finally I could speak against his talk of an original [34] equality in North America by using his own words on "the higher classes" (for example, vol. 1, p. 91, PE; p. 76, BE), if it were still necessary to persuade the reader of his inconsistencies.

## Part Five

Another analysis that belongs here concerns the doctrine that the Democratic Party opposes centralization, and that it is the most dangerous enemy of the federal power, which has already been considerably weakened and threatens to dissolve entirely. This doctrine only appears for the first time in the *second* volume. Still, it is visible in what is said beforehand on the principle of popular sovereignty and what is said of the political parties.

I will not repeat the fact that our author was found making a directly opposed statement in the *first* volume (p. 161, PE; p. 152, BE; p. 133, RT). I would prefer totally to ignore it, since his thoroughly defended statement in chapter 10 of the *second* volume appears to be his actual opinion. I have to begin my analysis with the assertion that, strictly speaking, neither the one nor the other is true, precisely insofar as the author speaks of a *planned* effort. Listen to me further. In the previous part I said that the majority in North America pursues no principle, neither the principle of popular sovereignty nor any other, since most of the individuals making up this majority knew as little of political principles as the mass of the European peoples. I will use the same basis now as well. It suffices entirely to counter all our author's talk and to prove that there is absolutely no possibility of *planned* striving, no striving toward a final goal among the majority. And beyond this counter-argument, in order to show the readers in more detail how the American people (in its two parties) relate to the communal, state and federal authorities, I will continue as follows.

Just as all over the world, so it is also in North America with people, that a person is left to himself and prefers to be left alone and prefers to pay attention to nothing but his immediate surroundings. This simple natural state also explains the true account of our author that the Americans regard the government as a necessary evil. But now one must probe a bit more thoroughly to

discover the truth. That natural attitude [35] of men, if they are to exist at all, must express itself where they encounter something. And what operates on the interests of the citizen concentrating on his household interests will be rather the nearer government than the more distant; in North America it will be the *communal* and *state* authorities rather than the *federal* authority. This is because the cases in which *federal* officials exercise immediate authority over private persons occur much more seldom. What is more obvious than that a citizen to whom the way is barred by *lower* officials, in an area where, as everyone knows, opposition must take place *within* the laws, turns to *higher* officials? Starting with the saying, "that men obey reluctantly," there is obviously joined the second, "that they will seek a higher power against a lower one, moving up for as great a distance as possible." This inclination cannot express itself in what is called the *constitutional* direction in any other way than that those in collision with those *communal* officials to which they are subject move to *state* officials, and in conflict with them, to the *federal* power. With this I want to show how, since the communal and state powers were already in existence at the separation from England, the federal power was expanded through the instinctual impulses of the masses, and that the creators of the laws acted only as midwives for it. This knowledge seems to me as significant for evaluating the true attitude of the majority to the central power and its persistence as much as the knowledge of the productive forces can be for the evaluation of any product and its persistence.—Yet to understand this same attitude, as well as the attitude of the majority to authority in general, one should weigh further that the same instinctual impulses would have called into being a higher instance, if healthy reason could imagine one higher than the highest. Since that does not work, then the constituted federal power became a limitation on its own mother, constituting productivity. In other words, the *source* of productivity, which is the disinclination to obey, certainly continued, but it had exhausted itself in one direction and had to continue its play in another direction in the future. Here one should recall that it is entirely about grasping phenomena *within* the law to withdraw thoughts from anything which could lead to *absolute* disobedience or such a horror of laws that might lead to wildness or ruination. In this sense one takes up the next sentence, that the instinctual impulse could only continue the mutations possible *within the organism once born*, and then test what changes appeared [36] possible in that organism and still appear today.

The change that is obvious is to change the *personnel* of the authorities, and for that reason the hostility to obedience directs and produces *electoral movements* in the people as a whole.

A second alteration is thinkable in the organism of the individual authorities in themselves, without respect for their relationship to one another. And

the primary way would be the possible distribution of their power among *several* persons or concentration in the hands of a single person. One knows what concerns have always been expressed over the placing a single person at the pinnacle of a federation, approximately like the analogous institution in its members that are called states. Until now the president of the Union possesses far too little of the federal power seriously to threaten the general independence. But it is another question whether the support of the majority works for the *expansion* of his participation. And this should be fully distinguished whether a support for the expansion of the federal power itself would be at the cost of the *state* and *communal* powers. If our author hadn't ignored this distinction, he would have been able to avoid many errors in his reasoning about decentralization.

Precisely because the majority is incapable of administering the most important offices, for that reason their dislike of obeying will always be associated with a certain dislike of the *personnel* of higher offices. And, whatever satisfaction this dislike finds in change by election, the condition of the masses still remains very far from the truth of the sentence, "that they rule themselves," and (which is what it approaches) also no more distant from the *belief* in it, no matter how it is foretold in public speeches and writings. Without difficulty, private conversations with simple country folk communicate, whenever one has the opportunity, their genuine outpourings of dissatisfaction. This statement applies to *communal* interests, let alone *state* and *federal* matters. To anyone who understands the true meaning of this word, aristocrats appear primarily to be in control of state offices as of federal offices. And from this side the natural rule that the disinclination to obey expresses itself more strongly against the closer than against the more distant office suffers no exception. But that the interest of the masses themselves are attached more to *state* authorities than to the *federal* authorities, or more against the latter than against the former, as our author asserts, is entirely false. If there are those who are simply systematic opponents of the [37] Union, so one may seek them more among the aristocrats than among the democrats. While among the *democrats* (a term that cannot be applied to all who call themselves that, at least to the *leaders* of the democrats, who are normally decided aristocrats according to their *inner* direction) the majority, born to obey, express their natural hostility to rulers against the communal and state officials rather than against *federal* officials. On the contrary, the majority of aristocrats, when abstracted from other interests, will for that reason support preservation and strengthening of the *state* powers rather than of the *federal* power, since far more aristocrats participate in the *many state powers* than in the *unique federal power*. But even from that one cannot yet conclude the existence of a party hostile to the Union. The fact that there have been recent threats in the South

to dissolve the federation belongs only to experiments to free themselves from the pressure of tariffs. Only where this interest stirs up passions could the great interests that speak for unity be put in play. Otherwise the interests of the states promote the loosening of the Union as little as *communal* interests promote the decline of the *state* association. How matters have remained for a long time is that the whole, both according to its inner life as according to its political form, is no federation at all but a body for which the word "state" suits better than the individual parts, which are actually called that. I have an argument for this view that destroys every doubt. It is well known that for what are called *territories* and their residents, the federal power is also the state power. That is, they are lacking that degree of independence from the Union for which the word "state" is used. But when one spends some time with the residents of these *territories* and asks them *how they feel*, to answer the question of whether the residents of the states (precisely, the majority) are more strongly attached to the *state* community than to the federal association, it is not hard to discover that if the administration and justice of all states were so subordinated to the federal power as is the actual case in the territories in the process of becoming states, the interests of the citizens *out of office* would continue unbothered, in contrast to that of those who would hold office and share in the advantages of rule. In other words, if the states became mere provinces, which is what the territories really are, where so many satisfied citizens live, the interests of those citizens who are not tied to the state by offices would only rarely suffer. Just to speak of the *most important* branch of state administration, it is still rather [38] indifferent whether justice is done in the name of an individual state or in the name of the entire federation. In contrast to that, let us pose the results of the dissolution of the *Union*. Every European grasps that the security of North Americans on their coasts, on their great rivers, on the distant ocean and in all the civilized lands of the earth is attributable to their collected strength. And the American himself is supposed to grasp this so poorly as to treat the Union as more unimportant, as provincial forms, tolerating manifold variations while leaving the essence unaltered?

Quite distinct from the question of whether democrats are for or against the Union itself is also, as said, the question of what the voice of the people is concerning the power of the *president*, and whether this power is destined to increase, either at the cost of other federal officials alone, or to the disadvantage of the *state* or *communal* powers. The following deals with that.

In my statements on the unwillingness of the people to obey I came upon the sentence that, once they have reached the pinnacle in appealing to officials, they can only express themselves *within* the path they have taken,

perhaps in a different *distribution* of powers among the officials, or among the personnel of the officials. This is where I place my explanation, which is that the same hostility would lead to a different culmination of powers, which has its highest point in the plenitude of power of a single person.[iv]—if

[iv] I will not repeat our author, despite having noted what he says in the first volume, page 161, PE, and his conflicting tenth chapter in the second volume. However I do challenge the reader to glance at his speech on the difference between *administrative* and *governmental* concentration. Although by no means do I hold it to be so easy to attribute both expressions to their proper areas, so far as the terms themselves indicate, still, along with Monsieur de Tocqueville, I respect a fundamental precondition of liberty, always to be conceived with the sharp distinction of the power of individuals and families from the power of corporations (particularly of communes) and the power of the state. Without this there is neither a guarantee for liberty for the individual or the family against communal despotism, nor is there a guarantee of communal liberty (not to mention family liberty) against despotism by the state. Conversely, this same limitation also aids the state, the commune and the family to preserve their bond and to protect against anarchy. But Monsieur de Tocqueville lives in the error, as if it were a matter of logic, and he never considers that the question of how much the question of what the interests of a simple individual, a family interest, a corporation or state interest is, depends on the inner variety of [39] people. The Romans long regarded marriage and the power of the father as family matters with which the state did not concern itself. How utterly different it is among Christians! The opinion that this limitation could happen once and forever is utterly incorrect. It must change along with the people. Time and the development of people create the interests. One must oversee the politicians to make sure that their operations and creations do not fall into contradiction with them, and our author, in his talk about concentration degenerating into despotism, has precisely forgotten the chief cause, which is precisely the *school-concepts of the state* as well as *dreams of the purposes of state* unknown to our Germanic ancestors. That is what more and more has led our politicians into conflict with the demands of true liberty. Innumerable writings concern themselves with the sort of despotism that can threaten from placing a single person at the pinnacle of states, but the much more perilous sort, arising from those school-concepts, is completely overlooked, or they attribute their sins to the first form of despotism. To be sure this has proceeded in the worst way in France, insofar as they have not only obliterated communal liberty, but also bound individual life with fetters that could not have been done by the most officious theocracy, and all of that at a time when it said it was accomplishing the most perfect freedom by beheading the most philanthropic of kings and promulgating the rule of the people. The phantom of the common good seduced them to the worst atrocities against the individual, and this phantom is to be declared unthinkingly guilty in part for the dreadful events of the French Revolution. However strong the ferment, however great the distress and however much greater the want, it still needed the concentrated blindness concerning the highest purposes of the state and people. It would have been impossible for fanaticism to unleash a similar rage against the communes, families and individuals. In Europe one cannot expect the lower classes to resist acts of political rage. But it is precisely the more educated who were bound by perverse school-theories. This obscurantism assisted all the ruthless who, hidden behind the bulwark of the same theories, attacked mankind. Only once the blood flowed in streams did instinct win out over maddened reflection, and one sought to help as well as possible against the stranglers through withdrawal from school-nonsense. With such views it is certainly natural for me to warn my fellow men to watch out if I still see adherents of the malignant school-spook everywhere. It is true that it caused enough mischief in Antiquity as well. But the Germanic people long remained spared of this, even after reflection had already had a considerable role in their political activities. One

did not dare to designate positive goals for states and peoples, and they left this all to nature and to heaven. One simply acted defensively where individual evils appeared to disturb life, and thus protection against external and internal enemies was almost all that moved politics. There were institutions of war against *external* enemies, against *internal* enemies [40] there was justice, and the other branches of internal politics were left as well to the jurists as a marginal matter. *For that reason jurists always stood closest to the swords of the princes.* Obviously it could not always remain so; extensive development had to produce changes. But that the changes were not always improvements might once again be measured by the human fate that only leads to the goal through error. The turning point is approached when one begins to see that, even in peace, there is more to politics than what the old jurists' schools taught. Unfortunately, the jurists were the ones most to be distressed against this insight, and sought simply to defend their all-too one-sided direction, ignoring the natural call to reforms, the *gradual changing of men and things*, which is the reason that jurisprudence was expelled from the highest state positions, and that interests to which the jurists gave too little attention rose to domination. The most precise knowledge of laws always and ever belong to the pinnacle of a totality led by law alone and internally saturated by it. If they are already indispensable to realizing laws, then it can only be called absurd to regard them as dispensable for legislative changes and innovations. Yet most of the peoples praised as cultivated are in conflict with this doctrine, so that the chiefs of branches of state administration, to whom such knowledge of law and justice would seem less to pertain, have come to the highest command *without* it. Only true connoisseurs of law can be saturated by the truth that it is the only sure anchor of states; and once again that only such a saturation protects against the peril of being seduced into a denial of justice by what seems to be useful. Even if not all those called jurists are called to politics, one should never seek politics if one is not a jurist. Necessity knows no law. It is only the phenomenon of sacrificing the secure anchor of the state to the phantom of the good of the state, such a confusion was only possible due to a lack of legal initiation brought in by those new politicians, under the name of administrators, who took over from the jurists. It is also through them that the French Revolution was prepared before the generation of the Revolution was present, and if we saw jurists (at least lawyers) playing the leading role in this revolution, this demonstrates precisely the overwhelming of the concepts of law and injustice all the more, and shows the fact that jurists of the old type hardly existed anymore in France. It showed that all and sundry worshipped the doctrines of the Encyclopedists.—In fact there is no more striking witness for the lamentable state of politics than the appearance of purely financial officials (who soon took first place among the administrators) at the head of the state. It corresponds entirely to the raw madness that saw the epitome of all goods and qualities in riches. One also only needs to look at the ordinary maneuvers of the financiers with state [41] credit to show to the simplest observer the inadequacy of purely mercantile arts for the care of countries and peoples. They deal with state credit entirely as if it were a matter of the interests of a trading house. One simply needs to discuss the example of paper money. It has been praised with good reason as a means for easing intercourse. But a stronger reason for it was found in the seductive possibility of making state credit into a source of interest payments that costs no one anything, but which through the reduction of taxes benefits everyone. But the fact that one cannot treat the credit of peoples the same way as the credit of an individual was not taken to heart, since it threatens the state far more than it does an individual, and that the best security is to support oneself as little as possible on credit. Indeed, it gets worse. One exchanges paper money for metallic money without realizing that it is actually nothing other than *a mass of certificates of debt.* The easier it is to make debts out of paper by stamping it, the more debt will be created. And just as the problems of raising funds from normal loans also hold the *memory* of indebtedness alive, so on the contrary the easier method misleads one to believe in an increase of wealth rather

deliberation does not resist [39] the dark pressure. And with this I reach the essential character element that the majority [40] in North America has over the majority of other countries, which is that they are really capable of *some* deliberation in politics. In all the European states [41] the greater part of the population consists of poor people, men who, if they were at all capable of deliberation, are still too subject to the moment. That is different in North America. And it is also to be ascribed that an independence of the people that would swiftly lead in Europe to dictatorship would not even lead to a constitutional kingdom in North America. By the way, I warn once more against dreaming of a *principle* of popular sovereignty. Among families and individuals such as the North Americans are, the most important products of politics do not derive from the passions and interests of individuals. It requires an adequate basis in the heads of the majority. And until now the memory of the king of England alone is capable of suppressing thoughts of a continental king. But although there is not the slightest prospect for a *formal* kingship, yet we see how some attempts of the president to expand his power, despite all the protests of [42] officials and citizens struggling on behalf of the law, find support if the person of the president possesses great popularity.

The disinclination to obey (the *instinctual* love of independence) still provides *certain* restraints to *all* people. Only these restraints are highly various according to the variety of people. In America the common sense of the majority is strong enough to understand clearly the necessity of a legal order, and the political parties only struggle over the finer conditions of this order. In fact all interests, pure and impure, place limits on themselves that they do not dare to violate, and they only pursue their manifold games within them. That must always be kept before one's eyes if one is to judge political conflicts in North America. And one should not be misled either by the complaints of individual politicians and journalists, or by sentimental declamations on rawness and anarchy. Every perceptive reader will find it understandable that there is no lack of exceptions, and that now and then the impulses of the moment lead to disruptions of legal process, but he will give the cry raised about this no more room than it deserves. Particularly the procedures of what is called lynch law should not be taken as a naked atrocity of a raw mob.

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than of debt. What results would be more natural than a great increase of state expenditures at a time when there was every reason to increase thrift? And what could arise from this more naturally than state bankruptcy? Specifically, if one used state credit in whole or in part for paper money (that is, debt certificates) and afterwards also issued this paper money (that is, made the debts genuine), then a sudden need for money (such as war or the mere *danger* of it produce) will necessarily betray insolvency, and without the possibility of increasing state goods in *real* terms, since it is necessary to discount the paper money. So despite all the bitter experiences and their explanations, the nonsense goes on everywhere, and for that reason future wars cannot fail to bring new punishment.

There certainly are acts of lawlessness. But one should not believe for that reason that it strikes those not guilty. In most cases lawful institutions do not provide effective protection against criminals, and the peril of threatened families compels them to self-help, which they practice with as much care and formality as the conditions permit, and certainly more conscientiously than many European military tribunals are seen to proceed. And even if the whole population of North America appears divided into factions through the various interests and directions of individuals, that does not justify talk about a constant majority and its despotism over the minority, a does Monsieur de Tocqueville. His Jeremiad on this rests on entirely confused perceptions. I might not show how hard this can be combined in volume 2 (p. 97, PE; p. 112, BE; p. 73, RT)[49] with the high praise for the capacity for instruction of the majority, and how much the phrases of *high political enlightenment* on which popular sovereignty is supposed to rest in vol. 1, chapter 2, opposes it. I would rather add a few words criticizingcriticizing those confused perceptions.

Monsieur de Tocqueville uses the expressions "aristocrats and democrats" everywhere without offering more than the usual fog in which they appear in daily life to define them. His entire reasoning stumbles around in this fog. So among his many bad grabs are included the one that sometimes he takes the democrats as the same as the majority, then [43] he gives both groups a steadiness that no party could ever have except through *closing their number and interests* (perhaps through a Venetian closure of the Great Book). He forgets completely that what is called a majority in political movements is continually increasing or decreasing because of the continual changing of interests and views. So even if the *numbers* of the majority or minority remain the same, this does not mean that the persons remain the same; instead the dependence of individuals on the parties changes continually, producing frequent movement from one party to another. But it is almost worse to give in to the idea that whatever the majority wishes has to belong to the *democratic* interests. Since in this way not only is the error sanctioned that says that the majority and the Democratic Party are equivalent, but the possibility of a real examination of which interests and impulses are actually moving the life-force is cut off in advance. Obviously this error is found in both continents, and this is why newspaper accounts are rarely more wrong than when they try to discuss the general division of politics. It has gone so far that everything in which a respected politician wins many votes from a party is tagged with the words "democratic" or "aristocratic" as essentially proper to the direction of this or that party. It is obvious that this contributes to the worst superficiality. Because he has never devoted himself to a close study of human impulses and interests in general, it is all the more distressing that he cannot approach the

true significance of the words "*democratic* and *aristocratic*[v] interests." For that reason he could not recognize the *relationship* of these two interests in *North America*. If he had seen clearly that there, with the weak tensions between the two parties, the transition from the democrats to the aristocrats is generally so easy that it happens continually and often, then he would neither have been misled to believe in a consistent effort of democrats against the Union, not of a despotic pressure against the freedom of thought and speech. This even if he had not heard a syllable of the formidable speeches in opposition, which have always been all too frequent and too passionate in North America. What is not [44] said and printed against *Jackson*? What will not still be spoken or printed against him every day? And he is, as our author knows, the darling of the majority. How has it gone with most previous presidents? Even with the immortal *Washington*?

In order to bring my proof against our author, that the majority is *for* concentration more than it is opposed, to its full intensity, I had to add to that instinctual impulse all of the other interests of the Americans. That undertaking is too broad for here, so that I will restrict myself to the following remarks. Those citizens who are interested in strengthening *state* powers at the cost of the federal power are primarily those who hold the highest state offices, hence a class that no one would include among democrats in terms of their convictions. To be sure these citizens also understand more clearly the advantages of the great Union, and they also all harbor the intension of rising to federal power. Other than the bureaucrats, it is the lands on the coast and the borders that seem to be the most interested in the continuation of the Union, due to defense against external enemies. And if we are interested in the professions, then trade overseas, with the producers for it, would be in the first ranks. But every citizen feels and grasps all too clearly how the prosperity of this branch works on the others, and every American participates in the perception of the respect that they only enjoy from remaining united. Our author expresses this strongly enough, insofar as in volume 2, page 402, PE (p. 455, BE; p. 294, RT) he says, "The Union is founded in mores and beloved.[50] Its positive results and benefits are obvious," and in that he declares in volume 2, page 384, PE (p. 437, BE; p. 282, RT) that "the equality of sensibility promoted in the Union increases, coming at the cost of locality and the states." Yet this same author teaches that the majority is at work *weakening* the Union. Yes, in another place (vol. 1, p. 280, PE; p. 289, BE; p. 222, RT) he says (in order to color correctly the bond that every American has with the government of his individual state) that the Union rests upon a legal deception (vol. 2, p. 403,

[v] One hopes that the remark is superfluous that normal linguistic usage is as useless as is etymology. Most people know the fact that the aristocrats are actually not the best; most also know as little of the actual rule of the best as most democrats know of the reign of *all*.

