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## *Leitkultur*: Reflections of a Critical Observer

### Introduction

The purpose of this essay is to cover some aspects of a recent trend in contemporary Germany: The discussion of "*Leitkultur*" and of German "pride" within the framework of the emerging multi-ethnic German society.

In an editorial about "Repairing Bilingual Education" in the *New York Times* of 22 December 2000, the "educational mainstream" was described as the goal of language training for foreign-born children. The aim was "to move them as quickly as possible into the mainstream"; the means was the so-called immersion method, or at least chances to choose other options than bilingual classes. It is easy to imagine that Germany might have spared itself of most of the "*Leitkultur*" discussion, had there only been an equivalent for the term "mainstream" in the German language. But there is no widely accepted concept of "mainstream" culture in Germany, and consequently there is no word for it.

Since 1990, when the reunification process of Germany East and Germany West started, there is a completely new overall situation in German society and in German political and societal life. LaVern Rippley and Eberhard Reichmann described it as early as 1993:

Accelerated by the Fall of the Wall and the end of communism, a continuous flow of refugees, asylum seekers and destitute from former communist and less-developed countries, have been entering Germany, testing the newly unified country's economic and emotional ability to deal with the foreigners in their midst. Like America, modern Germany has become a prime destination for immigrants. But unlike the United States whose population, despite repeated policy efforts at rapid Americanization, has been developing along multi-ethnic/multi-cultural lines, Germany has a long history of being home to a largely homogeneous people. That makes it much harder to accept groups of various and markedly different backgrounds, languages, and cultures.<sup>1</sup>

Homogeneity in Germany has been a myth in the last decades, for many Germans simply deny that their country has become a haven for immigrants and how difficult it will be for them to accept the given reality.

## How the Debate Started

In October 2000, Friedrich Merz, chairperson of the Christian Democratic and the Christian Social Unions in the German Federal Parliament, born 1955 in Brilon, Sauerland (which is a region of North Rhine-Westphalia), a member of the Bundestag since 1994, and a practicing Catholic, published this sentence:

Basically, it is essential, that the foreign citizens, who live here (in Germany), are ready to join the German "*Leitkultur*."<sup>2</sup>

This sentence triggered off a widespread public discussion that was highly controversial even within the Christian Democratic Union. With the search engine Altavista, 1,850 hits of *Leitkultur* were found by 17 April 2001, and with the search engine Fireball, 5779 hits were found on 5 January 2001. The *New York Times* search as of 10 April 2001, provided 7 hits, which puts this national German debate into a worldwide perspective.

On 18 October 2000, Merz said in an interview with the *Rheinische Post* that he wanted to legally fix a maximum number of 200,000 foreign citizens relocating into Germany per year, and that foreigners would have to actively integrate into the German culture and learn the German language. The standards of German *Leitkultur* would not allow Islamic schools outside the German school system. They would not permit girls to be circumcised or forced to marry, or boys and girls as teens during puberty to be sent back to their parents' home countries for some years.<sup>3</sup>

On the homepage of Friedrich Merz, there was a more detailed text that put these messages into a broader perspective. He used as a headline "Germany is a country open to the world and friendly towards foreigners." His opinion can be summarized as:

- The Germans want to live together with millions of "foreigners" in peaceful and tolerant ways.
- Basically there are no problems, and Germany is an open country, open to the world and to foreigners.
- Problems can arise, where Germans are finding themselves a minority in their community or region.
- Germany urgently needs more skilled foreigners, and a different blend of them. It will have to compete for these foreigners with other nations around the world.
- We need (new) regulations for the immigration of people from other countries, and likewise for their integration.
- Both sides—the Germans and the immigrants, who temporarily or



permanently want to live in Germany—have to be tolerant and ready for “mutual” integration. The immigrants must respect the rules and regulations by which life in Germany is organized.<sup>4</sup>

Merz concludes:

I have called these rules the “liberal German *Leitkultur*.” Its concept should be based on a value system, which is generally accepted throughout society. This value system has been permanently set in the German constitution and its basic elements and human rights. It is equally rooted in the idea of European integration and is based on peace, liberty, democracy, and socially oriented market economy. A vital part of this is the contemporary status that was achieved by and for the women.<sup>5</sup>

When Merz further says that this set of rules and its equivalents in the culture system is binding for all groups and individuals in Germany, he implicitly refers to what can be called the “constitutional approach to culture.” For him, this includes a fair command of the German language.

This concept will hardly be controversial in Germany, if one looks at its core elements. It reflects most of the elements that can be found in any democratic constitution within the western, transatlantic parts of the world. According to a recent poll:

- 44% of the Germans favor immigration of those persons, whom are needed (limited access of persons according to economic needs);
- 44% favor the immigration of those person, who need to do so (political asylum);
- 74% of all Germans would accept immigration legislation with quotas describing the numbers and origins of immigrants.<sup>6</sup>

Another recent poll by the European Union showed that throughout the European Union:

- 48% think that immigrants will enrich the cultural diversity of their country (49% of the Germans who were asked said so).

On the other side:

- 25% of the Germans,
- 28% of the citizens of Luxembourg, and
- 32% of the Greeks

who were asked in another poll said they favored that all foreigners should leave their countries. Those who want this conceded that they feared the European social and

economic systems would be crushed by immigrants.<sup>7</sup>

It appears somewhat difficult to blend the term *Leitkultur* into this model. This is true even more so for the second controversial term Merz introduces when he says:

We can and we should not tolerate "Parallelgesellschaften" [ethnic groups separated from the mainstream culture], especially with respect to religious education and many more subjects.<sup>8</sup>

It too is difficult to clarify the meaning of *Leitkultur* or the meaning of "Parallelgesellschaften" from what one can read from Merz within this constitutional framework. The vagueness of how he uses the terms seems to be part of the concept.

On 12 December 2000, Merz in a discussion with Renate Künast (at that time chairperson of the Green Party in the Bundestag, presently Federal Minister of Consumer Protection, Food and Agriculture in Chancellor Schroeder's cabinet), provided more details to underline his opinion: Foreigners not only should learn the German language, but must accept "our" mores, ("Sitten"), customs ("Gebräuche"), and traditions ("Gewohnheiten"). This includes that religious education exclusively has to be carried out under the control of the state and not under the Islamic Koran schools. To wear a headscarf for religious reasons and to kill animals ritually cannot be accepted.<sup>9</sup>

### ***Leitkultur* – Just a Word or a Concept?**

Some facets of contemporary Germany can highlight the given socio-economic situation and some related future trends—this is the framework of the debate:

- Without any further transfer of people into Germany, Germany's population by 2050 would be reduced by 23 million persons. 40% out of the remaining population would be retirees. Even if annually 300,000 persons would be added (which would be a net plus of 15 million immigrants within the next half century), the percentage of retirees would only go down to one third of the total population.<sup>10</sup>
- According to numbers released by the German Federal Labor Institute (Bundesanstalt für Arbeit), the number of working persons will go down from now 41 million to 27 million by 2040. The present ratio of working and retired persons would only be preserved (and some experts say this would not be enough anyway), if half a million immigrants would enter Germany annually.<sup>11</sup>
- Germany's baby boomers are aging. By 2050, workers in Germany and many other parts of Europe will have to support twice the number of retirees than today.<sup>12</sup>
- In 72 elementary schools out of 485 elementary schools in Berlin, German is the first language only for a minority of students. 12 schools have to cope with the fact, that 80% of the students are foreign-born or living in a family



not speaking German. German parents have long started to leave these neighborhoods—a picture, only too familiar for Americans.<sup>13</sup>

- A number of trials in Hamburg had to be canceled because it turned out that jurors (who may be picked by a ballot system without any prior consultations), who have to be German citizens, were not able to speak German. When the lawmakers decided on the laws regulating trials, they were not aware that there would be German citizens without any command of the German language.<sup>14</sup>

- There are 3.5 million Muslims living in Germany. Most of them actively practice their religion. From 1997 until early 2000, the numbers increased by 420,000. During that same period, the largest German religious organizations, the Lutheran and the Catholic churches (which are so-called “state churches” in Germany), lost 670,000 (Lutherans) and 520,000 (Catholics) members.<sup>15</sup>

- 79% of the members of the Social Democratic Party (which now runs the German national government), and 73% of the members of the Christian Democratic Union (which now is the largest opposition party in the German parliament and ran the German government under Chancellor Helmut Kohl) favor immigration legislation, which Germany has not had so far. This implies that there would be legal and governed immigration. 78% of all Germans still want to maintain the constitutional right of any person worldwide to seek asylum in Germany.<sup>16</sup>

These facts and impressions, even if they are estimates and somewhat controversial,<sup>17</sup> indicate drastic changes in the German and European societies. They constitute the background, against which we can envisage the ongoing debate about *Leitkultur*. Its further stages show a broad range of activities and opinions: The leading national newspapers and magazines ran special sections on *Leitkultur*: *Die Welt*, *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, *Der Spiegel*, *Die Zeit* etc. Politicians and writers, academic teachers and television celebrities engaged in the debate. Sometimes, as in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, it split the staff between supporters and opponents of the term *Leitkultur* and whatever connotations were related to it.<sup>18</sup>

November 9, the memorial day for the pogroms against German Jews in 1938 (and the day, the first German Republic was declared in 1918), and since 1999 the memorial day for German Unification, a vast demonstration against *Fremdenhass* (hate against foreigners) with more than 200,000 participants was staged in Berlin. More demonstrations were organized in other German Cities. 30,000 gathered in Bremerhaven, which has a population of a little over 100,000.