PE; p. 456, BE; p. 222, RT), that it is something accidental, dependent on conditions.[51] Throughout this chapter there abound the strangest contradictions: according to vol. 2, p. 351, PE (p. 399, BE; p. 258, RT), the interest for an American in his individual state is so far above that for the Union because his liberty, his rights, his property, his life, his entire future depends on the state, but the benefits of the Union are only of significance for the individual *by mediation*. I [45] will not remark against this that a similar argument could be made for *every state* in Europe made up of provinces; but I will simply note that the same author in volume 2, pages 384 and 385, PE (p. 437, BE; pp. 281, 282, RT) portrays with a special emphasis how the American regards the entire Union as his homeland, so that he easily moves from one part of it to another (that is, from one state to another, or to a *territory*, which stands *directly* under the Union).—According to volume 2, page 363, PE (p. 413, BE), *true* patriotism *cannot* be founded in (material) interests, since it would be too changeable. According to volume 2, page 363, PE (p. 416, BE; p. 268, RT) peril to the Union does not arise from such interests, but from passions.[52] But according to volume 2, page 373, PE (p. 423, BE; p. 273, RT) the peril for the Union consists in the geographic displacement of the strength of the people (with the further colonization of the West), and in the *commentary on this* everything runs once more in terms of material interests (poverty and wealth).[53] On volume 2, page 388, PE (p. 439, BE) it says that the reason the states are beholden to the Union currently vanishes from sight, which is to say the results of earlier division before the results of the current unification, and so the people seek to free themselves of the Union once more.[54] And yet, according to volume 2, page 402, PE, cited above, the last results lie before the eyes of everyone and for that reason the Union is *beloved*, indeed founded in their mores!!!

## Part Six

In the work by Tocqueville, several passages present religion as a principal support of the North American condition. Volume 1, page 70, PE (p. 51, BE) speaks, in fact, only of two prime supports, religion and the spirit of liberty. Only he who has already remarked that the area of mores there has already been attributed to the area of religion can later (vol. 2, p. 242, PE; p. 278, BE, where the talk is of three chief supports: conditions, laws and mores) have the pleasure of seeing religion conversely attributed to [46] mores. If I wanted to play a similar switch with words against our author, I would wager here that he provided, on the same page 242 (p. 278, BE), a definition of the word "mores"—according to which it should embrace all intellectual and moral dispositions that people bring with them into the social order (*état de*

*société*)—so that he would attribute religion to mores rather than mores to religion. But since it is my concern to extract the *results* and to show what in the end is to be regarded as his opinion under this confusion, so I ask the reader to sustain for a while that religion is contained under those three rubrics. So if the reader wishes to look closer as to how our author portrays this religion of the Americans in order to explain its *marvelous influence* on democracy, in the second volume he dedicates to it a section starting at page 209, PE (p. 242, BE). One might attempt to bring it into harmony with the first volume, particularly with what is said on pages 70 and 71, PE (pp. 50, 51, BE). There the area of religion, as that of passive obedience (*obéisance passive*) is placed in opposition to the area of politics and liberty, but at the same time there is talk of a marvelous unity of the two. Here, on page 209, PE (p. 242, BE) it is said of the same religion that one could not portray it better than with the title of a democratic and republican religion. Another might pursue our author's chaos into all its ramifications. I regard it as more advisable, however, briefly to present *my own* opinion on religion in North America.

Religion in North America has almost no immediate influence on politics, on the area of laws protected by public power. Everyone knows that the well-known doctrine of the original separation of Church and state, which arose in Europe in opposition to the hierarchy, is nowhere more strictly carried through than in North America. To that degree the striving of modern people for freedom of religion has had a success such as in few European countries. Yet even this toleration only actually exists toward *Christianity*, and the doctrines of other religions are simply tolerated insofar as they have little or no influence on external life. For example, no law in the entire Union recognizes polygamy, which places a rude limit against religious freedom of half of mankind, especially against Mohammedans. "Oh yes, polygamy!" they will say, "that would be too much." It only requires destroying the dark and perverse images that come with such general expressions, and to warn those contemplating life in North America that they believe neither in an absolute freedom of religion nor in an absolute division [47] of religion from politics. In another place (*Europe and Germany*, vols. 1 and 2) I have expressed in more detail how the dogma of this division arose, and that it was not in any way an attribute of the highest culture. Here I am seeking only to report how it actually goes with the relationship of religion and politics, and I repeat my previous assertion that in North America—insofar as their residents may be seen as united, that their toleration only reaches as far as the borders of Christianity and perhaps of Judaism—religion has absolutely no *immediate* influence on politics. The clergy is to be found among the political authorities in no state. And where it is exceptionally *not* forbidden to elect clergy, they do not appear

to be called especially for the interests of religion. (To see that my limitation is not to be seen to be nothing, just think of the universally enforced observance of Sunday) So far Monsieur de Tocqueville is correct that the actual effect of religion on politics is distinct from influence on legislation, only to be seen as the area of morality of individual men, as he has done in his second volume. But in sketching the effect itself he has been unsuccessful because he has not recognized the essential *cause* of the difference between European and North American religious life. Listen to me.

The Christian faith appears in North America in the same variations as in Europe. That is, the actual doctrines and opinions registered in words are roughly the same, and there is hardly an adventurous sect that does not have brothers in Europe. Most of them originate in Europe, and to be exact our own *Germany* begins to send sects, such as that of *Rapp*, and most recently those of *Proli*.

Hence the difference is not to be sought there. It lies much more 1) in the different *effect* of those opinions and doctrines according to the nature of people, and 2) in the differing influence of the servants and promoters of religiosity in both continents.

Concerning the first point, one should consider how very differently this same religion operates on the mob and on the middle class; then consider how very differently it operates on the middle class in Europe, beset by continual pressures, and the North American middle class, existing in positively rewarding activity.

On the second point it is necessary to dig deeper. I would like to begin with the general saying that everywhere where the *political* powers impose less on ordinary life, [48] the *religious* must rise. I only hope to find better access if I seek the reader to look around in towns in *Europe*, where the servants of religion enjoy a surprisingly higher influence than otherwise. I am not speaking of congregations in the country, where as ever it depends on the *personality* of the priest to gain more influence than in the cities. As long as the clergy was the only spiritual form in the whole of Christendom, this distinction between town and country was not yet visible. One should just recall the standing of the first Protestant priests in Germany's towns. Yet even then there was a difference between the *free* cities and those standing under princes. In the former the influence of priests was always much more important than in the latter. The same cause that did this in Europe also has a large role in the great influence of the clergy in North America's cities. It reads: because the political *heights* are lacking here, for that reason religious powers have an easier play. Entirely the same reason applies to those European cities where the middle class lacks outstanding nobles and officials, or where the middle class outshines the power of middling nobles and the power of officials through its

wealth. The influence of priests there is all the greater, the fewer persons rise above what is called half-educated. And precisely because there is no lack of individuals risen above the half-educated level, the influence of priests is seldom so great there as in many European factory and trading towns. In order to cite whole countries as proof of this statement, I could recall here Holland and Switzerland.

That is the essence of what can be said about the role of religion in the condition of Americans, and the reader may wish to decide how this measures up to the declamations of our author about Puritanism, which can today accomplish no more than in Britain or Germany, as well as about a spirit of religion that is miraculously united with a spirit of liberty (vol. 1, p. 50). That it is not the *quality* of religion in itself that communicates its greater effectiveness, but rather the varying receptiveness of people, and that this receptiveness of Americans when compared with the inhabitants of Britain, Holland, Germany and Scandinavia, derives from a more fortunate external position, is ignored by our author just as much as he resists a similar declaration on the good cheer and moderation of Americans in *politics* (his area of *liberté*).

Our author issues the statement that the condition of Americans is at least in part derived from their external situation, particularly the physical fruitfulness of their country, but even more so from their [49] laws, and thirdly and most of all from their mores. To him the fact that the first two elements are not sufficient is easily proved by recalling peoples (such as the Spanish) on which they have no effect. From this he settles unequivocally on mores, which according to his definition means nothing other than that it relies on the *entirely spiritual* variety of people. Even the crudest glance suffices to be impressed by how little that contributes to clarity. But my accusation goes even further, to an accusation that his reasoning leads directly to falsehoods. Our author literally wishes to lead the reader to be satisfied with a general category rather than a close examination of causes. But by stopping at this general category, he seeks by a complete separation of the external situation to fake the opinion that the external situation of North Americans has nothing to do with their intellectual and moral disposition. Here is *my own* view, which has been extensively presented in my earlier writings.

I already asserted in my *Travel Report* that the productivity of the Americans is the cause of their fortunate situation and, in order to reach a sharper conception, on the productivity of those who live from the soil, that is, of a majority of three quarters of the entire population. In the meantime I have determined that "productivity" is too imprecise, even if it does lead obviously enough to more precise concepts than our author's "mores." For this reason I analyzed the individual impulses of the prosperity of the majority, that is, I investigated their total interests (page 316 and following, 2nd edition of the

*Travel Report*)[55] and their roots. With this I ended up with the result that the *deeper* cause is seen to be *the external situation, since without this they* would have neither the productivity now would they have the mores that our author regards as the limits of all further explanations. I could not agree that the external situation was the *sole* cause. On the contrary, I, as well as our author, have expressly recalled the Indians, the Spaniards and the Portuguese, who failed to thrive in the same situation. And according to confessions by French writers, for example Volney and Brissot, I could add the French as well.[56] For that reason I have said that the Americans owe their prosperity and their good luck to their better external situation, along with the British, the Hollanders, the Germans and the Scandinavians (from which they also descend). If that leads indirectly to praise for Germanic blood, then the reader sees that this direction arose without my responsibility, through the mere course of the investigation.

Our author, due to his vague support [50] by *all* intellectual and moral dispositions (his *mœurs*) has already pulled himself clear of this conflict, and remained in the general darkness where the literary conflict about state and politics in general and about North American life in particular, is being waged. When one finds in Achilles Mürat [Achille Murat] (who on the whole holds much more closely to reality than Monsieur de Tocqueville), [*Darstellung der*] *Grundsätze der republikanischen Regierung*[*wie dieselbe in Amerika vervollkommnet worden ist*], German translation, Brunswick and Leipzig: Verlags-Comtoir, 1833, pp. 313, 314, 316 ff.,[57] the insanity that all the well-being in North America derives from the style of government and legislation, and above all from *inaction*, non-hindrance of popular drive, which is equated with legislative wisdom, instead of what I said in *Europe and Germany*, vol. 1, p. 85f., deriving it from the more modest source of the instinctual resistance of the masses. This offers a new proof for the teaching demonstrated in my volume on the influence of our perverted school-prejudices and opinions on healthy eyes. In order to say it again, the worst thing about this school-prejudice is that it blinds us completely for the instinctual life of the masses, staring at the classes living more on reflection and what they produce, particularly on written laws, which, though the will of the masses has much influence upon them, are always *edited* by the reflecting classes. Hence it happens that one seeking the content of the laws *extracts* from the laws precisely what only derives from its editors, for example, its so-called *principle*, mistaking it for its *essence*. And it is no less easy to add to this the school-opinion that every state has one specific purpose, and also to every *concept* of a state. My whole polemic against this opinion appears to have had little impact. It is far more dangerous than one could imagine. In my note on page 38 I have spoken of

it, but here I wish to try to show its attitude to practical politics even more pressingly.[58]

I am inclined to choose as an introduction to our attention a saying, that wherever a purpose of states is chosen by the school, everything must necessarily be subordinated to it, as an example for which I only have to point at France, where its power is obvious enough in the lower spheres as well as in the higher spheres. I further want to recall in advance that in the very countries where the political order rests on the educated, and the great masses are hostile to them, similar potencies deriving from concepts can become all-powerful. And for this reason Europe is very subject to this peril, but North America at the present time not at all.

But so far as convictions about the purpose of states themselves [51] go, their elimination is made most difficult through the reputation of famous men of earlier times. Yes, so far as I know, *all* Greek and Roman politicians who have left us theories about the state and justice have been more or less bound in this. *Aristotle*, for example, sees the purpose of the state to be to promote virtue and happiness for people, and he declares this measure to be completely essential (*Politics*, 3). And the doctrines of the *moderns*, which is that happiness or perfection is the goal, are, if not just veneration of the ancients, still to be seen as *fruits* of ancient culture. Be that as it may, all these doctrines deserve the accusation that within the darkness of used-up values *a specific goal is dreaming* that neither exists nor can exist. Absolutely nothing is said by the phrases about happiness or wellbeing of the people if one cannot give *closer* information about what the happiness or well being of an *individual* person involves. It is precisely this last investigation that leads to the result undesired by both politicians and moralists, which is that this could never lead to a specific, concrete something. And if that is really so, if research for true wellbeing can never lead to any conclusion in an individual, then it is certainly to be called crazy to believe that when we are talking about many people, with various talents and levels of culture, of varieties that are the results of times and generations producing the potentialities of whole peoples. Yet all the talk of the purposes of states promotes this faith somewhat, so that mirages in Europe as in America are taken to be genuine lighthouses.

Just as the moralists have always tormented and dominated the lives of individuals with airy deductions from their purported "destiny of man," so also politicians have done with deductions from the purposes of the state. Both of these run parallel to one another. This is not to say that all state schoolmastering is derived from theories. One may say that as little of didacticism of *individuals*. One can also rule and dominate without theories, according to talents, opinions and moods of the moment, in politics as in schools

and in the household. But a despotism according to theory is much more dangerous for the development of the individual and of the whole.

Reflections and theories (their results) belong in any case to a higher development, and they can be entirely alien to (grown) people at any level if one does not believe in levels where there is less spirit and reason in [52] people than are found in many animals. But for that reason *false* theories are no less damaging. And of theories in general, the more abstract they are, that is, the less they have to do with objects, the easier they fall into *conflict* with their objects, and this applies best of all with the theories and rules for the leading of men and peoples. As we unfortunately see with our own eyes, they can fall into such conflict with genuine life that they drive us to wish to renounce everything theoretical and to leave ourselves to the course of the things of nature and the impulses of the moment. I have spoken on this matter elsewhere (*Europe and Germany*, vol. 1, p. 134 ff.) on the political situation in North America. With or without reference to this, I wish to proceed here in the following manner.

The temptation to schoolmaster is more closely related to the life of reflection than to the instinctual. As said, human life is never without all reflection, at least so far as the history of the Germanic peoples knows it, and with it also the temptation to schoolmaster. Yet another condition is also guilty of this. Unexpected troubles awaken the longing for helpful rules. And just as bad children bring forth discipline from good parents, so in state life bad citizens bring forth corrections from politicians. Even if one of the chief causes of poor conduct is extreme oppression, so also this oppression should be held to be one of the causes of the increased schoolmastering. To confirm this derivation, among others, there are a few European oases where people have remained better, since people were always happy, and there one finds the political schoolmastering as mild as in North America. Despite that, I am of the opinion that disturbances in reflection inevitably bound up with gradual development (which is proper to humanity) is most to be blamed. How can one wonder at the politicians who deny the principle "*to respect individualities*" when our entire culture and its institutions treat individual seeds and their *natural* unfolding like an original sin? The madness[vi] that human discipline must do everything and that nothing comes on its own now threatens more than ever the rarest gift of heaven of childhood and youth, robbing innocent cheerfulness, making of them a world of grownups in [53] which the healthy natural variety completely vanishes in an artificial, sick equality. This reminds one of our old formal gardens, where nothing was more hated

[vi] Is it not forgivable to believe the blindness of our educators not even to see the enormous power of nature in small children, who learn language without any instruction (as play), which would act to some degree against this madness?

than the traces of outstanding individual energy. They mutilated and twisted trees and bushes according to an ideal of uniformity, in which the upward striving of the oak displeased as much as the joyous buds of the natural plants protected by it. So also our education worked continually to destroy healthy differences and to impose a sick general mediocrity in its place. In this way it is understandable (however poorly external compulsion might fit in with it) that the *natural* (free) impulse to serve and to obey must be extirpated at the root, and the European revulsion to physical labor has inoculated everyone down to the servants.—There are still more proofs of the politicians' excuses with the failures of our culture, such as the ludicrous compulsion of what is called fashion, particularly in clothes. Only I must abstain from that in order to remain closer to my mission, directed against *political* schoolmastering, its source and connection with the *general* inclination to schoolmaster people and things, the remark was simply dictated in order to orient the reader concerning its *existence*. And in the expectation that enough has been done for it, I now return to fighting it in the concept of the state.

As said, from the earliest times, as long as one has thought and written about the state, there has been talk about a highest purpose. Specifically, in Roman politics there was the saying, "*salus publica suprema lex esto*" ["Let the wellbeing of the people be the supreme law"]. But the *Germanic* peoples built modern states neither according to *Roman* state theories, nor according to their own. To be sure, they soon drew on theories for help, but they did not take to worrying about *ideals* of the state, despite the attractions of the Greeks and Romans. In particular, jurists were not yet misled by that Roman rule to see the rights of *real* persons, when placed against the state as an *artificial* person to be nil or an object to be manipulated.[59] Until deep into the previous century, *German* teachers (publicists) had a certain shyness about the previous maxim and earnestly sought to limit it so that it could not be used against accumulated rights, except in the greatest necessity, and then only with all possible compensation. One may glance, for example, in *Pütter's Staatsrecht*,[60] in the chapter on the law of the highest power. Hence, despite individual sins of *practical* politics, the theory remained rather pure. And if things today appeared no worse, my own effort to ban every mention of the purpose and concept of the state would not baselessly be seen as impractical and unnecessary. It is just that while the jurists have conducted themselves in that way, alongside them [54] and the theologians and physicians, soon *other* disciplines have arisen that have made it their chief occupation to *worry* about people and peoples, and to leave the concept of the state so little untouched that the world has grown increasingly used to entrust to them the *highest* position in political theory to them alone (*Europe and Germany*, vol. 1, p. 297 ff.). At first it was philosophers and historians who received this reputation, which

was even increased by the fact that many jurists passed over to join them. The *actual* jurists (later called positivists, those of positive law), as much as they were also influenced by the times and the gradual alteration of people and things through development, still held closely enough to reality so as not to be pulled forward by the *general* nature of things. Certainly there was no lack of material and room for airy deduction in *their own* specialties. It is only their concern not to lose their footing that protected them from succumbing to temptation. And they concerned themselves with the question of what justice was *in the abstract* as with that of the absolute good. That was done particularly by the revived discipline of philosophy, and with that began the modern theories on what is called natural law (on original law, *born* rights, human rights) as a moral system. Now to be sure the theories of legal and moral philosophers remained somewhat isolated from *practical* undertakings, as do the philosophers themselves. What remains inadequately disputed is their dark faith in a *specific future* goal of the state more or less demanding sacrificing the present, while jurists are satisfied in referring to a saying on it (like "*salus publica prima lex*") in emergencies, following the doctrine of purely protecting the old and existing while poorly satisfying the needs of a new world being born. So this dark faith is propagated in the region of ideals by philosophers and historians, until finally the *newest* discipline (that of political economists and financiers) by mastering the interpretation of the purpose of the state, bring it to the pinnacle, where every faith is necessarily turned into reality. In fact, the reputation of philosophers and historians began to exceed that of statesmen, showing themselves outside the realm of theory, demonstrating a growing inclination toward schoolmastering in the realm of *practical* politics. They were generally alienated from *genuine* jurists, and to their credit one must say that they were *shy* about activist governing, particularly about promulgating new laws and ordinances, because they knew and felt how hard it is to issue good laws. At the same time it is precisely *the* politicians who feel no difficulties. They are pitched into perpetual crises by the phantom of the purpose of the state, and [55] they issue decrees on the affairs of millions as easily as they give parole orders. But truth commands that the praise of jurists be mixed with the rebuke that their shyness extends too far, and, besides the egregious abuses, they promote the opinion that one can rule a state without being a jurist, and even that for real governing a jurist is not even competent. This opinion has a twofold result: the division of justice from what is called administration, and the transfer of administration to non-jurists. The first seemed to correspond to reason, because something as different as judging (settling disputes) and pure administration may not be mingled. Even the placing of *different* persons for one and the other is defensible; but by no means should persons *ignorant* of the law be placed in

administration. As long as the state is one built on laws, a whole permeated by law, no one can administer without a thorough knowledge of the laws. It does not suit my plan to supply this saying with proofs from reality; I must even pass up *the chief* proof, which is the inadequacy of non-jurists for fiscal interest, from perennial collisions with the private, easily avoided by those who know the law. I have a more important argument that directly applies to the continuation of the whole, that it is precisely a thorough knowledge of justice and injustice that is the best guarantee that they are not frivolously ignored, and that the sole countermeasure against the seductive expectations of the goals of the state and the common good lies in the conviction that the last secure basis of states lies in law alone. Because administration has divorced itself from this conviction, for that reason its much-praised separation from justice—the foundation of states, despite all improvements in individual branches—has been injurious. It is from this divorce that the accursed overgoverning and concentration dates. Through it, the bureaucratic-political guardianship has risen to such a degree that in Germany even the *theocratic*, with all the zeal of priests to mix in the affairs of families, could not achieve. And if earlier the common interests that were left to the priests (such as teaching and the care of the poor) accomplished too little, one now has passed too far to the other extreme, complaining about interventions in private property and individual liberty. Even meaner was intervention in matters previously controlled by private persons, whether in free professions or in keeping with contracts, all in the name of general interests.