The slogan of the demonstrations was “Rising for Humanity and Tolerance.” The political elites of Germany, high representatives of the federal government, of the parliaments and political parties, of citizens groups, of the labor unions, of the religious organizations, and other institutions joined the rallies. Among the list of prominent speakers were Federal President Rau and Paul Spiegel, President of the Central Council of the Jews in Germany, who through his speech would become the most prominent of them all. Among other things Spiegel said:

What do you want with the gibberish about *Leitkultur*? Is it German *Leitkultur* to chase foreigners, to set fire to synagogues, to kill homeless people? Are you caring for culture or about the value system of western and democratic civilization, which is deeply rooted within our constitution? . . . If *Leitkultur* is equivalent with this principle, then I completely agree with the concept. But then I want to urge all politicians to better control their populist speaking and to push for the enforcement of Article One of the constitution. . . . Politicians, ladies and gentlemen alike: Consider, what you say, and stop to smolder with words.<sup>19</sup>

Some of the attending politicians, mainly those known for their conservative record, were taken aghast and completely stunned by these words. After Friedrich Merz had first introduced the word *Leitkultur* and after Paul Spiegel had made his first contribution to the debate, the public discussion went on:

- Early in November 2000, Walter Jens, a prominent liberal author and scholar, who is Honorary President of the German Academy of Arts, wanted to propose the term *Leitkultur* as the outstanding “non-word” (“Unwort”) of the year 2000. He said it awakened memories of the Nazi times, and that immigrants should not have to give up their cultural traditions.<sup>20</sup> The jury of the University of Frankfurt later picked the phrase “nationally liberated zone,” which has been used by neo-Nazi groups, as the year 2000 non-word.<sup>21</sup>
- Said, president of the writers’ organization PEN, who lives in Munich, sharply criticized the term and said the concept would detach Germany from Europe.<sup>22</sup>
- Most Social Democrats and politicians further to the left fiercely have criticized the term and have opposed the consequences that they connected with it. The same is true for most newspapers in Germany. This resulted in a wave of public criticism of Merz’s statements.
- Consequently, all this was taken to the three large commissions on immigration, which had been established: A Federal Commission, chaired by Rita Süßmuth, former Chairperson of the German Federal Parliament; a CDU commission, and a CSU commission.
- Within the higher ranks of the Christian Democratic Union, a controversial discussion started whether or not to use the term. It resulted in a paper, which was issued in late November and now represents the official position of the CDU. *Leitkultur* was put into the broader perspective of Christian-occidental traditions, consisting of Christianity, Judaism, classical philosophy, humanism, the Roman legal system, and enlightenment.

The paragraph about *Leitkultur* in that paper reads:



Integration neither means one-sided assimilation nor incoherently living side by side. Multi-cultural societies and "parallel societies" are no valid model for the future. Our goal must be a culture of tolerance and togetherness, based on the values of our constitution and on the knowledge of our own identity. This is what we mean, when we call it "*Leitkultur* in Germany" to accept and recognize these values.<sup>23</sup>

The position of the Bavarian CSU was highlighted in a series of interviews. One was given by Günther Beckstein, Bavarian Secretary of the Interior and chairperson of the CSU commission on immigration legislation. He said:

With the term *Leitkultur* we want to express that a person, who relocates to Germany and wants to live here for a longer time, has to integrate into this country. That includes an (adequate) command of the German language and recognition of the (German) constitution. They will have to integrate into the German structures and must not try to change this country . . . People living in Bavarian villages for example do not want a minaret next to the church, and that the muezzin with the same degree of loudness as the church bells calls for service into the village. . . . Each country rightly has its own profile. It would be a mistake if after ten more years you could no longer distinguish between Munich and Chicago.<sup>24</sup>

Alois Glück, chairperson of the CSU in the Bavarian Parliament and chairperson of the CSU-Grundsatzkommission added one more aspect and some confusion to the debate, when he said:

*Leitkultur* does not include the field of cultural habits or living styles. Within the framework of *Leitkultur* everybody can reach saintliness in his or her own style.<sup>25</sup>

In an interview for *Die Welt* Angela Merkel, chairwoman of the CDU, added a component of national orientation to the debate, when she said: "The question of *Leitkultur* for me leads to a debate about our understanding of [the term] nation. We can only be tolerant with others, if we are self-assured. . . . What is wrong, when you declare your loyalty for your homeland?"<sup>26</sup>

Theo Sommer from *Die Zeit*, one of the most respected journalists in Germany, in a long article pointed out, that all players in the debate had one thing in common: All of them now favor some sort of organized immigration and immigration legislation. As early as 1986 he had written: "Let us create a legal system for citizenship of foreigners. Let us establish *jus soli* . . ." which means the system which was established in the United States: You are a citizen, if you are born in the country, no matter who your parents are. He wanted to combine this with a quota system as in the U. S. or Canada.<sup>27</sup>

Yavuz Özoguz, webmaster of a Muslim Internet portal, put a number of questions into the homepage, asking whether what Merz had said about religious head scarves

in schools would be applied to Catholic nun teachers. Another question asked whether what he said about ritually killing animals would be valid for the Jewish community as well.<sup>28</sup>

Shortly after the *Leitkultur* debate was opened, the discussion took a new turn: The issue of "pride" in Germany was added. This was again done by leaders of the Christian Democratic Union and Friedrich Merz. Summing up earlier statements, and when he urged the Secretary of the Environment, Jürgen Trittin, to resign, he said in the Bundestag, 30 March 2001:

Yes, we may be proud of our country. . . . To be proud of what we have in common leads [us] to more responsibility towards maintaining the common good. The vast majority of the Germans identify with their town, their region, and above all with their country and increasingly with Europe, *Heimat*, homeland, nation—these are not terms from the extremist right side, these terms describe a normal self-understanding, which in Germany is living reality.<sup>29</sup>

Not many new arguments have recently been added to the debate, it more or less repeated itself. Throughout the first month of the year 2001, the leaders of the CDU and CSU were discussing mandatory language and integration courses for immigrants. The leaders of the SPD joined them in this.<sup>30</sup>

### Why Did Paul Spiegel Criticize the Word *Leitkultur*?

The controversial discussion, which was initiated and led by Spiegel, and the somewhat complicated matter can be reduced to mainly two sets of arguments. The first is the "historic dimension," the sufferings of the Jews in Germany during the Nazi time and the emotions involved, and the second is the "potential of defamation," which Spiegel sees connected with how the term *Leitkultur* has been used. The governor of the Saarland, Peter Müller, a Christian Democrat, conceded this and did not want the term to be included in resolutions of the CDU.<sup>31</sup> Others within the CDU ranks joined him.<sup>32</sup>

In his speech of 9 November 2000, Paul Spiegel drew the historic line back to the pogrom night in 1938, which the Nazis called the *Kristallnacht*, and he connected this with aggressions and violence against foreigners in contemporary Germany. Because he feared that the term *Leitkultur* may be misinterpreted and used against ethnic and other minorities living in Germany, and because it arouses memories which take the Jews in Germany back into the horrible past, Paul Spiegel urgently demanded not to use the term any longer. For him, there is no feasible distinction between so-called "useful" and "useless" immigrants, and to any political organization he denies the right to make this an element of campaign strategies.

Referring to the recent violent attacks on synagogues in various German cities like Lübeck, Erfurt, Düsseldorf, and Berlin, and in the streets against foreigners and



other persons, he said:

Can you imagine, which memories are aroused, have to be aroused among us Jews by these crimes? And I do not only include my generation, which had to go through the hell of the Holocaust. I as well think of our children and grandchildren. Can you imagine, what we feel, when we have to experience, how again German people set our synagogues on fire and send us threats to kill and bomb us? Can you envision, what occurs within ourselves, when we see how a black African is chased through German streets and killed? . . . We are right in the middle of the fight against the (Political) Right.<sup>33</sup>

On 9 September 2000, Spiegel had suggested to introduce *jus soli* in Germany (every person born within the state borders of Germany automatically should be granted German citizenship) and to introduce immigration legislation, which should include demographic, economic as well as humanitarian necessities. Later he suggested to use the term "German culture" rather than *Leitkultur*.<sup>35</sup> So did Michael Friedmann, Vice President of the Central Council of the Jews in Germany and an active member of the CDU.<sup>36</sup>

Andreas Nachama, who is chairman of the Berlin Jewish Community, later explained how important the emotional attitude of the Jews in Germany towards the concept of *Leitkultur* is. He said the Jewish community in Germany feared that debating the issue of immigration in a polarizing way, and this would be true for both the everyday discussions and campaign strategies, would only increase sentiments against foreigners in Germany.<sup>37</sup> On 11 April 2001, the search machine of *msn.de* had 467 hits on "Paul Spiegel" and "*Leitkultur*," which is an indication of the lively discussion Spiegel stimulated.

Prominent support for Spiegel came from many public figures and celebrities like Rudolf Augstein, founder and publisher of *Der Spiegel*, who wrote an essay about what he called "a contemptible (*unwürdige*) debate." The headline of that essay read "My *Leitkultur* was Jewish." He told how much of the popular culture of the Golden Twenties and even the Thirties and Forties in Germany was created by Jews.<sup>38</sup>

The German Liberals (FDP) rejected the term *Leitkultur* as a populist formula, which may suggest German "supremacy" over other cultures.<sup>39</sup> The great old man of the German Liberals, former Foreign Secretary Hans-Dietrich Genscher supported this in an essay for the leading French newspaper *Le Figaro* and *Die Welt*.<sup>40</sup> In this, observers see a fundamental split between the Liberals and the Conservatives, the former coalition partners during the reunification process, and they sense first signals towards the Social Democrats.<sup>41</sup>

It may well be that most of those who supported Spiegel, when he criticized the term *Leitkultur*, were taken back with him into those twelve years of German history and their aftermath, when the German people following their leaders tried

to reformulate the story of salvation, when they not only created a monstrous

cataclysm of their society, but a breakdown of their language and a mental disaster, bewitched by political prophesy without limitations,

as the German philosopher and writer Peter Sloterdijk said, when he tried to cope with the unification of Germany in his famous "Speech about (my) own country."<sup>42</sup>

All this can be seen in the broader realm of a debate that was opened much earlier. Guy Stern, who had been invited for a speech in the German Parliament in Bonn, where the German Government was present, too, as early as in 1998 suggested to bring past, present and future together to find a better way for mutual understanding. His words, spoken long before the debate about *Leitkultur* started, aptly emphasize the scope of these discussions, when he said:

I am dreaming, how during my childhood and my adolescence, we were completely unreserved when we were together; we had no awareness of any difference which could have affected us. . . . I have learned during four semesters as a guest professor at the German universities of Freiburg, Frankfurt, Leipzig, and Potsdam, that my dream is no delusion. . . . It has to be the joint task of all who may be affected—and this all of us are—to preserve our knowledge and because of this knowledge to rise against monstrosities of any kind. Only thus will we find our way back and the way ahead of us towards frankness.<sup>43</sup>

### "German Culture" versus "Cultures in Germany"

All of the players without any exception refer to the German constitution and its provisions for regulating life in Germany. Therefore, it is a little complicated to ask for patterns which may constitute the core elements of the concept of *Leitkultur*. In general, it may be called the "General Constitutional Approach," although there are experts like Dieter Oberndörfer of the University of Freiburg, who say that the concept itself is unconstitutional, and the term is without any precise meaning.<sup>44</sup>

Given the manifold aspects of culture in the history of German politics, education, literature, and philosophy, it is somewhat surprising that almost none of the participants went back into the historic field of German culture. Only parliamentary leader Thierse briefly mentioned Goethe as a person, who eagerly integrated multi-cultural influences into his writings. It seems, as if the contestants pretend that there is no history of any debate over the role of culture within Germany before the 1920s.

Is this so, because Germans now strictly remain within the democratic and constitutional borders of their postwar history, of their democratic country and of the European Union? Or is it so, because those cultural traditions will hardly provide anything else than a universally humanistic and multi-ethnic model of tolerance?

When the Dutch writer, translator and journalist Nico Rost gave his Dachau diary the title "Goethe in Dachau" and when he had asked for Goethe, Lichtenberg and Lessing books from the hospital library, he did this because he knew that these authors were part of universal culture, of *Weltliteratur*, and could never be claimed



for inhumane, anti-democratic or prejudiced purposes. It might well be that those players who belong to the older generations (born before 1930) simply avoid a very touchy field when they exclude the historic dimension, and that those belonging to the younger generations (born after the war) simply are neither interested in the shadows of the past nor in a historic approach.

Richard Kurin has provided an explanation for this, when he named three worlds, in which "culture" resides: The worlds of entertainment (anything from high art to popular culture), scholarship, and politics.<sup>45</sup> With the *Leitkultur* debate, we are dealing with the world of social politics, where

culture is associated with the identities of people, nations, factions, institutions, professions, and segments of the electorate. Culture is the symbolic means through which people express their views, values, and interests - and impose them upon others. Culture, expressed as language, dress, behavioral code, music, and specific beliefs, defines who "we" are. Global communities, nations, ethnic groups, tribes, corporations, occupations, regions, local neighborhoods, organizations, even families and clubs, each may have its own culture.<sup>46</sup>

### **"Homogenous Society" versus "Patchwork Society"**

Taking a closer look at the debate, some main characteristics of the *Leitkultur* concepts can be found. Conservatives, who seem to favor a predominantly homogenous society where through *Leitkultur* a hierarchy can be constituted (within which they still claim "tolerance" and constitutional rights for any citizen) appear not to be aware of what they are up to.

Hall and Hall have pointed out that culture is a "program of behavior," a "shared system" of open and hidden codes, 90 percent of which are communicated as nonverbal messages and all of which vary from culture to culture. It can easily be understood how complex the task would be to change such a system.<sup>47</sup> Cultures seen as "unified entities in which everything interrelates"<sup>48</sup> obviously are objects of very high complexity. It seems to be almost impossible to enforce a hierarchy of different cultures, because each particular culture, to which its members are programmed, will exactly reach its specific goals, i.e., to organize society and the communication systems which makes it function.<sup>49</sup>

As much as culture has its roots in the "shared experiences of the ordinary people" and their ancestors, it is eminently practical and likewise complex, and we can easily understand how difficult it will be to make people not only understand but even to completely adopt the culture of another group or another region or even another continent. What we adequately easily can understand is, how reluctant each member belonging to such a cultural entity will be to give his or her entire culture up and to assimilate into the other culture. Cultures do have their inner forces to remain coherent, and whoever wants an ethnic group to assimilate to another culture, should be aware of this.

Beckstein, Minister for the Interior of the State of Bavaria and responsible for law-enforcement, which includes the surveillance of totalitarian and unconstitutional activities, is a credible representative of the conservative approach. He concedes that the term *Leitkultur* is not very precise. He refuses a concept of, as he says, "parallel societies" within Germany, and he distances himself from the United States with its diversity of ethnic groups.

With the term "parallel societies" he obviously signifies a collection of self-designated minorities, who live in segregated neighborhoods and do not want to assimilate to the German mainstream culture. Therefore, he fears that Germany will lose its unique German "profile." Consequently, he denounces any concept of "multiculturalism."<sup>50</sup>

What Daniel Boorstin had called "most remarkable about the American immigrant experience," namely "that so many different peoples somehow retained their separate identities,"<sup>51</sup> for German conservatives of this category unfortunately becomes a threat.

It may be helpful to introduce what Richard Kurin, who is Director of the Center for Folklife and Cultural Heritage of the Smithsonian Institution, has said about cultural homogeneity:

Cultural homogenization leads to cultural sameness. . . . Cultural sameness isn't all that bad. People can understand each other's languages, interests, and motives. Sameness can provide a sense of shared value and identity. . . . Cultural homogeneity does, however, guarantee boredom and diminished creativity within the species. Cultural heterogeneity entails an extant pool of diverse ways of living, any one of which might have evolutionary advantages in the long run. . . . And culturally heterogeneous units, differing in occupational specialization, national loyalty, and ethnicity, can join together in complementary way to form broader alliances.<sup>52</sup>

Nevertheless Beckstein has touched a very sensitive issue for many Germans: The Muslim groups in Germany are seen by most Germans as aggressively denying any demand for assimilation. The culture clash is accompanied by lots of everyday clashes, especially in the large cities where there is a large number of Turkish people like in Kreuzberg, Berlin. Germans simply fear, that aggressive Muslim culture might threaten the multiversity of cultures and strive for a homogenous society, which can be seen in radical Muslim theocracies.

Bassam Tibi, an ethnic Arab from Syria, who teaches sociology at Göttingen and Harvard Universities, made Germans aware of this, when he first introduced the term *Leitkultur* in a 1998 publication. He distinguishes between "Islamic" and "Islamistic" organizations and affirms that Islamistic thinking is a totalitarian ideology, that Germans should be aware of and should fight against it with their own culture concept.<sup>53</sup>

On the other side, moderates and liberals often link the term *Leitkultur* to the tradition of German nationalism, which relies on ethnic and national identity and at their extreme ends ethnic supremacy. It favors concepts like *Gemeinschaft* rather than



to base society on democratic structures and performance, co-operation, and international understanding. Hilmar Hoffmann, President of the Goethe Institute, did so, when he denounced *Leitkultur* as a "phantom," as a static idea that would lead back to a "canonized concept of culture."<sup>54</sup>

Liberals and moderates do accept the given situation in Germany as a multi-ethnic patchwork and, as many sociologists, political scientists and intellectuals, say that a multiversity of ethnic groups in Germany is all we can expect in modern society. If each person abides the laws, pays for her or his expenses, votes, and strives for education—he or she will have the highest level of "integration" you can expect. "Culture" in this sense would mean to accept diversity in society, which has always been there and will be so even more in the future.

Otto Schily, Federal German Domestic Secretary, explained what legal changes the federal government has been considering: Obviously, nothing else than the constitutional approach. But within this constitutional pluralism has to be linked to the multi-cultural (and multi-ethnic) society: "Ethnic, cultural, and religious distinctions only in a democratic society can be combined to a rational order."<sup>55</sup> Schily, as any other player, demands that immigrants should command the German language and be able "to fit into life in Germany."

## The "European" Dimension of Culture

Past Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and Bavarian Prime Minister Edmund Stoiber in a discussion about *Leitkultur* agreed almost completely.<sup>56</sup> They fiercely criticized plans to further enlarge the European Union: The European Union should be defined within geographical plus cultural plus political boundaries. National entities like Russia, Byelorussia, Ukraine, and Turkey which never had gone through a revolutionary phase like the French Revolution and which never had lived through "Enlightenment" ("geistige und politische Aufklärung"), should not receive membership status within the European Union.

Schmidt and Stoiber referred to the historical concepts of Western European culture and politics, and inasmuch as they have been incorporated into the German constitution (and the future constitution of the United States of Europe), they should be used to draw the line between those which are allowed to get in and those like Turkey who should not.