This is not to be marveled at. Once administration was [56] emancipated from justice, its superior weight will prevail by itself through its fiscal doctrine, everywhere penetrating modern politics. Since financiers began interpreting the purposes of the state, practice did not linger long behind theory. References to money compelled the princes, pressed in turn by continual wars, not to listen carefully to the makers of financial projects, as earlier they had listened to the alchemists. In good time these new interpreters of the wellbeing of the state turned solely against the subjects, whose rights sank into the dust in the face of the general interest. Yet it was quite blind not to see in advance where this despotism of a school-phantom led in the end, and that the same reasoning that destroyed the rights of the subjects also undermined the rights of the princes. In the same blinding one dates the revolutionary period from the *open* attacks on the princes, instead of its true beginning in the much earlier exclusion of jurists from the controls of the state. Yes, what is even worse, one is misled in seeing the *end* of this period to such an extent as not to see how much all princes and peoples, whose first counselors are too little initiated into the doctrine of law, must hold law to be the sole secure support of the state.

In this one should not perceive a naked desire for the return of the jurists. I admit that some of them both before and after their calling to politics seek only to fend off injustice and are devoted to a raw conservatism, without concerning themselves with the principle of development, perennially driving for change, and a second part has been infected with revolutionary welfare-schoolmastering. Even if the revolutionary conventions in France consisted mostly of fanatics and true *enemies of the law*, of whom some were to numbered among the jurists and could also be numbered among the people. But even those learned jurists, who were the most free of one or the other evil, still suffered (of which what was said in the first and second volume of my *Europe and Germany* hardly needs to be recalled) from the general illness of our culture, *which is the result of the crude divorce of reflection from practical life.* These illnesses have risen along with intellectual disciplines, and for that reason the most recent legal scholars, despite their high learning, are less capable of political practice, specifically of legislation, than their predecessors, which very strongly announces the excessiveness of hopes for laws against earthly oppression.

The fact that the confusion arises from theories, and that princes have less guilt of it than might seem at first glance, is shown [57] recently by the solemn exhortation of the dying Emperor Franz to his son and successor, always to protect the rights of his subjects, and then the subjects would also protect his own rights.[61] Princes have been misled by the products of the schools, which all the so-called scholars praise as pure wisdom, and all of it under the pressure of wars. It is understandable that the first condition of victory is the concentration of the strength of the people, and a prince who has no desires to be a conqueror might have to follow the manner of government established by warmongering French kings, further developed by the Revolution and its dictators. For a time he will carry out things that would be impossible to a king who respects individuals and their rights. But he does not expect to retain what he has taken in the course of his Asiatic exploitation of the strengths of the people, which ruins these strengths at their source, at least with peoples whose individual lives are more healthy. Unfortunately princes personally free of the lust for war, are beset by cannibalistic neighbors, so that they sacrifice too much to a concentration that restricts the healthy unfolding of life, instead of distrusting it as a terrible poison, to be renounced again as soon as the peril of war disappears.

Do empty school-concepts that interest but little the practical world exercise the most dreadful influence on this our world, without the world realizing from whence its dreadful power came? And despite all the solemn speeches about rising culture, today in most states the actual rudder is given to men whose whole wisdom is lost in projects of financing and concentration,

so that both tendencies are harmonized in undermining opposition to the *next* fruits, but see the doctrines of justice and injustice to be a hindrance and superfluous, to be banned from *external* politics, and also more and more from *internal* politics. But one or the other reader will object, "Granted that the doctrine on the purpose of the state is much abused, that still does not disprove the truth of the doctrine itself. And obviously this definition of its purpose was only included in order that there would not be a lack of a higher regulating element (a lighthouse). Is the saying about the common wellbeing and the like entirely wrong? Or is there another, better regulation?"

In answer to this I want to add to my earlier statements something that can bring the matter to a conclusion.

In my book *On the essential varieties of states* [62]I have shown how contradictory it is to include the term "highest power" in one and the same concept, [58] and then include a definition on its purpose, that is, right after declaring it the highest, subordinating it to another. There, as in the first part of my *Europe and Germany*, it is clear to see how poorly the school concept of the state fits with a supposed purpose of states or conforms at all with states in reality, not to mention at all the North American Union, where the political directions depend so much on the dark impulses of the mass of the people. Here it only remains to say something about the intention of determining a purpose.

One believes in any case that it is a secure regulating power for guiding the state, and that is the reason that one holds onto it with a death-grip. I have already pointed out in the introduction about naked talk about happiness, or the well-being of the people, etc., in airy, generalities, where there is no bridge to earthly reality, and in connection to further discussion of this saying I need only to refer to volume 1 of *Europe and Germany*, page 167 ff. Whoever studies that closely will certainly concede to me that this designation of a purpose does no better as a regulating power than the vague designation of people as the regulating power of an individual life. And joining this is the further result, that the unending variation of life does not permit a single decisive norm over all possible cases, even less could there be such norms for peoples and states. This is roughly repeats a passage of my American *Travel Report* (2nd edition, p. 153 ff.).[63] The art of leading a state cannot be reduced to the invention of a theory, which one only has to apply to individual cases. Natural variations are of such a sort that the artist has to be present continually to develop theories for individual cases, entirely as is the case with an individual life. One may certainly be able to *prepare* oneself for these operations. But the general rules, unlike those lying images to which the wellbeing of the people and the purpose of the state belong, do not dispense from a careful study of the details of the world. Yes, the true general rules direct one

toward such a study. But the rules themselves are written so deeply in the brain of every person and also emerge so naturally (where the weeds of *perverse artificial* rules do not strangle them) that one needs not complain—he moves through their intrinsic insufficiencies to the individual cases without greater effort. How could there be a higher rule for all the human backing and forth-ing, for all human willing, struggling and fighting, except *striving to the better*? Well [59] understood, to the *better*, not to the *absolute* good. This has already said that striving for given relationships and things has to halt at a certain point, instead of striving for the *absolute* good running right off into the void, or to be enticed through false goals wildly to destroy reality. But striving for the better belongs so thoroughly to human nature, that there cannot fail to be the striving of a variety of people. But to stress it especially in the concept of the state for that reason is as illogical as to do so in the definition of a single human being,[vii] *precisely because it goes together with the naked struggle for existence*. If that does not clarify things, just consider that no human being can exist without willing, seeking and striving, but striving always reaches for that which is desirable to the striver, whose achievement he sees as an improvement. He thinks further that to every person, whether his stage of development is low or high, a condition hovers before him, at least darkly, that seems desirable to him, and that to him with that, however much he might err (insofar as he adds to it what does not belong), yet *something* always hovers before him whose achievement even altruistic reason must regard as an improvement. It is only that what is nearer depends too much on individualities and individual external situations for a harmonious *common striving* to be *possible*. On the contrary, the collisions that arise from the natural inner varieties of individual members can very often be of such a sort that a naked moral postulate for peace appears laughable. For that reason it is obvious nonsense to speak of a *common will* and derive from it a basis for state operations. This is the reason why good leadership of a state is far harder than good leadership of an isolated individual life. If one wishes to make a precise characterization of the striving for the better, for the one as for the other, the remark is made that striving does not exclude comfort, satisfaction, joy, etc., but cannot be aimed at these alone, but that it always has to hold a course that appears to correspond to the development (in its true course, not in the dreamlike fight of fantasies). Insofar as the investigation of courses of development is the highest *theoretical* duty, that following it is the highest *practical*. If with this I recall the old saying "*naturae convenienter vivere*" ["To live in keeping with nature"] then a field has been created that is a [60] theoretical preparation for leading individual life, as well as for leading whole peoples,

[vii] To which the saying of Montaigne always applies: *mon art, mon métier, c'est vivre* ["My art, my craft, is living"].

which would protect research from being misled into empty constructions.[viii] [64] [61] But as intensely as such a field might be investigated, I say once more that no preparation for leadership can completely overcome the difficulties of leading itself, and from time to time there will be situations where the choice of the way will go very badly with the best human insight and the purest will.

Moreover, to the statesman is certainly to be recommended the continuous encouragement of a truth that must serve as the final consolation for every human struggle, which is that on this earth there is absolutely no final purpose, and that we have to find our earthly destiny in struggle itself. Only that can both protect from confusion, in which the individual overrates *in itself* what has been achieved, as well as against that in which one overrates what has been achieved for a totality and for entire peoples. See here volume 1, pp. 220 and 221 of *Europe and Germany.*

[viii] In order to know what an empty construction is, one simply has to glance at what is called the system of natural law. True jurists have done so little against this product of philosophy that one still constantly hears about a natural law and its conflict with historical law. It is not enough to repeat the common saying that there is no natural law. Certainly reality can be unjust. One needs only recall the actions of a Caligula or a Nero. And a person also has an inner light and measure with which he should illumine and test reality. One could go even further and say that he should learn to recognize the reality of things and relationships, and distinguish the inevitable demands of nature from the assaults of human error, arbitrariness and passions. The only difficulty is to fulfill this obligation where required. And unfortunately one may not praise it in the *most recent* political wisdom that sees the difficulty: otherwise so many pedants would not seek to lift them up through their so-called abstract thinking. Certainly it is useful to think about laws, both those already issued and those coming into being. How else could Roman jurisprudence come into being? And in the course of such thinking things and relationships must be *supposed*, as well as when contemplating *future* laws. It is just never to be forgotten that this theorizing may only be predicated on *realities*, and that it must be tied with unavoidable demand to know reality, grasping it through and through. Is it not amazing how people who called themselves philosophers and politicians can fail in this context so thoroughly that, instead of studying the world and its relationships, they create for themselves a world of their own conviction while dreaming and brooding, and after they have blessed it with their system of legislation, they postulate the immediate transformation of the real world everywhere, even where it does not suit their system? That there is no salvation in this direction, even when the debility of earthly conditions is so severe, and it is precisely in the higher classes, that concern themselves primarily with reflections, that are least consoled. The mere use of the term "historical law" in *contrast* to the law of reason is a witness to this. The notion that reason, in order to say what is right in reality, must know the reality and also respect it as such in the highest degree, will be hard put to confound any theoretician. But all realities are *products* of history (the past), and insofar as they have *their roots* in history, their history belongs along *with* their being in the present. As a result no law of reason is thinkable that is not based more or less on history. In fact the conflict of the honorable fighter for what is called the law of reason only turns on the question of how much or how little of history is to be respected without it going only so far toward clarity as this expression reaches.—It [61] was my principle not to name any living protagonists of political doctrines by name, so I am so pleased to see two famous researchers go so far against these errors that I make an exception of Baron [Hans Christoph] von Gagern and Professor [Friedrich Christoph] Dahlmann.

## Part Seven

Now about slavery. In my *Travel Report* I portrayed slavery as an evil that could not be extirpated immediately without the knife of a revolution, and I expressed the desire for its *gradual* extirpation. For that I have received the reputation that I defend slavery. What will the same critics say about my present statement! Since the publication of my *Report*, then, one has begun to deal with this circumstance in America with a similar fanaticism, so that it almost seems to imperil the existence of the Union. As a result I also have been spurred to a new consideration whose result I present here to the public.

I know no higher saying for my warning against wild experiments than that we poor human beings—to whom only a brief time is granted them to live, and an even shorter time to live with understanding—have to take the earth as it is, and that before everything else we must seek to *understand* what surrounds us and how we are to treat it. In this operation [62] we will find that the order of earth and of heaven in no way harmonizes completely with what we *people* would think to the desirable, that is, what appears *to us* as an ordered system. We normally express this with the words, "Yes, if it went the way it should," and similar. And with it we combine the notion as if some disturbance of order was guilty for it not being so. It is certainly not an encouraging truth that this split lies precisely against the noblest wishes of the best and brightest people, and it appears beyond dispute to be a strange calling that, despite the endlessly superior power of the order of the world, it should clash with what *we* call order to some degree. But a steady attention to that same reality is the sole preventative measure that we do not allow ourselves to be moved *against* creation as it is, while we obey our calling to live as members of creation as *we* would have it. In other words, however it might go in the world, however perverse we find reality, and however many reasons we rightly would wish to fight it to the end, we must ever reject fighting those thoughts of a disorder in nature and in the course of things, lest we eventually fall into pointless self-flagellation, even complete raving madness.

There is opportunity enough for such conceptions already in the most private of family lives. How often has the more responsible member complained that heaven has bestowed too *little* understanding on his dependents? How often does the strong father of the family see that illnesses, accidents, natural weaknesses and stupidities of men lame his benevolent efforts?! Easily such experiences encourage the thoughts of how small the number of understanding persons there are in contrast to those without understanding, and how much the latter exceed the former in physical strength, and in intense impulses to use that strength. And yet the *complaints* on this are in one class with the complaints that heaven has made primarily weak people and those

without understanding, that it has made children, and that even the most capable persons have to pass through a period of lacking understanding. In short, in order to grasp the nature of human life, those with understanding must always console themselves that, despite their calling to lead and protect those without understanding, the world will still proceed according to the impulses of non-understanding than the impulses of those with understanding. This is because heaven has always given lack of understanding the greater support, as through the rawness of *entire* peoples, and in cultivated peoples through the overwhelming number of children, youths and women (not to mention the many men without understanding). However sad it might sound, the lot of the best of us is always no other than to bring oneself through a path of non-understanding, in order [63] to fight the remaining years with non-understanding, and surely he who speculates on the lack of understanding of his fellows will prosper more than he who figures on understanding.

So, if the fruit of this investigation is necessary for the leader of a small family, how much more is it necessary for those who have influence on the leadership of a mass of families, a state and people. But in the course of this, unfortunately our practical and theoretical politicians encounter as of the first of all conditions of such an important effect, striking on the grossest nakedness. For these pages there is only room to deal with one example, the way our politicians speak and act about slavery in North America.

Never was it more pressing to recommend to politicians to hold as closely as possible in their reflections about whole states and peoples than to the elements of which they consist, which is with individuals and families. And so also with the slavery question I offer them the circle of the family as a basis, to protect against speculative confusion and dreams of bettering the world order.

What is the calling of the best and most understanding in the circle of the family? Everywhere there are members of the family who are less than others in strength and health of body and of spirit. And often enough these lacks are truly irretrievable, for which neither age nor medicines nor teaching can accomplish anything. Agreed that in a family of five, seven and more children after the death or simple incapacity of the parents only one member who far exceeds the others by insight: what is his obligation, dictated by nature and heaven? Without dispute everyone's answer will be to use his greater insight intelligently for the true good of his siblings. Well fine, that expresses itself *theoretically* as if automatically, however much practice might vary from that. But the trouble arises when one goes deeper to find what is to be *understood* in the words "true wellbeing," to determine the *ways* and the *means*. The reader should not be frightened here. I do not intend to preach a sermon on this subject. For my purpose it is enough to say a few words about a few of

the endlessly-many that do *not* belong to true well-being, and does not lead there. Every day we can find examples where an association of relatives is governed by one or two members, and where it is easy to see that without their insight the whole would collapse and then only the *ruled* members would be most endangered. Every day we can also see the incorrect judgments of such situations, specifically, that the government whose leader would so [64] gladly be free of this heavy burden, and for which they need only the conviction that otherwise their relatives would be ruined, is interpreted as a lust for domination and selfishness. The doubts, however, that mislead others to this interpretation are those that I must draw to the light for future use.

It lies in the natural differences of individual members that one cannot do what the other is capable of doing. That becomes especially the lot of him with the most understanding, to do what his superiority demands. Superiority asserts itself silently, without the body having to move. For that reason it does not surprise, while physical action is visible. Nothing is more common for that reason than to overestimate the lot of the former, and even if sickliness is inseparable with it, he is always the happy onlooker, the other the oppressed worker. It is inevitable that the understanding person differs from that person of less understanding in many opinions about common interests. He will prevail in creating an opening for his reasons, but the weaker and more childlike his dependents, the more often will he have to flee to misleading reasons, or to requests as if he was pursuing only *his own* interests, or it will come to conflicts. No matter how good the result, the suspicion of domineering and self-serving against him will be increased both within and beyond the household. One will accuse him of not treating his dependents *entirely* as equals, and if he cannot resolve differences with them, he will not leave them to themselves. Only so long as the dependents are true children will one judge differently. But now I ask the reader to decide what would be the way to true wellbeing here.

One should pay even greater attention to intellectual difference. Consider that a part of the family only has a talent for *physical* labor, and the other part could certainly do this work as well, but they are also capable of more significant business. On account of equality, should the one member be called to the same occupation as the other? The fact that heaven does not bestow the same abilities to all persons is visible to the dumbest eye, and yet people of supposedly high insight torment themselves to pretend that the *endowment* to abilities are always equal, that it is only a question of developing them properly in everyone. And thus is the political schoolmastering (to which politicians feel particularly called) that is to produce perfect equality in all heads, and as a result also perfect equality of rights. They do not attack the *despotism* of schoolmastering, because since they see themselves as personally

called in advance to be the masters, they have nothing to fear from it. They must be tolerated for a time on behalf of the *splendid fruit to come*. And such [65] theoreticians even dare to denounce the despotism of *hierarchy*. It is only to these that I will not appear concise when I proceed to say that we are fighting truth and heaven as soon as we deny the physical and intellectual variety of people and the variety of roles that derive from that. The role in the family of those with understanding is precisely the hardest because it is so hard to hold at bay everything that can turn those of less understanding against their own roles. It is already very hard to deny on one's own authority everything that works in that direction, and how much harder to avoid the instigations of jealous or fanatical neighbors. To be sure, when the leaders of a family has degraded his role to a game of vanity, he has sinned against his dependents no less than when he acting in naked self-serving. It should straightaway serve to moderate his self-regard to consider that understanding alone does not suffice alone on this earth, that not a blade grows for bread without *physical* labor, or, when the blade really grows by itself, that harvesting happens by itself as little as baking. And all the members of a family should always take heart when the *distribution* of labors corresponds in high degree to the various capacities, where *nature* cares for the distribution, and the sort of labor falls to each that he would prefer. In this case it would be the greatest folly to complain about despotism and compulsion. Unfortunately this dissatisfaction is nothing compared with the arrogance that would ennoble one form of labor over another, since reason and nature knows nothing of such ranking, and the simple labor of an honorable plowman has the same rank as the most sensitive product of an artist or thinker. It is precisely this arrogance that distinguishes our household life from the situation that we call patriarchal or (to use a term less alienating to the fanatics) what we tend to call the manner of a patron. How should it proceed in the activities of whole peoples? It is only in North America that it goes better. There one senses little about the weeds of modern culture, for which reason pedants and fools doubt that there is such a thing as culture beyond the ocean. And for that reason I will not permit all hope to vanish for a fortunate turn of the relations of North Americans to their slaves.

It is my purpose in my current statements on the inequality of people within the *family circle* to derive other than an analogous reflection on the inequality of *whole peoples*. I wish to work toward the clear recognition that, abstracted from so-called races, Europeans and their and their offspring for that reason far ahead of Negroes in their receptiveness of the higher light, *because this receptiveness is so much* [66] *dependent on a progressive culture over the course of generations*, as I have shown in my work, *Europe and Germany observed from America*. Such an advance in heritage cannot be equalized by

the arts of instruction and education, let alone religious dogmas. Just as the Americans, as healthy offspring of Germanic potency, are obligated in the first instance to develop their better adaptation for the higher light more and more, so are they obligated in the second case to make a usage of their superiority over colored people as a brother does for his siblings.