As Schmidt and Stoiber want to limit the European Union to members, who accept and live Western European culture, they seem to basically envision Europe and European culture as a primarily static society based on the values of Western European history; they do less see it as an open society where contributions from other cultures would enrich its further development.

In contrast, former Foreign Secretary Hans Dietrich Genscher links the European Union with global developments and puts it into a universal pattern. Europe should offer its neighbors in the East the possibility to join within the transatlantic partnership and should do this without any claim of cultural supremacy. But Genscher, too, asserts that this partnership should be based on the value system of Western Democracies.

If we acknowledge each participating culture, a new "European Culture" will emerge. "There is not too much of 'America,' there is just too little of Europe."<sup>57</sup>

### "Angst" versus "Self-Confidence"

Besides of the political discussion and besides of the debate in the media and among experts, there must be innumerable private discussions going on in Germany. Earlier I mentioned some polling results about attitudes of the ordinary German. To get closer to it, I recently asked a retired, mildly conservative Bavarian teacher, what he thought about *Leitkultur*. He immediately connected the topic of *Leitkultur* with the matter of "illegal immigration," which he would refer to as vast numbers of foreign citizens who try to illegally relocate into Germany. When I mentioned that Germany has had de facto immigration at least for some decades he insisted that Germany never was a real "immigrant" nation and never should be. He regarded the subject of refugees seeking political asylum in Germany to be a matter of almost exclusively illegal resettlement, with the exception of a small group of persons legitimately seeking political asylum. He demanded that the German government should effectively reduce the numbers of foreigners who are entering Germany illegally. He was ready to talk about setting quotas for controlled admission of experts needed by companies, but he was not willing to talk about *Leitkultur*.

When I realized this, I started to understand that talking about *Leitkultur* implicitly would mean to accept that many Germans may have a real problem with about 7.3 million foreigners living within its borders. This retired teacher was more affected by his worries about the impact, which large quantities of persons seeking admission to Germany would have on other aspects of German society. He feared that the tide of immigrants floating into Germany would basically challenge life in Germany, not only culturally. He was very emotional, and he did not look at the issue rationally from a demographic or an economic point of view and only vaguely admitted that the constant decline of the German population would be a real threat for the future of the German social security system within a few decades. *Jus sanguinis*, which still is the legal basis for immigration into Germany rather than *jus loci* as in the U. S. was the basis of his way to approach the topic. My impression was that for him to enter an in-depth discussion of *Leitkultur* would almost force him to accept the basics of de facto immigration into Germany.

A recent poll by an institution of the European Union shows the amount of angst with respect to ethnic minorities in Germany: 60% of the German population in East Germany think that foreigners misuse the social security system (West Germany: 56%). 65% in the East think foreigners are the main reason for unemployment (West Germany: 75%). 67% of the polled persons in the East and 51% in the West say that foreigners are over represented in criminal activities.<sup>58</sup>

Many people in those states which have started to form the United States of Europe fear that this process may become a threat for their ethnic, regional, and cultural uniqueness and economic and social security. Today, there is a much higher awareness for regional identity and cultural distinctiveness in Germany and elsewhere



in Europe than ever before. Austria and Switzerland can be taken as examples for this. Awareness of one's own cultural "self" and angst to be absorbed by predominant ethnic groups are strong forces underlying and feeding the current debate. To many Germans, this may mean both a threat and a chance, because for the first time since the 68ers started their campaign to revise the German political and value systems there is a nationwide debate about this. So angst may be not all that bad, if only it opens up chances for better information and understanding than previously.

Roman Herzog, at that time Federal President of Germany, in his famous speech "Departure into the 21st Century" (which he held in the traditional Hotel Adlon, Berlin, in 1997) directly linked angst, insecurity, and fear to what he called "an unbelievable mental depression" and the "ossification of (the German) society." After he even linked this to a "dramatic lack of leadership" in Germany (Helmut Kohl still was Chancellor), he almost was ostracized by the conservative rank and file. President Herzog demanded an "open society, a society to pursue tolerance, which enables members of different cultures to live together." Dynamism, openness, multiversity, patchwork concepts for him are inter-related.<sup>59</sup>

What most experts and the liberals say, that immigrants will energize the economy, flatten the demographic pyramid, that they will enrich German culture by widening its scope and transforming it, is questioned, doubted and opposed by those, which can be seen as angst-ridden *Kleinbürger*. They draw from their personal experiences, and they fear a limiting, negative impact on their own cultural identities.

## Vagueness

*Leitkultur* is a vague term. This is conceded even by those who use it. Even more so by those who oppose it, and who are arguing that this indistinctness is dangerous and links the term to historic national concepts like *Gemeinschaft* and other terms which have been misused for nationalistic and racist purposes throughout German history. Of course, this implies a dynamic attitude, which will hardly be found where a static conservative model of society relates *Leitkultur* to supremacy. Vagueness is increased by constantly mixing the "worlds" of cultures.

## Functional Pragmatism: A Twofold Approach

Friedrich Merz openly admitted that he wanted to introduce the *Leitkultur* debate into the upcoming election campaigns in Germany to reach out for the conservative voters and for the angst-driven potential amidst the Germans.<sup>60</sup> This is a plain functional and pragmatic attitude if one looks at it from a political point of view—and if one forgets or pushes back the historical connotations which this debate has for other players.

The Liberals like Guido Westerwelle, party chairperson of the FDP, reach out for the younger generations of voters by formulating the opposite.<sup>61</sup> The Social Democrats because they, too, want to connect to their voters do the same. And because they are now controlling the federal government, they are more obliged than the opposition

towards the trends of the European Union.

This attitude can be called "functional pragmatism." It is part of the political brawl, and it will even more increase during the next election campaign. According to where they stand and which constituencies they want to reach, it is more or less populist.

Functional pragmatism, on the other side, can be claimed from a sociological point of view by those who want to take a close analytical look at how the ethnic landscape in Germany has evolved over the last fifty or so years. Klaus Bade, who is a prominent scholar on migration at Osnabrück University, stands for this approach:

Immigration is a two-sided process of assimilation. Therefore, I would like not only to talk about "integrating the immigrants," but as well about "integration between accepting and immigrating societies." Nevertheless, the assimilation effort of the immigrants always has to be incomparably higher.<sup>62</sup>

### EXPO 2000: "Culture" in the German Pavilion

Germany had an unprecedented chance to present itself as a nation and display its concept of culture to visitors from all over the world, when the World Exhibition EXPO 2000 was organized at Hannover from June to October, last year. Five million visitors who called at the German Pavilion could see, how Germany presented its culture concept to the world. The federal government, representatives of the sixteen federal states, an organization of the German business community, and the company which was established to develop and run the German Pavilion were responsible for developing, building and running it. The goal was to present the new Germany as opposed to the different images which people in Europe and all over the world have acquired during the last century. So the German Pavilion should present an "image of a modern, open-minded country that is mindful of its responsibility to history and to today's world," as Michael Naumann, at that time Federal Government Commissioner for Cultural Affairs and the Media, wrote in the foreword for the pavilion catalogue.<sup>63</sup>

A now historic tour through the building displayed this. Through the entrance in the steel framed, huge glass facade, the visitors entered a workshop, where they walked through a workshop with 46 sculptures in all stages of their formation. Christoph Stölzl, who became principal adviser for the German Pavilion, after he had been Secretary for Cultural Affairs in the State Government of Berlin, described the building and its exhibits:

The *First Hall* (was) a sculpture workshop, not a temple to the muse but a dusty place of work with the tools of the trade, tubs of plaster, drawing tables and scaffolding distributed around the room, the walls covered with working sketches and photos. The heads and statuary at different stages of completion (gave) the impression that the sculptor (had) just stopped work for a few minutes. What is Germany? *Germany—a Workshop of Ideas.*<sup>64</sup>



The collection of persons brought together were "incontestably positive figures" from Germany and its history; the list included Konrad Adenauer (first Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany), Hans Beck (inventor of "Playmobil" figures), Ludwig van Beethoven, Robert Bosch (industrialist), Marlene Dietrich, Otto Brenner (trade union leader), Johann G. Elser (unsuccessful assassin of Hitler), Stefanie Graf (tennis player), Albert Einstein (Nobel Prize winner and German-American), Sigmund Jähn (first German astronaut from East Germany), Berthold Leibinger (laser equipment manufacturer), Claus Schenk von Stauffenberg (unsuccessful Hitler assassin), Margarete Steiff (handicapped entrepreneur and producer of stuffed toy animals), Rupert Neudeck (founder of CAP ANAMUR/German Emergency Doctors), Jürgen Sparwasser (soccer player from East Germany), and the Mouse from the most popular German television series for children.<sup>65</sup>

The *Second Hall* invited the visitor into the show *Bridges to the Future*, which was a huge hall with 720 degree film projections showing scenes from a Berlin kaleidoscope of vistas and glimpses into how people live in the multi-ethnic and multi-cultural Kreuzberg area of the German capital. The visitors looked into scenes of historic importance like the fall of the Berlin Wall and the people rejoicing over it, and into other scenes of dense intimacy like people of many cultures living in the same apartment building, dressing and undressing, studying and dancing—all this observed from the outside through open windows. The multi-media show lasted for eight minutes and released the visitors into the largest of the halls.