In this the way the path is dictated that true humanity and religion must take in the conflict for and against slavery. It is visibly not less far from a fanatical emancipation, a civil and political equalization of colored and white, than from imprisonment in the rawest self-service. Instead of concentrating on radical experiments that always deal with externalities without altering inner dispositions, all philanthropic effort should, for that reason, aim at ennobling white lords and their *treatment* of slaves. To bring the relationship of slaves to their slaves closer to a true *patronage* can only be the reasonable striving of those who want to be decent to both sides. Only no one is less capable for this than the *ordinary* agitators against slavery, who can understand nothing more than to produce situations such as in Domingo,[65] and after they have accomplished the political emancipation of *women*, come at last to demand the liberation of babies (since the liberation of youth has long since taken place). Unfortunately their unhealthy experiments promote the short-sighted philanthropy of half-education across the entire earth. Even if it is indisputably the calling of cultivated men to watch and work for the well-being of less-cultivated persons, and it is properly called praiseworthy that individual Europeans travel for this into distant lands among wild hordes, why does one overlook this calling there, where raw persons are given directly into our hands, placed under our household power? Certainly it is an old European distortion to seek misery far away while looking away from need close at hand, as if such belonged to the order of nature. Should masters become more noble, then slavery will lose its raw character by itself. But whoever pursues dreams of equalization has a spirit that needs healing more than the good sense of slave owners. Heaven appears to desire everywhere a different play of human forces. It has distributed capacities variously and promotes the unfolding of outstanding talents for intellectual activity in order to grant one person more *destiny* than the other, [67] or more *inclination* to physical labors, or a certain disinclination to intellectual activity. In this ever more elements promote patron-relationships. And even if among people of the same development in fortunate situation these elements suffice only for patron relations among relatives, still wherever in the midst of a people of higher development there exists a people of lower talents, the temptation of an extensive patron relationship is so strong that only the superficiality of a perverse school-education can stop it. Already the striking difference in physical aspects, such as in skin-color, is what very much favors this development, the

same difference that insane preachers of freedom so gladly wish to obliterate as a failure of creation through cross-breeding. If such ideas were promoted, I would happily withdraw my earlier statement that the black population of North America should be *wished away*. Alongside this statement I said (*Travel Report*, 2nd edition, p. 334)[66] that because of the masters, one must vote for the gradual abolition of slavery, since otherwise there was no hope for measures of education and moral oversight protecting against their poison. It is one of the results of my newest review that I now vote for efforts to help both one side and the other. That is, one should by no means entirely *abolish* slavery, *because nothing would be less sensible than to create a mass mob where it has heretofore been lacking*, and then, that the political equality of the raw and the cultivated would *both* produce police guards, and the latter would necessarily be savaged under the political despotism of the former.—What the fanatical orators for freedom and equality, despite the examples of history and the present, grasp so poorly that no one is more avid than they as they work toward the worst tyranny. But one should make slavery *milder*, on the one side through positive laws, through *regulations* of humanity that would stand under the guarantee of the *whole*—which is certainly a sort of abolition,—and on the other hand through ennoblement of the masters, tending to form a guarantee of humane treatment in *families*. And it seems to me, after mature consideration, that this ennoblement of the masters, as an increasingly rising development, considered less as a Roman-style censorial compulsion or national education than depending on its opposite, an improvement of the same higher classes that would tend to respect that censoriousness and national education for those below them as desirable. Yes, at the peril of offending some readers, I add that it is precisely the class of the higher estates that is at the pinnacle both in Europe and in America, the politicians, priests and teachers, who must improve themselves. As part of *their* [68] improvement I count first of all their separation from the perverse cultural products that have brought the life of reflection into the most lamentable conflict with the direct life, regarding living and working in the stillness of the countryside, which are the eternal preconditions of health and cheer, as spiritually empty, raw and low. They have stamped attending to secular and church offices in the frantic tumult of the cities, surrounded by a mere play of formalities, or total *reflecting* on the *state* of life and the life *of others*, without having any *immediate life of one's own* save in a narrow room, to be the true existence. So long as American politicians and teachers replicate the Europeans, so long as they take a Cicero as their model rather than a Cincinnatus, and seek political office for the sake of *honor*, the prospect of improvement is dim. But a brighter time will come, and it is when one will think more clearly about relationships of people to one another, once thought to be a certain way and no other, will

be imagined more clearly. No one complains about the basic inequalities within individual families save in moments of dissatisfaction; and all the orations of the world-reformers have not been able to enthuse us to the hope that these inequalities can be charmed away through cultural tricks. On the other hand, the necessity of resignation eventually gives way to the consolation that they can be very *helpful* for manifold development of human strengths and inclinations. If there should not in the future as well the so natural and insurmountable inequalities of *whole generations* be resolved in a similar consolation, for example of the Eskimo and the Europeans, the Pescheras and the Europeans, the Indians and the Europeans, and finally the Negroes and the Europeans? Shouldn't this possibly take place in a country where there has been so much support for the independence of *white people* that none of them wants to be a servant? Truly one must be astonished at the confusion into which even spirited persons allow themselves to be led through the ordinary condemnations of slavery, ignoring all the facts of nature that invite one to patron relationships, leaving aside all the superficial radicals.—Incidentally, city and trade life never greets such invitations positively. And in North America as well, such are to be found particularly among those who need few servants in their craft and household, or they can satisfy this need adequately from *free* colored people; the fanatical opponents of slaveholding, just as the enthusiasts *against* strict servant ordinances in Europe are seldom found among farmers. What is to be hoped for the patron relationship from a superficiality that damns the obligations of the master to protect his servants from seduction to luxury and [69] immorality out of sheer liberality, as contrary to natural liberty?—But that even Europeans, who themselves see physical labor as beneath their dignity, have a house authority that is like that of masters over slaves, is blamed in North America entirely because the masters may be misled into laziness, a censorial attitude whose explanation must be sought in the brain of a censor.—Monsieur de Tocqueville is certainly not one of the most severe opponents of slavery. It is simply that the way of reform that I have suggested would be hard to match with his views. The *consistency* these views have with this side of North American life is illuminated by comparing two passages of his book, which I cite word for word.

In volume 1, chapter 2, it says: *L'esclavage, comme nous l'expliquerons plus tard, déshonore le travail ; il introduit l'oisiveté dans la société, et avec elle l'ignorance et l'orgueil, la pauvreté et le luxe. Il énerve les forces de l'intelligence et endort l'activité humaine. L'influence de l'esclavage, combiné avec le caractère anglais, explique les mœurs et l'état social du Sud.* ["Slavery, as we will explain later, dishonors labor; it introduces leisure to society, and along with it ignorance and pride, poverty and luxury. It weakens the forces of intelligence and weakens humane activity. The influence of slavery, combined with the

English character, explains the mores and social condition of the South."][67]

One should compare this with the passage in volume 2, chapter 10:

*L'americain du Sud est plus spontané, plus spirituel, plus ouvert, plus genereux, plus intellectuel et plus brilliant* ["The American of the South is more spontaneous, more open, more generous, more intellectual and more brilliant"],[68] than those of the North, and indeed, as it expressly says there, because the one possesses slaves and the other not.

I think any commentary on this is superfluous. Orations that do battle with anthropology and history have seldom have such an anchor in memory that a fiery speaker does not stand in peril of saying precisely the opposite with the same pathos at the end of a long speech.

## Part Eight

I consider my current critique of Tocqueville's work to be adequate for my true purposes. If I wished to pursue his threads through all the interesting parts, I would have to write a larger book than his was. For that reason I add only a few remarks.

Against his general statements about the *laws* of the Americans, I stress my earlier statement that he places far too much weight on them, and particularly on the part that [70] is supported by jurists rather than the composition of the court. With the exception of the jury, the jurists, *if they were united*, would be able to transform civil law and civil procedure entirely, and the criminal law to a great extent, without the people taking any notice of it. Where the jurists can accomplish less is administration and politics. But one should not believe for that reason that the laws on these things sustain themselves without the jurists on their own or through the instinct of the masses. It is quite improper to think of the masses as always desiring change. The masses often hand on far more what is old than the minority of those with higher cultivation. But from them no lasting protection is to be sought from them for laws that the masses do not understand. That derives from their *distrust of change* that arises from their current well-being, and the appeal of a few jurists to this is what secures longevity for many laws. If the masses were as in Europe, then they would soon lose one piece after another of their political and administrative liberty. For that reason importance is not to be attributed as it usually is to *real* laws, as good or bad as they might prove to be for this liberty. On this one should take the commentary from what I now will declare concerning our author's statements on administration and justice of the North Americans.

It is our author's opinion that the source of free institutions is to be found in the essence of local government. He is certainly right that a truly free people

would never tolerate such a guardianship of local government as the French sought to introduce everywhere their weapons penetrated. But between communal liberty and general liberty (state liberty) there is a great gap, and our author appears to know little about Europe if he ascribes communal liberty to the British alone. It is found as frequently in Germany, not only in its many imperial cities, but also in territorial cities. And precisely this shows clearly that beyond the finest *legal* ordinances, that is to say, the commands consisting of words on how it *should* go, there is also required an invisible impulse so that it *really* goes in that manner. This invisible element had vanished in Germany, and from that moment is dated the decline of communalism, and not from the final suspension of the laws. It is in fact instructive and depressing to see how the legislators exerted themselves to help in a well-meaning way as the spirit gradually waned. For example, in the duchies of *Jülich* and *Berg* there was a mass of ordinances on administration and justice that could not be denied the character of law, and which never had effect as laws in reality. For that reason a study of its own on practice is needed to discover *the* laws [71] that were never laws. North American communal ordinances certainly have beautiful sides. But one cannot believe that they will have positive results. One should also be wary of the belief that there were not many complaints over their poor application. I hold this warning to be more important than looking at individual errors in the reasoning of our author. Yet I was not able to suppress my astonishment over the conflicting sentences (of which one appears at the start) in the section, "The Political effect of Decentralization" (at the end of part I, chapter 5).[69] Soon it says (p. 135, BE) that the central administration serves to enervate and pacify everything. Then (pp. 139, 143, 145) that central officials would be able to do everything better, and in North America much administration is poorer than in Europe, but the *political* advantages (namely the effect of self-administration on the spirit of the people) prevail. Then (p. 150) there follow expressions in which the *administrative* advantages are so praised that the European must marvel at the American administration as an ideal in itself. Here it is said that the centralization of administration will make the peoples Chinese, there (p. 147), that such people rendered Chinese would be capable of doing the maximum for the fame and happiness of the nation (as if for gods).

So far as North America's *justice* goes, our author marvels at its influence on the preservation of the *basic law* (Constitution). In this context it must be considered that in general, where the *ordinary* legislative power is as clearly distinct from the special legislative power that alone can alter the constitution as it is in North America,[ix] it follows automatically those who have the power

[ix] According to the fifth article of the federal Constitution, *its amendment* can only be sanctioned by three-quarters of the individual states. The legislative power of the Congress

to express law in case of conflicts will not be able to sustain laws that do not comply. The ordinary legislators (for the Union, the Congress) have no power to alter the Constitution, and hence if they do so anyway they pass into an area where their power is null and their acts have no more authority than that of private persons. It would certainly *not* be good justice in North America if they were not able to use the Constitution as a support against similar excesses. Strangely enough our author recognizes this himself later with his words, "Hence it is right that the courts obey the Constitution [72] before the laws." And yet before this he was able to speak of an *abnormal* power that was vested in American judges to support themselves on the Constitution.—But the fact that the Americans permit this to be applied as a natural result of their institutions and does not have a special court for settling *theoretical* errors before they touch anyone *in fact* alongside that justice that exists for the settlement of actual legal cases, can be praised highly as *negative* wisdom, since they have as yet found no adequate cause to establish such a dangerous overseer of the Constitution. American courts do not declare a law to be unconstitutional as do similar overseeing authorities; they must wait until a plaintiff appears, that is, as our author says it, they do not have the initiative. At the same time it would be an error to believe that judicial rulings can declare a law unconstitutional only in trials where there is a dispute over private rights. They may also occur in criminal trials, both on the motion of the accused and of the officials prosecuting (the Grand Jury and state attorneys). And the Grand Jury also represents the people in other general interests, such as concerning public streets; for that reason it is it that can approach the courts through a representative if an unconstitutional law stands in the way of those interests.

It sounds ludicrous when our author says a great deal on this occasion about similar distinctions between the Constitution and legislation in France, since French legislators can only be hindered in combining them by themselves, that is, to issue new laws that are obvious alterations of the Constitution. In fact it operates in France precisely as in England, where Parliament has both the constituting and the legislative power, and the difference resides entirely and only in theoretical *principles* that are occasionally violated.

Further, our author's opinion that the organism of federal power, whose organs exist alongside and independent of the authorities of the individual states reaching down to individuals, is something entirely new. Germany presents an analogy in its Imperial Constitution, and in its division into Circles also has officials independent of the rulers of the individual territories, particularly financial and military officials. Admittedly Circle mandates only passed to the territorial powers in all cases where these were not party to the

hence has to restrain itself entirely *within* the limits of this document.

matter, so that the mandate would have to take place against their residents *through* them. But when one considers that it was a leading rule that a *non-partisan* power was always used to carry out the mandate, then the American institution is only a [73] variation of a long-known institution and by no means a new discovery; all the more so since the execution of the Imperial courts would also apply to subjects of territorial lords in *individual* cases.

* * *

I am pleased to be able to find an occasion before the publication of these pages to prove in fact my inclination, announced in the introduction, to prefer to praise rather than to blame. This will also permit me to counter the suspicion that my pen is moved by national prejudice. Quite recently a book on North America has appeared from another Frenchman that I may recommend more than any other to the attention of Germans. This is not because it is free of incorrectness—on the contrary, there are many errors, less in reports about the New World than in the reflections of our author—but because it is evidence of a striving for openness that is rare in itself, and even rarer among Europeans judging North America. It consists of two octavo volumes of letters by *Michel Chevalier*.[70] Perhaps a third of the letters have already appeared in the *Journal des Débats*, sent by our author from America, where he was from 1833 to 1835. Monsieur Chevalier is an outstanding engineer from whom one may expect nothing but the facts on physical matters of North America and its use of surfaced roads, canals and railroads. He also shows himself to be a sharp observer on industry in general. Beyond this, Monsieur Chevalier also shows himself to be a politician, and in fact a better politician than many educated to this in schools. His book is full of the most interesting information on the political activities of the Americans in recent years, even if *reflections* on them remain too much on the surface. What I have to dispute of his political content can be derived from the accusations I have made of recent culture in general, as well as partisanship for France, or rather for Frenchmen, although this does not hinder him from praising considerably the advantages of the Germanic element in Englishmen and North Americans. In order to explain myself in more detail in a few words, I do remark that in his often very charming speeches he does not go deeply enough into the varying talents of people and peoples, and for that reason he does not clearly recognize the *essential* variations of peoples clearly enough, since he does not concern himself carefully with the essential variations of human nature in itself. Hence he does not recognize the variations occasioned over *generations*, even when they impose themselves so [74] strongly as between Negroes and Europeans. For that reason it is no surprise that his judgment on the *slavery* of Negroes shares nothing with my thoughts. There is also no trace

of the distortions of modern culture and of what is called higher life, and as a result our author, despite his proper concern to do right by the lower classes in North America, condemns them too negatively. He himself has tasted too much of the life of the salon and offices, and he has become too comfortable there, to be able to evaluate the differences without partisanship. And especially the residents of the American West, of whom he expects a softening of their manners as a result of the disappearance of the forests, will resent him for reasons similar to those he gives in declaring England's aristocracy incompetent to judge North America's democracy. Yet his ideas come so often together with *my own* writings that I have to conclude his direct or indirect knowledge of them.[x] My *Travel Report*, as well as the first volume [75] of my

[x] This includes, for example, the reason why the wages for servants and workers are so high in North America. Ordinarily this is attributed to the lack of people. I report at the outset that the true reason consists in the high offerings of nature, pages 269, 270 of my *Travel Report* (2nd edition) [31st letter, deals with the cost[labor inversion of America in comparison with Europe]. This must have been utterly unknown in Europe before my journey, since I had to defend it with a long note in the second edition on pages 369 and following. Accompanying this was my remark that much European *care* is a waste of time and effort in North America, that human labor has more to comprehend and can deal less with details, that, for example, the same labor is more advantageously expended on several acres than on a single acre (due to the natural fruitfulness of the land and the superfluity of it). One finds a similar judgment in *Chevalier*.—Further, this author speaks against the common accusation that North Americans are only interested in money with the indisputable phenomenon that the *worst* evidence of avarice is lacking with them, which is *marrying* for money. Compare here the 27th excerpt of my *Europa und Deutschland*, which is excellently devoted to this question.—In his fifteenth letter Monsieur Chevalier speaks again on the avarice of the American and says that they still do not resort to such stinginess or debasement as the European. [Lettre XV: "Les élections," dated New York, 11 November 1834, *Lettres sur l'Amérique du Nord*, 3rd ed., vol. 2, pp. 1-14] Literally the same is to be read in the work just named in volume 1, page 315.—The fact that in respect to clothing, house goods and other practices there is no difference between town dwellers and country folk in North America, that there are no beggars, excepting only those fresh from Europe, absolutely no mob, that the education there is more practical, that European prejudices against physical labor are lacking; remarks about the security of property, on the differing morality of whites and colored people, all of that can be found in Chevalier exactly as in me. His thoughts about the [75] Germanic and Romance element in modern Europeans and Americans, his wishes that the higher classes should want to participate in physical labor, and particularly on agriculture, are as little alien to my own writings. In the first volume of my *Europa und Deutschland*, I have expressed myself very *thoroughly*. And in the most important point on which we agree, *that the core of strength lies in those who use the soil, and that as a result the West will soon stand superior*, I have in turn dedicated my critique to the fact that this is in turn conditioned by the superiority of individual life over the political. Precisely because one is blinded everywhere, in Europe and America, against this truth by perverse theories, I had to seek to prove it in a stricter manner than has occurred in his treatment of the political condition of the North Americans. One should compare Chevalier's statements with excerpts 8 and 10 of my *Europa und Deutschland*. I could provide even more proofs, but I see it as advisable to prefer to use the space for something treating *the latest crisis in the trade world*.

In his sixth letter, Monsieur Chevalier speaks, concerning *Jackson's* attack on the Bank of the United States, of two powers, the military and civil officials, who have hitherto participated in the power of the Union, and opposing the appearance of the third power, the financiers. [Lettre VI, "Progrès de la lutte—pouvoirs nouveaux," Baltimore, 1 March 1834, *Lettres sur l'Amérique du Nord*, 3rd ed., vol. 1, pp. 86–111] Actually the struggle against the Bank is nothing other than this. Also it must in the end come to the point where the presidency of the Bank becomes a *political office*, if the matter develops in keeping with nature. However the proofs alleged on its behalf from history sound, his opinion arises from an intermingling of true and false assumptions. What is true 1) in the matter I refer to in my *Travel Report* and in my note on page 219 (2nd edition), where I *also* speak of the three powers indicated, with the difference that Monsieur Chevalier, instead of using my term of "civil officials" says "lawyers" (which does not suit the administrative officials), and that instead of my expression "financiers" has chosen the term "wealth." With this one should recognize that we are so much in harmony concerning the *true existence* of the three powers that we can seize all the more easily where we vary from one another. I have precisely the following to say *on what is wrong* in Chevalier's opinion 2): The effectiveness of the three powers does not depend in any way from a political organism as Monsieur Chevalier thinks. Wealth has always had an influence on politics in North America without a specific political office to communicate it, for the simple reason that the rich have different interests from the non-rich, and that this distinction acts on legislation and on the election of officials. Even if wealth does not dominate the election of higher military and civil offices as was the case with the decadent Romans, as when the Praetorians bestowed the throne of the Caesars on the [76] one bidding the most money, it is still obvious that this can still provide much support. In this way it is not easy for a general, to whom one does not entrust any knowledge of government or laws, to be elected president or high judge, just as inversely one does not make a judge or governor instantly into the leader of an army. But a military reputation does help one to a civil office (as one has literally experienced with Jackson), and conversely fame as a civil officer to a military post. Wealth works in a similar way, and it will continue to work.—Meanwhile Monsieur Chevalier's discussion is to be blamed because it implies that there is no other power working on politics in North America. In order not to exclude the possibility, I have named these three in my note only *as an example*. *Everything* that bestows prestige and is in any way significant for the support of people is also significant for politics, and as such a political power. And even if *descent* cannot do as much as in Europe, then *relationship to a profession or trade* is all the more effective. Who does not know, to choose only one example, the preference of farmers for a fellow farmer in political elections? *Yes, sympathy and antipathy of professions is exactly what has a major role in the struggle against the Bank.* Specifically, the struggle against the Bank is for the people (that is, other than the officers and president of the Union) actually a struggle of those living from agriculture against the rapid enrichment of merchants and manufacturers.—Hatred against the Bank of the United States as such does not exist, because there is no reason at all for it. It is the banks of *the individual states* that have attracted the hatred of the masses through the losses they have made for many. And yet the struggle is so little directed against them, that they have profited from those attacking the Bank of the United States. The Bank of the United States has always (since its founding in 1816) flourished in such a way that its notes are taken all over the Union at full face value. And if farmers have never *lost* anything from it, on the other side the restoration of money, so deteriorated before 1816, has been very positive for the trading community.—This is not to state that the antipathy of farmers against merchants and manufacturers is pure envy, or is directed against wealth *in itself*. From the conflict over the tariff we know that how unjust the interest of the latter against the interests of the former can be. Hence it is to be considered that the different way of life of country people and city people, both in their occupations and

daily interests, must always hold them in a certain opposition one to another. The difference of the two North American classes in clothing, style of conversation, and external mores is almost precisely nothing when measured by European standards, but the *internal* difference and opposition for that reason is not lacking, without considering the impact of urban luxury as an explanation. Finally there in the people is no lack of men who fear evil from the [77] life of trade and industry in the future, even more in view of the treasures to win through this. But the number of those who can give a clear account of their hostility to the Bank is small in comparison to the mass of *instinctual* fighters. And it is this mass through which *Jackson* has led his struggle. He has stated a series of reasons, but their value was in part not of the sort that go very far, part of them were not understandable enough to the masses. They have only functioned as a *leader* of the President's commitment, and so alongside of the antipathy mentioned there is the inclination of the people in favor of Jackson, which is responsible for the attack on the Bank, along with Jackson's conviction. So far as Jackson's commitment goes, it should include certain valid concerns about the world of trade and industry for the elements of the political situation are not alien to it.—Not that one need take his speeches about the plans of the Bank against liberty as seriously meant, since it all too obvious that up to now the efforts of merchants has been concentrated on money rather than political purposes, *and if liberty really had all the defenders of the Bank against it, it would long since be the end for it.* But purely personal impulse must always enter into it (to which I particularly include the jealousy of a soldier against the influence of wealth) to bring him in his position to an act such as we have experienced it. And even the mildest analysis will see it as a philanthropic intervention into human life to which a certain degree of fanaticism belongs in the current state of the development.

Now a few words about the *results* of his procedure. We suddenly begin reading of catastrophes in the trade situation of North America that appear in the greatest contradiction to previous reports of this country's flourishing. Let one not be misled. In this Jackson is right: the flourishing of North Americans is not entirely dependent on the flourishing of their premier trading houses. The country is not going under, and no matter how bad the misfortune among merchants and manufacturers might be, no class of beggars will arise. But this consolation has little charm for the many rich families that suddenly have been plunged from affluence into a situation even he would not credit as personally deserved, who at the deepest is accused of a fanaticism that seeks general aims at the cost of individuals. Therefore *Jackson* cannot be without blame in the great catastrophes, and the question still remains, is he guilty of it? There is much discussion in American papers on this. But neither what has passed into European papers, nor Chevalier's interesting reports (which also tells of the remarkable transformation of the Bank of the United States into a Bank of Pennsylvania), appear to me to give the best resolution that the following remarks provide.

In Europe as in America, *money* is essential to trade, that legal custom and express law, as for [78] example in France, declares every merchant who cannot *pay—without* any regard for his property *beyond* the business capital—to be bankrupt. One impresses this sentence as the principle, and then posits the situation in which a mass of merchants who are continually involved in the greatest enterprises and daily must pay out significant sums suddenly have a shortage of money (metal or paper) that the best credit cannot handle. Is another result possible except bankruptcy? The answer to this fits entirely with the Bank story. The Bank of the United States may be regarded as the common till of all solid trading houses in the large East-Coast cities. It had to cease to be so as soon as the federal president attacked it in such an unexpected manner (particularly through the withdrawal of federal deposits, in violation of agreements, before the end of the legal life of the Bank), and at the same time compelled its peripheral function to turn inward to save itself. That is the main point that does not need to be confused with talk

*Europe and Germany* were distributed well enough during his residence in America, to permit such a conclusion, [76] and I only guard against suspicion because it is not pleasant to me to see my views being effective [77] without being named as the originator. Far from such lamentable self-love, I am happy for our author's strong [78] witness on behalf of the North Americans against fanatical slanderers and their blind devotees. Truly, the Germans should not [79[continue to publish judgments about the North Americans that they have to choke back down in a few decades. For those who know North Americans the way I do, it is extremely painful that negative prejudices that dominate about Germans and their homeland are justified more and more by Germany's newest literature. If I wanted to make another attempt to give an idea of the power of the North Americans overcoming all obstacles, I could do nothing better than to urge for reinforcement Monsieur Chevalier's report on

about a lack of metal currency or excessive speculation. Where such a bank exists such as the Bank of the United States was, metal currency is only needed in small amounts. And speculation may be as sober and completely in keeping with income as may be, but as soon as the common institution of payment fails its obligations, even the greatest wealth is not protected from bankruptcy. Of course conditions determine that not all bankruptcies will take place in a single day. It is only when the small houses are in peril because of their *weakness*, then it was the great houses because of *their extensive business* and the resulting obligation for large payments. One has accused the Bank of helping the trading community less than it could have out of malice, in order to make the federal president odious. This accusation probably rests on pure hostility, or on factional engagement as the natural result reacting to the attack, and to explain many later bankruptcies created the phantom of excessive speculation, so that business was put down to this rubric, so that so long as money did not depart the Union with one motion it was marked to the honor of the houses whose entrepreneurial spirit had enlivened it.

One should allow me to add a remark here that is very significant for the reader's judgment of the difference between my views and those of Chevalier and Tocqueville. Both authors agree that in North America it is simply the *lower* classes that rule. This is, however, thoroughly false, since the lower classes only elect *persons from the upper classes* as the chief officials of the government. One complains about the power of impulse that these persons must obey in governing, but the story of the Bank shows that the impulses of the masses only become harmful when certain directions that can *only* develop in what is called *higher life* that takes them over. The people would never have come to the most recent experiments through that antipathy against the trading community [79] on its own without Jackson's influence and will. The instinct of the masses in North America is not as in Europe. In America the people does not resort to political experiments that cost individuals and families great sacrifice without an obvious advantage with no leadership of men from the highest class. And even if the mass is too healthy to be misled into actual revolutions, and God willing will so remain, it is not safe from every degradation into perverse politics, particularly when urged by men whose indubitable services have won them great popularity. The brief history of republics provides many examples for which there is no room here. Only one should not believe that healthy instinct will not return. The Germanic seeds have always been too strong to persist in patient obedience against the caprices of reflective life, and the Germanic peoples have never submitted permanently to the compulsion of princes, whether religious or political. One should expect all the less that North Americans will do so; how ever much shame over the obvious losses of the *current* confusion might compel resistance.

the public works undertaken and completed in the last ten years in canals, bridges and railways. If I were seeking new proofs against the too-widely spread opinion about a rule by the masses, I need only refer to the remarkable measures of the large cities on the Atlantic coast which, solely to prevent a feared ruin of general trust, have imposed restrictions on individual freedom that would be generally denounced in Germany as despotism. The most important export products are subjected to the strictest inspection, and if their quality is inadequate, they are not allowed to be exported. Even meat is not free of this inspection, and according to the laws of New York, for example, this includes whether it is fat enough. Something of the sort should counter the silly notion that individual liberty has gone to the extreme and opposes *all* state oversight and centralization. Yet I do not deny that Monsieur Chevalier seems to me to [80] praise state oversight and centralization too much. North American matters can only please political schoolmastering from this side, and a mass of restrictions of the forces of life created by politicians can be attributed to the account of the idolatry by our culture for the purposes of state, general welfare, progress of the whole, etc. Monsieur Chevalier must have been committed to political schoolmastering earlier in a higher degree, since he was notoriously one of the most zealous adherents of Saint-Simon.[71] It is strange that his observation of phenomena in the Western states, which bring him time and again to a true marveling at the present and prediction of a great future did not make him more positive about their true *source*, instinctual individual life, which in time produces the elements for new states in spite of politicians and teachers. Yet, I repeat, it violates the political reasoning of our author, as seductive as it seems occasionally, at its deepest level, to which a sharper testing of human nature itself leads, and not the naked reflections on *generalities*, on masses of people. In particular, that is in his erroneous contrast of the Yankee (New Englander) to the Virginian, from which he draws results that read well, but do not hold up to precise criticism.[72] Our author is likewise misled to place far too much weight on the original variety among the first colonists. He speaks likewise of strict Puritanism, with a force of life turned too much to the interior in the North, and of a milder religion with a life-force directed elaborately outward and to sociability in the South. To this he attaches several other variations between the so-called Yankees and the Virginians. And although he himself expressly reports the gradual amalgamation of both natures, and says particularly of the Yankee that he soon changes his nature among Virginians or also in the Western states, the thought is still alien to him that the variety derives not from *inner* reasons (differences in *the core*, in *talents*) but from varying external positions. Yankees (New Englanders) live primarily from trade, from shipping and industry, the Virginian from agriculture. One only needs to observe the same religious sects in Europe

in the one and the other external location, and one will need no further key to explain American diversity.—Dogmatizing in *politics* serves Monsieur Chevalier on the whole as little as Monsieur de Tocqueville, and for that very reason Chevalier's work stands above that of Tocqueville, since Tocqueville deals with politics alone, and deals with it only by dogmatizing, while Chevalier spreads himself to much more than politics, and when [81] dealing with politics he often restricts himself to communicating data without trying to use them as proofs for theories.

The *most important* difference between Monsieur Chevalier and my views consists in the fact that he regards the preponderance of the masses in North America over the higher classes (which he calls the *bourgeoisie*) to be an evil. He has been misled there on the one hand through individual outbreaks of rawness and lack of understanding that have been distressing enough in recent years; on the other hand, however, he has been misled by his own involvement in the failings of the higher classes (that is, modern culture).[73] He agrees with me that the masses in North America are better than in the European states, without granting the *higher* classes superiority over the higher classes in Europe. This places him very close to my own teaching, which is that the general well-being of the North Americans derives from the behavior of the masses, and in turn from the advantages of a healthy *instinctual* life over an unhealthy life of *reflection*. Yet he remains in conflict with this teaching insofar as he continual complains that the higher classes (that is, the life of reflection and culture) are dominated by the lower (that is, by the instinctual life). To criticize this, I need only to do no more than refer to the eighth excerpt in my *Europa und Deutschland*. There I have sought to show thoroughly what can only be indicated here, why I regard the *instinct* of the North American masses to be *healthy*, but the products of reflection (the culture) of the higher classes to be *sick*, and in fact of the same failings of which the entire modern culture suffers. If the higher classes in North America win predominance, it would quickly develop in a European direction. With such a point of view, I oppose Monsieur Chevalier's complaints with the assertion that one should on the contrary rejoice, and see in North America a region of health which, instead of being overcome by the failings of modern culture, is qualified as no other land of earth to heal its upper classes of the same failings. In order to entice the reader to test the further demonstration of these thoughts, I include the following two excerpts from my *Europe and Germany* word by word. In volume 1, page 93 it reads:

> The madness that wherever the government is not led by theories learned in the schools, it has to proceed according to the impulse of the moment, is too far removed from the proverb, "how useful men of high education and reflection become if the opposition of a healthy mass of the people

guides it." In this country there is never a lack of heads that recognized the confusion of prior theories and never sank into confusion about the future when the instinctual direction of the masses received predominance. And the *indubitable* services that higher education [82] has achieved in the new continent rest alone with such heads. As much as they felt the faults of the instinctual direction, they did not give up their hope for good results, and they served the people with that self-denial that also sought to help carrying out things for the *better*, where *completion* followed passion and non-understanding, always taking heart from the imperfection of everything earthly.

Page 126: The first helper of these perversities is arrogance, which scoffs at every statement of flourishing that does not address service alone, but rather primarily the bearers of what is regarded as higher culture. What can be more painful to arrogance than the proof that American prosperity owes so very little to human wisdom? That its roots rise in *external* nature, and what *human* nature contributes to it is the *opposite* of that wisdom, the *dark* (almost instinctual) *feeling* of the masses. But this proof achieves its most wounding sharpness when one shows that the very visions that appear to statesmen, priests and teachers as blossoms of culture, would seek to model and restrict American family life so completely as it has been bound in Europe. It is not to be doubted in the least that, if in North America the priests won control, one would quickly see a theocracy here. The politicians would handle the land and people according to what they call the purposes of state. A corps of financiers would see America as the region for economic experiments. A military would give the first rank to *its* ideals, and dream solely of laurels, and the teachers would seek their last angel in school life. Nothing is easier than to convince oneself on the spot that it would go entirely European. *One needs only ask each class of these bearers of culture what they seek to accomplish for the situation of the North Americans*, and summarizing it, what one hears time and again what is lacking for perfection, for whose possession mankind in Europe sighs so much.

By the way, the fact that it is not going so badly with the subordination of the higher classes in North America is shown, as was said in the note above, simply by the fact that the lower classes have hitherto given the highest offices only to members of the higher class, and there is not yet any fear of the slightest worsening in the future. To take an argument for despotism of the lower classes from the Bank dispute and its sad result is utterly absurd. Since, as said, the fault for that falls far less on those same classes than on the statesman who has created it, that is, [83] on none other than a product of the higher classes.[xi] For that reason I close with the declaration that those complaints of

[xi] While these lines were being printed, the journals produced new evaluations of the trade crisis that led me to fear that my own was too brief. On speaks repeatedly of causes that either didn't exist or could only be subordinated to the chief cause. Certainly before the collapse of

Monsieur Chevalier—who is said to have been named a state counsel by the king of France—are to be characterized entirely according to the passage of my *Europa und Deutschland*, vol. 1, p. 131, as arising from the displeasure that all products of modern culture regard the possession of state offices (that is, governing) as their *calling*, and that they lie in wait for it wherever individual and private life prevails over public life.

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many houses there was a period of bumbling and remedies that, instead of healing the *basic problem*, made it worse by using palliatives,—just as *further* damaging experiments by *officials* followed on the main cause. But that may not blind us to the importance of *this*, as little as its use by speculators. The *Times* even asserts that the Bank crisis is entirely guiltless for the crisis, since similar crises took place in 1814 and 1818 when no *Treasury Order* yet existed. The excessive issuance of paper money was alone at fault. It is hardly possible to distort the truth more ridiculously to use precisely the strongest positive argument against it. Not to criticize the illogical presumption that similar evils are always to be derived from similar causes, I merely remind the reader that it was precisely the confusion in the currency in 1814 that led to the constitution of the Bank of the United States in 1816, so that it would counter the misconduct of local banks and their excessive emission of paper currency; that the crisis of 1818 was, however, a simple result of the *unavoidable* cure, an *exposure* of the evil and a *liquidation* of the deficit of the local banks (incidentally without reaching the scale of the current crisis). Since then the *solvency censorship* that the Bank of the United States performed over local banks and over individual trading houses, as if automatically, operated powerfully against backsliding. And if this backsliding has recently returned, if the local banks have once more emitted excessive paper, what is at fault but the *weakening of the reputation of the general bank*? And must not, alongside their freeing from its control, the driving out of circulation of its notes along with the government's distribution of federal deposits and later income surpluses work as *positive stimuli* for new emissions of paper?—Already the simple disappearance of the general bank (the non-extension of its legal tenure) could not have been without the most negative consequences, besides the embarrassment of the merchants, who had depended completely on it due to its solvency, with the disappearance of many millions in paper money, for which no replacement could be found over the short run, without even mentioning metal currency and exchange.—Whoever does not live under that magical spell that the mere dating from an American city of opinions on American things possesses for many Europeans will regard three facts as true guiding lights against the polemic of financial theories of political parties: first, that *before* Jackson's presidency one could not detect the slightest mistrust of the Bank of the United States, that on the contrary (at least during my [84[ presence in North America) one was generally convinced of its great usefulness. Second, that their bitterest enemies are already returning to a similar institution as a saving anchor, obviously with the modification that it will henceforth not be *independent* of their influence—which was certainly its true failing in the eyes of the politicians striving now to control their individual and private lives; thirdly, that the most recent permission in law to suspend bank payments is nothing other than an open admission of the indispensability of paper money.—Truly there could not be a more perfect negation of Jackson's caprice: in his hatred against the general bank he inclined to be hostile to *all* paper money, and after he had succeeded more and more in excluding or discounting notes that asserted themselves through *their own credit in free trade*, one saw himself compelled in the end to create a market for them *by compulsion*.

[84]

# Duden's

## Confession concerning his American Travel Report, as a Warning against further frivolous Emigration openly declared

I, the author of that much-read *Travel Report*, now step before the public as a penitent sinner and confess aloud my gross error, that I had not dared to presume so much misunderstanding among my neighbors as I have experienced and continue to experience from the impact of that publication. To be sure it deserves a scolding when one transmits truths to children that only should go to adults. And so I confess that I had not considered how many children and fools there were in Germany who could read, and that my information and thoughts about North America should have been written in hieroglyphs for the *intelligent alone* rather than in ordinary alphabetical letters for *everyman*. It is still clear that whoever writes a book in German infers the idea that he is writing for everyone who can read German, and that it should be comprehensible to every one such. And it is no less clear that when an author calls others he calls to read his thoughts, whose applause he courts, he has also selected them to some extent to be capable judges over him. But by uniting these two sentences, it follows that one holds that any author, simply through writing in the German language, holds any person who can read German to be a capable judge over his book. Even if that is only an illusion, it would still be unjust to expect that the weakest would be able to resist this seductive flattery. In other words, no one graduating from a reading school would remove himself from the class of those appearing to be called as judges. And it would be an even more unjust supposition that anyone seduced into being a judge would doubt his own understanding rather than the understanding and coherence of the maker of books. [85]

From this I draw the fatal scruple that I, together with my book, am guilty of all stimulations that have caused any readers to lay unfortunate plans, however foolish and laughable they may be.

In the Letter 31, for example (p. 267 of the second edition), the strongest words are spoken about the lot of those emigrants who commit themselves to slavery for the costs of transportation.[74] Yet an oppressed day-laborer grasped this in another sense. He had read so much positive about America and thought, "Whether, if there is nothing more against it, I will still do it. Who knows how the people who did poorly behaved? There were still some who did *well*." So he heads off, and his disappointments come only when it

is too late. Who will suppose that he will accuse himself? Is it any wonder that, to help his own conscience, he sees *me* as the seducer? And what is more understandable than that he also seeks to use the same argument to counter the accusations and scorn of his acquaintances? Hence my book is the source of his misfortune, since it was written in a language that an impoverished fool can read, even if only to read it falsely or half-way.

My defenders could certainly remark that in that very book (p. 265, Letter 31) I said that it was the duty of the states and governments to advise and to help lead the instinctual pressure of the raw masses, who turn to any ray of hope in their need. Since this does not happen, for that reason alone so many race into misfortune. Germans emigrated long before my portrayal, and it will continue without my portrayal in the future. But I do not wish to be defended in that manner. I must have known in advance that my pious wishes would never be realized, that it ran against all modern theories of state to promote emigration, that it was precisely the unfortunate destinies of emigrants that served best to frighten emigrants, and that it was foolish for that reason to discourage the very class that provided the most dreadful examples. I could not rely on there being *instructive interpretations* of my book, since the unpatriotic effect of a *correct* understanding of it could be countered by the results of the misunderstanding of the masses.

It is almost a masthead motto of my book that one should never cross the ocean without property, and that everyone should bring so much as is needed to orient himself in the new country, if he is not entirely at home, and one cannot be sure of a *secure* income. It is only the half-reader who is possessed about the cheapness of food, the fruitfulness of the soil, the hunting and the fruits of the forests, [86] and his imagination permits no room for similar warnings to be practical. He convinces himself that as soon as he gets across the ocean he will be satisfied with those natural goods through his own extraordinary abilities. So he sets off and is only healed of his self-delusion by harsh reality, that is, of his self-delusion about America, but not of that about my book. In his inclination to shift the blame onto me, the complaints of those who sold themselves into slavery sound sweet, finding the strongest echo in his own self-love.

Another reader concentrates on my statement on the height of the daily wage, and his hope for the improvement of his situation becomes so dependent on it that he is blind to everything else. On pages 108 and 267 (second edition),[75] I warn expressly not to rely on the daily wage, I show the peril and predict a downfall that is hardly to be avoided. Despite that, the emigrant does not see it and careens into misfortune (perhaps because he has heard that some of his acquaintances have *won* the bet). To whom should he attribute guilt? To himself? Who is so lacking in love for himself when all he needs is

to join in the cry that has already been raised by others against my seductive book?