The *Third Hall* was called "Patchwork Germany." It represented "a German kaleidoscope" and the contributions of all sixteen federal German states to the nation. The Official Catalogue describes it:

A tree stands firmly rooted in the ground. Its branches, leaves and fruit move gently as though brushed by breeze. It is surrounded by 16 islands with 16 unique exhibits from the German states. From here a film kaleidoscope of Germany is set in motion, an installation composed of the states' exhibits, light effects, images, sounds and movement to symbolize the cross-fertilization of ideas. . . . In *A German Kaleidoscope* attention focuses on the assembled state showpieces.<sup>66</sup>

The visitors could see the original Benz Patent-Motor Car of 1886 (Baden-Württemberg), a piece of rock of the highest German mountain, the Zugspitze (Bavaria), a slice of the Berlin Wall of the period from 1961 to 1989 (Berlin), the first German film projector of 1895 (Brandenburg), the original medieval document with the signature of the Kaiser Barbarossa of 1189 bestowing the privilege of exemption from duty upon the city of Hamburg (Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg), The Fairytale Workshop of Brothers Grimm with their writing cabinet of 1830 (Hessen), parts of the hull of a medieval merchant ship from the Baltic Sea (Mecklenburg-Vorpommern), the "Capri-Battery," a piece of art with a lemon and a bulb by Joseph Beuys of 1985 (Nordrhein-Westfalen), one of the first original post WWII Volkswagen beetles of 1948 (Niedersachsen), the original document of the French-German Treaty

of 1956 (The Saarland), an original of one of the first Gutenberg Bibles and the Printing Press of 1452 to 1455 (Rheinland-Pfalz), the artificial person, made from synthetic glass for the German Hygiene Museum of 1930 (Sachsen), the original pulpit which Martin Luther used to preach on in Wittenberg of the early sixteenth century (Sachsen-Anhalt), the replica of the bow of a Viking Ship of 885, built on the coast of the Baltic Sea near present Schleswig (Schleswig-Holstein), Johann Sebastian Bach, "Kunst der Fuge," first print of 1750, and spinet of around 1760 (Thüringen).

The Free Hanseatic City of Bremen was represented by the core model of the Spacelab, which between 1976 and 1983 was built in Bremen for NASA. After twenty-two missions, in 1999 it was transferred back to Bremen and put on display in the airport exhibit hall. It was meant to be an adequate symbol for combining Hanseatic traditions of reaching out over the oceans, bringing back goods, people, ideas, with the challenges to blend them into national and international markets and cultures.

The film panorama of thirty-six minutes which completed the show on sixteen huge screens and nineteen more large screens above the exhibits took the spectators on a tour of Germany, each sequence starting with one exhibit: "a flow of images . . . , sometimes contrapuntally drifting apart, sometimes flowing together on a grand whole, following no narrative rhythm, obeying only its won logic, associative, meditative, unique. The vision of a nation is born."<sup>67</sup>

The show was accompanied by specially composed music. It had been divided into two 18-minute segments to make it shorter for the audience. As it turned out, most of the 5 million plus visitors who saw it stayed through the whole show.

Besides the three exhibit areas, the German Pavilion ran a daily performance program. The evening program more or less followed the concept of high-end culture, with about eighty performances especially written, composed and produced for the culture program of the German Pavilion.

For the daily performance program, each federal state contributed one week of a specific *Länder* program. They showed the diversity of regional cultural traditions, of German folk life, of its music, popular and country music, theaters and orchestras, and of the rich cultural activities from all over Germany. It reached from activities you would find in any Smithsonian Folklife Festival to performances to be found during International Music and Theatre Festivals.

The State of Bremen brought in the Bremen Musical Company, maritime folk music, cabaret from Bremerhaven, the German Chamber Philharmonic with Schubert, Seventh Symphony, "Barber Shop Music" and "Cheerleaders," the Bremen "Junior Singers." All these are authentic German-English names, "Wiener Kaffeehausmusik" by the Bremen "Kaffeehaus-Orchester" (Bremen has been, since the seventeenth century, one of the major European ports for importing coffee), Jazz, Salsa and Rap groups from Bremen, a Shakespeare theater performance by the Bremen "Shakespeare Company," and a new production of the Bremen Dance Theater.

The culture of ethnic minorities living in Germany was not incorporated in the culture program of the German Pavilion. Nevertheless, with the German Pavilion its makers achieved a little of what Richard Kurin and Diana Parker had written for the



In this world, where memory, tradition, and history are often devalued, we sorely need moments of pause, recognition, and embrace. Large-scale public events can become important symbolic occasions through which meanings are construed, negotiated, and disseminated and wherein values are asserted, re-enforced, or even discovered.<sup>68</sup>

### Is There Anything Germans May Learn from German-Americans and Their Experience?

On 23 March 2001, the German national newspaper had an article by Hans Zippert with the title "Wie ich einmal verblüfft war" ("How I once was stunned"). He had attended a conference about "The Politics of Pop—Popular Culture in Germany," organized by the Department of German, Scandinavian, and Dutch of the University of Minnesota. Zippert was frank enough to admit that he had known nothing about German-Americans and German-Americana before, that he had known nothing about German-American research in America before, and that he had known nothing about popular culture in Germany before. He closed his article with the words:

I had had no understanding that for 40 years I had lived in a country so interesting and manifold. . . . For a fraction of a second I really felt something like pride. For the rest of my stay I simply was stunned, how unbelievably fascinating it can be to be a German.<sup>69</sup>

Likewise he was stunned to have met American scholars who spoke German, studied the German culture, and "even had lived in Leipzig for four years"—"Das muss man sich einmal vorstellen," is what he wrote.

To mirror German culture through German-American research in America and to ask how much Germans may be able to learn for their *Leitkultur* debate seems to be surprising but, as it turns out to be, will not be without its rewards.

If one tries to apply the approach of *Leitkultur* in its general mainstream meaning to the German cultural and educational system, it would be necessary to define who a German person is. Obviously, it makes no sense to pretend that every person living within the boundaries of the German nation or even holding a German passport already is a "German" in the sense of the *Leitkultur* debate. Presently, there are about 7.3 million *Ausländer* ("foreigners," non-citizens, and their offspring) permanently living in Germany, who see themselves as non-Germans or are perceived so.

Germany does not yet have a system of immigration and naturalization legislation and procedures. The German authorities are still handling these millions of persons with a set of provisional regulations. The result of this is that the public is confronted with a constant flow of inefficiencies, both under legal and humanitarian aspects. One may well doubt that there would be a more effective way to increase insecurity and "angst" on all sides involved.

To compare this situation with the German-American experience in the U. S., it is worthwhile to take a glance at how "German-Americans" define themselves. It can be done by using two excellent sources: The online teaching unit *German-Americans and Their Contributions to the American Mainstream Culture*, which was produced by the Max Kade German-American Center of IUPUI, Indianapolis, and the recent book by Don Tolzmann, *The German American Experience* (1999).

German-Americans as the major ethnic group in America in both sources are defined within a broad ethno-linguistic and cultural setting: "Immigrants from German-speaking areas and their descendants" constitute the group of German-Americans in the United States. Their "sense of affinity" to their ethnic group is created by a diversity of shared cultural traditions and values. They are characterized by ethnic and cultural "markers," which distinguish them from other ethnic groups within the multi-cultural and multi-ethnic American society. Still, they are Americans in that popular sense which is described in the CD-ROM *Smithsonian's America*:

What makes an American an American? It's not a place of birth or family origin. Rather, it's a belief in a common set of ideals. Ideals of democracy and liberty, freedom and equality, enterprise, and community. These ideals do not always reflect the underlying realities. They are a goal at which we always aim.<sup>70</sup>

If this concept would have to be taken back to Germany, it would soon become clear, that such a transfer would require a lot of patience for a long period of time. With respect to the ethnic minority groups living in Germany, the following which is true not only for German-Americans, but for all ethnic groups in America, would be even more true in a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural German society: As much as becoming an American means that immigrants have to learn through language and ideals "what it is to be an American" they are still connecting with their own ethnic group through heritage, religion, celebrations, language, music, and cuisine.<sup>71</sup>

This could be the formula which could be applied to the ongoing discussion in Germany. German-Americans have shown, that it is possible to be Americans *and* German-Americans. They have as well shown that it might even be necessary to preserve individual identity by belonging to a traditional ethnic and cultural group which has its authentic uniqueness within the larger framework of an open, democratic, multi-cultural, and multi-ethnic society.

All players in the German debate on *Leitkultur* through references to the German constitution link the present-day German society to universal ethics, to democracy and to the humanitarian value system which Kant had in mind when he formulated his categorical imperative. There is a tradition of culture within German history, which is part of universal culture, and which we should not stop seeing as the basis of German mainstream culture:

As Tolzmann has reminded us again, German-Americans as early as 1688 issued the first protest against slavery. In spite of the slave state which was established in Germany between 1933 and 1945, it is worth noticing that today we can look back at



such an early formulation of a humanitarian concept as part of the German tradition. We can see ourselves as partners of this German-American and German cultural tradition, if we put it into perspective with the German Enlightenment and its views. It would be totally adequate to make all immigrants coming into Germany aware of this and to invite them to a learning experience for becoming a German in this sense. If there was anything like the "Guidelines for the Introduction of German-American Studies" at various educational levels in the German educational system, this would probably be a little easier. But still, under the present conditions it would be quite a challenge for all sides and all groups involved, not just for the ethnic and cultural minorities.

## Summary

A moderate set of suggestions may be derived from these observations: First, German politicians, educators, intellectuals and academicians should accept the fact that the German people, especially those who have never been confronted with the challenges of a multi-cultural and multi-ethnic society, may be angst-ridden. Therefore, they should start to educate them for a positive, self-assured attitude. Second, it should be admitted that there are and will be problems with an ever-increasing stream of immigrants, and that these problems will have not only to be addressed, but to be solved, too. Third, through a broad range of activities, cultural awareness in Germany should be created and encouraged, for the mainstream culture and other minority and ethnic cultures alike ("mainstream culture" here is referred to as the culture of the majority group in Germany within the patchwork of culture, based on constitution and tradition inasmuch as they are part of the humanitarian, democratic universe). Fourth, the ethnic minority groups should be encouraged to strive for "active assimilation" and they should be supported to formulate and show their ethnic pride through positive images.

An example for this is, how the German-Americans since the 1950s revived their ethnic heritage.<sup>73</sup> "Active involvement" is more than "passive assimilation," as Giles Hoyt has pointed out in the *Theodor Stempfel Festschrift*.<sup>74</sup> The Germans should learn from America that ethnic education (ethnic-heritage and ethnic-culture schools) can give the ethnic minorities the pride which makes them ready to contribute to German culture through active assimilation, and which makes concepts of *Leitkultur* obsolete, at least inasmuch as they contain elements of "guidance."<sup>75</sup>

Fifth, a concept of "Mainstream Culture" should be developed, which encourages clarity, vigor, controversy, accuracy, honesty, sensitivity, understanding and openness towards minority groups. This will lead to more uninhibited and everyday discussions of its meaning. Germany's central interest will lie in assimilating new immigrants as much as this has been so in America. Immigrants then will think of themselves primarily as Germans, which is more than "having them join the economic mainstream," as Robert J. Samuelson says about immigrants to America.<sup>76</sup>

The core elements within the German debate on *Leitkultur* are:

1. There is a general understanding that Germany is an immigrant nation.
2. There will be immigration and naturalization legislation with the *jus soli* definition within the next few years.
3. Language and culture courses will be offered.
4. All players involved already accept the *constitutional* concept of "culture" in Germany.
5. Initially, the debate was launched by the younger generation within the CDU mainly for campaign reasons. Meanwhile, the debate has become a general issue on the national level.

Germany is presently undergoing a process of reinventing itself within the framework of the emerging United States of Europe and global challenges. Further down on this road there will be a widely accepted concept of what can be called the "constitutional approach" of German culture. It will be a mainstream and patchwork concept of "Cultures in Germany."

This concept will be adopted by ethnic minorities to the extent which they themselves deem necessary to pursue happiness in Germany and reach their own goals as German citizens.

The process towards modernization and change, which former German President Roman Herzog in his famous Hotel Adlon speech of 1997 intensely demanded when he referred to the dynamics of other European nations (like France and the Netherlands) and to that of the American society,<sup>77</sup> has started. The ongoing *Leitkultur* debate will be a central aspect of this modernization process, and it will show Germany as a vital member of the international community.

### Wrap-up: The End of the Debate?

Between April 2001 and the end of the year 2001, there has been a series of substantial changes of the debate: By 11 September 2001 it was completely amalgamated with the German debate on immigration and naturalization legislation, and after the terrorist attacks on America it was almost wiped out by the debate on the "Security Packages" and on immigration legislation in Germany.

Otto Schily, German Minister for the Interior, as early as in November 2000 had declared the *Leitkultur* debate "unnecessary," and said it was only relevant for the internal fights within the conservative parties. A search in the Internet for the term *Leitkultur* at the end of the year 2001 revealed that since April 2001 there are hardly any more relevant articles on *Leitkultur*. Even the CDU "Commission on Immigration and Integration" in May 2001 eliminated the term from its report.<sup>79</sup>

By the end of August 2001, a series of proposals, comments and legislative initiatives on the issues of immigration and naturalization had been published. They seem to indicate, that the period of the *Leitkultur* debate was transformed into the phase of legislative and decision making processes with an ever growing and intense debate on the immigration and naturalization issues. Its steps were:



1. March (2001): The ecological party (The Greens) Concept on Immigration,
2. April: Christian Social Union (CSU) Concept on Immigration,
3. May: Christian Democratic Union (CDU) Guidelines on Immigration,
4. June: PDS (Party of Democratic Socialism) Concept on Immigration,
5. June: Social Democratic Party (SPD) Concept on Immigration,
6. July: Independent Commission on Immigration, Final Report,
7. July: Guidelines of the Social Democratic Party in the German General Assembly (Bundestag),
8. July: Guidelines of the Free Democratic Party on Immigration,
9. August 2001: First Draft of the Legislation on Immigration and Naturalization, by the German Ministry of the Interior.<sup>80</sup>

The main forces which fed these developments were the determination of the German Federal Government to introduce the immigration legislation well before the upcoming election campaign for the year 2002, the increasing demands of the German business community for more foreign skilled workers,<sup>81</sup> the search for a unanimous standpoint within the CDU and CSU and their stance against the "Open Gates" policy of the German government,<sup>82</sup> the guidelines of the *Report of the Independent Commission on Immigration*,<sup>83</sup> the search for a bipartisan legislative compromise in the Bundesrat, and the forewarnings of the federal election campaign 2002.

All this was overshadowed by the terrorist attacks on America and their impact on the debate on immigration in Germany. On 14 September 2001, some newspapers reported that Schily had stopped the first draft of the immigration legislation, which was reported to pursue a more liberal approach. The conservative opposition in the German parliament immediately demanded to introduce more restrictive measures.<sup>84</sup> This matched the results of opinion polls after 11 September; 12 October 2001: 76% of the Germans involved said that immigration legislation should go on, but 79% demanded that it should be more restrictive to assure that the danger for terrorist activities from immigrants would be reduced.<sup>85</sup>

The German Ministry of the Interior developed a set of anti-terror and security measures, and the federal government sent two "Security Packages" to the German Bundestag.<sup>86</sup> More than 100 laws were modified, and the federal government and its agencies were almost unanimously given extensive powers to fight terrorism. These measures will be terminated after five years, though.<sup>87</sup> Even other political activities were affected by these developments: Actions and propaganda against "globalization" almost died out. They were washed away by the tide of considerations how to react after the terrorist attacks.<sup>88</sup>

Indirectly, though, during this process the formerly controversial debate on *Leitkultur* was replaced by a more comprehensive debate on immigration and its manifold implications. It can also be viewed as a passageway to a somewhat concealed consensus on the basics of what should be expected from immigrants. As soon as German language skills and a sound understanding of the German constitution and the essentials of democratic society in Germany (as part of the international community of democratic nations) were introduced into the debate and into legislative initiatives

as preliminary requirements for citizenship, the core elements of a consensual concept of *Leitkultur* became apparent.

This again took place during the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on America. As much as the government, the political parties, the media, organizations and groups from all sectors of the German society struggled to formulate their stance on what had happened and what was yet to come, it became clear that the most important results of this elucidatory process were the support for America and the common cause in the fight against terrorism, and a refreshed emphasis on the fundamental values which unite the European and the transatlantic worlds.

Chancellor Gerhard Schröder articulated this, when in his policy statement, which he made to the German Bundestag 19 September 2001, he said:

What we have here is not a "clash of civilizations" but a struggle to protect civilization in this one world. We are aware of the diversity of the world's civilizations, and we respect them all. But we must insist that the principles of the American Declaration of Independence apply universally. . . . These principles, even if they are the legacy of the Christian West and did not develop without a number of disastrous aberrations, do not conflict with an interpretation of Islam free of fundamentalist frenzy. Such faceless, barbaric terrorism is directed against the very fabric that binds our world together: respect for human life and human dignity, the values of liberty, tolerance, democracy and the peaceful balancing of interests. In the face of this unprecedented attack Germany will give its unreserved support to the United States of America. . . . we must make it clear that while gratitude (to the U. S. ) is an important and weighty factor, it does not suffice to legitimize fundamental decisions of principle. In such decisions we are led by one goal only, that of ensuring the future of our country as part of a free world. . . . Our battle against terrorism is a defense of our open society, our liberties, our way of life.<sup>89</sup>

On 13 December 2001, the Bundestag passed the German immigration legislation with a slim majority. The full title of the law reflects the complicated political, legal, historical and societal environment surrounding it: "Law for the Management and Limitation of Immigration and for the Regulation of the Residence and Integration of Citizens of the (European) Union and of Aliens (Immigration Law)."<sup>90</sup>

It is scheduled to take effect in January 2003. Until then, more compromising with the German states (*Länder*) will be necessary, because the Bundesrat will have to make its final decision in spring 2002 and a majority is not yet secured.<sup>91</sup> Because both conservative parties in Germany continue to fiercely oppose some of the provisions of the immigration law, it seems to be inevitable that the immigration issue will be made a central part of the 2002 federal election campaign.

Nevertheless, the debate on *Leitkultur*, although it seems to have been a short-lived flare-up in the media, in politics and in the contributions of German thought-leaders, has played a vital role in what Bade called Germany's "path from the informal



to the formal status as an immigration nation."<sup>92</sup>

As is often the case with debates on culture and its meaning, the *Leitkultur* debate may well have achieved what it at best could have accomplished: It presented essential contributions to the quest for a better understanding of the scope and the challenges of migration, and it heightened the German's awareness of what has to be achieved before the ongoing process of integrating millions of immigrants into the German society will be handled successfully and in accordance with human dignity and human rights.