Already in my preface (p. xlviii of the second edition) I declared it to be one of the basic errors of emigrants intending to live from the soil to chose lands on this side of the Alleghenies, and in this book as well as in the sequel I have developed the argument further. Since every fourth or fifth reader is shy of traveling into the interior or thinks that I have a special preference for Missouri or have some other motive to steer in that direction, he takes from my *Report* whatever appeals to him. Despite my warning against the coasts or anything on this side of the Alleghenies, he decides he wishes to seek his salvation in farming. Of course it does not succeed. But who is to be blamed for this? Who other than he who presented such enticing pictures of the new continent? Without it he perhaps never would have thought of emigration. For that reason, my book itself is guilty, even though its advice was not taken in the least, either in preparing a plan for emigration, or in carrying it out.

On pages xliv, 318, 359, 373 and 374 I have portrayed the use of the soil as the sole certain basis for existence. But there I did not simply say that good soil was only available at a reasonable price beyond the Alleghenies, but also that one had to bring along sufficient means for the journey as well as for the entire establishment on the land. And (pp. 263 and 264 in Letter 31)[76] for those emigrants seasoned to hard physical labor a minimum of 1000 Prussian Thaler *beyond* the [87] travel costs, and for so-called gentlemen a minimum of 3000-4000 beyond the travel costs, even *specifying* the necessary costs. Despite that, the emigrant who lacks a part of this sum still does not wish to be excluded from the promised land, and so he reasons away beyond my book, inferring things he is not told. Without ever having done physical labor, he relies on his capacity to do it, something on which even my emigrating day-laborer would not rely, according to my warning. And perhaps he says to himself: "If it is as good in America as the book says, I must be able to succeed with less. And if the book regards those amounts as adequate, it is clear that someone with special above-average abilities (which everyone believes he possesses) will get through more cheaply." Who is now guilty if cheated by this reasoning? Who other than the book that encouraged him to that?

On page 272 (in Letter 31) I warned against using disposable capital too rapidly; one should restrict oneself at the outset to setting up the land for one's own household without speculating about production for the market. In vain! The emigrant thinks to himself: "The author is trying to be smarter in everything; since I am here on the spot, I can well judge what has to be done as well as he." Then he proceeds in his amazement over the apparent rawness of the Americans, to create what can be called European model farms, builds

operations that have no relationship to cheap soil and cheap products, and so he loses his entire wealth. Who is supposed to be punished with deprecations *for this*? The entrepreneur himself? That would just be too hard; he is already suffering too much. It would appear to correspond better to humanity to pass as much as possible on to others, and who would suit better than the author of that damned book from which his imagination drew so much?

No less enthusiastic an emigrant paid no heed to my warnings concerning the use of European servants (p. 263 in Letter 31).[77] He lost a considerable amount of his capital as a result, which negatively impacted his enterprise from the outset. He would only need a second problem to arise, or a case of illness, and the book will be blamed of placing too little emphasis on the shadow side.

Joining these complainers is a fellow German who, ignoring my repeated warnings (p. 384 in the addendum to the book), traveled through New Orleans in the summer, thus losing a dear relative through attacks on health influenced by the climate.[78]

On page 160 (in the continuation of Letter 20) I have said that in the Western states (whither I invite emigration), for the time being extensive acreage can be worked without slaves [88] when the family itself is used to physical labor and is numerous enough. But some have tried to do this alone in Illinois with hired whites. Their poor success must necessarily have damaged their opinion of America, and nothing is more understandable than that they regard a more positive view as excessive, insofar as they damn my advice to use slaves to be a devilish invitation to Hell.

On page 265 (Letter 31) I mention how *patriotic associations* should promote the emigration of *poor* persons, and I expressed wishes for a central place for German culture in North America. This and the grounds for it have been miraculously combined in the imagination of many a reader with my statement on page 290 (in Letter 33) and page 356 (in my treatment on the political situation), where I speak of associations to establish cities and the benefits to be obtained form it. Since page 255 (Letter 31) already mentions the benefits of the closeness of other countrymen as a condition for the enjoyment of life on the Mississippi or Missouri, and it says on page 385 (in the postscript) that people can cross the ocean much more cheaply in large numbers than individually, thus people have fallen into the opinion that that every goal of profit and national life can also be attained by those without monetary support of patriotic or simply speculative capitalists through a naked association of the emigrants themselves. **I myself** was obviously thinking about undertakings of *such* capitalists as have and sustain solid footing in the Mother Country, since adequate support and protection is only to be expected of *leaders* of colonists, not from those colonists themselves, in the midst of emigration.

But it must occur to every level-headed person that *without* such support in the Fatherland, the same leaders can only rely on loyalty that stands on the special nexus to the individual emigrant, such as in a *blood relationship* or in that of a rich patron who advances the money to an entire undertaking. Not to mention a *religious* nexus, such as that between *Rapp* and the members of his congregation, so that it strikes one that *independent* associations cannot be large in number, however large the number of those simply making the crossing might be. The leaders of the large associations that have existed up to now clearly saw it differently. Instead, in the place of believing that with the rise of numbers there was a rise in *peril*, they only saw a rise in *advantages*. And the worst disappointment was that they believed that unifying *dispensed* them from bringing as much money as I declared necessary for every family. They wanted to think about mutual support, and that the concentration of many people on one point increasing the value of the soil. But the first would have required significant wealth in *individuals* together with the [89] firm decision to use it for fellow immigrants. And the latter rests on the misleading circular argument that one hopes to harvest the money needed at the outset from the *fruits* of the undertaking.—Just as I may now ask all my critics to show me the passages where this error appears in my book, then I find it entirely natural that it is my fault that the associations failed—*because* I urged the formation of *associations* and—if my book had never been written, people would not have been able to misunderstand it.

No less unjust would be the accusation that I have been silent about the helplessness of all Europeans in what is called wild nature. Just because I cited it as the chief difficulty of emigration, I did not expect that people could interpret my book to mean that I advised *associations* of such helpless people be settled in isolated locations where help from North Americans, indispensable for strangers, is impossible. This carelessness as well was injurious to some emigrants, and so it is proven beyond a doubt that, because careful *reading* cannot be expected, I should have *written* more carefully.

Insofar as I have already made it an unavoidable condition for an individual to bring enough money, I held it to be unnecessary to add that it applies all the more for a father with a wife and children. Now I confess myself guilty of excess hurry. I should have had it printed in red on the title page, in fact on every page. This is because, since I did not do that, it happened that a man from Saxony by the name of *Streckfuss*,[79] was run into misery along with his children. But that would not have been enough: I should have printed the words of on page xliv of the preface to the first edition and page 396 of the postscript, namely, that it is *only* the soil, and certainly not the expensive soil of Fredericktown (about 10 German miles from Baltimore), but only the soil in the *Western* states (p. 373) that gives a hope of *secure* support. And even

that would not be enough: I should have printed it in letters an inch high to warn the fathers of families that there is no hope of being able to live in the coastal city of Philadelphia as a vinegar maker and gentleman using a few hundred Thaler. [80] Finally, I should have warned against the extreme necessity not to depend on peddling, since it is burdened with high license fees there as well, as in Missouri according to page 401. All of that was left undone, and because the unfortunate *Streckfuss* fell into this gap in my book, he justly accuses my book in his remarkable libel published at *Zeitz*, also expressing his distress with the Freemasons, who refused to help pay for his return journey. As he adds at the conclusion, [90] however, he probably would have done better if he had remained longer in the country. Because of his children he preferred literally to *beg* his way back home.

In my book it is said that there are good expectations as well for craftsmen and artists, and I have mentioned some of these crafts by name. But on page 267 it not only says that emigrants included *there* should bring some money, but in both the preface and the postscript (p. 396) these expectations, like all others, are subordinated to the exploitation of the soil. In other words, craftsmen and artists should hold agriculture to be the sole secure basis for their existence. On quiet consideration the thoughts form up without effort that even the most competent craftsman or artists is tempting fate when he sets off with wife and children without preparing a secure annuity or a supporting farm in case of his incapacity or even death. But quiet consideration is not a condition for buying my book, and since they also are not made to do spelling, they complain because I did not include a warning sign along with my charming portrayal of the land in general.

On pages 259 and 261 it is shown how the *propertied* emigrant needs special preparation or good guidance. Earlier I relied on the hope that this had defended me from a frivolous conception of my account. But now I see it differently. What should be understood by *special* preparation? Why did I not write a book or at least a treatment *of that*? I would have thought that everyone would be perfectly able to make this preparation simply by planning and reading the available literature about North America. Especially I should not have had to provide ordinary Germans that one cannot rent rooms in hotels everywhere, and that one cannot presume *comfortable* housing in the American woods without having houses built himself. I should have said to all *urban* emigrants that part of their preparation should be to become acquainted with life in the countryside *in the old homeland*, and to learn that one does not just have fun and games even after the common complaints about the poverty of the soil, poor weather, insecurity against robbers and thieves, poor roads, inadequate servants, taxes from the state and district, and even about poverty and beggary fall away. Everywhere, and in America as

well, there is sowing and reaping, cooking [91] and baking, caring and watching for clothing and shelter, for sick and servants, for children and the old, for house pets and even against mice and rats, flies and mosquitoes. In short, I should have written with flaming letters that the advantages of life in the interior of America is only obvious to those who are capable of comparing it to European country life, in other words, extremely seldom for a German town watchman. Further, as a frame to all these portrayals I should have placed the old Carthusian proverb "*momento mori*" ("Recall that you are mortal!"), not being silent about the North American health situation, that in America one is not *im*-mortal. What good did my talk about the necessity for medical protection against bilious-fever, ague, whooping cough, etc.? Who is careful about this sort of thing here? Who thinks at all of dying here? And then there is cholera. I have not said a word about it. I should have known eight years ago that it would come from Asia to Europe and then across the ocean to Missouri, to be able to recall that it is precisely the wanderer who is exposed all the more to this illness the more his travels touch infected places. Or to protect myself even more strongly against accusations, in my medical advice I should not have forgotten the sole secure means against *death* in foreign lands, which is *staying home*.

The very same means is the sole dependable one against the peril of losing one's *wealth* on the journey. Just to fill a gap in German literature, in this context I should have provided the words "special preparation and good guidance" with a catechism, in which case the book would have become three times thicker. It is still beyond dispute that the ordinary German citizen has his chief protection in the fact that houses and land are not as easy to lose as money. How much then must the situation of such a person worsen when he suddenly decides to become the precise opposite of what he is, so that he changes everything he has into cash. One places this candidate utterly outside his old elements, far from cousins and parents, who had once anxiously warned him against everything that one could undertake. Imagine him now in a new part of the world, in the midst of utterly different people for whom enterprise and the continuous use of capital has become second nature. Imagine him without a homeland and for that reason required to do *something*, in a place where he encounters manifold enticements, enticements of which even the *best* still demand much caution, lest instead of the attractive profit [92] he snatches at clouds. I must have been raving for not considering how needy of assistance this way of emigrating is. For that reason, although working out the catechism was closed to me, still I spoke of them with proper concern in my *Travel Report*, and I have asserted with the greatest emphasis that it is the duty of states and philanthropists to take care of their own and guard against the continuing complaint. What I have not done is to say

that so long as the states and philanthropists provide no help, *no one* should emigrate, no matter how he fares or is threatened in the homeland. That this has not happened, that I have not said that *no one* in Germany has sufficient understanding to emigrate, and since the door remains *open* for *intelligent* people, that was my true crime. Even this open door is guilty of the harm. I should have considered that it was precisely the unintelligent who would most intensely storm it, and that, if I could not conjure up a dictatorial censor with lictors and swords from the underworld to act as gatekeepers, it was all the more irresponsible to hope that their own understanding would restrain those without understanding.

In fact that is how it is. All of my talking about "Success in emigration depends totally on the manner of carrying it out, and that the first two years are the most perilous" protects me no better against accusations than my cautions about special preparation and good guidance. It is clear that all of this can only have effect on those *with understanding*, and that it is precisely those *without understanding* that set off most readily across the barriers. But unfortunately I only recognize the full value of this theory now, after practice has shown me what understanding exists among the readers of my book, particularly since I have seen an example of what has been presented to the public in the exemplary journal *Didaskalia* (numbers 27, 28 and 29, 1836 series).[81] This provides a crying proof of how inadequate my book is for many who have bought it, since they felt that they agreed with its judgment. Indeed I confess my guilt: while I portrayed emigration as so difficult and transcribed the earnest conditions of special preparation or good guidance, it never occurred to me that it was precisely the least capable of the incapable who would extract an exception for themselves out of their reading. Even less did it occur to me when I sought to impress the *most capable* merchant and craftsman only to expect *secure* support from the soil, that an individual could pass through my book as if by a magic spell into a wider world where it is possible to turn the back and despite my urging to settle among *America's* trading centers, no longer knowing [93] country life, but to follow the first best offer in the streets of St. Louis as among the merchants, manufacturers, officials and scholars of Europe. It will be some reprieve for my penalty if I recall the common experience of how hard it is to overlook the doings of fools. There is some accounting for what a *person with understanding* will do in a certain situation. But how often do we see that happen in a madhouse? Who can find the key to find in advance all the false combinations the brain of a father of a family can discover who brings a wife and children out of the homeland without really being aware of why? It is truly a riddle to me what motives there are for a father of a family who voluntarily leaves a situation in the homeland against which any situation in western America, in town or country,

will appear as poor as the correspondent writes. Specifically this includes his mighty complaints about lacks in comfort of life in St. Louis. So far as I know this city, the same exclamations indicate a place left behind that presumes the good fortune of a millionaire, even if other of the correspondent's words, such as that he was compelled to undertake something, indicate restricted means. Further, whatever else it was besides my book that caused him to emigrate, he appears to be the model of the very class for which my narrative should have been rendered in hieroglyphics to render it unreadable. It would never have occurred to me while composing my *Report* that anyone would be drawn to bet his last jot and sacrifice his own existence, and his children's, in Europe, on the basis of my account. I would never have believed that anyone would be so utterly to insist on the conditions of his existence blind in the *New* World, as this Frankfurt paterfamilias. On the contrary, until now it appeared to me impossible that a reader so dedicated to the direction of my writing would not have even heard how generally cheap life is *in the countryside*, and that he, after the *cooling* of his enthusiasm, should not at least have made an attempt, on behalf of his children, to save the *remnant* of his wealth through leasing in the countryside. It is only experience that taught me what we can trust people to do. Just glance at my book and read that in Missouri the most abundant food for a week can be bought for *one* dollar (2 1/2 guilders); that wherever one's own roof is too small, two large rooms may be built new for sixty to eighty dollars (outside of raw logs, but inside as good as masonry); that a family of four persons (the rent would happen to be equal [94] to the total value of the building) can live for a year for *six hundred guilders*, more comfortably and healthier than in any city—to see my amazement when the correspondent of the *Didaskalia* dares to insist that there was nothing better for him to do than to remain in St. Louis, where one needs six to seven hundred dollars (1500 to 1750 guilders), hence in a year about three thousand dollars or 7500 guilders, a sum that would buy one of the finest farms thoroughly capable of supporting the largest family in the grandest style.

From this I frankly have more that enough to explain the remaining contents of his letters, such as the fact that country life does not *suit* him, and that he first realized this in Missouri, that he heartily desires to return home, and that he believes the same to be true of every other emigrant, since no one can flourish on the land, that still every now and then he lets an expression escape that sounds almost like a confession that it might actually be his own fault. This includes the statement that the foreign language is the main obstacle to his advancement, and the no less important statement, "There is certainly a lot of money to be made, and with a capital of twelve thousand dollars it would be very easy to quadruple that amount in three years." In fact he declares it certain that one could do this every time so long as he did not

speculate too *crazily*. He excludes himself because he lacks knowledge of the language, but perhaps because he has *less* than twelve thousand dollars, and it is impossible to make *anything* with less, but he does not suspect that it is the *third* condition that prevents the merchants of his homeland from being his partner. It is well known to me that a family of four can live decently and comfortably in St. Louis on less than a thousand dollars a year. This does not mean that a fool's operation cannot cost three times as much.

How should it offend me that such an example of stupidity is blamed on me and my book rather than on himself? And if the doubter is not to be moved even through a pressing interest in the fate of his own to test the details of my book not to declare publicly that it reports 90° as the highest temperature, although there are examples in Letter 30 (p. 225) of 104° and 110°, how am I to expect that he does so, after it is already too late, simply to prove his claim that it is a tissue of lies? Or is it perhaps the *tone of brutality* with which he attacks that is unexplainable? As long as there are creatures whose natural arguments sound thus, they essentially can please less than when they excite sympathy and response among those of similar mind. [95]

I concede that this person, a suitable warning against foolish emigration, is right to complain about my book, since it never should have fallen into his hands. But since he desires to appear as a *totally blameless* victim of my narrative and is not satisfied to wash himself clean in the presence of his related sympathizers, but rather seeks to shift the entire blame for the loss of his wealth onto me, the obligation "of the duty to myself" compels me to say that he has a special duty so to document the dangerousness of my book as he used it, and that such assertions should not remain hidden in the homeland, to move the government and clergy to protective measures in the interests of his wife and children. At least I think this is more likely than that the residents of Frankfurt will be *surprised* by talents revealed on the other side *of the ocean*, and should feel especially honored by the pen-name of "Frankfurt Paterfamilias" chosen by the author. The mere rumor that I have earned a large fortune through my *Travel Report* (whose first edition, since reprinted, consisted of 1500 copies, and the second edition had not yet even appeared) speaks volumes about his own original abilities. Or is it possible to presume that such a man, using a center of the German book trade such as Frankfurt am Main and hence to be presumed acquainted with every educated customer of his native city, can make himself the laughingstock of book dealers for his capacity to orient himself so as is necessary to secure his property and family? And yet there are journals that have talents of the sort to choose as organs to provide proper orientation for foreign parts of the world.

But having confessed my error in writing a book in German letters, should every libel be heaped on me? Or, what is even worse, should I have

to defend myself against every libeler? For instance, must I defend myself against this libeler against the suspicion of *self-seeking*, passing back to my earliest life, to the point where I declined the incomes from a judicial office for which such men are wont to expend body and soul? Must I refer the public to the Weber Bookstore in Bonn, so that it can learn why I published my apologies for emigration at my own cost, and that my printed works since my return from America have barely covered their costs? Must I present a special accounting to convince everyone that I live both beforehand and afterwards on my parental endowment? Or is it proper for [96] me to call the libeler's attention to the fact that I have been better supplied from my parents' house than he? Is there no other weapon against this lowlife? Should I really respond to all the stupidities of all sinners who bought my book, and still be subjected to every sort of libel? One could measure what respect flows to me from patriotic literature, or rather from the majority of their ephemeral promoters when I see printed about myself that I survived on the Missouri by serving as a physician, then that I journeyed there with so many riches that allowed me every possible enjoyment, and again that I held school there. This sort of thing should instruct fools that it is important before everything else to test the *quality* of witnesses before listening to their witnessing concerning me and my *Report*. Since emigration has increased so much, there must be a multiplicity of subjects that could hardly be offered by a European trade fair, and for that reason one could expect that my judgment of North America would be in collision with the judgment of people of every sort. This is even the case about the *charms of rural nature*, which will make collision of *every* sort with the judgment of people who can find nothing charming in woodland and hills and who do not see anything in common on productivity for the stomach or the market when choosing a site.

One should not take this difference badly or interpret them as a collapse into stalemate. In fact my regret cannot reach further than the *perception* of my guilt. And in order that people should no longer doubt, I will announce it out loud, since I know of no better way out than most earnestly to attempt to awaken through begging the *reconcilable* to have some sympathy with me against the irreconcilable. For, as said, the opinion that for a full defense I only need to show how those warnings were visible to an *understanding* reader offends the basic principle that it is precisely the understanding that I was silly to insist upon. I also treat it as not moderating my guilt that in Letter 31 (p. 269 and 271) stands the express and motivated condition for emigration, "One must bring along a good head." Who indeed has ever been so lacking in understanding of himself as to believe seriously that he lacks this? Finally there is little use to me to mention that in every case where the decision of guilt or innocence has been made, jurists, who have presidency

and leadership, and will continue to do so until the non-jurists become more juristic, have found no guilt in me or in my book. This is because they are used to read with some understanding, which would certainly ruin the entire book trade if it became the *universal* precondition for reading and buying.

Incidentally, yet another situation is opposed to a *stubborn* defense. [97] These accusations and imputations are not presented in good society. In order to respond, I had to visit the evil places where they may be heard. It is true that the proprietors of such locations are nonpartisan and accommodating enough to offer the libeled the same bench, the same table, as the libelers to defend themselves, and if possible to carry on even more grossly than they do. In fact they are beyond hospitable: they are offended if one declines their invitation. This is because they feel themselves privileged to be able to call their fellow man to accounting without regard to the laws on injuries, and they think themselves capable of wielding a power that even the highest spiritual and secular officials regard as beyond their range, a power such as no censor in old Rome had, and they treat abstention as a bold injury of their authority and an actionable reduction of their income. In terms of reason and justice it is inadvisable to hang out in lousy taverns, although from time to time honorable people end up there for lack of shelter. Once I was summoned before just such a censor's court by a *day laborer* who had been enticed to go to America by my book, without having read it; and when a friend of mine complained and compared this nonsense to the mobbing (charivari) in front of the homes of peaceful men, he was clearly told that an author attacked in this way could not complain because he could use the same institution to defend himself, and not knowing this just demonstrated his ignorance of the economy of similar institutions. Even more remarkably, the proprietor assured me that he had received a license from a *higher official.* Thank God it was not also said that it was a *Prussian* official, and so we were consoled that we could still dispute the notion that there were higher officials in the Fatherland who were so subservient to sans-cullotte-ism that they would combine with the best men of the street to inspire them to attacks against literary products. That despite the existing penal threats against injury, in both the Western and the Eastern Provinces, they might encourage attacks on the honor and the name of a fellow citizen, who himself had been one of the higher officials, and that in view of both years of service in judiciary offices as well of his private life, was not out of line to challenge the creators of similar libels to a public evaluation of the worth of both sides.

At the conclusion of my confession I do not conceal that I do not want to delay this any longer, since I am seriously considering making a second journey to America, and I begin to fear the martyrdom that has been predicted by some of those victims of false-reading or half-reading. Further, do not think

that the reported embitterment is [98] *entirely* benign, at least on the part of the prophets themselves. But now permit me to ask the public not to forget this dangerous mood when enquiring was *sort* of people complain about my book. To what class do those here in Germany belong who now one fears to be killed without further ado? Is it those one believes is plundering property, and against whom one safe only through official force? No one believes that *better* people are capable of such deeds in North America. Only this much is certain: that the subjects who are really capable of this were never *at home* there, on the contrary that they must have immigrated from the soil and the company from which those prophets also derive. It is a well-known race that only needs a pretext for the outbreak of their coarseness, and they are precisely inclined to use a book they have not read or did not know how to read, as a slogan whose actual meaning remains hidden to them.—A race of which Cardinal de Retz long ago said that they are persuaded only of what is obscure to them.[82]—Since I once had to compare the European population with the North American, I asked myself why many *German* emigrants fail to prosper in the new land, while there is undoubted experience how well the Americans themselves prosper, with much less capital, how much the prosperity of the individual and of the whole in the West exceeds more and more everything and promises even more, than is known in the whole history of the earth and its peoples. In addition one may add the proverb that not a single white man born in North America (excepting those expelled for crime) has ever exchanged his homeland for Europe, that an American farmer taken from his place over there and placed in the European countryside could be held there only by poverty and force. For whomever it is that does not understand that the success of emigration depends on the actual nature of the emigrant, all argument is pointless. At the same time, it should also lead us to thinking how much or now little hope there is for the present residents of Germany ever to win the qualities required to become colonists if they cannot survive a term of education among the North Americans. Whether what distinguishes North Americans from highly hostile Europeans is an *advantage* or a *disability*, if the journalists and psychologists do not wish it otherwise, may be left in God's name to a Miss *Trollope* or another kindred spirit to pronounce.[83] One thing would be a consolation to me that this [99] prejudice striking complaining emigrants returning to Europe, and which is much stronger in our Germany now than the prejudice against departure from the homeland ever was. In Prussia's most respected political newspaper, the *Staatszeitung*, a remark on North America was published that sounds almost official, which may be used as a shield against all the libels of my *Travel Report*. In an issue of February, 1834, there is the following passage concerning the embarkation of Polish refugees to North America:

> The Government did not leave the matter at that. It also wished to assure the future of the emigrants. It had information gathered in New York as to the prospects of the Poles on their arrival, and whether they would find the means to support themselves. The response was that seventy thousand Europeans land here in a year and a day (in one year), and none of them, if they are not shy of work or is a disorderly person, has died. Seven hundred Poles would hardly be noticed, and a number ten times larger would be lost in the great country like a drop in the ocean.

I have found another consolation in *Lichtenberg* (Posthumous Works, vol. 1, p. 401),[84] who makes the following saying about the influence of books:

> The book had the influence that good books all have: it made the simple simpler, the smart smarter, and the other thousands remained unchanged.

Up to this point the talk has been of people whose accusations against me and my book arose primarily from false-reading, half-reading and mechanical repetition without reading at all. There is another category to distinguish, which consists of those who rebuke or entirely reject everything that I praise about North America. It is understandable that this category falls under several rubrics; for this I only need to recall those subjects that *never* wish to do good, and those who in consequence are least comfortable in any land that through its great drive in *external* conditions places *internal* qualities under unavoidable pressure. It is natural that such people try before everything else to explain away that drive because it is a part of their self-defense, when they return to Europe, appearing as a tribute to their reintegration.

But only now has it become clear to Europeans through the emigration how many of these misfits there are among what is called *Honoratioren* [gentlemen]. It may be expected with some certainty [100] that as soon as one of this class is not comfortable in America, he will not simply seek to communicate it by mouth or in letters to relatives and acquaintances, but increasingly to the entire public the less he is used to doubting himself. And so our literature is continually enriched with utterly marvelous products. I would not care to mention a one of them except that occasionally, because of direct attacks on my person, it appears occasionally advisable to clear away the weeds that have dirtied my doorstep due to my zeal for colonization matters. For this reason I mention one that has just come to my eyes, entitled *Reisescenen aus zwei Welten nebst einer Behandlung* [sic!] *der Zustände in den West-Staaten der Union* [*Travel Scenes from two Worlds, along with a treatment of the situation in the Western states of the Union* ] by J. H. Rausse, [in] Güstrow, [published by] Opir and Frege, 1836.[85] Whoever disapproves of my mention *such* attacks, for them I have a further reason, which is that unfortunately one of our

best journals, *Das Ausland*, has stooped to publicizing this author's absurd declamations.

I will restrain myself from reading the whole of this little book of 222 pages for 1 Thaler 11 Groschen. But everyone may believe me, or convince himself by a quick glance at a few pages, that one can more cheaply come to know the author and the situation in his skull, which harmonize so poorly with the situation in North America. Certainly it is a *treatment* of the conditions, but heaven help us what sort of treatment!—Our author has undertaken to portray me directly, and for this I will now attempt to do him a service in reply and show the public how *he* appears *to me*. This is particularly because I am free of all cares of drawing the lines too cuttingly, since the darkness in which he dips his pen in this little book will certainly armor him sufficiently against my judgment.

*He* says *of me* that I certainly have a great talent for narrative, and an even greater one for forming speculative doctrines, but that I am entirely stupid as an observer.

In response, I can unfortunately not report anything positive, except that perhaps that he did not *intend* to write such a bad book (so as not to respond to his human decency, which causes him to assure us that I did not intentionally report my many untruths about Missouri, but that I was misled by my neighbors, who lied to me). And since Mr. Rausse does my book the honor of declaring it dangerous, I will add as a contribution to the truth that his own book is utterly *not* dangerous, except perhaps for anyone who would be compelled to read it, as well as for the author, who could make the catchers of madmen very suspicious. [101] Still, in order to avoid the suspicion that I am trying to show my ability at observation on my very doubters, I invite the public to observe the main lines of the image of our author appearing in his own person. On page 1 it says, word by word:

> To the reader! I, at this instant your telescope on America, am ready to show you as much about the construction of the telescope as I myself know. Good, you ask, name? J. Rausse.—Religion? Protesting Christian.—Age? Thirty years.—Character? Mixed, malignant, grandiose, also a builder of houses.—Motive for distant journeys? Mmmm—perhaps the pressure of a desire to know? Oh no, no—Sick of knowledge? Yes, and of consciousness, and the pressure of my members to stretch out in a long, warm bath of natural life, and to cool my hot, red eyes and wash the black spleen from my kidneys.

Whoever has not had enough of this may read further and experience more of the author, how it is with his liberality, how he loves the truth like a goddess, and that he desires for the moment to wax *poetic* (pp. 2 and 3). In fact he holds forth in his poetic voice about the lands on the American coast for

*one hundred thirty-three pages*. Whoever flips through the book to that point encounters the dumbest nonsense that the idiotic author offers as humor and poetry, by an author who thinks it beautiful to tell the readers how much beauty he contains, and who presents a mishmash of phrases about dagger and love, on midnight, ghosts and death's heads, on depression and rosemary, on Goethe's Faust and Gretchen as much as his travel scenes. And that is supposed to prepare the way for the remaining eighty-nine pages on the whole of North America east and west of the Alleghenies?

But how does it look on these remaining pages? Everywhere there are traces of ignorance, arrogance, distortion and blindness about the good of the new continent. One might advance many hypotheses about the final source of this repellent phenomenon. Perhaps it could be derived from the genuineness of the spleen of which the author *boasts* at the outset, partly from his helplessness and lack of resources to secure his existence, and from his irritation at his inability to pay Americans with genius rather than money. The indubitable cause remains in his born talents and their unfortunate development. What is one to think of a young man who thinks in the most arrogant, but also sometimes guttersnipe tone, not just against me, to whom he feels so superior, but to so many significant voices of Europe, and, without entering into anything one could call a narrative with a foundation (yes, even without [102] indicating the time when he crossed the ocean, or the number of the year of his residence) declares the whole of North America to be *accursed*. This from a man who find nothing beautiful in the nature of the entire West, even nothing beautiful on the entire long Ohio, which the Americans call a single long rut. And (p. 187) expressing a recapitulation in the following words:

> There every creature loses its greatest beauty, the rose its perfume, the nightingale its song, the pointer its nose, the woman her modesty and beauty, the man his courage and his beard. Alas! People there lack the bloom of humanity, the year lacks its spring.

Thus far extends the author's mad darkness as to expect that the public will be placed in the dilemma of *either* thinking the worst of the many millions of Americans and their land *or* holding him to be a clown, and that it would be the former rather than the latter. And it is precisely this model German who accuses other Germans of mocking American material!!

Should one waste his further attention on such a mess by noting error, incoherence and contradiction *individually*? Or if one dispenses with this martyrdom for the 133 pages of prefatory material, must I subject myself to the 89 pages remaining? Or would I still have at least to reject the silly invectives against the state of Missouri? Should I perhaps reply to the accusation that my lack of judgment made me the plaything of my neighbors with the

challenge that in my writings there is only the slightest trace of such drinking as our author appears to wallow in? Truly a person who has really been in Missouri among the colonists and yet has not seen everything that I have recounted does not need a cunning American to make him believe the craziest things. And concerning an informer who speaks against my statement about the domestic fowl, that they never go far from the people's homes and return there in the evening, saying that it is against the instinct of freedom that drives everyone into the wider world—I know the same characteristic of tame fowl in our European stewards' yards,—it appears as little strange that he uses the testimony of an American farmer against my portrayal of life on the Missouri. This farmer could just as well be over a thousand miles from Missouri, perhaps in Pennsylvania, of which I myself mention on page 318 (second edition) that they spoke of the areas on the Missouri as one speaks in Germany of the regions of Asia.

Why should I dispute once again with an informant of this sort any [103] further on what I have told about the wintering of the cattle in the open, that neither freshly-born calves nor lambs nor foals come into stalls, and that even today I own cattle in Missouri that live in that manner? Or is it necessary to respond to the story of a bitterness existing against me among the Germans of Missouri that rises to a lust for murder, if the same hand writes on page 196 of the same Germans that they believe they have a better Germany on the Missouri than we have on the Rhine?

Generally one can see in the author how poorly supplied he is in his culture, and especially in that knowledge of which he declares himself in his introduction to be so tired. But in his proud insanity he regards himself as a true ideal of humanity, and he asserts this word time and again as if inspired, and he convinces himself to be able to decide the highest aims of the human race. I have no exaggerated opinion of my writings, particularly of my American *Travel Report,* despite all the applause. But it appears ludicrous that *such an individual* chatters about his calling to refute the whole work, as splendidly as he documents himself as a mouthpiece of the mob cursing me. I confess that in the howling libels of the newspapers I sense a stifling seizure coming. That was one cause of my rising pain in continuing to read, that Germany really is in advance of the sort of intellectual development, in which *Herr Rausse* distinguishes himself so much, is in advance of the North Americans, and that it continually brings forth so-called mad geniuses, people to whom the melancholy of their struggle against health and nature is taken to be a sign of their true education and genius. The other, perhaps milder, cause rests on the curiosity of what a critic who denies all nobler life to North Americans, can say about me. But this last concern vanished more and more with every word of rebuke, and his core expressions at the end gave me the complete

serenity that I would rather seek my place by them than with him.

Incidentally, I find the lot of being pitted against similar fighters to be less than desirable; for that reason I ask all those who are convinced to some extent of the truth and usefulness of my writings to stand beside me against them. The advice to pay no attention to it is not to be listened to. Certainly the declaiming against the North Americans seems to me no more reasonable than the baying of the dog at the moon in the fable. But just as little as the *applause* of those without understanding interests me, I must be concerned that they are not continually *incited* against me. Since unfortunately this is all too common in Germany as well as in all of Europe. [104] Every day there is more and more evidence that there are enemies of emigration who seize with joy and spread every libel against America and my *Report*, no matter how senseless and insulting, and they carefully seek to suppress any truth that seems positive. Just as centuries ago, so also today, emigrants have misfortunes, and no one is more open on this than I. But it is no less malignant and dumb to shift all the guilt out of misguided piety, since no one is supposed to be guilty of his own pain, onto me, a poor and very vulnerable mortal, entirely because my book did not hide the evil existing overseas. Instead that guilt should be passed to that invulnerable being whose inscrutable will shrouds life with sorrow in the homeland as well, not hundreds but many thousands, through fire, flood, illness and innumerable other means, even lightning.

[Print correction for page 48]

Bonn, printed by Carl Georgi

[Back Cover]

For sale at the firm mentioned:

**Duden, G., Report on a Journey to the Western States** of North America and a residence of several years on the Missouri, concerning emigration and overpopulation and its significance for the residential and political situation of Europeans, presented a) in a collection of letters, b) in a treatment of the political condition of North Americans, and c) with an addendum for emigrating German farmers and those thinking of trade undertakings. The second original edition, with the most recent reports of correspondence, many other additions and a map.
Large octavo, bound. 1 Thaler, 12 Groschen.

**Ditto, Europe and Germany as seen from North America**, or European Development in the 19th century concerning the situation of Germans, while experiencing the North American interior.
First volume. 2 Thaler, 8 Groschen.
Second and last volume 2 Thaler, 8 Groschen.

**Ditto, On the Essential Varieties of States and Strivings of Human Nature.**
Large octavo. 20 Groschen.[86]

Bonn

**Eduard Weber**

## Notes

[1] Alexis de Tocqueville, *De la démocratie en Amérique*, 2 vols. (Paris: Librairie de Charles Gosselin, 1835). There is an MS-Word document of the text of the first edition of 1835, Part I, first half, posted by the Bibliothèque Paul-Émile Boulet de l'Université de Québec à Chicoutimi: http:[[classiques.uqac.ca[classiques[De_tocqueville_alexis[democratie_1[democratie_tome1.html. A text is also posted for the original volume 2 of 1835.

The 1848 Paris edition is posted in the Gallica collection of the website of the Bibliothèque Nationale de France.

The newest edition of the French text, together with yet another translation into English, is Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America; Historical-Critical Edition of De la démocratie en Amérique; A Bilingual French-English Edition*, 4 vols., ed. Eduardo Nolla, tr. James T. Schleifer (Indianapolis: The Liberty Fund, 2010) [henceforth cited as "Nolla edition"]. Page citations will be given to this edition, as well as to the useful 2-volume paperback edition is published in Paris by Gallimard, with a preface by André Jardin (1986) [henceforth cited as "Gallimard"]. The translations from French or German are my own, unless otherwise noted.

The principal American translation today is Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, tr. Arthur Goldhammer (New York: The Library of America, 2004).

[2] Françoise Mélonio, "Tocqueville européen: La France et l'Allemagne," *Tocqueville Review*, vol. 27 (2006), 517–32, points out that Tocqueville only became actively interested in Germany after completing *Democracy in America*. This is shown by his learning German, and in his use of German comparisons in *L'Ancien regime et la Revolution française* (p. 518).

[3] Gustave de Beaumont, Alexis de Tocqueville, *Du système penitentiaire aux États-Unis et de son application en France, suivi d'un appendice sur les colonies pénales et des notes* (Paris: H. Fournier jeune, 1833).

[4] Duden refers throughout to these editions of Tocqueville: Alexis de Tocqueville, *De la démocratie en Amérique*, 4th ed., 2 vols. (Paris: Gosselin, 1836); idem, *De la démocratie en Amérique*, 2 vols. (Brussels: Hauman, 1835), four editions to 1837; idem, *Ueber die Demokratie in Nordamerika*, aus dem französischen übersetzt von F. A. Rüder, 2 vols. (Leipzig: bei Eduard Kummer, 1836).

[5] Nolla edition, vol. 1, p. 162; Gallimard, vol. 1, p. 162:

"I am finally convinced that no nations are more exposed to fall under the yoke of administrative centralization than those whose social condition is democratic.

"Several causes conjoin for this result, but they include:

"The permanent tendency of these nations to concentrate all governmental power in the hands of a single power that directly represents the people, because, among the people, they do not perceive anything but equal persons confounded in a common mass."

Nolla edition, vol. 1, p. 90, n. h: Tocqueville's father Hervé held this passage to be "obscure."

[6] Nolla edition, vol. 1, pp. 89–90; Gallimard, vol. 1, p. 104:

"There is, effectively, a virile and legitimate passion for equality that causes men to wish to be strong and respected. This passion tends to raise the little to the rank of the great; but it also arouses in the human heart a depraved taste for equality that causes the weak to wish to pull the strong down to their level; but that also reduces men to prefer equality in servitude to inequality in liberty; on the contrary, they have an instinctive taste for this. But liberty is not their principal goal and content of their desire: what they love with an eternal love is equality;

they advance toward liberty by a rapid advance and through sudden efforts, but if they fail to obtain this goal, they resign themselves; but they cannot be satisfied without equality, and they are readier to perish than to lose it."

[7] Nolla edition, vol. 2, p. 617; Gallimard, vol. 1, p. 563: "The democratic party, which has always opposed all increase of federal power . . ."

[8] Nolla edition, vol. 1, pp. 127-28; Gallimard, vol. 1, p. 137; Goldhammer, p. 87–88:

"Americans in New England have not placed a public minister in the court of sessions [note: I say in the court of sessions. There is an official who fulfils some of the functions of a public minister in the ordinary courts] and one could conceive that it would not be difficult to establish one. If there is already a *prosecutorial official* [*magistrat accusateur*] in each county seat, and there are no such officers in the communities, why could not this magistrate be informed of what happens in the county as are the members of the court of sessions? If agents were placed in each community, the most formidable of powers would be concentrated in his hands, which is to administrate judicially. Laws in any case are the daughters of habits, and nothing of this sort exists in English legislation." [Emphasis added]

"Americans have divided the right of investigation and pleading in the same way as they have all other administrative functions."

The term *magistrat accusateur* is translated by Rüder as "Fiskal oder Staatsanwald,"by Duden as "Fiscal," recalling the Roman[canon-law] office of "procurator fiscal," a title still used in Scotland. Goldhammer renders it "public prosecutor."

[9] Part I, chapter 5, note 49; Nolla edition, vol. 1, p. 152; Gallimard, vol. 1, pp. 152–53):

"I think that the authority that represents the state, even when it does not administer in its own right, loses the right to investigate local administration. For example, I suppose that an agent of the government in a fixed place in each county could refer to the judicial power any crimes committed in the communities and in the county. Couldn't order be more uniformly pursued without compromising the independence of the localities? Still, nothing of the sort exists in America. Below the level of the county court there is nothing, and these courts only deal episodically with administrative crimes that they must repress."

[10] Nolla edition, vol. 1, p. 46; Gallimard, vol. 1, p. 69–70:

"Let us go back; look at the child still in his mother's arms; see the outside world reflected for the first time on the still-dark mirror of his intelligence; watch the first images that draw his attention; listen to the first words that excite the sleeping powers of thought; finally help him in the first struggles he must endure; and only then will you comprehend whence come the prejudices, habits and passions that will dominate his life. One might say that the man is already present within the clothes of his cradle.

"There is something similar in nations. People always harken back to their origins. The circumstances that accompanied their birth and made for their development influence the whole rest of their career."

[11] Claude Adrien Helvétius, 1715–71, was a French *philosophe* infamous for the sensualism and materialism of his theory of human development. His main work was *De l'esprit* ("On the Spirit") of 1758.