Bremen, Germany

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Willi Paul Adams, *The German-Americans: An ethnic Experience*. American Edition. Translated and Adapted by LaVern J. Rippley, and Eberhard Reichmann (Max Kade German-American Center, Indiana University Purdue University at Indianapolis, 1993), 1.

<sup>2</sup> Transl. D.S. - A first round of *Leitkultur* discussion had started in 1998, triggered off by former General Schönbohm, Secretary for Domestic Affairs in the State of Berlin. It soon trickled down, so that I do not go back to this first phase. Cf. *BerlinOnline*, 17 July 1998, [www.berlinonline.de/wissen/berliner\\_zeitung/archiv/1998/0717/lokales/012](http://www.berlinonline.de/wissen/berliner_zeitung/archiv/1998/0717/lokales/012).

<sup>3</sup> *RPOnline*, 18 October 2000, [www.rp-online.de/news/politik/2000-1018merz\\_rhtml](http://www.rp-online.de/news/politik/2000-1018merz_rhtml).

<sup>4</sup> [www.webpolitik.de/europa/merz.htm](http://www.webpolitik.de/europa/merz.htm).

<sup>5</sup> Transl. D.S., [www.webpolitik.de/europa/merz.htm](http://www.webpolitik.de/europa/merz.htm).

<sup>6</sup> Klaus-Peter Schöppner (EMNID) in *Die Welt*, 18 April 2001.

<sup>7</sup> EU Beobachtungsstelle für Rassismus und Fremdenfeindlichkeit in Wien, cited by Andreas Middel: "Jeder fünfte EU-Bürger will Ausländer sofort ausweisen," *Die Welt*, 22 March 2001.

<sup>8</sup> [www.webpolitik.de/europa/merz.htm](http://www.webpolitik.de/europa/merz.htm).

<sup>9</sup> *Bild am Sonntag*, 3 December 2000.

<sup>10</sup> Rainer Münz in *Die Welt*, 9 March 2001.

<sup>11</sup> [msnbc.de/news/65109.asp](http://msnbc.de/news/65109.asp): Internet; accessed 04-17-01.

<sup>12</sup> *Newsweek*, 16 April 2000.

<sup>13</sup> Alan Posener in *Die Welt*, 3 January 2001.

<sup>14</sup> Ira von Mellenthin in *Die Welt*, Hamburg, 29 March 2001.

<sup>15</sup> Gernot Facius in *Die Welt*, 17 April 2001.

<sup>16</sup> Klaus-Peter Schöppner in *Die Welt*, 18 April 2001.

<sup>17</sup> Some sources say, the number of Germans until 2050 would only decrease by 11 millions: see Michael Mönninger in *Die Welt*, 18 April 2001.

<sup>18</sup> Reinhard Mohr, "Operation Sauerbraten," *Der Spiegel* 45/2000; [www.spiegel.de/druckversion/0,1588,101362,00.html](http://www.spiegel.de/druckversion/0,1588,101362,00.html).

<sup>19</sup> [www.juden.de](http://www.juden.de) - transl. D.S.

<sup>20</sup> *Spiegel Online*, 4 November 2000, [spiegel.de/kultur/gesellschaft/0,1518,101365,00.html](http://spiegel.de/kultur/gesellschaft/0,1518,101365,00.html).

<sup>21</sup> *Spiegel Online*, 3 January 2001.

<sup>22</sup> *Spiegel Online*, [www.webpolitik.de/europa/merz.htm](http://www.webpolitik.de/europa/merz.htm) 30, 2000.

<sup>23</sup> Quoted in [zdf.msnbs.de/news/65038.asp](http://zdf.msnbs.de/news/65038.asp), 28 November 2000; transl. D.S.

<sup>24</sup> *Spiegel Online*, 17 November 2000, transl. D.S.

<sup>25</sup> *Bayernkurier Online*, 27 October 2000, transl. D.S.

<sup>26</sup> [www.webpolitik.de/europa/merz.htm](http://www.webpolitik.de/europa/merz.htm).

<sup>27</sup> [www.die-zeit.de/2000/47/Politik/200047\\_Leitkultur.html](http://www.die-zeit.de/2000/47/Politik/200047_Leitkultur.html).

<sup>28</sup> [www.muslim-markt.de/Aktion/Leitkultur/maillsanctu.htm](http://www.muslim-markt.de/Aktion/Leitkultur/maillsanctu.htm). In 2002, the German Supreme Court also allowed Muslim-style ritual slaughtering.

<sup>29</sup> [www2.friedrich-merz.de/www/aktuell\\_print.asp?AktuellID=150](http://www2.friedrich-merz.de/www/aktuell_print.asp?AktuellID=150), transl. D.S.

- <sup>30</sup> *Die Welt*, 17 April 2001.
- <sup>31</sup> Harald Lüders and Gottlob Schober in *zdf.msnbc Online*; [zdf.msnbc.de/news/65109.asp](http://zdf.msnbc.de/news/65109.asp).
- <sup>32</sup> [zdf.msnbd.de/news/65001.asp?cp1=1](http://zdf.msnbd.de/news/65001.asp?cp1=1): Volker Rühle, Christian Wulff, Hans-Jochen Vogel, Hildegard Müller, Hermann-Josef Arentz.
- <sup>33</sup> Transl. D.S.
- <sup>34</sup> Conference on "The Future of Remembrance," 9 September 2000, Memorial Buchenwald.
- <sup>35</sup> [www.juden.de/newsarchiv/november\\_2000/15\\_11:03.htm](http://www.juden.de/newsarchiv/november_2000/15_11:03.htm).
- <sup>36</sup> *Spiegel Online*, 11 November 2000.
- <sup>37</sup> *Die Welt*, 11 November 2000, transl. D.S.
- <sup>38</sup> *Der Spiegel* 47/2000.
- <sup>39</sup> *BerlinOnline*, 31 October 2000.
- <sup>40</sup> 7 March 2001.
- <sup>41</sup> *Berliner Zeitung*, 31 October 2000.
- <sup>42</sup> Peter Sloterdijk, *Versprechen auf Deutsch: Rede über das eigene Land* (Suhrkamp: Frankfurt 1990), 36.
- <sup>43</sup> Transl. D. S. "Ich träume von der, damals von keinerlei Bewußtsein des Anderseins getrübbten Unbefangenheit des Umgangs miteinander in meiner Kindheit und Jugend. . . . In vier Semestern als Gastprofessor an den deutschen Universitäten Freiburg, Frankfurt, Leipzig und Potsdam habe ich erfahren, daß mein Traum kein leerer Traum ist. . . . Es ist die gemeinsame Aufgabe aller Betroffenen - und das sind wir - das Wissen zu bewahren und um dieses Wissens willen sich aufzulehnen gegen Ungeheuerlichkeit jeder Provenienz. Nur so finden wir den Weg zurück und den Weg vorwärts in die Unbefangenheit." (Guy Stern, *Manuscript*, 15-16).
- <sup>44</sup> *Berliner Morgenpost online*, 24 October 2000; Marie-Luise Beck, Federal Government Commissioner for Foreign Resident Affairs (Ausländerbeauftragte der Bundesregierung), said the same in a radio interview ([www.ndr4.de/inerviews/archiv/200010193.html](http://www.ndr4.de/inerviews/archiv/200010193.html)).
- <sup>45</sup> Richard Kurin, *Reflections of a Cultural Broker: A View from the Smithsonian* (Smithsonian Institution Press: Washington and London 1997), 15.
- <sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, 16.
- <sup>47</sup> Edward T. Hall and Mildred Reed Hall, *Understanding Cultural Differences; Keys to Success in West Germany, France, and the United States* (Intercultural Press: Yarmouth 1989), xiii - xiv.
- <sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, xix.
- <sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>50</sup> Beckstein, *Spiegel Online*, 17 November 2000.
- <sup>51</sup> Daniel Boorstin, *The Americans. The Democratic Experience* (New York: Random House, 1973), 248.
- <sup>52</sup> Richard Kurin, *Reflections of a Cultural Broker*, 17.
- <sup>53</sup> Tibi's contributions are often cited when, especially by leaders of the CSU, Muslim groups are identified as ethnic groups who will not fit into the constitutional value systems of German and Europe; compare for this Alois Glück, Chairperson of the CSU Commission on Political Basics - Grundsatzkommission, as cited in *Bayernkurier online*, 27 October 2000.
- <sup>54</sup> Hilmar Hoffmann, "Deutsche Leitkultur ist nichts für Stammtische," *Rheinischer Merkur*, 6 January 2001.
- <sup>55</sup> Otto Schily, "Vom christlichen Abendland zum multikulturellen Einwanderungsland?" [www.h-quandt-stiftung.de/deutsch/kooq/12\\_dr\\_os.htm](http://www.h-quandt-stiftung.de/deutsch/kooq/12_dr_os.htm), transl. D.S.
- <sup>56</sup> *Die Welt*, 8 February 2001.
- <sup>57</sup> *Die Welt*, 7 March 2001.
- <sup>58</sup> Stephan Haselberger, "Deutsche haben nur wenig Verständnis für Zuwanderung," *Die Welt*, 20 April 2001.
- <sup>59</sup> Roman Herzog, "Aufbruch ins 21. Jahrhundert," [www.bundespraesident.de/n/nph b/reden/de/berlin/htm?reden/deutsch1997.ma](http://www.bundespraesident.de/n/nph b/reden/de/berlin/htm?reden/deutsch1997.ma)
- <sup>60</sup> Interview with the weekly newspaper *Bild am Sonntag*, 3 December 2000.
- <sup>61</sup> Editorial by Torsten Krauel in *Die Welt*, 20 March 2001.
- <sup>62</sup> Klaus Bade, "Einwanderung ist kein Allheilmittel für gesellschaftliche Probleme," *Die Welt*, 29 March 2001, 4, transl. D.S.
- <sup>63</sup> *English Supplement, German Pavilion Catalogue* (Hannover: Trägergesellschaft Deutscher Pavillon, 2000), 3.
- <sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, 14.