[12] Nolla edition, vol. 1, p. 47; Gallimard, vol. 1, p. 70:

"For us, America is the sole country where one can follow the natural, tranquil developments of a society and where it was possible to define the influence of the point of departure on the future of states."

[13] Nolla edition, vol. 1, p. 54; Gallimard, vol. 1, p. 76; Québec text, part 1, chapter 2, p. 36:

"Le puritanisme n'était pas seulement une doctrine religieux ; il se confondait encore en plusieurs point avec les théories démocratique et républicaines les plus absolues."

[14] Nolla edition, vol. 1, pp. 61–62; Galimard, vol. 1, p. 82:

"There is nothing more singular or more instructive at the same time than the legislation of this period. It is there that one finds the word of the great social enigma that the United States presents to our present-day world . . .

"The legislators of Connecticut [1650] concerned themselves with criminal laws, and to compose them they conceived the strange notion of searching for them in sacred texts."

[15] See John H. Langbein, *Prosecuting Crime in Renaissance England, Germany, France* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974) for a treatment of the *Constitutio Carolina criminalis*.

[16] Nolla edition, vol. 1, pp. 49–50; Gallimard, vol. 1, p. 72:

"At the time of the first emigrations, communal government, this fecund germ of free institutions, had already entered deeply into English habits, and with it the dogma of the sovereignty of the people was introduced to the very heart of the Tudor monarchy."

[17] Nolla edition, vol. 1, p. 62; Gallimard, vol. 1, p. 83:

". . . thus one introduced into a society with an already enlightened spirit and softened mores the legislation of a coarse and semi-civilized people . . ."

[18] Nolla edition, vol. 1, p. 64; Gallimard, vol. 1, p. 85:

". . . it is not necessary to hold that these bizarre, tyrannical laws were imposed; they were voted by the free effort of all those personally interested, and that their mores were even more austere and puritanical than these laws."

[19] Nolla edition, vol. 1, p. 70; Gallimard, vol. 1, p. 91:

"Thus, in the moral world, everything was classified, coordinated, decided in advance. In the political world, everything was disputed, contested, uncertain; in one there was passive obedience, if voluntary; in the other, independence, discounting of experience and jealousy of every authority.

"Far from devouring one another, these two tendencies, so opposed in appearance, march together and appear to support one another.

"Religion sees civil liberty as a noble exercise of the faculties of man . . ."

[20] Nolla edition, vol. 1, pp. 69-70; Gallimard, vol. 1, p. 90, 91.

[21] Part 2, chapter 9, section title, "On the influence of mores on the maintenance of the democratic republic in the United States." Nolla edition, vol. 2, pp. 566–67; Gallimard, vol. 1, p. 426:

"I said above that I consider mores as one of the great general causes to which one may attribute the maintenance of the democratic republic in the United States.

"Here I intend to use the term of mores in the sense that the Ancients attached to the word mores; I apply this not only to mores properly so called, what one could call the habits of the heart, but also to different notions that men possess about diverse opinions that circulate among themselves, as well as to the totality of ideas from which the habits of the spirit are formed.

"Under this term I comprehend the entire moral and intellectual condition of a people. My purpose is not to make a total display of American mores : at this moment I limit myself to examine what among them helps to maintain political institutions."

[22] Nolla edition, vol. 2, p. 495, n. 8:

"Je rappelle ici au lecteure le sens général dans lequel je prends le mot *mœurs* : j'entends par ce mot l'ensemble des dispositions intellectuelles et morales que les hommes apportent dans l'état de société."

[23] Nolla edition, vol. 1, pp. 64–65; Gallimard, vol. 1, p. 85:

"The general principles on which modern constitutions repose, those principles that most Europeans of the seventeenth century barely comprehended and that triumphed incompletely in Great Britain, are all recognized and set by the laws of New England: the intervention of the

people in political affairs, the free voting of taxes, the responsibility of agents of power, individual liberty and judgment by jury, all are established there without discussion and in fact."

[24] Nolla edition, vol. 1, pp. 49–50; Gallimard, vol. 1, p. 72.

[25] Nolla edition, vol. 1, p. 61, n. 16; Gallimard, vol. 1, p. 82, conflation of several texts: thus:

". . . in 1650 the name of the king no longer appeared at the head of judicial orders . . .";

Nolla edition, vol. 1, p. 65, n. 30; Gallimard, vol. 1, p. 86, n. 30:

"In 1641 the general assembly of Rhode Island unanimously declared that the government of the state consisted in a democracy, and that power reposed in the body of free men, who alone had the power to make laws and order their execution."

[26] Nolla edition, vol. 1, p. 71; Gallimard, vol. 1, pp. 91–92:

"When one wishes to understand and judge Anglo-Americans in our own days, it is necessary to distinguish carefully what is of puritan origin and what is of English origin."

[27] Nolla edition, vol. 1, pp. 59–60; Gallimard, vol. 1, p. 80.

[28] Nolla edition, vol. 1, p. 92;Gallimard, vol. 1, p. 107:

"I said before that the principle of the sovereignty of the people was the generating principle of most of the English colonies of America.

"This was so much the case that it dominated the government of society as it does today.

"Two obstacles, one external, the other internal, retarded its penetrating march.

"It did not need to appear openly among the laws, since the colonies were still constrained to obey the ruling country ; still, it was reduced to hiding itself in the provincial assemblies and particularly in the community. It grew there in secret."

[29] Nolla edition, vol. 1, p. 54; Gallimard, vol. 1, p. 76:

". . . en exposant aux misères inevitables de l'exil, ils valaient faire triompher *une idée*." Emphasis in the original.

[30] Nolla edition, vol. 1, p. 54; Gallimard, vol. 1, p. 76.

[31] Nolla edition, vol. 1, p. 53; Gallimard, vol. 1, p. 75.

[32] Nolla edition, vol. 1, p. 66; Gallimard, vol. 1, p. 87:

"In the states of New England, the safety of the poor is assured." (note 34: "Code of 1650, p. 78").

[33] Nolla edition, vol. 1, p. 65; Gallimard, vol. 1, p. 86:

"Chez la plupart des nations européennes, l'existence politique a commencé dans les regions superieures de la société, et s'est communiqué peu à peu, et toujours d'une manière incomplète, aux diverses parties du corps social.

"En Amérique, au contraire, on peut dire que la commune a été organisée avant le comté, le comté avant l'État, l'État avant l'Union."

There follows a conflation of the subsequent paragraph:

"Dans la Nouvelle-Angleterre, dès 1650, la commune est complètement et définitivement constituée. Autour de l'individualité communale viennent se grouper et s'attacher fortement des intérêts, des passions, les devoirs et des droits. Au sein de la commune on voit régner une vie politique réelle, active, toute démocratique et républicaine. Les colonies reconnaissent encore l'État, mais déjà la république est toute vivante dans la commune."

[34] Nolla edition, vol. 1, p. 65; Gallimard, vol. 1, p. 86:

"In most European nations, political existence began in the upper levels of society and was communicated bit by bit downward, and always incompletely, to the various parts of the social body.

"In America, on the contrary, one may say that the commune was organized before the county, the county before the state, and the state before the Union."

[35] Goldhammer consistently translates "l'état sociale" as "social state," e.g. p. 52, as does Schleifer in Nolla, vol. 1, p. xxvi, while I prefer the more traditional "social condition."

[36] Nolla edition, vol. 1, pp. 48–49; Gallimard, vol. 1, p. 71:

"When, after having carefully studied the history of America, one closely examines its political and social condition, one becomes profoundly convinced of this truth: that there is no opinion, no habit, no law, I would even say no event that the point of departure could not easily interpret. Those reading this book will find in this chapter the germ that must be pursued and the key to almost the entire work."

[37] Nolla edition, vol. 2, p. 277; Gallimard, vol. 1, p. 264:

"Jusqu'à présent, j'ai examiné les institutions, j'ai parcouru les lois écrites, j'ai peint les formes actuelles de la société politique aux Etats-Unis."

[38] Nolla edition, vol. 1, pp. 49–50; Gallimard, vol. 1, p. 72:

"A l'époque des premières émigrations, le gouvernement communal, ce germe fécond des institutions libres, était déjà profondémont entré dans les habitudes anglaises, et avec lui le dogme de la souveraineté du peuple."

[39] Nolla edition, vol. 1, p. 50; Gallimard, vol. 1, p. 73:

"On y fit des lois pour y établir la hièrarchie des rangs, mais on s'aperçut bientôt que le sol américain repoussait absolument l'aristocratie territoriale . . ."

[40] Nolla edition, vol. 1, p. 75; Gallimard, vol. 1, p. 95:

"The social condition of Americans is eminently democratic. It had this character from the birth of the colonies; it still has it today."

Hervé de Tocqueville objected to overgeneralization here, noting that this was a result of Alexis de Tocqueville restricting himself to only two points of departure, New England and Virginia.

[41] Nolla edition, vol. 1, p. 74; Gallimard, vol. 1, p. 94:

"The social condition is ordinarily the product of a deed, sometimes of laws, usually of these two causes united . . .

"To understand the legislation and the mores of a people, it is necessary to begin by studying its social condition."

[42] Nolla edition, vol. 1, p. 89; Gallimard, vol. 1, p. 104.

[43] Nolla edition. vol. 1, p. 90; Gallimard, vol. 1, p. 105:

"Les circonstances, l'origine, les lumières, et surtout les mœurs, leur ont permit de fonder et maintenir la souveraineté du peuple."

[44] Nolla edition, vol. 2, p. 497; Gallimard, vol. 1, p. 451; ibid., p. 453:

"Mexico, which is as fortunately situated as the Anglo-American Union, has appropriated the same laws, and yet it cannot get used to a government of democracy."

[45] In the portion of *De la démocratie* available to Duden, "*dogme,*" dogma, is used 15 times; it appears twice in the context of a discussion of the Roman Catholic Church, twice in other secular patriotic contexts, but 11 times together with "of the sovereignty of the people."

[46] Gottfried Duden, *Europa und Deutschland von Amerika aus betrachtet, die Europäische Entwickelung im 19. Jahrhundert in Bezug auf die Lage der Deutschen, nach einer Prüfung im innern Nordamerika*, 2 vols. (Bonn: In Commission bei Edouard Weber, 1833; 1835) [available online as google books], vol. 1, p. 172, but there should be ellipses between the first and second sentence, and the comment in brackets is added by Duden only in 1838. The last sentence was in spread type.

[47] Tocqueville's original part 2, chapter 2 deals with parties, but chapter 3 treats the press.

[48] Traugott Bromme published a number of travel guides on America before the publication date of this book, printed by C. Scheld and Company in Baltimore and Dresden. Most notable were *Reise durch die Vereinigten Staaten und Ober-Canada* (1834); *Missouri und Illinois:*

*Taschenbuch für Einwanderer und Freunde der Länder- und Völkerkunde* (1835), and *Taschenbuch für Reisende in den Vereinigten Staaten von Nord-Amerika* (1836).

[49] Nolla edition, vol. 2, p. 365; Gallimard, vol. 1, p. 339:

"Le grand privilège des Américains n'est donc pas seulement d'être plus éclairés que d'autres, mais d'avoir la faculté de faire des fautes réparables."

[50] Nolla edition, vol. 2, p. 626; Gallimard, vol. 1, p. 572:

"L'union est dans les mœurs, on la desire ; ses résultats sont évidents, ses bienfaits visibles . . ." Rüder's translation of this passage, vol. 2, p. 294, seems peculiar, yet Duden accepts it: "Die Union ist in den Sitten begründet und beliebt. Ihre günstige Resultate und Wohltaten liegen vor Augen."

[51] Nolla edition, vol. 2, p. 627; Gallimard, vol. 1, p. 573–74:

"The Union is an accident that will not outlast the circumstances that favor it, but the natural condition of Americans appears to me to be republican."

[52] Nolla edition, vol. 2, p. 601; Gallimard, vol. 1, p. 545:

"Hence the dangers that menace the Union do not arise from the diversity of opinions so much as from that of interests. It must be sought in the vanity of characters and passions of Americans."

[53] Nolla edition, vol. 2, p. 604; Gallimard, vol. 1, p. 549:
"Simply the multiplication of members of the Union tends powerfully to break the federal bond."

Nolla edition, vol. 2, pp. 607–8; Gallimard, vol. 1, p. 553:

"Every day the center of federal power is shifting."

[54] Nolla edition, vol. 2, p. 615; Gallimard, vol. 1, p. 561.

[55] Gottfried Duden, *Bericht über eine Reise nach den westlichen Staaten Nordamerika's und einen mehrjährigen Aufenthalt am Missouri (in den Jahren 1824, 1825, 1826 und 1827) in Bezug auf Auswanderung und Uebervölkerung, oder: Das Leben im innern der Vereinigten Staaten und dessen Bedeutung für die häusliche und politische Lage der Europäer*, 2nd ed. (Bonn: Edouard Weber, 1834), section "Ueber die politische Natur der nordamerikanischen Friestaaten oder die Stützen des politischen Zustandes der Nordamerikaner," part 2, pp. 316–19. First edition was Elberfeld: S. Lucas, 1829.

[56] Constantin-François Chasseboeuf de la Girondais, comte de Volney (1757–1820), anthopologist, author of *Tableau du climat et sol des États-Unis d'Amérique* (Paris, 1803). Jacques Pierre Brissot de Warville (1754–93), *Mémoire sur les Noirs de l'Amérique septentrionale* (1790), and *Voyage aux États-Unis* (1791).

[57] The French original of this is Achille Murat, *Exposition des principes du gouvernement républicain, del qu'il a été perfectionné en Amérique* (Paris: Paulin, 1833).

[58] See the long note in Part Five.

[59] The main discussion of this question in the nineteenth century was by Otto von Gierke, *Das deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht*, a portion of which was translated into English by Frederick William Maitland as *Political Theories of the Middle Age* (Cambridge University Press, 1900).

[60] Johann Stephan Pütter, 1725–1807, was a leading legal scholar at the University of Göttingen. Duden might be referring to *Litteratur des teutschen Staatsrechts*, 3 vols. (Göttingen, 1776–83) or *Beyträge zum Teutschen Staats- und Fürstenrechte* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck, 1777).

[61] Emperor Franz (II as Holy Roman Emperor, I as Austrian Emperor) died on 2 March 1835.

[62] Gottfried Duden, *Ueber die wesentliche Verschiedenheiten der Staaten und die Strebungen der menschlichen Natur* (Cologne: Self-Published, 1822); it was reprinted in Bonn by Edouard Weber in 1835 and listed for sale on the back cover of the book edited here.

[63] Duden, *Bericht über eine Reise*, 2d ed., p. 153 ff., 20th letter, deals with slavery.

[64] Friedrich Christoph Dahlmann (1785–1860), one of the "Göttingen Seven," including the Grimm Brothers, suspended from their professorships in 1837 for being liberals, the author of *Die Politik, auf den Grund und Maaß der gegebenen Zustände zurückgeführt* (Göttingen: Dieterich, 1835); Baron Hans Christoph von Gagern (1766–1852), a leading politically-active liberal in Hesse [identified in Goodrich, ed., *Report on a Journey*, pp. 330–31].

[65] The reference is to the violent race-war that broke out in Haïti, leading ultimately to Haïtian independence.

[66] Duden, *Bericht über eine Reise*, 2d ed., p. 334, in the postscript, section 5, "Von der Sicherheit des politischen Zustandes der Nordamerikaner und von der Wirksamkeit ihrer politischen Kraft," dealing with the moral impact of slavery.

[67] Nolla edition, vol. 1, p. 52; Gallimard, vol. 1, pp. 74–75.

[68] Nolla edition, vol. 2, pp. 602-3; Gallimard, vol. 1, p. 547.

[69] Nolla edition, vol. 1, pp. 142-166; Gallimard, vol. 1, pp. 148–63, chapter 5, section "Des effets politiques de la décentralisation administrative aux États-Unis," Nolla edition, vol. 1, p. 147; Gallimard, vol. 1, p. 150:

"Mais je pense que la centralisation administrative n'est proper qu'à enerver les peuples qui s'y soumettent . . ."

Nolla edition, vol. 1, p. 156 ; Gallimard, vol. 1, p. 157:

"Les avantages *politiques* que les Américains retirent du système de la décentralisation me le feraient encore préférer au système contraire."

Nolla edition, vol. 1, p. 160; Gallimard, p. 159:

"Ce que j'admire le plus en Amérique, ce ne sont pas les effets *administratifs* de la décentralisation, ce sont ses effets *politiques*. Aux Etats-Unis, la patrie se fait sentir partout. Elle est un objet de sollicitude depuis le village jusqu'à l'Union entière."

[70] Michel Chevalier, *Lettres sur l'Amérique du Nord*, 2 vols. (Paris: C. Gosselin et Cie., 1836). There was a second Paris edition in 1837 (in 2 vols.): "Édition speciale, rév., corr., et augm. de pluseurs chapitres", and a third (in 3 vols.) in Paris and Brussels in 1838, "Revue, corrigée, augmentée de pluieurs chapitres et d'une table raisonnée de matières." The version reprinted in 2006 by Elibron Classics is the third edition published in Brussels by Société Belge de librairie, Hauman et Cie., 1838, in 3 vols. The on-line version in the digital collection "Gallica" of the Bibliothèque Nationale de France is of the 4th edition, published in Brussels by Wouters et Cie., 1844, in 3 vols. Chevalier (1806–79) also wrote articles on America for *Revue des deux mondes*.

[71] Michel Chevalier published a series of pamphlets with the general title of *La réligion Saint-Simonienne*, reprinting articles from the journal *Globe* (Paris: Éverat imprimeurs, 1832).

[72] Lettre X: "L'Yankee et le Virginien," dated Charleston, SC, 28 May 1834, *Lettres sur l'Amérique du Nord*, 3rd ed., vol. 1, pp. 155–76

[73] This refers chiefly to Lettre XXXI: "Symptòms de révolution," dated Baltimore, 25 September 1835, *Lettres sur l'Amérique du Nord*, 3rd ed., vol. 3, pp. 124–38.

[74] The reference is to indentured servitude for a period of time to compensate the master for the cost of transportation and support.

[75] Duden, *Bericht über eine Reise*, 2d ed., p. 108, 17th letter, predicts that American wages will drop as the population rises; p. 267, 31st letter, urges emigrants to bring wealth.

[76] Duden, *Bericht über eine Reise*, 2d ed., pp. 263–64 has a note that emphasizes the importance of having an adequate financial backing.

[77] Duden, *Bericht über eine Reise*, 2d ed., p. 261, 31st letter, recommends buying slaves.

[78] Duden, *Bericht über eine Reise*, 2d ed., p. 384, stresses that New Orleans should only be transited in mid-winter.

[79] G. F. Streckfuss, *Der Auswanderer nach Amerika, oder treue Schilderung der Schicksale,*

*welche mich auf meiner Wanderung nach Amerika, während meines dortigen Aufenthalts und auf meiner Rückreise trafen; nebst Bemerkungen über die Landschaften, welche ich kennen lernte, die Sitten ihrer Bewohnern und die Lage dort eingewanderten Deutschen* (Zeitz: I. Webel, 1836, 1837). Zeitz is presently in Sachsen-Anhalt, Germany, but in the nineteenth century it was the seat of a Prussian *Landkreis*.

[80] In terms of gold content, a Prussian Thaler in the 1830s was worth 3 shillings Sterling, or 75 United States cents. Until 1875 a Thaler consisted of 30 Silbergroschen, each of 12 Pfennige.

[81] *Didaskalia* was a cultural supplement of the *Frankfurter Journal* in the mid-19th century.

[82] Jean-François Paul de Gondi, Cardinal de Retz (1613–1679) was a noted memoirist, particularly of the *Fronde* period of French political history.

[83] Frances ("Fanny") Trollope (1780–1863), mother of the novelist Anthony Trollope, visited the United States in 1827 and had a dreadful time of it. She wrote a scathing account, *Domestic Manners of the Americans* (1832), and included the same opinions in other writings.

[84] Georg C. Lichtenberg (1742–99), German humorist and Anglophile, noted particularly for his detailed and often facetious explications of William Hogarth's paintings and prints.

[85] J. H. Rausse was the pen-name of Heinrich Friedrich Francke (1805–48), a water-cure advocate born in Güstrow (Mecklenburg-Vorpommern), who traveled widely after 1830, also publishing *Der Geist der Gräfenberger Wasserkur*, 2nd ed. (Zeitz: Druck und Verlag von Julius Schieferdecker, 1839). Gräfenberg is in Franconia, now northern Bavaria, east of Egloffstein and north of Nuremberg. See http://de.wikipedia.org/Heinrich_Friedrich_Francke for a preliminary biographic sketch.

[86] This reprint of Duden's treatise, originally self-published in Cologne in 1822, was published by E. Weber in 1835.