<sup>65</sup>The complete list includes: Konrad Adenauer (1876-1967), first chancellor, FRG; Hans Beck (1929), designer and producer of Playmobil toys; Ludwig van Beethoven (1770-1827), composer; Gerhard Behrendt (1929- ), creator of Little Sandman, East German Television; Joseph Beuys (1921-1986), action artist, academic teacher; Heinrich Böll (1917-1985), writer, Nobel Prize winner 1972; Hedwig Bollhagen (1907- ), ceramic artist and entrepreneur; Robert Bosch (1861-1942), technical pioneer, industrialist, philanthropist; Willy Brandt (1913-1992), first Social Democratic chancellor of Germany, Nobel Peace Prize winner 1971, left Nazi Germany for exile in Norway; Bertolt Brecht (1898-1956), writer, left Nazi Germany for exile; Otto Brenner (1907-1972), labor union leader; Marlene Dietrich (1901-1992), actress and film star, left Germany in 1930 for U. S.; Dr. Motte (1960), founder of Love Parade in Berlin; Albert Einstein (1879-1955), physicist, left Germany for exile in U. S.; Johann Georg Elser (1903-1945), unsuccessful assassin of Hitler, murdered at Dachau; Ludwig Erhar (1897-1977), first federal economics minister after WWII, introduced social market economy; Hartmut Esslinger (1944), designer of consumer goods; Rainer Werner Fassbinder (1945-1982), movie director and producer; Artur Fischer (1919), inventor with more than 5,000 patents; Stefanie Graf (1969- ), tennis player; Jacob Grimm (1785-1863) and Wilhelm Grimm (1786-1859), collectors and publishers of German fairytales and *Deutsches Wörterbuch*; Sigmund Jähn (1937), first German in outer space, from East Germany; Janosch (1931), painter, illustrator and writer of children's books; Erich Kästner (1899-1974), writer, prominent in the twenties and thirties; Petra Kelly (1947-1992), co-founder of the Green Party in Germany; Heinrich Maria Ledig-Rowohlt (1908-1992), publisher; Berthold Leibinger (1930), laser equipment manufacturer; Thomas Mann (1875-1955), writer, Nobel Prize winner in 1926, left Germany for exile in U. S.; Lise Meitner (1878-1968), physicist, left Germany for exile in Sweden; Ludwig Mies van der Rohe (1886-1969), architect, left Germany for exile in U. S.; Reinhard Mohn (1921), publisher, principal owner of Bertelsmann Group; Monday Demonstrators (1989), anonymous in East Germany, cried "we are the people" and started German unification; The Mouse (1971), idol of the most popular television series for children in Germany; Mousse T. (1966), disc jockey of Turkish descent; Ruper Neudeck (1939), medical doctor, founder of CAP ANAMUR/German Emergency Doctors; Gerhard Polt (1942), Bavarian revue artist and writer; Georg Salvamoser (1950), owner of Europe's first zero-emission facility for the production of solar energy modules; Mildred Scheel (1932-1985), founder of the German Cancer League, wife of former German Federal President Walter Scheel; Claus Schenk Count von Stauffenberg (1907-1944), unsuccessful assassin of Hitler, shot 20 July 1944; Romy Schneider (1938-1982), actress and movie star; Sophie Scholl (1921-1943), Munich student opposing the Nazis, was murdered by the Nazis; Irmela Schramm (1945), teacher and activist, erases racist and offending graffiti all over socker Germany; Jürgen Sparwasser (1947), East German football player, shot the only goal in the first German-German game in 1974; Margarete Steiff (1847-1909), wheel-chaired entrepreneur and producer of stuffed toy animals; Martin Teucher (1981), philosopher, inventor of "Homepage Upper" software; Konrad Zuse (1910-1995), inventor of the world's first programmable computer "Z3."

<sup>66</sup>*English Supplement, German Pavilion Catalogue*, 14.

<sup>67</sup>*English Supplement, German Pavilion Catalogue*, 27.

<sup>68</sup>Richard Kurin and Diana Parker, "The Festival in the Electronic Age" (Smithsonian Institution, Festival of American Folklife, Washington, DC: 1996), 5.

<sup>69</sup>*Die Welt*, 23 March 2001, transl. D.S.

<sup>70</sup>CD ROM Smithsonian's America.

<sup>71</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>72</sup>Don Heinrich Tolzmann, *The German-American Experience* (Amherst, New York: Humanity Books, 1999), 19.

<sup>73</sup>Don Heinrich Tolzmann, "The German-American Legacy," *The Journal of the German-Texan Heritage Society*, 16, 2, (1994) 49.

<sup>74</sup>Giles R. Hoyt, "Foreword," *Theodor Stempfel's Festschrift Fifty Years of Unrelenting German Aspirations in Indianapolis, 1848 - 1898* (Indianapolis: German-American Center and Indiana-German Heritage Society, Inc.: Indianapolis 1991), vii.

<sup>75</sup>Anna Kuchment, "Ethnic Education," *Newsweek*, 2 April 2001, 74.

<sup>76</sup>Robert J. Samuelson, "Can America Assimilate?," *Newsweek*, 9 April 2001, 47.

<sup>77</sup>Roman Herzog, "Aufbruch ins 21. Jahrhundert," [www.bundespraesident.de/n/nph/b/reden/de/berlin/htm?reden/deutsch1997.ma](http://www.bundespraesident.de/n/nph/b/reden/de/berlin/htm?reden/deutsch1997.ma).

<sup>78</sup>Interview in *Die Zeit*; 10 November 2000, [www.zeit.de/2000/45/Politik/200045\\_schily.html](http://www.zeit.de/2000/45/Politik/200045_schily.html).

<sup>79</sup>Deutsche Presse Agentur (dpa), cited in [www.juden.de/newsarchiv/mai\\_2001/02\\_05\\_01\\_01.htm](http://www.juden.de/newsarchiv/mai_2001/02_05_01_01.htm).

<sup>80</sup> cf. [www.sueddeutsche.de/deutschland/politik/1566/](http://www.sueddeutsche.de/deutschland/politik/1566/).

<sup>81</sup> cf. *efms Migration Report*, März 2001, [www.uni-bamberg.de/~ba64f3/dmar01\\_d.htm](http://www.uni-bamberg.de/~ba64f3/dmar01_d.htm); FAZ, 28 September 2001; *Die Welt*, 6 November 2001; *Die Welt*, 5 December 2001; *Die Welt*, 21 December 2001.

<sup>82</sup> Edmund Stoiber, Prime Minister of Bavaria, explains this in an interview with *Die Welt*, 29 November 2001, 3. cf. the coverage in *Die Welt*, 30 November 2001, 3.

<sup>83</sup> [www.bmi.bund.de](http://www.bmi.bund.de).

<sup>84</sup> [www.sueddeutsche.de/deutschland/politik/24321/?url=deutschland%2Fpolitik%2F](http://www.sueddeutsche.de/deutschland/politik/24321/?url=deutschland%2Fpolitik%2F).

<sup>85</sup> EMNID and ntv, [www.emnid.tnsfres.com/presse/ntv-2001\\_10\\_12.html](http://www.emnid.tnsfres.com/presse/ntv-2001_10_12.html); cf. the poll from 22-29 October 2001, with almost the same figures, which show a dramatic change towards backing the tight security measures imposed by the government: [www.emnid.tnsfres.com/presse/ntv/ntv-2001\\_10\\_29.html](http://www.emnid.tnsfres.com/presse/ntv/ntv-2001_10_29.html).

<sup>86</sup> *efms Migration Report*, September 2001, [www.uni-bamberg.de/~ba6ef3/dsep01\\_d.htm](http://www.uni-bamberg.de/~ba6ef3/dsep01_d.htm) and October, 2001, [www.uni-bamberg.de/~ba6ef3/dokt01\\_d.htm](http://www.uni-bamberg.de/~ba6ef3/dokt01_d.htm).

<sup>87</sup> [www.nrz.de/free/nrz.artikel-000.html?news\\_id=2097270](http://www.nrz.de/free/nrz.artikel-000.html?news_id=2097270)

<sup>88</sup> Christian Tenbrock und Wolfgang Uchatius, "In der Nationalisierungsfalle: Nach dem Terror drohen neue Grenzen für Migranten in aller Welt," *Die Zeit* 39/2000 v. 27.09.2001, [www.zeit.de/2001/39/Wirtschaft/200139\\_globalisierung.html](http://www.zeit.de/2001/39/Wirtschaft/200139_globalisierung.html).

<sup>89</sup> [http://eng.bundesregierung.de/dokumente/Rede/ix\\_56718\\_5459.htm](http://eng.bundesregierung.de/dokumente/Rede/ix_56718_5459.htm)

<sup>90</sup> Gesetz zur Steuerung und Begrenzung der Zuwanderung und zur Regelung des Aufenthalts und der Integratoin von Unionsbürgern und Ausländern (Zuwanderungsgesetz); trans. D.S.

<sup>91</sup> *Die Welt*, 21 December, 2.

<sup>92</sup> Klaus J. Bade, "Wir sind ein Einwanderungsland," *Die Welt*, 14 December, 31.